

Summa Theologiae

Table of Contents: Part 1-2

PROLOGUE TO PART 1-2	1
Question 1: Man's Ultimate End	1
Article 1: Does a man act for the sake of an end?	1
Article 2: Is acting for the sake of an end peculiar to a rational nature?	2
Article 3: Do human acts take their species from their end?	3
Article 4: Is there some ultimate end of a human life, or is there an infinite procession of ends?	5
Article 5: Can one man's will be simultaneously directed to many things as ultimate ends? ...	6
Article 6: Is everything a man wills such that he wills it for the sake of his ultimate end?	7
Article 7: Is there a single ultimate end for all men?.....	8
Article 8: Do all other things share in man's ultimate end?	9
Question 2: The Things That Man's Beatitude Lies In	10
Article 1: Does man's beatitude lie in riches?	10
Article 2: Does man's good lie in honors?	11
Article 3: Does man's beatitude lie in glory or fame?	12
Article 4: Does man's beatitude lie in power?	13
Article 5: Does man's beatitude lie in any bodily good?	14
Article 6: Does man's beatitude lie in delight or pleasure?	15
Article 7: Does man's beatitude lie in a good of the soul?.....	17
Article 8: Does man's beatitude lie in a created good?.....	18
Question 3: What Beatitude Is	20
Article 1: Is beatitude something uncreated?	20
Article 2: Is beatitude an operation [i.e., an action]?	21
Article 3: Does beatitude consist in an operation of the sentient part of the soul or only in an operation of the intellective part??	22
Article 4: Does beatitude consist in an act of the will?	23
Article 5: Does beatitude consist in an operation of the speculative intellective or of the practical intellect?	25
Article 6: Does man's beatitude consist in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences?	26
Article 7: Does man's beatitude consist in the cognition of the separated substances, i.e., the angels?	28
Article 8: Does man's beatitude lie in his seeing God's very essence?	29
Question 4: What is Required for Beatitude	31
Article 1: Is delight required for beatitude?	31
Article 2: Is the act of delighting more central to beatitude than the act of seeing?	32
Article 3: Is comprehending required for beatitude?	33
Article 4: Is rectitude of will required for beatitude?	34
Article 5: Is the body required for beatitude?	35
Article 6: Is the perfection of the body required for beatitude?	37
Article 7: Are exterior goods required for beatitude?	38
Article 8: Are friends necessary for beatitude?.....	39

Question 5: The Attainment of Beatitude	41
Article 1: Can a man acquire beatitude?	41
Article 2: Can one man be more blessed than another?	42
Article 3: Can beatitude be had in this life?	43
Article 4: Can beatitude be lost?	44
Article 5: Is a man able to attain beatitude by his own natural powers?	45
Article 6: Can a man be made blessed through the action of a higher creature, viz., an angel? ..	47
Article 7: Are any human works required in order to obtain beatitude from God?.....	48
Article 8: Does everyone desire beatitude?.....	49
 Question 6: The Voluntary and the Involuntary	51
Article 1: Is voluntariness found in human acts?	51
Article 2: Does voluntariness exist in brute animals?	53
Article 3: Can there be voluntariness in the absence of an act?	54
Article 4: Can violence be done to the will?	55
Article 5: Is violence a cause of involuntariness?	56
Article 6: Is fear a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking?	57
Article 7: Is concupiscence a cause of involuntariness?.....	59
Article 8: Is ignorance a cause of involuntariness?.....	60
 Question 7: The Circumstances of Human Acts	62
Article 1: Is a circumstance an accident of a human act?	62
Article 2: Should the theologian consider the circumstances of human acts?	63
Article 3: Are the circumstances correctly enumerated in Ethics 3?	64
Article 4: Is it the case, as Ethics 3 asserts, that the principal circumstances are <i>why?</i> and the things in which the operation exists?	65
 Question 8: The Objects of the Will	67
Article 1: Is the will directed only toward the good?	67
Article 2: Is will (or willing) directed only toward the end or also toward the means to the end?	68
Article 3: Is it by the very same act that the will is directed both toward the end and toward the means to the end??	70
 Question 9: What Moves the Will	72
Article 1: Is the will moved by the intellect?	72
Article 2: Can the will be moved by the sentient appetite?	73
Article 3: Does the will move itself?	74
Article 4: Is the will moved by anything exterior to it?	75
Article 5: Is the human will moved by any celestial body?	76
Article 6: Is the will moved by God alone as an exterior principle?	77
 Question 10: The Modality with Which the Will is Moved	79
Article 1: Is the will moved naturally toward anything?	79
Article 2: Is the will moved with necessity by its object?	80
Article 3: Is the will moved with necessity by the passions of the lower appetite?	81
Article 4: Is the will moved with necessity by God?	83

Question 11: Enjoying as an Act of the Will	84
Article 1: Does the act of enjoying belong only to an appetitive power?	84
Article 2: Does the act of enjoying belong only to men?	85
Article 3: Is the act of enjoying directed only toward the ultimate end?	86
Article 4: Is the act of enjoying directed only toward an end that is possessed?	87
Question 12: Intending	89
Article 1: Is intending an act of the intellect or an act of the will?	89
Article 2: Is intending directed only toward the ultimate end?	90
Article 3: Can someone intend more than one thing at the same time?	90
Article 4: Is intending an end one and the same movement as intending the means to that end?	92
Article 5: Do brute animals intend an end?	93
Question 13: Choosing	94
Article 1: Is choosing an act of the will or an act of reason?	94
Article 2: Does the act of choosing belong to brute animals?	95
Article 3: Is an act of choosing directed only toward the means to an end?	96
Article 4: Is it only with respect to human acts that there is an act of choosing?	97
Article 5: Is an act of choosing directed only toward what is possible?	98
Article 6: Does a man choose with necessity?	99
Question 14: Deliberating or Taking Counsel, Which Precedes Choosing	101
Article 1: Does deliberating or taking counsel count as inquiry?	101
Article 2: Does deliberating concern the end or just the means to an end?	102
Article 3: Does deliberating or taking counsel concern only things that are done by us?	103
Article 4: Is there deliberating or taking counsel with respect to everything that is done by us?	104
Article 5: Does deliberating proceed by way of analysis?	105
Article 6: Does deliberation's inquiry go on ad infinitum?	105
Question 15: Consenting, Which is an Act of The Will concerning the Means to an End	107
Article 1: Does consenting belong only to the apprehensive part of the soul?	107
Article 2: Does consenting belong to brute animals?	108
Article 3: Does consenting concern the end?	108
Article 4: Does consenting to an act always belong to higher reason?	110
Question 16: Using, Which is an Act of the Will concerning the Means to an End	111
Article 1: Is using an act of the will?	111
Article 2: Does using belong to brute animals?	112
Article 3: Can using concern even the ultimate end?	112
Article 4: Does using precede choosing?	113
Question 17: Acts Commanded by the Will	115
Article 1: Is commanding an act of the will or an act of reason?	115
Article 2: Does commanding belong to brute animals?	116
Article 3: Does using precede commanding?	117
Article 4: Is the commanded act the same act as the very act of commanding?	118
Article 5: Are acts of the will commanded?	119
Article 6: Are acts of reason commanded?	120
Article 7: Are acts of the sentient appetite commanded?	121
Article 8: Are acts of the vegetative soul subject to reason's command?	122
Article 9: Do the members of the body obey reason in their acts?	123

Question 18: The Goodness and Badness of Human Acts in General	125
Article 1: Is every human action good, or are some actions bad?	125
Article 2: Does an action have goodness or badness from its object?	126
Article 3: Does an action have goodness or badness from its circumstances?	127
Article 4: Does a human act have goodness or badness from its end?	128
Article 5: Do moral acts differ in species because of their goodness and badness?	129
Article 6: Do the goodness and badness derived from the end make for diverse species among acts?	130
Article 7: Is the species of goodness derived from the end contained under the species of goodness derived from the object in the way that a species is contained under a genus?	131
Article 8: Is any act indifferent by its species?	133
Article 9: Is any act indifferent as an individual?	134
Article 10: Can a circumstance constitute a species of good or bad act?	135
Article 11: Does every circumstance relevant to goodness and badness give an act its species?	136
Question 19: The Goodness and Badness of the Interior Act of Willing	138
Article 1: Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on its object?	138
Article 2: Does the goodness of an act of willing depend solely on its object?	139
Article 3: Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on reason?	140
Article 4: Does the goodness of a human act of willing depend on the eternal law?	141
Article 5: Is an act of willing bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken?	141
Article 6: Is an act of willing good if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken?	143
Article 7: Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on the act of intending the end?	145
Article 8: Does the quantity or amount of goodness in an act of willing depend on the amount of goodness in the act of intending?	146
Article 9: Does the goodness of a human will or act of willing depend on its being conformed to God's will?	147
Article 10: Should a human act of willing always be conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed?	148
Question 20: The Goodness and Badness of the Exterior Act	151
Article 1: Do goodness and badness exist in the exterior act before they exist in the act of willing?	151
Article 2: Do the entire goodness and badness of exterior acts depend on the act of willing?	152
Article 3: Is the goodness or badness of the interior act of willing the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act?	153
Article 4: Does the exterior act add any goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act?	154
Article 5: Do subsequent events add to an act's goodness or badness?	155
Article 6: Can a single act be both good and bad?	157
Question 21: What Accrues to Human Acts by Reason of their Goodness or Badness	158
Article 1: Does a human act have the character of being upright or deviant insofar as it is good or bad?	158
Article 2: Does a human act have the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy from the fact that it is good or bad?	159
Article 3: Does a human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious because of its goodness or badness?	161
Article 4: Does a good or bad human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in relation to God?	162

Question 22: The Subject of the Passions of the Soul	164
Article 1: Are there passions in the soul?	164
Article 2: Are the passions in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part?	165
Article 3: Are the passions in the sentient appetite more than in the intellective appetite? ..	167
Question 23: The Differences among the Passions	168
Article 1: Do the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers?	168
Article 2: Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad ?	169
Article 3: Does every passion of the soul have a contrary?	171
Article 4: Is it possible for passions that differ in species and are not contrary to one another to exist in the same power?	171
Question 24: Goodness and Badness in the Passions of the Soul	174
Article 1: Is any passion morally good or morally bad?	174
Article 2: Is every passion of the soul morally bad?	175
Article 3: Does a passion always diminish a moral act's goodness?	176
Article 4: Is any passion of the soul morally good or bad by its species?	177
Question 25: The Ordering of the Passions with respect to One Another	179
Article 1: Are the passions of the irascible power prior to the passions of the concupiscible power?	179
Article 2: Is love the first among the passions of the concupiscible power?	180
Article 3: Is hope the first among the passions of the irascible power?	181
Article 4: Are the four principal passions joy and sadness, hope and fear?	183
Question 26: Love	185
Article 1: Does love exist in the concupiscible power?	185
Article 2: Is love a passion?	186
Article 3: Is love (<i>amor</i>) the same as elective love (<i>dilectio</i>)?	187
Article 4: Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence? .	188
Question 27: The Causes of Love	190
Article 1: Is the good the only cause of love?	190
Article 2: Is cognition a cause of love?	191
Article 3: Is likeness a cause of love?	192
Article 4: Can any of the other passions be a cause of love?	193
Question 28: The Effects of Love	194
Article 1: Is union an effect of love?	194
Article 2: Is love a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa?	195
Article 3: Is ecstasy an effect of love?	196
Article 4: Is jealousy an effect of love?	197
Article 5: Is love a harmful passion?	198
Article 6: Does a lover do everything out of love?	200

Question 29: Hatred	201
Article 1: Is the cause and object of hatred the bad ?	201
Article 2: Is love a cause of hatred?	202
Article 3: Is hatred stronger than love?	203
Article 4: Can someone hate himself?	204
Article 5: Can someone hate the truth?	205
Article 6: Can there be hatred of something in general?	206
 Question 30: Concupiscence	208
Article 1: Does concupiscence or sentient desire exist just in the sentient appetite?	208
Article 2: Is concupiscence a specific passion of the concupiscible power?	209
Article 3: Are some instances of concupiscence natural and others non-natural?	210
Article 4: Is concupiscence infinite or unlimited?	211
 Question 31: Pleasure in Itself	213
Article 1: Is pleasure a passion?	213
Article 2: Does pleasure exist in time?	214
Article 3: Is joy altogether the same thing as pleasure?	215
Article 4: Does pleasure exist in the intellective appetite?	216
Article 5: Are corporeal and sensible pleasures greater than intelligible spiritual pleasures? ..	217
Article 6: Are the pleasures associated with touch greater than the pleasures associated with the other senses?	219
Article 7: Are any pleasures non-natural?.....	220
Article 8: Is one pleasure contrary to another?.	221
 Question 32: The Causes of Pleasure	222
Article 1: Is operation a cause of pleasure?	222
Article 2: Is movement a cause of pleasure?	223
Article 3: Are hope and memory causes of pleasure?	224
Article 4: Is sadness a cause of pleasure?	225
Article 5: Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure for us?	226
Article 6: Is doing good for another a cause of pleasure?	227
Article 7: Is likeness a cause of pleasure?.....	228
Article 8: Is wonder a cause of pleasure?.	229
 Question 33: The Effects of Pleasure	231
Article 1: Is being widened an effect of pleasure?	231
Article 2: Is pleasure a cause of a desire for pleasure itself?	232
Article 3: Does pleasure impede the use of reason?	233
Article 4: Does pleasure perfect an operation?	234
 Question 34: The Goodness and Badness of Pleasures	236
Article 1: Is every pleasure bad?	236
Article 2: Is every pleasure good?	237
Article 3: Is any pleasure the best thing?	238
Article 4: Is pleasure the measure or rule of moral goodness and badness?	240

Question 35: Pain or Sadness in Itself	241
Article 1: Is pain a passion of the soul?	241
Article 2: Is sadness or sorrow the same as pain?	242
Article 3: Is sadness or pain contrary to pleasure?	243
Article 4: Is every instance of sadness contrary to every instance of pleasure?	244
Article 5: Is there a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?	245
Article 6: Is sadness to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired?	247
Article 7: Is exterior pain greater than the interior pain of the heart?.....	249
Article 8: Is Damascene's division of sadness into four species correct?.....	250
 Question 36: The Causes of Sadness or Pain	253
Article 1: Is it a lost good that is a cause of pain rather than a conjoined evil?	253
Article 2: Is concupiscence a cause of pain or sadness?	254
Article 3: Is a desire for oneness a cause of pain?	255
Article 4: Should a greater power be posited as a cause of pain?	256
 Question 37: The Effects of Pain or Sadness	258
Article 1: Does pain remove the ability to learn something new?	258
Article 2: Is the mind's being weighed down an effect of sadness?	259
Article 3: Does sadness impede every operation?	260
Article 4: Is it sadness that inflicts the most harm on the body?	261
 Question 38: The Remedies for Pain or Sadness	263
Article 1: Is pain or sadness lessened by every instance of pleasure ?	263
Article 2: Does weeping lessen sadness?	264
Article 3: Does the pain of a compassionate friend lessen sadness?	265
Article 4: Does contemplating the truth lessen pain?	265
Article 5: Do sleeping and bathing lessen sadness?	266
 Question 39: The Goodness and Badness of Sadness or Pain	268
Article 1: Is every instance of sadness bad?	268
Article 2: Does sadness have the character of an upright good?	269
Article 3: Can sadness be a useful good?	270
Article 4: Is sadness the greatest evil?	271
 Question 40: Hope and Despair	273
Article 1: Is hope the same thing as desire or avid desire?	273
Article 2: Does hope belong to the cognitive power?	274
Article 3: Does hope exist in brute animals?	275
Article 4: Is despair contrary to hope?	276
Article 5: Is experience a cause of hope?	277
Article 6: Are youthfulness and inebriation causes of hope?	278
Article 7: Is hope a cause of love?.....	279
Article 8: Does hope facilitate action?.....	279
 Question 41: Fear in Itself	281
Article 1: Is fear a passion of the soul?	281
Article 2: Is fear a specific passion or a generic passion?	282
Article 3: Is there such a thing as natural fear?	283
Article 4: Does Damascene correctly assign the species of fear?	284

Question 42: The Objects of Fear	286
Article 1: Is the object of fear something good or something bad?	286
Article 2: Is there fear of evils of nature?	287
Article 3: Is there fear of evils of sin?	288
Article 4: Can fear be feared?	289
Article 5: Are unfamiliar and sudden things more to be feared?	290
Article 6: Are evils for which there is no remedy more to be feared?	291
 Question 43: The Causes of Fear	292
Article 1: Is love a cause of fear?	292
Article 2: Is weakness a cause of fear?	293
 Question 44: The Effects of Fear	295
Article 1: Does fear make one to be drawn inward?	295
Article 2: Does fear make one deliberative?	296
Article 3: Is quivering an effect of fear?	297
Article 4: Does fear impede an operation?	298
 Question 45: Daring	300
Article 1: Is daring contrary to fear?	300
Article 2: Does daring follow upon hope?	300
Article 3: Is some defect a cause of daring?	302
Article 4: Are those who are daring more eager at the beginning than in the midst of the dangers themselves?	303
 Question 46: Anger in Itself	305
Article 1: Is anger a specific passion?	305
Article 2: Is the object of anger something bad?	306
Article 3: Does anger exist in the concupiscible part of the soul?	307
Article 4: Does anger involve an act of reason?	308
Article 5: Is anger more natural than concupiscence?	309
Article 6: Is anger more grave than hatred?	310
Article 7: Is anger directed only toward individuals with respect to whom there is justice?. .	312
Article 8: Does Damascene correctly enumerate the species of anger?.	313
 Question 47: The Causes of Anger, and its Remedies	315
Article 1: Is it always because of something done to himself that someone gets angry?	315
Article 2: Is disdain or contempt the only moving cause of anger?	316
Article 3: Is an individual's excellence a cause of his getting angry more easily?	317
Article 4: Is an individual's defectiveness a cause of his being such that we more easily get angry with him?	318
 Question 48: The Effects of Anger	320
Article 1: Is anger a cause of pleasure?	320
Article 2: Is fervor an effect especially of anger?	321
Article 3: Does anger impede reason?	322
Article 4: Does anger cause speechlessness?	323

Question 49: The Substance of Habits	325
Article 1: Is a habit a quality?	325
Article 2: Is <i>habit</i> a determinate species of quality?	326
Article 3: Does <i>habit</i> imply an ordering toward an act?	329
Article 4: Is it necessary for there to be habits?	330
Question 50: The Subject of Habits	332
Article 1: Are there any habits in the body?	332
Article 2: Are habits in the soul with respect to its essence rather than with respect to its power?	333
Article 3: Can there be a habit in the powers of the sentient part of the soul?	334
Article 4: Are there any habits in the intellect?	336
Article 5: Are there any habits in the will?	337
Article 6: Are there habits in angels?	338
Question 51: The Causes of Habits	340
Article 1: Are there any habits from nature ?	340
Article 2: Can a habit be caused by an act?	342
Article 3: Can a habit be generated by just a single act?	343
Article 4: Are any habits infused into men by God?	344
Question 52: The Growth of Habits	345
Article 1: Can habits grow?	345
Article 2: Is the growth of a habit effected by addition?	347
Article 3: Does each act make a habit grow?	349
Question 53: The Corruption and Diminution of Habits	351
Article 1: Can a habit be corrupted?	351
Article 2: Can a habit be diminished?	352
Article 3: Is a habit corrupted or diminished just by a cessation from its acts?	354
Question 54: The Distinctions among Habits	356
Article 1: Can there be many habits in a single power?	356
Article 2: Are habits distinguished by their objects?	357
Article 3: Are habits distinguished by <i>good</i> and <i>bad</i> ?	358
Article 4: Is one habit constituted from many habits?	359
Question 55: The Essence of a Virtue	361
Article 1: Is a human virtue a habit?	361
Article 2: Is it part of the concept of a human virtue that it is a habit ordered toward operation?	362
Article 3: Is it part of the concept of a virtue that it is a good habit?	363
Article 4: Is the customary definition of virtue correct?	364
Question 56: The Subject of Virtue	367
Article 1: Does a virtue exist in a power of the soul as in its subject?	367
Article 2: Can a single virtue exist in two powers?	368
Article 3: Is the intellect the subject of any virtue?	368
Article 4: Can the irascible and concupiscible powers be the subject of any virtue?	370
Article 5: Can any virtue exist in the interior sentient apprehensive powers?	372
Article 6: Is the will the subject of any virtue?	373

Question 57: The Distinctions Among the Intellectual Virtues	374
Article 1: Are the speculative intellectual habits virtues?	374
Article 2: Is it appropriate to distinguish three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding?	375
Article 3: Is an art or craft an intellectual virtue?	377
Article 4: Is prudence a virtue distinct from an art?	378
Article 5: Is prudence a virtue that is necessary for living well?	379
Article 6: Are good deliberation (<i>eubilia</i>), and two sorts of good judgment (<i>synesis</i> and <i>gnome</i>) appropriately joined to prudence?	381
Question 58: The Distinction between the Moral Virtues and the Intellectual Virtues	383
Article 1: Is every virtue a moral virtue?	383
Article 2: Is a moral virtue distinguished from an intellectual virtue?	384
Article 3: Is <i>human virtue</i> adequately divided into <i>moral virtue</i> and <i>intellectual virtue</i> ? . . .	385
Article 4: Can moral virtue exist without intellectual virtue?	386
Article 5: Can intellectual virtue exist without moral virtue?	388
Question 59: The Relation of the Moral Virtues to the Passions	390
Article 1: Is a moral virtue a passion?	390
Article 2: Can moral virtue exist along with a passion?	391
Article 3: Can virtue exist along with sadness?	392
Article 4: Does every moral virtue have to do with the passions?	394
Article 5: Can a moral virtue exist without any passion?	394
Question 60: The Distinctions among the Moral Virtues	396
Article 1: Is there just a single moral virtue?	396
Article 2: Are moral virtues distinguished from one another by the fact that some have to do with actions or operations, while others have to do with the passions?	397
Article 3: Is there just a single moral virtue with respect to operations?	398
Article 4: Are there diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions?	399
Article 5: Are the moral virtues distinguished in a way that corresponds to the objects of the passions?	401
Question 61: The Cardinal Virtues	404
Article 1: Is it moral virtues that should be called cardinal, i.e., principal, virtues?	404
Article 2: Are there four cardinal virtues?	405
Article 3: Should any other virtues be called more principal than these?	406
Article 4: Are the four virtues under discussion diverse virtues and distinct from one another?	407
Article 5: Are the four virtues under discussion appropriately classified as exemplary virtues, virtues of a purified mind, purifying virtues, and political virtues?	408
Question 62: The Theological Virtues	411
Article 1: Are there any theological virtues?	411
Article 2: Are the theological virtues distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues?	412
Article 3: Is it appropriate to posit three theological virtues?	413
Article 4: Is the order of the theological virtues such that faith is prior to hope and hope is prior to charity?	414

Question 63: The Cause of Virtue	416
Article 1: Does virtue exist in us by nature?	416
Article 2: Can virtues be caused in us by the habituation of actions?	417
Article 3: Are there other virtues infused in us by God besides the theological virtues?	418
Article 4: Do the infused virtues differ in species from the acquired virtues?	419
 Question 64: The Mean of the Virtues	421
Article 1: Do the moral virtues consist in a mean?	421
Article 2: Is the mean of a moral virtue a mean that belongs to the things or a mean of reason?	422
Article 3: Do the intellectual virtues consist in a mean?	423
Article 4: Does a theological virtue consist in a mean?	424
 Question 64: The Connectedness of the Virtues	426
Article 1: Are the moral virtues necessarily connected with one another?	426
Article 2: Can the moral virtues exist without charity?	428
Article 3: Can charity be had without the other moral virtues?	429
Article 4: Do faith and hope ever exist without charity?	430
Article 5: Can charity exist without faith and hope?	431
 Question 66: The Equality of the Virtues	433
Article 1: Can a virtue be greater or lesser?	433
Article 2: Are all the virtues in one and the same individual equally intense?	434
Article 3: Are the moral virtues preeminent over the intellectual virtues ?	436
Article 4: Is justice the principal moral virtue?	437
Article 5: Is wisdom the greatest of the intellectual virtues?	438
Article 6: Is charity the greatest of the theological virtues?	440
 Question 67: The Duration of the Virtues after this Life	442
Article 1: Do the moral virtues remain after this life?	442
Article 2: Do the intellectual virtues remain after this life?	443
Article 3: Does faith remain after this life?	444
Article 4: Does hope remain after death in the state of glory?	446
Article 5: Does anything of faith or hope remain in the state of glory?	447
Article 6: Does charity remain after this life in the state of glory?	449
 Question 68: The Gifts of the Holy Spirit	450
Article 1: Do the gifts differ from the virtues?	450
Article 2: Are the gifts necessary for human salvation?	452
Article 3: Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit habits?	454
Article 4: Are the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit appropriately enumerated?	455
Article 5: Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit connected ?	456
Article 6: Do the gifts of the Holy Spirit remain in heaven?	457
Article 7: Is the dignity of the gifts preserved by the way they are enumerated in Isaiah 2? .	459
Article 8: Should the virtues take precedence over the gifts?.....	460

Question 69: The Beatitudes	462
Article 1: Do the beatitudes differ from the virtues and the gifts?	462
Article 2: Do the rewards attributed to the beatitudes belong to this life?	463
Article 3: Are the beatitudes appropriately enumerated?	464
Article 4: Are the rewards of the beatitudes appropriately enumerated?	467
 Question 70: The Fruits of the Holy Spirit	469
Article 1: Are the fruits of the Holy Spirit named by the Apostle in Galatians 5 acts?	469
Article 2: Do the fruits of the Holy Spirit differ from the beatitudes?	470
Article 3: Did the Apostle correctly enumerate the fruits in Galatians 5?	471
Article 4: Are the fruits contrary to the works of the flesh enumerated by the Apostle?	473
 Question 71: Vices and Sins in Themselves	475
Article 1: Is vice contrary to virtue?	475
Article 2: Are vices contrary to nature?	476
Article 3: Is a vice, i.e., a bad habit, worse than a sin, i.e., a bad act?	478
Article 4: Can a vicious act, i.e., a sin, exist together with a contrary virtue?	479
Article 5: Does every sin involve an act?	480
Article 6: Is it correct to define a sin as "a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law"?	481
 Question 72: The Distinctions among Sins	484
Article 1: Do sins differ in species according to their objects?	484
Article 2: Is it appropriate to distinguish spiritual sins from carnal sins?	485
Article 3: Are sins distinguished in species according to their causes?	486
Article 4: Is it appropriate to divide sin into sins against God, sins against one's neighbor, and sins against oneself?	488
Article 5: Does the division of sins according to the degree of guilt—as, e.g., when sin is divided into mortal sin and venial sin—make for a diversity of species?	489
Article 6: Do sins of commission differ in species from sins of omission?	490
Article 7: Is it appropriate to divide sins into sins of the heart, sins of the mouth, and sinful deeds?	492
Article 8: Do excess and defect make for diverse species of sin?	493
Article 9: Are vices and sins diversified in species by diverse circumstances?	494
 Question 73: The Relation of Sins to One Another	496
Article 1: Are all sins connected?	496
Article 2: Are all sins equal?	497
Article 3: Does the gravity of sins vary according to their objects?	499
Article 4: Does the gravity of sins differ according to the dignity of the virtues to which the sins are opposed, in the sense that a graver sin is opposed to a greater virtue?	500
Article 5: Are carnal sins lesser faults than spiritual sins?	501
Article 6: Does the gravity of a sin have to do with the cause of the sin?	502
Article 7: Do the circumstances aggravate a sin?	503
Article 8: Is a sin's gravity increased by its doing greater harm?	504
Article 9: Is a sin aggravated by the status of the person who is sinned against?	506
Article 10: Does the greatness of the person who commits a sin aggravate the sin?	507

Question 74: The Subject of Sins	509
Article 1: Can the will be the subject of sin?	509
Article 2: Is the will alone a subject of sin?	510
Article 3: Can sin exist in the sentient appetite?	511
Article 4: Can a mortal sin exist in the sentient appetite?	512
Article 5: Can sin exist in reason?	513
Article 6: Does the sin of lingering pleasure exist in reason?	514
Article 7: Does the sin of consenting to an act exist in higher reason?.....	514
Article 8: Is the act of consenting to the pleasure a mortal sin?.	516
Article 9: Can there be a venial sin in higher reason insofar as it directs the lower powers?..	518
Article 10: Can a venial sin exist in higher reason with respect to itself, i.e., insofar as it examines the eternal conceptions ?.....	519
 Question 75: The Causes of Sin in General	 521
Article 1: Does sin have a cause?	521
Article 2: Does sin have an interior cause?	522
Article 3: Does sin have an exterior cause?	523
Article 4: Is sin a cause of sin?	524
 Question 76: Ignorance as a Cause of Sin	 526
Article 1: Can ignorance be a cause of sin?	526
Article 2: Is ignorance a sin?	527
Article 3: Does ignorance excuse one totally from sin?	528
Article 4: Does ignorance diminish a sin?	530
 Question 77: The Sentient Appetite as a Cause of Sin	 532
Article 1: Is the will moved by a passion of the sentient appetite?	532
Article 2: Can reason be overcome by a passion against its own knowledge?	533
Article 3: Should a sin of passion be called a sin of weakness?	535
Article 4: Is love of self a source of every sin?	536
Article 5: Are ‘concupiscence of the flesh’, ‘concupiscence of the eyes’, and ‘pride of life’ appropriately posited as causes of sins?	537
Article 6: Is a sin lessened by passion?	539
Article 7: Does passion totally excuse one from sin?	540
Article 8: Can a sin of passion be mortal?.....	541
 Question 78: Malice as a Cause of Sin	 543
Article 1: Does anyone sin purposefully or from fixed malice?	543
Article 2: Does everyone who sins from a habit sin from fixed malice?	544
Article 3: Does everyone who sins from fixed malice sin from a habit?	545
Article 4: Does one who sins from fixed malice sin more gravely than one who sins from passion?	547
 Question 79: God as a Cause of Sin	 549
Article 1: Is God a cause of sin?	549
Article 2: Is the act of sinning from God?	550
Article 3: Is God a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?	551
Article 4: Are spiritual blindness and hardness of heart always ordered toward the salvation of the one who is blinded or whose heart is hardened?	552

Question 80: The Devil as a Cause of Sin	554
Article 1: Is the devil a direct cause of a man's sinning?	554
Article 2: Can the devil induce a man to sin by instigating him interiorly?	555
Article 3: Can the devil impose a necessity for sinning?	556
Article 4: Do all of men's sins come at the devil's suggestion?	557
 Question 81: Man as a Cause of Sin: The Transmission of Original Sin	559
Article 1: Is the first sin of the first parent transmitted to the others by way of origin?	559
Article 2: Are other sins of the first parent himself or of close ancestors likewise transmitted to their descendants?	561
Article 3: Does the sin of the first parent pass by way of origin to all men?	562
Article 4: Would someone who was miraculously formed out of human flesh contract original sin?	563
Article 5: If Adam had not sinned after Eve sinned, would their children have contracted original sin?	564
 Question 82: The Essence of Original Sin	566
Article 1: Is original sin a habit?	566
Article 2: Are there many original sins in a single man?	567
Article 3: Is original sin concupiscence or disordered desire?	568
Article 4: Does original sin exist equally in everyone?	569
 Question 83: The Subject of Original Sin	571
Article 1: Does original sin exist more in the flesh than in the soul?	571
Article 2: Does original sin exist in the soul's essence prior to existing in its powers?	572
Article 3: Does original sin infect the will prior to infecting the other powers?	573
Article 4: Are the powers mentioned in the introduction, [viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch], more infected than the other powers? ..	574
 Question 84: One Sin as a Cause of Another Sin	576
Article 1: Is avid desire or covetousness the root of all sins?	576
Article 2: Is pride the beginning of every sin?	577
Article 3: Besides pride and avarice, are there any other sins that might be called capital sins?	578
Article 4: Should one claim that there are seven capital vices, viz., vainglory, envy, anger, sadness, avarice, gluttony, and lust?	579
 Question 85: The Corruption of the Good of the Nature as an Effect of Sin	582
Article 1: Does sin diminish the good of the nature?	582
Article 2: Can the whole of the good of human nature be destroyed by sin?	583
Article 3: Is it appropriate to claim that there are wounds of the nature that follow from sin, viz., weakness, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence?	585
Article 4: Is the privation of mode, species, and order an effect of sin?	586
Article 5: Are death and other bodily defects the effects of sin?	587
Article 6: Are death and other bodily defects natural to man?	588
 Question 86: The Stain of Sin as an Effect of Sin	590
Article 1: Does sin cause a stain in the soul?	590
Article 2: Does the stain remain in the soul after the sinful act?	591

Question 87: Being Deserving of Punishment as an Effect of Sin	592
Article 1: Is it an effect of sin to be deserving of punishment?	592
Article 2: Can a sin be the punishment for a sin?	593
Article 3: Does any sin make one deserving of an eternal punishment?	594
Article 4: Should the punishment for sin be infinite with respect to quantity?	595
Article 5: Does every sin make one deserving of an eternal punishment?	596
Article 6: Does one's being deserving of punishment remain after the sin?	597
Article 7: Is every punishment because of some sin?	599
Article 8: Is anyone punished for someone else's sin?	600
 Question 88: Mortal Sin and Venial Sin	602
Article 1: Is it appropriate for venial sin to be divided off against mortal sin?	602
Article 2: Do venial sin and mortal sin differ in genus in the sense that some sins are mortal by their genus and some sins are venial by their genus?	603
Article 3: Is a venial sin a disposition toward a mortal sin?	605
Article 4: Can a venial sin become a mortal sin?	606
Article 5: Can some circumstance surrounding a venial sin make it a mortal sin?	607
Article 6: Can a mortal sin become a venial sin?	609
 Question 89: Venial Sin in its own Right	611
Article 1: Does a venial sin cause a stain in the soul?	611
Article 2: Are venial sins appropriately designated as "wood, hay, and straw"?	612
Article 3: Was man in the state of innocence able to commit a venial sin?	613
Article 4: Can a good angel or bad angel commit a venial sin?	615
Article 5: Are the first movements of the sentient appetite in non-believers mortal sins? ...	616
Article 6: Can venial sin exist in someone who has original sin alone?	617
 Question 90: The Essence of Law	619
Article 1: Is law something that belongs to reason?	619
Article 2: Is law always ordered toward the common good as its end?	620
Article 3: Whose reason is it that makes law?	621
Article 4: Is promulgation part of the nature of law?	622
 Question 91: The Different Kinds of Law	624
Article 1: Is there such a thing as eternal law?	624
Article 2: Is there any such thing as natural law in us?	625
Article 3: Is there any such thing as human law?	626
Article 4: Was it necessary for there to be such a thing as divine law?	627
Article 5: Is there just a single divine law?	628
Article 6: Is there such a thing as a 'law of the stimulant [to sin]'?	630
 Question 92: The Effects of Law	632
Article 1: Is it the role of law to make men good?	632
Article 2: Are the acts of law correctly enumerated when one says that the acts of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish?	633

Question 93: The Eternal Law	635
Article 1: Is the eternal law the highest conception or plan existing in God?	635
Article 2: Is the eternal law known to everyone?	636
Article 3: Does every law stem from the eternal law?	637
Article 4: Are necessary and eternal things subject to the eternal law?	638
Article 5: Are natural contingent things subject to the eternal law?	639
Article 6: Are all human affairs subject to the eternal law?	641
Question 94: The Natural Law.	643
Article 1: Is the natural law a habit?	643
Article 2: Does the natural law contain many precepts or just one precept?	644
Article 3: Do all the acts of the virtues belong to the law of nature?	645
Article 4: Is there a single law of nature for everyone?	646
Article 5: Can the law of nature be changed?	648
Article 6: Can the natural law be wiped out of a man's heart?	650
Question 95: Human Law	651
Article 1: Was it useful for laws to be made by men?	651
Article 2: Does every humanly made law stem from the natural law?	652
Article 3: Does Isidore appropriately describe the characteristics of positive law?	653
Article 4: Is Isidore's division of human laws appropriate?	655
Question 96: The Force of Human Law	657
Article 1: Should human law be made in a general way or for particular cases instead?	657
Article 2: Should human law suppress all vices?	658
Article 3: Does human law command the acts of all the virtues?	659
Article 4: Does human law impose an obligation in conscience on a man?	660
Article 5: Is everyone subject to human law?	661
Article 6: Is one who is subject to the law permitted to act outside the letter of the law?	663
Question 97: Changes in Human Law	665
Article 1: Should human law in any way be changed?	665
Article 2: Should human law always be changed when something better comes along?	666
Article 3: Can custom acquire the force of law or nullify a law?	667
Article 4: Can the rulers of the people give dispensations from human laws?	668
Question 98: The Old Law	670
Article 1: Was the Old Law good?	670
Article 2: Was the Old Law from God?	671
Article 3: Was the Old Law given through the mediation of angels or was it given directly by God?	673
Article 4: Was it fitting for the Old Law to have been given only to the Jewish people?	674
Article 5: Were all men obliged to observe the Old Law?	675
Article 6: Was it appropriate for the Old Law to have been given at the time of Moses?	677

Question 99: The Precepts of the Old Law	679
Article 1: Does the Old Law contain just one precept ?	679
Article 2: Does the Old Law contain moral precepts?	680
Article 3: Does the Old Law contain ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts?.....	681
Article 4: Does the Old Law contain judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts?	682
Article 5: Are there any precepts contained in the Old Law in addition to the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts?	683
Article 6: Was it right for the Old Law to have induced the observance of its precepts by temporal promises and threats?	685
 Question 100: The Moral Precepts of the Old Law	687
Article 1: Do all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?	687
Article 2: Do the moral precepts of the Law have to do with all the acts of the virtues?	688
Article 3: Are all the moral precepts of the Old Law traced back to the ten precepts of the Decalogue?	689
Article 4: Are the precepts of the Decalogue correctly distinguished from one another?	691
Article 5: Is there an appropriate number of precepts in the Decalogue?	692
Article 6: Are the precepts of the Decalogue correctly ordered?	695
Article 7: Are the precepts of the Decalogue set down in an appropriate way?	697
Article 8: Can dispensations be granted from the precepts of the Decalogue?	699
Article 9: Does the mode of virtue fall under a precept of the Law?	700
Article 10: Does the mode of charity fall under a precept of divine law?	702
Article 11: Is it correct to mark out moral precepts of the Law in addition to the Decalogue?.	703
Article 12: Did the moral precepts of the Old Law give justification [before God]?	705
 Question 101: The Ceremonial Precepts of the Old Law in Themselves	708
Article 1: Does the reason for the ceremonial precepts lie in their having to do with the worship of God?	708
Article 2: Are the ceremonial precepts figurative	709
Article 3: Was it right for there to be a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts?	711
Article 4: Are the ceremonies of the Old Law correctly divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?	712
 Question 102: The Causes of the Ceremonial Precepts	715
Article 1: Are there reasons for the ceremonial precepts?	715
Article 2: Do the ceremonial precepts have literal reasons or only figurative reasons?	716
Article 3: Can appropriate reasons be assigned for the ceremonies that involve sacrifices? ..	717
Article 4: Can appropriate reasons be assigned for the ceremonies that involve the sacred things?	723
Article 5: Can appropriate reasons be assigned for the sacraments of the Old Law?	731
Article 6: Are there reasoned causes for the ceremonial observances?	742

Question 103: The Duration of the Ceremonial Precepts	749
Article 1: Did the ceremonies of the Law exist before the Law existed?	749
Article 2: Did the ceremonies of the Old Law have the power to confer justification at the time of the Law?	750
Article 3: Did the ceremonies of the Old Law cease with the coming of Christ?	752
Article 4: Can the ceremonial precepts be observed without mortal sin after Christ's passion?	754
Question 104: The Judicial Precepts of the Old Law	757
Article 1: Does the nature of the judicial precepts consist in their directing a man in his relations with his neighbor?	757
Article 2: Are the judicial precepts figures of anything?	758
Article 3: Do the judicial precepts of the Old Law have perpetual binding force?	759
Article 4: Can the judicial precepts be divided into set kinds?	760
Question 105: The Reasons for the Judicial Precepts	762
Article 1: Did the Old Law give appropriate direction concerning the rulers?	762
Article 2: Were appropriate judicial precepts given with respect to the common life of the people?	764
Article 3: Were appropriate judicial precepts given with respect to outsiders?	772
Article 4: Did the Old Law issue appropriate precepts with respect to household members?	775
Question 106: The Law of the Gospel, called the New Law, in Itself	779
Article 1: Is the New Law a written law?	779
Article 2: Does the New Law confer justification?	780
Article 3: Should the New Law have been given from the beginning?	781
Article 4: Will the New Law last until the end of the world?	782
Question 107: The Relation between the Old Law and the New Law	785
Article 1: Is the New Law different from the Old Law?	785
Article 2: Does the New Law bring the Old Law to fulfillment?	787
Article 3: Is the New Law contained within the Old Law?	789
Article 4: Is the New Law more burdensome than the Old Law?	790
Question 108: The Contents of the New Law	793
Article 1: Should the New Law command or prohibit any exterior acts?	793
Article 2: Does the New Law give adequate direction to exterior acts?	794
Article 3: Does the New Law give man adequate direction with respect to interior acts?	797
Article 4: Is it appropriate for certain determinate counsels to be proposed in the New Law?	800

Question 109: The Necessity for Grace	802
Article 1: Can a man have cognition of any truth without grace?	802
Article 2: Is a man able to will and do good without grace?	803
Article 3: Can a man love God above all things by just his natural power and without grace?	805
Article 4: Can a man without grace fulfill the precepts of the Law by his own natural power?	806
Article 5: Can a man merit eternal life without grace?	807
Article 6: Can a man prepare himself for grace on his own without the exterior assistance of grace?	808
Article 7: Can a man rise up from sin without the assistance of grace?	809
Article 8: Is a man without grace able not to sin?	811
Article 9: Is someone who has already received grace able on his own to do good and avoid evil without any further assistance of grace?	812
Article 10: Does a man in the state of grace need the assistance of grace in order to persevere?	814
 Question 110: The Essence of God's Grace	816
Article 1: Is grace an entity of some sort in the soul?	816
Article 2: Is grace a quality of the soul?	817
Article 3: Is grace the same as a virtue?	819
Article 4: Is it the essence of the soul that is the subject of grace?	820
 Question 111: The Divisions of Grace	822
Article 1: Is grace appropriately divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitously given grace?	822
Article 2: Is grace appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace?	823
Article 3: Is grace appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace?	825
Article 4: Does the Apostle appropriately distinguish the kinds of gratuitously given grace?	826
Article 5: Is gratuitously given grace superior to sanctifying grace?	828
 Question 112: The Cause of Grace	829
Article 1: Is God alone a cause of grace?	829
Article 2: Is any preparation or disposition for grace required on the part of a man?	830
Article 3: Must grace necessarily be given to someone who prepares himself for grace or who does what is within his power?	831
Article 4: Is grace greater in one man than in another?	832
Article 5: Can a man know that he has grace?	833

Question 113: The Effects of Grace	835
Article 1: Is the justification of a sinner the forgiveness of sins?	835
Article 2: Is an inpouring of grace required for that forgiveness of sin which is the justification of a sinner?	836
Article 3: Is a movement of free choice required for the justification of a sinner?	837
Article 4: Is a movement of faith required for the justification of a sinner?	838
Article 5: Is a movement of free choice with respect to sin required for the justification of a sinner?	840
Article 6: Should the forgiveness of sins be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner?	841
Article 7: Does the justification of a sinner occur instantaneously or successively?.	842
Article 8: Is the inpouring of grace first in the natural ordering of the things required for the justification of a sinner?.	844
Article 9: Is the justification of a sinner God's greatest work?.....	845
Article 10: Is the justification of a sinner a miraculous work?.	847
 Question 114: Merit	849
Article 1: Can a man merit anything from God?	849
Article 2: Can someone merit eternal life without grace?	850
Article 3: Can a man who is in the state of grace merit eternal life by his own worthiness?	851
Article 4: Is grace the principle of merit mainly through charity rather than through the other virtues?	852
Article 5: Can a man merit first grace for himself?	853
Article 6: Can one man merit first grace for another man?	854
Article 7: Can someone merit restoration for himself after a fall?.	855
Article 8: Can a man merit an increase of grace or charity?.....	856
Article 9: Can someone merit [final] perseverance?.....	857
Article 10: Do temporal goods fall under merit?.....	858

PROLOGUE TO PART 1-2

Since, as Damascene puts it, man is said to be made to the image of God insofar as ‘image’ signifies “what is intellectual and free in choosing and has power in its own right (*intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum*),” now that we have talked about the exemplar, viz., God (*ST* 1, questions 1-43), and about the things that proceed from God’s power in accord with His will (*ST* 1, questions 44-119), it remains for us to consider His image, i.e., man, insofar as he himself is a principle of his own works in the sense of having free choice and power with respect to those works.

QUESTION 1

Man’s Ultimate End

Here we must consider first the ultimate end of human life (questions 1-5) and then the things through which man is able to arrive at that end or to deviate from it (questions 6-114); for it is on the basis of the end that one must ascertain the character of what is ordered toward that end. And since the ultimate end of human life is beatitude, it is necessary first to consider the ultimate end in general (question 1) and then to consider beatitude (questions 2-5).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Does a man act for the sake of an end? (2) Is this peculiar to a rational nature? (3) Do a man’s actions take their species from the end? (4) Is there an ultimate end of human life? (5) Can one man have many ultimate ends? (6) Does a man order everything to his ultimate end? (7) Is the ultimate end the same for all men? (8) Do all other creatures share in that ultimate end?

Article 1

Does a man act for the sake of an end?

It seems that a man does not act for the sake of an end (*propter finem*):

Objection 1: A cause is something that is naturally prior. But an end has the character of what is last (*rationem ultimi*), as the name ‘end’ itself suggests. Therefore, an end does not have the character of a cause. But what a man acts because of (*propter illud*) is such that it is a cause of his action, since the preposition ‘because of’ (*propter*) designates a relation to a cause. Therefore, a man does not act for the sake of an end (*propter finem*).

Objection 2: That which is an ultimate end is not itself for the sake of an end. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, in some cases actions are the ultimate end. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does all his actions (*omnia agit*) for the sake of an end.

Objection 3: It is when a man deliberates that he seems to be acting for the sake of an end. But there are many things a man does without deliberation; in fact, in some cases he does not think about them at all, as when he moves his hand or foot or strokes his beard while thinking intently about something else. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does all his actions for the sake of an end.

But contrary to this: Everything that is in a genus flows from the principle of that genus. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 2, the end is the principle in actions done by a man (*in operabilibus a homine*). Therefore, a man does all his actions for the sake of an end.

I respond: Among the actions done by a man, the only ones that are properly called *human actions* (*actiones humanae*) are those that belong to a man insofar as he is a man. Now man differs from the non-rational animals in that he is the master of his own acts (*suorum actorum dominus*). Hence, the only actions that are properly called human actions are those that a man is the master of. But a man is the master of his acts through his reason and will; this is why free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) is called a power (*facultas*) of the will and of reason. Therefore, the actions that are properly called human actions

are those that proceed from a deliberate act of willing (*ex voluntate deliberata*). By contrast, if there are other actions that belong to a man, then they can be called the *acts of a man* (*hominis actiones*) but not properly human acts, since they do not belong to the man insofar as he is a man.

Now it is clear that all the actions that proceed from a given power are caused by it in accord with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Hence, all human actions must be for the sake of an end.

Reply to objection 1: Even if the end is the last thing to be executed (*sit postremus in executione*), it is the first thing to be intended by the agent (*primus in intentione agentis*).

Reply to objection 2: If any human action is itself an ultimate end, then it must be voluntary; otherwise, as has been explained, it would not be a human action.

Now there are two senses in which an action is said to be voluntary: first, because it is *commanded* by the will, e.g. to walk or to speak; second, because it is *elicited* by the will, e.g., the act of willing itself. It is impossible that an act elicited by the will should be an ultimate end. For the end is an object of an act of willing (*obiectum voluntatis*), in the same way that color is an object of an act of seeing. Hence, just as the first thing to be seen (*primum visibile*) cannot be the very act of seeing, since every act of seeing is an act of seeing some visible object, so too the first thing to be desired (*primum appetibile*), which is the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Hence, it follows that if any human action is an ultimate end, then that action must be *commanded* by the will; and so in that case there is some action of the man's, at least the very act of willing, that is for the sake of an end. Therefore, whatever a man does, it is true to say that the man acts for the sake of an end, even when he does an action that is an ultimate end.

Reply to objection 3: Actions of the sort in question are not properly human actions, since they do not proceed from the deliberation of reason, which is the proper principle of human acts. And so these actions have, as it were, a sort of imagined end (*finem imaginatum*), but not an end predetermined by reason.

Article 2

Is acting for the sake of an end peculiar to a rational nature?

It seems that acting for the sake of an end is peculiar to a rational nature (*proprium rationalis naturae*):

Objection 1: Man, who acts for the sake of an end, never acts for the sake of an end that is unknown. But there are many things that have no cognition of an end—either because they lack cognition altogether, as in the case of non-sentient creatures, or because they do not apprehend the concept of an end, as in the case of brute animals. Therefore, acting for the sake of an end seems peculiar to a rational nature.

Objection 2: To act for the sake of an end is to order one's action toward that end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore, it does not belong to things that lack reason.

Objection 3: The good and the end are the object of the will. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the will exists in reason. Therefore, to act for the sake of an end belongs only to a rational nature.

But contrary to this: In *Physics* 2 the Philosopher proves that not only an intellect, but nature as well, acts for the sake of an end.

I respond: It must be the case that all agents act for the sake of an end. For if, among causes that are ordered to one another, the first is taken away, then the others must be taken away. But the first among all causes is the final cause. The reason for this is that matter attains a form only insofar as it is moved by an agent, since nothing brings itself from potentiality into actuality; but an agent effects

movement only because of its tendency toward an end (*non nisi ex intentione finis*). For if an agent were not fixed on some effect, then it would not do *this* rather than *that*. Therefore, in order for it to produce a determinate effect, it must be fixed on something specific (*determinetur ad aliquid certum*) that has the character of an end. Now just as this specification, when it occurs in a rational nature through a *rational appetite* (*per rationalem appetitum*), is called a *willing* (*voluntas*), so when it occurs in other things through a *natural inclination* (*per inclinationem naturalem*), it is called a *natural appetite* (*appetitus naturalis*).

However, notice that there are two ways in which something tends toward an end in its action or movement: (a) insofar as it *moves itself* toward the end, as a man does, and (b) insofar as it *is moved by something else* toward its end, in the way that an arrow tends toward a determinate target (*ad determinatum finem*) because it is moved by the archer, who directs its action toward the target. Thus, things that have reason move themselves toward an end, since they have dominion over their own acts through free choice, which is a power of will and reason (*facultas voluntatis et rationis*). By contrast, things that lack reason tend toward their end through a natural inclination, as if moved by something else and not by themselves; for they have no cognition of the concept of an end and so cannot order anything toward an end, but are instead ordered toward an end only by something else. For, as was explained above (*ST* 1, q. 103, a. 1), the totality of non-rational nature is related to God as an instrument is related to its principal agent.

And so (a) it is peculiar to a rational nature that it should tend toward an end in the sense of impelling or leading itself toward that end, whereas (b) it is proper to a non-rational nature that it should tend toward an end in the sense of being impelled or being led by something else—either toward an apprehended end, as in the case of brute animals, or toward a non-apprehended end, as in the case of those things that lack cognition altogether.

Reply to objection 1: When a man acts on his own (*per seipsum*) for the sake of an end, he has cognition of that end. However, when he is impelled or led by someone else—for instance, when he acts at someone else's command, or when he is moved by something else that impels him—he need not have cognition of the end. And this is the way it is with non-rational creatures.

Reply to objection 2: To order something toward an end belongs to one who impels himself toward that end. But what belongs to a thing that is impelled by something else toward an end is *to be ordered* toward that end; this is the condition that can belong to a non-rational nature, as long as it is ordered by something that has reason.

Reply to objection 3: The will's object is the good and the end *in general* (*finis et bonum in communi*). Hence, things that lack reason and understanding cannot have a will, since they cannot apprehend a universal; instead, what exists in them is either a natural appetite or a sentient appetite that is fixed upon some particular good.

However, it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause, in the way that the ruler of a city, who intends the common good, effects by his commands all the particular functions within the city. And so everything that lacks reason must be moved toward particular ends by a rational will that stretches out toward the universal good (*se extendit in bonum universale*); and this is God's will.

Article 3

Do human acts take their species from their end?

It seems that human acts do not take their species from their end:

Objection 1: The end is an extrinsic cause. But each thing has its species from an intrinsic principle. Therefore, human acts do not take their species from their end.

Objection 2: That which confers the species must be prior. But the end is posterior in being. Therefore, human acts do not have their species from their end.

Objection 3: One and the same thing can exist only within a single species. But it is possible for numerically the same act to be ordered toward diverse ends. Therefore, the end does not confer the species on human acts.

But contrary to this: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae et Manichaeorum* Augustine says, “Our works are blameworthy or praiseworthy insofar as their ends are blameworthy or praiseworthy.”

I respond: Each thing receives its species in accord with its actuality and not its potentiality. Hence, things composed of form and matter are constituted in their species by their proper forms.

We have to think like this in the case of proper movements, too (*etiam in motibus propriis*). For given that a movement is in some sense divided into an instance of *acting* and an instance of *being acted upon* (*distinguitur per actionem et passionem*), both of these receive their species from an actuality (*ab actu*). The instance of *acting* receives its species from the actuality that is the *principle* of acting, while the instance of *being acted upon* receives its species from the actuality that is the *terminus* of the movement. Hence, the instance of *acting* involved in the giving of warmth (*actio calefactio*) is nothing other than a certain movement that proceeds *from* heat, whereas the instance of *being acted upon* involved in the giving of warmth (*calefactio passio*) is nothing other than a movement *toward* heat—where the definitions make clear the nature of the species.

Now human acts take their species from their end in both of these ways, i.e., regardless of whether they are thought of as instances of *acting* or as instances of *being acted upon*. For human acts can indeed be thought of in both of these ways, because a man both moves himself and is moved by himself. Moreover, it was explained above (a. 1) that acts are called human acts insofar as they proceed from a deliberate act of willing (*a voluntate deliberata*). Now the object of an act of willing is the good and the end, and so it is clear that the *principle* of human acts, insofar as they are human acts, is their end. Likewise, the *terminus* of human acts is their end. For what a human act terminates in is what the will intended as an end—just as, among natural agents, the form of what is generated matches (*est conformis*) the form of what generates it. And since, as Ambrose says in *Super Lucam*, “Morals are properly called human,” moral acts properly take their species from the end. For *moral acts* are the same as *human acts*.

Reply to objection 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, since it is related to the act as either its principle or its terminus, and it is of the very nature of an act that (a) it is *from* something insofar as it involves an instance of *acting* and that (b) it is *toward* something, insofar as it involves an instance of *being acted upon* (*quantum ad passionem*).

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1), insofar as the end pertains to the act of willing, it is prior in intention. And it is in this way that it gives a human or moral act its species.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as numerically the same act proceeds from an agent at any one time, it is ordered only toward a single *proximate* end, from which it has its species, even though it can be ordered toward a plurality of *remote* ends, one of which is the end of another.

However, it is possible for an act that is one as regards its natural species (*species naturae*) to be ordered toward diverse ends of the will. For instance, *killing a man*, which has a single *natural* species, can be ordered toward conserving justice as an end or toward satisfying anger as an end. Accordingly, the acts will be diverse as regards their *moral* species, since in the one case there will be an act of virtue and in the other an act of vice. For a movement takes its species only from what is a *per se* terminus (*terminus per se*) and not from what is an incidental terminus (*terminus per accidens*). But moral ends are incidental to a natural entity and, conversely, the natural character of an end is incidental to a moral entity. And so nothing prevents acts that are the same as regards their natural species from being diverse as regards their moral species, and vice versa.

Article 4

Is there some ultimate end of a human life, or is there an infinite procession of ends?

It seems that there is no ultimate end of a human life, but instead an infinite procession of ends:

Objection 1: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is by its nature diffusive of itself. Therefore, if what proceeds from the good is itself likewise good, then that good must issue in another good, and so the procession of the good goes on to infinity. But the good has the character of an end. Therefore, there is an infinite procession among ends.

Objection 2: What belongs to reason can be multiplied to infinity; this is why mathematical quantities can be increased to infinity. There are likewise infinitely many species of number, because given any number, reason can think of another greater number. But the desire for an end follows reason's apprehension. Therefore, it seems that one may likewise proceed to infinity in the case of ends.

Objection 3: The good and the end are the object of the will. But the will can reflect upon itself infinitely many times; for I can will something, and will that I will that thing, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, there is an infinite procession among the ends of a human will, and there is no ultimate end of a human will.

But contrary to this: In *Metaphysics* 2 the Philosopher says, "Those who maintain an infinity undermine the nature of the good." But the good is what has the nature of an end. Therefore, it is contrary to the nature of an end that there should be an infinite procession. Therefore, one must posit an ultimate end (*unum ultimum finem*).

I respond: Speaking *per se*, in the case of ends it is impossible to proceed to infinity from any perspective at all. For in all things that have a *per se* ordering with respect to one another, if the first is removed, then anything that is ordered toward the first must be removed. Hence, in *Physics* 8 the Philosopher proves that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of moving causes, since otherwise there would not be a first mover, where a first mover is such that if it is removed, then the others cannot effect movement, since they effect movement only by being moved by the first mover.

Now there is a twofold ordering among ends, viz., the order of *intending* (*ordo intentionis*) and the order of *executing* (*ordo executionis*), and in each of these orderings something must be first. What is first in the order of intending is, as it were, the principle that *moves the appetite*, and so if this principle were removed, then the appetite would not be moved by anything. On the other hand, what is first in the order of executing is that with which the *operation* begins, and so if this principle were removed, then no one would begin to do anything.

Now the principle with respect to intending is the ultimate end, whereas the principle with respect to executing is the first of the means that are ordered toward that end (*primum eorum quae sunt ad finem*). So it is impossible to proceed to infinity in either case. For if there were no ultimate end, then nothing would be desired, no action would be terminated, and no intention of the agent's would be put to rest; and if nothing were first among the means ordered to an end, then no one would begin to do anything, and deliberation would proceed to infinity and never come to an end.

By contrast, there is nothing to prevent an infinity among things that do not have a *per se* ordering but are instead joined to one another incidentally (*coniunguntur per accidens*). For *per accidens* causes are indeterminate. And so in this way there can likewise be an infinity incidentally among ends and among means to an end (*infinitatem per accidens in finibus et in his quae sunt ad finem*).

Reply to objection 1: It is part of the nature of the good that something should flow from it, but not that it itself should proceed from something else. And so since the good has the nature of an end, and since the First Good is the ultimate end, the argument does not prove that there is no ultimate end, but instead proves that from a presupposed First End one may descend (*procedatur inferius*) to an infinity with respect to the means to that end.

And, indeed, this would hold if we were thinking just about the First Good's power, which is infinite. However, since the First Good has a diffusion that follows a plan (*habet diffusionem secundum intellectum*) according to which the good flows forth in a determinate way (*secundum aliquam certam formam*) into the things it causes, the outflow of goods from the First Good has a fixed mode in accord with which all the other goods participate in the diffusive power. And so the diffusion of goods does not proceed to infinity, but instead, as Wisdom 11:21 puts it, God disposed all things "in number, weight, and measure."

Reply to objection 2: Among those things that are *per se*, reason begins with naturally known principles and proceeds to some conclusion (*ad aliquem terminum*). Hence, in *Posterior Analytics* 1 the Philosopher proves that there is no infinite regress among demonstrations by appeal to the fact that among demonstrations there is an ordering of things that are connected to one another *per se* and not *per accidens*.

However, among things that are connected *per accidens*, nothing prevents reason from proceeding to infinity. For it is possible to add a quantity (or a unit) to some preexistent quantity (or number) as such. Hence, in cases of this sort nothing prevents reason from proceeding to infinity.

Reply to objection 3: The multiplication of acts of the will as it reflects upon itself is related *per accidens* to the ordering of the ends. This is clear from the fact that it is with respect to one and the same end that the will reflects upon itself one or more times indifferently.

Article 5

Can one man's will be simultaneously directed to many things as ultimate ends?

It seems that one man's will can be simultaneously directed to many things as ultimate ends:

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says that some have proposed four things as man's ultimate end, viz., "pleasure (*voluptas*), tranquility (*quies*), primary natural blessings (*prima naturae*), and virtue (*virtus*).” But these four are manifestly more than a single thing. Therefore, one man can set up the ultimate end of his will in many things.

Objection 2: Things that are not opposed to one another do not exclude one another. But there are many things in the world (*multa in rebus*) that are not opposed to one another. Therefore, if one thing is posited as an ultimate end, then other things are not thereby excluded.

Objection 3: The will does not lose its power of freedom when it sets up something as its ultimate end. But before it set up one thing, e.g., pleasure, as its ultimate end, it was able to set up something else, e.g., riches, as its ultimate end. Therefore, even after someone has set up pleasure as an ultimate end of his will, he can simultaneously set up wealth as an ultimate end. Therefore, it is possible for a man's will to be simultaneously directed toward diverse things as ultimate ends.

But contrary to this: A man's affections are dominated (*dominatur*) by what he reposes in as an ultimate end; for it is from this end that he derives the rules for his whole life. Hence, Philippians 3:19 says of the gluttonous, "Their god is their belly," viz., because they set up the delights of their belly as their ultimate end. But as Matthew 6:24 says, "No one can serve two masters (*duobus dominis*)," i.e., two masters that are not ordered toward one another. Therefore, it is impossible for one man to have many ultimate ends that are not ordered toward one another.

I respond: One man's will cannot be simultaneously related to diverse things as ultimate ends. There are three possible ways to argue for this:

First, since each thing seeks (*appetat*) its own perfection, what someone desires as an ultimate end is what he wills as his own perfect and complete good. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, "We now call it the end of goodness, not because it is consumed so as not to exist, but because it is

perfected so as to exist to the full.” Therefore, the ultimate end must fulfill the whole of a man’s appetite in such a way that there is nothing outside of it that is left to be desired. But this cannot be the case if something extraneous to its fulfillment is required. Hence, it cannot be the case that there are two things an appetite tends toward in this way, i.e., as if each of them were its perfect good.

The second argument is that just as the principle in the process of reasoning is what there is a natural cognition of, so too the principle in the process of rational desiring, i.e., of willing, has to be what there is a natural desire for. But this must be a single thing, since nature tends only toward a single thing. Now the principle in the process of rational desiring is the ultimate end. Hence, what the will tends toward as an ultimate end (*sub ratione ultimi finis*) must be a single thing.

The third argument is that since, as was established above (a. 3), voluntary actions take their species from their end, they must take their genus from their ultimate end, which is common [to all of them]—just as natural entities are placed in a genus according to a formal general notion. Therefore, since everything desirable by the will belongs as such to a single genus, the ultimate end must be a single thing. This is so especially in light of the fact that in every genus there is some one first principle and, as has been explained, the ultimate end has the nature of a first principle. Now the ultimate end of *this* man is related to *this* man in the same way that the ultimate end absolutely speaking is related to the whole human race. Hence, this man’s will must be fixed upon a single ultimate end in the same way that there is by nature a single ultimate end that belongs to all men.

Reply to objection 1: The authors who posited the goods in question as the ultimate end took them all together as the single complete good that is composed of them.

Reply to objection 2: Even if one proposed many things that do not oppose one another, it would still be opposed to the perfect good that something of the entity’s perfection should lie outside it.

Reply to objection 3: The will’s power is not such that it can make opposites exist simultaneously. But, as is clear from what has been said, this would happen if the will tended toward many disparate things as ultimate ends.

Article 6

Is everything a man wills such that he wills it for the sake of his ultimate end?

It seems that it is not the case that everything a man wills is such that he wills it for the sake of his ultimate end:

Objection 1: The means that are ordered toward the ultimate end are said to be ‘very serious’ (*seriosa*) in the sense that they are advantageous (*utilia*). But what is in jest (*iocosa*) is opposed to what is serious. Therefore, the things a man does in jest are such that he does not order them toward his ultimate end.

Objection 2: At the beginning of the *Metaphysics* the Philosopher says that the speculative sciences are pursued for their own sake. And yet one cannot claim that each of them is an ultimate end. Therefore, it is not the case that everything a man desires is such that he desires it for the sake of an ultimate end.

Objection 3: If someone orders something toward an end, then he is thinking about that end. But it is not the case that a man is always thinking about his ultimate end in everything that he desires or does. Therefore, it is not the case that everything a man desires or does is such that he desires it or does it for the sake of his ultimate end.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “The end of our good is such that other things are loved for its sake, whereas it itself is loved for its own sake.”

I respond: It is necessary that everything a man desires is such that he desires it for the sake of his

ultimate end. This is clear from two arguments:

First, everything that a man desires is such that he desires it under the concept of the good. What is not desired as a perfect good must be desired as tending toward a perfect good, i.e., an ultimate end, since the beginning of something is always ordered toward its consummation. This is clear both in what is done by nature and in what is done by art. And so every beginning of perfection is ordered toward consummated perfection, which occurs through the ultimate end.

Second, when it moves an appetite, the ultimate end functions in the way that a first mover functions in other movements. But it is clear that secondary moving causes effect movement only insofar as they are moved by the first mover. Hence, secondary desirable things move an appetite only insofar as they are ordered toward the first desirable thing (*non nisi in ordine ad primum appetibile*), i.e., the ultimate end.

Reply to objection 1: Diversions (*actiones ludicrae*) are not ordered toward any extrinsic end, and yet, insofar as they are pleasant or restful (*delectantes vel requiem praestantes*), they are ordered toward the good of the man himself who engages in them (*bonum ipsius ludentis*). But a man's consummate good is his ultimate end.

Reply to objection 2: The same reply holds for the second objection, concerning speculative science. Speculative science is desired as a certain good of the man who pursues it (*bonum quoddam speculantis*); and it is included under that complete and perfect good which is the ultimate end.

Reply to objection 3: One need not always be thinking about the ultimate end whenever he desires something or does something. Instead, the force (*virtus*) of the first intention, which has to do with the ultimate end, remains in any desire for anything whatsoever, even if the ultimate end is not being thought about. In the same way, one who is travelling along a path need not be thinking about his destination (*de fine*) with every step.

Article 7

Is there a single ultimate end for all men?

It seems not to be the case that there is a single ultimate end for all men (*omnium hominum unus finis ultimus*):

Objection 1: Man's ultimate end seems especially to be an immutable good (*incommutabile bonum*). But some men turn themselves away from the immutable good by sinning. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a single ultimate end for all men.

Objection 2: A man's whole life is regulated by his ultimate end. Therefore, if there were a single ultimate end for all men, then it would follow that there are not diverse ways of living (*diversa studia vivendi*) among men. But this is clearly false.

Objection 3: The end is the terminus of an action, and actions have to do with singular things. But even if men share in the nature of their species, they nonetheless differ in those things that pertain to the individuals. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a single ultimate end for all men.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says that all men agree in desiring the ultimate end, which is beatitude (*beatitudo*).

I respond: There are two ways in which we can talk about an ultimate end: (a) with respect to the concept of an ultimate end (*secundum rationem ultimi finis*) and (b) with respect to the thing that the concept of an ultimate end is found in (*id in quo finis ultimi ratio invenitur*).

Thus, as regards the concept of the ultimate end, everyone agrees in desiring an ultimate end, since everyone desires that his own perfection be fulfilled—and this, as has been explained (a. 5), is the concept of an ultimate end.

But as regards that which the ultimate end is *found in*, it is not the case that all men agree in their ultimate end. For some desire riches as their consummate good, some desire pleasure, and some desire something else. In the same way, what is sweet is pleasurable to every sense of taste, but to some it is the sweetness of wine that is especially pleasurable, whereas to others it is the sweetness of honey or of some other such thing. Yet the sweet thing that is most pleasurable absolutely speaking must be that which someone with the best taste takes the most pleasure in. And, similarly, the good that is the most complete must be that which someone with well-disposed affections desires as his ultimate end.

Reply to objection 1: Those who sin turn themselves away from the thing which the concept of the ultimate end is truly realized in. However, they do not turn themselves away from intending their ultimate end, which they mistakenly seek in other things.

Reply to objection 2: Diverse ways of life are possible among men because of the diverse things in which the concept of the highest good is sought.

Reply to objection 3: Even if actions have to do with singulars, the first principle of acting within singular things is the nature, which, as has been explained (a. 5), tends toward a single thing.

Article 8

Do all other things share in man's ultimate end?

It seems that all other things share in man's ultimate end:

Objection 1: The end corresponds to the beginning (*finis respondet principio*). But that which is the principle of men, viz., God, is also the principle of all other things. Therefore, all things share in man's ultimate end.

Objection 2: In *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, "God turns all things toward Himself as their ultimate end." But He is also man's ultimate end, since, as Augustine puts it, He alone is to be enjoyed (*solo ipso fruendum est*). Therefore, other things share in man's ultimate end.

Objection 3: Man's ultimate end is the object of his will. But the object of the will is the universal good (*bonum universale*), which is the end of all things. Therefore, other things must share in man's ultimate end.

But contrary to this: Man's ultimate end is beatitude (*beatitudo*), which, as Augustine says, everyone desires. But as Augustine says in 83 *Quaestiones*, "It does not befit animals that lack reason to be blessed (*beata*)."

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2 and *Metaphysics* 5, there are two senses of 'end' (*finis*), viz., (a) *finis cuius* and (b) *finis quo*—i.e., (a) *the thing itself (ipsa res)* in which the concept of the good is found and (b) *attaining (adeptio) or possessing (usus)* that thing. For instance, we say that the end of a heavy body's motion is either (a) a lower place (the thing) or (b) being in a lower place (possessing the thing); and we say that a greedy man's end is either (a) money (the thing) or (b) having money (possessing the thing).

Therefore, if we are talking about man's ultimate end as regards *the thing itself* which is the end, then in this sense all other things share in man's ultimate end, since God is the ultimate end of man and of all other things.

By contrast, if we are talking about man's ultimate end as regards *attaining* the end, then in this sense non-rational creatures do not share in man's end. For man and other rational creatures attain the ultimate end by knowing and loving God—something that does not belong to other creatures, which attain their ultimate end by participating in a certain similarity to God insofar as they exist, or insofar as they are alive, or even insofar as they have [sentient] cognition.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The reply to the objections is obvious from what has been said.

QUESTION 2

The Things That Man's Beatitude Lies In

Next we have to consider beatitude: first, what it lies in (question 2); second, what it is (questions 3-4); and third, how we can attain it (question 5).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Does beatitude lie in riches? (2) Does beatitude lie in honors? (3) Does beatitude lie in fame or glory? (4) Does beatitude lie in power? (5) Does beatitude lie in a bodily good? (6) Does beatitude lie in pleasure? (7) Does beatitude lie in a good of the soul? (8) Does beatitude lie in a created good?

Article 1

Does man's beatitude lie in riches?

It seems that man's beatitude lies in riches (*consistit in divitiis*):

Objection 1: Since beatitude is man's ultimate end, it lies in what most dominates man's affections. But riches are like this, since Ecclesiastes 10:19 says, "All things obey money (*pecuniae obediunt omnia*).” Therefore, man's beatitude lies in riches.

Objection 2: According to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, "Beatitude is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods." But it seems that in money (*in pecuniis*) all things are possessed, since, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, money (*nummus*) was invented in order to be a guarantee (*fideiussor*), as it were, that a man might have whatever he wanted in exchange for it. Therefore, beatitude lies in riches.

Objection 3: Since the desire for the highest good never goes away (*numquam deficiat*), it seems to be unlimited (*infinitum*). But this is what one finds especially in the case of riches, since, as Ecclesiastes 5:9 says, "An avaricious man (*avarus*) shall not be satisfied with money." Therefore, beatitude lies in riches.

But contrary to this: Man's good lies more in keeping (*in retinendo*) beatitude than in giving it away (*in emittendo*). But as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 2, "Riches flourish more by being poured out than by being amassed; for avarice always creates loathsome men, while generosity creates illustrious men." Therefore, beatitude does not lie in riches.

I respond: It is impossible for man's beatitude to lie in riches. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, there are two kinds of riches, viz., *natural* riches and *artificial* riches. Natural riches—e.g., food (*cibus*), drink (*potus*), clothing (*vestimenta*), means of transportation (*vehicula*), housing (*habitacula*), and other things of this sort—are those by which a man is assisted in meeting his natural needs (*ad defectus naturales tollendos*). On the other hand, artificial riches are those such as money (*denarii*), which do not in their own right assist nature, but which human art has introduced to be, as it were, a measure of items for sale in order to facilitate buying and selling (*propter facilitatem commutationis*).

Now it is obvious that man's beatitude cannot lie in natural riches. For riches of this sort are sought for the sake of something else, viz., to sustain man's nature, and so they cannot be a man's ultimate end, but are instead ordered toward the man himself as an end. Hence, in the order of nature all things of this sort are lower than man and are made for the sake of man—this according to Psalm 8:8 ("You have subjected all things under his feet").

On the other hand, artificial riches are sought only for the sake of natural riches, since they would not be sought except that things necessary for one's way of life (*necessariae ad usum vitae*) are bought with them. Hence, artificial riches have even less of the character of an ultimate end.

Therefore, it is impossible that beatitude, which is a man's ultimate end, should lie in riches.

Reply to objection 1: All bodily things "obey money" in the eyes of the multitude of the foolish, who are acquainted only with the bodily goods that can be acquired with money. But one's judgment

about human goods should be taken from the wise and not from the foolish, just as one's judgment about tastes should be taken from those whose sense of taste is well-disposed.

Reply to objection 2: What can be had with money are all the things that are for sale, but not spiritual goods, which cannot be sold. Hence, Proverbs 17:16 says, "What good is it for a fool to have riches, seeing that he cannot buy wisdom?"

Reply to objection 3: The desire for natural riches is not unlimited, since at some fixed point they are sufficient for nature. But the desire for artificial riches is indeed unlimited, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, it is subject to a disordered concupiscence that knows no bounds.

However, the desire for the highest good is different from this unlimited desire for riches. For the more perfectly the highest good is possessed, the more it itself is loved and other things disdained. For the more it is had, the better it is known. This is why Ecclesiasticus 24:29 says, "They that eat me shall yet hunger."

By contrast, it is just the opposite with the desire for riches and for temporal goods in general. For once these goods are possessed, they are disdained, and other goods are desired. This is what is meant in John 4:13 when our Lord says, "Whoever drinks of this water [read: temporal goods] will thirst again." The reason for this is that their insufficiency is better understood once they are possessed. And so this very fact shows their imperfection, and it also shows that the highest good does not lie in them.

Article 2

Does man's good lie in honors?

It seems that man's good lies in honors:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, beatitude (*beatitudo*), or happiness (*felicitas*), is a reward for virtue. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, honor seems especially to be what the reward of virtue is. Therefore, beatitude lies especially in honor.

Objection 2: Beatitude, which is a perfect good, seems especially to be whatever belongs to God and to the most excellent beings. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, honor is one of those things. Likewise, in 1 Timothy 1:17 the Apostle says, "To the only God be honor and glory." Therefore, beatitude lies in honor.

Objection 3: Beatitude is whatever is especially desired by men. But nothing seems to be more desirable to men than honor; for men suffer losses in all other things in order not to suffer any loss of honor. Therefore, beatitude lies in honor.

But contrary to this: Beatitude exists in the one who is blessed (*in beato*). However, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 1, honor exists not in the one who is being honored, but rather in the one doing the honoring, who shows reverence for the one being honored. Therefore, beatitude does not lie in honor.

I respond: It is impossible for beatitude to lie in honor. For honor is shown to someone because of some excellence on his part. And so honor is a sign of and testimony to the excellence that exists in the one being honored. But it is a man's excellence that is especially involved in beatitude (*maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem*), which is man's perfect good, and in the parts of beatitude, i.e., in those goods which participate in beatitude. And so honor can, to be sure, follow upon beatitude, but beatitude cannot lie principally in honor.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in the same place, honor is not a reward for virtue in the sense that virtuous men act for the sake of honor; rather, it is in place of a reward that they receive honor from men—as if from men who have nothing greater to give them. Indeed, the real reward for virtue is beatitude itself, and it is for the sake of beatitude that virtuous men act. Moreover, if they did

act for the sake of honor, then this would no longer be virtue, but ambition instead.

Reply to objection 2: Honor is due to God and to the most excellent beings as a sign of or testimony to a preexistent excellence and not because the honor itself makes them excellent.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, it is out of a natural desire for beatitude, which gives rise to honor, that men happen especially to desire honor. This is why men seek to be honored especially by the wise, in light of whose judgment they come to believe themselves to be excellent or happy.

Article 3

Does man's beatitude lie in glory or fame?

It seems that man's beatitude lies in glory [or fame]:

Objection 1: Beatitude seems to lie in what is rendered to the saints because of the tribulations they suffered in the world. But this is glory; for in Romans 8:18 the Apostle says, "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us." Therefore, beatitude lies in glory.

Objection 2: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is diffusive of itself. But it is through glory that man's good is especially diffused into the knowledge of others, since, as Ambrose says, glory is nothing other than "clear knowledge accompanied by praise (*clara notitia cum laude*).” Therefore, man's beatitude lies in glory.

Objection 3: Beatitude is the most stable of goods. But fame or glory seems to be like this, since it is through fame or glory that a man in some sense attains eternity. Hence, in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says, "You seem to propagate immortality for yourselves when you consider your fame in times to come." Therefore, man's beatitude lies in fame or glory.

But contrary to this: Beatitude is man's true good. But it is possible for fame or glory to be false; for as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, "Many men have acquired a great name from the false opinions of the crowd. Can anything be thought more shameful? For those who are falsely lauded must blush to hear their own praises." Therefore, it is not the case that man's beatitude lies in fame or glory.

I respond: It is impossible for man's beatitude to lie in fame or glory. For as Ambrose puts it, glory is nothing other than "clear knowledge accompanied by praise." Now a thing that is known is related in one way to human cognition and in a different way to God's cognition.

For human cognition is caused by the things known, whereas God's cognition is a cause of the things known. Hence, the perfection of the human good, which is called beatitude, cannot be caused by human knowledge; instead, it is human knowledge of someone's beatitude that proceeds from and is in some sense caused by human beatitude itself, either inchoative beatitude or perfect beatitude. And so man's beatitude cannot lie in fame or glory.

By contrast, a man's good depends on God's cognition as its cause. And so the cause which a man's beatitude depends on is the glory he has from God (*gloria quae est apud Deum*)—this according to Psalm 90:15-16 ("I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation").

There is also another thing to take into consideration, viz., that human ideas (*humana notitia*) are often mistaken, especially with respect to singular contingent things like human acts. And, therefore, human glory is often fallacious. By contrast, since God cannot make a mistake, the glory that comes from Him (*eius gloria*) is always true. This is why 2 Corinthians 10:18 says, "He is approved whom God commends."

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is speaking here of the glory that comes from God in the

presence of His angels and not about the glory that comes from men. Hence, Mark 8:38 [cf. Luke 12:8] says, “The Son of Man will acknowledge him in the glory of His Father in the presence of His angels.”

Reply to objection 2: The good of a man that exists in the cognition of the multitude through fame or glory must—if the cognition is indeed true—be derived from a good that exists within the man himself, and so it presupposes either perfect or inchoative beatitude.

On the other hand, if the cognition is false, then it does not agree with reality, and so there is no good that is found in him by reason of his popular acclaim (*cuius fama celebris habetur*).

Hence, it is clear that there is no way in which fame can make a man blessed (*beatum*).

Reply to objection 3: Fame lacks stability and is, in fact, easily destroyed by false rumors. And if it does at times persevere in a stable manner, this is incidental. By contrast, beatitude has stability in its own right and forever (*habet stabilitatem per se et semper*).

Article 4

Does man’s beatitude lie in power?

It seems that [man’s] beatitude lies in power:

Objection 1: All things tend toward being similar to God (*appetunt assimilari Deo*) insofar as He is their ultimate end and their first principle. But powerful men, because of the likeness of their power, seem to be especially conformed to God. Hence, they are called ‘gods’ even in Scripture, as is clear from Exodus 22:28 (“You shall not speak ill of the gods”). Therefore, beatitude lies in power.

Objection 2: Beatitude is a perfect good. But it is most perfect for a man to be able to rule others as well—a function that belongs to those who have been established in power. Therefore, beatitude lies in power.

Objection 3: Since beatitude is maximally desirable, what is opposed to it is by all means to be avoided. But what men especially flee from is servitude, which is counterposed to power. Therefore, beatitude lies in power.

But contrary to this: Beatitude is a perfect good. But power is especially imperfect. For as Boethius says in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, “A man’s power cannot expel the bites of care or avoid the prickles of dread.” And later he adds, “Do you think a man is powerful when he is surrounded by men who are afraid of him but whom he himself fears even more?” Therefore, beatitude does not lie in power.

I respond: It is impossible for beatitude to lie in power, and this for two reasons:

First, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 5, power has the character of a principle, whereas beatitude has the character of an ultimate end.

Second, power is open both to what is good and to what is evil (*potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum*), whereas beatitude is man’s proper and perfect good. Hence, some sort of beatitude would be more able to lie in the *good use* of power, which occurs through virtue, than in power itself.

Moreover, there are four general arguments that can be adduced to show that beatitude does not lie in any of the exterior goods discussed thus far:

The first of these arguments is that since beatitude is a man’s highest good, it is incompatible with any sort of evil. But all of the goods discussed thus far are found both in good men and in bad men.

The second argument is that since, as is clear from *Ethics* 1, beatitude is sufficient by its very nature (*per se sufficiens*), it must be the case that once beatitude is attained, no good which is necessary for a man is lacking. But after each of the goods discussed thus far has been attained, there are still many goods lacking that are necessary for a man, e.g., wisdom, bodily health, and others of this sort.

The third argument is that since beatitude is a perfect good, no evil can come to anyone because

of beatitude. But this does not apply to the goods discussed thus far; for Ecclesiastes 5:12 says that riches are sometimes kept “to the detriment of their owner.” And the same thing is obvious in the case of the other three goods.

The fourth argument is that a man is ordered toward beatitude by interior principles, since he is naturally ordered toward it. But the four goods discussed thus far come from exterior causes, and very often from fortune. This is why they are called ‘goods of fortune’.

Hence, it is clear that beatitude cannot in any way lie in the goods discussed thus far.

Reply to objection 1: God’s power is His goodness, and so He can use His power only in the right way (*non nisi bene*). But the same does not hold in the case of men. Hence, it is not enough for a man’s beatitude that he become similar to God with respect to power, unless he also becomes similar to Him with respect to goodness.

Reply to objection 2: Just as the best situation is for someone to use his power well in ruling a multitude, so the worst situation is for him is to use his power badly. And so power is open both to good and to evil.

Reply to objection 3: Servitude is an obstacle to the good use of power. This is why men naturally avoid it—and not because man’s highest good lies in power.

Article 5

Does man’s beatitude lie in any bodily good?

It seems that man’s beatitude lies in some bodily good:

Objection 1: Ecclesiasticus 30:16 says, “There are no riches above the riches of the health of the body.” But beatitude lies in what is the best. Therefore, it lies in the health of the body.

Objection 2: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, Dionysius says that to exist (*esse*) is better than to live (*vivere*), and to live is better than the other things that follow upon it. But a man needs bodily health in order to exist and to live. Therefore, since beatitude is man’s highest good, it seems that bodily health is especially pertinent to beatitude.

Objection 3: The more general (*communius*) something is, the higher the principle it depends upon, since the higher a cause is, the more things its power extends to. But just as an efficient cause’s causality is thought of as having to do with an inflowing (*secundum influentiam*), so an end’s causality has to do with an appetite (*secundum appetitum*). Therefore, just as the first efficient cause is a cause that flows into all things (*influit in omnia*), so an ultimate end is a cause that is sought after by all things (*desideratur ab omnibus*). But existence itself (*ipsum esse*) is what is most sought after by all things. Therefore, man’s beatitude consists especially in those things that pertain to his existence, e.g., bodily health.

But contrary to this: With respect to beatitude, man is more excellent than all the other animals. But with respect to bodily goods, he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, he is surpassed by the elephant in length of life, by the lion in strength, and by the deer in speed. Therefore, man’s beatitude does not lie in bodily goods.

I respond: There are two reasons why it is impossible for man’s beatitude to lie in bodily goods:

First, it is impossible for the ultimate end of a thing that is ordered toward something else as an end to be the conservation of that same thing in existence (*in esse*). Thus, a ship’s captain (*gubernator*) does not intend as an ultimate end the preservation of the ship that has been entrusted to him; for the ship is ordered toward something else as an end, viz., toward sailing. Now just as a ship is entrusted to the captain to direct, so man is entrusted to his own will and reason—this according to Ecclesiasticus 15:14 (“God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”). But it is obvious

that man is ordered toward something else as his end, given that man is not the highest good. Hence, it is impossible for the ultimate end of human reason and will to be the conservation of human existence (*conservatio humani esse*).

Second, even if it were granted that the end of human reason and will is the conservation of human existence, it would still not be possible to claim that man's end is a bodily good. For human existence lies in the soul and the body. And, as was shown above (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 2), even though the body's existence depends on the soul, the human soul's existence does not depend on the body; and the body itself exists for the sake of the soul in the way that matter exists for the sake of form and in the way that instruments exist for the sake of the mover, in order that the mover might exercise its actions through them. Hence all bodily goods are ordered toward the goods of the soul as toward their end. Hence, it is impossible for beatitude, which is the ultimate end, to lie in the goods of the body.

Reply to objection 1: Just as the body is ordered toward the soul as its end, so exterior goods are ordered toward the body itself. And so it is reasonable to prefer the good of the body to exterior goods, which are signified in this passage by "riches"—just as it is reasonable to prefer the good of the soul to all the goods of the body.

Reply to objection 2: Existence (*esse*) taken absolutely—i.e., insofar as it includes within itself all the perfection of being—surpasses life and all the goods that follow upon it, since existence (*esse*) in this sense contains within itself all the ensuing goods (*sic ipsum esse prae habet in se omnia subsequencia*). And it is in this sense that Dionysius is speaking.

However, if *esse* itself is thought of as participating in this or in that thing, where these things do not capture the whole perfection of being (*non capiunt totam perfectionem essendi*) but instead have imperfect existence (*esse*), viz., the existence (*esse*) of some creature, then it is clear that existence (*esse*) itself in this sense is more eminent when taken with an added perfection. Hence, Dionysius himself says in the same place that living things are better than [merely] existing things, and intelligent things are better than [merely] living things.

Reply to objection 3: Given that the end corresponds to the principle, this argument proves that the ultimate end is the first principle of being, in whom exists every perfection of being and whose likeness [all things] seek in due proportion—some with respect just to *esse*; some with respect to living-*esse*; and some, a few, with respect to living-*esse* and intelligent-*esse* and beatified-*esse*.

Article 6

Does man's beatitude lie in delight or pleasure?

It seems that man's beatitude lies in delight (*delectatio*) or pleasure (*voluptas*):

Objection 1: Since beatitude is the ultimate end, it is not desired for the sake of anything else; instead, other things are desired for its sake. But this feature seems especially to belong to delight (*delectatio*); for, as *Ethics* 10 points out, "it is ridiculous to ask someone why he wants to be delighted (*propter quid velit delectari*).” Therefore, beatitude consists especially in pleasure and delight.

Objection 2: As the *Liber de Causis* says, "a first cause makes a stronger impression than a secondary cause." But the end's influence has to do with the desire for it. Therefore, that which especially moves one's appetite seems especially to have the character of an ultimate end. But this is pleasure (*voluptas*). An indication of this is that pleasure (*delectatio*) absorbs a man's will and reason to such an extent that it makes him disdain other goods. Therefore, it seems that the ultimate end, which is beatitude, consists especially in pleasure (*in voluptate*).

Objection 3: Since desire is for the good, that which all things desire seems to be the best thing. But all things desire delight (*delectatio*)—both the wise and the foolish, and even things that lack reason.

Therefore, delight (*delectatio*) is the best thing. Therefore, beatitude, which is the highest good, lies in pleasure (*voluptas*).

But contrary to this: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says, “Anyone who chooses to look back on his past excesses will understand that pleasures have a sad ending. And if pleasures can make a men blessed, there is no reason not to say that even brute animals are blessed.”

I respond: As *Ethics* 3 says, “Because corporeal delights (*delectationes corporales*) are known to more people, they have taken the name ‘pleasures’ (*voluptates*) for themselves”—even though there are other, more powerful, delights. Nevertheless, beatitude does not principally lie in them.

For within each thing, what pertains to its essence is different from its proper accidents; for instance, in the case of man, his being a rational mortal animal is different from his being capable of laughing. Thus, one should notice that every delight is a sort of proper accident which follows upon beatitude or upon some part of beatitude. For someone delights in having a good which befits him—regardless of whether he has it in reality, or in his hopes, or at least in his memories. Now if the fitting good in question is a perfect good, then it is human beatitude itself, whereas if it is an imperfect good, then it is a certain participation in beatitude—either a proximate participation, or a remote one, or at least an apparent one. Hence, it is clear that not even the very delight which follows upon the perfect good is itself the essence of beatitude; instead, it is a certain consequence of beatitude, like a *per se* accident.

Moreover, corporeal pleasure cannot follow upon the perfect good even in the way just explained. For corporeal pleasure follows upon a good that is apprehended by the sensory power, which is a power of the soul insofar as it uses the body. But the good which pertains to the body and which is apprehended by the sensory power cannot be man’s perfect good. For since the rational soul exceeds the measure of corporeal matter, the part of the soul that is unrestricted by a corporeal organ (*ab organo corporeo absoluta*) has a sort of unlimitedness (*quaedam infinitas*) with respect to the body and with respect to the parts of the soul that are concretized with the body (*partium animae corpori concretarum*)—in the way that immaterial things are in a sense unlimited (*infinita*) in relation to material things by reason of the fact that form is in some sense contracted to and limited by matter. Thus, a form that is free of matter is in some sense unlimited (*infinita*). And so the sensory power, which is a corporeal power, has cognition of the singular, which is made determinate by matter, whereas the intellect, which is a power free of matter, has cognition of the universal, which is abstracted from matter and contains infinitely many singulars within itself. Hence, it is clear that a good which befits the body and which causes corporeal delight through the sensory power’s apprehension is not man’s perfect good, but is, as it were, minimal in comparison to the good of the soul. Hence, Wisdom 7:9 says, “All gold, in comparison to wisdom, is as a little sand.” So, then, corporeal pleasure is neither beatitude itself nor a *per se* accident of beatitude.

Reply to objection 1: The reason why delight is desired is the same as the reason why beatitude is desired—and this is nothing other than the repose of desire in the good (*quietatio appetitus in bono*). Similarly, the natural power by which a heavy thing is borne downward is the same as the power by which it comes to rest there. Hence, just as the good is desired for its own sake, so too delight is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, if ‘for the sake of’ is expressing a final cause. However, if it is instead expressing a formal cause or, better, an efficient cause (*causam motivam*), then in that sense delight is desirable for the sake of something else, viz., for the sake of the good which is the object of delight and which, as a result, is its principle and gives it its form. For the reason why delight is sought after is that it is repose in a good that is desired.

Reply to objection 2: The strong desire for sensible delight occurs because the operations of the sensory power, since they are the beginnings of our cognition (*principia nostrae cognitionis*), are more perceptible. Hence, sensible delights are also desired by more people.

Reply to objection 3: All men desire delight in the same way that they desire the good. Yet, as has been explained, they desire delight by reason of the good, and not vice versa. Hence, it does not

follow that delight is the greatest good in its own right (*maximum et per se bonum*). Rather, each delight follows upon some good, and there is a delight that follows upon that which is the greatest good in its own right.

Article 7

Does man's beatitude lie in a good of the soul?

It seems that beatitude lies in a good of the soul:

Objection 1: Beatitude is a certain human good. But man's good is divided into three, viz., exterior goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But as has been shown above (aa. 4-5), beatitude does not lie in the exterior goods or in the goods of the body. Therefore, it lies in the goods of the soul.

Objection 2: The one for whom we desire a good is such that we love him more than the good we desire for him; for instance, we love the friend for whom we desire money more than the money. But each individual desires every good for himself. Therefore, he loves himself more than all other goods. But beatitude is what he especially loves; this is obvious from the fact that all other goods are loved and desired for its sake. Therefore, beatitude lies in some good that belongs to the man himself. But it does not lie in the goods of the body. Therefore, it lies in the goods of the soul.

Objection 3: Perfection is something that belongs to what is perfected. But beatitude is a certain perfection of a man. Therefore, beatitude is something that belongs to the man. But as has been shown, it is not something that belongs to the body. And so it lies in the goods of the soul.

But contrary to this: In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, "That in which the good life is constituted is to be loved for its own sake." But a man is not to be loved for his own sake; instead, whatever exists in a man is to be loved for the sake of God. Therefore, beatitude does not lie in any good of the soul.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8), 'end' has two senses, viz., (a) *the thing itself* that we desire to obtain, and (b) the *having*, i.e., the attaining or the possessing, of that thing (*usus seu adeptio aut possessio illius rei*).

Thus, if we are talking about man's ultimate end *as regards the thing itself* which we desire as our ultimate end, then it is impossible for man's ultimate end to be either the soul itself or anything that belongs to the soul.

For the soul, taken in itself, is like something that exists in potentiality, since it comes to be actually knowing from having been knowing in potentiality, and it becomes actually virtuous from having been virtuous in potentiality. But since the potentiality is for the sake of the actuality in the sense of being for the sake of what completes it, it is impossible that what is in potentiality in its own right should have the nature of an ultimate end. Hence, it is impossible for the soul itself to be its own ultimate end.

The same holds for anything that belongs to the soul, whether it be a power, a habit, or an act. For the good that is the ultimate end is a perfect good that satisfies the appetite (*bonum perfectum complens appetitum*). Now man's appetite, which is his will, is for a *universal* good. But any good that inheres in the soul itself is a participated good and, as a result, a *particularized* good. Hence, it is impossible that any of these goods should be man's ultimate end.

On the other hand, if we are talking about man's ultimate end *as regards the attaining or possessing of it*, i.e., as regards any sort of having of the very thing that is desired as an end, then something that belongs to a man's soul is pertinent to the ultimate end. For a man attains beatitude *through* his soul (*per animam*).

Therefore, the very thing that is desired as the end is what beatitude *lies in* and what *makes one blessed*, but it is the *attainment of that thing* which is called *beatitude*. Hence, one should say that

beatitude is something that belongs to the soul, but that what beatitude lies in is something outside of the soul.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as the division in question includes all the goods that are desirable to a man, what is called ‘a good of the soul’ includes not only [the soul’s] powers, habits, and acts, but also its objects, which are extrinsic to it. And in this sense there is nothing to prevent one from saying that what beatitude lies in is a certain good of the soul.

Reply to objection 2: As regards what is proposed here, the relevant point is that beatitude is especially loved as a *desired good* (*bonum concupitum*), whereas a friend is loved as the *one for whom* the good is desired; and in this latter sense a man loves himself as well. Hence, the character of the love is not the same in the two cases.

Now when we treat charity below (*ST* 2-2, q. 26), there will be room to consider the question of whether a man might love something above himself (*supra se*) with a love of friendship.

Reply to objection 3: Since beatitude itself is a perfection of the soul, it is a certain good that inheres in the soul. But as has been explained, what beatitude lies in, i.e., what makes one blessed, is something outside the soul.

Article 8

Does man’s beatitude lie in a created good?

It seems that man’s beatitude lies in some created good:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says that God’s wisdom “joins the ends of the first things to the principles of the secondary things.” This can be taken to mean that the high point for a lower nature is to attain the low point of a higher nature. But man’s highest good is beatitude. Therefore, since, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 111, a. 1), an angel is higher than a man in the order of nature, a man’s beatitude seems to lie in his attaining in some way the status of an angel (*aliquo modo attingit ad angelum*).

Objection 2: The ultimate end of a thing lies in what is complete in relation to it (*in suo perfecto*); hence, a part exists for the sake of the whole as its end. But the whole universe of creatures, which is called the ‘greater world’, is related to a man, who in *Physics* 7 is called a ‘lesser world’, in the same way that what is complete is related to what is incomplete (*sicut perfectum ad imperfectum*). Therefore, man’s beatitude lies in the whole universe of creatures.

Objection 3: A man is made blessed (*beatus*) by the fact that his natural desire comes to rest. But man’s natural desire does not extend to a greater good than he himself is able to take possession of. Therefore, since man is not capable of a good that exceeds the limits of all of creation (*limites totius creaturae*), it seems that man can be made blessed by some created good. And so man’s beatitude lies in some created good.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “Just as the soul is the life of the flesh, so God is man’s blessed life (*beata vita*)—God, of whom it is said, ‘Blessed the people whose God is the Lord’ (Psalm 143:15).”

I respond: It is impossible for man’s beatitude to lie in any created good. For beatitude is a perfect good that puts the appetite totally to rest—it would not be the ultimate end otherwise, i.e., if something remained to be desired. But the object of the will, which is man’s appetite, is the universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal truth. From this it is clear that nothing can put man’s will to rest except the universal good. But the universal good is found only in God and not in any created good, since every creature has participated goodness. Hence, only God can satisfy man’s will—this according to Psalm 102:5 (“He satisfies your desire with good things”). Therefore, it is in God alone that man’s beatitude lies.

Reply to objection 1: The high point of man does indeed attain to the low point of angelic nature by a sort of likeness. Yet man does not rest there as in his ultimate end. Instead, he gets all the way to the universal source itself of goodness, i.e., to Him who is the universal object of beatitude for all the blessed insofar as He is the infinite and perfect good.

Reply to objection 2: If a given whole is not the ultimate end but is instead ordered toward a further end, then the ultimate end of a part of it is not the whole itself but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is related as a part to a whole, is not the ultimate end. Instead, it is ordered toward God as its ultimate end. Hence, it is God Himself, and not the good of the universe, that is man's ultimate end.

Reply to objection 3: There is a created good, in the sense of something *intrinsic to and inherent in* man, that is not less than the good that man is capable of. Nevertheless, this created good is indeed less than some good, in the sense of an *object*, which man is capable of and which is infinite. Moreover, the participated good of an angel, or of the whole universe, is a finite and contracted good.

QUESTION 3

What Beatitude Is

Next we have to consider what beatitude is (question 3) and what is required for it (question 4).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is beatitude something uncreated? (2) If it is something created, is it an operation [i.e., an action]? (3) Is it an operation of the sentient part of the soul or of the intellective part? (4) If it is an operation of the intellective part of the soul, is it an operation of the intellect or of the will? (5) If it is an operation of the intellect, is it an operation of the speculative intellect or of the practical intellect? (6) If it is an operation of the speculative intellect, does it consist in a speculative act belonging to the speculative sciences? (7) Does it consist in a speculative act with respect to the separated substances, i.e., the angels? (8) Does it consist solely in a speculative act with respect to God by which He is seen through His essence?

Article 1

Is beatitude something uncreated?

It seems that beatitude is something uncreated:

Objection 1: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says, “It is necessary to confess that God is beatitude itself.”

Objection 2: Beatitude is the highest good. But it belongs to God to be the highest good. Therefore, since there is no more than one highest good, it seems that beatitude is identical with God.

Objection 3: Beatitude is the ultimate end toward which the human will naturally tends. But the will ought to tend toward nothing other than God as an end. “He alone is to be enjoyed (*quo solo fruendum est*),” as Augustine puts it.

But contrary to this: Nothing that is made is uncreated. But man’s beatitude is something made, since, according to Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, “Those things are to be enjoyed which make us blessed.” Therefore, beatitude is not something uncreated.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), ‘end’ has two senses: (a) *the thing itself* which we desire to attain, in the sense that *money* is an end to the avaricious man; and (b) attaining (*adeptio*) or possessing (*possessio*), i.e., having (*usus*) or enjoying (*fruitio*), that thing which is desired, in the sense that *having money* is said to be the avaricious man’s end, and *enjoying a pleasurable thing* is said to be the intemperate man’s end.

Therefore, in the first sense, man’s ultimate end is an uncreated good, viz., God, who alone is able to satisfy man’s will perfectly by His infinite goodness. But in the second sense, man’s ultimate end is something created which exists within him and which is nothing other than possessing or enjoying the ultimate end (cf. *ST* 1, q. 12, a. 5).

Therefore, if man’s beatitude is thought of with respect to its *cause or object*, then in this sense it is something uncreated, whereas if it is thought of with respect to the *very essence of beatitude*, then in this sense it is something created.

Reply to objection 1: God is beatitude through His essence, since He is blessed through His own essence and not by attaining, or participating in, something else. By contrast, as Boethius says in the same place, men are blessed through participation, just as they are said to be ‘gods’ through participation. And the participation in beatitude by virtue of which a man is called blessed is itself something created.

Reply to objection 2: The reason why beatitude is said to be man’s highest good is that it is an act of attaining or enjoying the highest good (*est adeptio vel fruitio summi boni*).

Reply to objection 3: Beatitude is called the ultimate end in the sense in which attaining an end is called the end.

Article 2

Is beatitude an operation [i.e., an action]?

It seems that beatitude is not an operation [or action]:

Objection 1: In Romans 6:22 the Apostle says, “You have your fruit unto sanctification, and as your end, life eternal.” But life is the very existence (*esse*) of living things and not an operation. Therefore, the ultimate end, i.e., beatitude, is not an operation.

Objection 2: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says that beatitude is “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.” But ‘state’ does not designate an operation. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

Objection 3: ‘Beatitude’ signifies something that exists within the one who is blessed, since it is a man’s ultimate perfection. But ‘operation’ does not signify a thing as *existing within* the one who operates; rather, it signifies it as *proceeding from* the one who operates. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

Objection 4: Beatitude remains permanently in the one who is blessed. But an operation is temporary and does not remain permanently (*non permanet sed transit*). Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

Objection 5: A single beatitude belongs to a single man. But operations are multiple. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

Objection 6: Beatitude exists without interruption in the one who is blessed. But human operations are frequently interrupted, e.g., by sleep, or by some other occupation, or by rest. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, “Happiness (*felicitas*) is an operation in accord with perfect virtue.”

I respond: In the sense in which a man’s beatitude is something created existing within him, one must claim that man’s beatitude is an operation.

For beatitude is a man’s ultimate perfection. But each thing is perfect to the extent that it is actual, since a potentiality is unperfected (*imperfecta*) in the absence of its [corresponding] actuality. Therefore, beatitude must consist in man’s ultimate actuality. But it is clear that an operation is the ultimate actuality of a thing that operates; this is why the operation is called “*second actuality*” by the Philosopher in *De Anima* 2. For it can be the case that what possesses a form is operating [only] in potentiality, in the way that someone who has knowledge might be thinking [only] in potentiality. Hence, in the case of other entities as well, each thing is said to exist *for the sake of* its operation, as *De Caelo* 2 says. Therefore, it must be the case that man’s beatitude is an operation.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Life’ has two senses.

In the first sense, what is called ‘life’ is the very existence (*esse*) of the living thing. In this sense, beatitude is not life. For it has been shown (q. 2, a. 5) that man’s *esse*, whatever it might be, is not man’s beatitude, since it is only God who is such that His beatitude is His *esse*.

In the second sense, what is called ‘life’ is an operation of a living thing by which a principle of life is made actual. It is in this sense that we talk about ‘the active life’ or ‘the contemplative life’ or ‘the pleasure-seeking life’. This is the sense in which the ultimate end is called ‘eternal life’. This is clear from what is said in John 17:3: “This is eternal life: that they may know you, the one true God.”

Reply to objection 2: In defining beatitude Boethius was thinking about the *general concept* of beatitude (*ipsam communem beatitudinis rationem*). For the general concept of beatitude is that it is a general and perfect good (*bonum commune perfectum*). And this is what he meant when he said that beatitude is “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods”—which means nothing other than that one who is blessed is in a state of the perfect good (*in statu boni perfecti*).

Aristotle, on the other hand, expressed the very *essence* of beatitude when he showed what it is through which a man is in such a state, viz., through a certain operation. And in *Ethics* 1 he himself also showed that beatitude is a perfect good.

Reply to objection 3: As *Metaphysics* 9 says, there are two sorts of actions.

The first sort, e.g., burning or cutting, proceeds from the thing that is operating into an exterior matter. Beatitude cannot be this sort of action, since, as it says in the same place, such an operation is more the action and perfection of the patient and not of the agent.

The second sort of action, e.g., sensing, intellectual understanding, or willing, is an action that remains within the agent itself. This sort of action is a perfection and act of the agent. This is the sort of operation that it is possible for beatitude to be.

Reply to objection 4: Since ‘beatitude’ expresses a certain ultimate perfection, ‘beatitude’ must have different senses because the diverse things capable of beatitude are able to attain diverse grades of perfection.

For instance, in God there is beatitude through His essence, since His very *esse* is His operation—an operation by which He has enjoyment of Himself and not of anything else.

On the other hand, in the beatified angels there is ultimate perfection through an operation by which they are joined to the uncreated good. And this operation is a single everlasting operation in them.

By contrast, in men who are in the state of the present life, the ultimate perfection is through an operation by which a man is joined to God, but this operation cannot be continuous and, as a result, it cannot be a single operation, either, since an operation is multiplied by being divided. For this reason, in the state of the present life a man cannot have perfect beatitude. Hence, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher, in positing beatitude for man in this life, says that it is imperfect, and after much discussion he concludes that “we call men blessed, but as men.”

However, God has promised us perfect beatitude, when we will be “like the angels in heaven,” as Matthew 22:30 says. Therefore, when applied to this perfect beatitude, the objection loses its force. For in this state of beatitude man’s mind will be joined to God by a single operation that is continuous and everlasting.

By contrast, in the present life we fall short of perfect beatitude to the extent that we fall short of the oneness and continuity of such an operation. Yet there is some participation in beatitude, and this participation is greater to the extent that the operation is able to be more continuous and unified. And so in the *active life*, which is occupied with many things, there is less of the character of beatitude than there is in the *contemplative life*, which is centered on one thing, viz., the contemplation of truth. And even if at times the man is not actually engaging in the sort of operation in question, still, because he is always ready to engage in it, and because he orders even the very cessation of the operation, e.g., sleep or some natural occupation, toward the operation in question, the operation seems like it is continuous.

Reply to objection 5 and objection 6: The replies to the fifth and sixth objections are clear from what has just been said.

Article 3

Does beatitude consist in an operation of the sentient part of the soul or only in an operation of the intellective part?

It seems that beatitude consists in an operation of the sentient part of the soul as well [as in an operation of the intellective part]:

Objection 1: Outside of an intellective operation, there is no operation in man more noble than a sentient operation. But in us an intellective operation depends on a sentient operation, since, as *De*

Anima 3 says, “we are unable to have intellectual understanding without a phantasm.” Therefore, beatitude consists in a sentient operation as well.

Objection 2: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says that beatitude is “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.” But some goods are sensible goods, which we attain through the operation of the sensory power. Therefore, it seems that an operation of the sensory power is required for beatitude.

Objection 3: As is proved in *Ethics* 1, beatitude is a perfect good—which would not be the case if a man were not perfected by it with respect to all of his parts. But certain parts of the soul are perfected through sentient operations. Therefore, a sentient operation is required for beatitude.

But contrary to this: Sentient operations are common both to us and to brute animals, but beatitude is not common to us and to brute animals. Therefore, beatitude does not consist in a sentient operation.

I respond: There are three ways in which something can pertain to beatitude: (a) *essentially* (*essentialiter*), (b) *as an antecedent* (*antecedenter*), and (c) *as a consequence* (*consequenter*).

No operation of the sensory power can pertain *essentially* to beatitude. For man’s beatitude consists essentially in his being joined to an uncreated good, which, as was shown above (a. 1 and q. 2, a. 8), is the ultimate end and such that a man cannot be joined to it through an operation of the sensory power. Similarly, as has been shown (q. 2, a. 5), man’s beatitude does not lie in corporeal goods, which are all that we attain to through the operation of the sensory power.

However, the operations of the sensory power can pertain to beatitude both *as an antecedent* and *as a consequence*:

They pertain *as an antecedent* to the sort of imperfect beatitude that can be had in the present life. For the operation of the intellect has as a prerequisite (*praeexigit*) the operation of the sensory power.

They pertain *as a consequence* to the perfect beatitude that we await in heaven, because, after the resurrection, as Augustine says in his letter *Ad Dioscorum*, “from the very beatitude of the soul there will be a certain overflow (*refluentia*) into the body and into the bodily senses, in order that they might be perfected in their operations.” This will become clearer below, when we talk about the resurrection. However, the operation by which the human mind is joined to God will not in that state (*tunc*) depend on the sensory power.

Reply to objection 1: This objection proves that the operation of the sensory power is required as an antecedent for the sort of imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life.

Reply to objection 2: The sort of perfect beatitude that an angel has is such that it is an “aggregation of all goods” through his being joined to the font of all good—and not such that it requires every single particular good (*non quod indigeat singulis particularibus bonis*).

By contrast, in the imperfect beatitude of the present life (*in hac beatitudine imperfecta*), what is required is an aggregation of goods that are sufficient for the most perfect operation possible in this life.

Reply to objection 3: In perfect beatitude the whole man is perfected, but he is perfected in his lower part through an overflow (*per redundantiā*) from his higher part. By contrast, in the imperfect beatitude of the present life, it goes, conversely, from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.

Article 4

Does beatitude consist in an act of the will?

It seems that beatitude consists in an act of the will:

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says that man’s beatitude lies in peace; hence,

Psalm 147:3 says, “He has placed peace within your borders.” But peace has to do with the will. Therefore, man’s beatitude consists in an act of will (*in voluntate*).

Objection 2: Beatitude is the highest good. But the good is the object of the will. Therefore, beatitude consists in an operation of the will.

Objection 3: The ultimate end corresponds to the first mover, in the way that the ultimate end of the army as a whole is victory, which is the end of the leader who moves everyone. But the first mover in the case of an operation is the will, since, as will be explained below (q. 9, a. 1), the will moves the other powers. Therefore, beatitude has to do with the will.

Objection 4: If beatitude is an operation, it must be man’s most noble operation. But as is clear from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13, loving God (*dilectio Dei*), which is an act of the will, is a more noble operation than knowing God (*cognitio Dei*), which is an operation of the intellect. Therefore, it seems that beatitude consists in an act of the will.

Objection 5: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, “The blessed man is such that (a) he has everything that he wills and (b) he wills nothing badly.” And a little later he adds, “Someone is close to being blessed if he wills well whatever he wills. For good things make him blessed, and he already has something of those goods, viz., a good will itself.” Therefore, beatitude consists in an act of the will.

But contrary to this: In John 17:3 our Lord says, “This is eternal life: that they know you, the one true God.” But as has been explained (a. 2), eternal life is the ultimate end. Therefore, man’s beatitude consists in a cognition of God, and this is an act of the intellect.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 2, a. 6), two things are required for beatitude: (a) the *essence* of beatitude and (b) its *per se accident*, as it were, viz., the delight adjoined to it.

Thus, I claim that as regards what beatitude is in its essence (*essentialiter*), it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is clear from what was said above (aa. 1-2 and q. 2, a. 7) that beatitude is the attainment of the ultimate end. But attaining an end does not consist in an act of the will. For the will is directed toward the end—an *absent* end when the will *desires* it, and a *present* end when it *delights* while reposing in it. But it is clear that an act of desiring an end (*desiderium finis*) is not itself an act of attaining the end (*ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis*); rather, it is a movement toward the end. Moreover, an act of delighting comes to the will because the end is present, whereas it is not the case, conversely, that something is present because the will delights in it. Therefore, there must be something other than the act of the will (*oportet aliquid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis*) such that through it the end itself becomes present to the one who wills.

This is manifestly obvious in the case of sensible ends. For if acquiring money (*consequi pecuniam*) occurred through an act of the will, then the covetous man would acquire the money right from the start, when he willed to have it. But, of course, it is absent from him at the beginning, and he acquires it by taking it with his hand or in some other such way; and it is *then* that he delights in the money now possessed.

Therefore, the same thing happens with an intelligible end, too. For at the beginning we will to attain some intelligible end. But we attain it by the fact that it becomes present to us through an act of the intellect. And then our delighted will comes to rest in the end now attained.

So, then, the essence of beatitude consists in an act of the intellect, whereas what pertains to the will is an act of delighting that is consequent to this beatitude. Accordingly, in *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says that beatitude is “rejoicing in the truth” (*gaudium de veritate*), because the act of rejoicing is the consummation of beatitude.

Reply to objection 1: Peace is relevant to man’s ultimate end not in the sense that it is beatitude itself in its essence, but in the sense that it is related to beatitude as an antecedent and as a consequence. *As an antecedent*, to the extent that all the troubles or obstacles (*perturbantia et impediencia*) associated with the ultimate end have already been removed; *as a consequence*, to the extent that a man, having attained his ultimate end, remains at peace (*remanet pacatus*) now that his desire has been put to rest.

Reply to objection 2: The will's first object is not its own act—just as the first object of the power of sight is not the act of seeing itself, but the visible thing. Hence, from the very fact that beatitude is the will's first object it follows that beatitude is not the will's very act.

Reply to objection 3: It is the intellect, rather than the will, that first apprehends an end, whereas the movement toward the end begins in the will. And so what is due to the will is what ultimately follows upon the attainment of the end, viz., an act of delighting or enjoying (*delectation vel fruitio*).

Reply to objection 4: Loving (*dilectio*) is preeminent over knowing (*cognitio*) as far as effecting movement [toward the end] is concerned, but knowing precedes loving in the attainment [of the end]. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, "A thing is not loved unless it is known." And so we first attain an intelligible end through an action of the intellect, just as we first attain a sensible end through an action of the sensory power.

Reply to objection 5: He who has everything that he wills is blessed because he *has* the things that he wills—and this having is through something other than an act of the will.

On the other hand, to will nothing badly is a requirement for beatitude in the sense of being an appropriate disposition (*debita dispositio*) for beatitude.

Now a good will counts as one of the goods that make a man blessed insofar as it is a certain inclination in the will [toward beatitude]—just as a movement is assigned to the genus of its terminus, as, e.g., an alteration is assigned to the genus *quality*.

Article 5

Does beatitude consist in an operation of the speculative intellect or of the practical intellect?

It seems that beatitude consists in an operation of the practical intellect:

Objection 1: The ultimate end of any creature consists in its becoming similar to God (*in assimilatione ad Deum*). But man is more similar to God through his practical intellect, which is a cause of things that are understood intellectually, than through his speculative intellect, whose knowledge is taken from the things. Therefore, man's beatitude consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than in an operation of the speculative intellect.

Objection 2: Beatitude is man's perfect good. But the practical intellect is more ordered toward the good than is the speculative intellect, which is ordered toward the true. Hence, it is because of the perfection of the practical intellect that we are called 'good', and not because of the perfection of the speculative intellect. Rather, we are called 'knowledgeable' or 'intelligent' because of the perfection of the speculative intellect. Therefore, man's beatitude consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than in an act of the speculative intellect.

Objection 3: Beatitude is a certain good that belongs to a man himself. But the speculative intellect is occupied more with things that lie outside of a man, whereas the practical intellect is occupied with things that belong to the man himself, such as his operations and his passions. Therefore, man's beatitude consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than in an operation of the speculative intellect.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, "Contemplation is promised to us as the end of all our actions and the eternal perfection of our joys."

I respond: Beatitude consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than in an operation of the practical intellect. This is clear from three considerations:

First, if man's beatitude is an operation, it must be man's best operation. But man's best operation is the operation that belongs to the best power with respect to the best object. Now the best power is the intellect and its best object is the divine good, which is an object of the speculative intellect and not of

the practical intellect. Hence, beatitude consists especially in this operation, i.e., in an act of contemplating divine things (*in contemplatione divinorum*). And since, as *Ethics* 9 and 10 say, “Each thing seems to be that which is best in it,” this operation is especially proper to man and especially delightful to him.

The same point is clear from the fact that contemplation is especially sought after for its own sake. By contrast, an act of the practical intellect is sought after not for its own sake, but for the sake of an action. And the actions themselves are likewise ordered toward some end. This is why it is clear that the ultimate end cannot consist in the active life, which is associated with the practical intellect.

Third, the same point is clear from the fact that the contemplative life is common to both man and higher beings, viz., God and the angels, to whom man is assimilated through beatitude. By contrast, as regards those things that pertain to the active life, even the other animals in some sense have them in common with man, albeit imperfectly. And so the ultimate and perfect beatitude which we wait for in the future life consists as a whole in contemplation. By contrast, as *Ethics* 9 says, the sort of imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life (*qualis hic haberi potest*) consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily in the operation of the practical intellect, which orders human actions and passions.

Reply to objection 1: The proposed similarity of the practical intellect to God is a proportional likeness (*secundum proportionalitatem*); that is, the practical intellect is related to what it has cognition of (*ad suum cognitum*) in the way that God is related to what He has cognition of (*ad suum*). By contrast, the speculative intellect’s assimilation to God is through its being united to and informed by [Him] (*secundum unionem et informationem*)—which is a much greater similarity (cf. ST 1, q. 12, a. 5).

Still, one could also reply that with respect to the principal thing that He knows, viz., His own essence, God has only speculative cognition and not practical cognition.

Reply to objection 2: The practical intellect is ordered toward a good outside of itself, whereas the speculative intellect has its own good within itself, viz., the act of contemplating the truth. And if this good is perfect, then the whole man is perfected and made good by it. The practical intellect does not have this good, but instead orders things toward it.

Reply to objection 3: This argument would go through if a man himself were his own ultimate end, since in that case his beatitude would consist in his thinking about and ordering his actions and passions. But since man’s ultimate end is in fact an extrinsic good, viz., God, whom we attain through an operation of the speculative intellect, it follows that beatitude consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than in an operation of the practical intellect.

Article 6

Does man’s beatitude consist in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences?

It seems that man’s beatitude consists in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences (*in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum*):

Objection 1: In the *Ethics* the Philosopher says that happiness (*felicitas*) is an operation in accord with perfect virtue. And in distinguishing the virtues, he posits just three speculative virtues, viz., scientific knowledge (*scientia*), wisdom (*sapientia*), and understanding [of principles] (*intellectus*), all of which have to do with the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences. Therefore, man’s ultimate beatitude consists in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences.

Objection 2: Ultimate human beatitude seems to be what is naturally desired for its own sake by everyone. But the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences is like this; for *Metaphysics* 1 says, “All men by nature desire to know,” and a little later it adds that the speculative sciences are sought

for their own sake. Therefore, beatitude consists in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences.

Objection 3: Beatitude is ultimate human perfection, and each thing is perfected by being brought from potentiality to actuality. But the human intellect is brought to actuality by the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences. Therefore, it seems that man's ultimate beatitude consists in thinking of this sort.

But contrary to this: Jeremiah 9:23 says, "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom," and it is speaking about the wisdom of the speculative sciences. Therefore, man's ultimate beatitude does not consist in the sort of thinking that belongs to these sciences.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), there are two types of human beatitude, the one *perfect* and the other *imperfect*. Perfect beatitude has to be thought of as attaining to the true nature of beatitude (*attinigit ad veram beatitudinis rationem*), whereas imperfect beatitude has to be thought of as not attaining to the true nature of beatitude, but instead as participating in a certain particular likeness of beatitude—in the way that perfect prudence is found in man, who has reason with respect to his actions, whereas imperfect prudence exists in some brute animals in whom there are particular instincts for certain actions that are similar to acts of prudence.

Perfect beatitude cannot consist essentially in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences. To see this clearly, note that the sort of thinking that belongs to a speculative science does not extend beyond the strength of that science's principles, since the whole of a science is virtually contained in the principles of that science. Now as is clear from the Philosopher at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* and at the end of the *Posterior Analytics*, the first principles of the speculative sciences are received through the sensory power. Hence, the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences cannot as a whole extend further than the cognition of sensible things can lead one. But man's ultimate beatitude, which is his ultimate perfection, cannot consist in the cognition of sensible things. For nothing is perfected by something lower than itself unless the lower thing has some participation in a higher thing. But it is clear that the form of a rock—or the form of any sensible thing—is lower than a man. Hence, the human intellect is perfected by the form of a rock not insofar as it is a form of that sort, but rather insofar as it participates in some likeness of what is above the human intellect, viz., the intelligible light or something of that sort. But whatever exists through another (*per aliud*) is traced back to something that exists in its own right (*per se*); hence, man's ultimate perfection must come through the cognition of something that lies beyond the human intellect. But it has been shown (*ST* 1, q. 88, a. 2) that one cannot arrive at the cognition of separated substances, which lie beyond the human intellect, through sensible things. Hence, it follows that man's ultimate beatitude cannot lie in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences.

However, just as sensible forms have a participated likeness to higher substances, so the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences is a certain participation in true and perfect beatitude.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 2), in the *Ethics* the Philosopher is talking about the sort of imperfect happiness (*de felicitate imperfecta*) that can be had in this life.

Reply to objection 2: What is desired naturally is not just perfect beatitude, but also any sort of likeness of it or participation in it.

Reply to objection 3: Through the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences our intellect is brought in some sense to actuality, but not to its ultimate and complete actuality.

Article 7

Does man's beatitude consist in the cognition of the separated substances, i.e., the angels?

It seems that man's beatitude consists in the cognition of the separated substances, i.e., angels:

Objection 1: In a homily Gregory says, "It does not at all avail us to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of the angels"—by which he means final beatitude. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore, it seems that man's ultimate beatitude consists in contemplating the angels.

Objection 2: Each thing's ultimate perfection lies in its being joined to its source (*coniungatur suo principio*); thus, the circle is said to be a perfect figure because its source is the same as its end. But as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, the source of human cognition is from the angels themselves, by whom men are illuminated. Therefore, the perfection of the human intellect lies in contemplating the angels.

Objection 3: Each nature is perfected when it is joined to a higher nature; for instance, a body's ultimate perfection is to be joined to a spiritual nature. But in the order of nature the angels are higher than the human intellect. Therefore, the ultimate perfection of the human intellect is to be joined to the angels themselves by means of contemplation.

But contrary to this: Jeremiah 9:24 says, "But let him who glories glory in this, that he understands and knows me." Therefore, man's ultimate glory or beatitude consists only in the cognition of God.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 6), man's perfect beatitude does not consist in the perfecting of his intellect through any sort of participation; rather, it lies in what is such-and-such through its essence (*est per essentiam tale*). But it is clear that to the extent that any given thing constitutes the perfection of a power, it is such that the concept of that power's proper object applies to it. But the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore, whatever has participated truth does not, when contemplated, make the intellect perfect with its ultimate perfection.

Now since, as *Metaphysics* 2 says, entities have the same relation to *esse* that they have to truth, anything that is a being by participation is true by participation. But angels have participated being (*esse participatum*), since, as was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 44, a. 1), it is only in the case of God that His *esse* is His essence. Hence, it follows that God alone is truth through His essence, and that God alone is such that contemplating Him makes one perfectly blessed.

On the other hand, nothing prevents a sort of imperfect beatitude from accompanying the contemplation of the angels; and this is a beatitude even higher than that found in the sort of thinking that belongs to the speculative sciences.

Reply to objection 1: We "take part in the feasts of the angels" by contemplating not only the angels but God along with them.

Reply to objection 2: According to those who claim that human souls are created by the angels, it seems appropriate enough that man's beatitude should lie in contemplating the angels and in being joined in this way to his source. However, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 90, a. 3), this view is erroneous. Hence, man's ultimate perfection comes through his being joined to God, who is the first source (*principium*) both of the creation of the soul and of its illumination.

Now as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 111, a. 2), an angel does illuminate as a minister. Hence, by his ministry an angel helps a man to reach beatitude, but he is not the object of human beatitude.

Reply to objection 3: There are two possible ways to understand what it is for a higher nature to be reached (*atingi*) by a lower nature.

The first sense has to do with reaching the level of a participated power, and in this sense a man's

ultimate perfection will lie in the man's reaching the point of contemplating in the way that the angels contemplate.

The second sense has to do with a power's reaching its object, and in this sense the ultimate perfection of any power is to reach the thing in which the nature of the power's object is fully realized (*in quo plene invenitur ratio sui obiecti*).

Article 8

Does man's beatitude lie in his seeing God's very essence?

It seems that man's beatitude does not lie in his seeing God's very essence (*in visione ipsius divinae essentiae*):

Objection 1: In *Mystica Theologia*, chap. 1, Dionysius says that through the highest possible understanding, man is joined to God as to something altogether unknown. But what is seen through its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore, the ultimate perfection of the intellect, viz., beatitude, does not consist in God's being seen through His essence.

Objection 2: To a higher nature belongs a higher perfection. But to see His own essence is a perfection peculiar to God's intellect (*perfectio divini intellectus propria*). Therefore, the human intellect's highest perfection does not reach this point, but stops somewhere short of it (*sed infra subsistit*).

But contrary to this: 1 John 3:2 says, "When He appears, we shall be like Him, and we shall see Him as He is."

I respond: There cannot be ultimate and perfect beatitude except in seeing God's essence. To see this clearly, there are two points that must be taken into account: the first is that a man is not perfectly happy as long as something remains to be desired and sought after; the second is that the perfection of any given power is in accord with the nature of its object.

Now as *De Anima* 3 says, an intellect's object is the 'what-ness', i.e., the essence, of a thing (*quod quid est, idest essentia rei*). Hence, an intellect's perfection goes as far as does its cognition of the essence of a thing. Therefore, if some intellect has a cognition of the essence of some *effect* but cannot thereby have a cognition of that effect's *cause*—i.e., a cognition by which the cause's 'what-ness' might be known—then that intellect is not said to have attained to the cause absolutely speaking (*non dicitur attingere ad causam simpliciter*), even though it is able, through the effect, to have a cognition of the cause's existence (*cognoscere possit de cause an sit*). And so when a man has a cognition of an effect and knows that it has a cause, there remains in him by nature a desire to know the 'what-ness' of the cause as well. And as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* says, this desire has its source in wonder (*illud desiderium est admirationis*) and leads to inquiry. For instance, if someone has a cognition of an eclipse of the sun, he realizes that it proceeds from some cause, which he wonders about because he does not know what it is, and in his wonder he makes an inquiry. And this inquiry is not put to rest until he arrives at a cognition of the essence of the cause.

Therefore, if the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows of God only that He exists, then the intellect's perfection has not yet, absolutely speaking, reached the first cause; instead, there still remains in it a natural desire to make an inquiry into that cause. Hence, that intellect is not yet perfectly blessed.

Therefore, what is required for perfect beatitude is that the intellect should reach the very essence of the first cause. And so it will have its perfection by being united to God as its object, and, as was explained above (q. 2, a. 8), this alone is what man's beatitude consists in.

Reply to objection 1: Dionysius is talking about the cognition had by those who are still in this

life (*qui sunt in via*) and tending toward beatitude.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8), there are two possible senses of ‘end’.

One of them has to do with the very thing which is desired, and in this sense the end of the higher nature is the same as the end of the lower nature—and, indeed, of all things, as was said above.

The other sense has to do with attaining this thing, and in this sense the end of the higher nature is different from the end of the lower nature in light of their diverse relations to the sort of thing in question. In this sense, then, God’s beatitude in comprehending His own essence is higher than the beatitude of a man or an angel who sees God but does not comprehend Him (cf. q. 4, a. 3 and *ST* 1, q. 12, a. 7).

QUESTION 4

What is Required for Beatitude

Next we have to consider the things required for beatitude. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is delight required for beatitude? (2) Is it the delighting or the seeing which is more central to beatitude? (3) Is comprehending required for beatitude? (4) Is rectitude of will required for beatitude? (5) Is the body required for man's beatitude? (6) Is the perfection of the body required for beatitude? (7) Are any exterior goods required for beatitude? (8) Is the company of friends required for beatitude?

Article 1

Is delight required for beatitude?

It seems that delight (*delectatio*) is not required for beatitude:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, "The vision is faith's entire reward." But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, it is beatitude that is the reward or payment for virtue. Therefore, nothing other than the vision alone is required for beatitude.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, "Beatitude is a good that is sufficient by itself (*per se*).” But whatever stands in need of something else is not sufficient by itself. Therefore, since, as has been shown (q. 3, a. 8), the essence of beatitude consists in the act of seeing God, it seems that an act of delighting is not required for beatitude.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 7 says, "The operation of happiness [read: beatitude] must be unimpeded.” But as *Ethics* 6 says, delight impedes the intellect's action; for it undermines the judgment of prudence. Therefore, delight is not required for beatitude.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says that beatitude is "rejoicing in the truth (*gaudium de veritate*).”

I respond: There are four possible ways in which one thing is required for another:

In one way, it is required as a *precursor to* or *preparation for* (*praeambulum vel praeparatorium*) that thing, in the way that instruction (*disciplina*) is required for scientific knowledge.

In a second way, it is required in the sense that it *brings that thing to perfection* (*sicut perficiens aliquid*), in the way that a soul is required for a body's life.

In a third way, it is required as an *extrinsic aid*, in the way that friends are required for doing something.

In a fourth way, it is required as *something concomitant*, in the way that heat is said to be required for fire.

It is in this last way that delight is required for beatitude. For delight is caused by a desire's coming to rest in a good that has been attained. Hence, since beatitude is nothing other than the attaining of the highest good, beatitude cannot exist without a concomitant delight.

Reply to objection 1: By the very fact that a reward is given to someone, the will of the one who merits the reward comes to rest, and this is what it is to have delight. Thus, delight is included in the very notion of a reward's being given.

Reply to objection 2: The act of delighting is caused by the very act of seeing God. Therefore, he who sees God cannot 'stand in need' of delight.

Reply to objection 3: As *Ethics* 10 says, an act of delighting that is concomitant with an operation of the intellect strengthens that operation and does not impede it. For what we do with delight we do with more attentiveness and perseverance.

On the other hand, an extraneous act of delighting does impede the intellect's operation. It sometimes does this by distracting one's attention, since, as has been explained, we are more attentive to those things in which we take delight; and when we are intensely attentive to one thing, our attention is

necessarily withdrawn from anything else. But it also sometimes does this by contrariety, in the sense that a sensual delight that is contrary to reason impedes the judgment of prudence more than the judgment of the speculative intellect.

Article 2

Is the act of delighting more central to beatitude than the act of seeing?

It seems that the act of delighting (*delectatio*) is more central (*principalius*) to beatitude than the act of seeing (*visio*):

Objection 1: *Ethics* 10 says, “Delight is the perfection of an operation.” But the perfection is better than that which is perfected. Therefore, the act of delighting is more central (*potior*) than the intellect’s operation, i.e., the act of seeing.

Objection 2: What is more central (*potius*) is that for the sake of which something is desirable. But operations are desired for the sake of the delight they bring (*propter delectationem ipsarum*); hence, nature attaches delight to the operations necessary for conserving the individual and the species, so that these operations will not be neglected by animals. Therefore, in the case of beatitude the act of delighting is more central than the intellect’s operation, i.e., the act of seeing.

Objection 3: The act of seeing corresponds to faith, whereas the act of delighting (*delectatio*), i.e., the act of enjoying (*fruitio*), corresponds to charity. But as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 13:13, charity is greater than faith. Therefore, the act of delighting, i.e., the act of enjoying, is more central than the act of seeing.

But contrary to this: A cause is more central than its effect. But the act of seeing is a cause of the act of delighting. Therefore, the act of seeing is more central than the act of delighting.

I respond: The Philosopher poses this problem in *Ethics* 10 and leaves it unresolved.

However, if one considers the matter carefully, it must necessarily be the case that the intellect’s operation, which is the act of seeing, is more central than the act of delighting. For the act of delighting consists in the will’s coming to rest in a certain way (*consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis*). But the will comes to rest in something only because of the goodness of the thing in which it comes to rest. Therefore, if the will comes to rest in some operation, then the will’s coming to rest proceeds from the operation’s goodness. But it is not the case that the will seeks the good for the sake of coming to rest; for if that were so, then the act of will itself would be the end—which is contrary to what was premised. Rather, the reason why it seeks to come to rest in the operation is that the operation is its good. Hence, it is clear that the very operation that the will comes to rest in is a more central good than is the will’s coming to rest therein.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in the same place, “Delight perfects the operation in the way that comeliness perfects youth,” i.e., it follows upon youth. Hence, delight is a perfection that is concomitant with the act of seeing, and it is not a perfection in the sense that it makes the act of seeing to be perfect within its own species.

Reply to objection 2: Sentient apprehension does not attain to the general notion of the good; instead, it attains to some particular good that is pleasurable. And so in the case of the sentient appetite that exists in animals, operations are sought for the sake of pleasure (*propter delectationem*).

By contrast, the intellect apprehends the universal notion of the good, whose attainment is followed by delight. Hence, the intellect intends the good more centrally than the delight. And hence it is that God’s intellect, which instituted nature, attached the delights for the sake of the operations.

Now a thing should not be judged simply in accord with the order of the sentient appetite; instead, it should be judged in accord with the order of the intellectual appetite.

Reply to objection 3: Charity does not seek the good it loves for the sake of delight; instead, its taking delight in an acquired good that it loves is consequent to it. And so it is not the act of delighting that is related to charity as an end, but instead the act of seeing, through which the end first becomes present to it.

Article 3

Is comprehending required for beatitude?

It seems that comprehending is not required for beatitude:

Objection 1: In *Ad Paulinum De Vivendo Deum* Augustine says, “To attain to God with the mind is great beatitude, but to comprehend Him is impossible.” Therefore, there is beatitude without comprehending.

Objection 2: Beatitude is a man’s perfection with respect to the intellective part [of his soul], in which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, qq. 79ff.), there are no powers other than the intellect and the will. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by the act of seeing God (*per visionem Dei*), whereas the will is sufficiently perfected by the act of delighting in Him (*per delectationem in ipso*). Therefore, it is not the case that an act of comprehending is required as some sort of third thing.

Objection 3: Beatitude consists in an operation. But operations are specified by their objects. Now there are two general objects, viz., the true and the good, with the true corresponding to the act of seeing and the good corresponding to the act of delighting. Therefore, it is not the case that an act of comprehending is required as, so to speak, a third thing.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 9:24 the Apostle says, “Run in such a way as to comprehend (*ut comprehendatis*).” But spiritual running terminates in beatitude, as he himself says at the end of 2 Timothy (“I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice”). Therefore, comprehending is required for beatitude.

I respond: Since beatitude consists in attaining the ultimate end, what is required for beatitude has to be taken from man’s very ordering toward his end.

Now man is ordered toward his intelligible end partly through his intellect and partly through his will: through his *intellect*, insofar as there exists in the intellect beforehand an *imperfect cognition* of the end; and through his *will*, first through *love* (*per amorem*), which is the first mover of the will toward something, and, second, through a real relation of the lover to what is loved. There can be three such relations: (a) sometimes what is loved is present to the lover, and in that case what is loved is no longer sought after; (b) sometimes what is loved is not present but is impossible to attain, and in that case it is likewise not sought after; and (c) sometimes what is loved is possible to attain, but it is elevated beyond the ability of the one who seeks it (*est elevatum supra facilitatem adipiscentis*), so that it cannot be had immediately—and this is the relation of *the one who hopes to what he hopes for*, which is the only relation that induces the seeking of the end (*sola habitudo facit finis inquisitionem*).

Now there are certain elements in beatitude itself answering to the three things just noted. For the *perfect cognition* of the end answers to the *imperfect cognition*; the *presence of the end itself* answers to the *relation of hope*; and, as was explained above (a. 2), the *act of delighting* in the already present end follows upon the *love* (*consequitur dilectionem*).

And so for beatitude it is necessary for these three things to come together, viz., *the act of seeing* (*visio*), which is the perfect cognition of the intelligible end; *comprehending* (*comprehensio*), which implies the presence of the end; and the act of *delighting* or *enjoying* (*delectatio vel fructio*), which implies the lover’s coming to rest in what is loved.

Reply to objection 1: There are two senses of ‘comprehending’:

The first sense is the inclusion of what is comprehended in that which comprehends it, and in this sense whatever is comprehended by something finite is itself finite. Hence, in this sense God cannot be comprehended by any created intellect.

In the second sense ‘comprehending’ names nothing other than embracing a thing that is now had with its presence (*tentionem alicuius rei iam praesentialiter habitae*), as when someone who attains a thing is said to comprehend it when he is embracing it. And it is in this sense that comprehending is required for beatitude.

Reply to objection 2: Just as hope and love involve the will because the same will loves something and tends toward it when it is not had, so too comprehending and delighting involve the will because the same will possesses something and comes to rest in it.

Reply to objection 3: The comprehending is not an operation in addition to the seeing, but is instead a certain relation to the end once it is had. Hence, the very act of seeing, or the thing seen insofar as it is there with its presence, is the object of the comprehending.

Article 4

Is rectitude of will required for beatitude?

It seems that rectitude of will is not required for beatitude:

Objection 1: As has been explained (q. 3, a. 4), beatitude consists essentially in an operation of the intellect. But rectitude of will, through which men are called ‘clean’, is not required for the perfect operation of the intellect; for in *Recontrationes* Augustine says, “I do not approve of what I said in the prayer, ‘God, who does not will any but the clean to know the truth ...’. For it can be replied that many who are not clean also know many truths.” Therefore, rectitude of will is not required for beatitude.

Objection 2: What is prior does not depend on what is posterior to it. But the intellect’s operation is prior to the will’s operation. Therefore, beatitude, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of will.

Objection 3: What is ordered toward something as toward an end is not necessary once the end has been attained, e.g., a ship after it has arrived at the port. But rectitude of will, which exists through virtue, is ordered toward beatitude as toward an end. Therefore, once beatitude has been attained, rectitude of will is unnecessary.

But contrary to this: Matthew 5:8 says, “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.” And Hebrews 12:14 says, “Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God.”

I respond: Rectitude of will is required for beatitude both as something antecedent to it and as something concomitant with it (*et antecedenter et concomitanter*).

Rectitude of will is required as *something antecedent* because it exists through an appropriate ordering toward the ultimate end. But the end is related to what is ordered toward the end in the way that form is related to matter. Hence, just as matter cannot attain to a form unless it is disposed in the right way for that form, so nothing attains an end unless it is ordered in the right way toward that end. And so no one can arrive at beatitude unless he has rectitude of will.

Rectitude of will is required as *something concomitant* because, as has been explained (q.3, a. 8), ultimate beatitude consists in seeing God’s essence, which is the very essence of goodness. And so the will of the one who is seeing God’s essence must love whatever he loves in relation to God (*sub ordine ad Deum*), just as the will of someone who is not seeing God must love whatever he loves in relation to the general notion he has of the good (*sub communi ratione boni quam novit*). And it is this very thing that gives the will rectitude (*quod facit voluntatem rectam*). Hence, it is clear that beatitude cannot exist

without a rectified will (*sine recta voluntate*).

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about the cognition of a truth that is not the very essence of goodness.

Reply to objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by some act of the intellect, and yet some acts of the will are prior to some acts of the intellect. For the will tends toward the final act of the intellect, which is beatitude. And so the right sort of inclination of the will is a prerequisite for beatitude in the way that the right sort of movement on the part of an arrow is a prerequisite for its striking the target.

Reply to objection 3: Not everything that is ordered toward an end ceases when the end is attained; rather, all that ceases is that which, like a movement, involves a notion of imperfection. Hence, the instruments of a movement are not necessary after it arrives at its end, but the right sort of ordering toward the end is necessary.

Article 5

Is the body required for beatitude?

It seems that the body is required for beatitude [or being blessed]:

Objection 1: The perfection of virtue and of grace presuppose the perfection of nature. But beatitude is the perfection of virtue and of grace. Now the soul without the body does not have the perfection of nature, since the body is by nature a part of a human nature, and every part is imperfect when separated from its whole. Therefore, the soul cannot be blessed (*beata*) without the body.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 3, a. 2), beatitude is a certain operation. But a perfect operation follows upon perfect *esse*, since nothing operates except insofar as it is a being in actuality. Therefore, since the soul does not have perfect *esse* when it is separated from the body—just as no part at all is perfect when it is separated from its whole—it seems that the soul cannot be blessed without the body.

Objection 3: Beatitude is man's perfection. But the soul is not a man without the body. Therefore, beatitude cannot exist in the soul without the body.

Objection 4: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, the operation of happiness that beatitude consists in is unimpeded. But a separated soul's operation is impeded, since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, "There is in the soul a certain desire to rule the body, and it is in a sense held back by this desire from moving with full force (*tota intentione*) toward the highest heaven," that is, toward seeing God's essence. Therefore, the soul cannot be blessed without the body.

Objection 5: Beatitude is a sufficient good and so puts desire to rest. But this good cannot belong to a separated soul, since, as Augustine says, it still desires to be united to the body. Therefore, a soul that is separated from its body cannot be blessed.

Objection 6: A man is equal in beatitude to the angels. But as Augustine says, the soul without the body is not equal to the angels. Therefore, the soul without the body is not blessed.

But contrary to this: Apocalypse 14:13 says, "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord."

I respond: There are two sorts of beatitude: the one, which is had in this life, is imperfect, and the other, which consists in the act of seeing God, is perfect.

Now it is clear that for the sort of beatitude that belongs to this life the body is necessarily required. For the beatitude that belongs to this life is an operation of the intellect, either the speculative intellect or the practical intellect. But in this life the intellect's operation cannot exist without phantasms, which, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 84, aa. 6-7), exist only in a corporeal organ. And so the beatitude that can be had in this life depends in some way on the body.

But as regards the perfect beatitude that consists in the act of seeing God, some have claimed that this beatitude cannot come to the soul when it exists without the body, and they assert that the souls of the saints, which are separated from their bodies, do not arrive at this beatitude until Judgment Day, when they regain their bodies.

But it is clear both from authority and from reason that this claim is false.

It is clear from authority because in 2 Corinthians 5:6 the Apostle says, “As long as we remain in the body, we are wandering away from the Lord.” And he shows the reason for this wandering when he adds, “For we walk by faith and not by sight (*per fidem et non per speciem*).” From this it is clear that as long as someone walks by faith and not by sight, lacking the vision of God’s essence, he is not yet present to God. By contrast, the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are present to God; this is why he adds, “But we are confident and have a good intention to wander away from the body and to be present to the Lord.” Hence, it is clear that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, walk by sight and see God’s essence, wherein lies true beatitude.

This same point is also clear from reason. For the intellect needs the body for its operation only because of the phantasms, in which it perceives intelligible truth; this was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 84, a. 7). But as was also explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 12, a. 3), it is obvious that God’s essence cannot be seen through phantasms. Hence, since man’s perfect beatitude consists in seeing God’s essence, man’s perfect beatitude does not depend on the body. Thus, the soul can be blessed without the body.

But notice that there are two ways in which something pertains to a thing’s perfection. The first way is by constituting that thing’s *essence*, in the way that the soul is required for man’s perfection. In a second way, what is required for a thing’s perfection is what pertains to its *well-being* (*ad bene esse eius*), in the way that bodily attractiveness or quickness of wit pertains to a man’s perfection.

Therefore, even though the body is irrelevant to the perfection of human beatitude in the first way, it is nonetheless relevant in the second way. For since a thing’s operation depends on its nature, when the soul is more perfect in its own nature, it will to that extent have more perfectly the proper operation in which happiness (*felicitas*) consists. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, having asked “whether this highest beatitude can be bestowed on the spirits of the dead without their bodies,” Augustine replies, “They cannot see the incommutable substance in the way that the holy angels do, either for some other more hidden reason or because they have a natural desire to rule their bodies.”

Reply to objection 1: Beatitude is the perfection of the soul on the part of its intellect, with respect to which the soul transcends the body’s organs, whereas beatitude is not the perfection of the soul insofar as the soul is the natural form of the body. And so the first sort of perfection of nature, in accord with which beatitude befits the soul, remains—even though the sort of perfection of nature it has insofar as it is the form of the body does not remain.

Reply to objection 2: The soul is related to its *esse* in a way different from the way in which other parts are related to their *esse*.

For the *esse* of a whole does not belong to any of its parts; hence, when a whole is destroyed, either (a) the parts cease to exist altogether, in the way that the parts of an animal cease to exist when the animal is destroyed, or (b) if the parts remain, then they have a different *esse* in actuality, in the way that a part of a line has an *esse* different from that of the line as a whole.

By contrast, the *esse* of the composite remains with the human soul after the destruction of the body—and this because the *esse* of the form is the same as the *esse* of the matter, and this *esse* is the *esse* of the composite. But as was shown in the First Part (ST 1, q. 75, a. 2), the soul subsists in its own *esse*. Hence, it follows that after its separation from the body it still has its complete (*perfectum*) *esse* and so it can have its perfect operation—even though it does not have the complete nature of the species (*licet non habeat perfectam naturam speciei*).

Reply to objection 3: Man’s beatitude has to do with the intellect, and so as long as the intellect

remains, beatitude can exist within it. Similarly, an Ethiopian's teeth, with respect to which the Ethiopian is said to be white, can be white even after they have been extracted.

Reply to objection 4: There are two ways in which one thing is impeded by another.

The first way is by *contrariety*, in the way that coldness impedes the action of heat, and this sort of impediment to an operation is incompatible with happiness.

The second way is in the manner of a *shortage* (*per modum cuiusdam defectus*), viz., when the impeded thing does not have everything that is required for its complete perfection (*ad omnimodam sui perfectionem*). This sort of impediment to an operation is not incompatible with happiness, though it is incompatible with its complete perfection. This is the sense in which being separated from the body is said to hold the soul back "from moving with full force" toward seeing God's essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment itself, as is possible, also overflows into the body (*dirivetur ad corpus per redundantiam*). And so as long as the soul itself enjoys God in the absence of the body, its desire is put to rest in what it has, yet in such a way that it nonetheless still wants its own body to participate in it.

Reply to objection 5: The separated soul's desire is completely put to rest as regards what is desired, since it has that which suffices for its own desire. But it is not totally at rest as regards the one who has the desire, since it does not possess the relevant good in every way in which it wants to possess it. And so, when it regains its body, beatitude increases in its extent, though not in its intensity (*beatitudo crescit non intensive sed extensive*).

Reply to objection 6: What he says in that place, viz., that "the spirits of the dead do not see God in the way that the angels do," should not be taken to imply a *quantitative* inequality (*non est intelligendum secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis*), since even now some of the souls of the blessed have been assumed into the higher orders of angels and see God more clearly than the lower angels do (cf. *ST* 1, q. 108, a. 8). Rather, it implies a *proportional* inequality (*secundum inaequalitatem proportionis*), since the angels, even the lowest ones, have the entire perfection of beatitude that they are ever going to have, whereas this is not the case with the separated souls of the saints.

Article 6

Is the perfection of the body required for beatitude?

It seems that the perfection of the body is not required for man's perfect beatitude:

Objection 1: The perfection of the body is a certain corporeal good. But it was shown above (q. 2) that beatitude does not lie in corporeal goods. Therefore, it is not the case that some perfect disposition on the part of the body is required for man's beatitude.

Objection 2: As has been shown (q. 3, a. 8), man's beatitude consists in the act of seeing God's essence. But as has been explained (a. 5), the body does not contribute anything to this operation. Therefore, there is no sort of disposition on the part of the body that is required for beatitude.

Objection 3: The more abstracted the intellect is from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But beatitude consists in the most perfect possible operation of the intellect. Therefore, the soul has to be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, there is no sort of disposition on the part of the body that is in any sense required for beatitude.

But contrary to this: Beatitude is the reward for virtue; hence John 13:17 says, "You shall be blessed if you do these things." But what is promised to the saints as a reward is not just seeing God and delighting in Him, but also a certain good disposition on the part of the body. For the last chapter of Isaiah, verse 14, says, "You will see, and your heart will rejoice, and your bones will flourish like an herb." Therefore, a good disposition on the part of the body is required for beatitude.

I respond: If we are talking about the sort of human beatitude that can be had in this life, then it is clear that a good disposition on the part of the body is necessarily required for it. For according to the Philosopher, this sort of beatitude consists in the operation of perfect virtue. But it is obvious that a man can be impeded in every sort of virtuous operation by bodily infirmities (*per invaletudinem corporis*).

On the other hand, if we are talking about perfect beatitude, some have claimed that no particular disposition of the body is required for beatitude; in fact, they have claimed that what is required for beatitude is that the soul should be altogether separated from the body. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 22 Augustine quotes Porphyry as saying that “in order for the soul to be blessed, it must flee from all bodies.”

But this is wrong. For since it is natural for the soul to be united to its body, it cannot be the case that the soul’s perfection excludes the body’s natural perfection.

And so one should reply that for beatitude that is perfect in every way, a perfect disposition on the part of the body is required both as an antecedent and as a consequence.

It is required as an *antecedent* because, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, “If the body is such that it is difficult and burdensome to rule—e.g., flesh that is corrupting and burdening the soul—then the mind is turned away from the vision that belongs to the highest heaven.” Hence, he concludes that since the body will be a spiritual body and no longer an animal body, a man will at that point be equal to the angels, and what was a burden to him will be to his glory.

On the other hand, it is required as a *consequence* because there will be an overflow of the soul’s beatitude into the body, so that the body itself will have its own perfection. Hence, in the letter *Ad Dioscorum* Augustine says, “God made the soul with such a potent nature that the vigor of incorruption overflows from its fullness of beatitude into the lower nature.”

Reply to objection 1: Beatitude does not lie in a corporeal good in the sense that such a good is the object of beatitude. But a corporeal good can make for a certain embellishment and perfection of beatitude.

Reply to objection 2: Even if the body does not contribute anything to the operation of the intellect by which God’s essence is seen, it could nonetheless impede that operation. And so the body’s perfection is required in order that it not impede the mind from being elevated.

Reply to objection 3: What is required for a perfect operation on the part of the intellect is an abstraction from this corruptible body, which burdens the soul, but not from the spiritual body, which will be totally subject to the spirit. This will be discussed in the Third Part of this work.

Article 7

Are exterior goods required for beatitude?

It seems that even exterior goods are required for beatitude:

Objection 1: What is promised to the saints as a reward is relevant to beatitude. But the saints are promised exterior goods such as food and drink, riches and a kingdom (*regnum*); for Luke 22:30 says, “... that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom,” and Matthew 6:20 says, “Lay up treasures for yourselves in heaven,” and Matthew 25:34 says, “Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom.” Therefore, exterior goods are required for beatitude.

Objection 2: According to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, beatitude is “a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods.” But as Augustine says, exterior goods are human goods, even if they are the least among them. Therefore, even they are required for beatitude.

Objection 3: Matthew 5:12 says, “Your reward is great in heaven.” But ‘to be in heaven’ signifies being in a place. Therefore, at least an exterior place is required for beatitude.

But contrary to this: Psalm 72:25 says, “For what have I in heaven? And, besides You, what do I desire upon earth?”—as if to say, I desire nothing other than what follows [in verse 28]: “It is good for me to adhere to God.” Therefore, no other exterior thing is required for beatitude.

I respond: For the sort of imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life exterior goods are required, not in the sense that they are part of the essence of beatitude, but in the sense that they are instruments serving beatitude, which, as *Ethics* 1 says, consists in the operation of virtue. For in this life a man needs bodily necessities both for the operation of contemplative virtue and for the operation of active virtue. For the latter, many other things are required as well, by means of which a man might perform the works of active virtue.

However, goods of this sort are not required in any way for the perfect beatitude that consists in seeing God. The reason for this is that all exterior goods of the sort in question are either required for sustaining the animal body, or else they are required for certain operations which we carry out by means of the animal body and which are appropriate for human life. By contrast, the perfect beatitude that consists in seeing God will exist either in a soul without a body or else in a soul united to a body that is spiritual and no longer animal. And so exterior goods of the sort in question are not required in any way for this sort of beatitude, since such goods are ordered toward animal life.

Moreover, as is clear from what has been said (q. 3, a. 5), in this life it is contemplative happiness, rather than active happiness, that comes closer to a likeness of perfect beatitude, given that it is more similar to God. This is why, as *Ethics* 10 says, contemplative happiness stands in less need of bodily goods of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: All these corporeal promises that are contained in Sacred Scripture are to be understood metaphorically, since in the Scriptures spiritual things are usually designated through corporeal things, so that, as Gregory puts it in one of his homilies, “from the things we know, we rise up to desire what is unknown.” For instance, ‘food’ and ‘drink’ stand for the delight of beatitude, ‘riches’ stands for the sufficiency by which God will suffice for man, and ‘kingdom’ stands for a man’s being lifted up to union with God.

Reply to objection 2: The goods in question, which serve animal life, do not belong to the spiritual life in which perfect beatitude consists. And yet within that beatitude there will be a collection of all goods, since whatever good is found in those things is such that all of it will be had in the source of all goods.

Reply to objection 3: According to Augustine in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, it is not being asserted that the reward of the saints exists in the corporeal heavens; rather, ‘heaven’ means the height of spiritual goods.

Still, a corporeal place, viz., the empyrean heaven, will be present to the blessed, not because beatitude demands it, but in keeping with a certain fittingness and suitability.

Article 8

Are friends necessary for beatitude?

It seems that friends are necessary for beatitude:

Objection 1: In the Scriptures our future beatitude is often designated by the name ‘glory’. But glory consists in a man’s good being brought to the attention of many. Therefore, the company of friends (*societas amicorum*) is required for beatitude.

Objection 2: Boethius says, “There is no good such that it is delightful (*iucunda*) to possess it without company (*sine consortio*).” But delight (*delectatio*) is required for beatitude. Therefore, the company of friends is likewise required.

Objection 3: Charity is perfected in beatitude. But charity extends to loving God and neighbor. Therefore, it seems that the company of friends is required for beatitude.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 7:11 says, “All good things have come to me together with her,” i.e., together with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. And so nothing else is required for beatitude.

I respond: If we are talking about the happiness (*felicitas*) that belongs to the present life, then, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, the happy man needs friends—not, to be sure, for the sake of their usefulness, since he is self-sufficient (*sibi sufficiens*); nor for the sake of pleasure, since he has within himself perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but instead for the sake of good action, so that, namely, he might do good to them, delight in seeing them do good, and be aided by them in doing good. For a man needs the assistance of friends in order to do well, both in the works of the active life and in the works of the contemplative life.

On the other hand, if we are talking about the perfect beatitude that will exist in heaven (*in patria*), then the company of friends is not necessarily required for beatitude, since a man has the entire fullness of his perfection in God.

However, the company of friends does make for the well-being of beatitude. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “In order to be blessed, spiritual creatures are aided intrinsically only by the creator’s eternity, truth, and charity. However, extrinsically—if they should be said to be aided—they are perhaps aided by just one thing, viz., by seeing one another and rejoicing over their fellowship in God.”

Reply to objection 1: The glory that is essential to beatitude is that which a man has in the eyes of God and not in the eyes of men.

Reply to objection 2: This passage applies when what one has in the relevant good is not fully sufficient. But this cannot be said in the case under discussion, since in God a man has enough of every good.

Reply to objection 3: The perfection of charity is essential to beatitude with respect to loving God, but not with respect to loving one’s neighbor. Hence, if there were just one soul enjoying God, then he would be blessed even without having a neighbor to love.

However, if one assumes that a neighbor is present, then love of that neighbor follows from loving God perfectly. Hence, friendship is related concomitantly, as it were, to perfect beatitude.

QUESTION 5

The Attainment of Beatitude

Next we have to consider the attainment itself of beatitude. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Can a man attain beatitude? (2) Can one man be more blessed than another? (3) Can a man have beatitude in this life? (4) Can beatitude once had be lost? (5) Can a man acquire beatitude by means of his natural powers? (6) Can a man attain beatitude through the action of some higher creature? (7) Are some works required of a man in order for the man to obtain beatitude from God? (8) Does every man desire beatitude?

Article 1

Can a man acquire beatitude?

It seems that a man cannot acquire beatitude:

Objection 1: As is clear from Dionysius in many places in *De Divinis Nominibus*, just as a rational nature is higher than a sentient nature, so an intellectual nature is higher than a rational nature. But brute animals, which have only a sentient nature, cannot arrive at a rational nature's end. Therefore, neither can man, who has a rational nature, arrive at an intellectual nature's end, i.e., beatitude.

Objection 2: Genuine beatitude consists in seeing God, who is pure truth. But it is connatural to a man to see truth in material things; hence, as *De Anima* 3 says, "He understands intelligible species in phantasms." Therefore, man cannot arrive at beatitude.

Objection 3: Beatitude consists in acquiring the highest good. But one cannot arrive at the highest point without passing through the middle. Therefore, since in the middle between God and human nature there is angelic nature, which man cannot transcend, it seems that man cannot acquire beatitude.

But contrary to this: Psalm 93:12 says, "Blessed the man whom you shall instruct, O Lord."

I respond: 'Beatitude' names the acquisition of the perfect good. Therefore, whoever has a capacity for the perfect good (*est capax perfecti boni*) can arrive at beatitude. But it is clear that a man has a capacity for the perfect good, since it is the case both that his intellect is able to apprehend a universal and perfect good and that his will is able to desire that good. And so a man is able to acquire beatitude.

The same thing is also clear from the fact, established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 1), that a man has the capacity to see God's essence, and we have explained (q. 3, a. 8) that this vision is what man's perfect beatitude consists in.

Reply to objection 1: A rational nature exceeds a sentient nature in a way different from that in which an intellectual nature exceeds a rational nature.

For a rational nature exceeds a sentient nature with respect to *the object of cognition*, since there is no way in which a sensory power can have a cognition of a universal, which is what reason has cognition of.

By contrast, an intellectual nature exceeds a rational nature with respect to *the way it has a cognition* of the very same intelligible truth; for as is clear from what was said in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 58, a. 3 and q. 79, a. 8), an intellectual nature apprehends immediately the truth which a rational nature attains to [only] through reason's inquiry. And so it is through a certain movement that reason attains to what the intellect apprehends. Hence, a rational nature is able to attain beatitude, which is the perfection of an intellectual nature, but in a way different from that in which the angels attain it. For the angels attained to beatitude immediately after the beginning of their existence (*statim post principium suae conditionis*), whereas men arrive at beatitude over time (*per tempus*). By contrast, a sentient nature cannot attain this end in any way at all.

Reply to objection 2: The mode of knowing intelligible truth through phantasms is connatural to man within the state of the present life. But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 89), after the

present life, man has a different connatural mode of cognition.

Reply to objection 3: Man cannot transcend the angels in the level of his nature, i.e., so as to be naturally higher than they are. Nevertheless, he is able to transcend them through the operation of his intellect, when he understands that there is something beyond the angels which beatifies man and which is such that when a man perfectly attains it, he will be perfectly blessed.

Article 2

Can one man be more blessed than another?

It seems that one man cannot be more blessed than another:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, beatitude is “the reward for virtue.” But an equal reward is given to everyone for the works of virtue. For Matthew 20:10 says that all who worked in the vineyard “received every man a denarius,” since, as Gregory puts it, “They obtained the equal payment of eternal life.” Therefore, one will not be more blessed than another.

Objection 2: Beatitude is the highest good. But there cannot be anything greater (*maius*) than what is highest. Therefore, any one man’s beatitude is such that there cannot be a beatitude greater than it.

Objection 3: Since beatitude is a perfect and sufficient good, it puts a man’s desire to rest. But a desire is not put to rest if there is some good lacking that could be supplied. But if there is nothing lacking that could be supplied, then there could not be any other good that is greater. Therefore, either the man is not blessed or, if he is blessed, then there cannot be another greater beatitude.

But contrary to this: John 14:2 says, “In my Father’s house there are many mansions”—by which, as Augustine puts it, “we are to understand different values of merit (*diversae meritorum dignitates*) in eternal life.” But the value of eternal life that is given for merits is beatitude itself. Therefore, there are different levels of beatitude and not an equal beatitude for everyone.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), there are two things included in the concept of beatitude, viz., (a) the ultimate end itself, which is the highest good, and (b) the acquisition or enjoyment of that good.

Thus, as regards the good itself that is the object and the cause of beatitude, one beatitude cannot be greater than another, since there is only one highest good, viz., God, who is such that men are blessed in enjoying Him.

However, as regards the acquisition or enjoyment of this good, one man can be more blessed than another, since one is more blessed to the extent that this good is enjoyed more. Now someone is able to enjoy God more perfectly than another by the fact that he is better disposed or ordered toward enjoying Him; accordingly, the one can be more blessed than the other.

Reply to objection 1: The sameness of the denarius (*unitas denarii*) signifies the oneness of beatitude on the part of the object. On the other hand, the diversity of the mansions signifies the diversity of beatitude in accord with the different levels of enjoyment.

Reply to objection 2: Beatitude is called the highest good insofar as it is the perfect possession of or enjoyment of the highest good.

Reply to objection 3: No one who is blessed is lacking in any good that is to be desired, since he has the infinite good itself, which, as Augustine puts it, is “the good of every good.” But someone is said to be more blessed than another because of the diverse ways of participating in that same good.

Moreover, the addition of other goods does not increase beatitude; hence, in *Confessiones* 5 Augustine says, “He who knows you and other things as well is not more blessed because of those other things, but is blessed because of you alone.”

Article 3

Can beatitude be had in this life?

It seems that beatitude can be had in this life:

Objection 1: Psalm 118:1 says, “Blessed are the undefiled on the way (*immaculati in via*), who walk in the law of the Lord.” But this is something that happens in the present life. Therefore, someone can be blessed in this life.

Objection 2: An imperfect participation in the highest good does not rule out beatitude; otherwise, it would not be the case that one man can be more blessed than another. But in this life men are able to participate in the highest good by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore, a man can be blessed in this life.

Objection 3: What is asserted by the many (*a pluribus*) cannot be totally false; for what occurs in most cases appears to be natural, and nature does not totally fail. But there are many who claim that there is beatitude in this life, as is clear from Psalm 143:15, “They have called the people blessed who have these things,” viz, the goods of the present life. Therefore, someone can be blessed in this life.

But contrary to this: Job 14:1 says, “Man born of woman, living a short time, is filled with many miseries.” But beatitude excludes misery. Therefore, a man cannot be blessed in this life.

I respond: A sort of participation in beatitude can be had in this life, but perfect and genuine beatitude cannot be had in this life.

There are two possible ways to think about this:

The first way is derived from *the general concept of beatitude*. For since beatitude is “a perfect and sufficient good,” it excludes every evil and fulfills every desire.

But in this life it is impossible for every evil to be excluded. For as Augustine diligently discusses in detail in *De Civitate Dei* 19, the present life is subject to many evils that cannot be avoided: ignorance on the part of the intellect, disordered affection on the part of the appetite, and numerous afflictions (*multiplicibus poenalitibus*) on the part of the body.

Similarly, in this life the desire for the good cannot be fully satisfied. For a man naturally desires that the good he possesses should be permanent. But the goods of the present life are transitory, since even life itself passes away, despite the fact that we naturally desire it and want it to endure forever; for man naturally recoils from death.

Therefore, it is impossible that genuine beatitude should be had in this life.

The second way considers *what beatitude consists in specifically*, viz., seeing God’s essence, which, as was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 2), cannot come to a man in this life.

From these considerations it is clear that no one can acquire genuine and perfect beatitude in this life.

Reply to objection 1: Some are called blessed in this life either (a) because of their hope of attaining beatitude in a future life—this according to Romans 8:24 (“We are saved by hope”)—or (b) because of a participation in beatitude that comes from some sort of enjoyment of the highest good.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which a participation in beatitude can be imperfect:

In one way, on the part of the *object of beatitude*, which is not seen with respect to its essence; and this sort of participation undermines the concept of genuine beatitude.

In the second way, the participation can be imperfect on the part of *the one participating*, who indeed attains the very object of beatitude in Himself, viz. God, but does so imperfectly in comparison with the mode in which God enjoys Himself. This sort of imperfection does not destroy the true concept of beatitude. For since, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 2), beatitude is a certain operation, the true concept of beatitude is taken from the object, which gives the act its species, and not from the subject.

Reply to objection 3: It is because of a likeness to genuine beatitude that men think there is some sort of beatitude in this life. And so they are not completely mistaken in thinking this.

Article 4

Can beatitude be lost?

It seems that beatitude can be lost:

Objection 1: Beatitude is a certain perfection. But every perfection exists in the perfectible thing in accord with the mode of that thing (*secundum modum ipsius*). Therefore, since man is mutable by his nature, it seems that beatitude is participated in by a man in a mutable way. And so it seems that a man can lose beatitude.

Objection 2: Beatitude consists in an action of the intellect, and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will is open to opposites (*se habet ad opposita*). Therefore, it seems that the will could desist from the operation by which a man is beatified, and in this way the man would cease to be blessed.

Objection 3: Corresponding to a beginning (*principium*) there is an ending (*finis*). But a man's beatitude has a beginning, since the man has not always been blessed. Therefore, it seems that his beatitude has an ending.

But contrary to this: Matthew 25:46 says of the just that "they shall go into life everlasting"—which, as has been explained (a. 2), is the beatitude of the saints. But what is eternal does not end (*non deficit*). Therefore, beatitude cannot be lost.

I respond: If we are talking about imperfect beatitude of the sort that can be had in this life, then in this sense beatitude can be lost.

This is obvious in the case of *contemplative* happiness, which is lost either (a) through forgetfulness, as when one's knowledge is corrupted by an illness, or (b) because of certain occupations by which someone is totally distracted from contemplation.

The same thing is also clear in the case of *active* happiness. For a man's will can change, so that he degenerates from virtue, in the operation of which happiness principally consists, into vice. On the other hand, even if virtue remains uncorrupted (*integra*), exterior changes can disturb this sort of beatitude insofar as they pose obstacles to many acts of the virtues. However, exterior changes cannot totally destroy this sort of beatitude, since the operation of a virtue still remains as long as a man withstands these adversities in a praiseworthy way.

Moreover, it is because the beatitude of this life can be lost—something which seems contrary to the concept of beatitude—that in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says that in this life some are blessed, not absolutely speaking, but "as men" whose nature is subject to change.

By contrast, if we are talking about the perfect beatitude which one looks forward to after this life, then notice that Origen, following the error of certain Platonists, claimed that a man can become unhappy after having had ultimate beatitude.

But there are two ways in which to see that this is obviously false.

First, from *the general concept of beatitude (ex ipsa communi ratione beatitudinis)*. For since beatitude itself is a perfect and sufficient good, it must put a man's desire to rest and exclude all evil. But a man naturally desires to hold on to the good that he has and to have a guarantee that he will keep it (*eius retinendi obtineat securitatem*); otherwise, he will necessarily be troubled by the fear of losing it or by sadness at the certainty that he will lose it. Therefore, what is required for genuine beatitude is that a man have the fixed opinion that he will never lose the good that he has. If this opinion is true, it follows that he will never lose beatitude. On the other hand, if it is false, then this very fact is an evil, viz., to have a false opinion, since, as *Ethics* 6 says, falsehood is bad for the intellect in the same way that truth is

its good. Therefore, he will not have been truly blessed (*beatus*) if some evil exists in him.

Second, the same point is clear from a consideration of *the specific concept of beatitude (ratio beatitudinis in speciali)*. For it was shown above (q. 3, a.8) that a man's perfect beatitude consists in seeing God's essence. But it is impossible for anyone who is seeing God's essence to will not to see it. For every good that someone wills not to have is such that either (a) it is insufficient and something more sufficient is being sought after in its place, or (b) there is something unwelcome (*incommodum*) connected with it and because of this it comes to be disliked (*propter quod in fastidium venit*). But the vision of God's essence fills the soul with every good, since it unites the soul to the font of all goodness; hence, Psalm 16:15 says, "I shall be satisfied when Your glory appears," and Wisdom 7:11 says, "All good things came to me together with her," viz., with the contemplation of wisdom. Similarly, the vision of God does not have anything unwelcome adjoined to it; for Wisdom 8:16 says of the contemplation of wisdom, "Her conversation has no bitterness, nor does her company have any tedium."

So, then, it is clear that someone who is blessed cannot give up beatitude by his own will (*propria voluntate non potest beatitudinem deserere*).

Similarly, he cannot lose it by having God take it away from him (*Deo subtrahente*). For since taking away beatitude would constitute a punishment, it could not come from God, the just judge, except for some sin; but someone who is seeing God's essence cannot fall into sin, since, as was shown above (q. 4, a. 4), rectitude of will necessarily follows upon seeing God's essence.

Again, neither could any other agent take away beatitude. For a mind conjoined to God is elevated above all other things, and so no other agent can cut it off from that union.

Hence, it is clearly absurd that a man should pass from beatitude to misery, or from misery back to beatitude, over the changing course of time (*per quasdam alternationes temporum*). For there cannot be temporal changes of this sort except with respect to things that are subject to time and change (*nisi circa ea quae subiacent tempori et motui*).

Reply to objection 1: Beatitude is a consummate perfection which excludes every defect from the one who is blessed. And so beatitude comes without mutability to the one who has it, once it is brought about by God's power, which lifts a man up to participation in an eternity that transcends all change.

Reply to objection 2: The will is open to opposites in the case of those things that are ordered toward an end, but it is ordered toward its ultimate end by natural necessity. This is clear from the fact that a man is not able not to will to be blessed (*homo not potest non velle esse beatus*).

Reply to objection 3: Beatitude has a beginning because of the nature (*conditio*) of the one who participates in it; but it lacks an ending because of the nature of the good which is such that participation in it makes one blessed. Hence, the beginning of beatitude derives from one thing, and that fact that it lacks an ending derives from something else.

Article 5

Is a man able to attain beatitude by his own natural powers?

It seems that a man able is to attain beatitude by his own natural powers (*per sua naturalia*):

Objection 1: Nature is not deficient when it comes to necessities. But nothing is more necessary to a man than that by means of which he attains his ultimate end. Therefore, this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore, a man is able to attain beatitude by his own natural powers.

Objection 2: Since man is more noble than the non-rational creatures, he seems to be more self-sufficient (*sufficientior*). But non-rational creatures are able to attain their own ends by their own natural powers. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a man is able to attain beatitude through his own natural powers.

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher, beatitude is a perfect operation. But that which

initiates a thing is the same as that which brings it to perfection. Therefore, since the imperfect operation, which is, as it were, the beginning (*principium*) in the case of human operations, is subject to a man's natural power, by means of which he is the master of his own acts, it seems that he is able to attain the perfect operation, i.e., beatitude, through his own natural power.

But contrary to this: A man is naturally the principle of his own acts through his intellect and his will. But the ultimate beatitude prepared for the saints exceeds the human intellect and will; for 1 Corinthians 2:9 says, "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him." Therefore, a man cannot attain beatitude by his own natural powers.

I respond: Through his own natural powers a man can acquire the imperfect beatitude that can be had in this life, in the sense that through his own natural powers he can likewise acquire virtue, the operation of which this beatitude consists in. This will be explained below (q. 63).

However, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 8), man's perfect beatitude consists in seeing God's essence. And as was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 4), seeing God through His essence lies not only beyond human nature, but also beyond every creature's nature. For any creature's natural cognition is in accord with the mode of its substance (*secundum modum substantiae suae*), in the sense in which the *Liber de Causis* says of an intelligence that "it has cognition of what is above it, and of what is below it, in accord with the mode of its substance (*secundum modum substantiae suae*)." But every cognition that is in accord with the mode of a created substance falls short of seeing God's essence, which infinitely surpasses every created substance. Hence, neither man nor any other creature can attain ultimate beatitude through his own natural powers.

Reply to objection 1: Just as nature has not failed man when it comes to necessities even though it has not given him weapons and hides as it has to other animals—for nature has given man reason and hands, by which he is able to provide these things for himself—so, too, nature has not failed man when it comes to necessities even though it has not given him any principle by which he can attain beatitude. For this was impossible. However, it did give him free choice, by which he would be able to turn toward God, who would make him blessed. For as *Ethics* 3 says, what we can do through our friends is such that we can in some sense do it through ourselves.

Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 2, a nature that can attain the perfect good, even though it needs exterior help to do this, is more noble than a nature that cannot attain the perfect good, but instead attains some imperfect good, even though it does not need exterior help to do this. In the same way, someone who is able to attain perfect health, even though this is through the help of medicine, is better disposed toward health than is someone who is able only to attain imperfect health without the help of medicine. And so a rational creature, who is able to attain the perfect good of beatitude, though he needs God's help to do this, is more perfect than a non-rational creature, which does not have a capacity for this sort of good, but instead attains some imperfect good by the power of its own nature.

Reply to objection 3: When what is imperfect and what is perfect belong to the same species, they can be caused by the same power. However, this is not necessary if they belong to different species; for it is not the case that whatever can cause a given disposition in matter can confer the ultimate perfection. But the imperfect operation that is subject to man's natural power does not belong to the same species as the perfect operation that constitutes man's beatitude, since the species of the operation depends on the object. Hence, the argument does not go through (*ratio non sequitur*).

Article 6

Can a man be made blessed through the action of a higher creature, viz., an angel?

It seems that a man can be made blessed through the action of a higher creature, viz., an angel:

Objection 1: There are two orderings found among things: (a) the ordering of the parts of the universe to one another, and (b) the ordering of the universe as a whole to a good that lies outside the universe. As *Metaphysics* 12 says, the first of these orderings is itself ordered to the second as to its end, in the way that the ordering of the parts of an army to one another is for the sake of the ordering of the whole army to its leader. But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, 109, a. 2), the ordering of the parts of the universe to one another involves higher creatures acting on lower creatures, whereas beatitude consists in man's being ordered to a good that lies outside the universe, viz., God. Therefore, it is through the action of a higher creature, viz., an angel, on a man that the man is made blessed.

Objection 2: What is such-and-such in potentiality can be brought to actuality through that which is such-and-such in actuality; for instance, what is hot in potentiality is made hot in actuality through that which is hot in actuality. But man is blessed in potentiality. Therefore, he can be made blessed in actuality by an angel who is blessed in actuality.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 3, a. 4), beatitude consists in an operation of the intellect. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 111, a. 1), an angel can illuminate a man's intellect. Therefore, an angel can make a man blessed.

But contrary to this: Psalm 83:12 says, "The Lord will give grace and glory."

I respond: Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature in the sense of having limited power and action, what exceeds created nature cannot be brought about by the power of any creature. And so if something that lies beyond nature (*est super naturam*) has to be brought about, this is done immediately by God—e.g., resuscitating the dead, giving sight to the blind, and other things of this sort. But it has been shown (a. 5) that beatitude is a good that exceeds created nature. Hence, it is impossible for beatitude to be conferred through the action of any creature; instead, if we are talking about perfect beatitude, a man is made blessed by God acting alone.

On the other hand, if we are talking about imperfect beatitude, then the explanation that applies to it is the same as the explanation that applies to virtue, the action of which imperfect beatitude consists in.

Reply to objection 1: What happens in most of the cases involving ordered active powers is that it is the highest power's role to bring a thing to its ultimate end, whereas the lower powers assist in the attainment of this ultimate end by conferring dispositions (*disponendo*); for instance, the use of a ship, for the sake of which the ship itself is made, pertains to the art of navigation, which presides over the art of shipbuilding. So, then, likewise in the case of the ordering of the universe, in attaining to beatitude a man is aided by the angels with respect to certain preliminaries by which he is disposed toward attaining to beatitude. But he attains the ultimate end itself through the first agent Himself, viz., God.

Reply to objection 2: When a form exists in something in actuality with perfect and natural *esse*, then it can be a principle for acting on another; for instance, a hot thing gives warmth through its heat. But if a form exists in something imperfectly and not with natural *esse*, then it cannot be a principle for communicating itself to another. For instance, the likeness of a color (*intentio coloris*) that exists in the pupil cannot make anything white. Again, not everything that is illuminated or heated can illuminate other things or make other things warm; otherwise, illuminating and heating would go on *ad infinitum*.

Now the light of glory through which God is seen exists in God perfectly with its natural *esse*, but in a creature it exists imperfectly and with assimilated or participated *esse*. Hence, no creature who is blessed can communicate his beatitude to another.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 106, a. 1), a beatified angel illuminates man's intellect, or even the intellect of a lower angel, with respect to certain ideas about

God's works, but not with respect to seeing God's essence. For in seeing His essence, all beatified creatures are illuminated directly by God.

Article 7

Are any human works required in order to obtain beatitude from God?

It seems that no human works are required in order to obtain beatitude from God:

Objection 1: Since God is an agent of infinite power, neither matter nor any disposition on the part of the matter is a prerequisite for His acting; instead, He can produce the whole immediately. But since, as has been explained (a. 6), a man's works are not required as an efficient cause of his own beatitude, they cannot be required for beatitude except as dispositions. Therefore, God, who does not need any dispositions for His acting, confers beatitude without any antecedent works.

Objection 2: Just as God is the direct source of beatitude (*auctor beatitudinis immediate*), so too He immediately establishes nature. But in the first establishment of nature, He produced creatures in the absence of any antecedent disposition or action on the part of any creature; instead, He instantly (*statim*) made each thing perfect in its species. Therefore, it seems that He confers beatitude on a man without any antecedent operations.

Objection 3: In Romans 4:6 the Apostle says that beatitude belongs to the man "on whom God confers justification without works." Therefore, no human works are required in order to obtain beatitude.

But contrary to this: John 13:17 says, "If you know these things, you will be blessed if you do them." Therefore, one arrives at beatitude through action.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 4, a. 4), rectitude of will is required for beatitude. For rectitude of will is nothing other than the will's being rightly ordered toward its ultimate end, and this is required for attaining to the ultimate end in the same way that the right sort of disposition on the part of the matter is required for its attaining to a form.

However, this does not show that some human operation has to precede a man's beatitude; for God could simultaneously (a) make a will tend in the right way toward the end and (b) make it attain that end—just as He sometimes simultaneously disposes the matter and induces the form.

Nevertheless, the order of God's wisdom dictates that it not happen this way. For as *De Caelo* 2 says, "Of those things that have a perfect good, some have it with no movement, some have it with a single movement, and some have it with many movements."

Now to have the perfect good without movement is something that belongs to what has that good by nature (*naturaliter*). But to have beatitude naturally belongs solely to God. Hence, it is proper to God alone not to move toward beatitude through some antecedent operation.

On the other hand, since beatitude exceeds every created nature, no mere creature attains beatitude fittingly except by means of movement via an operation through which it tends toward beatitude. Now as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 62, a. 5), an angel, who is higher in the order of nature than a man is, attained to beatitude in the order of God's wisdom with the single movement of a meritorious operation. Men, on the other hand, attain beatitude by means of many operational movements that are called *merits*. Hence, even according to the Philosopher, beatitude is the reward for virtuous operations.

Reply to objection 1: A man's operation is required antecedently for obtaining beatitude not because God's power to beatify someone is not sufficient, but so that the order among things might be preserved.

Reply to objection 2: The reason why God immediately produced the first creatures as perfect, without any antecedent disposition or operation on the part of a creature, was that He instituted the first

individuals of the various species in such a way that their natures would be propagated through them to their descendants. Similarly, it was because beatitude was to flow through Christ, who is God and man, to others—this according to Hebrews 2:10 (“... who had brought many children into glory”)—that His soul was made blessed immediately from the beginning of His conception without any antecedent meritorious operation.

However, this is peculiar to Christ. For His merit is what enables baptized children to obtain beatitude, even if they lack their own proper merits; for through baptism they have been made members of Christ.

Reply to objection 3: The Apostle is speaking here of the ‘beatitude of hope’, which is had through justifying grace and which is indeed not given because of antecedent works. For, unlike beatitude, it does not have nature of a terminus of movement, but is instead the beginning of a movement that tends toward beatitude.

Article 8

Does everyone desire beatitude?

It seems that not everyone desires beatitude:

Objection 1: No one can desire what he is ignorant of, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it is an apprehended good that is the object of desire. But there are many who do not know what beatitude is—which, as Augustine explains in *De Trinitate* 13, is obvious from the fact that some have thought beatitude to lie in bodily pleasure, some in the mind’s virtue, and some in other things. Therefore, not everyone desires beatitude.

Objection 2: As has been explained (q. 3, a. 8), the essence of beatitude is seeing God’s essence. But some are of the opinion that it is impossible for God to be seen through His essence by a man, and so they do not desire it. Therefore, not all men desire beatitude.

Objection 3: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, “The blessed man is the one who has everything that he wills and who wills nothing badly.” But not everyone wills this very thing, since some men will certain things badly and yet will that they should will those things. Therefore, not everyone wills beatitude.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, “If he had said, ‘You all wish to be blessed, you do not wish to be wretched,’ then he would have said something that no one would fail to acknowledge in his own will.” Therefore, everyone desires to be blessed.

I respond: There are two possible ways to think of beatitude:

One way is in accord with *the general concept of beatitude (secundum communem rationem beatitudinis)*. Given this sense, it is necessary that every man should will beatitude. Now, as has been explained (aa. 3 and 4), the general concept of beatitude is that it is a perfect good. But since the good is the object of the will, someone’s perfect good is such that it totally satisfies his will. Hence, to desire beatitude is nothing other than to desire that one’s will should be satisfied—which everyone wants.

In the second way, we can speak of beatitude in accord with its *specific concept (secundum specialem rationem)*, i.e., with respect to what beatitude consists in. And given this sense, not everyone has a cognition of beatitude, since not everyone knows which thing is such that the general concept of beatitude applies to it. And, in this regard, consequently, not everyone wills beatitude.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: Since the act of will (*voluntas*) follows upon the intellect’s (i.e., reason’s) apprehension, it follows that just as it is possible for something to be the same in reality and yet diverse according to reason’s consideration of it, so too it is possible for something to be the same in reality and

yet to be desired in one way and not desired in another.

Thus, beatitude can be thought of under the concept of an ultimate and perfect good, which is the general concept of beatitude, and, as has been explained, given this sense, the will tends toward it naturally and by necessity. Beatitude can also be thought of in such a way as to include other specific considerations, either on the part of the operation itself, or on the part of the operative power, or on the part of the object. And when it is so considered, it is not necessarily the case that the will tends toward it.

Reply to objection 3: If the definition of beatitude that some have posited—viz., that the blessed man is he who has everything that he desires, or that the blessed man is he who is such that everything he hoped for has come true—is understood in a certain way, then it is a good and sufficient definition. But if it is understood in another way, then it is imperfect.

For if it is understood simply of all those things that a man wills *by a natural desire*, then it is true that he who has everything that he wills is blessed. For nothing except a perfect good, i.e., beatitude, satisfies a man's natural appetite.

By contrast, if the definition is understood of those things that a man wills *according to reason's apprehension*, then, in this sense, to have the things that the man wills pertains not to beatitude but more to wretchedness, to the extent that having things of this sort keeps a man from having everything that he naturally wills. In the same way, reason sometimes accepts as truths things that impede its cognition of the truth. And it is because of this consideration that Augustine adds to beatitude's perfection the idea that the man "wills nothing badly"—even though the first part of the definition, viz., that the blessed man is he who has everything that he wills, could suffice by itself if it were understood correctly,.

QUESTION 6

The Voluntary and the Involuntary

Since, therefore, one has to arrive at beatitude through certain acts, we must next inquire about human acts, so that we might know the acts by which one arrives at beatitude or by which the journey toward beatitude is impeded. But because operations and acts have to do with singulars, every practical science (*operativa scientia*) is brought to completion in the consideration of particulars (*in particulari consideratione*). Therefore, since moral theory (*moralis consideratio*) concerns human acts, it has to deal with them first in general (qq. 6-114) and then in particular (*ST* 2-2).

As regards the general consideration of human acts, what comes up first for consideration are the human acts themselves (qq. 6-48) and, second, their principles (qq. 49-114).

Among human acts some are proper to man, and some are common to man and the other animals. Since beatitude is proper to man, the acts that are properly human are more closely related to beatitude than are the acts that are common to man and the other animals. Therefore, we must first consider the acts which are proper to man (qq. 6-21) and, second, the acts which are common to man and the other animals and which are called the passions of the soul (qq. 22-48).

As regards the first topic, there are two things that come up for consideration: first, the nature of human acts (*de conditione humanorum actorum*) (qq. 6-17) and, second, the distinctions among them (*de distinctione eorum*) (qq. 18-21).

Now since what are properly called human acts are those acts that are voluntary—for the will is a rational appetite and is proper to man—we must consider human acts insofar as they are voluntary. Therefore, what needs to be considered first is the voluntary and the involuntary (qq. 6-7); second, the acts that are voluntary in the sense of being elicited by the will itself in such a way that they belong immediately to the will (qq. 8-16); and, third, the acts which are voluntary in the sense of being commanded by the will and which belong to the will through the mediation of other powers (q. 17).

And since voluntary acts have certain circumstances according to which they are judged, what needs to be considered first is the voluntary and the involuntary (q.6) and, after that, the circumstances of the acts in which the voluntary and the involuntary are found (q. 7)

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is voluntariness found in human acts? (2) Is voluntariness found in brute animals? (3) Can there be voluntariness in the absence of any act? (4) Can violence be done to the will? (5) Is violence a cause of involuntariness? (6) Is fear a cause of involuntariness? (7) Is concupiscence a cause of involuntariness? (8) Is ignorance a cause of involuntariness?

Article 1

Is voluntariness found in human acts?

It seems that voluntariness (*voluntarium*) is not found in human acts:

Objection 1: As is clear from Gregory of Nyssa, Damascene, and Aristotle, the voluntary is that “whose principle exists within the thing itself (*in ipso*).” But the principle of human acts exists outside of a man and not within the man himself; for as *De Anima* 3 explains, a man’s appetite is moved to act by something desirable which exists outside of him and which is like an unmoved mover. Therefore, in human acts there is no voluntariness.

Objection 2: In *Physics* 8 the Philosopher proves that within animals there is no new movement that does not come from another movement that is exterior. But all of a man’s acts are new in the sense that no human act is eternal. Therefore, the principle of all human acts is from without (*ab extra*). Therefore, voluntariness is not found in human acts.

Objection 3: Someone who acts voluntarily is able to act on his own (*per se agere potest*). But this does not apply to men; for John 15:5 says, “Without me you can do nothing.” Therefore,

voluntariness is not found in human acts.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “The voluntary is an act that is a rational operation.” But human acts are like that. Therefore, voluntariness is found in human acts.

I respond: Voluntariness has to exist in human acts.

To see this clearly, consider that some acts or movements are such that their principle exists within the agent, i.e., within that which is moved (*seu in eo quod movetur*), whereas other movements or acts are such that their principle lies outside the agent. For instance, when a rock moves upward, the principle of the motion lies outside the rock, but when it moves downward, the principle of the motion exists within the rock itself.

Now among the things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves while others do not. For since, as was established above (q. 1, a. 2), every agent effects movement or is moved (*seu motum agat seu moveatur*) for the sake of an end, what is perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle is that in which there exists some intrinsic principle not only of the thing’s being moved, but also of its being moved toward an end.

Now in order for something to be done for the sake of an end, some sort of cognition (*cognitio*) of the end is required. Therefore, if a thing acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle in such a way that it has some sort of cognition (*notitia*) of the end, then it has within itself the principle of its own act not only insofar as it acts, but also insofar as it acts for the sake of an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no cognition (*notitia*) of the end, then even if the principle of its action or movement exists within it, nonetheless, its principle of acting or being moved *for the sake of an end* does not exist within it, but instead exists in something else by which the principle of its moving toward the end is imprinted upon it. Hence, things of this sort are not said to move themselves, but are instead said to be moved by other things. By contrast, the things that have cognition (*notitia*) of the end are said to move themselves, since there exists within them a principle not only of their acting, but also of their acting for the sake of an end. And so since both things—viz., acting and acting for the sake of an end—come from an intrinsic principle, their acts and movements are called ‘voluntary’; for the name ‘voluntary’ signifies that the movement and the act come from the thing’s own inclination (*sit a propria inclinatione*).

And so it is that, according to the definition given by Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene, what is said to be voluntary is not only “that whose principle is intrinsic” (*cuius principium est intra*), but also includes knowledge (*cum additione scientiae*).

Hence, since man especially has cognition of the end of his action and moves himself, voluntariness is found especially in his acts.

Reply to objection 1: Not every principle is a *first* principle. Therefore, even though it is part of the concept of the voluntary that its principle be intrinsic, it is nonetheless not contrary to the concept of the voluntary that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an exterior principle. For it is not part of the concept of the voluntary that the intrinsic principle should be a *first* principle.

Still, notice that it is possible for a given principle of movement to be first in a genus and yet not first absolutely speaking. For instance, in the genus of things that can undergo alteration (*in genere alterabilium*), the first altering being is a celestial body, and yet it is not the first mover absolutely speaking; instead, it is moved by a higher mover with respect to its local motion. So, then, a voluntary act’s intrinsic principle, which is a power that is cognitive and appetitive, is a first principle in the genus of appetitive movement, even though it is moved by some exterior being with respect to other species of movement.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which a new animal movement is preceded by some exterior movement:

First, insofar as it is through an exterior movement that something sensible, which when sensed moves the appetite, is presented to the animal’s sensory power. For instance, a lion sees a stag because of the stag’s approaching movement and begins to be moved with respect to it.

Second, insofar as it is through an exterior movement that the animal's body begins to be changed in some way by a natural change, e.g. through cold or heat, and when the body is thus changed through the movement of an exterior body, the animal's sentient appetite, which is a power belonging to a corporeal organ, is also changed incidentally (*immutatur etiam per accidens*)—as, for instance, when because of some bodily alteration the appetite is moved to desire a given thing. However, this is not contrary to the concept of the voluntary, since, as has been explained, motions of this sort from an exterior principle belong to a different genus.

Reply to objection 3: God moves a man to act not only by proposing something to his sensory power or by affecting his body, but also by moving his will itself. For every movement of both the will and nature proceeds from Him as the first mover. And just as it is not contrary to the concept of a nature that the nature's movement proceeds from God as the first mover, given that a nature is a sort of instrument of God as a mover, so too it is not contrary to the concept of a voluntary act that it proceed from God insofar as the will is moved by God.

Nonetheless, what is common to the concept of a natural movement and to the concept of a voluntary movement is that these movements proceed from an intrinsic principle.

Article 2

Does voluntariness exist in brute animals?

It seems that voluntariness does not exist in brute animals:

Objection 1: 'Voluntariness' (*voluntarium*) comes from 'will' (*voluntas*). But since, as *De Anima* 3 says, the will exists in reason, there can be no will in brute animals. Therefore, neither is voluntariness found in them.

Objection 2: It is because human acts are voluntary that a man is said to be the master of his own acts. But brute animals do not have dominion over their own acts; for as Damascene says, "they do not act but are rather acted upon." Therefore, voluntariness does not exist in them.

Objection 3: Damascene says, "Praise and blame follow upon voluntary acts." But neither praise nor blame is appropriate for the acts of brute animals. Therefore, voluntariness does not exist in brute animals.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "Young children and brute animals share in voluntariness." Moreover, Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa say the same thing.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), what is required for the concept of voluntariness is (a) that the principle of the act should be intrinsic (*sit intra*), along with (b) some sort of cognition of the end.

Now there are two sorts of cognition of the end, viz., *perfect* and *imperfect*.

A *perfect* cognition of the end occurs when there is not only (a) an apprehension of the thing that is the end, but also (b) a cognition of the concept of an end and (c) a cognition of the relation between the means ordered to an end (*quod ordinatur in finem*) and the end itself. And this sort of cognition of an end belongs only to a rational creature.

On the other hand, an *imperfect* cognition of an end is one that consists solely in an apprehension of the end, without a cognition of the concept of an end or a cognition of the act's relation to the end. This sort of cognition of an end is found in brute animals and occurs through the sensory power and the natural estimative power (*per sensum et aestimationem naturalem*) (cf. *ST* 1, q. 78).

Therefore, a perfect cognition of the end is followed by voluntariness in accord with its perfect concept—so that, namely, once the end has been apprehended, someone is able, in deliberating about the end and about the means to the end (*deliberans de fine et de his quae sunt ad finem*), either to move

himself toward the end or not to move himself toward it (*aliquis potest moveri in finem vel non moveri*).

By contrast, an imperfect cognition of the end is followed by voluntariness in accord with its imperfect concept—so that, namely, in apprehending the end one does not deliberate, but is immediately moved toward the end.

Hence, voluntariness in accord with its perfect concept belongs only to a rational nature, but voluntariness in accord with its imperfect concept belongs to brute animals as well.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Will’ (*voluntas*) names the rational appetite, and so it cannot exist in things that lack reason. On the other hand, ‘voluntary’ (*voluntarium*) is predicated denominatively of the will, and it can be extended to include things (*potest trahi ad ea*) in which there is some sort of participation in will, through some likeness to an act of will (*secundum convenientiam ad voluntatem*). And this is the way in which voluntariness is attributed to brute animals, viz., insofar as they are moved toward the end through some sort of cognition.

Reply to objection 2: A man’s being the master of his own acts stems from the fact that he has deliberation about his acts. For it is from the fact that reason, in deliberating, is open to opposites (*deliberans se habet ad opposita*) that the will has a capacity for both opposites (*in utrumque potest*). But, as has been explained, this is a respect in which voluntariness does not exist in brute animals.

Reply to objection 3: Praise and blame follow upon a voluntary act in accord with the perfect concept of voluntariness. This sort of voluntariness is not found in brute animals.

Article 3

Can there be voluntariness in the absence of an act?

It seems that there cannot be voluntariness in the absence of an act:

Objection 1: The voluntary (*voluntarium*) is what is from the will (*voluntas*). But nothing can be ‘from the will’ except through an act, at least an act of the will itself. Therefore, there cannot be voluntariness in the absence of an act.

Objection 2: Just as someone is said ‘to will’ because of the will’s act, so too, when the act of will ceases, he is said ‘not to will’. But *not to will* (*non velle*) is a cause of involuntariness, which is opposed to voluntariness. Therefore, voluntariness cannot exist once the will’s act ceases.

Objection 3: As has been explained (aa. 1-2), cognition is part of the concept of voluntariness. But cognition occurs through an act. Therefore, there cannot be voluntariness in the absence of any act.

But contrary to this: The voluntary is said to be that of which we are the masters. But we are the masters of both acting and not acting, of both willing and not willing. Therefore, just as acting and willing are voluntary, so too are not acting and not willing.

I respond: The voluntary is what is from the will. But there are two ways in which something is said to be ‘from something’: (a) *directly*, so that, namely, it proceeds from something insofar as that thing is an agent, in the way that giving warmth proceeds from heat; and (b) *indirectly*, from the very fact that the thing does not act, in the way that a ship’s sinking is said to be from the pilot (*a gubernatore*) because he stops steering the ship.

But note that it is not always the case that what follows upon the absence of an act (*ad defectum actionis*) is traced back causally (*sicut in causam*) to the agent’s not acting; this occurs only when the agent is able to act and ought to act. For if the pilot were unable to steer the ship, or if piloting the ship had not been entrusted to him, then the ship’s sinking, which happened because of the absence of steering, would not be imputed to him.

Therefore, since the will is able, by willing and by acting, to prevent its own not willing and its own not acting, and since it sometimes ought to prevent them, this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to the

will as if it were something that proceeded from the will.

And so there can be voluntariness in the absence of an act—sometimes in the absence of an exterior act but with an interior act, as when someone wills not to act, and sometimes in the absence of an interior act as well, as when he does not will anything.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Voluntary’ expresses not only what proceeds directly from the will as from an agent, but also what proceeds indirectly from the will as from a non-agent.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Not to will’ (*non velle*) has two senses:

In one sense, it is taken with the force of a single word, and in this sense it is the infinitive of the verb ‘to will-against’ (*infinitivum huius verbi nolo*). In this sense, just as when I say, ‘I will against reading’ (*nolo legere*), the sense is ‘I will not to read’ (*volo non legere*), so too ‘I do not will to read’ (*non volo legere*) signifies that I will not to read. And ‘not to will’, taken in this sense, is a cause of involuntariness.

In a second sense, ‘not to will’ is taken with the force of a phrase. And in this sense it is not the case that an act of the will is affirmed. And ‘not to will’, taken in this sense, is not a cause of involuntariness.

Reply to objection 3: An act of cognition is required for voluntariness in the same sense in which an act of will is required—namely, that it be in someone’s power to think about something and to will it and to do it. And in this sense just as not willing it and not doing it are, when the time comes, voluntary, so too is not thinking about it.

Article 4

Can violence be done to the will?

It seems that violence can be done to the will (*voluntati possit violentia inferri*):

Objection 1: Each thing is such that it can be coerced by something more powerful than it. But there is something more powerful than the human will, viz., God. Therefore, the will can be coerced at least by Him.

Objection 2: Everything passive is coerced by its active counterpart when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive power; for as *De Anima* 3 says, it is “a moved mover.” Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active counterpart, it seems that it is sometimes coerced.

Objection 3: A violent movement is one that is contrary to nature. But the will’s movement is sometimes contrary to nature; this is clear in the case of the will’s movement toward sinning, since, as Damascene says, sinning is contrary to nature.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says that if something is effected by the will, it is not effected by necessity. But anything that is coerced is effected by necessity. Therefore, what is effected by the will cannot be coerced. Therefore, the will cannot be forced to act.

I respond: There are two sorts of acts of the will: (a) the one is an act that belongs directly to the will (*qui est eius immediate*) in the sense that it is *elicited* by the will, viz., to will; (b) the other is an act of the will that is *commanded* by the will and exercised by the mediation of some other power, e.g., to walk or to talk, which are commanded by the will by means of the power to effect local motion (*mediante potentia motiva*).

With respect to acts that are commanded by the will, the will is able to suffer violence, since the exterior members of the body can be prevented from executing the will’s command.

However, with respect to the will’s own proper act itself, violence cannot be done to the will. The reason for this is that the will’s act is nothing other than a certain inclination that proceeds from a cognitive interior principle (*ab interiori principio cognoscente*), in the same way that a natural appetite is

a certain inclination that proceeds from an interior principle and without cognition. Hence, it is contrary to the concept of the will's act that it should be coerced or violent, in the same way that this is also contrary to the concept of a natural inclination or movement. For instance, a rock can be borne upward through violence, but this violent movement cannot proceed from the rock's natural inclination. Similarly, a man can be dragged along by force, but it is incompatible with the concept of violence that this movement should proceed from his will.

Reply to objection 1: God, who is more powerful than the human will, is able to move the human will—this according to Proverbs 21:1 (“The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, and He shall turn it wherever He wills”). But if this occurred through violence, then it would by that very fact not occur with an act of the will, and the will itself would not be moved. Instead, it would be something contrary to the will.

Reply to objection 2: When what is passive is moved by something active, it is not always the case that the movement is violent. Violence occurs when the movement is effected in a way contrary to the passive thing's interior inclination. Otherwise, all the alterations and generations of simple bodies would be unnatural and violent; and yet they are natural because of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or the subject for the relevant disposition. Similarly, when the will is moved in accord with its proper inclination by a desirable thing, then this movement is voluntary and not violent.

Reply to objection 3: Even if what the will tends toward in sinning is bad and contrary to its rational nature as a matter of fact (*secundum rei veritatem*), it is nonetheless something that is apprehended as good and as in conformity with its nature (*conveniens naturae*); for it is pleasing to the man because of some sensory passion or because of some corrupt habit.

Article 5

Is violence a cause of involuntariness?

It seems that violence is not a cause of involuntariness:

Objection 1: ‘Voluntary’ (*voluntarium*) and ‘involuntary’ (*involuntarium*) have to do with the will (*voluntas*). But as has been shown (a. 4), violence cannot be done to the will. Therefore, violence cannot be a cause of involuntariness.

Objection 2: As Damascene and the Philosopher point out, what is involuntary occurs with sadness. But it sometimes happens that someone suffers violence and yet is not thereby saddened. Therefore, violence is not a cause of involuntariness.

Objection 3: What proceeds from the will cannot be involuntary. But some sorts of violence proceed from the will, as when someone with a heavy body climbs upward, or as when someone twists his limbs in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore, violence is not a cause of involuntariness.

But contrary to this: The Philosopher and Damascene say, “Something is involuntary because of violence.”

I respond: Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, just as it is likewise directly opposed to the natural. For it is common to the voluntary and the natural that both proceed from an intrinsic principle, whereas the violent proceeds from an extrinsic principle. Because of this, just as in the case of things that lack cognition, violence effects something contrary to nature, so in the case of things with cognition, violence brings it about that something is contrary to the will.

Now what is contrary to nature is said to be unnatural (*innaturale*), and, similarly, what is contrary to the will is said to be involuntary. Hence, violence is a cause of involuntariness.

Reply to objection 1: The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. But it was explained above

(a. 4) that 'voluntary' is said not only of acts that belong to the will immediately, but also of acts that are commanded by the will. Thus, as was explained above (a. 4), with respect to acts that belong to the will itself immediately, violence cannot be done to the will, and so violence cannot make such acts involuntary. By contrast, with respect to acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence. And as regards such acts, violence renders them involuntary.

Reply to objection 2: Just as what occurs in accord with a nature's inclination is called natural, so what occurs in accord with the will's inclination is called voluntary.

Now there are two ways in which something is said to be *natural*: (a) first, because it proceeds from the nature as from an *active principle*, in the way that giving warmth is natural to a fire; (b) second, in accord with a *passive principle*, i.e., because there exists in the nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle, in the way that the movement of a celestial body is said to be natural because of the celestial body's natural readiness (*propter aptitudinem naturalem*) for such a motion, even if what effects the motion is voluntary.

Similarly, there are two possible ways in which something is said to be *voluntary*: (a) in one way, *with respect to an action*, e.g., when some one wills to do something; (b) in the second way, *with respect to being acted upon*, viz., when someone wills to be acted upon by another.

Hence, when an action is done to someone by something exterior, then as long as the volition to undergo the action remains in the will of the one who undergoes the action (*manente in eo qui patitur voluntate patiendi*), there is no violence absolutely speaking. For even though the one who is undergoing the action does not contribute by acting, he nonetheless contributes by his willing to undergo the action. Hence, this cannot be called involuntary.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Physics* 8, even if the movement of an animal by which the animal sometimes moves against the body's natural inclination is not natural to the body, it is nonetheless in some sense natural to the animal, since it is natural to the animal to be moved by desire. And so this movement is violent in a certain respect but not absolutely speaking.

And one should reply along the same lines for the case in which someone twists his limbs against their natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, viz., with respect to the particular limbs, but not violent absolutely speaking, i.e., with respect to the man himself.

Article 6

Is fear a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking?

It seems that fear (*metus*) is a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking (*involuntarium simpliciter*):

Objection 1: Just as violence has to do with what is presently contrary to the will, so fear has to do with a future evil that is repugnant to the will. But violence is a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking. Therefore, fear is likewise a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking.

Objection 2: Whatever is such-and-such in its own right (*tale secundum se*) remains that way no matter what is added to it; for instance, what is hot in its own right is such that as long as it itself remains, it is hot regardless of what it is joined to. But what is done out of fear (*per metum*) is involuntary in its own right. Therefore, whatever fear is added to is likewise involuntary.

Objection 3: Whatever is such-and-such on some condition (*tale sub conditione*) is such-and-such in a certain respect (*secundum quid tale*), whereas what is such-and-such unconditionally (*absque conditione tale*) is such-and-such absolutely speaking (*simpliciter tale*). For instance, what is necessary on a condition is necessary in a certain respect, whereas what is necessary unconditionally (*absolute*) is necessary absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*). But what is done out of fear is unconditionally involuntary,

whereas it is voluntary only on a condition, viz., in order that the feared evil might be avoided. Therefore, what is done out of fear is involuntary absolutely speaking (*simpliciter involuntarium*).

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, and the Philosopher likewise, that things done out of fear “are more voluntary than involuntary.”

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3—and Gregory of Nyssa says the same thing in *De Homine*—things that are done out of fear are a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary. For what is done out of fear, considered just in itself, is not voluntary, but it becomes voluntary in the given case, viz., in order to avoid the evil that is feared.

However, if one thinks about this matter correctly, actions of the sort in question are voluntary more than involuntary (*magis voluntaria quam involuntaria*), since they are voluntary absolutely speaking (*voluntaria simpliciter*), whereas they are involuntary in a certain respect (*involuntaria secundum quid*). For each thing is said to exist absolutely speaking insofar as it is actual, whereas insofar as it exists only in one’s apprehension, it exists in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking. Now what is done out of fear is actual insofar as it is done; for since acts are numbered among singular things and since a singular thing as such exists *here* and *now*, what is done actually exists insofar as it exists *here* and *now* and with other *individual conditions*. But what is done in this sense out of fear is voluntary insofar as it exists *here* and *now*, since in *this* case there is the obstacle of a greater evil that was feared; for instance, to throw the cargo into the sea during a storm becomes voluntary because of the fear of danger. Hence, it is clear that this action is voluntary absolutely speaking. The concept of the voluntary also applies to it because its principle is internal..

On the other hand, that fact that what is done out of fear is taken to be repugnant to the will when existing outside of this particular case has to do only with our thought. And so the action is involuntary in a certain respect, i.e., insofar as it is thought of as existing outside of this particular case.

Reply to objection 1: Things done out of fear (*per metum*) and things done through coercion (*per vim*) differ from one another not only with respect to the present and the future, but also in the fact that what is done through coercion is altogether contrary to the will’s movement and such that the will does not consent to it, whereas what is done out of fear is voluntary by reason of the fact that the will is directed toward it (*fertur ad id*)—not, to be sure, for its own sake but for the sake of something else, viz., to ward off the evil that is feared. For an action’s being voluntary for the sake of something else is sufficient for the concept of the voluntary, since the voluntary is not only that which we will for the sake of itself as an end, but also that which we will for the sake of something else as an end. Therefore, it is clear that in the case of what is done through force, the interior will does nothing, whereas in the case of what is done out of fear, the will does do something. And this is why, in order to exclude what is done out of fear from the definition of the violent, Gregory of Nyssa not only says, “The violent is that whose principle is external,” but also adds, “while what is being acted upon contributes nothing (*nihil conferente vim passo*).” For the will of the one who fears does contribute something to what is done out of fear.

Reply to objection 2: Things that are predicated absolutely (*ea quae absolute dicuntur*) are those, e.g., ‘white’ and ‘hot’, which remain regardless of what is added to them. On the other hand, things that are predicated relatively (*ea quae relative dicuntur*) vary according to their relations to different things. For instance, what is large in comparison to *this* thing is small in comparison to *that* thing.

Now something is said to be voluntary not only because of itself and, as it were, absolutely, but also because of another and, as it were, relatively. And so nothing prevents something that would not be voluntary relative to one thing from becoming voluntary relative to something else.

Reply to objection 3: What is done out of fear is unconditionally voluntary (*voluntarium absque conditione*), i.e., voluntary with respect to what is actually done. But it is conditionally involuntary (*involuntarium sub conditione*), i.e., involuntary if this fear were not present. Hence, given the argument contained in the objection, the opposite conclusion could rather be drawn.

Article 7

Is concupiscence a cause of involuntariness?

It seems that concupiscence [or sentient desire] (*concupiscentia*) is a cause of involuntariness:

Objection 1: Just as fear is a certain passion, so too is concupiscence. But fear is a cause of what is in some sense involuntary. Therefore, so is concupiscence.

Objection 2: Just as, because of his fear, the fearful man does something contrary to what he had intended (*contra id quod proponebat*), so does the incontinent man because of his concupiscence. But fear is in some sense a cause of involuntariness. Therefore, so is concupiscence.

Objection 3: Cognition is required for voluntariness. But concupiscence corrupts cognition; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, “Pleasure”—or the desire for pleasure—“corrupts the judgment of prudence.” Therefore, concupiscence is a cause of involuntariness.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, “What is involuntary deserves mercy or indulgence (*miser cordia vel indulgentia*) and is done with sadness (*cum tristia agitur*).” But neither of these characteristics applies to what is done out of concupiscence. Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of involuntariness.

I respond: Concupiscence is not a cause of involuntariness but instead makes something voluntary. For something is said to be voluntary from the fact that the will is directed (*fertur*) toward it. But the will is inclined by concupiscence toward willing what is desired. And so concupiscence makes it the case that something is voluntary rather than that it is involuntary.

Reply to objection 1: Fear (*timor*) is directed at what is bad, whereas concupiscence is related to what is good. Now what is bad in its own right (*malum secundum se*) is contrary to the will, whereas what is good is consonant with the will. Hence, fear acts as a cause of involuntariness more than concupiscence does.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of something done out of fear, the will retains a repugnance to what is done, considered in itself. By contrast, in the case of something done out of concupiscence, e.g., something incontinent, there is no remaining prior volition by which the will repudiated what is now desired; instead, the will changes in such a way as to will now what it previously repudiated. And this is why what is done out of fear is in some sense involuntary, whereas what is done out of concupiscence is in no sense involuntary. For the incontinent man who cannot control his concupiscence acts contrary to what he previously intended, but not contrary to what he now wills, whereas the fearful man acts contrary to what he even now wills in its own right.

Reply to objection 3: If concupiscence totally undermined cognition, as happens in the case of those who go out of their minds (*fit amentes*) because of concupiscence, then it would follow that concupiscence destroys voluntariness. And yet in such a case there would not, properly speaking, be involuntariness, either, since neither the voluntary nor the involuntary exist in things that do not have the use of reason.

However, sometimes in the case of actions done out of concupiscence cognition is not totally removed, since the cognitive power is not undermined; rather, what is undermined is just the actual thinking about *this* particular possible action (*consideratio actualis in particulari agibili*). And yet this very undermining is itself voluntary to the extent that what is voluntary is said to be within the will’s power—including not acting, not willing something, or, similarly, even not thinking about something. For as will be explained below (q. 10, a. 3 and q. 77, a. 7), the will is able to resist the passions.

Article 8

Is ignorance a cause of involuntariness?

It seems that ignorance is not a cause of involuntariness:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, “Involuntariness deserves leniency (*meretur veniam*).” But sometimes what is done out of ignorance (*per ignorantia*) does not deserve leniency—this according to 1 Corinthians 14:38 (“If anyone does not know, he shall not be known”). Therefore, ignorance is not a cause of involuntariness.

Objection 2: Every sin is accompanied by ignorance—this according to Proverbs 14:22 (“They are mistaken who do evil”). Therefore, if ignorance were a cause of involuntariness, then it would follow that every sin is involuntary. But this is contrary to Augustine, who says that every sin is voluntary.

Objection 3: As Damascene says, “What is involuntary is accompanied by sadness.” But some actions are done out of ignorance and yet without sadness—as, for instance, if someone, thinking that he is killing a stag, kills an enemy whom he wanted to kill. Therefore, ignorance is not a cause of involuntariness.

But contrary to this: Damascene and the Philosopher claim that a certain sort of involuntariness occurs because of ignorance.

I respond: Ignorance has to be a cause of involuntariness by reason of the fact that it is a privation of the cognition (*privat cognitionem*) which, as was explained above (a. 1), is a prerequisite for voluntariness. Yet not every instance of ignorance is a privation of this sort of cognition. And so notice that there are three ways in which ignorance might be related to an act of the will: (a) as something *concomitant* (*concomitanter*), (b) as something *consequent* (*consequenter*), and (c) as something *antecedent* (*antecedenter*).

It is related as something *concomitant* when the ignorance has to do with something which (a) is being done and yet which (b) would still be done even if the knowledge were present (*etiam si sciretur*). For in such a case the ignorance does not lead one to will that this thing be done; instead, it just happens that what is done is simultaneous with the ignorance—as in the example posited above, where someone wills to kill his enemy but kills him unknowingly, thinking that he is killing a stag. As the Philosopher points out, ignorance of this sort does not make for *involuntariness*, since it is not a cause of anything that is repugnant to the will, but it does make for *non-voluntariness*, since what one is ignorant of cannot be actually willed [here and now].

Ignorance is related to the will as something *consequent* insofar as the ignorance itself is voluntary. There are two ways in which this can happen, corresponding to the two modes of voluntariness posited above (a. 3):

In the first way, an act of will is directed toward the ignorance (*actus voluntatis fertur in ignorantiam*), as when someone wills to be ignorant so that he might be excused from his sin or so that he might not withdraw from sinning—this according to Job 21:14 (“We do not want knowledge of Your ways”). This is called *affected ignorance*.

In the second way, what is called voluntary is an ignorance of what one can and should know in the sense, explained above (a. 3), in which not acting and not willing are called voluntary. Ignorance in this sense occurs either (a) when someone does not actually think about what he can and ought to think about, and this is *ignorance by bad choice* (*ignorantia malae electionis*), which arises either from passion or from a habit, or (b) when someone does not take care to acquire knowledge (*notitiam*) that he ought to have, and, accordingly, this *ignorance of general principles of law* that everyone is obliged to know is voluntary and arises from a sort of negligence.

Now when the ignorance is itself voluntary in one of these ways, it cannot be a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking. Yet it is a cause of involuntariness in a certain respect, viz., insofar

as it precedes the will's movement toward doing something that would not be done if the knowledge were present.

Ignorance is related to the will as something *antecedent* when the ignorance is not voluntary and yet is a cause of willing what the man would not otherwise will, as when a man is ignorant of some circumstance of an act which he is not obliged to know, and because of this he does something that he would not do if the knowledge were present. For instance, suppose that someone, having exercised due diligence and not knowing that someone is crossing a path, shoots an arrow with which he kills the one crossing the path. This sort of ignorance is a cause of involuntariness absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the objections. For the first objection has to do with ignorance of things that one is obliged to know. The second objection has to do with ignorance by choice, which, as has been explained, is voluntary in a certain way. The third objection has to do with ignorance that is related to the will as something concomitant.

QUESTION 7

The Circumstances of Human Acts

Next, we have to consider the circumstances of human acts. On this topic there are four questions: (1) What is a circumstance? (2) Should a theologian take into account the circumstances surrounding human acts? (3) How many sorts of circumstances are there? (4) Which are the most important among them?

Article 1

Is a circumstance an accident of a human act?

It seems that a circumstance (*circumstantia*) is not an accident of a human act:

Objection 1: In *Rhetorica* Tully says that a circumstance is “that by which an oration adds authority and strength to its argumentation.” But an oration gives strength to its argumentation mainly by appeal to what has to do with a thing’s substance—e.g., the definition, the genus, the species, etc.—on the basis of which Tully teaches orators how to argue. Therefore, a circumstance is not an accident of a human act.

Objection 2: It is proper to an accident to *exist in* something (*accidentis proprium est inesse*). But what surrounds (*circumstat*) a thing exists outside of it and not in it. Therefore, circumstances are not accidents of human acts.

Objection 3: An accident does not itself have accidents (*accidentis non est accidens*). But human acts are themselves certain sorts of accidents. Therefore, it is not the case that circumstances are accidents of acts.

But contrary to this: The particular conditions of a singular thing are called the accidents that individuate it (*accidentia individuantia ipsam*). But in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher calls the circumstances *particulars*, i.e., particular conditions of singular acts. Therefore, circumstances are the individual accidents of human acts.

I respond: Since, according to the Philosopher, names are “signs of understandings” (*signa intellectuum*), in addition to the process of intellective cognition there has to be a corresponding process of naming as well. Now our intellective cognition proceeds from what is better known to what is less known. And so among us names are transferred from what is better known to signify things that are less known. And so it is, as *Metaphysics* 10 points out, that the name ‘distance’ is extended (*processit*) from things having to do with place to all sorts of contraries. Similarly, we use names pertaining to local motion to signify other movements, since bodies, which are circumscribed by their place, are the things best known to us. And so it is that the name ‘circumstance’ is extended from things existing in a place to human acts.

Now in matters of place, what is said to surround (*circumstare*) a thing is extrinsic to it and yet touches it or is close to it in place. And so what are called ‘circumstances’ are conditions that lie outside the substance of a human act and yet touch on the act in some sense.

Now anything that exists outside the substance of a thing and yet belongs to the thing itself is called an accident of that thing. Hence, the circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents.

Reply to objection 1: An oration does indeed give strength to its argumentation in the first place by appeal to the substance of an act, but it also gives strength to its argumentation secondarily by appeal to what surrounds the act. For instance, someone is rendered blameworthy (*accusabilis*) in the first instance by the fact that he committed homicide, but he is rendered blameworthy secondarily by the fact that he did it with evil intent (*dolo fecit*), or for the sake of money, or at a sacred time, or in a sacred place, or something else of this sort. And so Tully expressly claims that it is by appeal to the circumstances that an oration secondarily, as it were, adds strength to its argumentation.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which something is said to be an accident of a thing:

(a) because it *exists in that thing*, in the sense in which *white* is said to be an accident of Socrates, or (b) because it *exists together with that thing in the same subject*, in the sense in which *white* is said to be accidental to *musical* insofar as they come together in a single subject and in some sense touch one another. It is in this second way that circumstances are called accidents of acts.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, an accident is said to be accidental to an accident because of their coming together in a subject. But there are two ways in which this can happen: (a) insofar as the two accidents are related to the single subject without any ordering, in the way that *white* and *musical* are related to Socrates, and (b) with some ordering, i.e., because the subject receives the one accident by the mediation of the other, in the way that a body receives its color by the mediation of its surface. In this latter sense one accident is even said to exist in the other; for example, we say that the color exists in the surface.

Now circumstances are related to acts in both of these ways. For some circumstances that are ordered to the act, e.g., place and the person's condition, have to do with the agent but are not mediated by the act, whereas other circumstances, e.g., the manner of acting, have to do with the agent and are mediated by the act itself.

Article 2

Should the theologian consider the circumstances of human acts?

It seems that the theologian (*theologus*) need not consider the circumstances of human acts:

Objection 1: A theologian considers human acts only insofar as they are of a certain sort, viz., good or bad. But it does not seem possible for the circumstances to make a human act to be of a certain sort, since a thing is qualified by what exists within it, and nothing is qualified, formally speaking, by what exists outside of itself. Therefore a theologian need not consider the circumstances of human acts.

Objection 2: The circumstances are accidents of acts. But "there are infinitely many things that are accidental to any given thing." This is why, as *Metaphysics* 6 says, "there is no art or science, except a sophistical one, with respect to a *per accidens* entity (*circa ens per accidens*)." Therefore, theologians do not have to consider the circumstances of human acts.

Objection 3: Consideration of the circumstances belongs to the rhetorician. But rhetoric is not a part of theology. Therefore, the consideration of circumstances is irrelevant to the theologian.

But contrary to this: As Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa point out, ignorance of the circumstances is a cause of involuntariness. But involuntariness excuses one from sin (*excusat a culpa*), the consideration of which pertains to the theologian. Therefore, the consideration of circumstances likewise pertains to the theologian.

I respond: There are three reasons why the circumstances pertain to the theologian's inquiry:

First, the theologian considers human acts insofar as through them a man is ordered toward beatitude. Now everything that is ordered toward an end must be proportioned to that end. But acts are proportioned to an end in accord with a certain measure, which is brought about through the right circumstances. Hence, a consideration of circumstances pertains to the theologian.

Second, the theologian considers human acts insofar as they are good or evil, and better or worse, and, as will become clear below (q. 18, aa. 10-11), this diversification involves the circumstances.

Third, the theologian considers human acts insofar as they are meritorious or demeritorious, features which belong to human acts and for which it is required that the acts be voluntary. But as has been explained (q. 6, a. 8), a human act is judged to be voluntary or involuntary according to one's knowledge of the circumstances or ignorance of them.

And so a consideration of the circumstances pertains to the theologian.

Reply to objection 1: A good that is ordered to an end is called a *useful good* (*bonum utile*). This implies a certain relation, which is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, “It is with respect to something that a good is useful.” However, in those things that are predicated relatively (*quae ad aliquid dicuntur*) something is denominated not only from that which exists within it, but also from that which touches on it extrinsically, as is clear with *right* and *left*, *equal* and *unequal*, and other similar cases. And so since the goodness of acts exists insofar as they are useful for the end, nothing prevents them from being called *good* or *bad* because of a relation to certain things that affect touch on them from the outside.

Reply to objection 2: Accidents that behave altogether accidentally (*quae omnino per accidens se habent*) are left aside by every art because they are unstable and infinite in number (*propter eorum incertitudinem et infinitatem*). But such accidents do not have the nature of a circumstance (*non habent rationem circumstantiae*), since, as has been explained, circumstances lie outside of the act in such a way that they nonetheless touch on the act in some sense and are ordered toward it; and *per se* accidents do fall under an art.

Reply to objection 3: The consideration of circumstances pertains to the moralist and the statesman as well as to the rhetorician (*pertinet ad moralem et politicum et ad rhetorem*).

The circumstances pertain to the moralist insofar as the mean of virtue in human acts and human passions is either found or missed in relation to them.

They pertain to the statesman and the rhetorician insofar as acts are rendered praiseworthy or blameworthy, excusable or inexcusable (*laudabiles vel vituperabiles, excusabiles vel accusabiles*) by their circumstances. Yet the circumstances pertain to the statesman and the rhetorician in different ways. For the rhetorician makes a persuasive argument for what the statesman passes judgment on (*quod rhetor persuadet, politicus diiudicat*).

Now the circumstances pertain to the theologian, to whom all the other arts are subordinated, in *all* of the ways just mentioned. For the theologian, along with the moralist, conducts inquiry into virtuous acts and vicious acts. And along with the rhetorician and the statesman, he considers acts insofar as they merit punishment or reward.

Article 3

Are the circumstances correctly enumerated in *Ethics* 3?

It seems that the circumstances are incorrectly enumerated in *Ethics* 3:

Objection 1: What is called a circumstance of an act is related externally to the act. Time and place are circumstances of this sort. Therefore, *when?* and *where?* are the only two sorts of circumstances.

Objection 2: That something is done well or done badly is taken from the circumstances. But something's being done well or done badly has to do with the mode [or manner] of an act (*pertinet ad modum actus*). Therefore, all the circumstances are included under a single circumstance, viz., *the manner of acting* (*modus agendi*).

Objection 3: Circumstances do not belong to the substance of an act. But it seems that the causes of the act itself have to do with the substance of the act. Therefore, no circumstance should be taken from the causes of the act itself. So, then, *who?* and *why?* and *what?* are not circumstances; for *who?* has to do with the efficient cause, *why?* with the final cause, and *what?* with the material cause.

But contrary to this is the relevant passage (*auctoritas*) from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3.

I respond: In *Rhetorica* Tully enumerates seven sorts of circumstances that are contained in the following verse: “*Who? (quis), what? (quid), where? (ubi), by what means? (quibus auxiliis), why? (cur), in what manner? (quomodo), when? (quando).*” For in the case of an act, one has to take account

of *who* did it, *by what means or instruments* he did it, *what* he did, *where* he did it, *why* he did it, *in what manner (quomodo)* he did it, and *when* he did it. In *Ethics 3* Aristotle adds another, viz., *with respect to what? (circa quid)*, which Tully includes under *what?*.

The explanation for this enumeration can be thought of as follows:

A circumstance is something that, while existing outside the substance of an act, touches on the act in some way. There are three ways in which this happens: (a) the circumstance touches on *the act itself*; (b) it touches on a *cause* of the act; or (c) it touches on an *effect* of the act.

Now it touches on *the act itself* either (a) as a measure, as with *time* and *place*, or (b) as a quality of the act, as with the *manner of acting*.

It touches on an *effect* as in the consideration of *what* someone has done.

It touches on a *cause* as follows: as regards the final cause, *why? (propter quid)*; as regards the material cause (or object), *with respect to what? (circa quid)*; as regards a principal agent cause, *who did it?*; and with respect to an instrumental agent cause, *by what means?*.

Reply to objection 1: *Time* and *place* are ‘surround’ (*circumstat*) the act as measures, but the other circumstances are such that, while existing outside the substance of the act, they touch on the act itself in some other way.

Reply to objection 2: The particular mode or manner *done well* (or *done badly*) is posited not as a circumstance, but as something that follows upon all the circumstances. By contrast, *the manner [of acting]* that is posited as a special circumstance has to do with a quality of the act, e.g., that someone is walking *quickly* or *slowly*, or that someone struck another *forcefully* or *lightly*, and so on.

Reply to objection 3: It is a conjoined condition—and not the condition of a cause on which the act’s substance depends—that is a circumstance. For instance, in the case of the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the item belongs to someone else, since this has to do with the substance of theft; rather, a circumstance would be that the object is of great value or of small value (*magnum vel parvum*).

The same holds for other circumstances that are taken from the other causes. For it is a conjoined end—and not the end that gives an act its species (*dat speciem actus*)—that is a circumstance. For instance, it is not a circumstance that a brave man acts bravely for the sake of the good of courage; instead, it is a circumstance that he acts bravely for the sake of freeing his city, or for the sake of the Christian people, or for something else of this sort.

The same holds for *what?*. For instance, it is not a circumstance of someone’s pouring water on another that he makes him wet; but it is a circumstance that, in pouring the water, he makes him cold or hot, or heals him or harms him.

Article 4

Is it the case, as *Ethics 3* asserts, that the principal circumstances are *why?* and the things in which the operation exists?

It seems that it is not the case, as *Ethics 3* asserts, that the principal circumstances are “*why?*” (*propter quid*) and the “things in which the operation exists”:

Objection 1: The things in which the operation exists seem to be place and time, which do not seem the most important among the circumstances, since they are especially extrinsic to the act. Therefore, the things in which the operation exists are not the most important circumstances.

Objection 2: The end is extrinsic to a thing. Therefore, it does not seem to be the most important circumstance.

Objection 3: The most important element in any given thing is its cause and its form. But the

cause of the act itself is the person who is the agent, whereas the form is the manner of acting (*modus actus*). Therefore, these are the two circumstances that seem to be the most important.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, “The most important circumstances are *that for the sake of which* the act is done and *what* it is that is done.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), acts are properly called human insofar as they are voluntary. But the will’s motive and object is the end. And so the most important of all the circumstances is that which touches on the act from the side of the end, viz., *that for the sake of which*, and, secondarily, that which touches on the substance of the act, i.e., *what* the agent did. The other circumstances are more or less important to the extent that they are more or less close to these.

Reply to objection 1: By “things in which the operation consists” the Philosopher means those things that are adjoined to the act itself and not time or place. Hence, Gregory of Nyssa, in explaining, as it were, what the Philosopher says, puts “what is done” in place of “things in which the operation exists.”

Reply to objection 2: Even if the end does not belong to the substance of the act, it is nonetheless the most important cause of the act insofar as it moves the agent to act. Hence, a moral act has its species especially from the end.

Reply to objection 3: The person is the agent cause of an act insofar as he is moved by the end, and it is mainly in this respect that he is ordered toward the act. By contrast, the other conditions of the person are not as principally ordered toward the act.

Also, the manner of acting is not the act’s substantial form, since it is, as it were, a certain quality of the act, whereas the substantial form in an act has to do with the object and with the terminus or end.

QUESTION 8

The Objects of the Will

Next, we have to consider voluntary acts themselves in particular. First, we have to consider the acts that belong immediately to the will in the sense that they are elicited by the will itself (questions 8-16), and, second, the acts that are commanded by the will (question 17).

Now the will is moved both toward the end and toward the means to the end (*in ea quae sunt ad finem*). Therefore, we first have to consider acts of the will by which it is moved toward the end (questions 8-12), and then acts of the will by which it is moved toward the means to the end (questions 13-16).

There seem to be three acts of the will with respect to the end, viz., to will (*velle*), to enjoy (*frui*), and to intend (*intendere*). Therefore, we will first consider the will (*voluntas*) (questions 8-10); second, the act of enjoying (*fruitio*) (question 11); and, third, the act of intending (*intentio*) (question 12).

Concerning the first point, there are three things to consider: (a) what the objects of the will are (*quorum voluntas sit*) (question 8), (b) what the will is moved by (*a quo moveatur*) (question 9), and (c) the manner in which the will is moved (*quomodo moveatur*) (question 10).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Is the will directed only toward the good? (*utrum voluntas sit tantum boni*) (2) Is the will directed only toward the end, or is it also directed toward the means to the end? (3) If the will is in some sense directed toward the means to the end, is it moved with a single movement toward both the end and the means to the end?

Article 1

Is the will directed only toward the good?

It seems that the will is not directed only toward the good:

Objection 1: The same power is directed toward opposites (*est oppositorum*), in the way that the power of seeing is directed toward the white and the black. But the good and the bad are opposites. Therefore, the will is directed not only toward good but also toward the bad.

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher, rational powers behave in such a way as to pursue opposites. But the will is a rational power, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it exists “in reason.” Therefore, the will is directed to opposites (*se habet ad opposita*). Therefore, it is directed not only toward willing the good, but also toward willing the bad.

Objection 3: *Being* and *good* are convertible. But the will is directed not only toward beings, but also toward non-beings; for instance, we sometimes will not to walk and not to speak. We also sometimes will certain future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore, the will is not directed only toward the good.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The bad lies beyond the will,” and “All things desire the good.”

I respond: The will is a certain rational appetite (*appetitus rationalis*). But every appetite is directed only toward the good. The reason for this is that an appetite is nothing other than an inclination toward something on the part of the thing that has the appetite (*inclinatio appetentis in aliquid*). But nothing has an inclination except toward something similar to and appropriate for itself. Therefore, since every entity, insofar as it is a being and a substance, is a certain good, it must be the case that every inclination is toward the good. And so it is that in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says that the good is “what all things desire” (*quod omnia appetunt*).

But note that since every inclination follows upon some form, a natural appetite follows upon a form that exists in *nature*, whereas a sentient appetite, as well as an intellective or rational appetite (which is called ‘will’), follows upon an *apprehended* form. Therefore, just as what a natural appetite tends toward is a *good that exists in reality*, so an animal or voluntary appetite tends toward an

apprehended good. Therefore, in order for the will to tend toward something, it is required not that the thing be good in reality, but rather that it be apprehended under the concept of the good (*quod apprehendatur in ratione boni*). It is for this reason that in *Physics* 2 the Philosopher says, “The end is a good, or an apparent good.”

Reply to objection 1: The same power is directed to opposites, but it is not related to both of them in the same way. Thus, the will is related to both the good and the bad, but it is related to the good in the sense of desiring it (*appetendo ipsum*), whereas it is related to the bad in the sense of avoiding it (*fugiendo illud*). Therefore, an actual desire for the good is called ‘willing’ (*voluntas*) insofar as ‘willing’ names an act of the will; for this is the sense in which we are now speaking of the will. By contrast, avoiding the bad (*fuga mali*) would better be called ‘willing-against’ (*noluntas*). Hence, just as willing is directed toward the good, so willing-against is directed toward the bad.

Reply to objection 2: A rational power does not behave in such a way as to pursue all opposites whatsoever; rather, it pursues those opposites that are contained under its appropriate object. For no power pursues anything except its appropriate object. But the will’s object is the good. Hence, the will behaves in such a way as to pursue those opposites that are included under *good*, e.g., to be moved and to rest, to speak and to remain silent, and others of this sort. For the will is directed to both opposites under the concept *good*.

Reply to objection 3: What is not a being in reality (*ens in rerum natura*) is taken as a being in reason (*ens in ratione*); it is in this sense that negations and privations are called ‘beings of reason’ (*entia rationis*). It is in this sense, too, that future things, insofar as they are apprehended, are beings. Therefore, insofar as there are beings of this sort, they are apprehended under the concept *good*, and in this way the will tends toward them. Hence, in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that “a lack of badness (*carere malum*) has the nature of a good.”

Article 2

Is will (or willing) directed only toward the end or also toward the means to the end?

It seems that will (or willing) (*voluntas*) is directed only toward the end and not toward the means to the end:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “Willing (*voluntas*) is directed toward the end, whereas choosing (*electio*) is directed toward the means to the end (*est eorum quae sunt ad finem*).”

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 6 says, “Diverse powers of the soul are ordered toward things that are diverse in genus.” But the end is in a different genus of *good* from the means to the end; for as *Ethics* 1 says, the end, which is a noble good (*bonum honestum*) or a pleasant good (*bonum delectabile*), is in the genus of quality (or of action or passion), whereas a means to the end is called a useful good (*bonum utile*) and is in the category of relation (*in ad aliquid*). Therefore, if will (*voluntas*) is directed toward the end, then it will not be directed toward the means to the end.

Objection 3: Habits are proportionate to their corresponding powers, since a habit is the perfection of its power. But among the habits that are called operative arts, the end pertains to one art, while the means to the end pertains to a different art. For instance, the use of a ship, which is the ship’s end, belongs to the navigator, while the construction of the ship, which is a means to the end, belongs to the art of shipbuilding. Therefore, since will (*voluntas*) is directed toward the end, it will not be directed toward the means to the end.

But contrary to this: Among natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the medium and reaches the terminus. But the means to an end are, as it were, the medium through

which one reaches the end as a terminus. Therefore, if willing (*voluntas*) is directed toward the end, then it is likewise directed toward the means to the end.

I respond: Sometimes it is the very *power* by which we will that is called ‘will’ (*voluntas*), and sometimes it is the will’s *act* itself that is called ‘will’ (*voluntas*).

Thus, if we are talking about will insofar as ‘will’ names the *power*, then the will tends (*se extendit*) both toward the end and toward the means to the end. For each power tends toward those things in which the nature of its object (*ratio sui obiecto*) is found in some way; for instance, the power of seeing tends toward whatever in some way participates in color. But the nature of the good, which is the object of the *power* that is the will, is found not only in the end, but also in the means to the end.

On the other hand, if we are talking about will insofar as ‘will’ properly names the will’s *act*, then, properly speaking, it is directed only toward the end. For every act that is denominated from its power names the simple act of that power, in the way that ‘to understand intellectually’ (*intelligere*) names the simple act of intellectual understanding (*simplicem actum intellectus*). Now the simple act of a power is directed toward that which is in its own right the object of that power. But it is the end which is good for its own sake and willed for its own sake (*propter se bonum et volitum*). Hence, an act of willing (*voluntas*) is properly directed toward the end itself.

By contrast, a means to an end is good or willed not for its own sake but because it is ordered toward the end (*ex ordine ad finem*). Hence, an act of willing (*voluntas*) is directed toward the means only to the extent that it is directed toward the end, and so the very thing that it wills in the means is the end. Similarly, intellectual understanding is properly directed toward what is known in its own right (*secundum se cognoscuntur*), viz., the principles, whereas there is no intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) with respect to those things that are known through the principles except to the extent that the principles are being thought of in them. For as *Ethics* 7 says, “Among desirable things the end plays the same role that the principle plays among intelligible things.”

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is here speaking about will insofar as ‘will’ names the simple act of willing (*simplicem actum voluntatis*), and not insofar as it names the *power*.

Reply to objection 2: Diverse powers are ordered toward things that are diverse in genus and related as equals; for instance, *sound* and *color* are diverse genera among things that can be sensed, and the power of hearing and the power of seeing are ordered toward them (*ad quae ordinantur auditus et visus*). However, *useful* and *noble* are not related as equals, but are instead related as what is such-and-such in its own right and what is such-and-such because of another. And things of this sort are always referred back to the same power, in the way that both color and light, through which color is seen, are sensed through the power of seeing.

Reply to objection 3: It is not the case that whatever makes the habits diverse also makes the powers diverse, since habits channel their powers to certain specific acts (*habitus sunt determinationes potentiarum ad aliquos speciales actus*).

Yet every operative art considers both the end and the means to the end. For instance, the art of navigation takes account of the end as something that it *does* and takes account of the means to the end as something that it *commands*. Conversely, the art of shipbuilding takes account of the means to the end as something that it *does*, whereas it takes account of the end as that toward which what it does is *ordered*.

Again, in each operative art there is some proper end, along with something which is a means to the end and which properly pertains to that art.

Article 3

Is it by the very same act that the will is directed both toward the end and toward the means to the end?

It seems that it is by the very same act that the will is directed both toward the end and toward the means to the end:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher, “In a case where one thing is for the sake of another, there is just a single thing (*unum tantum*).” But the will does not will the means to an end except for the sake of the end. Therefore, it is by the same act that it is moved toward both of them.

Objection 2: The end is the explanation (*ratio*) for willing the means to the end, in the way that light is the explanation for seeing colors. But it is by the same act that both light and color are seen. Therefore, the movement of the will by which it wills the end is the same as the movement by which it wills the means to the end.

Objection 3: It is numerically the same natural motion which goes through the medium all the way to the endpoint (*per media tendit ad ultimum*). But the means to an end are related to the end in the way that the medium is related to the endpoint. Therefore, the movement by which the will is directed toward the end is the same as the movement by which it is directed toward the means to the end.

But contrary to this: Acts are made diverse by their objects. But the end belongs to one species of the good and the means to the end, which is a useful good, belongs to a different species. Therefore, it is not by the same act that the will is directed toward both of them.

I respond: Since an end is willed in its own right (*secundum se volitus*), whereas a means to the end is, as such, willed only for the sake of the end, it is clear that the will can be directed toward an end without being directed toward the means to the end. By contrast, the will cannot be directed toward the means to an end, as such, without being directed toward the end.

So, then, there are two ways for the will to be directed toward the end itself: (a) it may be directed toward the end absolutely in its own right (*absolute secundum se*), or (b) it may be directed toward the end as a reason for willing the means to the end.

Therefore, it is clear that the movement of the will by which it is directed toward the end insofar as the end is a reason for willing the means to the end is the same as the movement by which it is directed toward the means themselves to the end.

However, the act by which it is directed to the end absolutely speaking is a different act. Sometimes this act temporally precedes the other one—as, for instance, when someone first wills health and later on, when deliberating about how he can be cured, wills to engage a physician in order to be cured. The same thing also occurs with respect to intellectual understanding; for someone first has an intellectual understanding of the principles in their own right, and then later on understands them in the conclusions themselves insofar as he assents to the conclusions because of the principles.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the case in which (*secundum quod*) the will is directed toward the end insofar as the end is a reason for willing the means to the end.

Reply to objection 2: Whenever color is seen, light is seen by the same act; and yet it is possible for light to be seen without color being seen. Similarly, whenever someone wills the means to an end, he wills the end by the same act—but not vice versa.

Reply to objection 3: In the *execution* of a work, the means to the end are like the medium and the end is like the terminus. Hence, just as a natural movement sometimes stops in the medium without reaching the terminus, so too sometimes one does something ordered toward the end and yet does not attain to the end.

But in the case of *willing*, the opposite holds true. For it is through the end that the will arrives at willing the means to the end, just as it is through the principles, which are called ‘means’, that the

intellect arrives at the conclusions. Hence, the intellect sometimes understands the ‘means’ without proceeding from there to the conclusion. Similarly, the will sometimes wills the end and yet does not proceed forward to willing the means to the end.

Reply to argument for the contrary: The answer to this argument is clear from what has been said above. For *useful* and the *noble* are not species of the good that are divided off from one another as equals. Rather, they are related as what is [good] because of itself (*propter se*) and what is [good] because of something else (*propter alterum*). Hence, an act of will can be directed toward the first without being directed toward the second, but not vice versa.

QUESTION 9

What Moves the Will

Next, we have to consider what moves the will (*de motivo voluntatis*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Is the will moved by the intellect? (2) Is the will moved by the sentient appetite? (3) Does the will move itself? (4) Is the will moved by any principle exterior to it? (5) Is the will moved by a celestial body? (6) Is the will moved by God alone as an exterior principle?

Article 1

Is the will moved by the intellect?

It seems that the will is not moved by the intellect:

Objection 1: In commenting on Psalm 118:20 (“My soul has longed to desire your justifications”), Augustine says, “The intellect flies ahead, the desire (*affectus*) is late or non-existent; we know the good, but we do not desire to act.” But this would not be the case if the will were moved by the intellect; for a moveable thing’s movement follows upon the mover’s motion. Therefore, the intellect does not move the will.

Objection 2: The intellect is related to the will as that which exhibits what is desirable (*demonstrans appetibile*), in the way that the imagination exhibits what is desirable to the sentient appetite. But in exhibiting what is desirable, the imagination does not move the sentient appetite; in fact, sometimes we are related to what we imagine in the way that we are related to things that are shown to us in a picture and which, as *De Anima* says, we are not moved by. Therefore, neither does the intellect move the will.

Objection 3: It is not the case that the same thing is both mover and moved with respect to the same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we engage in intellectual understanding when we will to. Therefore, the intellect does not move the will.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “An apprehended desirable thing is an unmoved mover, whereas the will is a moved mover.”

I respond: To the extent that a thing needs to be moved by something, it is in potentiality with respect to more than one thing. For what is in potentiality has to be brought to actuality by something that is actual (*quod est actu*), and this is what it is to effect movement (*hoc est movere*).

Now there are two ways in which a given power of the soul is in potentiality to diverse things: (a) with respect to *acting* and *not acting*, and (b) with respect to *doing this* or *doing that*. For instance, sometimes the power of sight is actually seeing, and sometimes it is not seeing; and sometimes it sees something white, and sometimes it sees something black. Therefore, such a power needs a mover (*indiget movente*) in two ways, viz., (a) with respect to the *exercise* or *employment* of its act (*quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus*), and (b) with respect to the *specification* of its act (*quantum ad determinationem actus*). The former concerns the *subject*, which is sometimes acting and sometimes not acting, while the latter concerns the *object* by which the act is specified.

Now the motion of the *subject* itself arises from some *agent*. And since, as was shown above (q.1, a. 2), every agent acts for the sake of an end, the principle of this motion comes from the end; this is why an art directed toward the end (*ars ad quam pertinet finis*) effects movement by its command in an art directed toward the means to the end (*moveret suo imperio artem ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem*), in the way that, as *Physics* 2 says, the navigational art commands the shipbuilding art. Now the good in general (*bonum in communi*), which has the nature of an end, is the will’s object. And so in this regard the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, since we use the other powers when we will to. For the ends and perfections of all the other powers are included as particular goods under the will’s object, and it is always the case that an art or power that is directed toward a universal end presses into action (*moveret ad agendum*) an art or power that is directed toward a particular end included under that

universal end. For instance, the general of an army, who intends the common good (*qui intendit bonum commune*)—viz., the ordering of the whole army—effects movement by his command in one of the tribunes, who intends the good of a particular battalion.

By contrast, in giving the act its species (*determinando actum*), the *object* gives movement in the manner of a *formal* principle like that by which an action is given its species among natural things—in the way, for instance, that the act of giving warmth (*calefactio*) is given its species by heat (*a calore*). Now the first formal principle is being and truth in general (*ens et verum universale*), which is the object of the intellect. And so it is in this sense of ‘motion’ that the intellect moves the will by presenting to the will its object.

Reply to objection 1: This passage shows not that the intellect does not move the will, but that the intellect does not move the will with necessity.

Reply to objection 2: Just as imagining a form without judging whether it is fitting or harmful does not move the sentient appetite, so neither does an apprehension of what is true without thinking about whether it is good and desirable (*sine ratione boni et appetibilis*). Hence, as *De Anima* 3 says, it is not the speculative intellect that effects movement, but rather the practical intellect.

Reply to objection 3: The will moves the intellect with respect to the *exercise* of the intellect’s act, since the true, which is the perfection of the intellect, is itself contained under the universal good as a certain particular good.

But as regards the *specification* of the act, which involves the object, the intellect moves the will, since the good is itself apprehended as a certain special concept included under the universal concept of the true.

And so it is clear that it is not the case that the same thing is both moved and mover with respect to the same thing.

Article 2

Can the will be moved by the sentient appetite?

It seems that the will cannot be moved by the sentient appetite:

Objection 1: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 7, “The mover and agent is more preeminent than that which is acted upon (*praestantius patiente*). But just as the sensory power is lower than the intellect, so the sentient appetite is lower than the will, which is an intellective appetite. Therefore, the sentient appetite does not move the will.

Objection 2: No particularized power (*nulla virtus particularis*) can produce a universal effect. But the sentient appetite is a particularized power, since it follows upon the sensory power’s particularized apprehension. Therefore, it cannot be a cause of the movement of the will, which is universal in the sense that it follows upon the intellect’s universal apprehension.

Objection 3: As *Physics* 8 proves, a mover is not moved by what it moves in such a way that the motion would be reciprocal. But the will moves the sentient appetite insofar as the sentient appetite obeys reason. Therefore, the sentient appetite does not move the will.

But contrary to this: James 1:14 says, “Everyone is tempted by his own sentient desire (*a concupiscentia*), being drawn away and allured.” But no one would be drawn away by sentient desire unless his will were moved by the sentient appetite, in which sentient desire exists. Therefore, the sentient appetite moves the will.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), what is apprehended under the concept of the good and the fitting moves the will in the manner of an *object*. But something’s being seen as good and fitting depends on two things, viz., (a) the condition of the thing that is proposed and (b) the condition of the

one to whom it is proposed. For ‘fitting’ is a relational predicate (*secundum relationem dicitur*), and it depends on both relata (*ex utroque extremo*). So it is that as the sense of taste is differently disposed, it does not receive something as fitting or as not fitting in the same way. Hence, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “According as someone is, thus does the end seem to him.”

Now it is clear that a man is altered in his disposition by the passions of the sentient appetite. Hence, to the extent that a man is subject to some passion (*est in passione*), something will seem fitting to him that would not seem fitting to someone who was not subject to that passion; for instance, something will seem good to an angry man that would not seem good to a calm man. It is in this way, on the part of the object, that the sentient appetite moves the will.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents that which is preeminent absolutely speaking and in its own right from being inferior in some respect. Thus, the will is preeminent over the sentient appetite absolutely speaking, but the sentient appetite is preeminent in the case of someone whom the passions dominate insofar as he is subject to some passion.

Reply to objection 2: Men’s acts and choices have to do with singular things. Hence, by the very fact that the sentient appetite is a power that deals with particulars (*virtus particularis*), it has a great ability (*habet magnam virtutem*) to dispose a man in such a way that something regarding singulars seems one way or another to him.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, reason, in which the will resides, moves the irascible and concupiscible [appetites] by its command—not, to be sure, with a despotic rule, in the way that a servant is moved by his master, but rather with a regal or political rule, in the way that free men are directed by a governor, even though they are able to move in a contrary direction. Hence, the irascible and concupiscible appetites are likewise able to effect movement in a way contrary to the will. And so nothing prevents the will from sometimes being moved by them.

Article 3

Does the will move itself?

It seems that the will does not move itself:

Objection 1: Every mover, as such, is actual (*est in actu*), whereas what is moved is in potentiality (*est in potentia*); for “a movement is the act of something that is in potentiality insofar as it is in potentiality.” But it is not the case that the same thing is both actual and in potentiality with respect to the same thing. Therefore, nothing moves itself. Therefore, the will cannot move itself, either.

Objection 2: A movable thing is moved in the presence of the mover. But the will is always present to itself. Therefore, if the will moved itself, it would never stop being moved (*semper moveretur*). But this is clearly false.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), the will is moved by the intellect. Therefore, if the will moved itself, it would follow that the same thing is being moved directly by two movers at the same time—which seems absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that the will moves itself.

But contrary to this: Since the will is the master of its own activity, it is capable both of willing and of not willing. But this would not be the case if it did not have it within its power to move itself to will. Therefore, it moves itself.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), the will’s role is to move the other powers in light of the end, which is the will’s object. But as has been said (q. 8, a. 2), the end plays the same role among desirable things that a principle plays among intelligible things.

Now it is obvious that through its cognition of principles the intellect brings itself from potentiality to actuality with respect to its cognition of the conclusions, and in this way it moves itself. Similarly,

through its willing of an end the will moves itself to will the means to that end.

Reply to objection 1: It is not the case that the will is mover and moved with respect to the same thing, and so it is not the case that the will is both actual and in potentiality with respect to the same thing. Rather, insofar as it actually wills the end, it brings itself from potentiality to actuality with respect to the means to the end, so that it actually wills those means.

Reply to objection 2: The will's power is always actually present to it, but the will's act, by which it wills an end, does not always exist in the will. Now it is through this act that it moves itself. Hence, it does not follow that it is always moving itself.

Reply to objection 3: The way in which the will is moved by the intellect is not the same as the way in which it is moved by itself. Rather, it is moved by the intellect by reason of the *object* of the act, (*secundum rationem obiecti*), whereas in light of an end it is moved by itself as far the *exercise* of the act is concerned.

Article 4

Is the will moved by anything exterior to it?

It seems that the will is not moved by anything exterior to it (*non moveatur ab aliquo exteriori*):

Objection 1: The will's movement is voluntary. But it is part of the concept of the voluntary that what is voluntary is from an intrinsic principle, just as this is part of the concept of the natural. Therefore, it is not the case that the will's movement is from anything exterior to it.

Objection 2: As was shown above (q. 6, a. 4), the will cannot suffer violence. But the violent is that whose principle is exterior. Therefore, the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.

Objection 3: What is moved sufficiently by one mover does not need to be moved by any other mover. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore, it is not moved by anything exterior to it.

But contrary to this: As has been explained (a. 1), the will is moved by its object. But the object of the will can be any exterior thing proposed to the sensory power. Therefore, the will can be moved by something exterior.

I respond: Insofar as the will is moved by its *object*, it is obvious that it can be moved by something exterior to it.

But even in the mode in which it is moved with respect to the *exercise* of its act, one must likewise affirm that the will is moved by some exterior principle. For everything that is sometimes an actual agent and sometimes [merely] a potential agent needs to be moved by some mover. Now it is obvious that the will begins to will something after not having previously willed it. Therefore, it has to be moved to will it by something. And to be sure, as has been explained (a. 3), the will moves itself to the extent that by willing an end, it brings itself to will the means to that end. But it cannot do this except by the mediation of deliberation. For instance, when someone wills to be made healthy, he begins to think about how to accomplish this, and through this deliberation he arrives at the conclusion that he can be made healthy by a physician, and then he wills this. But because he had not been actually willing health at every previous moment (*quia non semper sanitatem actu voluit*), he must have begun, via some mover, to will to be made healthy. And if the will moved itself to will this, then it must have done it by the mediation of a deliberation following upon some previously posited act of will (*ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita*). But this cannot go on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, as Aristotle concludes in one of the chapters of the *Eudemian Ethics*, it is necessary to claim that for the will's first movement, the act of willing (*voluntas*) proceeds from the impulse of an exterior mover (*ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis*).

Reply to objection 1: It is part of the concept of the voluntary that its principle is intrinsic, but it need not be the case that this intrinsic principle is a first principle not moved by another. Hence, even if

a voluntary movement has a proximate intrinsic principle, its first principle may nonetheless be external—just as the first principle of a natural movement is likewise external, viz., the thing that moves the nature.

Reply to objection 2: It is not sufficient for the concept of the violent that its principle be external; rather, it is necessary to add that the thing acted upon contributes nothing. But this does not happen when the will is moved by something exterior to it; for it itself is what does the willing, even though it is being moved by another.

Now this movement would be violent if it were contrary to the will's movement. But this is impossible in the case under discussion, since if it were contrary, then the will would be both willing and not willing the same thing.

Reply to objection 3: The will is a sufficient mover of itself in a certain respect and within its own order, viz., as a proximate cause. But as has been shown, it cannot move itself with respect to everything. Hence, it needs to be moved by another as by a first mover.

Article 5

Is the human will moved by any celestial body?

It seems that the human will is moved by a celestial body:

Objection 1: All varied and multifaceted movements (*motus varii et multiformes*) are traced back to a uniform movement as their cause, and, as is proved in *Physics* 8, this is the movement of a celestial body. But human movements are varied and multifaceted, and they begin after not having previously existed. Therefore, they are traced back to the movement of a celestial body as their cause, and this movement is uniform by nature.

Objection 2: According to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 3, "Lower bodies are moved by higher bodies." But the movements of the human body that are caused by the will could not be traced back to the movement of a celestial body as their cause unless the will were likewise moved by a celestial body. Therefore, a celestial body moves the human will.

Objection 3: Through their observation of the celestial bodies astrologers (*astrologi*) make some true predictions (*quaedam vera prenuntiant*) about future human acts that proceed from the will. But this would not be the case if celestial bodies were unable to move the human will. Therefore, the human will is moved by celestial bodies.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, "Celestial bodies are not causes of our acts." But they would be causes of our acts if the will, which is a principle of human acts, were moved by celestial bodies. Therefore, it is not the case that the will is moved by celestial bodies.

I respond: In the sense in which the will is moved by an exterior *object*, it is clear that the will can be moved by celestial bodies, viz., insofar as exterior bodies, which move the will when proposed to the sensory power, as well as the very organs of the sentient powers, are subject to the movements of celestial bodies.

But even in the sense in which the will is moved by some exterior agent with respect to the *exercise* of its act, there are some who have claimed that celestial bodies directly affect the human will.

However, this is impossible. For as *De Anima* 3 says, "The will exists in reason." But reason is a power of the soul that is not tied to a corporeal organ. Hence, it follows that the will is a power that is altogether immaterial and incorporeal. Now it is obvious that a body cannot act on something incorporeal; instead, the opposite is true, since things that are incorporeal and immaterial have a more formal and universal power than any corporeal thing. Hence, it is impossible for a celestial body to directly affect either the intellect or the will. For this reason, it is to those who claimed that the intellect

does not differ from the sensory power that Aristotle in the *De Anima* attributes the opinion that “the will in men is like the day which the father of men and of gods bring on”—referring to Jupiter, by whom they mean the whole of the heavens. For since all the sentient powers are the acts of corporeal organs, they can be moved incidentally (*per accidens*) by celestial bodies, viz., when the bodies of which they are the acts are moved.

However, since it has already been explained (a. 2) that the intellective appetite is moved in a certain way by the sentient appetite, the movements of the celestial bodies redound upon the will indirectly, viz., insofar as the passions of the sentient appetite are able to move the will.

Reply to objection 1: The multifaceted movements of the human will are traced back to a certain uniform cause; and yet it is a cause that is higher than the intellect and the will—which cannot be said of any corporeal thing, but is instead true of a higher immaterial substance. Hence, the will’s movements need not be traced back to the movement of the heavens as their cause.

Reply to objection 2: Human corporeal movements are traced back to the movement of a celestial body as their cause insofar as (a) the disposition of the organs that is conformed to the movement is itself something that derives in some sense from the influence of the celestial bodies, and insofar as (b) the sentient appetite is likewise moved by the influence of celestial bodies, and, further, insofar as (c) exterior bodies are moved in accord with the movement of the celestial bodies and at the occurrence of this movement the will begins to will something or not to will it—in the way that when it gets cold, someone begins to will to make a fire. But this sort of movement on the will’s part derives from an object which is presented from the outside and not from an interior impulse.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained (*ST* 1, q. 84, aa. 6-7), the sentient appetite is an act of a corporeal organ. Hence, nothing prevents someone from being made liable to anger or sentient desire, or liable to some other passion, because of the influence of celestial bodies—just as this also happens because of some natural condition. Now most men follow their passions, whereas only a few wise men resist them. And so in most cases what is predicted about human acts through a study of the celestial bodies comes true. Yet as Ptolemy says in *Centiloquium*, “The wise man dominates the stars”—viz., because in resisting the passions and not being subject in any way to celestial movements, he impedes this sort of effect on the part of the celestial bodies.

An alternative reply is that, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, “One must claim that when truths are foretold by astrologers, this is attributed to a certain hidden inspiration that human minds are subject to unknowingly. And since this is done to deceive men, it is an operation of seductive spirits.”

Article 6

Is the will moved by God alone as an exterior principle?

It seems that the will is not moved by God alone as an exterior principle:

Objection 1: A lower thing is apt to be moved by something higher than it, in the way that lower bodies are moved by the celestial bodies. But man’s will has something higher in addition to God, viz., the angels. Therefore, man’s will can also be moved by an angel as an exterior principle.

Objection 2: The will’s act follows upon an act of the intellect. But as Dionysius says, man’s intellect is brought to its own act not only by God but also by the angels through illuminations. Therefore, the same line of reasoning applies to the will.

Objection 3: God is a cause only of the good—this according to Genesis 1:31 (“God saw all that He had done, and it was very good”). Therefore, if man’s will were moved by God alone, then it would never move toward evil—even though, as Augustine puts it, “it is the will by which one sins or lives

uprightly.”

But contrary to this: In Philippians 2:13 the Apostle says, “For it is God who works in us, to will and to accomplish.”

I respond: The will’s movement, just like natural movements, is from within. But even though it is possible for a natural thing to be moved by something that is not a cause of the nature of the thing moved, still, this mover cannot cause a *natural* movement unless it is in some sense a cause of the nature. For instance, a rock is moved upward by a man, who is not a cause of the rock’s nature, but this movement is not natural to the rock; rather, the rock’s natural movement is caused only by what causes its nature. Hence, according to *Physics* 8, what moves heavy and lightweight bodies with respect to place is that which generates them.

So, then, it is possible for a man who has a will to be moved by some extrinsic principle that is not a cause of him, but it is impossible that any *voluntary* act of his should be caused by an extrinsic principle that is not a cause of his will.

Now the cause of a will can be nothing other than God. There are two ways in which this is clear.

First, it is clear from the fact that the will is a power of the rational soul, which, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 90, aa. 2-3), is caused by God alone.

Second, it is clear from the fact that the will is ordered toward the universal good. Hence, nothing can be a cause of the will except God Himself, who is the universal good. Every other thing is called good by participation and is a certain particular good; but a particular cause does not bestow a universal inclination. Hence, primary matter, which is in potentiality with respect to all forms, cannot be caused by any particular agent, either.

Reply to objection 1: An angel is not higher than a man in the sense that he is a cause of a man’s will in the way that the celestial bodies are causes of the natural forms that the natural movements of natural bodies follow upon.

Reply to objection 2: Man’s intellect is moved by an angel with respect to the *object*, which is proposed for cognition by the power of the angelic light. And in this sense, as has been explained (a. 4), a man’s will can likewise be moved by a creature exterior to it.

Reply to objection 3: God moves a man’s will as a universal mover with respect to a universal object, i.e., the good. Without this universal motion a man would be unable to will anything. On the other hand, through his reason a man determines himself to willing *this* or *that*, which is either a real good or an apparent good.

However, God sometimes moves certain men in a special way to will some good determinately, as in the case of those whom He moves through grace. This will be explained below (q. 109, a. 2).

QUESTION 10

The Modality with Which the Will is Moved

Next, we have to consider the modality with which (*de modo quo*) the will is moved. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the will moved naturally toward anything? (2) Is the will moved with necessity by its object? (3) Is the will moved with necessity by the lower appetite? (4) Is the will moved with necessity by its exterior mover, i.e., God?

Article 1

Is the will moved naturally toward anything?

It seems that the will is not moved naturally toward anything:

Objection 1: As is clear from *Physics* 2, natural agents are divided off against voluntary agents. Therefore, it is not the case that the will is moved naturally toward anything.

Objection 2: What is natural to a thing always exists in it, in the way that being hot exists in a fire. But there is no movement that always exists in the will. Therefore, there is no movement that is natural to the will.

Objection 3: A nature is determined to a single effect (*determinata ad unum*). But the will is open to opposites (*se habet ad opposita*). Therefore, the will does not will anything naturally.

But contrary to this: The will's movement follows upon an act of the intellect. But there are certain things that the intellect naturally understands. Therefore, there are likewise certain things that the will naturally wills.

I respond: As Boethius says in *De Duabus Naturis* and the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, 'nature' is said in many ways.

Sometimes it means an intrinsic principle in moveable things. And as is clear from *Physics* 2, nature in this sense is either matter or a material form.

In a second sense, a nature is any substance, or even any being. And in this sense what is said to be 'natural' to a thing is what belongs to it by reason of its substance (*secundum suam substantiam*); and this is what belongs to a thing *per se*. Now in the case of each thing, what does not exist in it *per se* is traced back to something that does exist in it *per se* as a principle. And so if we take 'nature' in this sense, then the principle of whatever belongs to a thing must always be natural.

This is manifestly clear in the case of the intellect. For the principles of intellectual cognition are naturally known.

Similarly, the principle of voluntary movements must likewise be something that is naturally willed. Now this is (a) the good in general (*bonum in commune*), which the will naturally tends toward in the way that every power likewise naturally tends toward its own object, and also (b) the ultimate end itself, which plays the role among desirable things that the first principles of demonstration play among intelligible things, and, in general, (c) all the things that are fitting by nature for the one who wills them (*omnia illa quae conveniunt volenti secundam suam naturam*). For by our will we desire not only what has to do with the power of willing, but also what has to do with each of our powers and with the whole man. Hence, a man naturally wills not only the object of the will, but also the other objects that belong to the other powers, e.g., the cognition of truth, which belongs to the intellect; and existing and living and other things of this sort, which relate to natural existence. All of these things are included under the will's object as certain particular goods.

Reply to objection 1: The will is divided off against nature in the way that one cause is divided off against another; for some things come to be naturally and some come to be voluntarily.

Now there is another mode of causing that (a) is proper to the will, which is the master of its own act, and that (b) goes beyond the mode that belongs to nature and that is determined to a single effect. But since the will is grounded in a certain nature (*fundatur in aliqua natura*), that nature's proper

movement must in some respect be shared by the will (*quantum ad aliquid participetur in voluntate*), in the sense that what belongs to a prior cause is shared by a posterior cause. For in each thing the *esse* itself, which is had through the nature, is prior to the act of willing, which is had through the will. And so it is that the will naturally wills something.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of natural things, what is natural in the sense of following just upon the *form* is always actual in the thing, in the way that being hot is natural to a fire. However, what is natural in the sense of following upon the *matter* is not always actual but sometimes exists only in potentiality. For a form is actuality, whereas matter is potentiality.

Now a movement is the act of something that exists in potentiality. And so in the case of natural things, what pertains to a movement or follows upon a movement does not always exist in the thing; for instance, fire is not always moving upward, but moves upward [only] when it exists outside its proper place (*quando est extra locum suum*).

Similarly, the will, which is brought from potentiality to actuality when it wills something, does not have to be willing something at all times, but rather only when it exists in some determinate disposition.

However, God's will, which is pure actuality, is always actually willing.

Reply to objection 3: A nature always has a single corresponding effect, but it is an effect that is proportioned to the nature. For instance, something that is one in genus corresponds to the nature in its genus, and something that is one in species corresponds to the nature taken in its species, and some one individual corresponds to the nature as individuated.

Therefore, since the will, like the intellect, is an immaterial power, what corresponds to it naturally is something that is one and general, viz., *the good*—just as something that is one and general, viz., *the true* or *being* or 'what-ness' (*quid est*) corresponds to the intellect. But under the good in general (*sub bono communi*) there are many particular goods, and the will is not determined to any of them.

Article 2

Is the will moved with necessity by its object?

It seems that the will is moved with necessity by its object:

Objection 1: As is clear from *De Anima* 3, the will's object is related to the will in the way that a mover is related to what it moves. But if a mover is a sufficient mover, then it moves the movable thing with necessity. Therefore, the will can be moved with necessity by its object.

Objection 2: Just as the will is an immaterial power, so too is the intellect, and, as has been explained (a. 1), both of these powers are ordered toward a universal object. But the intellect is moved with necessity by its object. Therefore, the will is likewise moved with necessity by its object.

Objection 3: Everything that someone wills is either an end or something ordered toward an end. But, it seems, one wills an end with necessity, since an end is like a principle among speculative things and we assent to principles with necessity. But an end is a reason for willing the means to that end, and so it seems that we likewise will the means to the end with necessity. Therefore, the will is moved with necessity by its object.

But contrary to this: According to the Philosopher, rational powers are open to opposites. But the will is a rational power, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it exists "in reason." Therefore, the will is open to opposites. Therefore, it is not the case that it is moved with necessity to one of the opposites.

I respond: There are two ways in which the will is moved: (a) with respect to the *exercise* of its act, and (b) with respect to the *specification* of its act, which stems from the *object*.

As regards the first way, the will is not moved with necessity by any object, since in the case of any object, one is able not to be thinking about that object and, as a result, is likewise able not to be actually

willing it.

However, as regards the second sort of movement, the will is moved with necessity by some objects and not by others. For when a power is moved by its object, the aspect by which (*ratio per quam*) the object moves the power must be taken into account. For instance, what is visible moves the visual power under the aspect of an actually visible color. Hence, if a color is proposed to the visual power, it moves the visual power with necessity—unless the man averts his sight, which has to do with the *exercise* of the act. On the other hand, if what is proposed to the visual power were not actually colored in every respect, but only in some respects and not in others, then the visual power would not see such an object with necessity. For it would be possible to focus on a part of the object that was not actually colored and thus not see the object.

Now the good is the will's object in the same way that what is actually colored is the visual power's object. Hence, if an object that is good in every respect and according to every way of thinking about it (*bonum universaliter et secundum omnem considerationem*) is proposed to the will, then the will tends toward it with necessity if it wills anything at all—for it will not be able to will the opposite. On the other hand, if an object that is not good in every respect is proposed to the will, then the will does not tend toward it with necessity. And since a lack of any good has the character of something not good (*habet rationem non boni*), only a good that is perfect and lacking in nothing, viz., beatitude, is a good of the sort that the will is not able not to will. Every other particular good, insofar as it is lacking in some good, is able to be thought of as not good, and in this respect it can be either rejected or accepted by the will, which is able to tend toward the same thing according to the different ways of thinking about it (*secundum diversas considerationes*).

Reply to objection 1: The only sufficient mover of a given power is an object that has the character of a mover in every respect (*totaliter habet rationem motivi*). But, as has been explained, if it is lacking in anything, then it will not effect movement with necessity.

Reply to objection 2: The intellect is moved with necessity by an object such that it is always true and true by necessity, but not by an object that is able to be true and able to be false, i.e., by a contingent object—as has likewise been explained for the case of the good.

Reply to objection 3: The ultimate end moves the will with necessity, since it is a complete good (*bonum perfectum*). The same holds for what is ordered toward this end and such that the end cannot be had without it, e.g., existing and living and things of this sort. By contrast, the will does not will with necessity those other things without which the end can be had—just as someone who believes the principles does not believe with necessity those conclusions without which the principles can still be true.

Article 3

Is the will moved with necessity by the passions of the lower appetite?

It seems that the will is moved with necessity by the passions of the lower appetite:

Objection 1: In Romans 7:15 the Apostle says, “The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do”—which he says because of sentient desire (*propter concupiscentiam*), which is a passion. Therefore, the will is moved with necessity by the passions.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 3 says, “According as someone is, thus does the end seem to him.” But it is not within the will's power to immediately toss away a passion. Therefore, it is not within the will's power not to will what the passion inclines it toward.

Objection 3: A universal cause is applied to a particular effect only through the mediation of some particular cause; hence, as *De Anima* 3 says, even universal reason does not effect movement except by

the mediation of a particular estimative judgment. But universal reason is related to a particular estimative judgment in the same way that the will is related to the sentient appetite. Therefore, the will is never moved to will something particular except by the mediation of the sentient appetite. Therefore, if the sentient appetite is disposed toward something by a passion, then the will is not able to move in a contrary direction.

But contrary to this: Genesis 4:7 says, “Your lust shall be under you, and you shall have dominion over it.” Therefore, it is not the case that man’s will is moved with necessity by the lower appetite.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 9, a. 2), a passion of the sentient appetite moves the will in that way in which the will is moved by an *object*, i.e., insofar as a man who is in some way disposed by the passion judges something to be fitting and good which he would not judge to be fitting and good if he were without the passion.

Now there are two ways in which this sort of effect on a man is had through a passion:

In one way, the man’s reason is *totally bound* in such a way that he does not have the use of reason, as happens in the case of those men who become furious or demented (*furiosi vel amentes fiunt*) because of vehement anger or sentient desire, in the same way that this might happen because of some other bodily disorder. For passions of this sort do not occur without bodily transmutations. And in such cases the argument is the same as in the case of brute animals, which follow the impetus of the passion with necessity. For in these animals there is no movement of reason and, as a result, no movement of the will, either.

However, sometimes reason is not totally absorbed by the passion, but instead the free judgment of reason remains in some respect. Therefore, to the extent that reason remains free and not subject to the passion, any remaining movement of the will does not tend with necessity toward what the passion inclines the man to.

So either (a) no movement on the part of the will remains in a man, but the passion alone dominates, or (b) if there is a movement of the will, it does not follow the passion with necessity.

Reply to objection 1: Even if the will is unable to prevent the movement of sentient desire (*motus concupiscentiae*) from arising—this is what the Apostle is speaking of in Romans 7:15 when he says, “The evil which I will not, that I do,” i.e., that I desire—the will is still able to will not to have the desire or still able not to consent to the desire. And so it is not the case that the will follows the movement of sentient desire with necessity.

Reply to objection 2: Even though there are two sorts of nature in man, viz., intellective and sentient, it is sometimes the case that a man is uniformly such in his soul that either (a) the sentient part is totally subject to reason, as happens in the case of virtuous men, or, conversely, (b) reason is totally absorbed by a passion, as happens in those who are out of their minds. But sometimes, even if reason is clouded by a passion, something in reason remains free; and, accordingly, someone is able either to repel the passion altogether or, at least, to hold on to himself in such a way as not to follow the passion. For since, in this sort of disposition, the man is disposed differently in the diverse parts of the soul, things seem one way to him in accord with reason and another way in accord with the passion.

Reply to objection 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good that is apprehended through reason, but also by the good that is apprehended through the sensory power. And so the will can be moved toward some particular good without any passion of the sentient appetite. For we will and so many things without passion, through choice alone, as is especially clear in those in whom reason resists the passions.

Article 4

Is the will moved with necessity by God?

It seems that the will is moved with necessity by God:

Objection 1: Every agent that cannot be resisted effects movement with necessity. But since God is infinite in power, He cannot be resisted; hence, Romans 9:19 says, “Who resists His will?” Therefore, God moves the will with necessity.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 2), the will is moved necessarily toward what it naturally wills. But as Augustine says in *Contra Faustum* 26, “It is natural to each thing that God operates in it.” Therefore, the will necessarily wills everything toward which it is moved by God.

Objection 3: The possible is such that if it is posited, then the impossible does not follow. But the impossible follows if it is posited that the will does not will what God moves it toward; for if this were so, then God’s action would be inefficacious. Therefore, it is not possible that the will should not will what God moves it toward. Therefore, it is necessary that it will it.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 15:14 says, “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore, it is not the case that God moves man’s will with necessity.

I respond: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “It is the role of divine providence to preserve the nature of things and not to corrupt it.” Hence, all things effect movement in accord with their condition, so that through God’s motion effects follow with necessity from necessary causes and effects follow contingently from contingent causes. Therefore, since the will is an active principle that is not determined to a single effect but is instead open to many effects indifferently (*indifferenter se habens ad multa*), God moves it in such a way that (a) He does not determine it with necessity to one effect and that (b) its movement remains contingent and not necessary—except in regard to those things which it is naturally moved toward.

Reply to objection 1: God’s will extends outward not only in such a way that something is done through the thing which He moves, but also in such a way that it is done in a mode that fits the thing’s nature. And so it would be more repugnant to God’s motion if the will were moved with necessity, which does not belong to its nature, than if it were moved freely in the way that does belong to its nature.

Reply to objection 2: It is natural to each thing that God operates in it in a way that is natural to it. For something belongs to each thing in the way that God wills that it should belong to it. But He does not will that whatever He does in things should be natural to them; for instance, He does not will that it should be natural to them that they rise from the dead. Instead, He wills it to be natural to each thing that it should be subject to the divine power.

Reply to objection 3: If God moves a will to something, then it is not compossible with this assumption that the will not be moved toward that thing. But this is not impossible absolutely speaking. Hence, it does not follow that the will is moved by God with necessity.

QUESTION 11

Enjoying as an Act of the Will

Next, we have to consider the act of enjoying (*fruitio*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is enjoying an act of an appetitive power? (2) Does the act of enjoying belong only to rational creatures, or does it belong to brute animals as well? (3) Is the act of enjoying directed only toward the ultimate end? (4) Is the act of enjoying directed only toward an end that is possessed?

Article 1

Does the act of enjoying belong only to an appetitive power?

It seems that act of enjoying (*frui*) does not belong only to an appetitive power:

Objection 1: To enjoy seems to be nothing other than to partake of the fruit (*fructum capere*). But as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), the fruit of human life, i.e., beatitude, is partaken of by the intellect, an act of which beatitude consists in. Therefore, the act of enjoying belongs to the intellect and not to an appetitive power.

Objection 2: Every power has its proper end, viz., its own perfection; for instance, the end of the visual power is to have cognition of the visible, and the end of the auditory power is to perceive sounds, and so on for the others. But a thing's end is its 'fruit'. Therefore, the act of enjoying belongs to every power and not just to an appetitive power.

Objection 3: The act of enjoying implies a certain delight (*delectatio*). But sentient delight belongs to the senses, which take delight in their object; and, for the same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore, the act of enjoying belongs to an apprehensive power and not to an appetitive power.

But contrary to this: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 and in *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "To enjoy is to adhere to a thing with love for its own sake." But love involves an appetitive power. Therefore, enjoying is likewise an act of an appetitive power.

I respond: The act of enjoying (*fruitio*) and the fruit (*fructus*) have to do, it seems, with the same thing, and the one is derived from the other. For our present purposes, it makes no difference which is derived from which—except that it seems likely that the one that is more manifest was also the one that was named first.

Now what is manifest to us in the first place are things that are more able to be sensed. Hence, the name '*fruitio*' seems to have been derived from sensible fruits (*a sensibilibus fructibus*). But a sensible fruit is the ultimate thing that one looks forward to from a tree, and it is perceived with a certain gratification (*quadam suavitate*). Hence, the act of enjoying (*fruitio*) has to do, it seems, with someone's love for, or delight in, the ultimate thing that he looks forward to, viz., the end. But the end or the good is the object of an appetitive power. Hence, it is clear that the act of enjoying is an act of an appetitive power.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents one and the same thing, thought of in different ways (*secundum diversas rationes*), from belonging to different powers. Thus, the very vision of God, insofar as it is a vision, is an act of the intellect. But insofar as it is a good and an end, it is an object of the will, and it is in this respect that there is enjoyment of it. And so the intellect attains to this end as an active power (*tamquam potentia agens*), whereas the will pursues it as a power that (a) effects movement toward the end and that (b) enjoys the end once it is attained.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), the perfection and end of every other power is included in the end of the appetitive power, in the way that what is particular (*proprium*) is included in what is general (*commune*). Hence, insofar as the perfection and end of any power is a certain good, it pertains to the appetitive power. This is why the appetitive power moves the other powers to their own ends, and the appetitive power itself attains to its end when all the other powers

reach their end.

Reply to objection 3: There are two elements in delight, viz., (a) the perception of what is fitting, which belongs to an apprehensive power, and (b) being pleased with that which is proposed as fitting (*complacentia eius quod offerter ut conveniens*). The latter belongs to an appetitive power, in which the nature of delight is brought to completion.

Article 2

Does the act of enjoying belong only to men?

It seems that the act of enjoying belongs only to men:

Objection 1: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “It is we men who enjoy and use.” Therefore, it is not the case that other animals are capable of the act of enjoying.

Objection 2: The act of enjoying is directed toward the ultimate end. But brute animals are unable to reach the ultimate end. Therefore, the act of enjoying does not belong to them.

Objection 3: A natural appetite is subordinate to a sentient appetite in the same way that a sentient appetite is subordinate to an intellective appetite. Therefore, if the act of enjoying belongs to a sentient appetite, then it seems, by parity of reasoning, that it can belong to a natural appetite. But this is clearly false, since the act of delight does not belong to a natural appetite.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “It is not absurd to think that even beasts enjoy food and bodily pleasure.”

I respond: As is established by what has already been said (a. 1), the act of enjoying is not the act of a power that reaches the end in the sense of *executing* it (*sicut exequentis*), but is instead the act of a power that *commands* this execution (*imperantis executionem*); for it has been explained that the power in question is an appetitive power.

Now in things that lack cognition there is a power that arrives at the end by way of *executing* it, e.g., the power by which something heavy tends downward, and the power by which something lightweight tends upward. But the power that reaches the end in the sense of *commanding* it (*potentia ad quam pertineat finis per modum imperantis*) is found not in these things themselves, but instead in a higher nature that by its command moves their whole nature in the way that, in things with cognition, the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Hence, it is clear that in the case of things that lack cognition, even though they might attain their end, there is no act of enjoying the end; instead, the act of enjoying is found only in things that have cognition.

However, there are two sorts of cognition of the end, *perfect* and *imperfect*. *Perfect* cognition is that by which there is a cognition not only of that which is the end and the good, but of the *universal* notion of the end and the good; this sort of cognition belongs only to a rational nature. By contrast, *imperfect* cognition is that by which there is a *particularized* cognition of the end and the good (*qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum*); and this is the sort of cognition that exists in brute animals. In addition, the appetitive powers (*virtutes appetitivae*) in brute animals are not powers that command *freely*, but are instead powers that are moved by *natural instinct* toward the things that are apprehended.

Hence, a rational nature has the act of enjoying in the *perfect* sense (*secundum rationem perfectam*), whereas brute animals have it in an *imperfect* sense, and other creatures do not have it in any way at all.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking here about a perfect act of enjoying.

Reply to objection 2: The act of enjoying need not be directed toward the ultimate end absolutely speaking, but is instead directed toward what each thing has as its ultimate end (*eius quod habetur ab unoquoque pro ultimo fine*).

Reply to objection 3: Sentient appetite follows upon some sort of cognition, but natural appetite does not, especially as it exists in things that lack cognition.

Reply to the argument for the contrary: Augustine is here talking about an act of enjoying in the imperfect sense (*de fruitione imperfecta*). This is clear from his manner of speaking. For he says, “It is not all that absurd (*non adeo absurde*) to think that even beasts enjoy”—in the way that it *would* be altogether absurd (*absurdissime*) to say that they have the act of using (cf. q. 16, a. 2 below).

Article 3

Is the act of enjoying directed only toward the ultimate end?

It seems that the act of enjoying is not directed only toward the ultimate end:

Objection 1: In *Philemon*, verse 20, the Apostle says, “Brother, I so enjoy you in the Lord.” But it is manifest that Paul had not placed his ultimate end in a man. Therefore, the act of enjoying is not directed only toward the ultimate end.

Objection 2: A fruit (*fructus*) is what someone enjoys. But in Galatians 5:22 the Apostle says, “The fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace, etc.”—which do not have the character of an ultimate end. Therefore, it is not the case that the act of enjoying is directed only toward the ultimate end.

Objection 3: Acts of will are self-reflective; for example, I will that I will, and I love that I love. But to enjoy is an act of the will, since, as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 10, “It is the will through which we enjoy.” Therefore, someone enjoys his own act of enjoying. But it is not an act of enjoying that is man’s ultimate end; instead, it is an uncreated good alone, viz., God. Therefore, the act of enjoying is not directed only toward the ultimate end.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “There is no act of enjoying if it is for the sake of something else that one desires what he takes into the faculty of the will.” But it is the ultimate end alone which is not desired for the sake of something else. Therefore, it is the ultimate end alone that the act of enjoying is directed toward.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), two things are relevant to the notion of a fruit, viz., (a) that it be something ultimate and (b) that it put the appetite to rest with a certain sweetness or delight (*quadam dulcedine vel delectatione*).

Now something is ultimate either *absolutely speaking* or *relatively speaking*. A thing is ultimate absolutely speaking when it is not referred to anything further (*ad aliud non refertur*), whereas a thing is ultimate relatively speaking when it is the last with respect to certain things (*ultimum aliquorum*).

Thus, what is ultimate absolutely speaking is such that someone takes delight in it as in an ultimate end; and this is what is properly called a ‘fruit’ and what someone is properly said to enjoy.

By contrast, what is not delightful in itself, but is desired only in relation to something else, e.g., a bitter drink for the sake of health, can in no way be called a fruit.

On the other hand, what has a certain delight in itself and is such that certain preceding things are referred to it can in some sense be called a fruit—even if not properly speaking or in accord with the perfect notion of a fruit (*secundum completam rationem fructus*)—and we are said to enjoy it. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “We enjoy things which we have cognition of and in which the delighted will finds rest.” To be sure, the will does not rest in anything absolutely speaking except the ultimate end, since as long as there is still something to look forward to, the will’s movement remains uncertain (*in suspensio*), even if it has already arrived at something. It is like a case of local motion: Even though a point in the middle of a magnitude is a beginning and an end, it is nonetheless not taken as an *actual* end except when the thing comes to rest in it.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, “If he had said ‘I enjoy

you' and had not added 'in the Lord', then he would have seemed to place the end of love in him. But because he added that phrase, he signified that he was placing his end in the Lord and that it was Him whom he was enjoying." So he was saying that he enjoyed his brother not as a terminus, but as an intermediate.

Reply to objection 2: A fruit is related in one way to the tree that produces it and in another way to the man who enjoys it. It is related to the tree that produces it as an effect to a cause, whereas it is related to the man who enjoys it in the way that the ultimate thing looked forward to is related to the one who delights in it. Therefore, the things that the Apostle enumerates in this passage are called fruits because they are certain effects of the Holy Spirit in us; hence, they are called "the fruits of the Spirit," but not in such a way that we enjoy them as the ultimate end.

An alternative reply is that, according to Ambrose, they are called fruits "because they are sought for their own sake"—not, to be sure, in the sense that they are not referred to beatitude, but in the sense that they possess in themselves something that should please us.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), there are two senses of 'end', viz., (a) the thing itself and (b) our attainment of it. These are not two ends, but rather a single end that is (a) thought of in itself and (b) applied to something else.

Therefore, God is the ultimate end in the sense of the thing that is ultimately sought, whereas the act of enjoying is like the attainment of this ultimate end. Therefore, just as God is not an end different from the enjoyment of God, so it is the same notion of enjoyment by which we enjoy God and by which we enjoy our enjoying God. And the same line of reasoning applies to created beatitude, which consists in the act of enjoying.

Article 4

Is the act of enjoying directed only toward an end that is possessed?

It seems that the act of enjoying is directed only toward an end that is possessed (*non sit nisi finis habiti*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "To enjoy is to make use of with joy (*frui est cum gaudio uti*)—no longer with the joy of hope, but now with the joy of the thing itself." But as long as the thing is not possessed, there is the "joy of hope" and not "the joy of the thing itself." Therefore, the act of enjoying is directed only toward an end that is possessed.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 3), the act of enjoying is directed, properly speaking, only toward the ultimate end, since the ultimate end alone brings the appetite to rest. But the appetite is brought to rest only in an end that is already possessed. Therefore, the act of enjoying is directed, properly speaking, only toward an end that is possessed.

Objection 3: To enjoy is to partake of the fruit (*fructum capere*). But the fruit is partaken of only when the end is already possessed. Therefore, the act of enjoying is directed only toward an end that is possessed.

But contrary to this: As Augustine says, "To enjoy is to adhere to a thing with love for its own sake." But this can be done even with respect to an end that is not possessed. Therefore, the act of enjoying can be directed even toward an end that is not possessed.

I respond: 'To enjoy' implies a certain relation of the will to an ultimate end insofar as the will has something as its ultimate end.

Now there are two ways in which an end is possessed: (a) *perfectly* and (b) *imperfectly*. The end is *perfectly* possessed when it is had not only in one's thought (*in intentione*) but also in reality (*in re*), whereas it is *imperfectly* possessed when it is had only in one's thought.

Therefore, there is a *perfect* act of enjoying an end which is already possessed in reality. But there is also an *imperfect* act of enjoying an end which is possessed only in thought and not in reality.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about a perfect act of enjoying.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which the will's rest is impeded: (a) on the part of the object, viz., because it is not the ultimate end but is ordered toward something else; and (b) on the part of the one who desires the end but who has not yet attained to the end.

Now the *object* is what gives an act its *species*, whereas the *manner of acting* depends on the agent, with the result that the act is *perfect* or *imperfect* depending on the agent's condition. And so when the end in question is not the ultimate end, the act of enjoying is *improper* in the sense of falling short of the species *enjoyment*. And when the ultimate end is not possessed, then there is a *proper* act of enjoying but an *imperfect* one, because of the imperfect mode of possessing the ultimate end.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, someone is said to receive or possess an end not only in reality but also in thought.

QUESTION 12

Intending

Next, we have to consider the act of intending (*intentio*). On this topic there are five questions: (1) Is intending an act of the intellect or an act of the will? (2) Is an act of intending directed only toward the ultimate end? (3) Can someone intend two things simultaneously? (4) Is intending an end the same act as willing the means to that end? (5) Does the act of intending belong to brute animals?

Article 1

Is intending an act of the intellect or an act of the will?

It seems that intending is an act of the intellect and not of the will:

Objection 1: Matthew 6:22 says, “If your eye is simple, then your whole body will be light,” where, as Augustine says in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, ‘eye’ signifies the act of intending. But since the eye is the instrument of the visual power, it signifies an apprehensive power. Therefore, intending is an act of an apprehensive power and not of an appetitive power.

Objection 2: In the same work Augustine says that the act of intending is being called ‘light’ by our Lord when He says, “If the light that is in you is darkness” [Matthew 6:23]. But light pertains to cognition. Therefore, so does the act of intending.

Objection 3: ‘Intending’ designates a certain ordering toward an end. But it is reason’s role to do the ordering. Therefore, the act of intending belongs to reason and not to the will.

Objection 4: An act of the will is directed only to either an end or the means to an end. But an act of the will with respect to an end is called ‘willing’ (*voluntas*) or ‘enjoying’ (*fruitio*), whereas an act of the will with respect to the means to an end is called ‘choosing’ (*electio*). An act of intending differs from these acts. Therefore, intending is not an act of the will.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 11 Augustine says, “The will’s intending joins a body that is seen to the visual power and, similarly, it joins the species that exists in memory to the gaze of the mind’s interior thought.” Therefore, intending is an act of the will.

I respond: ‘Intending’, as the name itself suggests, signifies a tending toward something. Now both the mover’s action and the moveable thing’s movement tend toward something. But the fact that the moveable thing’s movement tends toward something stems from the mover’s action. Hence, intending pertains primarily and chiefly to that which *effects* movement toward the end; hence, we say that an architect, or anyone who is in charge, moves others by his command toward what he intends. But as was established above (q. 9, a. 1), it is the will that moves the other powers of the soul toward their end. Hence, it is clear that intending is, properly speaking, an act of the will.

Reply to objection 1: Intending is metaphorically called an ‘eye’ not because it has to do with cognition, but rather because it presupposes the cognition that proposes to the will the end toward which the will effects movement—in the same way that with the eye we see ahead to where we should tend with our bodies.

Reply to objection 2: Intending is called ‘light’ because it is manifest to the one who is doing the intending. Hence, the works are called darkness because, as Augustine explains in the same place, a man knows what he intends, but does not know what follows from his works.

Reply to objection 3: The will, to be sure, does not do the ordering, but it does tend toward something in accord with the order prescribed by reason (*secundum ordinem rationis*). Hence, the name ‘intending’ names an act of the will and presupposes the order by which reason orders something toward the end.

Reply to objection 4: Intending is an act of the will with respect to an end. However, there are three ways in which the will is related to an end:

First, it is ordered to an end absolutely speaking, and in this sense it is called *willing* (*voluntas*), as when we will health (or something else of this sort) absolutely speaking.

Second, the end is thought of insofar as one comes to rest in it, and in this sense it is the act of *enjoying* that is related to the end.

Third, the end is considered insofar as it is the terminus of something that is ordered toward it, and it is in this way that *intending* is related to the end. For we are said to intend health not only because we will it, but because we will to reach it through something else.

Article 2

Is intending directed only toward the ultimate end?

It seems that intending is directed only toward the ultimate end:

Objection 1: In *Sententiae* Prosperus says, “The heart’s intention is a cry to God.” But God is the ultimate end of the human heart. Therefore, intending always has to do with the ultimate end.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1), the act of intending relates to an end insofar as the end is a terminus. But a terminus has the character of something ultimate. Therefore, the act of intending always relates to the ultimate end.

Objection 3: An act of enjoying relates to the end just as an act of intending does. But an act of enjoying is always directed toward the ultimate end. Therefore, so is an act of intending.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 7), there is a single ultimate end of human acts of will, viz., beatitude. Therefore, if an act of intending were always directed toward the ultimate end, then there would not be diverse human intentions. But this is clearly false.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), intending has to do with an end insofar as the end is a terminus of the will’s movement. Now in the case of a movement, ‘terminus’ can be taken in one of two ways, viz., (a) for the *ultimate terminus* itself, in which there is rest and which is the terminus of the entire movement, or (b) for some *point in between* that is the beginning of one part of the movement and the end or terminus of another part. For instance, in a movement that goes from *A* to *C* through *B*, *B* is a terminus, though not the ultimate terminus. And with respect to each of *B* and *C* there can be an act of intending. Hence, even if intending is always directed toward an end, it does not always have to be directed toward the ultimate end.

Reply to objection 1: The heart’s intention is called “a cry to God” not in the sense that God is always the object of an act of intending, but because He knows the intention.

An alternative reply is that the heart’s intention is called “a cry to God” because when we pray, we direct our act of intending toward God and this act of intending has the force of a cry.

Reply to objection 2: A terminus has the character of something ultimate, but it is not always ultimate with respect to the whole; instead, it is sometimes ultimate with respect to some part.

Reply to objection 3: Enjoying implies resting in an end, and this pertains solely to the ultimate end. But intending implies movement toward an end and not rest. Hence, the two arguments are not similar to one another.

Article 3

Can someone intend more than one thing at the same time?

It seems that one cannot intend more than one thing at the same time:

Objection 1: In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says that a man cannot intend both God and bodily comfort (*commodum corporale*). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither can a man intend any other two things.

Objection 2: ‘Intending’ names a movement of the will toward a terminus. But one movement cannot have more than one terminus in a given direction (*ex una parte*). Therefore, the will cannot intend many things at the same time.

Objection 3: An act of intending presupposes an act of the intellect or reason. But according to the Philosopher, it is impossible to have intellectual understanding of more than one thing at the same time. Therefore, it is likewise impossible to intend more than one thing at the same time.

But contrary to this: Art imitates nature. But nature intends two uses for a single instrument; for instance, as *De Anima* 2 says, the tongue is ordered both toward tasting and toward speaking. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, art or reason can order a single thing toward two ends at the same time. And so someone can intend more than one thing at the same time.

I respond: A given pair of things (*aliqua duo*) can be taken in two ways, viz., either (a) as ordered to one another or (b) as not ordered to one another.

If they are ordered to one another, then it is clear from what has been said that a man is able to intend many things at the same time. For as has been explained (a. 2), the act of intending is directed not only toward the ultimate end, but also toward intermediate ends. But one intends a proximate end and its ultimate end at the same time, e.g., the preparation of medicine and health.

But a man can likewise intend more than one thing at the same time if the two things in question are not ordered to one another. This is clear from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is better than the other. But among the criteria according to which one thing is better than another, one is that it is good for more than one thing (*ad plura valet*). And so it is possible for some one thing to be preferred to another by the fact that it is good for more than one thing.

And so a man clearly intends more than one thing at the same time.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine means that a man cannot simultaneously intend God and temporal comfort as ultimate ends, since, as was shown above (q. 1, a. 5), one man cannot have more than one ultimate end.

Reply to objection 2: A single movement can have several termini in a given direction if one is ordered to another, but a single movement cannot have two termini in a given direction if they are not ordered to one another.

Still, notice that what is not a single thing in reality can be taken as a single thing in thought. Now as has been explained (a. 1), the act of intending is a movement of the will toward something that has already been ordered by reason (*in ratione*). And so things that are many in reality can be taken as a single terminus of an act of intending insofar as they are one thing in thought—either because (a) the two things come together to form something that is an integrated single thing, in the way that a balance of hot and cold comes together for health, or because (b) the two things are included under some one general thing that can be intended. For instance, the acquisition of wine and of clothes is contained under the general heading of wealth (*sub lucro sicut sub quodam communi*); hence, nothing prevents someone who intends wealth from simultaneously intending these two things.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 12, a. 10 and q. 58, a. 2 and q. 85, a. 4), it is possible to have intellectual understanding of more than one thing simultaneously, as long as those things are in some sense one.

Article 4

Is intending an end one and the same movement as intending the means to that end?

It seems that intending an end is not one and the same movement as intending a means to that end:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 11 Augustine says, “Willing to look at a window has seeing the window as its end, and that is different from willing to see passersby through the window.” But my willing to see passersby through the window involves an act of intending, whereas my willing to see the window involves an act of willing the means to that end. Therefore, the act of intending an end is a movement of the will different from willing the means to that end.

Objection 2: Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the end is an object different from the means to that end. Therefore, intending an end is a movement different from willing the means to that end.

Objection 3: An act of willing the means to an end is called ‘choosing’. But choosing and intending are not the same thing. Therefore, intending an end is not the same movement as willing the means to that end.

But contrary to this: A means to an end is related to the end in the way that an intermediate point is related to the terminus. But among natural things, it is the same movement that passes through the intermediate point to the terminus. Therefore, it is likewise the case among voluntary things that intending an end is the same movement as willing the means to that end.

I respond: There are two ways to think of the will’s movement toward an end and toward a means to that end.

The first way is to think of the will’s being directed toward each of them absolutely and in its own right (*absolute et secundum se*); and in this sense there are, absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), two movements of the will toward the two of them.

In the second way one can think of the will’s being directed toward the means to the end for the sake of the end. And in this sense a movement of the will that is one and the same in subject is tending both toward the end and toward the means to that end. For instance, when I say, ‘I will the medicine for the sake of health’, I am describing (*designo*) only a single movement of the will. The explanation for this is that the end is the reason for willing the means to the end. But it is the same act that covers both the object and the reason for the object—in the way that, as was explained above (q. 8, a. 3), it is the same act of seeing that is directed at both color and light. This is like the case of intellectual understanding. For if one considers the principle and the conclusion absolutely speaking, then thinking of the one is different from thinking of the other; but when one assents to the conclusion because of the principles, then there is just one act of intellectual understanding.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about seeing the window and seeing the passersby through the window insofar as the will is directed toward each of them absolutely.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as an end is a certain thing, it is an object of the will different from the means to that end. But insofar as an end is the reason for willing the means to that end, it is one and same object.

Reply to objection 3: A movement that is one in subject can, as *Physics* 3 points out, differ in thought with respect to its beginning and end, as in the case of the ascent and the descent. So, then, insofar as the will’s movement is directed toward the means to the end as ordered to the end, it is called an act of *choosing*. On the other hand, the movement of the will that is directed toward the end insofar as the end is acquired by the means to that end is called an act of *intending*. An indication of this is that there can be an act of intending the end even when the means—the object of the act of choosing—has not yet been determined.

Article 5

Do brute animals intend an end?

It seems that brute animals intend an end:

Objection 1: Nature in things that lack cognition is more distant from rational nature than is sentient nature, which is found in brute animals. But as is proved in *Physics* 2, nature intends an end even in those things that lack cognition. Therefore, *a fortiori*, brute animals intend an end.

Objection 2: The act of enjoying is directed to the end in the same way that the act of intending is. But as has been explained (q. 11, a. 2), the act of enjoying belongs to brute animals. Therefore, so does the act of intending.

Objection 3: The act of intending an end belongs to a thing that acts for the sake of an end, since intending is just tending toward another. But brute animals act for the sake of an end; for instance, an animal is moved to seek food or something else of this sort. Therefore, brute animals intend an end.

But contrary to this: Intending an end implies the ordering of something to that end, and this is the role of reason. Therefore, since brute animals do not have reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), intending is tending toward another, and this belongs both to *the mover* and to *what is moved*.

Thus, insofar as *what is moved* toward an end by another is said to ‘intend the end’, nature is said to intend its end in the sense that it is moved to its own end by God, in the way that an arrow is moved by an archer. And in this sense brute animals, too, intend an end insofar as they are moved toward something by natural instinct.

In the other sense, intending an end belongs to *the mover*, viz., insofar as the mover orders something’s movement—either its own movement or that of another—toward the end. This belongs only to reason. Hence, in this sense, which is the proper and principal sense of ‘intend’, brute animals do not intend an end.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through to the extent that intending belongs to *what is moved* toward an end.

Reply to objection 2: Enjoying does not imply an ordering of one thing to another in the way that intending does. Instead, enjoying implies an absolute rest in the end.

Reply to objection 3: Brute animals are moved to their end, not in the sense that they think that they are able to attain the end through their own movement—something that is proper to one who intends—but rather in the sense that, desiring the end by a natural instinct, they are moved to the end as if moved by another, just like the other things that are moved naturally.

QUESTION 13

Choosing

Next, we have to consider acts of the will that are related to the means to an end. There are three such acts: choosing, consenting, and using. And deliberating precedes choosing. So we must first consider the act of choosing (question 13); second, the act of deliberating (question 14); third, the act of consenting (question 15); and, fourth, the act of using (question 16).

As regards the act of choosing, there are six questions: (1) Which power does this act belong to, the will or reason? (2) Does the act of choosing belong to brute animals? (3) Is the act of choosing directed only toward a means to an end, or is it sometimes directed toward an end as well? (4) Is the act of choosing directed only toward what we do? (5) Is the act of choosing directed only toward what is possible? (6) Does a man choose freely or with necessity?

Article 1

Is choosing an act of the will or an act of reason?

It seems that choosing is an act of reason and not of the will:

Objection 1: Choosing implies a certain comparison in which one thing is preferred to another. But it is reason's role to compare. Therefore, the act of choosing belongs to reason.

Objection 2: The same power that reasons syllogistically is the one that comes to conclusions. But it is reason's role to reason syllogistically in matters of action (*in operabilibus*). Therefore, since, as *Ethics* 6 says, the act of choosing is, in matters of action, something like a conclusion, it seems that the act of choosing is an act that belongs to reason.

Objection 3: Ignorance belongs to a cognitive power and not to the will. But as *Ethics* 3 says, there is a certain "ignorance involved in choosing" (*ignorantia electionis*). Therefore, it seems that the act of choosing belongs to reason and not to the will.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that the act of choosing "is a desire for things that are within our power" (*desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis*). But desiring is an act of the will. Therefore, so is choosing.

I respond: The name 'act of choosing' (*electio*) implies something having to do with reason or intellect and something having to do with the will. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, "Choosing is an appetitive understanding or an intellectual appetite (*appetitivus intellectus vel appetitus intellectivus*)."

Now whenever two things come together to constitute some one thing, the one of them is like a form with respect to the other (*est ut formale respectu alterius*). Hence, Gregory of Nyssa says that choosing "is neither an act of desiring in its own right, nor just an act of deliberating, but is instead something composed of them. For just as we say that an animal is composed of a soul and a body, and that it is not the body by itself or just the soul, but both, so too with the act of choosing." Notice, however, that among the acts of the soul, an act that belongs essentially to one power or habit receives its form and species from a higher power or habit to the extent that the lower power or habit is ordered by the higher one. For instance, if someone exercises an act of courage because of his love for God, the act is, to be sure, materially an act of courage, but it is formally an act of charity.

Now it is clear that reason in some sense precedes the will and orders its act, viz., insofar as the will tends toward its object in accord with the order prescribed by reason (*secundum ordinem rationis*), given that the apprehensive power presents the appetitive power with its object. So, then, because the act by which the will tends toward something proposed to it as a good is ordered by reason toward the good, it is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of reason.

However, in this sort of thing the substance of the act is related as matter (*materialiter se habet*) to

the order imposed by the higher power. And so an act of choosing is in substance (*substantialiter*) an act of the will and not of reason. For an act of choosing is brought to completion in a movement of the soul toward the good that is being chosen. Hence, it is clear that it is an act of the appetitive power.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Choosing’ implies a comparison that precedes it, but it is not itself essentially the comparison.

Reply to objection 2: The conclusion of a syllogism that has to do with actions also belongs to reason and is called a ‘determination’ or ‘judgment’ (*dicitur sententia vel iudicium*), which the act of choosing follows upon. And it is because of this that the conclusion itself seems to belong to the act of choosing as to something that follows upon it.

Reply to objection 3: Choosing is said to involve ignorance not because the act of choosing is itself an act of knowing, but because it is not known what will be chosen.

Article 2

Does the act of choosing belong to brute animals?

It seems that the act of choosing belongs to brute animals:

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 3 says, an act of choosing is “desiring something for the sake of an end.” But brute animals desire things for the sake of an end, since they act for the sake of an end and out of desire. Therefore, the act of choosing exists in brute animals.

Objection 2: The name ‘choosing’ seems to signify that something is taken in preference to other things. But brute animals take certain things in preference to others, as is manifestly clear when a sheep eats one plant and rejects another. Therefore, the act of choosing exists in animals.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 6 says, “Prudence involves someone’s choosing in the right way a means to an end.” But prudence belongs to brute animals; hence, at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* it says, “All of the animals that cannot hear sounds, e.g., bees, are prudent without having learned it.” And this same point also seems evident to the senses, since marvelous instances of wisdom (*mirabiles sagacitates*) appear in the works of animals such as bees and spiders and dogs. For if a dog that is tracking a stag comes to a three-pronged crossroads (*ad trivium*), it explores by smelling to determine if the stag has taken the first path or the second path, and if it discovers that the stag has not taken either of them, it immediately starts off confidently along the third path without exploring; it is as if the dog were using a disjunctive syllogism so as to be able to conclude that the stag has taken the third path from the premise that it has not taken either of the other two paths, given that there are no more paths. Therefore, it seems that the act of choosing belongs to brute animals.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, “Children and non-rational animals do things voluntarily, but not by choosing.” Therefore, the act of choosing does not exist in brute animals.

I respond: Since the act of choosing involves taking one thing in preference to another, it must be the case that choosing is related to more than one thing that can be chosen. And so choosing has no place in matters that are completely determined to a single outcome.

Now the difference between the sentient appetite and the will is that, as is clear from what was said above (q. 1, a. 2), the sentient appetite is determined to a single *particular* thing in accord with the order of nature, whereas the will is determined to a single *general* thing, viz., the good, in accord with the order of nature, but is indeterminate with respect to *particular* goods. And so choosing belongs properly to the will, but not to the sentient appetite, which is the only appetite found in brute animals. Because of this, the act of choosing does not belong to brute animals.

Reply to objection 1: Not every case of desiring something for the sake of an end is called an act of choosing, but only those cases that involve discriminating one thing from another. But there is no

place for this except where the appetite can be directed toward more than one thing.

Reply to objection 2: A brute animal takes one thing in preference to another because its appetite is naturally determined to that very thing. Hence, as soon as something toward which its appetite is naturally inclined is presented to it through its sensory power or imagination, it is moved toward that thing alone without any act of choosing—just as fire moves upward rather than downward without an act of choosing.

Reply to objection 3: As *Physics* 3 says, movement is an act of a movable thing that has its source in the mover (*motus est actus mobilis a movente*). And so it is the mover's power that is apparent in a movable thing's movement. Because of this, the order of the mover's reason is apparent in all things that are moved by reason, even if the things themselves do not have reason. For instance, it is because of the archer's motion that the arrow tends directly toward the target as if it itself possessed directive reason.

Again, the same thing is apparent in the movements of clocks and all other human inventions that are made by art. But in the way that artifacts are related to human art, so all natural things are related to God's art. And so as *Physics* 2 says, an order appears in things that are moved in accord with nature, just as it does in things that are moved by reason. And the reason why it is possible for instances of wisdom to appear in the works of brute animals is that they have a natural inclination toward well-ordered processes of the sort ordained by the highest art. It because of this, and not because they have reason or choice, that certain animals are even called 'prudent' or 'wise'—something that is apparent from the fact that all the animals which share the same nature operate in a similar way.

Article 3

Is an act of choosing directed only toward the means to an end?

It seems that an act of choosing is not directed only toward the means to an end:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, "Virtue brings about a correct act of choosing, but if anything is apt to be done for the sake of that virtue (*illius gratia*), then it comes not from the virtue but from some other power." But that for the sake of which something is done is an end. Therefore, an act of choosing is directed toward the end.

Objection 2: 'Choosing' implies preferring one thing to another. But just as one means to an end can be preferred to another, so too one of a number of diverse ends can be preferred to the others. Therefore, an act of choosing can be directed toward an end as well as toward a means to an end.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "Willing is directed toward the end, whereas choosing is directed toward the means to an end."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), an act of choosing follows upon a determination or judgment that is like the conclusion of a practical syllogism (*sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi*). Hence, what falls under an act of choosing is like the conclusion in a syllogism about actions (*ut conclusio in syllogismo operabilium*). But as *Physics* 2 says, in the case of actions, the end is like a principle and not like a conclusion. Hence, the end as such does not fall under an act of choosing.

However, just as, in the case of speculative matters, nothing prevents something that is a principle in one demonstration or science from being a conclusion in some other demonstration or science, so too it is possible for what serves as an end in the case of one action to be ordered toward something else as its own end. And it is in this sense that an end falls under an act of choosing. For instance, in a physician's act, health is the end, and so it does not fall under the physician's act of choosing; instead, his act of choosing presupposes that end as a principle. However, bodily health is ordered toward the good of the soul, and so in the eyes of someone who looks after the health of the soul, being healthy or being sick can fall under an act of choosing. For as the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 12:10, "When I am

weak, then I am strong.”

By contrast, the ultimate end does not in any way fall under an act of choosing.

Reply to objection 1: The proper ends of the virtues are ordered toward beatitude as their ultimate end. And it is in this way that an act of choosing can be directed toward those ends.

Reply to objection 2: As was established above (q. 1, a. 5), there is just one ultimate end. Hence, whenever there is more than one end, there can be an act of choosing from among them insofar as they are ordered toward the ultimate end.

Article 4

Is it only with respect to human acts that there is an act of choosing?

It seems that it is not only with respect to human acts that there is an act of choosing:

Objection 1: An act of choosing is directed toward the means to an end. But as *Physics* 2 points out, the means to an end include not only acts but also instruments (*organa*). Therefore, it is not only with respect to human acts that there are acts of choosing.

Objection 2: Acting is distinct from contemplating. But choosing has a place even within contemplating, viz., insofar as one opinion is preferred to another. Therefore, it is not only with respect to human acts that there is an act of choosing.

Objection 3: Men are chosen to certain offices, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who do nothing with respect to them. Therefore, it is not only with respect to human acts that there is an act of choosing.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “No one chooses anything other than what he thinks will be done by him.”

I respond: Just as an act of intending is directed toward an end, so an act of choosing is directed toward a means to that end.

Now the end is either an action or a thing (*aliqua res*). When the end is a thing, then some human action must intervene either (a) in the sense that the man effects the thing which is the end (hence the physician’s end is to effect health), or (b) in the sense that the man in some way uses or enjoys the thing that is the end, as in the case in which money, or possessing money, is the greedy man’s end.

We should say the same thing about a means to an end. For a means to an end must be either (a) an action or (b) a thing along with an intervening action through which one either effects this means to the end or uses it. And this is the sense in which an act of choosing is always directed toward human acts.

Reply to objection 1: The instruments are ordered toward the end insofar as a man uses them for the sake of the end.

Reply to objection 2: Contemplating includes within itself the act of the intellect’s assenting to this or that opinion. It is instead *exterior* action that is divided off from contemplation.

Reply to objection 3: A man who chooses a bishop or a prince for a city chooses to name him to such an office (*eligit nominare ipsum in talem dignitatem*). Otherwise, if there were no action on his part that established someone as the bishop or the prince, then the choice would not belong to him. Similarly, one should claim that whenever one thing is said to be chosen in preference to another, some further operation on the part of the chooser is involved there (*adiungitur ibi aliqua operatio eligentis*).

Article 5

Is an act of choosing directed only toward what is possible?

It seems that an act of choosing is not directed only toward what is possible (*non sit solum possibilium*):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), choosing is an act of the will. But *Ethics* 3 says, “Willing (*voluntas*) is directed toward what is impossible.” Therefore, so is choosing.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 4), choosing is directed toward things that are done by us. Therefore, as far as choosing is concerned, it makes no difference whether what is chosen is impossible absolutely speaking or whether instead it is impossible for the one who is doing the choosing. But we often choose what we cannot bring to completion and is thus impossible for us. Therefore, an act of choosing can be directed toward what is impossible.

Objection 3: A man does not attempt to do anything except by choosing. But St. Benedict says that if a prelate commands something impossible, then it should be attempted. Therefore, an act of choosing can be directed toward what is impossible.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that an act of choosing is not directed toward what is impossible.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 4), our acts of choosing are always directed toward our actions. But the things done by us are always possible for us. Hence, one must claim that an act of choosing is directed only toward what is possible.

Similarly, the reason for choosing something is that it leads to an end. But no one can attain an end by means of what is impossible. An indication of this is that when in their deliberations men arrive at what is impossible for them, they desist as if unable to proceed any further.

The same point is also manifestly apparent from the reasoning process (*ex processu rationis*) that precedes an act of choosing. For a means to an end, toward which an act of choosing is directed, is related to that end in the way that a conclusion is related to a principle. But it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle. Hence, an end cannot be possible unless some means to the end is possible. But no one is moved toward what is impossible. Hence, no one would tend toward an end unless it appeared to him that some means to that end were possible.

Hence, what is impossible does not fall under an act of choosing.

Reply to objection 1: The will stands between (*media est*) the intellect and the exterior operation, since the intellect proposes the will’s object to it, and the will itself is a cause of the exterior action.

So, then, the beginning of the will’s movement is thought of as coming from the intellect, which apprehends something as good in general; but the terminus of the will’s movement, i.e., the completion of the will’s act, involves its being ordered toward the operation by which one tends toward the attainment of the thing. For the will’s movement is from the soul toward the thing. And so the completion of the will’s act involves there being something good for someone to do. But this sort of thing is possible. And so a *complete* act of will is directed only toward something possible that is a good for the one willing it.

However, there is an *incomplete* act of willing that is directed toward a thing that is impossible; some call it a ‘quasi-willing’ (*velleitas*) because the thing in question would be willed if it were possible.

By contrast, ‘choosing’ names an act of the will that is already determinate with respect to what is to be done. And so an act of choosing is not directed in any sense toward what is not possible.

Reply to objection 2: Since the will’s object is an apprehended good, one has to judge the will’s object according to the way in which it falls under apprehension. And so just as an act of willing is sometimes directed toward something that is apprehended as good and yet is not truly good, so too sometimes there is an act of choosing that is directed toward what is apprehended as possible for the

chooser and yet is not in fact possible for him.

Reply to objection 3: St. Benedict says this because a subordinate should not decide by his own judgement whether or not something is possible; instead, in every case he should abide by his superior's judgment.

Article 6

Does a man choose with necessity?

It seems that a man chooses with necessity:

Objection 1: As is clear from *Ethics* 7, the end is related to what can be chosen in the way that principles are related to what follows from those principles. But conclusions are deduced from principles with necessity. Therefore, it is with necessity that someone is moved to choose on the basis of the end.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1), an act of choosing follows upon a judgment of reason about things to be done. But reason judges with necessity concerning certain things because the premises are necessary. Therefore, it seems that an act of choosing likewise follows with necessity.

Objection 3: If any two things are absolutely equal, then a man is moved toward the one no more than toward the other. For instance, if a starving man (*famelicus*) has two equally desirable portions of food at an equal distance from him in different directions, he is not moved toward the one more than toward the other. (Plato made this claim and gave as the reason for it the immobility of the earth at the center of the universe, as *De Caelo* 2 reports.) But, *a fortiori*, something that is taken to be less good can no more be chosen than something that is taken to be equally good. Therefore, if two or more things are proposed and one of them appears better (*maius*) than the others, then it is impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore, what appears to be the most excellent (*eminentius*) is chosen with necessity. But every act of choosing has to do with something that seems better in some way. Therefore, every act of choosing occurs with necessity.

But contrary to this: Choosing is the act of a rational power and, according to the Philosopher, a rational power is open to opposites.

I respond: A man does not choose with necessity.

This is because what is possibly not such-and-such is not necessarily such-and-such. But the reason why it is possible either not to choose or to choose can be taken from a man's twofold power. For a man is able to will and able not to will, able to act and able not to act, and he is likewise able to will *this* or to will *that* and able to do *this* or to do *that*.

The explanation for this is taken from the very power of reason. For the will is able to tend toward whatever reason is able to apprehend as a good. But reason is able to apprehend as a good not only willing or doing such-and-such, but also not willing or not doing such-and-such. Again, in the case of all *particular* goods, reason is able to think of an aspect of goodness or of a lack of goodness (i.e., an aspect of badness), and accordingly it can apprehend each good of this sort either as something able to be chosen or as something able to be avoided (*non potest unumquodque huiusmodi bonorum apprehendere ut eligibile vel fugibile*).

By contrast, it is only the *perfect* good, viz., beatitude, that reason is unable to apprehend as something bad or defective (*non potest ratio apprehendere sub ratione mali aut alicuius defectus*). And so a man wills beatitude with necessity and is not able to will not to be blessed (*beatus*), i.e., not able to will to be non-blessed (*miser*). But since, as has already been explained (a. 3), an act of choosing is directed toward a means to an end and not toward the end, it is not directed toward the perfect good, viz., beatitude, but is instead directed toward other, particular, goods. And so a man chooses freely and not with necessity.

Reply to objection 1: A conclusion does not always proceed with necessity from its principles, but does so only when the principles cannot be true if the conclusion is not true. Similarly, it need not always be the case that because of the end there is a necessity for a man's choosing a given means to the end. For not every means to an end is such that the end cannot be had without it—or, if it is that way, it is not always being thought of in that way (*aut, si tale sit, non semper sub tali ratione consideratur*).

Reply to objection 2: Reason's determination or judgment about things to be done has to do with contingent things which can be done by us and in which the conclusions do not necessarily follow from principles that are necessary with absolute necessity; instead, the conclusions follow from principles that are necessary only with a conditional necessity, as in 'If something is running, then it is moving'.

Reply to objection 3: If two things are proposed that are equal when thought of in one way, nothing prevents it from being the case that (a) some condition might be thought of in the one by which it is better than the other and that (b) the will should be turned toward that one rather than the other.

QUESTION 14

Deliberating or Taking Counsel, Which Precedes Choosing

Next, we have to consider the act of deliberating or taking counsel (*consilium*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Does deliberating count as inquiry? (2) Does deliberating concern the end or only the means to an end? (3) Does deliberating concern only things that we do? (4) Is there deliberating about everything that we do? (5) Does deliberating proceed by way of analysis (*ordine resolutorio*)? (6) Does deliberating proceed *ad infinitum*?

Article 1

Does deliberating or taking counsel count as inquiry?

It seems that deliberating or taking counsel (*consilium*) does not count as inquiry (*inquisitio*):

Objection 1: Damascene says, “Deliberating (*consilium*) is desiring (*appetitus*).” But inquiring (*inquirere*) does not have anything to do with desiring. Therefore, deliberating does not count as inquiry.

Objection 2: Inquiring belongs to a discursive intellect (*intellectus discurrentis est*), and this is why it does not befit God, whose cognition is not discursive, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 7). But taking counsel (*consilium*) is attributed to God; for Ephesians 1:11 says, “He does all things according to the counsel (*consilium*) of His will.” Therefore, deliberating (*consilium*) does not count as inquiry.

Objection 3: Inquiry (*inquisitio*) concerns things about which there is uncertainty (*de rebus dubiis*). But there is deliberation (*consilium*) about things that are undoubtedly goods (*certa bona*)—this according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 7:25 (“Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but instead I am giving counsel (*consilium*)”). Therefore, deliberating does not count as inquiry.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, “Every instance of deliberating (*omne consilium*) is an instance of inquiring (*quaestio*), but not every instance of inquiring is an instance of deliberating.”

I respond: As has been explained (q. 13, aa. 1 and 3), an act of choosing follows upon reason’s judgment (*iudicium rationis*) concerning things to be done. But in the case of things to be done there are many uncertainties, since actions involve contingent singular things, which are uncertain because of their variability. Now in matters that are doubtful and uncertain (*in rebus dubiis et incertis*) reason does not propose a judgment without having previously inquired (*absque inquisitione praevia*). And so there must be an inquiry on reason’s part before any judgment about things to be chosen, and this inquiry is called ‘deliberating’ or ‘taking counsel’ (*haec inquisitio consilium vocatur*). This is why, in *Ethics* 3, the Philosopher says that the act of choosing is “the desire for what has been deliberated about beforehand” (*appetitus praeconsiliati*).

Reply to objection 1: When acts belonging to two powers are ordered to one another, then in each of the acts there is something that belongs to the other power, and so both of the acts can have names taken from both powers (*uterque actus ab utraque potentia denominari potest*).

Now it is clear that (a) an act of directive reason (*actus rationis dirigentis*) with respect to the means to an end and (b) an act of the will that tends toward the means in accord with reason’s guidance (*secundum regimen rationis*) are ordered to one another. Hence, in the will’s act, i.e., the act of choosing, there is something that belongs to reason, viz., an ordering; and in the act of deliberating, which is reason’s act, there is something that belongs to the will—both (a) something that plays the role of the matter (*sicut materia*), since deliberating concerns what a man wills to do, and also (b) something that plays the role of a mover (*etiam sicut motivum*), since it is by reason of the fact that a man wills an end that he is moved to deliberate about the means to that end.

And so just as in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Choosing is an appetitive understanding,” in order to show that both the intellect and the appetite come together for an act of choosing, so too Damascene

says, “Deliberating is an inquiring appetite,” in order to show that deliberating in some sense belongs both to the will, concerning which and because of which there is inquiry, and to inquiring reason.

Reply to objection 2: What is predicated of God must be understood without any of the defects that are found in us. For instance, it is by reasoning from causes to effects that we have scientific knowledge of conclusions, but ‘scientific knowledge’ as predicated of God signifies the certitude that the first cause has about all effects without any discursive reasoning.

Similarly, counsel (*consilium*) is attributed to God as regards the certitude of His determination or judgment. In us this certitude comes from deliberation’s inquiry (*ex inquisitione consilii*). But inquiry of this sort has no place in God, and so deliberating (*consilium*) is not attributed to God in this sense. Accordingly Damascene says, “God does not take counsel; instead, taking counsel (*consiliari*) is for those who are unsure.”

Reply to objection 3: Nothing prevents some things from being absolutely indubitable goods (*certissima bona*) in the judgment of wise and spiritual men and yet uncertain goods in the judgment of the many or of carnal men. And this is why counsels (*consilia*) are given concerning such things.

Article 2

Does deliberating concern the end or just the means to an end?

It seems that deliberating concerns the end as well as the means to an end:

Objection 1: Whatever involves uncertainty (*dubitationem habet*) is such that there can be inquiry concerning it. But as regards human actions, the end, and not just the means to an end, can involve uncertainty. Therefore, since deliberating is inquiry concerning actions, it seems that one can deliberate concerning the end (*consilium possit esse de fine*).

Objection 2: Human operations constitute the subject matter for deliberating. But as *Ethics* 1 points out, certain human operations are ends. Therefore, one can deliberate concerning the end.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, “Deliberating concerns the means to the end and not the end.”

I respond: In actions (*in operabilibus*) the end has the character of a principle, since ideas about the means to an end are taken from the end. Now a principle is not put into question (*non cadit sub quaestione*); instead, principles must be presupposed in every inquiry. Hence, since deliberating counts as inquiry (*cum consilium sit consilium*), deliberating concerns only the means to an end and not the end.

However, what serves as an end with respect to some things can itself be ordered toward some other end, in the same way that what serves as a principle in one demonstration can be a conclusion in another demonstration. And so what is taken as the end in one inquiry can be taken as a means to the end in some other inquiry. And in this way one will deliberate concerning it.

Reply to objection 1: What is taken as an end is already fixed (*determinata*). Hence, as long as something involves uncertainty, it is not being taken as an end. And so if one deliberates concerning it, he will be deliberating about a means to an end and not about an end.

Reply to objection 2: Deliberating concerns actions insofar as those actions are ordered toward an end. Hence, if some human operation is itself an end, then one will not deliberate concerning it as an end.

Article 3

Does deliberating or taking counsel concern only things that are done by us?

It seems that deliberating or taking counsel (*consilium*) does not concern only things that are done by us:

Objection 1: ‘Taking counsel’ (*consilium*) implies a certain sort of consultation (*collationem quandam importat*). But a consultation involving many individuals can also be made concerning immutable things that are not done by us, e.g., the natures of things. Therefore, taking counsel does not concern only things that are done by us.

Objection 2: Men sometimes take counsel about things that are ordained by law, and thus these men are called ‘legal counselors’. And yet it is not the role of those who take counsel in this way to make laws. Therefore, taking counsel does not concern only things that are done by us.

Objection 3: Some are said to make consultations about future events, and yet those future events are not within our power. Therefore, taking counsel does not concern only things that are done by us.

Objection 4: If taking counsel concerned only things that are done by us, then no one would take counsel about things that are to be done by someone else. But this is obviously false. Therefore, taking counsel does not concern only things that are done by us.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, “We take counsel about things that are within our power and that can be done by us.”

I respond: ‘Taking counsel’ (*consilium*) properly implies a consultation (*collatio*) that is made by several men. This is what the very name ‘counsel’ designates, since it is called ‘counsel’ in the sense of a ‘sitting down with’ (*considium*), because many men sit down together to confer at one time (*multi consistent ad simul conferendum*).

Now notice that in the case of particular contingent matters, in order for something to be grasped with certitude, it is necessary to take into account many conditions or circumstances which are not easily thought of by just one individual, but are seen with more certainty by many; for what the one thinks of does not occur to another. By contrast, in the case of necessary and universal matters, the consideration is more absolute and more simple, so that a single individual is more able to be sufficient by himself for a consideration of this sort. And the inquiry associated with taking counsel properly pertains to contingent singular matters.

Now in such matters the cognition of the truth does not have anything great that makes it desirable in itself, like the cognition of universal and necessary matters does. Instead, it is desired to the extent that it is useful for action, since actions have to do with singular contingent things. And so one should reply that taking counsel, properly speaking, concerns things that are done by us.

Reply to objection 1: For the reason already explained, ‘taking counsel’ implies not just any sort of consultation, but one that concerns things to be done,.

Reply to objection 2: Even if what has been laid down by law does not have its source in the action of someone who is taking counsel, it nonetheless directs him in his action, since one reason for doing something is that it has been mandated by law.

Reply to objection 3: Taking counsel concerns not only things to be done, but also things that are ordered toward operations. Because of this, it is called a consultation concerning things that will occur in the future, since a man is directed in doing or avoiding things by what he thinks will happen in the future.

Reply to objection 4: We take counsel concerning the works of others to the extent that those others are in some way united with us—either (a) through an affective union, as when a friend is solicitous about affairs that concern his friend just as he is about his own affairs, or (b) in the manner of an instrument, since a principal agent and an instrumental agent are like a single cause, given that the one acts through the other. It is in this latter sense that a master takes counsel about the things to be done by his servant.

Article 4

Is there deliberating or taking counsel with respect to everything that is done by us?

It seems that there is deliberating or taking counsel (*consilium*) with respect to everything that is done by us:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), an act of choosing is “a desire for what has been deliberated about beforehand.” But there is an act of choosing with respect to everything that is done by us. Therefore, there is an act of deliberating, too.

Objection 2: ‘Deliberating’ implies an inquiry on the part of reason. But whenever we do something without doing it through an impulse of passion, we proceed from reason’s inquiry. Therefore, there is deliberating with respect to everything that is done by us.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “If something can be done by more than one means, one takes counsel by inquiring into how it might be done most easily and optimally; but if it can be accomplished by just one means, then one takes counsel by inquiring how it should be done via that means.” But everything that is done [can be] done either through just one means or through many. Therefore, there is deliberating with respect to everything that is done by us.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, “There is no deliberating about things that are done by rote or by art (*secundum disciplinam vel artem*).”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), deliberating is a sort of inquiry. Now we normally inquire into things that involve uncertainty (*quae in dubium veniunt*), and thus inquiring reason (*ratio inquisitiva*), which is called ‘clarification’ (*argumentum*), “makes for faith in what is uncertain.”

Now in the case of human acts there are two possible ways for something not to be uncertain:

The first is when one proceeds by fixed means to fixed ends (*per determinatas vias proceditur ad determinatos fines*), as happens in the arts that have set ways of operating. For instance, someone who is writing does not deliberate about how he ought to make the letters, since this is determined by the art [of writing].

The second is when it does not matter much whether a given thing is done in this way or that way. And these are trivial matters (*minima*) that do not much help or hinder the attainment of the end, since reason counts as nothing what is of little importance.

And so, as the Philosopher points out, there are two sorts of things that we do not deliberate about even though they are ordered toward the end, viz., (a) trivial things and (b) things that are such that how they are to be done is fixed, as happens with works of the arts—“except in the case of those arts that involve conjecture,” as Gregory of Nyssa says, “for instance, the medicinal arts, business practices, etc.”

Reply to objection 1: Choosing presupposes deliberation because of deliberation’s judgment or determination (*ratione iudicii vel sententiae*). Hence, when the judgment or determination in question is clear without inquiry, then deliberation’s inquiry is not needed.

Reply to objection 2: Reason does not inquire into matters that are obvious; instead, it judges immediately in such matters. And so deliberation’s inquiry is not necessary for each thing that is done by means of reason.

Reply to objection 3: When something can be done by one means but in diverse ways, then there can be uncertainty in the same way that there is uncertainty when something can be done by more than one means. And so in such a case it is necessary to deliberate. But when both the thing itself and the mode are fixed, then there is no need to deliberate.

Article 5

Does deliberating proceed by way of analysis?

It seems that deliberating does not proceed by way of analysis (*non procedat modo resolutorio*):

Objection 1: Deliberating concerns things that are done by us. But our actions proceed not by way of analysis but rather by way of composition, i.e., from simple elements to composites. Therefore, deliberating does not always proceed by way of analysis.

Objection 2: Deliberating is reason's inquiry. But reason begins with what is prior and arrives at what is posterior, in accord with the more appropriate ordering. Therefore, since (a) what is past is prior to what is present and (b) what is present is prior to what is future, it seems that in deliberating one ought to proceed from the present and the past to the future—which is not the order of analysis (*quod non pertinet ad ordinem resolutorium*). Therefore, the order of analysis is not preserved in deliberating.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 3 says, deliberating concerns only what is possible for us. But whether something is possible for us depends on whether we are [now] capable or incapable of bringing it about that we attain to that thing. Therefore, in deliberation's inquiry one ought to begin from what is present.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "One who deliberates seems to inquire and to analyze (*videtur quaerere et resolvere*)."

I respond: In every inquiry it is necessary to begin with some principle. If this principle is prior in being (*prius in esse*) as well as prior in cognition (*prius in cognitione*), then the process is *compositional* rather than analytic (*non est processus resolutorius sed magis compositivus*). For proceeding from causes to effects is a compositional process, since causes are more simple than their effects.

On the other hand, if what is prior in cognition is posterior in being, then the process is *analytic*, since we make judgments about manifest effects by analyzing them into their simple causes.

Now in the case of deliberation's inquiry, the principle is the end, which is prior in thought but posterior in being (*prior in intentione, posterior tamen in esse*). Accordingly, deliberation's inquiry has to be analytic, beginning from what is intended in the future and proceeding until it arrives at what is to be done right now.

Reply to objection 1: Deliberating does, to be sure, concern actions. But the nature of an action is taken from its end, and so the ordering involved in reasoning about actions is the opposite of the ordering involved in acting.

Reply to objection 2: Reason begins from what is prior in thought (*prius secundum rationem*), but not always from what is prior in time.

Reply to objection 3: As regards what is to be done for the sake of an end, we do not seek to know whether something is possible if it is not congruous with the end. And so prior to considering whether the thing in question is possible, we must first inquire whether it appropriately leads to the end.

Article 6

Does deliberation's inquiry go on *ad infinitum*?

It seems that deliberation's inquiry proceeds *ad infinitum*:

Objection 1: Deliberating is inquiry concerning the particulars, among which are actions. But there are infinitely many singulars. Therefore, deliberation's inquiry is infinite.

Objection 2: Deliberation's inquiry includes consideration not only of what is to be done, but also of how obstacles are to be removed. But every human action is able to be impeded, and any obstacle is able to be removed through some sort of human reasoning. Therefore, inquiry concerning the removal of obstacles goes on *ad infinitum*.

Objection 3: Demonstrative science's inquiry does not go on *ad infinitum* because it arrives at principles which are known *per se* (*per se nota*) and which have absolute certitude (*quae omnimodam certitudinem habent*). But this sort of certitude cannot be found in singular contingent matters, which are variable and uncertain. Therefore, deliberation's inquiry goes on *ad infinitum*.

But contrary to this: As *De Caelo* 1 says, "No one is moved to attain what is impossible." But it is impossible to traverse something infinite. Therefore, if deliberation's inquiry were infinite, then no one would begin to deliberate. But this is clearly false.

I respond: Deliberation's inquiry is finite in actuality and on both sides, viz., (a) with respect to its beginning (*ex parte principii*) and (b) with respect to its terminus (*ex parte termini*). For there are two sorts of principles involved in deliberation's inquiry.

The one sort of principle is proper to deliberation's inquiry and is derived from the very genus of actions, and this is *the end*. As has been explained (a. 2), there is no deliberation concerning the end, but it is presupposed as a principle in deliberation.

The other sort of principle is taken, as it were, from a different genus—just as in the demonstrative sciences, where one science presupposes something which comes from another science and which it itself does not inquire into. Principles of this sort that are presupposed in deliberation's inquiry include (a) whatever is received through the sensory power, e.g., that this is bread or iron, and (b) whatever is generally known (*in universali cognita*) through some speculative or practical science, e.g., that committing adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live without being nourished by the right sort of food. Someone who takes counsel does not deliberate about these things.

Now the terminus of inquiry is that which is *immediately* within our power to do. For just as the end has the character of a principle, so too what is done for the sake of the end has the character of a conclusion. Hence, what turns out to be the first thing to be done has the character of an ultimate conclusion, and inquiry terminates with it.

However, nothing prevents deliberation from being *potentially* infinite, in the sense that the number of things that can come up for consideration in deliberation is infinite.

Reply to objection 1: It is only in potentiality, and not in actuality, that there are infinitely many singulars.

Reply to objection 2: Even though a human action can be impeded, it is nonetheless not always the case that the action in question has an imminent obstacle (*impedimentum paratum*). And so it is not always necessary to deliberate about removing obstacles.

Reply to objection 3: In the case of contingent singular things, there can be something taken as fixed *for now* because it is being assumed in the action, even if it is not fixed *absolutely speaking*. For instance, it is not necessary that Socrates is sitting, but it is necessary that he is sitting for as long as he is sitting. And his sitting can be taken as fixed (*per certitudinem*).

QUESTION 15

Consenting, Which is an Act of The Will concerning the Means to an End

Next we have to consider the act of consenting (*consensus*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is consenting an act of an appetitive power or an apprehensive power? (2) Does consenting belong to brute animals? (3) Does consenting concern the end or a means to the end? (4) Does consenting to an act belong only to the higher part of the soul?

Article 1

Does consenting belong only to the apprehensive part of the soul?

It seems that consenting (*consentire*) belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that consenting is attributed to higher reason (cf. *ST* 1, q. 79, a. 9). But ‘reason’ names an apprehensive power. Therefore, consenting belongs to an apprehensive power.

Objection 2: Consenting (*consentire*) is ‘sensing or feeling together with’ (*simul sentire*). But sensing belongs to an apprehensive power (*apprehensiva potentia*). Therefore, so does consenting.

Objection 3: Just as ‘assenting’ (*assentire*) expresses the intellect’s being applied to something, so too does ‘consenting’ (*consentire*). But assenting belongs to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore, consenting likewise belongs to an apprehensive power.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide* 2 Damascene says, “If someone makes a judgment and does not love [what he judges], then there is no determination,” i.e., consent (*non est sententia, idest consensus*). But loving belongs to an appetitive power (*vis apprehensiva*). Therefore, so does consenting.

I respond: ‘Consenting’ (*consentire*) implies the *application* of the sensory power to something. Now it is proper to the *sensory power* to have cognition of present things; for the *power of imagining* apprehends the likenesses of bodies even in the absence of the things which they are likenesses of, whereas the *intellect* apprehends universal concepts (*universales rationes*), which it can apprehend indifferently both when the singular things are present and when they are absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a certain inclination toward the thing itself, the very application of the appetitive power to the thing, so that it cleaves to that thing, receives the name ‘sensing’ or ‘feeling’ (*sensus*) in virtue of a certain likeness—in the sense that it has a certain experience of the thing it cleaves to by being pleased with that thing (*inquantum complacet sibi in ea*). Hence, Wisdom 1:1 says, “Feel the Lord in goodness” (*sentite de domino in bonitate*). Accordingly, consenting is the act of an appetitive power.

Reply to objection 1: As *De Anima* 3 says, “The will exists in reason.” Hence, when Augustine attributes consenting to reason, he is taking ‘reason’ in the sense in which it includes the will.

Reply to objection 2: Sensing or feeling belongs, properly speaking, to an apprehensive power, but, as has been explained, it belongs to the appetitive power because of its likeness to a certain experience.

Reply to objection 3: Assenting (*assentire*) is, as it were, ‘sensing or feeling with respect to something else’ (*ad aliud sentire*), and so it implies a certain distance from what is being assented to. But consenting is ‘sensing or feeling together with’, and so it implies a certain connection with what is consented to (*quandam coniunctionem ad id cui consentitur*). And so the will, whose role is to tend toward the thing itself, is more properly said to *consent*, whereas, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 59, a. 2), the intellect, whose operation is not accompanied by a movement toward the thing, but just the opposite, is more properly said to *assent*—even though the one word is often used in place of the other.

One can also reply that the intellect assents insofar as it is moved by the will.

Article 2

Does consenting belong to brute animals?

It seems that consenting belongs to brute animals:

Objection 1: ‘Consenting’ implies a channeling of the appetite to a single thing. But the appetites of brute animals are channeled to a single thing. Therefore, consenting exists in brute animals.

Objection 2: When what is prior is removed, what is posterior is removed. But consenting precedes the execution of an act. Therefore, if consenting did not exist in brute animals, then there would be no execution of acts in them. But this is clearly false.

Objection 3: Men are sometimes said to consent to doing something out of some passion, e.g., out of sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) or anger. But brute animals act out of passion. Therefore, consenting exists in them.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, “After the judgment, a man disposes and loves what has been judged on the basis of deliberating (*disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est*), and this is called determining (*sententia*), i.e., consenting.” But deliberating does not exist in brute animals. Therefore, neither does consenting.

I respond: Properly speaking, consenting does not exist in brute animals. The reason is that ‘consenting’ implies applying an appetitive movement to doing something. But *applying* an appetitive movement toward doing something belongs to a thing that has the appetitive movement within its power (*in cuius potestate est appetitivus motus*); for instance, touching the rock belongs to the staff, but *applying* the staff to touching the rock belongs to someone who has it within his power to move the staff.

However, brute animals do not have appetitive movements within their power; instead, in them such movements proceed from an instinct of nature. Hence, a brute animal does, to be sure, have an appetitive movement (*brutum animal appetit quidem*), but it does not *apply* its appetitive movement to anything. And because of this a brute animal is not properly said to consent; rather, the only sort of nature that is properly said to consent is a rational nature, which has its appetitive movement within its own power and is able to apply it or not to apply it to this or that thing.

Reply to objection 1: In brute animals the channeling of the appetite to something occurs only passively. By contrast, ‘consenting’ implies that the channeling of the appetite is not just passive but instead active.

Reply to objection 2: When what is prior is removed, the only posterior thing that is removed is that which properly follows from what is prior. However, if something is able to follow from more than one prior thing, then it is not because one of the prior things is removed that the posterior thing is removed. For instance, if hardening can be effected by both heat and cold (for bricks are hardened by fire, and frozen water is hardened by cold), then it is not the case that if heat is removed, hardening is removed.

Now the execution of an act follows not only from consenting but also from a forceful appetite of the sort that is found in brute animals.

Reply to objection 3: Men who act out of passion are able not to follow their passions. But this is not the case with brute animals. Therefore, the arguments are not parallel.

Article 3

Does consenting concern the end?

It seems that consenting concerns the end:

Objection 1: That for the sake of which a thing is such-and-such is itself all the more such-and-such (*propter quod unumquodque, illud magis*). But it is for the sake of the end that we consent to the means to that end. Therefore, we consent all the more to the end.

Objection 2: An intemperate man's action is his end, just as a virtuous man's action is his end. But an intemperate man consents to his own action. Therefore, it is possible for consenting to concern the end.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 13, a. 1), desire concerning the means to an end is choosing. Therefore, if consenting concerned only the means to an end, it would seem to differ in no way from choosing. But this is clearly false according to Damascene, who says, "After disposing"—which he had previously called 'determining' (*sententia*)—"comes the act of choosing." Therefore, it is not the case that consenting concerns only the means to an end.

But contrary to this: In the same place Damascene says, "Determining (*sententia*) [read: consenting (*consensus*)] is when a man disposes and loves what has been judged on the basis of deliberating." But deliberating concerns only the means to an end. Therefore, so does consenting.

I respond: 'Consenting' names the application of an appetitive movement to something that is in the power of the one doing the applying. Now in the order of actions, one must take into account (a) apprehending an end, then (b) desiring the end, then (c) deliberating about the means to the end, and then (d) desiring a means to the end.

Now our appetite naturally tends toward the ultimate end, and thus the application of an appetitive movement to an apprehended end has the character of *simple willing* (*habet rationem simplicis voluntatis*) and not the character of *consenting* (*non rationem consensus*).

On the other hand, the things that come after the ultimate end, insofar as they are ordered toward the end, fall under deliberation, and so consenting can concern them, insofar as an appetitive movement is applied to what has been judged on the basis of deliberation. But the appetitive movement toward the end is not applied to deliberating; rather deliberating is applied to it, since deliberating presupposes desiring the end. But desiring the means to the end presupposes deliberation's determination (*praesupponit determinationem consilii*). And so consenting is, properly speaking, applying an appetitive movement to deliberation's determination. Hence, since deliberating concerns only the means to the end, consenting, properly speaking, concerns only the means to the end.

Reply to objection 1: Just as we know conclusions through principles even though there is no scientific knowledge (*scientia*) of the principles, but something greater, viz., understanding (*intellectus*), so too we consent to the means to an end for the sake of the end even though there is no consenting to the end, but something greater, viz., willing (*voluntas*).

Reply to objection 2: The intemperate man has for his end the action's pleasure, and it is for the sake of the pleasure, rather than for the sake of the action itself, that he consents to the action.

Reply to objection 3: Choosing adds to consenting a certain relation to that which is such that something else is preferred to it, and so after consenting, there is still choosing.

For it can happen that through deliberation one finds several means that lead to the end, and as long as each of them is pleasing, each of them is consented to. But out of the many means that please us, we give one preference by choosing it.

On the other hand, if there is just one means that is pleasing, then consenting and choosing differ only conceptually (*in ratione*) and not in reality—so that it is called 'consenting' to the extent that acting in the way in question is pleasing, whereas it is called 'choosing' to the extent that the act in question is preferred to those acts that are not pleasing.

Article 4

Does consenting to an act always belong to higher reason?

It seems that consenting to an act does not always belong to higher reason (*ratio superior*):

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 10 says, “Pleasure (*delectatio*) follows upon an action and brings it to completion (*perficit eam*), in the way the beauty brings youth to completion.” But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, consenting to pleasure belongs to lower reason. Therefore, consenting to an act does not belong only to higher reason.

Objection 2: An action to which we consent is said to be voluntary. But many powers have the role of producing voluntary actions. Therefore, it is not just higher reason that consents to an act.

Objection 3: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “Higher reason is intent on inspecting and consulting eternal realities.” But oftentimes a man consents to an act not because of the eternal conceptions (*propter rationes aeternas*), but because of certain temporal conceptions—or even because of the passions of the soul. Therefore, it is not the case that consenting to an act belongs only to higher reason.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “The mind cannot efficaciously decide to perpetrate a sin unless the mind’s intention, which is the highest power for moving the bodily members to an action or restraining them from an action, yields to and complies with a bad action.”

I respond: The final determination (*finalis sententia*) always belongs to the superior (*ad eum qui est superior*), whose role it is to pass judgment on the others. For as long as the judgment still remains to be made, there is as yet no final determination. But it is clear that it is higher reason that has to pass judgment on all things, since we judge sensible things by means of reason, whereas we pass judgment on things that pertain to human conceptions (*ad rationes humanas*) in accord with God’s conceptions (*secundum rationes divinas*), which belong to higher reason. And so as long as it is uncertain whether or not something is to be resisted in accord with God’s conceptions, no judgment of reason has the character of a final determination.

Now consenting to an act is the final determination concerning things to be done. And so consenting to an act belongs to higher reason—though this, as was explained above (a. 1), is in the sense in which the will is included in reason.

Reply to objection 1: Consenting to an action’s pleasure belongs to higher reason in the same way that consenting to the action does.

However, consenting to the pleasure of the *thought* of an action belongs to lower reason in the same way that thinking about the action belongs to lower reason. And yet higher reason has judgment (a) concerning the thinking or not thinking itself, insofar as it is considered as an action [in its own right], and, similarly, (b) concerning the pleasure that follows from the thinking.

But insofar as the thinking is taken as ordered toward another action, it belongs to lower reason. For what is ordered toward something else belongs to an art or power that is lower than the end toward which it is ordered; hence, the art that concerns the end is called an architectonic, i.e., principal, art.

Reply to objection 2: Since actions are called voluntary by reason of the fact that we consent to them, it is not necessary that consenting should belong to any power except the will (*voluntas*), from which they are called voluntary (*voluntarium*). And, as has been explained (a. 1), the will exists in reason.

Reply to objection 3: Higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves one to act in accord with eternal conceptions, but also because it [sometimes] fails to dissent in a way that accords with eternal conceptions (*secundum rationes aeternas non dissentit*).

QUESTION 16

Using, Which is an Act of the Will concerning the Means to an End

Next we have to consider the act of using (*usus*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is using an act of the will? (2) Does using belong to brute animals? (3) Does using concern a means to an end or the end as well? (4) How is using related to choosing?

Article 1

Is using an act of the will?

It seems that using (*uti*) is not an act of the will:

Objection 1: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “Using is directing what comes into use toward the acquisition of something else (*id quod venerit in usum ad aliud obtinendum referre*).” But directing something toward something else belongs to reason, whose role it is to collate and to order. Therefore, using is an act of reason. Therefore, it is not an act of the will.

Objection 2: Damascene says, “A man makes an impulse (*facit impetum*) toward acting, and this is called ‘an impulse’ (*impetus*), and then he uses [his powers], and this is called ‘using’ (*usus*).” But acting belongs to the executing power (*ad potentiam executivam*). And no act of the will follows the act of the executing power; instead, the execution is the last thing. Therefore, using is not an act of the will.

Objection 3: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “All the things that have been made have been made for man’s use, since the reason that has been given to man makes use of all things by judging them.” But judging the things created by God belongs to speculative reason, and speculative reason seems to be altogether separate from the will, which is a principle of human acts. Therefore, using is not an act of the will.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “Using is taking something up into the power of the will (*assumens aliquid in facultatem voluntatis*).”

I respond: Using a thing implies applying that thing to some operation; this is why the operation to which we apply a thing is called ‘using it’. For instance, horseback riding is ‘using a horse’, and striking is ‘using a staff’.

Now we apply to an operation both (a) *interior principles* of acting, viz., the powers of the soul themselves along with the bodily members, e.g., the intellect to acts of understanding and the eye to acts of seeing, and also (b) *exterior things*, e.g., a staff to an act of striking. But it is clear that we apply exterior things to an operation only by means of intrinsic principles, viz., the powers of the soul, or habits of those powers, or organs, which are members of the body.

Now it was shown above (q. 9, a. 1) that it is the will that moves the powers of the soul to their own acts, and this is what it is to apply those powers to an operation. Hence, the act of using belongs (a) first and principally to the *will* as a first mover, then (b) to *reason* as directing, and (c) to the *other powers* as executing—where these other powers are related to the will, by which they are applied to an action, as instruments are related to the principal agent. But an action is properly attributed to the principal agent and not to the instrument; for instance, the act of building is attributed to the builder and not to his instruments. Hence, it is clear that using is properly an act of the will.

Reply to objection 1: Reason does, to be sure, direct one toward something else, but the will tends toward that which is directed by reason toward something else. This is the sense in which one says that to use is to direct something toward something else.

Reply to objection 2: Damascene is talking about the act of using insofar as it belongs to the executing powers.

Reply to objection 3: Even speculative reason itself is applied by the will to its work of understanding or judging. And so speculative reason is said to use something insofar as it is moved by

the will in the way that the other executing powers are.

Article 2

Does using belong to brute animals?

It seems that using belongs to brute animals:

Objection 1: Enjoying is more noble than using, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, “We use those things which we direct toward something else that is to be enjoyed.” But as was explained above (q. 11, a. 2), enjoying belongs to brute animals. Therefore, *a fortiori*, using belongs to them as well.

Objection 2: To apply our bodily members to acting is to use those members. But brute animals apply their members to doing things; for instance, they apply their feet to walking and their horns to striking. Therefore, using belongs to brute animals.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Only an animal that participates in reason can use a thing.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), *using* is applying a principle of action to an action, in the same way that, as has been explained (q. 15, aa. 1-3), *consenting* is applying an appetitive movement to desiring something. Now applying something to something else belongs only to that which has control (*arbitrium*) over it, and this belongs only to that which knows how to direct something toward something else, viz., reason. And so consenting and using belong only to a rational animal.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Enjoying’ implies an absolute movement of the appetite toward a desirable thing, whereas ‘using’ implies a movement of the appetite toward something that is ordered toward something else (*motum appetitus ad aliquid in ordine ad alterum*).

Thus, if using and enjoying are compared with respect to their *objects*, then enjoying is more noble than using, since what is desirable absolutely speaking is better than what is desirable solely insofar as it is ordered toward something else. On the other hand, if they are compared with respect to the apprehensive power that precedes them, then more nobility is required for using, since it belongs to reason to order one thing toward another, whereas even the sensory power is able to apprehend something absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 2: It is by an instinct of nature that animals do things by means of their bodily members—and not because they understand the relation of those members to the operations in question. Hence, animals are not properly said either to apply their members to an act or to use their members.

Article 3

Can using concern even the ultimate end?

It seems that using can concern even the ultimate end:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “Everyone who enjoys something uses it.” But one enjoys the ultimate end. Therefore, one uses the ultimate end.

Objection 2: As Augustine says in the same place, “Using is taking something up into the power of the will.” But nothing is taken up by the will more than the ultimate end. Therefore, using can concern the ultimate end.

Objection 3: In *De Trinitate* 2 Hilary says, “*Eternity* exists in the Father, *likeness* exists in the Image, i.e., in the Son, and *using* exists in the Gift, i.e., in the Holy Spirit. But since the Holy Spirit is God, He is the ultimate end. Therefore, it is possible to use the ultimate end.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “One rightly enjoys God, but no one rightly uses God.” But God alone is the ultimate end. Therefore, the ultimate end is not to be used (*non est utendum*).

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), ‘using’ implies applying one thing to another. But what is applied to another has the character of a means to an end (*se habet in ratione eius quod est ad finem*). And so using always concerns the means to an end. It is for this reason that things which are appropriate as means to an end are called *useful*, and this very usefulness is itself sometimes called their *use*.

But notice that there are two senses of ‘the ultimate end’, viz., (a) the ultimate end absolutely speaking and (b) the ultimate end with respect to someone. For as was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), sometimes it is a certain thing and sometimes it is the attainment or possession of that thing that is called the end; for instance, an avaricious man’s end is either money or possessing money. It is clear that, simply speaking, the ultimate end is the thing itself, since possessing money is good only because of the goodness of money. But in relation to this man, the ultimate end is the acquisition of money, since an avaricious man would not seek after money except in order to have it. Therefore, properly and simply speaking, the man *enjoys* the money, since he has set up money as his ultimate end; but to the extent that he directs the money toward his possessing it, he is said to *use* the money.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is speaking here in a general way of *using*, insofar as ‘using’ implies the ordering of an end to the very *enjoyment* of the end that someone looks for in that end.

Reply to objection 2: The end “is taken up into the power of the will” in order that the will might come to rest in it. Hence, resting in the end, i.e., *enjoying* the end, is being called ‘*using* the end’ in a certain sense.

However, a means to an end “is taken up into the power of the will” not only in relation to using the means to the end, but also in relation to that other thing in which the will comes to rest.

Reply to objection 3: In the passage from Hilary, ‘using’ is being understood for resting in the ultimate end, in the sense in which, as has been explained, someone is commonly said to ‘use’ an end in order to possess it. Hence, In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine explains, “The love or delight or happiness or beatitude in question is called ‘using’ by [Hilary].”

Article 4

Does using precede choosing?

It seems that using precedes choosing:

Objection 1: The only thing that follows after choosing is executing. But since using belongs to the will, it precedes executing. Therefore, it also precedes choosing.

Objection 2: The absolute is prior to the relational (*absolutum est ante relatum*); therefore, the less relational is prior to the more relational. But ‘choosing’ implies two relations, viz., one to the means that is chosen, and the other to that which the chosen means is preferred to. ‘Using’, on the other hand, implies only a relation to the end. Therefore, using is prior to choosing.

Objection 3: The will uses the other powers insofar as it moves them. But as has been explained (q. 9, a. 3), the will moves even itself. Therefore, it also uses itself by applying itself to acting. But it does this when it consents. Therefore, there is an act of using in the very act of consenting. But as has been explained (q. 15, a. 3), consenting precedes choosing. Therefore, so does using.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, “After choosing, the will makes an impulse toward acting, and after that it uses.” Therefore, using follows upon choosing.

I respond: The will has a twofold relation to what is willed:

The *first* relation stems from the fact that in some sense what is willed exists within the one who

wills it insofar as he is proportioned to or ordered toward what is willed (*per quamdam proportionem vel ordinem ad volitum*). Hence, even things that are naturally proportioned to a given end are said to desire that end naturally. However, to possess an end in this way is to possess it imperfectly.

Now everything that is imperfect tends toward perfection. And both natural desire and voluntary desire tend toward possessing the end itself in reality, which is to possess it perfectly. And this is the *second* relation that the will has to what is willed.

Now what is willed includes not only the end, but the means to the end. And with respect to the means to the end, the last thing that belongs to the will's *first* relation is choosing. For the will's proportion to the end is completed in choosing, so that it completely wills a means to the end.

By contrast, using already belongs the will's *second* relation, by which it tends toward attaining to the thing that it wills. Hence, it is clear that using follows choosing, as long as 'using' is being taken to designate the will's using the executing powers by moving them.

However, since in some sense the will also moves reason and uses it, 'using the means to the end' can be understood as it exists within reason's thought when reason directs the means toward the end. And 'using' in this sense precedes choosing.

Reply to objection 1: The very execution of the act is preceded by the movement by which the will effects movement toward the execution, but this movement follows upon choosing. And so since using belongs to this movement of the will, it lies between choosing and executing.

Reply to objection 2: What is relational by its essence is posterior to what is absolute, but that to which relations are attributed need not be posterior. In fact, to the extent that a cause is prior, it has a relation to many effects.

Reply to objection 3: Choosing precedes using if they are both referred to the same thing. But nothing prevents the using of one thing from preceding the choosing of something else.

Also, since the will's acts are self-reflective (*reflectuntur supra seipsos*), consenting and choosing and using can be understood to exist in each of the will's acts, so that one might say that the will consents to its choosing, and consents to its consenting, and uses itself to consent and to choose. And it is always the case that these acts, which are ordered toward what is prior, are themselves prior.

QUESTION 17

Acts Commanded by the Will

Next we have to consider acts that are commanded by the will (*de actibus imperatis a voluntate*). On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is commanding an act of the will or an act of reason? (2) Does commanding belong to brute animals? (3) What is the order between commanding and using? (4) Are act of commanding and the commanded act a single act or different acts? (5) Are acts of the will commanded? (6) Are acts of reason commanded? (7) Are acts of the sentient appetite commanded? (8) Are acts of the vegetative soul commanded? (9) Are acts of the body's exterior members commanded?

Article 1

Is commanding an act of the will or an act of reason?

It seems that commanding (*imperare*) is an act of the will and not an act of reason:

Objection 1: To command is to effect movement in something (*movere quoddam*); for Avicenna says that there are four sorts of movers, viz., “perfecting, disposing, commanding, and advising.” But as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), it is the will's role to effect movement in all the other powers of the soul. Therefore, commanding is an act of the will.

Objection 2: Just as being commanded belongs to that which is subordinate (*subiectum*), so commanding seems to belong to that which is maximally free. But the root of freedom lies especially in the will. Therefore, the act of commanding belongs to the will.

Objection 3: A command (*imperium*) is immediately followed by an act. But an act of reason is not immediately followed by an act, since it is not the case that one who judges that something is to be done does it immediately. Therefore, commanding is an act of the will and not an act of reason.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa, along with the Philosopher, claims that “the appetite (*appetitivum*) obeys reason.” Therefore, the act of commanding belongs to reason.

I respond: Commanding is an act of reason, but one that presupposes an act of the will.

To see this clearly, notice that since acts of the will and acts of reason can be directed toward one another—for reason reasons about willing and the will wills to reason—it is possible for an act of the will to be preceded by an act of reason, and vice versa. And since the force of the prior act remains in the subsequent act, it is sometimes possible—as was explained above in the case of using (q. 16, a. 1) and choosing (q. 13, a. 1)—for an act to be an act of the will insofar as something of an act of reason remains virtually within it, and, conversely, it is possible for an act to be an act of reason insofar as something of an act of will remains virtually within it.

Now commanding is by its essence (*essentialiter*) an act of reason, since, by intimation or declaration (*intimando vel denuntiando*), the one who commands orders the one whom he commands to do something, and it is reason's role to order another in the manner of an intimation.

Now there are two possible ways in which reason intimates or declares something. In the first way, reason intimates or declares something *absolutely*, and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mode—as when someone says to another, “This is what you should do” (*hoc est tibi faciendum*). On the other hand, sometimes reason intimates something to someone *by moving him toward it*, and this sort of intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mode—as when someone says to another, “Do this!” (*fac hoc*).

Now as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), among the powers of the soul it is the will that is the first mover with respect to the exercise of an act. Therefore, since a secondary mover effects movement only in the power of the first mover (*secundum movens non moveat nisi in virtute primi moventis*), it follows that the very fact that reason effects movement by its command accrues to reason from the will's power. Hence, it follows that commanding is an act of reason that presupposes an act of the will, in the power of

which reason effects movement by its command toward the exercise of an act.

Reply to objection 1: Commanding is not effecting movement in just any way at all; instead, it is effecting movement with a certain sort of intimation that declares something to another. This belongs to reason.

Reply to objection 2: The root of freedom has the will as its subject, but reason as its cause. For it is because reason is able to have diverse conceptions of the good (*diversas conceptiones boni*) that the will is able to be directed toward diverse things. And so philosophers define free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) as reason's free judgment (*liberum de ratione iudicium*), in the sense that reason is a cause of freedom (*quasi ratio sit causa libertatis*).

Reply to objection 3: This argument reaches the conclusion that, as has been explained, commanding is not an act of reason absolutely speaking, but an act of reason along with a certain motion (*non sit actus rationis absolute sed cum quadam motione*).

Article 2

Does commanding belong to brute animals?

It seems that commanding belongs to brute animals:

Objection 1: According to Avicenna, "The power to command a movement is an appetitive power, as is the power to execute a movement in the muscles and nerves." But both of these powers are found in brute animals. Therefore, commanding is found in brute animals.

Objection 2: It is part of the concept of a servant that he receives commands (*quod ei imperetur*). But as *Politics* 1 says, the body is related to the soul as a servant is related to his master. Therefore, the body receives commands from the soul even in brute animals, which are composed of a body and a soul.

Objection 3: In giving a command a man effects an impulse toward acting (*facit impetum ad opus*). But as Damascene says, "An impulse toward acting is found in brute animals." Therefore, commanding is found in brute animals.

But contrary to this: As has been explained (a. 1), commanding is an act of reason. But reason is not found in brute animals. Therefore, neither is commanding.

I respond: Commanding is nothing other than ordering someone to do something, along with a certain intimating motion. But ordering is an act proper to reason. Hence, it is impossible for commanding to exist in any way in brute animals, given that they do not have reason.

Reply to objection 1: The appetitive power is said to command an action in the sense that it moves reason-as-commanding (*inquantum movet rationem imperantem*). But this occurs only in men. In brute animals, by contrast, the appetitive power does not properly command (*non est proprie imperativa*), unless 'to command' is taken in a broad sense for 'to effect movement' (*nisi imperativum sumatur large pro motivo*).

Reply to objection 2: In brute animals the body does, to be sure, have the wherewithal to obey, but the soul does not have the wherewithal to command, since it does not have the wherewithal to order. And so there is no such thing as commanding and being commanded in brute animals (*non est ibi ratio imperantis and imperati*); rather, there is only effecting movement and being moved.

Reply to objection 3: The 'impulse toward acting' occurs in one way in brute animals and in another way in men. For men 'effect an impulse toward acting' through reason's ordering, and so in men the impulse toward acting has the character of a command. By contrast, in brute animals the 'impulse toward acting' is effected by an instinct of nature in the sense that as soon as something pleasing or unpleasing is apprehended, their appetite is naturally moved toward pursuing it or fleeing from it. Hence, they are ordered by another toward acting, and they do not order themselves toward an action. And so in

brute animals there is an impulse, but no command.

Article 3

Does using precede commanding?

It seems that using precedes commanding:

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 1), commanding is an act of reason that presupposes an act of the will. But as was said above (q. 16, a. 1), using is an act of the will. Therefore, using precedes commanding.

Objection 2: An act of commanding is one of the means that are ordered toward the end (*imperium est aliquid eorum quae ad finem ordinantur*). But an act of using is directed toward the means to the end (*eorum quae sunt ad finem est usus*). Therefore, it seems that using is prior to commanding.

Objection 3: Every act of a power that is moved by the will is called an act of using, since, as was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), the will uses the other powers. But as has been explained (a. 1), commanding is an act of reason insofar as it is moved by the will. Therefore, commanding is a certain sort of using. But what is general is prior to what is particular (*commune est prius proprio*). Therefore, using is prior to commanding.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, “The impulse toward acting precedes using. But the impulse toward acting is effected by the command. Therefore, commanding precedes using.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 16, a. 4), insofar as an act of using the means to an end exists in reason, which is directing that act toward the end, that act of using precedes the act of choosing. Hence, *a fortiori*, it precedes the act of commanding.

However, insofar as an act of using the means to the end is in the executing power, it follows the act of commanding, since the user’s using is conjoined with the act of that which he is using. For instance, it is not the case that someone uses a staff before he in some way acts through the staff.

By contrast, an act of commanding is not simultaneous with the act of that which receives the command; instead, the act of commanding is naturally prior, and sometimes also temporally prior, to the command’s being obeyed. Hence, it is clear that commanding precedes using.

Reply to objection 1: Not every sort of act of the will precedes that act of reason which is commanding. Some acts of the will, e.g., choosing, precede commanding and some, e.g., using, follow it. For after deliberation’s determination, i.e., after reason’s judgment, the will chooses; and after the choosing, reason commands that through which what is chosen is to be done; and then, finally, someone’s will begins the act of using by executing reason’s command. Sometimes the relevant will is that of another, as when someone issues a command to someone else; and sometimes it is the will of the one who issues the command, as when someone issues a command to himself.

Reply to objection 2: Just as acts are prior to powers, so too objects are prior to acts. Now the object of an act of using is the means to the end. Therefore, from the premise that the act of commanding is itself a means to the end one should conclude that the act of commanding is prior to the act of using rather than that it is posterior to the act of using.

Reply to objection 3: Just as the act of the will when it uses reason to issue a command precedes the act of commanding, so too one can claim that this act of using on the part of the will is preceded by some act of commanding on the part of reason, since the acts of these powers always reflect back on one another.

Article 4

Is the commanded act the same act as the very act of commanding?

It seems that the commanded act is not the same act (*not sit unus actus*) as the very act of commanding:

Objection 1: The acts of diverse powers are themselves diverse. But the commanded act belongs to one power and the act of commanding belongs to another power, since the power that commands is different from the power that receives the command. Therefore, the commanded act is not the same as the act of commanding.

Objection 2: If any two things can be separated from one another, then they are diverse, since nothing is separated from itself. But sometimes the commanded act is separated from the act of commanding, since sometimes the act of commanding comes first and is not followed by the commanded act. Therefore, the act of commanding is different from the commanded act.

Objection 3: If any two things are related as prior and posterior, then they are diverse from one another. But the act of commanding is naturally prior to the commanded act. Therefore, they are diverse from one another.

But contrary to this: The Philosopher says, “Where there is one thing because of another, there is only one thing.” But the commanded act exists only because of the act of commanding. Therefore, they are one.

I respond: Nothing prevents things from being many in a certain respect and one in a certain respect. To the contrary, as Dionysius says in the last chapter of *De Divinis Nominibus*, all the many things are one in a certain respect. However, there is a difference that must be attended to, viz., that some things are many absolutely speaking and one in a certain respect, whereas other things are one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect.

Now ‘one’ (*unum*) is said in the same way that ‘being’ (*ens*) is. But a being absolutely speaking (*ens simpliciter*) is a substance, whereas a being in a certain respect (*ens secundum quid*) is an accident, or even a being of reason. And so if the things in question are one in substance, then they are one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect. For instance, a whole in the genus of substance, composed of its integral or essential parts, is one absolutely speaking, since the whole is a being and a substance *absolutely speaking*; the parts, on the other hand, are beings and substances *within the whole*. By contrast, things that are diverse in substance and one in accident are diverse *absolutely speaking*—in the way that many men are one people and many rocks are one pile, i.e., with a oneness of *composition* or of *order*. Similarly, many individuals that are one in genus or one in species are many *absolutely speaking* and one in a certain respect, since to be one in genus or one in species is to be one *in thought* (*unum secundum rationem*).

Now just as, in the case of a genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form, in the way that a man is composed of soul and body, and yet is *one natural being* even though it has *many parts*, so too, in the case of human acts, the act of a lower power is related as matter to the act of a higher power because the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power’s moving it; for the act of the first mover is related as a form to the act of its instrument. Hence, it is clear that the act of commanding and the commanded act are *one human act*, in the way that a given whole is *one*, but *many in its parts* (*sicut quoddam totum est unum sed est secundum partes multa*).

Reply to objection 1: If the powers in question were diverse powers not ordered to one another, then their acts would be diverse absolutely speaking. But when one of the powers moves the other, then their acts are in some sense one, since, as *Physics* 3 says, “The act of the mover is the same as the act of what is moved.”

Reply to objection 2: From the fact that the act of commanding and the commanded act can be

separated from one another, it follows that they are many in the parts (*multa partibus*). For a man's parts can be separated from one another and yet they are one as a whole (*unum toto*).

Reply to objection 3: Nothing prevents things that are many as parts and one as a whole from being such that the one is prior to the other. For instance, the soul is in some sense prior to the body, and the heart is prior to the other members of the body.

Article 5

Are acts of the will commanded?

It seems that acts of the will are not commanded:

Objection 1: In *Confessiones* 8 Augustine says, "The mind commands that the mind will, and yet it does not do it." But to will is an act of the will. Therefore, acts of the will are not commanded.

Objection 2: Being commanded is fitting for that which understands the command. But it is not the will's role to understand commands, since the will differs from the intellect and it is the intellect's role to understand. Therefore, acts of the will are not commanded.

Objection 3: If some act of the will is commanded, then by parity of reasoning all of them are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are commanded, then there must be an infinite regress. For, as has been explained (a. 1), an act of the will precedes the act of reason when reason commands, and, once again, if this act of the will is commanded, then the relevant act of commanding is preceded by yet another act of the* will*, and so on *ad infinitum*. But it is impossible to proceed *ad infinitum*. Therefore, acts of the will are not commanded.

But contrary to this: Everything that is within our power is subject to our command. But acts of the will are maximally within our power, since all our acts are said to be within our power to the extent that they are voluntary. Therefore, acts of the will are commanded by us.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), an act of commanding (*imperium*) is nothing other than an act of reason ordering that something be done, along with a certain movement. But it is clear that reason is able to give an order concerning an act of the will. For just as it is possible to judge it to be good to will a certain thing, so too it is possible to give an order by commanding that the man will that thing. From this it is clear that acts of the will can be commanded.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in the same place, when the mind *perfectly* commands itself to will, then it is already willing, whereas the fact that it sometimes commands and does not will stems from the fact it does not perfectly command. Now an imperfect command stems from the fact that reason is moved in conflicting directions to command or not to command. Hence, it fluctuates between the two and does not have a perfect act of commanding.

Reply to objection 2: Just as, with the members of the body, each member operates for the whole body and not for itself alone—for instance, the eye sees for the whole body—so too with the powers of the soul. For the intellect engages in intellectual understanding not only for itself but for all the powers, and the will wills not only for itself but for all the powers. And so a man commands an act of willing for himself insofar as he understands and wills.

Reply to objection 3: Since commanding is an act of reason, an act that is commanded is one that is subject to reason. But as was explained above (q. 9, a. 4), the first act of the will comes not from reason's ordering but from an instinct of nature or of a higher cause. And so it is not necessary to proceed *ad infinitum*.

Article 6

Are acts of reason commanded?

It seems that acts of reason cannot be commanded:

Objection 1: It seems absurd for something to command itself. But as has been explained (a. 1), it is reason that commands. Therefore, acts of reason cannot be commanded.

Objection 2: What is such-and-such by its essence is distinct from what is such-and-such by participation. But as *Ethics* 1 says, a power whose act is commanded by reason is itself reason by participation. Therefore, the power that is reason is by its essence such that its act cannot be commanded.

Objection 3: A commanded act is one that is within our power. But knowing and judging what is true, which is an act of reason, is not always within our power. Therefore, it is not the case that acts of reason can be commanded.

But contrary to this: What we do by free choice is such that it can be done at our command. But acts of reason are exercised through free choice; for as Damascene says, “It is by free choice that a man investigates and scrutinizes and judges and disposes.” Therefore, acts of reason can be commanded.

I respond: Since reason is self-reflective (*quia ratio super seipsam reflectitur*), it is able to order its own acts in the same way that it orders the acts of the other powers.

However, notice that there are two possible ways to think about an act of reason:

The first way is to think about the *exercise* of the act. And in this sense an act of reason can always be commanded—as, for instance, when someone is asked to pay attention and to use his reason.

The second way is to think about the *object* of the act, and on this score there are two sorts of acts of reason to be attended to:

The first sort of act is *apprehending the truth about something*. This sort of act is not within our power, since it occurs by either a natural or supernatural light. And so on this score, an act of reason is not within our power and cannot be commanded.

The second sort of act of reason is *assenting to what is apprehended*. Thus, if the things apprehended are such that, as in the case of first principles, the intellect naturally assents to them, then assent to or dissent from such things is not within our power but is instead part of the order of nature, and so, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. By contrast, there are other apprehended things that are not so intellectually compelling as to rule out the possibility of assenting or dissenting or at least of suspending assent and dissent for some reason (*non adeo convincunt intellectum quin possit assentire vel dissentire vel saltem assensum vel dissensum suspendere propter aliquam causam*), and in such cases the assent or dissent is itself within our power and is subject to our command.

Reply to objection 1: Reason issues commands to itself in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 3), the will moves itself—viz., insofar as both powers reflect back on their own acts and on the basis of one act tend toward another.

Reply to objection 2: Because of the diversity of the objects that are subject to an act of reason, nothing prevents reason from participating in itself—in the way, for instance, that the cognition of the principles participates in the cognition of the conclusion.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to this objection is clear from what has been said.

Article 7

Are acts of the sentient appetite commanded?

It seems that acts of the sentient appetite are not commanded:

Objection 1: In Romans 7:15 the Apostle says, “The good which I will I do not,” and a Gloss explains that a man wills not to have sentient desire (*non concupiscere*) and yet has it. But sentient desire is an act of the sentient appetite. Therefore, acts of the sentient appetite are not subject to our command.

Objection 2: As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 110, a. 2), corporeal matter obeys only God as far as its formal transmutation is concerned. But an act of the sentient appetite involves a certain formal transmutation of the body, viz., becoming hot or cold. Therefore, an act of the sentient appetite is not subject to human command.

Objection 3: The proper mover of the sentient appetite is something apprehended by the sensory power or by the imagination. But apprehending something by the sensory power or by the imagination is not always within our power. Therefore, acts of the sentient appetite are not subject to our command.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, “That which is obedient to reason is divided into two, the desirous and the irascible” (*desiderativum et irascitivum*)—and these belong to the sentient appetite. Therefore, acts of the sentient appetite are subject to the command of reason.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 5), an act is subject to our command insofar as it is within our power. And so to understand how an act of the sentient appetite might be subject to reason’s command, we have to think about how it might be within our power.

Now note that the sentient appetite differs from the intellective appetite, which we call ‘the will’, in that the sentient appetite, but not the will, is a power of a corporeal organ. But every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ depends not only on the soul’s power but also on the disposition of the corporeal organ, in the way that an act of seeing depends both on the visual power and also on the condition of the eyes (*ex qualitate oculi*), by which it is either aided or impeded. Hence, an act of the sentient appetite depends not only on the appetitive power but also on a bodily disposition.

Now that which depends on the appetitive power follows upon apprehension. But since the imagination’s apprehension is of the particular, it is regulated by reason’s apprehension, which is of the universal, in the way that an active particular power is regulated by an active universal power. And so, on the one hand, an act of the sentient appetite is subject to reason’s command. However, the condition and disposition of the body (*qualitas et dispositio corporis*) is not subject to reason’s command. And so this, on the other hand, prevents the movement of the sentient appetite from being *totally* subject to reason’s command.

It can also sometimes happen that the sentient appetite’s movement is suddenly aroused at an apprehension by the imagination or sensory power. And in such a case the movement is beyond reason’s command—even though it could have been stopped by reason if reason had foreseen it. This is why the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1 that reason presides over the irascible and concupiscible appetites not by “despotic rule” of the sort that a master has over his servant, but by “political or kingly rule” of the sort that a ruler has over free men who are not totally subject to his command.

Reply to objection 1: The fact that a man wills not to have a sentient desire for something and yet nonetheless desires that thing stems from a bodily disposition through which the sentient appetite is prevented from totally following reason’s command. That is why the Apostle adds in the same place (Romans 7:23), “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind.” As has been explained, this likewise happens because of a sudden movement of sentient desire.

Reply to objection 2: The body’s condition (*qualitas corporis*) is related in two ways to an act of the sentient appetite: (a) insofar as it *precedes* the act, as when someone is in some sense disposed

because of his body to this or that passion, and (b) insofar as it is *subsequent to* the act, as when someone becomes heated up by anger.

Thus, a preceding condition is not subject to reason's command, since it stems either from nature or from a previous motion that cannot be put to rest immediately. By contrast, a subsequent condition follows reason's command, since it follows upon the local motion of the heart, which is moved in different ways by the different acts of the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 3: Since an apprehension by the sensory power requires an exterior sensible thing, it is not within our power to apprehend something by the sensory power unless that sensible thing is present; but its presence is not always within our power. For if its presence is within our power, then a man can use his sensory power when he wills to, unless there is some obstacle on the part of the relevant organ.

On the other hand, an apprehension by the imaginative power is subject to reason's command, depending on the imaginative power's strength or weakness. For the fact that a man cannot imagine what reason considers stems either (a) from the fact that the things in question are not imaginable, as in the case of incorporeal things, or (b) from a weakness in the imaginative power that derives from some indisposition on the part of the organ.

Article 8

Are acts of the vegetative soul subject to reason's command?

It seems that acts of the vegetative soul are subject to reason's command:

Objection 1: The sentient powers are more noble than the powers of the vegetative soul. But the sentient powers of the soul are subject to reason's command. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so are the powers of the vegetative soul.

Objection 2: A man is called "a miniature world" (*minor mundus*), since the soul in the body is like God in the world. But God is in the world in such a way that all the things that exist in the world obey His command. Therefore, all the things that exist in a man likewise obey reason, even the powers of the vegetative soul.

Objection 3: Praise and blame are possible only in the case of acts that are subject to reason's command. But praise and blame, as well as virtue and vice, are possible in acts of the nutritive and generative powers, as is clear from gluttony and lust and from their opposed virtues. Therefore, acts of these powers are subject to reason's command.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says, "The nutritive and the generative are not subject to persuasion by reason."

I respond: Some acts proceed from natural appetite, whereas others proceed from animal appetite or intellectual appetite. For every agent in some way desires an end.

Now natural appetite does not follow upon any sort of apprehension in the way that animal appetite and intellectual appetite do. But reason commands in the manner of an apprehensive power. And those acts that proceed from either intellective appetite or animal appetite can be commanded by reason, but not those acts that proceed from natural desire. The acts of the vegetative soul are of this latter sort, and this is why Gregory of Nyssa says that the nutritive and the generative are called 'natural'. Because of this, acts of the vegetative soul are not subject to reason's command.

Reply to objection 1: An act is more noble and more subject to reason to the extent that it is more immaterial. Hence, from the very fact that the powers of the vegetative soul do not obey reason, it is clear that they are very low-level powers (*apparet has vires infimas esse*).

Reply to objection 2: The likeness in question is likeness in a certain respect, viz., that the soul

moves the body in the way that God moves the world. But it is not a likeness that holds in all respects. For instance, it is not the case that the soul created the body *ex nihilo* in the way that God created the world; yet it is because of this that the world is totally subject to His command.

Reply to objection 3: Virtue and vice, and praise and blame, are not appropriate in the case of the very acts of the nutritive and generative powers that constitute digestion or the formation of the human body. Instead, they are appropriate in the case of acts of the sentient part of the soul that are ordered toward those acts of the generative and nutritive powers, viz., acts of desiring the pleasures of food and sexual intercourse, and acts of using those powers either in a way that they ought to be used or in a way that they ought not to be used.

Article 9

Do the members of the body obey reason in their acts?

It seems that the members of the body do not obey reason in their acts:

Objection 1: It is clear that the members of the body are more distant from reason than are the powers of the vegetative soul. But as has been explained (a. 8), the powers of the vegetative soul do not obey reason. Therefore, *a fortiori*, neither do the members of the body.

Objection 2: The heart is the principle of animal movement. But the heart's movement is not subject to reason's command; for Gregory of Nyssa says, "What pulses is not subject to reason's persuasion." Therefore, the movement of the members of the body is not subject to reason's command.

Objection 3: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "The movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and undesired, whereas sometimes it fails the one who desires it, and even though desire glows in the mind, the body remains frigid." Therefore, the movements of the members do not obey reason.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 8 Augustine says, "The mind commands that the hand be moved, and the hand has such readiness that one can scarcely distinguish the command from the obedience."

I respond: The members of the body are certain instruments (*organa*) of the powers of the soul. Hence, the members of the body are related to obeying reason in the same way that the powers of the soul are. Therefore, since the powers of the sentient soul are subject to reason's command whereas the natural powers are not, all the movements of the members of the body that are moved by the sentient powers are subject to reason's command, whereas the movements of the members that follow the natural powers are not subject to reason's command.

Reply to objection 1: The members do not move themselves but are instead moved through the powers of the soul, some of which are closer to reason than are the powers of the vegetative soul.

Reply to objection 2: In cases that involve the intellect and will, one first finds that which comes from nature (*id quod est secundum naturam*) and from which other things are derived—in the way that the cognition of conclusions is derived from the cognition of naturally known principles, and in the way that the choice of the means to an end is derived from the willing of a naturally desired end. So, too, in the case of corporeal movements, the principle comes from nature (*principium est secundum naturam*).

Now the principle of the body's movements lies in the movement of the heart. Hence, the heart's movement comes from nature and not from the will, since it follows as a *per se* accident upon life, which itself arises from the union of the soul and the body. (In the same way, the movement of heavy and lightweight things follows upon their substantial form, and this is why, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8, they are said to be moved by what generates them.) And it is because of this that the heart's movement is called a 'vital' movement.

Hence, Gregory of Nyssa says that just as the generative and the nutritive do not obey reason, so neither does the pulsating, i.e., the vital. Now ‘pulsating’ names the heart’s movement, which manifests itself through the pulsating veins.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, the fact that the movement of the genital members does not obey reason stems from the punishment for sin—so that, namely, for its disobedience to God the soul suffers the penalty of disobedience in that specific member through which original sin is handed down to posterity.

But since, as will be explained below (q. 85, a. 1), because of the sin of the first parent nature was left to itself (*natura est sibi relictā*) once the supernatural gift that had been conferred on man by God was taken away, one has come up with a natural explanation (*consideranda est ratio naturalis*) for why the movements of these specific members do not obey reason.

Aristotle gives a reason for this in *De Causis Motus Animalium*, when he claims that the movements of the heart and of the genital members are involuntary because these members are co-moved by some sort of apprehension; more specifically, they are moved insofar as the intellect and imagination make representations of certain things that give rise to those passions of the soul that are followed by the movements of these members. On the other hand, these members are not moved by the command of reason or of the intellect, because the movement of these members requires a natural alteration involving heat and cold, and this sort of alteration is not subject to reason’s command.

Now this happens in a special way with these two members because each of them is, as it were, a sort of separate animal (*quasi quoddam animal separatum*) to the extent that it is a principle of life, given that a principle is a ‘virtual whole’ (*virtute totum*). For the heart is the principle of the sensory powers, and the genital member is such that the seminal power, which is virtually the whole animal, comes forth from it. And so they have their own proper movements by nature (*naturaliter*), because, as was just explained, the principles have to come from nature (*principia oportet esse naturalia*).

QUESTION 18

The Goodness and Badness of Human Acts in General

Next we have to consider the goodness and badness of human acts: first, the way in which a human action is good or bad (questions 18-20) and, second, what follows from the goodness or badness of human acts, viz., merit and demerit, sin and guilt (question 21).

On the first point, there are three topics to consider: first, the goodness and badness of human acts in general (question 18); second, the goodness and badness of interior acts (question 19); and, third, the goodness and badness of exterior acts (question 20).

On the first topic there are eleven questions: (1) Is every action good, or are some actions bad? (2) Does a man's action have goodness or badness from its object? (3) Does it have goodness or badness from its circumstances? (4) Does it have goodness or badness from its end? (5) Are some human actions good or bad by their species? (6) Does an act have its species of goodness or badness from its end? (7) Is the species derived from the end contained under—as under a genus—the species derived from the object, or vice versa? (8) Is any act indifferent by its species? (9) Is any act indifferent as an individual? (10) Does a circumstance confer on a moral act its species of goodness or badness? (11) Does every circumstance that adds to a moral act's goodness or badness confer on it its species of goodness or badness?

Article 1

Is every human action good, or are some actions bad?

It seems that every human action is good and that none is bad:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that what is bad does not act except by the power of what is good (*nisi virtute boni*). But what is bad is not effected by the power of what is good. Therefore, no action is bad.

Objection 2: Nothing acts except insofar as it is actual. But a thing is bad not insofar as it is actual, but insofar as a potentiality is deprived of actuality—while, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, what is good exists insofar as a potentiality is perfected by actuality. Therefore, nothing acts insofar as it is bad; rather, it acts only insofar as it is good. Therefore, every action is good, and none is bad.

Objection 3: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, what is bad can be a cause only *per accidens*. But every action has a *per se* effect. Therefore, no action is bad, but instead every action is good.

But contrary to this: In John 3:20 our Lord says, “Everyone who acts badly hates the light.” Therefore, some human actions are bad.

I respond: It is necessary to speak about good and evil in actions in the same way that one speaks of good and evil in things, since each thing produces actions that are such as it itself is. Now in the case of things, each thing has as much goodness as it has *esse*, since, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 5, aa. 1 and 3), ‘good’ and ‘being’ are convertible.

God alone has the whole fullness of His *esse* as something one and simple, whereas every other thing has a fullness of *esse* that belongs to it through diverse aspects (*secundum diversa*). Hence, with some things it happens that they have *esse* in certain respects and yet they lack something of the fullness of *esse* that is appropriate for them. For instance, the fullness of human *esse* requires that a man be a certain sort of composite of soul and body and that he have all the powers and instruments for cognition and movement. Hence, if a particular man lacks some of these things, then he is lacking in something of the fullness of his *esse*. Therefore, he has as much goodness as he has *esse*, whereas to the extent that he lacks something of the fullness of *esse*, he is lacking in goodness and is called bad. For instance, a blind man has goodness in the fact that he is alive, and it is bad for him that he lacks sight. By contrast, if he

had no being or goodness at all, then he would not be able to be called either bad or good. But because the very fullness of *esse* belongs to the notion of the good (*de ratione boni est ipsa pleniudo essendi*), if a thing lacks something of the fullness of *esse* that it ought to have (*aliquid defuerit de debita essendi plenitudine*), then it will not be called *good absolutely speaking*, but will instead be called *good in a certain respect* (*non dicetur simpliciter bonum sed secundum quid*), insofar as it is a being—though, as was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 5, a. 1), it can be called a *being* absolutely speaking and a *non-being* in a certain respect.

So, then, one should reply that every action is such that (a) to the extent that it has something of *esse*, it has something of goodness, but such that (b) to the extent that it lacks something of the fullness of *esse* that a human action ought to have, it lacks something of goodness and so is called ‘bad’—as, e.g., when it lacks either the determinate quantity prescribed by reason, or the right place, or something else of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: What is bad acts in the power of a good thing that is defective (*in virtute boni deficientis*). For if there were nothing there of goodness, then the thing in question would not be a being and would be unable to act. On the other hand, if it were not defective, it would not be bad. Hence, the action caused is a certain defective good that is good in a certain respect, but bad absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents a thing from (a) being actual in a certain respect and so able to act, and yet (b) being deprived of actuality in some other respect and so the cause of a defective action. For instance, a blind man has in actuality the ambulatory power by which he is able to walk, but because he lacks vision, which directs one in walking, he suffers a defect in his walking when he walks by stumbling around.

Reply to objection 3: A bad action can have a *per se* effect insofar as it has something of goodness and being. For instance, an act of adultery is a cause of human generation insofar as it involves the sexual union of a man and a woman, though not insofar as it lacks the order prescribed by reason (*non inquantum caret ordine rationis*).

Article 2

Does an action have goodness or badness from its object?

It seems that an action does not have goodness or badness from its object:

Objection 1: The object of an action is a thing (*res*). But as Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 3, “Evil lies not in things, but in the use sinners make of them.” Therefore, a human action does not have goodness or badness from its object.

Objection 2: The object is related as matter to the action. However, a thing’s goodness comes not from its matter but rather from its form, which is its actuality. Therefore, it is not the case that goodness and badness exist in acts because of the object.

Objection 3: The object of an active power is related to its action in the way that an effect is related to its cause. But a cause’s goodness does not depend on its effect; rather, it is just the opposite. Therefore, a human action does not have goodness or badness from its object.

But contrary to this: Hosea 9:10 says, “They became abominable, just like the things that they loved.” But a man becomes abominable to God because of the badness of his actions. Therefore, the badness of an action stems from the bad objects that a man loves. And the same explanation holds for the goodness of an action.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), an action’s goodness or badness, just like the goodness or badness of other things as well, depends on its fullness of being or lack of being. Now what seems

relevant in the first place to a thing's fullness of being is that which gives the thing its species. And just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, in the way that a movement has its species from its terminus.

And so just as a natural thing's first goodness (*prima bonitas*) comes from its form, which gives it its species, so a moral act's first goodness comes from an appropriate object. Hence, some call this sort of action one that is 'good of its kind' (*bonum ex genere*), e.g., making use of what is one's own.

And just as in natural things the first badness occurs if a generated thing does not attain to the form of the species—for instance, if what is generated is not a man but something instead of a man—so too the first badness in moral actions is something that comes from the object, e.g., taking what belongs to another. And this sort of action is called 'bad of its kind' (*malum ex genere*)—where 'kind' (*genus*) is being taken for the species, in the manner of speaking in which we call the whole human species 'mankind'.

Reply to objection 1: Even though exterior things are good in themselves, they still do not always have the right sort of relation to this or that action. And so insofar as they are thought of as objects of the actions in question, these things do not have the character of goodness.

Reply to objection 2: The object of an action is not a matter *out of which* (*materia ex qua*) but a *matter with respect to which* (*materia circum quam*), and so insofar as the object gives an act its species, it has the character in some sense of a form.

Reply to objection 3: It is not always the case that the object of a human action is the object of an active power. For an appetitive power is in some sense passive, insofar as it is moved by something desirable, and yet it is a principle of human acts.

Nor is it the case that the objects of active powers always have the character of an effect. This is so only when they have already been transformed. For instance, transformed food (*alimentum nondum transmutatum*) is the effect of the nutritive power, but it is food that has not yet been transformed that is related to the nutritive power as the matter with respect to which it operates (*sicut materia circa quam operatur*).

On the other hand, from the fact that an object is in some sense the effect of an active power it follows that it is the terminus of that action and, as a result, that it gives the action its form and species. For a movement has its species from its termini. And even though the actions's goodness is not caused by its effect's goodness, the action is called a good action from the fact that it is able to induce a good effect. And so the action's proportion to the effect is itself the reason for the action's goodness.

Article 3

Does an action have goodness or badness from its circumstances?

It seems that an action does not have goodness or badness from its circumstances (*actio non sit bona vel mala ex circumstantia*):

Objection 1: As has been explained (q. 7. a. 1), the circumstances 'surround' an act in the sense of existing outside of it. But as *Metaphysics* 6 says, "Good and bad exist within the things themselves." Therefore, it is not the case that an action has goodness or badness because of its circumstances.

Objection 2: The goodness or badness of acts is considered especially in moral theory (*in doctrina morum*). But since the circumstances are certain accidents of acts, they seem to lie outside the consideration of art, since, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, "No art takes account of what exists *per accidens*." Therefore, the goodness or badness of an action is not from its circumstances.

Objection 3: What belongs to something with respect to its substance is not attributed to it through an accident. But *good* and *bad* belong to an action with respect to its substance, since, as has been

explained (a. 2), an action can be good or bad of its kind (*ex suo genere potest esse bona vel mala*). Therefore, it does not belong to an action to be good or bad because of its circumstances.

But contrary to this: In the *Ethics* the Philosopher says that the virtuous man acts “in the way he should, and when he should, and so on for the other circumstances.” Therefore, conversely, the vicious man acts, in the case of each vice, when he should not, and where he should not, and so on for the other circumstances. Therefore, human actions are good or bad according to their circumstances.

I respond: Among natural things the fullness of perfection that the thing should have does not come from the substantial form that confers the species; instead, much is added by the supervening accidents, e.g., in the case of man, the shape and color and others of this sort, which are such that badness results if they are not present in the right proportion.

The same thing holds for an action as well. For an action’s fullness of goodness does not consist wholly in its species; instead, something is added to the goodness by things that accrue to the action as accidents. And appropriate circumstances are accidents of this sort. Hence, if something required for appropriate circumstances is lacking, then the action will be bad.

Reply to objection 1: The circumstances exist outside of an action to the extent that they are not part of the action’s essence, but they exist within the action itself as certain of its accidents. The accidents that exist in natural things likewise exist outside their essences in this same sense.

Reply to objection 2: Not all accidents are related *per accidens* to their subjects; instead, some of them are the *per se* accidents, and *per se* accidents are studied in each art. This is the way in which the circumstances of acts are considered in moral theory.

Reply to objection 3: Since ‘good’ and ‘being’ are convertible, it follows that just as ‘being’ is said with respect to substance and with respect to accident, so too ‘good’ is likewise attributed to something both with respect to its essential *esse* and with respect to its accidental *esse*—and this holds for both natural things and moral actions.

Article 4

Does a human act have goodness or badness from its end?

It seems that a human act does not have goodness or badness from its end:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Nothing acts with a view toward evil.” Therefore, if an act’s goodness or badness were derived from its end, then no actions would be bad. But this is clearly false.

Objection 2: An act’s goodness is something that exists within the act. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore, it is not because of its end that an action is called good or bad.

Objection 3: It is possible for a good act to be ordered toward a bad end—as, for instance, when someone gives alms out of vainglory. And, conversely, it is possible for a bad action to be ordered toward a good end—as when someone steals something in order to give it to a poor man. Therefore, an action is not good or bad because of its end.

But contrary to this: In *Topica* Boethius says, “If something’s end is good, then it itself is likewise good; and if something’s end is bad, then it itself is likewise bad.”

I respond: The disposition of things in goodness is the same as their disposition in *esse*. For instance, there are some things whose *esse* does not depend on another, and in the case of such things it is enough to consider their *esse* itself, absolutely speaking. However, there are other things whose *esse* does depend on another, and they have to be studied by considering the cause on which they depend.

Now just as a thing’s *esse* depends on its agent and its form, so too a thing’s goodness depends on its end. Hence, in the case of the divine Persons, who do not have a goodness that depends on another,

no explanation of their goodness is taken from the end. By contrast, human actions and other things whose goodness depends on another have a reason for their goodness in the end on which they depend, and this reason goes beyond the absolute goodness that exists in them.

So, then, there can be four sort of goodness that exist in a human action:

(a) *being good with respect to its kind* (*bonitas secundum genus*), i.e., being good insofar as it is an action, since, as has been explained (a. 1), it has as much goodness as it has action and being;

(b) *being good by its species* (*bonitas secundum species*), which is taken from an appropriate object;

(c) *being good with respect to its circumstances* (*bonitas secundum circumstantias*) in the sense of being good with respect to certain accidents;

(d) *being good with respect to its end* (*bonitas secundum finem*) in the sense of being good with respect to its relation to a cause of goodness.

Reply to objection 1: The good that someone looks to in acting is not always a genuine good. Rather, sometimes it is a genuine good and sometimes it is an apparent good. And in the latter case, a bad action follows from the end.

Reply to objection 2: Even though the end is an extrinsic cause, it is nonetheless the case that the right sort of proportion to and relation to the end inhere in the action.

Reply to objection 3: Nothing prevents an action from having one of the sorts goodness listed above while lacking another. Accordingly, it is possible for an action that is good by its species or with respect to its circumstances to be ordered toward a bad end, and vice versa. But an action is not good absolutely speaking unless *all* these sorts of goodness come together in it. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Any single defect is a cause of badness, whereas goodness results from the whole cause.”

Article 5

Do moral acts differ in species because of their goodness and badness?

It seems that moral acts do not differ in species because of their goodness and badness:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), goodness and badness in acts are like goodness and badness among things. But goodness and badness do not make for a diversity of species among things; for instance, a good man and a bad man are the same in species. Therefore, neither do goodness and badness in acts make for a diversity of species.

Objection 2: Since badness is a privation, it is a certain sort of non-being (*quoddam non ens*). But according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 3, *non-being* cannot be a specific difference. Therefore, since it is the specific difference that constitutes a species, it seems that an act is not constituted in a species by the fact that it is bad. And so goodness and badness do not make for a diversity of species among human acts.

Objection 3: Acts that are diverse in species have diverse effects. But effects that are the same in species can follow from a good act and from a bad act. For instance, a man is generated from adultery and from marital intercourse. Therefore, a good act and a bad act do not differ in species.

Objection 4: As has been explained (a. 3), goodness and badness sometimes exist in acts because of a circumstance. But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an act its species. Therefore, human acts do not differ in species because of their goodness and badness.

But contrary to this: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, similar habits result in similar acts. But a good habit and a bad habit, e.g., generosity (*liberalitas*) and prodigality (*prodigalitas*), differ in species. Therefore, a good act and a bad act likewise differ in species.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), every act has its species from its object. Hence, it must be the case that some difference on the part of the object makes for a diversity of species among acts.

Notice, however, that a difference on the part of an object that makes for a difference of species among acts insofar as these acts are related to *one* active principle does not make for a difference of species among the acts insofar as they are related to *another* principle. For only something that is *per se*, and nothing that is *per accidens*, constitutes a species. But it is possible for a given difference on the part of the object to be *per se* in relation to one active principle and *per accidens* in relation to another; for instance, having a cognition of color and having a cognition of sound differ *per se* in relation to the sensory power, but not in relation to the intellect.

Now in the case of human acts, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are predicated in relation to reason, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a man’s good is “to be in conformity to reason” (*secundum rationem esse*), whereas the bad is what lies “outside of reason” (*praeter rationem*). For each thing is such that (a) the good for it is what is appropriate for it given its form, and (b) the bad for it is that which lies outside what is prescribed by its form (*praeter ordinem suae formae*). Therefore, it is clear that the differences *good* and *bad*, thought of in regard to the object, are related *per se* to reason, viz., insofar as the object either conforms to or does not conform to reason (*secundum quod obiectum est rationi conveniens vel non conveniens*).

Now acts are called ‘human’ or ‘moral’ insofar as they come from reason. Hence, it is clear that goodness and badness make for diverse species among moral acts, since specific differences make for diverse species *per se*.

Reply to objection 1: Even in the case of natural things goodness and badness, i.e., being consonant with nature (*secundum naturam*) and being contrary to nature (*contra naturam*), make for diverse natural species. For instance, a dead body and a living body do not belong to the same species. Similarly, goodness, i.e., being in accord with reason, and badness, i.e., being outside of reason, make for diverse moral species.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Bad’ does not imply an absolute privation, but instead implies a privation that affects such-and-such a potentiality. For instance, an act is called bad by its species not because it has no object, but because it has an object that is not in accord with reason, e.g., taking what belongs to another. Hence, insofar as the object is something positively speaking, it can constitute a species of bad acts.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as a conjugal act and an act of adultery are related to reason, they differ in species and have effects that differ in species, since the one deserves praise and reward, whereas the other deserves blame and punishment.

However, insofar as they are related to the generative power, they do not differ in species. So taken, they have the same effect in species.

Reply to objection 4: Sometimes a circumstance is taken as an *essential difference* on the part of the object insofar as the object is related to reason, and in such a case that circumstance can confer a species on a moral act. This has to be the case whenever the circumstance in question changes the act from goodness to badness. For a circumstance would not make an act bad except by being opposed to reason.

Article 6

Do the goodness and badness derived from the end make for diverse species among acts?

It seems that the goodness and badness derived from the end do not make for diverse species among acts:

Objection 1: Acts have their species from their object. But the end lies outside the notion of the object (*praeter rationem obiecti*). Therefore, the goodness and badness derived from the end do not make for diverse species of acts.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 5), what is *per accidens* does not constitute a species. But it is accidental to an act that it is ordered toward a given end; for instance, it is accidental that someone should give alms for the sake of vainglory. Therefore, acts are not diverse in species because of the goodness and badness derived from the end.

Objection 3: Acts that are diverse in species can be ordered toward a single end; for instance, acts of diverse virtues and of diverse vices can be ordered toward the end of vainglory. Therefore, it is not the case that the goodness and badness taken from the end make for diverse species of acts.

But contrary to this: It was shown above (q. 1, a. 3) that human acts have their species from their end. Therefore, the goodness and badness taken from the end make for diverse species of acts.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), acts are called human insofar as they are voluntary. But among voluntary acts, there are two sorts of acts, viz., (a) an *interior act* of willing and (b) an *exterior act*, and each of these acts has its own object.

Now the end is, properly speaking, the object of the interior voluntary act, whereas the object of the exterior action is what that action has to do with (*circa quod est actio exterior est obiectum eius*). Therefore, just as the exterior act takes its species from the object that it has to do with, so the interior act of willing takes its species from the end as from its proper object. The result is that what exists on the side of the will is like a form (*se habet ut formale*) with respect to what exists on the side of the exterior act, since the will uses the members of the body as instruments in order to act. Nor do the exterior acts have the nature of moral acts (*neque actus exteriores habent rationem moralitatis*) except insofar as they are voluntary.

And so the species of a human act is thought of *formally* in accord with *the end* and *materially* in accord with *the object of the exterior act*. Hence, in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Someone who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking *per se*, more an adulterer than a thief.”

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the end also has the character of an object.

Reply to objection 2: Even if being ordered toward the sort of end in question is accidental to the exterior act, it is nonetheless not accidental to the interior act of willing, which is related to the exterior act in the way that what is formal is related to what is material.

Reply to objection 3: When many acts that differ from one another in species are ordered toward a single end, there is, to be sure, a diversity of species among the exterior acts, but there is a oneness of species on the part of the interior act.

Article 7

Is the species of goodness derived from the end contained under the species of goodness derived from the object in the way that a species is contained under a genus?

It seems that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the object in the way that a species is contained under a genus, as, for instance, when someone steals in order to give alms:

Objection 1: As has been explained (aa. 2 and 6), an act has its species from its object. But it is impossible for something to be contained under a second species that is not itself contained under the act’s proper species, since the same thing cannot be in diverse non-subordinated species (*in diversis speciebus non subalternis*). Therefore, the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object.

Objection 2: The ultimate difference (*ultima differentia*) constitutes the lowest-level species (*constituit speciem specialissimam*). But the difference derived from the end seems to come later (*videtur esse posterior*) than the difference derived from the object, since the end has the character of something ultimate (*habet rationem ultimi*). Therefore, the species derived from the end is contained as a lowest-level species under the species derived from the object.

Objection 3: To the extent that a specific difference is more formal, it is more specific, since the difference is related to the genus as a form is related to matter. But as has been explained (a. 6), the species derived from the end is more formal than the species derived from the object. Therefore, the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object in the way that a species is contained under a genus.

But contrary to this: For every genus there are determinate specific differences. But acts of the same species, where the species is derived from the object, can be ordered toward infinitely many ends; for instance, theft can be ordered toward infinitely many good or bad ends. Therefore, the species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object in the way that a species is contained under a genus.

I respond: There are two ways in which the object of the exterior act can be related to the will's end: (a) the object can be ordered *per se* toward the end, in the way that fighting well is ordered *per se* toward victory, or (b) the object can be ordered *per accidens* toward the end, in the way that taking what belongs to another is ordered *per accidens* toward giving alms.

Now as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 7, the differences that divide a genus and constitute the species of that genus have to divide the genus *per se*. By contrast, if they divide the genus *per accidens*, then the division does not proceed in the right way—as, for instance, if someone were to say: “Rational animal and non-rational animal; non-rational animal with wings and non-rational animal without wings.” For *with wings* and *without wings* are not determinative *per se* of *non-rational*. Rather, one has to make the division as follows: “..... animal with feet and animal without feet; animal with two feet and animal with four feet and animal with many feet.” For these latter differences determine the prior difference *per se*.

So, then, when the object is not ordered *per se* toward the end, then the specific difference derived from the object is not *per se* determinative of what is derived from the end, and vice versa. Hence, it is not the case that one of the species is contained under the other; instead in this sort of case the moral act falls under two disparate species, as it were. Hence, we say that someone who steals in order to commit adultery commits two evils in one act (*committit duas malitias in uno actu*).

By contrast, if the object is ordered *per se* toward the end, then one of the differences in question is *per se* determinative of the other. Hence, one of the species will be contained under the other. What remains to be considered is which species falls under which. To make this issue clearer, notice, first, that the more particular the form is from which a given difference is taken, the more specific it is. Second, notice that the more universal the agent is, the more universal the form that comes from that agent. Third, notice that the more remote (*posterior*) an end is, the more universal the agent it corresponds to; for instance, victory, which is the ultimate end of an army, is the end intended by the highest leader, whereas the disposition of this or that line of battle is the end intended by some lower leader.

From these premises it follows that (a) the specific difference derived from the end is more general, and that (b) the difference derived from an object that is ordered *per se* toward such an end is a specific difference in relation to that end. For the act of willing (*voluntas*), whose proper object is the end, is a universal mover with respect to all the soul's powers, whose proper objects are the objects of particular acts.

Reply to objection 1: As regards its substance, nothing can be in two species that are such that it is not the case that one of them falls under the other. But as regards what accrues to a thing, that thing can be contained under diverse species. For instance, as regards its color, this piece of fruit is contained

under one species, viz., *white thing*, and as regards its odor, it is contained under the species *good-smelling thing*. Similarly, as was explained above (q. 1, a. 3), an act which, as regards its substance, is in a given natural species (*est in una specie naturae*) can, given the supervening moral conditions, be in two species.

Reply to objection 2: The end is the last thing in execution, but it is the first thing in reason's thought (*primum in intentione rationis*), and it is from the latter that the species of moral acts are taken.

Reply to objection 3: The specific difference is related to the genus as a form is related to matter, insofar as it makes the genus exist in actuality.

On the other hand, there is also a sense in which the genus is thought of as being more formal than the species, viz., because the genus is more unconditioned and less contracted (*absolutius et minus contractum*). Hence, as the *Physics* says, the parts of a definition are traced back to the genus of the formal cause. On this score, the genus is a formal cause of the species, and the more general it is, the more formal it is.

Article 8

Is any act indifferent by its species?

It seems that no act is indifferent by its species:

Objection 1: According to Augustine, evil is "a privation of good." But according to the Philosopher, a privation and the corresponding disposition (*privation et habitus*) are direct opposites (*opposita immediata*). Therefore, there is no act that is indifferent by its species in the sense of being in between goodness and badness.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 6), human acts derive their species from the end or from the object. But every object and every end has the character of goodness or the character of badness. Therefore, every human act is either good by its species or bad by its species. Therefore, no human act is indifferent by its species.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), an act is called good because it has the right sort of perfection of goodness, and an act is called bad because it lacks something of this goodness. But it is necessary for every act either (a) to have the entire fullness of its goodness or (b) to lack something of the entire fullness of its goodness. Therefore, it is necessary that every act be either good by its species or bad by its species, and that no act be indifferent.

But contrary to this: In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, "There are certain acts in between that can be done with a good intention or with a bad intention, and about these it would be rash to pass judgment." Therefore, there are some acts that are indifferent by their species.

I respond: As has been explained (aa. 2 and 5), every act has a species from its object, and every human act that is called moral has a species from an object related to the principle of human acts, viz., reason. Hence, if an act's object contains something that belongs to the order of reason, then it will be an act that is good by its species, e.g., giving alms to a poor man. On the other hand, if it contains something that is opposed to the order of reason, then it will be an act that is bad by its species, e.g., stealing, i.e., taking what belongs to someone else.

However, it is possible for an act's object not to contain anything that is relevant to the order of reason, e.g., picking up a leaf from the ground, or taking a walk, etc.; and acts such as these are indifferent by their species.

Reply to objection 1: There are two sorts of privations:

One sort of privation consists in *having already been deprived* (*consistit in privatum esse*), and this sort of privation leaves nothing behind, but instead removes everything—in the way that blindness totally

removes sight, and darkness totally removes light, and death totally removes life. Between this sort of privation and the opposed disposition there cannot be any middle ground for a property that might be received (*circa proprium susceptibile*).

However, there is another sort of privation that consists in *being in the process of being deprived* (*privari*), in the way that sickness is a privation of health—where health is not totally removed, but instead the privation is, as it were, a path toward the total removal of health (*quasi quaedam via ad totalem ablationem sanitatis*) that would come with death. And so since this sort of privation leaves something behind, it is not always such that it leaves no middle ground in relation to the opposed disposition (*non semper est immediata cum opposito habitu*). And this is the sense in which evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius points out in his commentary on the *Categories*. For evil does not remove the totality of goodness, but leaves something behind. It is in this way that there can be a middle ground between good and evil.

Reply to objection 2: Every object or end has some goodness or some badness, at least natural goodness or badness, but it does not always imply *moral* goodness or *moral* badness, which, as has been explained, are thought of in relation to reason. And this is the sort of goodness and badness that we are talking about here.

Reply to objection 3: Not everything had by an act is relevant to its species. Hence, even if the concept of an act's species does not contain everything that pertains to the fullness of the act's goodness, it is not because of this that the act is bad by its species, or even good by its species—in the same way that a man is not by his species either virtuous or vicious.

Article 9

Is any act indifferent as an individual?

It seems that some acts are indifferent as individuals:

Objection 1: Every species is such that it contains or can contain an individual under itself. But as has been explained (a. 8), some acts are indifferent by their species. Therefore, some individual acts can be indifferent.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 2 says, individual acts are a cause of habits conformed to those acts. But some habits are indifferent. For instance, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says of those who are easy-going and extravagant (*de placidis et prodigis*) that they are not bad; and yet it is clear that they are not good, since they are moving away from virtue. And so they are indifferent in their habits. Therefore, some individual acts are indifferent.

Objection 3: Moral good pertains to virtue, whereas moral badness pertains to vice. But it sometimes happens that a man does not order an act that is indifferent by its species toward any end of either virtue or vice. Therefore, it is possible for an individual act to be indifferent.

But contrary to this: In a certain homily Gregory says, "Idle conversation (*otiosum verbum*) lacks the usefulness of rectitude, or the rationale of upright necessity, or pious usefulness." But idle conversation is bad, because, as Matthew 12:36 says, a man shall render an account of it on the day of judgment. Therefore, every instance of speech (*omne verbum*) is either good or bad. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, every other act is either good or bad. Therefore, no individual act is indifferent.

I respond: It sometimes happens that an act is indifferent in its *species* and yet is good or bad when thought of as an *individual* act. This is because, as has been explained (a. 3), a moral act has its goodness not only from its object, from which it has its species, but also from its circumstances, which are, as it were, certain accidents—just as something belongs to an individual man because of his individual accidents that does not belong to him because of the essence of his species. And it is

necessary for each individual act to have some circumstance through which it is drawn toward goodness or badness, at least on the part of the act of intending the end. For since reason's role is to order, if an act that proceeds from deliberative reason is not ordered toward the right sort of end, then by this very fact it has the character of badness. On the other hand, if it is ordered toward the right sort of end, then it is consonant with the order of reason and thus has the character of goodness.

Hence, it is necessary that every one of a man's acts that proceeds from deliberative reason is, considered as an individual, either good or bad. On the other hand, if an act proceeds not from deliberative reason but instead from some act of imagining, as when someone scratches his beard or moves his hand or foot, then such an act is not, properly speaking, a moral or human act, since an act has the character of being moral or human from reason. And so an act of this sort will be indifferent in the sense of falling outside the genus of moral acts.

Reply to objection 1: There is more than one possible way for an act to be indifferent by its species (*secundum suam speciem*).

In one way, it is such that, given its species (*ex sua species*), the act *has to be* indifferent. And it is on this interpretation that the objection goes through.

However, there is no act that is indifferent by its species in this sense. For there is no object of a human act that cannot be ordered toward goodness or badness through some end or circumstance.

In a second sense, an act can be called indifferent by its species because it does not have goodness or badness by its species. Hence, it can become good or bad through something else. In the same way, a man does not by his species have whiteness or blackness, and he does not by his species have it that he is not white or not black. For whiteness or blackness can supervene on a man from somewhere other than from the principles of his species.

Reply to objection 2: The Philosopher is claiming that it is someone who is dangerous to other men who is, properly speaking, called 'bad'. Accordingly, he says that one who is extravagant is not bad because he harms no one other than himself. And the same thing holds for all others who are not dangerous to their neighbors.

We ourselves, however, are here calling 'bad' everything that is opposed to right reason (*omne quod est rationi rectae repugnans*). And in this sense, as has been explained, every individual act is either good or bad.

Reply to objection 3: Every end intended by deliberative reason is relevant to the goodness of some virtue or the badness of some vice. For instance, the very fact that someone acts in an well-ordered way to give his body sustenance or rest is ordered toward the good of virtue in one who orders his body to the good of virtue. And the same thing is clear in other cases as well.

Article 10

Can a circumstance constitute a species of good or bad act?

It seems that a circumstance cannot constitute a species of good or bad act:

Objection 1: An act's species comes from its object. But the circumstances differ from the object. Therefore, the circumstances do not give an act its species.

Objection 2: As has been explained (q. 7, a. 1), the circumstances are related to a moral act as its accidents. But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore, a circumstance does not establish a moral act in a species of goodness or badness.

Objection 3: A single thing cannot have more than one species. But a single thing has more than one circumstance. Therefore, a circumstance does not constitute a species of goodness or badness.

But contrary to this: Place is a circumstance. But there are certain species of badness in which

place constitutes moral acts; for instance, to steal something from a sacred place is a sacrilege. Therefore, a circumstance establishes a moral act in a species of goodness or badness.

I respond: Just as the species of natural things are constituted by natural forms, so, as is clear from what has been said above (a. 5), the species of moral acts are constituted by forms as conceived by reason. But since nature is delimited to a single outcome and since there cannot be an infinite natural process, one must arrive at some ultimate form from which the specific difference is taken and after which there cannot be any other specific difference. And so it is that among natural things, what is accidental to a thing cannot be taken as the difference that constitutes the species.

By contrast, reason's process is not delimited to some one outcome; instead, given any outcome, one is able to proceed further. And so, in the case of a particular act, what is taken as a circumstance and so as an addition to the object determining the act's species is such that reason in its ordering function can consider it yet again as a principal aspect (*principalis conditio*) of the object determining the act's species. For instance, an act of taking what belongs to someone else has its species from the concept *belonging to someone else*, and from this it is constituted in the species *theft*; and if one thinks beyond this to the notion of time or place, then time or place will have the character of a circumstance. But because reason can give prescriptions (*ratio ordinare potest*) concerning time and place and other things of this sort, it is possible for the aspect of place to be assumed into the object as something that is contrary to the order of reason; for instance, reason ordains that one should do no harm to a sacred place. Hence, an act of taking something belonging to someone else *from a sacred place* adds a special opposition to the order of reason. And so place, which before was thought of as a circumstance, is now being thought of as a principal aspect of an object that is opposed to reason.

In this way, whenever some circumstance has to do with—either for or against—some special prescription of reason, the circumstance has to give the species to a moral act, whether a good one or a bad one.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, insofar as a circumstance gives an act its species, it is being thought of as an aspect of the object and, as it were, a certain specific difference of the object.

Reply to objection 2: Since a circumstance that retains the character of a circumstance has the character of an accident, it does not give the act its species. But insofar a circumstance is changed into a principal aspect of the object, it does give the species.

Reply to objection 3: Not every circumstance constitutes a moral act in some species of goodness or badness, since not every circumstance implies an agreement or disagreement with reason. Hence, even though a single act has many circumstances, it is not necessary for a single act to have many species—though, as has been explained (a. 7), it is not absurd for a single moral act to be in several moral species, even disparate species.

Article 11

Does every circumstance relevant to goodness and badness give an act its species?

It seems that every circumstance relevant to goodness and badness gives an act its species:

Objection 1: *Good* and *bad* are specific differences of *moral acts*. Therefore, what makes for a difference in the goodness or badness of a moral act makes for a difference in the specific difference, and this is just what it is to differ in species. But that which adds to the goodness or badness of an act makes for a difference with respect to goodness and badness. Therefore, it makes for a difference in species. Therefore, every circumstance that adds to the goodness or badness of an act constitutes a species.

Objection 2: An adjoined circumstance (*circumstantia adveniens*) either does or does not have within itself some element of goodness or badness (*habet in se aliquam rationem bonitatis vel malitiae*

aut non). If it does not, then it cannot add to an act's goodness or badness, since what is not good cannot make an act better and what is not bad cannot make an act worse. But if it does have within itself an element of goodness or badness, then by that very fact it has a certain species of goodness or badness. Therefore, every circumstance that increases an act's goodness or badness constitutes a new species of good acts or of bad acts.

Objection 3: According to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "What is bad is caused by single defects." But every circumstance that aggravates an act's badness has a specific defect. Therefore, each circumstance adds a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that increases an act's goodness seems to add a new species of good act—in the same way that a unit, when added to a number, makes for a new species of number. For the good consists "in number, weight, and measure."

But contrary to this: *More* and *less* do not make for diverse species. But *more* and *less* are circumstances that add to goodness and to badness. Therefore, not every circumstance that adds goodness or badness establishes a moral act in a species of goodness or badness.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 10), a circumstance confers a species of good or bad acts insofar as it relates to some special prescription on the part of reason (*inquantum respicit specialem ordinem rationis*).

Now sometimes it happens that a circumstance relates to a special prescription of reason with respect to goodness and badness only if some other circumstance, from which the moral act has its species of goodness or badness, is presupposed. For instance, taking something in a large or small quantity relates to reason's prescription concerning goodness and badness only if one presupposes another condition through which the act has goodness or badness, e.g., the condition, opposed to reason, that the thing in question belongs to someone else. Hence, taking what belongs to another in a large or small quantity does not itself make for a diversity of species—even though it can still aggravate or diminish the sin. And the same thing holds for other cases of bad or good acts.

Hence, not every circumstance that adds goodness or badness makes for a variation in the species of a moral act.

Reply to objection 1: In things that are subject to intensification and remission, the differences *intense* and *remiss* do not make for a diversity of species; for instance, things that differ with respect to more whiteness and less whiteness do not differ in their species of color. Similarly, what makes for a diversity with respect to more intense goodness or badness or more remiss goodness or badness does not make for difference in species among moral acts.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, in some cases a circumstance that aggravates a sin or increases an act's goodness does not have goodness or badness in its own right (*secundum se*), but has it in relation to another of the act's conditions. And so such a circumstance does not confer a new species, but instead augments the goodness or badness that belongs to the act because of some other condition.

Reply to objection 3: Not every circumstance introduces a special defect in its own right, but sometimes it induces a defect only in relation to something else. And, similarly, a circumstance does not always add a new perfection, except in relation to something else. And even if it does increase the goodness or badness, it does not always make for a different species of goodness or badness.

QUESTION 19

The Goodness and Badness of the Interior Act of Willing

Next we have to consider the goodness of the interior act of willing. And on this topic there are ten questions: (1) Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on its object? (2) Does it depend solely on its object? (3) Does it depend on reason? (4) Does it depend on the eternal law? (5) Does reason oblige when it is mistaken? (6) Is an act of willing bad if it is opposed to God's law but is following mistaken reason? (7) Does the goodness of an act of willing directed toward the means to an end depend on the act of intending the end? (8) Does the amount of goodness or badness in an act of willing track the amount of goodness or badness in the act of intending? (9) Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on its being conformed to God's will? (10) In order for an act of willing to be good, must it be conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed?

Article 1

Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on its object?

It seems that the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on its object (*bonitas voluntatis non dependeat ex obiecto*):

Objection 1: An act of willing is not directed at anything except what is good (*voluntas non potest esse nisi boni*), since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, evil lies "outside of the will." Therefore, if the goodness of an act of willing were judged by its object, then it would follow that every act of willing is good and that no act of the willing is bad.

Objection 2: Goodness is found, first of all, in the end. Hence, the end's goodness does not as such depend on anything else. But according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, "Good *acting* is the end, whereas good *making* is never the end." For good making is always ordered toward the thing that is made as its end. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on any object.

Objection 3: Each thing is like what it makes. But the object of an act of willing is what is good by a goodness of *nature*. Therefore, this object cannot give *moral* goodness to an act of willing. Therefore, the moral goodness of an act of willing does not depend on its object.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that justice is that in accord with which someone wills just things and, for the same reason, virtue is that in accord with which someone wills good things. But a good act of willing is an act in accord with virtue. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing derives from the fact that someone wills what is good.

I respond: *Good* and *bad* are *per se* specific differences of acts of willing. For *good* and *bad* belong to the will *per se*, in the way that *true* and *false* belong to reason, whose acts are distinguished *per se* by the differences *true* and *false*, in the sense in which we say that an opinion is true or false. Hence, a good act of willing and a bad act of willing are acts that differ in species from one another. But as has been explained (q. 18, a. 5), diversity of species among acts follows from their objects (*est secundum obiecta*). And so the goodness and badness of acts of willing is attendant upon their objects (*proprie attenditur secundum obiecta*).

Reply to objection 1: Acts of willing are not always directed toward a genuine good; rather, they are sometimes directed at an apparent good, which, to be sure, has some aspect of goodness but not a goodness that it is right to desire absolutely speaking. And for this reason acts of willing are not always good, but are sometimes bad.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), even though man's ultimate end can in some sense be an act, that act is not an act of willing.

Reply to objection 3: A good is presented by reason to the will as an object (*bonum per rationem repraesentatur voluntati ut obiectum*); and insofar as that good falls under reason's prescription (*cadit*

sub ordine rationis), it belongs to the genus *moral* and is a cause of moral goodness in the act of willing. For as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5), reason is the principle of acts that are human and moral.

Article 2

Does the goodness of an act of willing depend solely on its object?

It seems that the goodness of an act of willing does not depend solely on its object:

Objection 1: An end has more affinity to the will than to any other power. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 18, a. 4), the acts of the other powers receive their goodness not only from their object, but also from their end. Therefore, an act of willing likewise receives its goodness not only from its object, but also from its end.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 18, a. 3), an act's goodness comes not only from its object, but also from its circumstances. But a diversity of goodness and badness in acts of willing can come from diverse circumstances—e.g., that someone wills when he should and where he should and as much as he should and how he should, or that he wills in a way he should not. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing depends not only on the object, but also on the circumstances.

Objection 3: As was established above (q. 6, a. 8), ignorance of the circumstances excuses the badness of an act of willing. But this would not be the case if the goodness and badness of acts of willing did not depend on the circumstances. Therefore, the goodness and badness of acts of willing depends on the circumstances and not on the object alone.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (q. 18, a. 10), an act does not have its species from its circumstances as such. But as has been explained (a. 1), *good* and *bad* are specific differences of acts of willing. Therefore, the goodness and badness of acts of willing depends on the object alone and not on the circumstances.

I respond: The closer something is to being first in a given genus (*quanto aliquid est prius*), the simpler it is and the fewer things it consists in; for instance, the first bodies are simple. And so we find that the things that are first in any given genus are in some sense simple and consist in just one thing. But the beginning (*principium*) of the goodness and badness of human acts is from an act of willing. And so the goodness and badness of acts of willing are attendant upon some one thing, whereas the goodness and badness of other acts can be attendant on diverse things.

Now this one thing which is the beginning in a given genus is *per se* and not *per accidens*, since what is *per accidens* is traced back to what is *per se* as to its principle. And so the goodness of an act of willing depends on just this one thing that makes for goodness in an act *per se*, viz., the object, and it does not depend on the circumstances, which are accidents of the act.

Reply to objection 1: The end is an object of an act of willing, but not of the acts of the other powers. Hence, as far as an act of willing is concerned, the goodness that derives from the object does not differ, as it does with the acts of the other powers, from the goodness that derives from the end—except perhaps *per accidens*, given that one end depends on another and given that one act of willing depends on another.

Reply to objection 2: On the assumption that an act of willing is directed toward what is good, no circumstance can make that act bad. Therefore, there are two possible ways to understand the claim that someone wills something good when he should not or where he should not:

(a) He wills something in such a way that the circumstance in question is ascribed to *what is willed* (*referatur ad volitum*). And in such a case the act of willing is not after all directed toward what is good, since an act of willing *to-do-something-when-it-should-not-be-done* is not an act of willing what is good.

(b) He wills something in such a way that the circumstance in question is ascribed to *the act of*

willing. And on this understanding it is impossible for someone to will a good when he ought not to, since it is always the case that a man should will the good—except perhaps *per accidens*, insofar as someone, by willing this good, is prevented from then willing some other good that he should will. And in such a case badness occurs not because the individual wills the first good, but because he does not will the second good.

The same reply should be given for other types of circumstance as well.

Reply to objection 3: Ignorance of the circumstances excuses the badness of an act of willing to the extent that the circumstances are relevant to what is willed (*secundum quod circumstantiae se tenent ex parte voliti*), i.e., to the extent that the agent does not know the circumstances of the act that he wills.

Article 3

Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on reason?

It seems that the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on reason:

Objection 1: What is prior does not depend on what is posterior. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 9, a. 1), the good pertains to the will prior to pertaining to reason. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on reason.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that the goodness of the practical intellect is “the true conformed to upright desire” (*verum conforme appetitui recto*). But upright desire is a good act of willing. Therefore, the goodness of practical reason depends on the goodness of the act of willing rather than vice versa.

Objection 3: It is not the mover that depends on what is moved, but vice versa. But as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), the will moves reason and the other powers. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on reason.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Hilary says, “All persistence in acts of willing that are undertaken is immoderate when the will is not subject to reason.” But the goodness of an act of willing consists in its not being immoderate. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing depends on its being subject to reason.

I respond: As has been explained (aa. 1 and 2), the goodness of an act of willing depends, properly speaking, on its object. But the object of an act of willing is proposed to the will by reason. For an intellectually understood good is an object of the will that is proportioned to it, whereas a sensible or imagined good is proportioned to the sentient appetite and not to the will, since the will is able to tend toward a universal good that is apprehended by reason, whereas the sentient appetite tends only toward a particular good that is apprehended by the sensory power. And so the goodness of an act of willing depends on reason in the sense that it depends on its object.

Reply to objection 1: It is the good under the concept *good*, i.e., the concept *desirable*, that pertains to the will prior to pertaining to the intellect. However, the good under the concept *true* pertains to reason prior to the good under the concept *desirable* pertaining to the will. For the will’s desire cannot be a desire for the good unless the good is first apprehended by reason.

Reply to objection 2: In the place in question the Philosopher is talking about the practical intellect insofar as it is deliberating and reasoning about the means to an end, since it is in this context that it is perfected by prudence. And in the case of the means to an end, the rectitude of reason consists in its conformity to the desire for the right sort of end. But this very desire for the right sort of end presupposes a correct apprehension of the end, and this apprehension occurs through reason.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), there is a sense in which the will moves reason, and there is another sense in which reason moves the will, viz., by means of the object.

Article 4

Does the goodness of a human act of willing depend on the eternal law?

It seems that the goodness of a human act of willing does not depend on the eternal law:

Objection 1: There is a single rule and measure for a single thing. But the rule for a human act of willing, on which its goodness depends, is right or correct reason (*ratio recta*). Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on the eternal law.

Objection 2: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “A measure is homogeneous with what it measures.” But the eternal law is not homogeneous with a human act of willing. Therefore, the eternal law cannot be a measure of a human act of willing in the sense that the act of willing depends on it for its goodness.

Objection 3: A measure should be absolutely certain (*certissima*). But the eternal law is not known to us. Therefore, it cannot be the measure of our acts of willing in the sense that the goodness of our acts of willing depends on it.

But contrary to this: In *Contra Faustum* 22 Augustine says, “A sin is something done, said, or desired contrary to the eternal law.” But the badness of an act of willing is the root of sin. Therefore, since badness is opposed to goodness, the goodness of an act of willing depends on the eternal law.

I respond: In the case of all ordered causes, the effect depends more on the first cause than on a secondary cause, since a secondary cause acts only in the power of the first cause. Now the fact that human reason is a rule for human acts of willing and that by which their goodness is measured is something reason has from the eternal law, which is God’s reason. Hence, Psalm 4:6-7 says, “Many say, ‘Who shows us good things?’ The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”—as if to say, “The light of your reason, which exists in us, can show us good things and regulate our will to the extent that it is the light of your countenance, i.e., the light derived from your countenance.”

Hence, it is clear that the goodness of human acts of willing depends much more on the eternal law than it does on human reason; and when human reason fails, it is necessary to have recourse to eternal reason.

Reply to objection 1: There is not more than one *proximate* measure of a single thing, but there can be more than one measure, one of which is subordinate to another.

Reply to objection 2: It is a proximate measure, not a remote measure, that is homogeneous with what it measures.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the eternal law is not known to us as it exists in God’s mind, it is nonetheless known to us in some way either (a) through natural reason, which is derived from the eternal law as its proper image, or (b) through some sort of supplementary revelation (*per aliqualem revelationem superadditam*).

Article 5

Is an act of willing bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken?

It seems that an act of willing is not bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 4), it is insofar as it is derived from the eternal law that reason is a rule for human acts of willing. But when reason is mistaken, it is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore, when reason is mistaken, it is not a rule for human acts of willing. Therefore, an act of willing is not bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

Objection 2: According to Augustine, the precept of a lower power does not impose an obligation

(*non obligat*) if it is contrary to the precept of a higher power—as, for instance, if a proconsul commands something that the emperor forbids. But when reason is mistaken, it sometimes proposes something that is contrary to the precept of someone higher, viz., God, whose power is the highest. Therefore, when reason is mistaken, its dictate does not impose an obligation. Therefore, it is not the case that an act of willing is bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

Objection 3: Every bad act of willing is traced back to some species of badness. But if an act of willing disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken, then that act cannot be traced back to any species of badness. For instance, if reason makes a mistake by dictating that one ought to fornicate, then the act of willing of someone who does not will to fornicate cannot be traced back to any sort of badness. Therefore, an act of willing is not bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

But contrary to this: As was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 79, a. 13), conscience is nothing other than an application of knowledge to some act. But knowledge exists in reason. Therefore, an act of willing that disagrees with mistaken reason is contrary to conscience. But every such act of willing is bad; for Romans 14:23 says, “Everything that is not of faith is a sin”—that is, everything that is contrary to conscience. Therefore, an act of willing is bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

I respond: Since conscience is in some sense a dictate of reason (for, as was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 79, a. 13), conscience is a certain sort of application of knowledge to an act), it follows that asking whether an act of willing is bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken is the same as asking whether a mistaken conscience imposes an obligation.

On this matter, there are those who have distinguished three types of acts: (a) some acts are *good of their kind* (*boni ex genere*), (b) some acts are *indifferent* (*indifferentes*), and (c) some are *bad of their kind* (*mali ex genere*).

Then they claim that if reason or conscience dictates that something which is good of its kind should be done, then there is no mistake in such a case. The same holds if reason or conscience says that something which is evil of its kind should not be done; for good things are prescribed for the same reason that bad things are forbidden.

However, if reason or conscience dictates to a man that (a) he is obligated by precept to do things that are in their own right bad, or that (b) things that are in their own right good are prohibited, then reason or conscience will be mistaken. And, similarly, if reason or conscience dictates to someone that what is in its own right indifferent, e.g., picking up a leaf from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, then reason or conscience will be mistaken.

Thus, they claim that when reason or conscience is mistaken about something indifferent, either by commanding it or by forbidding it, then it imposes an obligation, with the result that an act of willing that disagrees with reason in such a case will be bad or a sin. By contrast, when reason or conscience is mistaken because it commands what is *per se* bad or because it forbids what is *per se* good and necessary for salvation, then it does not impose an obligation. Hence, in such case an act of willing is not bad if it disagrees with reason or conscience when reason or conscience is mistaken.

But it is implausible to make these claims. For in the case of indifferent acts, if an act of willing disagrees with reason or conscience when reason or conscience is mistaken, then the act is, to be sure, in some sense bad because of its object, on which the goodness or badness of an act of willing depend. However, the act is bad not because of *the object's own nature* (*non propter obiectum secundum sui naturam*), but rather because reason apprehends the object *per accidens* as something bad to do or avoid. And since, as has been explained (a. 3), the object of an act of willing is what is proposed by reason, by the very fact that something is proposed by reason as bad, an act of willing takes on the character of something bad when it is directed toward that thing.

Moreover, this happens not only in the case of indifferent acts, but also in the case of acts that are *per se* good or *per se* bad. For it is not only what is indifferent that can take on the character of goodness or badness *per accidens*; it is likewise the case that, because of reason's apprehension, what is good can

take on the character of badness and what is bad can take on the character of goodness. For instance, abstaining from fornication is a certain good, and yet the will is not directed toward this good except insofar as it is proposed by reason. Therefore, if it is proposed as something bad by reason when reason is mistaken, then an act of willing will be directed toward it under the notion of badness. Hence, the act of willing will be bad, since it wills something bad—not, to be sure, something that is bad *per se*, but something that is bad *per accidens* because of reason's apprehension. Similarly, believing in Christ is *per se* good and necessary for salvation, but an act of willing is directed toward this good only insofar as it is proposed by reason. Hence, if believing in Christ is proposed as something bad, then an act of willing will be directed toward it as something bad—not because it is bad in its own right, but because it is bad *per accidens* in light of reason's apprehension.

This is why, in *Ethics* 7, the Philosopher says, "Speaking *per se*, the incontinent man is one who does not follow correct reason; however, speaking *per accidens*, he is one who does not follow even incorrect reason." Hence, one should claim that, absolutely speaking, every act of willing that disagrees with reason—regardless of whether reason is correct or mistaken—is invariably bad.

Reply to objection 1: Even though, when reason is mistaken, its judgment is not derived from God, nonetheless, reason, though mistaken, proposes its judgment as true and, consequently, as derived from God, from whom all truth comes.

Reply to objection 2: Augustine's claim has a place when the lower power is known to be prescribing something contrary to the higher power's precept. But if someone believed that the proconsul's precept were the emperor's precept, then by disdaining the proconsul's precept he would be disdaining the emperor's precept. Similarly, if a man knew that human reason were dictating something contrary to God's precept, he would not be obligated to follow reason, but in that case reason would not be totally mistaken. On the other hand, if, though it is mistaken, reason proposes something as God's precept, then disdaining reason's dictate is the same as disdaining God's precept.

Reply to objection 3: When reason apprehends something as bad, it always apprehends it under some type of badness—for instance, its being contrary to God's precept, or its being scandalous, or for some other such reason. And in such a case it is to this species of badness that the bad act of willing is traced back.

Article 6

Is an act of willing good if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken?

It seems that an act of willing is good if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken:

Objection 1: Just as an act of willing that disagrees with reason tends toward what reason judges to be bad, so an act of willing that agrees with reason tends toward what reason judges to be good. But an act of willing that disagrees with reason is bad, even when reason is mistaken. Therefore, an act of willing that agrees with reason is good, even when reason is mistaken.

Objection 2: It is always the case that an act of willing that agrees with God's precept and with the natural law is good. But the eternal law and God's precept are proposed to us through reason's apprehension, even when reason is mistaken. Therefore, an act of willing that agrees with reason is good, even when reason is mistaken.

Objection 3: An act of willing is bad if it disagrees with reason when reason is mistaken. Therefore, if an act of willing is likewise bad if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken, then it seems that every act of willing that belongs to a man whose reason is mistaken is invariably bad. And so the man in question will be in a dilemma (*erit perplexus*) and will of necessity sin—which seems wrong. Therefore, an act of willing is good if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

But contrary to this: The act of willing that belonged to those who killed the Apostles was bad. But it nonetheless agreed with their mistaken reason—this according to John 16:2 (“The hour will come when everyone who kills you will think that he is rendering a service to God”). Therefore, an act of willing can be bad if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken.

I respond: Just as the previous question was the same as the question of whether a mistaken conscience imposes an obligation, so the present question is the same as the question of whether a mistaken conscience excuses.

Now this question depends on what was said above in the question on ignorance (q. 6, a. 8). For it was explained above that ignorance is sometimes a cause of involuntariness and sometimes not. And since, as is clear from what has gone before (a. 2), moral goodness and moral badness (*bonum et malum morale*) are found in an act insofar as it is voluntary, it is obvious that the sort of ignorance which is a cause of involuntariness removes the character of moral goodness and moral badness, whereas the sort of ignorance which is not a cause of involuntariness does not. It was also explained above (q. 6, a. 8) that ignorance which is in any sense willed, whether directly or indirectly, is not a cause of involuntariness. I call ignorance *directly voluntary* when an act of willing is directed toward it, whereas I call ignorance *indirectly voluntary* when, because of negligence, someone does not will to know what he is obligated to know—this was explained above (q. 6, a. 8).

Thus, if reason or conscience is mistaken because of a voluntary error, either directly or because of negligence, then since this involves a mistake about what one is obligated to know, it follows that such a mistake on the part of reason or conscience does not excuse an act of willing from being bad if it agrees with reason or conscience when they are mistaken in this way.

On the other hand, if the mistake in question is the sort of mistake that is a cause of involuntariness and that arises from ignorance of a circumstance without any negligence, then such a mistake on the part of reason or conscience does excuse, so that the act of willing is not bad if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken. For instance, if reason mistakenly dictates that a man is obligated to have intercourse with another man’s wife, an act of willing is bad if it agrees with reason when reason is mistaken in this way; for this mistake arises from not knowing God’s law, which one is obligated to know. On the other hand, if reason is mistaken in such a way that a man believes that a certain woman who submits to him is his own wife, and if he has intercourse with her when she seeks it, then his act of willing is excused as not bad, because the mistake in question arose from ignorance of a circumstance, and this sort of ignorance excuses and is a cause of involuntariness.

Reply to objection 1: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Goodness results from the whole cause, whereas evil is caused by any single defect.” And so in order for what the will is directed toward to be called bad, it is sufficient that it be bad by its nature or that it be apprehended as bad. But in order for it to be good, it is necessary for it to be good in both ways.

Reply to objection 2: The eternal law cannot be mistaken, but human reason can be mistaken. And so an act of willing that agrees with human reason is not always correct and does not always agree with the eternal law.

Reply to objection 3: Just as, in syllogistic reasoning, when one incongruity is granted, other incongruities necessarily follow, so too, in moral matters, when one incongruity is posited, others follow by necessity. For instance, on the assumption that someone is seeking empty glory, he will sin regardless of whether what he is obligated to do is such that (a) he does it because of vainglory or (b) he fails to do it. Yet he is not in a dilemma, since he can abandon his bad intention.

Similarly, on the assumption that there is a mistake on the part of reason or conscience because of the sort of ignorance that does not excuse, badness will necessarily follow in the act of willing. And yet the man in question is not in a dilemma, since he can draw back from the mistake, given that his ignorance is vincible and voluntary.

Article 7

Does the goodness of an act of willing depend on the act of intending the end?

It seems that the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on the act of intending the end:

Objection 1: It was explained above (a. 2) that the goodness of an act of willing depends on its object alone. But in the case of the means to an end, the object of the act of willing is one thing and the intended end is another. Therefore, in such cases the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on the act of intending the end.

Objection 2: To will to follow God's command is a good act of willing. But this act can be directed toward a bad end, e.g., to the end of vainglory or greed, when someone wills to obey God for the sake of gaining temporal things. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing does not depend on the act of intending the end.

Objection 3: Just as *good* and *bad* make for diverse acts of will, so too they make for diverse ends. But the badness of an act of willing does not depend on the badness of the intended end; for instance, someone who steals in order to give alms has a bad act of willing, even though he intends a good end. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing likewise does not depend on the goodness of the intended end.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 9 Augustine says that one's act of intending is rewarded by God. But something is rewarded by God because it is good. Therefore, the goodness of an act of willing depends on the act of intending the end.

I respond: The act of intending the end can be related in two ways to an act of willing: (a) as *preceding* it and (b) as *being consequent* to it.

An act of intending the end causally *precedes* an act of willing when we will something because we intend a certain end (*quando volumus propter intentionem alicuius finis*). And in such a case the act's being ordered toward the end is thought of as a certain reason for the goodness of what is willed—as, for instance, when someone wills to fast for the sake of God. For the fasting has an aspect of goodness from the very fact it is done for the sake of God. Hence, since, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 2), the goodness of an act of willing depends on the goodness of what is willed, it necessarily depends on the act of intending the end.

On the other hand, the act of intending the end is *consequent* to the act of willing when it is appended to a preexisting act of willing—as, for instance, when someone wills to do something and then afterwards directs this thing to God. In such a case the goodness of the first act of willing does not depend on the subsequent act of intending except insofar as the act of willing is reiterated with that subsequent act of intending.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, when the act of intending is a cause of the act of willing, then the ordering toward the end is taken as a reason for the goodness that exists in the object.

Reply to objection 2: An act of willing cannot be called good if a bad act of intending is a cause of the act of willing. For instance, someone who gives alms for the sake of attaining empty glory wills something that is good taken by itself (*de se bonum*) under the conception of what is bad, and so, insofar as it is willed by him, it is bad. Hence, his act of willing is bad.

On the other hand, if the act of intending is consequent, then the act of willing was able to have been good, and that prior act of willing is not made bad by the consequent act of intending—though the act of willing that is reiterated with the consequent act of intending is made bad by that act of intending.

Reply to objection 3: As has already been explained (a. 6), “badness occurs because of any single defect, whereas goodness occurs because of the total and whole cause.” Hence, regardless of whether (a) an act of willing is directed toward something bad in its own right, even under the conception of what is good, or whether (b) it is directed toward something good under the conception of what is bad,

the act of willing will always be bad. By contrast, in order for an act of willing to be good, it is required that it be directed toward something good under the conception of what is good. That is, it is required that one will something good and for the sake of something good.

Article 8

Does the quantity or amount of goodness in an act of willing depend on the amount of goodness in the act of intending?

It seems that the quantity or amount of goodness in an act of willing (*quantitas bonitatis in voluntate*) depends on the amount of goodness in the act of intending:

Objection 1: A Gloss on Matthew 12:35 (“A good man brings forth good things out of the good treasure of his heart”) says, “Someone does good to the extent that he intends good” (*tantum boni quis facit quantum intendit*). But as has been explained (a. 7), the act of intending bestows goodness not only on the exterior act but also on the act of willing. Therefore, one has an act of willing that is as good as his act of intending (*tantum habet bonam voluntatem quantum intendit*).

Objection 2: If a cause is augmented, then its effect is augmented. But the goodness of an act of intending is a cause of a good act of willing. Therefore, one’s act of willing is as good as the amount of goodness had by his act of intending (*quantum quis intendit de bono, tantum voluntas est bona*).

Objection 3: In the case of bad acts, one’s sin is as great as [the evil] that he intends; for instance, if someone throwing a rock intended to commit homicide, then he would be guilty of homicide. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, in the case of good acts, one’s act of willing is as good as the good that he intends.

But contrary to this: It is possible for the act of intending to be good and the act of willing to be bad. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it is possible for the act of intending to have more goodness and the act of willing to have less goodness.

I respond: There are two sorts of quantity that can be thought of with respect to the act of willing and the act of intending the end (*circa actum et intentionem finis*): (a) *quantity on the part of the object*, in the sense that one wills or effects a greater good (*maius bonum*), and (b) *quantity in the intensity of the act*, in the sense that one wills or does something intensely, and this is a greater quantity on the part of the *agent*.

Thus, if we are talking about the quantity of each of the acts as far as its *object* is concerned, then it is clear that the quantity of the act of willing diverges from the quantity of the act of intending (*non sequitur quantitatem intentionis*).

There are two ways in which this can happen in the case of an *exterior act*:

(a) It happens in the first way because the object that is ordered toward an intended end is not proportionate to that end. For instance, if someone offered to pay ten dollars (*daret decem libras*), then he would not be able to fulfill his intention if he had intended to buy something that costs a hundred dollars.

(b) It happens in the second way because of obstacles that can affect the exterior act and are not within our power to overcome. For instance, someone intends to go all the way to Rome, and certain obstacles prevent him from doing this.

In the case of an *interior act of willing*, there is just one way in which this can happen, since interior acts of willing are within our power, even if the exterior acts are not. However, the will is able to will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end, and in this way an act of willing that is directed toward that object, considered absolutely, is not as good as the act of intending. (Yet because the act of intending is itself in some sense relevant to the act of willing, given that it is the reason for that

act, the quantity of a good act of intending spills over into the act of willing (*redundat quantitas bonae intentionis in voluntatem*) to the extent that the will wills a great good as its end—even if the means by which it wills to attain this great good is not appropriate for that good.)

On the other hand, if one is considering the quantity of the act of intending and the act of willing as regards their *intensity*, then the intensity of the act of intending spills over into the interior and exterior acts of willing (*redundat in actum interiorem et exteriorem voluntatis*). For as is clear from what was said above (q. 12, a. 4 and q. 18, a. 6), the act of intending is itself in some sense related as a form to the other two. However, even if, materially speaking, there is an intense act of intending, there can be an interior or exterior act that is not as intense, materially speaking—as, for instance, when someone wills to take medicine, but not as intensely as he wills health. Yet the very fact that he intends health intensely spills over, formally speaking, into his willing the medicine intensely.

But there is still this to consider: The intensity of an interior or exterior act can be referred back to the act of intending as an *object*—as, for instance, when someone intends to will with intensity or to do something with intensity. And yet he does not for this reason will or act with intensity, since, as has been explained, the goodness of the interior or exterior act does not conform to the quantity of the intended good. And this is why someone does not merit as much as he intends to merit. For as will be explained below (q. 20, a. 4 and q. 114, a. 4), the amount of merit has to do with the intensity of the act.

Reply to objection 1: This Gloss is talking about *God's* way of thinking (*loquitur quantum ad reputationem Dei*), since God mainly considers the act of intending the end. Hence, another Gloss in the same place says that the “treasure of the heart” is the intention, on the basis of which God judges our works. For, as has been explained, the goodness of the act of intending in some sense spills over into the goodness of the act of willing, and this goodness makes even the exterior act meritorious in the sight of God.

Reply to objection 2: The goodness of an act of intending is not the total cause of a good act of willing. Hence, the argument does not go through.

Reply to objection 3: The badness of an act of intending is by itself sufficient for the badness of the act of willing, and so it is also the case that the act of willing is as bad as the act of intending is. But as has been explained, the same reasoning does not hold for goodness.

Article 9

Does the goodness of a human will or act of willing depend on its being conformed to God's will?

It seems that the goodness of a human will or act of willing (*bonitas voluntatis humanae*) does not depend on its being conformed to God's will (*non dependeat ex conformitate ad voluntatem Dei*):

Objection 1: It is impossible for a man's act of willing to be conformed to God's will, as is clear from Isaiah 55:9: “As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways, and my thoughts above your thoughts.” Therefore, if being conformed to God's will were required for the goodness of our act of willing, then it would follow that it is impossible for a man's act of willing to be good. But this is absurd.

Objection 2: Just as our will is derived from God's will, so too our knowledge is derived from God's knowledge. But it is not required that our knowledge be conformed to God's knowledge; for God knows many things of which we are ignorant. Therefore, it is not required that our will should be conformed to God's will.

Objection 3: The will is a principle of action. But our action cannot be conformed to God's action. Therefore, neither can our will be conformed to God's will.

But contrary to this: Matthew 26:39 says, “Not as I will, but as you will”—which our Lord

says because He is an upright man and is directed toward God, as Augustine explains in *Enchiridion*. But the will's rectitude is its goodness. Therefore, the goodness of our will or act of willing depends on its being conformed to God's will.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 7), the goodness of an act of willing depends on the act of intending the end. Now as was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 3, a. 1), the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, viz., God. Hence, for the goodness of a human act of willing, it is required that it be ordered toward the highest good, viz., God. But this goodness is *per se* and primarily related to God's will as its proper object. And that which is first in any given genus is the measure of and rationale for all the things that belong to that genus. But each thing is upright and good insofar as it attains to its proper measure. Therefore, in order for a human act of willing to be good, it must be conformed to God's will.

Reply to objection 1: A man's will cannot be conformed to God's will by equality, but it can be conformed to God's will by imitation. Similarly, a man's knowledge is conformed to God's knowledge to the extent that it has cognition of the truth. And a man's act is conformed to God's action to the extent that it is fitting for the agent. And all this is by way of *imitation* and not by way of *equality*.

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the second and third objections are clear from what was just said.

Article 10

Should a human act of willing always be conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed?

It seems that a human act of willing need not always be conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed (*in voluto*):

Objection 1: We are unable to will what we do not know; for it is an apprehended good that is the object of an act of willing. But, for the most part, we do not know what God wills. Therefore, a human act of willing cannot be conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed.

Objection 2: God wills to damn a man whom He foreknows will die in mortal sin. Therefore, if the man were obligated to conform his own will to God's will with respect to what is willed, it would follow that the man is obligated to will his own damnation. But this is absurd.

Objection 3: No one is obligated to will anything that is contrary to piety. But if a man willed what God wills, then this would sometimes be contrary to piety. For instance, when God wills that someone's father should die, if the son were to will this same thing, it would be contrary to piety. Therefore, a man is not obligated to conform his own act of willing to God's will with respect to what is willed.

But contrary to this:

1. Psalm 32:1 says, "Praise is fitting for the upright," and a Gloss on this verse says, "An upright heart is had by one who wills what God wills." But everyone is obligated to have an upright heart. Therefore, everyone is obligated to will what God wills.

2. The form of an act of willing comes from its object, as it does for any sort of act. Therefore, if a man is obligated to conform his act of willing to God's will, then it follows that he is obligated to conform his act of willing to God's will with respect to what is willed.

3. An opposition of wills consists in men willing diverse things. But if anyone has an act of willing opposed to God's will, then he has a bad act of willing. Therefore, if anyone does not conform his own will to God's will with respect to what is willed, then he has a bad act of willing.

I respond: As is clear from what has been said above (aa. 3 and 5), an act of willing is directed

toward its object insofar as that object is proposed by reason. Now it is possible for a thing to be thought of in various ways by reason, so that it is good under one conception and not good under another conception. And so if someone's will wills that such-and-such a thing exist insofar as that thing has the character of goodness, then this act of willing will be good; and if someone else wills that the very same thing not exist insofar as that thing has the character of badness, then that act of willing will likewise be good. For instance, a judge has a good act of willing when he wills that the highwayman be put to death (*vult occisionem latronis*), since this act is just, whereas someone else's act of willing—say, that of the highwayman's wife or child—who wills that he not be put to death, insofar as being put to death is by its nature bad (*inquantum est secundam naturam occisio*), is likewise good.

Now since an act of willing follows upon an apprehension by reason or the intellect, it follows that the more general the notion of the apprehended good is, the more general is the good that the act of willing is directed toward—just as in the proposed example. For the judge has care for the common good, i.e., for justice, and so he wills the highwayman's death, which has the nature of a good in its relation to the common social condition (*quae habet rationem boni secundum relationem ad statum communem*). By contrast, the highwayman's wife has to consider the private good of her family, and accordingly she wills that her husband, the highwayman, not be put to death.

Now it is the good of the whole universe that is apprehended by God, who makes and governs the universe. Hence, He wills whatever He wills under the notion of the common good, i.e., His own goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. By contrast, a creature's apprehension is by its nature directed toward some particular good that is proportionate to its own nature. But, as has been explained, it is possible for something to be good in accord with a particular conception and not to be good in accord with a more universal conception, and vice versa. And so it is possible for an act of willing to be such that (a) it is good when it wills something thought of in accord with a particular conception, and yet (b) God does not will it in accord with His universal conception, and vice versa. And because of this it is also the case that diverse acts of willing with respect to opposite things on the part of diverse men can both be good, insofar as they will that a given thing exist or not exist under diverse particular conceptions.

However, when a man wills some particular good, his act of willing is upright only if it refers that good to the common good as its end, since the natural appetite of each part is ordered toward the common good of the whole. Now it is from the end that one takes the formal notion, as it were, of willing the means to the end. Hence, in order for someone to will a particular good by an upright act, it must be that (a) this particular good is willed *materially* and that (b) God's common good is willed *formally*. Therefore, a human act of willing has to be conformed to God's will *formally* with respect to what is willed, since it has to will the divine and common good, but it does not have to will the divine and common good *materially*, for the reason already explained.

Yet a human act of willing in some sense is conformed to God's will with respect to *both* objects. For insofar as it is conformed to God's will with respect to the *general* conception of what is willed, it is conformed to it with respect to the ultimate end. On the other hand, insofar as it is not conformed to God's will with respect to what is willed *materially*, it is conformed to it in accord with the conception of an efficient cause, since a thing has, from God as an efficient cause, *this* proper inclination that follows from its nature or from the particular apprehension of *this* thing. Hence, it used to be said that a man's act of willing is conformed to God's will in the sense that he wills what God wills that he will.

In addition, there is another mode of conformity corresponding to the nature of a *formal* cause—in the sense, namely, that a man wills something out of charity, in the way that God wills. And this mode of conformity is likewise traced back to the formal conformity which stems from the act's being ordered toward the ultimate end, which is the proper object of charity.

Reply to objection 1: We can know with a general conception what sort of thing God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills under the notion of the good. And so if anyone wills

something under some notion of the good, then he has an act of willing that is conformed to God's will with respect to the nature of what is willed (*quantum ad rationem voliti*).

However, we do not know what God wills in particular. And in this regard, we are not obligated to conform our act of willing to God's will.

Yet in the state of glory all will see, in each particular thing that they will, how it was ordered toward what God wills concerning that thing. And so then they will conform their wills to God in all things not only formally but also materially.

Reply to objection 2: God does not will the damnation of anyone under the conception of damnation, and He does not will death insofar as it is death, since "He wills that all men be saved" (1 Timothy 2:4). Instead, He wills these things under the conception of justice. Hence, with regard to such things, it is enough for a man to will that God's justice and the order of nature be preserved.

Reply to objection 3: The answer to the third objection is clear from what was just said.

Reply to argument 1 for the contrary: One wills more of what God wills when he conforms his own act of willing to God's will with respect to the conception *what God wills* (*quantum ad rationem voliti*) than when he conforms his act of willing to God's will with respect to the very thing willed. For an act of willing is directed toward the end more principally than toward the means to the end.

Reply to argument 2 for the contrary: An act's species and form have more to do with nature of the object than with what is material in the object.

Reply to argument 3 for the contrary: There is no opposition of wills when the different individuals do not will under the same conception.

On the other hand, if it were under the very same conception that something was willed by one of them and willed against by the other, then this would induce an opposition of wills. However, this is not what happens in the case under discussion.

QUESTION 20

The Goodness and Badness of the Exterior Act

Next we have to consider goodness and badness with respect to exterior acts. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Do goodness and badness first exist in the act of willing or in the exterior act? (2) Does the entire goodness or badness of the exterior act depend on the goodness [or badness] of the act of willing? (3) Are the goodness and badness of the interior acts the same as the goodness and badness of the exterior acts? (4) Does the exterior act add any goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act? (5) Do subsequent events add any goodness or badness to the exterior act? (6) Can the same exterior act be both good and bad?

Article 1

Do goodness and badness exist in the exterior act before they exist in the act of willing?

It seems that goodness and badness exist in the exterior act before they exist in the act of willing:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 19, aa. 1-2), an act of willing has its goodness from its object. But the exterior act is the object of the interior act of willing; for instance, we are said to will theft or to will to give alms. Therefore, badness and goodness exist in the exterior act before they exist in the act of willing.

Objection 2: Goodness belongs first to the end, because the means to the end have the character of goodness from their being ordered toward the end. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), an act of willing cannot be the end, whereas an act of some other power can be the end. Therefore, goodness exists in the act of some other power before it exists in the act of willing.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 18, a. 6), the act of willing is related as a form to the exterior act. But what is formal is posterior, since the form comes to the matter. Therefore, goodness and badness exist in the exterior act before they exist in the act of willing.

But contrary to this: In *Retractiones* Augustine says, “The act of willing is that by which one sins and that by which one lives uprightly.” Therefore, moral goodness and badness exist first in the act of willing.

I respond: There are two possible ways in which exterior acts can be called good or bad:

First, they are called good or bad with respect to their *kind* and with respect to the *circumstances* considered in them, in the way that giving alms in the right sort of circumstances (*dare eleemosynam servatis debitis circumstantiis*) is said to be good.

Second, something is said to good or bad from its relationship to the *end* (*ex ordine ad finem*), in the way that giving alms out of vainglory is said to be bad.

Now since the end is the proper object of the act of willing, it is clear that the sort of goodness or badness that the exterior act has from its relationship to the end is first found in the act of willing and flows from that act into the exterior act. By contrast, the goodness or badness that the exterior act has in its own right (*secundum se*)—because of the right sort of matter and circumstances (*propter debitam materiam et debitas circumstantias*)—is derived not from the will but rather from reason.

Hence, if one thinks of the exterior act’s goodness insofar as it exists in reason’s ordering and apprehension, then this goodness is prior to the goodness of the act of willing, whereas if one thinks of the exterior act’s goodness insofar as it exists in the execution of the act (*in executione operis*), then this goodness is posterior to the goodness of the act of willing, which is its principle.

Reply to objection 1: The exterior act is the object of the act of willing insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a certain good that is apprehended and ordered by reason, and in this sense it is prior to the goodness of the act of willing. However, insofar as it exists in the execution of the act, it is an effect of the act of willing and is posterior to the act of willing.

Reply to objection 2: The end is prior in intention, but it is posterior in the execution.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as a form is received into matter, it is posterior to the matter in the process of generation—even though it is prior in nature. However, insofar as the form exists in the agent cause, it is prior in every way.

Now the act of willing is related to the exterior act as its efficient cause. Hence, the goodness of the act of willing is the form of the exterior act in the sense that it exists in the agent cause.

Article 2

Do the entire goodness and badness of exterior acts depend on the act of willing?

It seems that the entire goodness and badness (*tota bonitas et malitia*) of exterior acts depend on the act of willing:

Objection 1: Matthew 7:18 says, “A good tree cannot bear bad fruit; nor can a bad tree bear good fruit.” Now according to a Gloss, ‘tree’ means the act of willing, and ‘fruit’ means the exterior act (*opus*). Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of willing to be good and the exterior act bad, or vice versa.

Objection 2: In *Retractationes* Augustine says that one sins only by an act of willing. Therefore, if sin does not exist in the act of willing, then there will be no sin in the exterior act. And so the entire good or badness of the exterior act depends on the act of willing.

Objection 3: The goodness and badness of which we are now speaking are specific differences of moral acts (*differentiae moralis actus*). But according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7, specific differences divide a genus *per se*. Therefore, since an act is a moral act because it is voluntary (*voluntaria*), it seems that goodness and badness are received in an act solely on the part of the act of willing (*solum ex parte voluntatis*).

But contrary to this: In *Contra Mendacium* Augustine says, “There are certain things that cannot be done well for any good end or by a good act of willing.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), it is possible to think of two kinds of goodness and badness in the exterior act: (a) goodness and badness that stem from the right sort of matter and circumstances (*secundum debitam materiam et circumstantias*) and (b) goodness and badness that stem from the relationship to the end.

The goodness and badness that stem from the relationship to the end depend entirely on the act of willing. By contrast, the goodness and badness that come from the right sort of matter and circumstances depend on reason, and the goodness of the act of willing depends on this sort of goodness to the extent that the act of willing is directed toward it.

However, one should note that, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 6), just a single defect is sufficient for something’s being bad, whereas a single good aspect is not sufficient for its being good absolutely speaking; instead, what is required is *complete* goodness (*integritas bonitatis*). Therefore, if the act of willing is good and has a proper object and end, then it follows that the exterior act is good. But the goodness of the act of willing, which comes from the act of intending the end, is not sufficient for the exterior act’s being good. Rather, if the act of willing is bad *either* because of the act of intending the end *or* because of the act that is willed, the result is that the exterior act is bad.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as it is a good act of willing that is signified by ‘good fruit’, the act must be understood in such a way that it has goodness *both* from the act that is willed *and* from the intended end.

Reply to objection 2: One sins by the act of willing not only when he wills a bad *end*, but also when he wills a bad *act*.

Reply to objection 3: What is said to be voluntary is not just the interior act of the will, but also the exterior acts insofar as they proceed from the will and reason. And so the specific differences *good* and *bad* can apply to *both* interior and exterior acts (*circa utrosque actus potest esse differentia boni et mali*).

Article 3

Is the goodness or badness of the interior act of willing the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act?

It seems that the goodness or badness of the interior act of the willing is not the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act:

Objection 1: The principle of the interior act is an interior power of the soul, either apprehensive or appetitive, whereas the principle of the exterior act is a power that executes a movement. But where there are diverse principles of action, there are diverse acts. Now it is an act that is the subject of goodness or badness. But it is impossible for the same accident to exist in diverse subjects. Therefore, the goodness of the interior act cannot be the same as the goodness of the exterior act.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 2 says, “A virtue is what makes the one who has it good and renders his action good.” But as is clear from *Ethics* 6, an intellectual virtue in a power that commands is different from a moral virtue in a power that is commanded. Therefore, the goodness of the interior act, which is the act of a power that commands, is different from the goodness of the exterior act, which is the act of a power that is commanded.

Objection 3: A cause and its effect cannot be the same thing, since nothing is a cause of itself. But as has been explained (aa. 1-2), either the goodness of the interior act is a cause of the goodness of the exterior act, or vice versa. Therefore, it is impossible for the same goodness to belong to both acts.

But contrary to this: It was shown above (q. 18, a. 6) that the act of willing is like the form of the exterior act. But something unified (*unum*) is effected from the formal and the material. Therefore, the goodness of the interior act is the same as the goodness of the exterior act.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 17, a. 4), to the extent that the interior act of willing and the exterior act are thought of as being in the genus of morals, they are a single act. However, sometimes it happens that an act which is one in subject has more than one type of goodness or badness (*plures rationes bonitatis vel malitiae*), and sometimes it happens that it has just one type (*unam tantum*).

So, then, one should reply that sometimes the goodness or badness of the interior act is the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act, and sometimes they are different from one another. For as has already been explained (aa. 1-2), the two aforementioned instances of goodness, viz., the goodness of the interior act and the goodness of the exterior act, are ordered toward one another.

Now in things that are ordered toward something else, it is possible for something to be good solely because it is ordered toward that other thing, in the way that a bitter-tasting medicine is good solely because it effects health (*potio amara ex hoc solo est bona quod est sanativa*). Hence, the goodness of health and the goodness of the medicine are not different from one another, but one and the same. On the other hand, sometimes what is ordered toward something else has within itself (*in se*) some type of goodness, even beyond its being ordered toward that other good; for instance, a good-tasting medicine has a type of pleasurable goodness over and beyond the fact that it is a cause of health.

So, then, one should reply that when the exterior act is good or bad solely because it is ordered toward the end, then the goodness or badness of the act of willing, which is related *per se* to the end, is altogether the same as the goodness or badness of the exterior act, which is related to the end by the mediation of the act of willing. On the other hand, when the exterior act has goodness or badness in its

own right (*secundum se*), either because of its matter or because of the circumstances, then the goodness of the exterior act is one thing and the goodness of the act of willing, which comes from the end, is another thing—yet, as has already been explained (aa. 1-2), in such a way that (a) the goodness of the end spills over from the act of willing into the exterior act and that (b) the goodness of the matter and the circumstances spills over into the act of willing.

Reply to objection 1: This argument shows that the interior act and the exterior act are diverse in their natural genera (*diversi secundum genus naturae*). However, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 4), acts that are diverse in this way constitute a single act in the genus of morals.

Reply to objection 2: As is explained in *Ethics* 6, the moral virtues are ordered toward the very acts of the virtues, which are, as it were, their ends, whereas prudence, which exists in reason, is ordered toward the means to the end. And this is why diverse virtues are required. But correct reason concerning the end of the virtues does not have a goodness that is different from the goodness of the virtue, since reason's goodness participates in every virtue.

Reply to objection 3: When one thing is derived from another and the latter is a *univocal agent cause*, then what exists in each of them is different; for instance, when a hot thing effects heat, the heat of that which effects heat is different from the heat in the thing that is heated, even though they are the same in species.

However, when one thing is derived from another *by virtue of an analogy or proportion (secundum analogiam vel proportionem)*, then there is only one thing numerically; for instance, health with respect to urine and medicine (*sanum ad medicinam et urinam*) is derived from health that exists in an animal's body (*sanum quod est in corpore animalis*); nor is health as it belongs to the medicine and the urine (*sanitas medicinae et urinae*) different from the animal's health (*sanitas animalis*), which the medicine effects and which the urine is a sign of. And it is in this latter sense that the goodness of the act of willing spills over into the exterior act, and vice versa, viz., because the one is ordered toward the other.

Article 4

Does the exterior act add any goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act?

It seems that the exterior act does not add any goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act (*non addat in bonitate vel malitia supra actum interiore*):

Objection 1: In *Super Mattheum* Chrysostom says, "The act of willing is what is rewarded for its goodness or condemned for its badness." Works, by contrast, are a testimony to acts of willing (*opera testimonia sunt voluntatis*). Therefore, God does not want works for His own sake, so that He might know how to judge them; rather, He wants them for the sake of others, so that all might understand that He is a just God. But goodness or badness is to be thought of in accord with God's judgment rather than in accord with the judgment of men. Therefore, the exterior act adds nothing to goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 3), the interior act's goodness is one and the same as the exterior act's goodness. But an increase is accomplished through the addition of one thing to something else (*per additionem unius ad alterum*). Therefore, the exterior act does not add any goodness or badness beyond that of the interior act.

Objection 3: The entirety of a creature's goodness does not add anything to God's goodness, since the entirety of a creature's goodness flows from God's goodness. But as has been explained (aa. 1-2), sometimes the entirety of the exterior act's goodness flows from the interior act's goodness, and sometimes vice versa. Therefore, it is not the case that the one act adds goodness or badness to the other.

But contrary to this: Every agent intends to attain good and to avoid evil. Therefore, if no

goodness or badness is added by the exterior act, then it will be useless for anyone who has a good or bad act of willing to do a good work or to desist from a bad work. But this is absurd.

I respond: If we are talking about the goodness that an exterior act has *from the act of willing the end*, then the exterior act adds no goodness—unless it happens that the act of willing is in its own right made better in the case of good acts or worse in the case of bad acts. There seem to be three ways in which this can happen:

(a) The act of willing is made better or worse *in number (secundum numerum)*. For instance, someone wills to do something with a good or bad end, then does not do it, but later wills it and does it. Here the act of willing is duplicated, and so there is a twofold goodness or twofold badness.

(b) The act of willing is made better or worse *by being extended (secundum extensionem)*. For instance, one individual wills to do something with a good or bad end and desists because of some obstacle, whereas another individual prolongs the movement of his will up to the point of bringing that movement to completion by means of the work. It is clear that an act of willing of this latter sort lasts longer in goodness or badness and is accordingly worse or better.

(c) The act of willing is made better or worse *by its intensity (secundum intensionem)*. There are some exterior acts which, to the extent that they are pleasurable or painful, are apt to make the act of willing more intense or less intense (*nati sunt intendere voluntatem vel remittere*). Now it is clear that the more intensely the will tends toward something good or bad, the better or worse it is.

On the other hand, if we are talking about the goodness an exterior act has *because of its matter and due circumstances*, then the exterior act is related to the act of willing as its terminus and end. And in this sense it adds to the goodness or badness of the act of willing, since every inclination or movement is perfected in attaining its end or reaching its terminus. Hence, it is not a perfect act of willing unless it is such that, given the opportunity, it issues forth in a work (*nisi sit talis quae opportunitate data operetur*).

However, if the opportunity is lacking (*si vero possibilitas desit*), even though there is a perfect act of willing—so that the individual would do the work if he were able to—then the lack of perfection associated with the exterior act is involuntary, absolutely speaking. But just as what is involuntary does not merit a punishment or reward in the doing of what is good or bad, so too neither is any of the reward or punishment removed if a man desists involuntarily, absolutely speaking, from doing something good or evil.

Reply to objection 1: Chrysostom is talking about a case in which (a) the man's act of willing has already been completed (*consummata*) and in which (b) he has desisted from the act only because he lacks the power to do it.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through as regards the goodness that an exterior act has from the act of willing the end. However, the goodness that the exterior act has because of its matter and circumstances is different from the goodness that the act of willing has from its end—though, as was explained above (aa. 1-2), it is not different from the goodness that the act of willing has from the very act that is willed, but is instead related to that goodness as its reason and cause.

Reply to objection 3: This makes clear the reply to the third objection.

Article 5

Do subsequent events add to an act's goodness or badness?

It seems that subsequent events add to an act's goodness or badness:

Objection 1: An effect preexists virtually in its cause. But subsequent events follow acts in the way the effects follow causes. Therefore, they preexist virtually in those acts. But each thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since, as *Ethics 2* says, "Virtue is what makes the one who has it

good.” Therefore, subsequent events add to an act’s goodness or badness.

Objection 2: The good things that the listeners do are certain effects that follow from the teacher’s preaching (*quidam consequentes praedicatione doctoris*). But good things of this sort redound to the preacher’s merit, as is clear from what is said in Philippians 4:1 (“My dearly beloved and longed for brothers, my joy and my crown”). Therefore, subsequent events add to the goodness and badness of acts.

Objection 3: One does not add to the punishment unless the guilt increases; hence, Deuteronomy 25:2 says, “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” But the punishment is increased because of subsequent events; for Exodus 21:3 says, “But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death.” But he would not have been put to death unless the ox—even if not shut up—had not killed a human being. Therefore, subsequent events add to an act’s goodness or badness.

Objection 4: If one does something that may cause death—say, by striking someone or passing sentence on him—but death does not ensue, then no [sacramental] irregularity is contracted. But it would be contracted if death were to follow. Therefore, subsequent events add to an act’s goodness or badness.

But contrary to this: Subsequent events do not make an act that was good bad, or an act that was bad good. For instance, if someone gives alms to a poor man and the poor man makes bad use of the alms in order to sin, nothing is lost to the one who gave the alms; and, similarly, if someone patiently bears an injury done to him, the one who inflicted the injury is not on that account excused. Therefore, subsequent events do not add to an act’s goodness or badness.

I respond: A subsequent event is either foreseen or not foreseen (*praecogitatus aut non*).

If it is foreseen, then it is clear that it adds to goodness and badness. For when someone who knows that many bad things can follow from his action does not for that reason desist, his act of willing appears to be more disordered.

On the other hand, if the subsequent event is not foreseen, then we have to draw a distinction.

For if the subsequent event follows *per se* and in most cases from the act in question, then the subsequent event accordingly adds to the act’s goodness or badness. For it is clear that an act is better of its kind if more good things are able to follow from it, and it is worse of its kind if more bad things are apt to follow from it.

On the other hand, if the subsequent event follows *per accidens* and in a fewer number of cases, then the subsequent event does not add to the act’s goodness or badness. For it is only insofar as something is *per se*, and not insofar as it is *per accidens*, that judgment is passed on it.

Reply to objection 1: A cause’s power is measured in accord with its *per se* effects and not according to its *per accidens* effects.

Reply to objection 2: The good things that the listeners do follow from the teacher’s preaching as *per se* effects. Hence, they redound to the reward of the preacher and especially when they are intended ahead of time by the preacher.

Reply to objection 3: The event for which it is commanded that punishment be inflicted is such that both (a) it follows *per se* from the cause in question and (b) it is posited as foreknown. And this is why it is imputed for punishment.

Reply to objection 4: This argument would go through if the [sacramental] irregularity followed from the sin. However, it does not follow from the sin, but instead follows from the deed that is done, because it causes a sacramental defect (*non sequitur culpam sed factum propter defectum sacramenti*).

Article 6

Can a single act be both good and bad?

It seems that a single act can be both good and bad:

Objection 1: As *Physics* 5 says, “A movement that is one is continuous.” But a single continuous movement can be both good and bad, e.g., if someone, while walking continuously to church, first intends to seek empty glory and later intends to serve God. Therefore, a single act can be both good and bad.

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 3, an action and [corresponding] passion are a single act. But it is possible (a) for the passion, e.g., Christ’s passion, to be good and (b) for the action, e.g., that of the Jews, to be bad. Therefore, a single act can be both good and bad.

Objection 3: Since a servant is, as it were, his master’s instrument, the servant’s action is the master’s action in the way that a tool’s action is the craftsman’s action. But it can happen that the servant’s action (a) proceeds from the master’s good act of willing and so is good, and (b) proceeds from the servant’s bad act of willing and so is bad. Therefore, the same act can be both good and bad.

But contrary to this: Contraries cannot exist in the same thing. But *good* and *bad* are contraries. Therefore, a single act cannot be both good and bad.

I respond: Nothing prevents something from being both (a) a single thing insofar as it is in one genus and (b) more than one thing (*multiplex*) insofar as it is referred to some other genus. For instance, a continuous surface is a single thing insofar as it is thought of as being in the genus of quantity, and yet, given that it is partly white and partly black, it is many things insofar as it is referred to the genus of color.

Accordingly, as has been explained (q. 3, a. 1 and q. 18, a. 7), nothing prevents some act from being a single act insofar as it is referred to the genus of nature, and yet not a single act insofar as it is referred to the genus of morals, or vice versa. For instance, walking is a single continuous act within the genus of nature, and yet it can happen that it is many acts within the genus of morals, given that the walker’s act of willing, which is the principle of moral acts, keeps changing.

Therefore, if one takes an act which is a single act insofar as it is in the genus of morals, then it is impossible for that act to be both good and bad with moral goodness and badness. Yet, if it is a single act by a oneness of nature and not by a oneness of morals (*unus unitate naturae et non unitate moris*), then it can be both good and bad.

Reply to objection 1: Even though the continuous movement in question, which proceeds from diverse intentions, is a single act by a oneness of nature, it is nonetheless not a single act by a oneness of morals.

Reply to objection 2: Action and passion belong to the genus of morals insofar as they have the character of voluntariness. And so to the extent that they are called voluntary because of diverse acts of willing, they are two acts morally speaking, and so it is possible for goodness to be in one part and for badness to be in the other part.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as the servant’s act proceeds from the servant’s act of willing, it is not the master’s act; rather, the servant’s act is the master’s act only insofar as it proceeds from the master’s command. Hence, in this sense the servant’s bad act of willing does not make the master’s act bad.

QUESTION 21

What Accrues to Human Acts by Reason of their Goodness or Badness

Next we have to consider what accrues to human acts by reason of their goodness or badness. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does a human act have the character of being upright or deviant (*habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati*) insofar as it is good or bad? (2) Does a human act have the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy (*habeat rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis*) insofar as it is good or bad? (3) Does a human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious (*habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti*) insofar as it is good or bad? (4) Does a human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God (*apud Deum*) insofar as it is good or bad?

Article 1

Does a human act have the character of being upright or deviant insofar as it is good or bad?

It seems that it is not the case that a human act has the character of being upright or deviant (*non habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati*) insofar as it is good or bad:

Objection 1: As *Physics* 2 says, “In nature, deviations (*peccata*) are monstrosities.” However, monstrosities are not *acts*, but are instead certain *things* that are generated outside of the order of nature. But as it says in the same place, what exists by art and reason (*secundum artem et rationem*) imitates what exists by nature. Therefore, it is not the case that an *act* has the character of being a deviation (*rationem peccati*) because it is disordered and bad (*inordinatus et malus*).

Objection 2: As *Physics* 2 says, a deviation (*peccatum*) occurs in nature or in a craft (*in arte*) when the intended end is not attained by nature or by the craft. But a human act’s goodness or badness exists especially in the act of intending the end and in the act of attaining the end. Therefore, it seems that an act’s badness does not bring with it the character of being a deviation.

Objection 3: If an act’s badness brought with it the character of being a deviation, then it would follow that whenever something bad exists, a deviation exists. But this is false, since even though punishment has the character of something bad, it does not have the character of being a deviation. Therefore, it is not the case that an act has the character of being a deviation because it is bad.

But contrary to this: As was shown above (q. 19, a. 4), a human act’s goodness depends principally on the eternal law and, as a result, its badness consists in its disagreement with the eternal law. But this is what grounds the character of being a deviation (*facit rationem peccati*), since in *Contra Faustum* 22 Augustine says, “What is deviant (or sinful) (*peccatum*) is something said, done, or desired against the eternal law.” Therefore, a human act has the character of being a deviation from the fact that it is bad.

I respond: *Being bad (malum)* is more general (*in plus est*) than *being a deviation (peccatum)* just as *being good (bonum)* is more general than *being upright (rectum)*. For any privation of a good in any given thing brings with it the character of badness, whereas a deviation (*peccatum*) is, properly speaking, an act done for the sake of some end, where the act does not have the right sort of ordering toward that end (*cum non habet debitum ordinem ad finem illum*).

Now the right sort of ordering toward an end is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is nature’s power itself (*ipsa virtus naturae*), which inclines them toward such-and-such an end. Therefore, when the act proceeds toward that end from a natural power in accord with a natural inclination, uprightness (or straightness) (*rectitudo*) is preserved in the act, since what is in the middle does not deviate from the endpoints, i.e., the act does not deviate from the active principle’s being ordered toward the end. On the other hand, when an act departs from this sort of uprightness, then the character of a deviation emerges.

By contrast, in things that act through their will, the proximate rule is human reason, whereas the highest rule is the eternal law. Therefore, when a man's act proceeds toward the end in accord with the order of reason and the eternal law, then the act is upright (or straight), whereas when it deviates from such uprightness, it is called a deviation (or sin) (*peccatum*).

Now it is clear from what has been said (q. 19, aa. 3-4) that every bad voluntary act is bad because it departs from the order of reason and the order of the eternal law, and every good act agrees with reason and with the eternal law. Hence, it follows that a human act has the character of being upright or being a deviation (or sin) from the fact that it is good or bad.

Reply to objection 1: Monstrosities are said to be deviations insofar as they are produced because of a deviation that exists in an *act* of nature.

Reply to objection 2: There are two sorts of ends, an *ultimate* end and a *proximate* end (*ultimus et propinquus*).

Now in a deviation in nature (*in peccato naturae*), the act fails with respect to the ultimate end, viz., the perfection of generation, but it is not the case that it fails with respect to every proximate end, since nature works by forming something.

Similarly, in a deviation (or sin) in the will (*in peccato voluntatis*), there is always a failure with respect to the intended ultimate end, since no bad voluntary act can be ordered toward beatitude, which is the ultimate end—even if the act does not fail with respect to some proximate end that the will intends and attains to. Hence, since the very act of intending this proximate end is ordered toward the ultimate end, it is in the very act of intending such an end that one can find the character of being upright or being a deviation (or sin).

Reply to objection 3: Each thing is ordered toward an end through its own act, and so the character of being a deviation, which consists in a deviation from this ordering toward the end, properly exists in the *act*. By contrast, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, aa. 5-6), punishment has to do with the *person* who deviates (or sins) (*poena respicit personam peccantem*).

Article 2

Does a human act have the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy from the fact that it is good or bad?

It seems that a human act does not have the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy (*laudabilis vel culpabilis*) from the fact that it is good or bad:

Objection 1: As *Physics* 2 explains, “Deviations (*peccati*) occur in what is done by nature.” But as *Ethics* 3 says, what is natural is not praiseworthy or blameworthy. Therefore, it is not the case that a human act has the character of blameworthiness (or sinfulness) (*non habet rationem culpae*) from the fact that it is bad or a deviation (*ex hoc quod est malus vel peccatum*); and, consequently, it does not have the character of being praiseworthy from the fact that it is good.

Objection 2: Just as deviations occur in moral acts, so too they occur in the acts of a craft; for as *Physics* 2 says, “A grammarian deviates in writing incorrectly, as does a physician in dispensing medicine incorrectly.” But it is not the case that a craftsman is blamed for making something bad, since it part of a craftsman's skill that he is able make both good and bad works when he wants to. Therefore, it seems likewise not to be the case that a moral act has the character of being blameworthy from the fact that it is bad.

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil is “weak and powerless.” But weakness and powerlessness either destroy or diminish the character of blameworthiness. Therefore, it is not the case that a human act is blameworthy because it is bad.

But contrary to this: The Philosopher says, “The works of the virtues are praiseworthy, whereas the contrary works deserve censure and blame.” But as *Ethics 2* says, the acts of a virtue are good acts, since “virtue is what makes the one who has it good and renders his works good.” Hence, the opposed acts are bad acts. Therefore, a human act has the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy from the fact that it is good or bad.

I respond: Just as *being bad* is more general (*est in plus*) than *being a deviation* (*peccatum*), so too *being a deviation* is more general than *being blameworthy* (or *being sinful*) (*culpa*). For an act is said to be blameworthy or praiseworthy from the fact that it is imputed to the agent, since someone’s being praised or blamed is nothing other than his having the goodness or badness of his act imputed to him.

Now an act is imputed to an agent when it lies within his power, with the result that he has dominion over his act. But this is the case with all voluntary acts, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 1, aa. 1-2), it is through a man’s will that he has dominion over his acts. Hence, it follows that (a) it is only in the case of voluntary acts that goodness or badness brings with it the character of praise or blame, and that (b) *being bad* (*malum*), *being a deviation* (or *sin*) (*peccatum*), and *being blameworthy* (or a *sin*) (*culpa*) are the same thing in the case of voluntary acts.

Reply to objection 1: Natural acts are not within the power of their natural agents, since nature is determined to one effect. And so even if there is deviation (*peccatum*) in natural acts, there is nonetheless no such thing as blame (or sin) (*culpa*) in them.

Reply to objection 2: Reason has one role in the case of artifacts and a different role in the case of morals (*ratio aliter se habet in artificialibus et aliter in moralibus*). In the case of artifacts, reason is ordered toward a particular end, which is something thought up by reason. By contrast, in the case of morals, reason is ordered toward the general end of the entirety of a human life (*ad finem communem totius humanae vitae*).

Now a particular end is ordered toward the general end. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), a deviation occurs because of a departure from the ordering toward the end, there are two possible ways in which a deviation can occur in the act of a craft:

(a) as a deviation from the *particular end* intended by the craftsman, and this sort of deviation is proper to the craft—as, for instance, when a craftsman who intends to make a good work instead makes a bad one, or when a craftsman who intends to make a bad work instead makes a good one;

(b) as a deviation from *the general end of human life*, and in this sense the craftsman will be said to deviate if he intends to make, and does make, a bad work through which someone else is defrauded. However, this sort of deviation is proper to the craftsman insofar as he is a man and not insofar as he is a craftsman.

Hence, the craftsman is blamed as a craftsman for the first sort of deviation, whereas a man is blamed as a man for the second sort of deviation

By contrast, in the case of morals, where reason is ordered toward the general end of a human life, deviation and badness always involve a departure from reason’s ordering toward the general end of human life. And a man is blamed for such a deviation both insofar as he is a man and insofar as he is a moral being. Hence, in *Ethics 6* the Philosopher says, “In the case of a craft, someone who deviates willingly is preferable, whereas someone who deviates is not preferable in the case of prudence or of the moral virtues directed by prudence.”

Reply to objection 3: The sort of weakness that exists in bad voluntary acts is subject to a man’s power. And so it neither removes nor diminishes blame.

Article 3

Does a human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious because of its goodness or badness?

It seems that a human act does not have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious because of its goodness or badness:

Objection 1: ‘Merit’ and ‘demerit’ are said in relation to recompense (*in ordine ad retributionem*), which has a place only in matters that have to do with others (*in his quae ad alterum sunt*). But not every good or bad human act is directed toward someone else; instead, some are directed toward oneself. Therefore, not every good or bad human act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious.

Objection 2: No one merits a punishment or a reward by the fact that he does what he wants to with what he has dominion over; for instance, a man is not punished if he destroys his own property, as he would be punished if he destroyed someone else’s property. But a man has dominion over his own acts. Therefore, he does not merit punishment or reward by reason of the fact that he does well or badly with his own acts.

Objection 3: No one merits being treated well by another by reason of the fact that he acquires a good for himself; and the same line of reasoning holds for evils as well. But a good act is itself a certain good and perfection of the agent, whereas a disordered act is a certain evil for him. Therefore, a man does not merit or demerit by reason of the fact that he does a bad act or a good act.

But contrary to this: Isaiah 3:10-11 says, “Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him.”

I respond: ‘Merit’ and ‘demerit’ are said in connection with the recompense that is made in accord with justice (*in ordine ad retributionem quae fit secundum iustitiam*). But recompense in accord with justice is made to someone because he acts for the benefit or harm of someone else (*ex eo quod agit in profectum vel nocumentum alterius*).

Now notice that each individual who lives in a society is in some sense a part of, and member of, the whole society. Therefore, if an individual does something that is good or bad for someone who lives in that society, then this redounds upon the whole society—just as someone who inflicts injury on a hand inflicts injury on the man as a result.

Thus, when someone does something that is good or bad for some other individual person, there are two ways in which the character of merit or demerit applies: (a) insofar as recompense is owed to him by the individual person whom he helps or offends, and (b) insofar as recompense is owed to him by the whole community (*a toto collegio*).

On the other hand, when someone orders his act directly toward what is good or bad for the whole community, recompense is owed to him first and mainly by the whole community and secondarily by all the parts of the community.

And when someone does something that is good or bad for himself, then he is likewise owed recompense to the extent that this also has an effect on the community, given that he himself is part of the community—even if he is not owed recompense insofar it is good or bad for the individual person who is the same as the agent (unless perhaps he is owed recompense by himself according to a sort of analogy, insofar as there is such a thing as a man’s being just to himself).

So, then, it is clear that a good or bad act has the character of being praiseworthy or blameworthy insofar as it lies within the will’s power, whereas it has the character of being upright or a deviation insofar as it is ordered toward an end, and it has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in accord with the recompense of justice with respect to someone else.

Reply to objection 1: Even if in some cases the acts of a good or bad man are not ordered toward what is good or bad for some other individual person, they are nonetheless ordered toward what is good

or bad for that other which is the community itself.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as he does well or badly with his own acts, a man, having dominion over his own acts, merits or demerits because he also belongs to another, viz., the community of which he is a part—just as if he were doing well or badly with other things of his own concerning which he owes service to the community.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, the very good or evil which someone does to himself through his own act redounds upon the community.

Article 4

Does a good or bad human act have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in relation to God?

It seems that a good or bad human act does not have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in relation to God (*non habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti per comparationem ad Deum*):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 3), ‘merit’ and ‘demerit’ imply an ordering toward compensation for benefits or harms done to someone else (*importat ordinem ad recompensationem profectus vel damni ad alterum illati*). But a man’s good or bad act does not result in any benefit or harm to God Himself; for Job 35:6-7 says, “If you sin, what harm will you do to Him? And if you act justly, what good will you do Him?” Therefore, a man’s good or bad act does not have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God (*apud Deum*).

Objection 2: No instrument has merit or demerit in the sight of the one who uses the instrument, since the instrument’s entire action belongs to the user himself. But when a man acts, he is an instrument of God’s power, which moves him as a principal cause (*principaliter*); hence, Isaiah 10:15 says, “Shall the ax boast against him that cuts with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn”—a passage that clearly compares an acting man to an instrument. Therefore, in acting well or badly, a man neither merits nor demerits anything in the sight of God.

Objection 3: A human act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious insofar as it is ordered toward someone else. But not every human act is ordered toward God. Therefore, not every good or bad act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiastes 12:14 says, “God will bring into judgment all things that are done, whether good or bad.” But judgment implies recompense, and it is with respect to recompense that ‘merit’ and ‘demerit’ are predicated. Therefore, every good or bad human act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), a man’s act has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious insofar as it is ordered toward someone else, either by reason of that individual or by reason of the community. Now it is in both ways that our good and bad acts have the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God:

(a) *by reason of the individual Himself*, insofar as He is man’s ultimate end. For it is fitting, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 10), for all our acts to be referred to the ultimate end. Hence, if one does an act that cannot be referred to God, then he does not preserve God’s honor, which is owed to the ultimate end.

(b) *by reason of the entire universal community*. For in every community the one who governs the community takes care mainly of the common good, and so it is his role to give recompense for what is done well or badly in the community. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, a. 5), God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe and especially of rational creatures.

Hence, it is clear that human acts have the character of being meritorious and demeritorious in

relation to God. Otherwise, it would follow that He does not care about human acts.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing can accrue to God or be lost to Him in His own right through man's action. And yet a man, from his own side (*quantum in se est*), takes something away from God, or gives Him something, when he observes or fails to observe the order that God has instituted.

Reply to objection 2: A man is moved as an instrument by God in such a way that, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 6), it does not exclude his moving himself through free choice. And so it is through his own act that he merits or demerits in the sight of God.

Reply to objection 3: It is not the case that a man is ordered toward the political community in his entire self or in all that is his (*secundum se totum et secundum omnia sua*), and so it is unnecessary for each of his acts to be meritorious or demeritorious in light of his ordering toward the political community. By contrast, the entirety of what a man is and of what he has and can do must be ordered toward God, and so every one of a man's good or bad acts, as far as the very nature of the act is concerned, has the character of being meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.

QUESTION 22

The Subject of the Passions of the Soul

After this we have to consider the passions of the soul, first in general (questions 22-25) and then in particular (questions 26-48).

In the general treatment, there are four things to consider about the passions: first, their subject (question 22); second, the differences among them (question 23); third, their relation to one another (question 24); and, fourth, their badness and goodness (question 25).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Are there passions in the soul? (2) Does a passion exist in the appetitive part of the soul rather than in the apprehensive part? (3) Does a passion exist in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellective appetite, which is called the will?

Article 1

Are there passions in the soul?

It seems that there are no passions in the soul (*nulla passio sit in anima*):

Objection 1: To be acted upon (*pati*) is proper to matter. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 5), the soul is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 3 says, a passion is a movement. But as is proved in *De Anima* 1, the soul does not undergo movement (*anima non movetur*). Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

Objection 3: A passion is a path toward corruption, since, as *Topics* says, “Every passion, when made stronger, takes away from the substance (*abicit a substantia*).” But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

But contrary to this: In Romans 7:5 the Apostle says, “When we were in the flesh, the passions of the sins which were by the law were working in our members.” But sins properly speaking exist in the soul. Therefore, the passions, which are here said to belong to the sins, likewise exist in the soul.

I respond: There are three ways in which something is said to be acted upon (*pati dicitur tripliciter*).

In one way, ‘to be acted upon’ is used generally, insofar as every instance of receiving something is an instance of being acted upon, even if nothing is taken away from the thing in question; in this sense the air is said to be acted upon when it is illuminated. However, properly speaking, this is to be *perfected* rather than *acted upon*.

In a second sense, something is said to be acted upon, properly speaking, when one thing is received along with the loss of something else. But there are two ways in which this happens:

(a) Sometimes what is taken away is not agreeable to the thing. For instance, when an animal’s body is healed, it is said to be acted upon, since it receives health while losing sickness.

(b) Sometimes the reverse happens. For instance, getting sick is said to be an instance of being acted upon, since infirmity is received while health is lost. And this is the most proper sense of ‘passion’ or ‘to be acted upon’ (*hic est propriissimus modus passionis*). For ‘to be acted upon’ is taken from the fact that something is drawn toward the agent, and that which withdraws from what is agreeable to it seems especially to be drawn toward something else. Similarly, *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1 says that when what is more noble is generated from what is less noble there is a generation absolutely speaking (*generatio simpliciter*), but when what is less noble is generated from what is more noble there is, conversely, a generation in a certain respect (*generatio secundum quid*).

These are the three ways in which passions can exist in the soul. For in the sense of just receiving, sensing and intellective understanding are a certain sort of being acted upon (*sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati*). On the other hand, a passion with a loss occurs only through a bodily change (*secundum*

transmutationem coporalem), and so a passion properly speaking belongs to the soul only *per accidens*—viz., insofar as the composite is acted upon. But even here there is a difference, since the sort of change in question has the character of a passion more properly when it is a change for the worse than when it is a change for the better. Hence, sadness (*tristitia*) is more properly a passion than joy (*laetitia*) is.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as being acted upon comes with a loss and a change, it is proper to matter and so is found only in things composed of matter and form. But insofar as being acted upon implies just the reception of something, it does not have to belong just to matter, but is instead able to belong to whatever is in potentiality.

Now even though the soul is not composed of matter and form, it nonetheless does have some potentiality, and accordingly it is suited for receiving and being acted upon. This is the sense in which, as *De Anima* 3 says, to understand intellectually is to be acted upon (*intelligere pati est*).

Reply to objection 2: Even if being acted upon and undergoing movement do not belong to the soul *per se*, they do belong to it *per accidens*, as *De Anima* 1 points out.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to passions that are accompanied by a change for the worse. This sort of passion belongs to the soul only *per accidens*, whereas it belongs *per se* to the composite, which is indeed corruptible.

Article 2

Are the passions in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part?

It seems that the passions are in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part:

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 2 says, what is first in a genus seems to be the greatest of the things belonging to that genus and to be a cause of the others. But the passions are in the apprehensive part before being in the appetitive part; for the appetitive part is not acted upon except when the apprehensive part has previously been acted upon (*non patitur pars appetitiva nisi passione praecedente in parte apprehensiva*). Therefore, the passions exist more in the apprehensive part than in the appetitive part.

Objection 2: What is more active seems to be less passive, since acting is opposed to being acted upon (*actio passioni opponitur*). But the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore, it seems that the passions exist more in the apprehensive part.

Objection 3: Just as the sentient appetite is a power in a corporeal organ, so too is the sentient apprehensive power. But the passions of the soul come to exist, properly speaking, through a bodily change (*secundum transmutationem corporalem*). Therefore, it is not the case that they exist in the sentient appetitive part more than in the sentient apprehensive part.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, “The movements of our mind—πάθη in the Greek—are such that some, like Cicero, call them perturbations (*perturbationes*), and some call them affections (*affectiones*) or affects (*affectus*), while others call them—more clearly, as in the Greek—passions (*passiones*).” From this it is clear that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections clearly belong to the appetitive part and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore, the passions are likewise in the appetitive part rather than in the apprehensive part.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), the name ‘passion’ implies that the thing being acted upon (*patiens*) is drawn toward something that belongs to the agent.

Now the soul is drawn toward a thing through its appetitive power rather than through its apprehensive power. For it is through its appetitive power that the soul is ordered toward the things themselves insofar as they exist in themselves (*ad ipsas res prout in seipsis sunt*). Hence, in *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says that “the good and the bad”—i.e., the objects of the appetitive

power—“exist in the things themselves.”

By contrast, the apprehensive power is not drawn to things insofar as they exist in themselves; rather, it has cognition of a thing in accord with the thing’s intention (*secundum intentionem rei*), which it has or receives within itself in its own mode. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that “the true and the false”—which pertain to cognition—“exist in the mind and not in the things.”

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found in the appetitive part more than in the apprehensive part.

Reply to objection 1: What pertains to perfection behaves in a way contrary to what pertains to defectiveness (*e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad perfectionem et in his quae pertinent ad defectum*).

In the case of what pertains to perfection, intensity is associated with an approach toward a single first principle (*attenditur per accessum ad unum primum principium*), so that the closer something is to that principle, the more intense it is. For instance, the intensity of light is associated with its approach toward something that is maximally bright, so that the closer it gets to that thing, the brighter it is.

By contrast, in what pertains to defectiveness, intensity is associated not with an approach toward some highest thing, but instead with a movement away from the perfect, since this is what the character of privation and defectiveness consists in. And so the less remote a defect is from the first thing, the less intense it is; and, for this reason, at the beginning a defect is always small, and then later, as it proceeds further, it becomes greater (*postea procedendo magis multiplicatur*).

Now the passions have to do with defectiveness, since a passion belongs to something insofar as it is in potentiality. Hence, in things that are close to the first perfect thing, viz., God, there is hardly anything of the character of potentiality and passion, whereas in the other things that come after them, there is more potentiality and passion. And so it is likewise the case that there is less of the character of a passion in that prior power of the soul, viz., the apprehensive power.

Reply to objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active because it is more of a source (*principium*) for the exterior act. It has this feature from the very fact in virtue of which it is more passive, viz., that it has an ordering toward a thing insofar as that thing exists in itself. For it is through the exterior act that we arrive at the attainment of things.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 78, a. 3), there are two ways in which an organ of the soul can be changed:

(a) *by a spiritual change (transmutatione spirituali)*, insofar as it receives the intention of a thing (*recipit intentionem rei*). This sort of change exists *per se* in the act of the sentient apprehensive power; for instance, the eye is changed by the visible thing not in such a way that it becomes colored, but in such a way that it receives the intention of color.

(b) *by a separate natural change in the organ*, insofar as the organ is changed with respect to its natural condition—e.g., becoming hot or cold or being changed in some similar way. This sort of change is related *per accidens* to the act of the sentient apprehensive power—as, for instance, when the eye is fatigued by an intent gaze or weakened by the intensity of a visible thing. However, a change of this sort is ordered *per se* toward an act of the sentient appetite. This is why a natural change in an organ is posited materially in the definition of movements of the appetitive part—as, for instance, when it is said that anger is the heating of the blood around the heart.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more in the act of sentient appetitive power than in the act of the sentient apprehensive power, even though both are acts of a corporeal organ.

Article 3

Are the passions in the sentient appetite more than in the intellectual appetite?

It seems that the passions are not in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says that Hierotheus “was taught by a more divine inspiration, not only learning divine things, but also undergoing them (*non solum discens sed etiam patiens divina*).” But the undergoing of divine things (*passio divinorum*) cannot belong to the sentient appetite, the object of which is the sensible good. Therefore, the passions exist in the intellectual appetite as well as in the sentient appetite.

Objection 2: The more powerful the agent (*activum*) is, the stronger the passion. But the intellectual appetite’s object, viz., the good in general (*bonum universale*), is a more powerful agent than the sentient appetite’s object, viz., a particular good. Therefore, the character of being a passion is found more in the intellectual appetite than in the sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Joy and love are said to be passions. But they are found in the intellectual appetite and not just in the sentient appetite; otherwise, they would not be attributed in the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore, it is not the case that the passions exist more in the sentient appetite than in the intellectual appetite.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene, in describing the animal passions, says, “A passion is a movement of the sentient appetitive power upon one’s imagining something good or bad.” And in another place: “A passion is a movement of the non-rational soul upon one’s receiving an indication of something good or bad.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), a passion properly speaking exists when there is a bodily change (*ubi est transmutatio corporalis*). Such a change is found in the acts of the sentient soul—and not only a *spiritual* change, as in the case of sentient apprehension, but a *natural* change as well. By contrast, in the case of an act of the intellectual appetite no bodily change is required, because this sort of appetite is not a power of any organ.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more properly in an act of the sentient appetite than in an act of the intellectual appetite, and this is likewise clear from the definitions cited from Damascene.

Reply to objection 1: Here what is called an “undergoing of divine things” is (a) an affection directed toward divine things and (b) a union with those things through a love that occurs without a bodily change.

Reply to objection 2: The magnitude of a passion depends not only on the agent’s power but also on the patient’s susceptibility (*sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis*), since things that are highly susceptible (*bene passibilia*) are acted upon strongly even by puny agents (*etiam a parvis activis*). Therefore, even if the intellectual appetite’s object is more active than the sentient appetite’s object, the sentient appetite is nonetheless more passive.

Reply to objection 3: When ‘love’, ‘joy’, and other names of this sort are attributed to God or the angels—or to men with respect to their intellectual appetite—they signify a simple act of willing along with a likeness of the effect, but without any passion. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, “The holy angels punish without anger and give help without compassionate sadness. And yet—because of a certain likeness in the works and not because of the weakness of having affections—the names of those passions are by a custom of human speech applied to the angels as well.”

QUESTION 23

The Differences among the Passions

Next we have to consider the differences the passions have from one another. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Are the passions that exist in the concupiscible power diverse from the ones that exist in the irascible power? (2) Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based on the contrariety between the good and the bad? (3) Is there any passion that does not have a contrary? (4) Are there any passions within the same power that differ in species and are not contrary to one another?

Article 1

Do the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers?

It seems that the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that the passions of the soul are “the ones that joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*) follow upon.” But joy and sadness exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, all the passions exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, the passions that exist in the irascible power are not different from the ones that exist in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: Jerome’s Gloss on Matthew 13:33 (“The kingdom of heaven is like leaven ..”) says, “In the power of reason we have prudence, in the irascible power we have hatred for the vices, and in the concupiscible power we have desire for the virtues.” But as *Topics* 2 says, hatred (*odium*) exists in the concupiscible power, as does love (*amor*), which it is its contrary. Therefore, the same passions exist in the concupiscible and irascible powers.

Objection 3: Passions, as well as actions, differ in species from one another according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the irascible power are the same as the objects of the passions of the concupiscible power. Therefore, the same passions belong to the irascible and concupiscible powers.

But contrary to this: The acts of diverse powers, e.g., seeing and hearing, are diverse in species. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers that divide the sentient appetite. Therefore, since, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), the passions are movements of the sentient appetite, it follows that the passions that exist in the irascible power differ in species from the passions that exist in the concupiscible power.

I respond: The passions that exist in the irascible power and the passions that exist in the concupiscible power differ from one another in species. For since, as was explained in the First Part (q. 77, a. 3), diverse powers have diverse objects, it is necessary for the passions of diverse powers to be directed toward diverse objects. Hence, *a fortiori*, the passions of the diverse powers differ in species, since a greater difference in the objects is required for a diversity of species among powers than for a diversity of species among the passions or actions of those powers. For just as, among natural things, a diversity of genus follows upon a diversity in the potentiality of the matter, whereas a diversity of *species* follows upon a diversity of form in the same matter, so too, among the acts of the soul, acts belonging to diverse powers are diverse not only in species but also in genus, whereas the acts or passions that are directed toward diverse specific objects that fall under the common object of a single power differ as species of the same genus.

Therefore, in order to discern which passions exist in the irascible power and which exist in the concupiscible power, one must take the object of each of these powers. Now in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2) it was explained that the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad taken absolutely (*bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum*), i.e., the pleasurable (*delectabile*) or the painful (*dolorosum*). However, because it is necessary for the soul to suffer sometimes from

difficulties and opposition in attaining a good of this sort or in avoiding something bad, and to the extent that attaining the good or avoiding the bad is in some sense elevated beyond the animal's easily exercised power (*quodammodo elevatum supra facilem potestatem animalis*), it follows that the object of the irascible power is the good or the bad insofar as it has the character of being arduous or difficult (*secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis*).

Therefore, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad absolutely speaking—e.g., joy (*gaudium*), sadness (*tristitia*), love (*amor*), hatred (*odium*)—then it belongs to the concupiscible power. By contrast, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad under the notion *arduous*, i.e., insofar as it is attainable or avoidable with some difficulty—e.g., daring (*audacia*), fear (*timor*), hope (*spes*), etc.—then it belongs to the irascible power.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible power was given to animals in order that the obstacles might be removed by which the concupiscible power is prevented from tending toward its object—either because of the difficulty involved in attaining a good or because of the difficulty involved in overcoming an evil. And this is why the irascible passions are all terminated in the concupiscible passions. Accordingly, joy and sadness, which exist in the concupiscible power, follow upon even those passions that exist in the irascible power.

Reply to objection 2: Jerome attributes the hatred of the vices to the irascible power not because of the character of hatred, which properly belongs to the concupiscible power, but rather because of the pugnacity (*propter impugnationem*) that belongs to the irascible power.

Reply to objection 3: It is the good insofar as it is pleasurable (*bonum inquantum est delectabile*) that moves the concupiscible power. But if a good is such that there is a difficulty involved in attaining it, then by that very fact the good in question has something that is contrary to the concupiscible power. And so it was necessary for there to be another power that would tend toward that good; and the same line of reasoning applies to bad things. The power in question is the irascible power. Hence, it is because of this that the passions of the concupiscible power differ in species from the passions of the irascible power.

Article 2

Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad?

It seems that the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power (*contrarietas passionum irascibilis*) is based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), the passions of the irascible power are ordered toward the passions of the concupiscible power. But the passions of the concupiscible power are not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad, in the way that love is contrary to hatred and joy to sadness. Therefore, the passions of the irascible appetite are likewise not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad.

Objection 2: The passions differ from one another according to their objects in the same way that movements differ from one another according to their termini. But as is clear from *Physics* 5, there is no contrariety among movements other than that based on the contrariety among their termini. But the object of an appetite is either the good or the bad. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions in any appetitive power except one based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

Objection 3: As Avicenna says in *De Naturalibus* 6, “Every passion of the soul involves approach and withdrawal (*omnis passio animae attenditur secundum accessum et recessum*).” But approach is caused by the character of the good, whereas withdrawal is caused by the character of the bad, since just

as the good “is what all things desire,” as *Ethics* 1 puts it, so too the bad is what all things seek to avoid. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions of the soul that is not based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

But contrary to this: As is clear from *Ethics* 3, fear and daring are contrary to one another. But fear and daring do not differ with respect to the good and the bad, since both of them are directed at things that are bad. Therefore, not every contrariety among the passions of the irascible power is based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

I respond: As *Physics* 3 says, a passion is a certain sort of movement. Hence, one has to interpret the contrariety among the passions in accord with the contrariety among movements or changes.

Now as *Physics* 5 says, there are two sorts of contrariety among changes or movements:

(a) The first has to do with *approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus (secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino)*. This sort of contrariety belongs properly to changes (*mutationes*), i.e., to (a) generation, which is a change toward *esse*, and (b) corruption, which is a change away from *esse*.

(b) The second has to do with *a contrariety among the termini*. This sort of contrariety properly belongs to movements (*motus*)—in the way that whitewashing (*dealbatio*), which is a movement from blackness to whiteness, is contrary to blackening (*denigratio*), which is a movement from whiteness to blackness.

So, then, two sorts of contrariety are found among the passions of the soul—(a) one involving a contrariety among their objects, viz., the good and the bad, and (b) the other involving approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus.

Now among the passions of the concupiscible power one finds only the first sort of contrariety, viz., contrariety among the objects, whereas among the passions of the irascible power one finds both sorts of contrariety. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad absolutely speaking. Now the good as good cannot be a *terminus from which (terminus ut a quo)*, but can only be a *terminus toward which (solum ut ad quem)*, since nothing withdraws from the good insofar as it is good, but instead all things desire it. Similarly, nothing desires the bad insofar as it is bad, but instead all things withdraw from it; because of this, the bad has only the character of a *terminus from which* and not the character of a *terminus toward which*.

So, then, every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the good—viz., *love (amor)*, *desire (desiderium)*, and *joy (gaudium)*—tends toward the good itself, whereas every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the bad—viz., *hatred (odium)*, *withdrawal (fuga)*, and *sadness (tristitia)*—tends away from the bad itself. Hence, among the passions of the concupiscible power there cannot be any contrariety based on approach toward and withdrawal from the same object.

By contrast, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the irascible power is not the sensible good or bad absolutely speaking, but rather the sensible good or bad as characterized by difficulty or arduousness (*sub ratione difficultatis vel arduis*). Now the arduous or difficult good has (a) the character of being tended toward insofar as it is good, and this pertains to the passion of *hope (spes)*, and (b) the character of being withdrawn from insofar as it is arduous or difficult, and this pertains to the passion of *despair (desperatio)*. Similarly, the arduous bad has (a) the character of being avoided insofar as it is bad, and this pertains to the passion of fear (*timor*), and it also has (b) the character of being tended toward as something arduous in order thereby to escape from being subjected to the bad, and it is *daring (audacia)* that tends toward it in this way. Thus, among the passions of the irascible power one finds (a) a contrariety according to the good and the bad, as in the case of the contrariety between hope and fear, and again (b) a contrariety according to approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus, as in the case of the contrariety between daring and fear.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 3

Does every passion of the soul have a contrary?

It seems that every passion of the soul has a contrary (*habeat aliquid contrarium*):

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 1), every passion of the soul exists either in the irascible power or in the concupiscible power. But both sorts of passions have contrariety in their own way. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

Objection 2: Every passion of the soul has either the good or the bad as its object, and these are in general the objects of the appetitive part of the soul. But a passion whose object is the bad is contrary to a passion whose object is the good. Therefore, every passion has a contrary.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 2), every passion of the soul involves either approach or withdrawal. But for every approach there is a contrary withdrawal (*cuiuslibet accessui contrariatur recessus*), and vice versa. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

But contrary to this: Anger is a passion of the soul. But as is clear from *Ethics* 4, no passion is posited as the contrary of anger. Therefore, not every passion of the soul has a contrary.

I respond: It is peculiar to the passion of anger that it cannot have a contrary based either on approach and withdrawal or on the good and the bad.

For anger is caused by a difficult evil that is already occurring and in the presence of which the appetite must either (a) succumb, in which case it does not go beyond the limits of sadness, which is a concupiscible passion, or else (b) experience a movement toward attacking the hurtful evil, and this pertains to anger. However, the appetite cannot experience a movement toward withdrawal, since the evil is already assumed to be present or past. And so there is no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between approach and withdrawal.

Again, there is likewise no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between the good and the bad. For what is contrary to an already occurring evil is an already acquired good, which no longer has the character of an arduous or difficult good. Nor does any other movement remain after the good is acquired—except for the appetite's resting in the acquired good, and this pertains to joy, which is a concupiscible passion.

Hence, the movement of anger cannot have any contrary movement of the soul. Rather, the only thing contrary to it is a cessation of movement. As the Philosopher says in the *Rhetoric*, "Calming down is opposed to getting angry, but it is opposed to it not as its contrary, but instead as its negation or privation."

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Is it possible for passions that differ in species and are not contrary to one another to exist in the same power?

It seems that it is impossible for passions that differ in species and are not opposed to one another to exist in the same power:

Objection 1: The passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the soul are the good and the bad, and it is according to the difference between them that the passions have contrariety. Therefore, no passions that belong to the same power and are not contrary to

one another differ from one another in species.

Objection 2: A difference in species is a difference in form. But as *Metaphysics* 10 says, “Every difference in form is a difference in accord with some sort of contrariety.” Therefore, passions that belong to the same power and are not contraries do not differ in species.

Objection 3: Since every passion of the soul involves approach toward or withdrawal from the good or the bad, it seems necessary for every difference among the passions of the soul to be based either (a) on the difference between the good and the bad or (b) on the difference between approach and withdrawal or (c) on a greater or lesser approach or withdrawal. But as has been explained (a. 2), the first two sorts of differences make for a contrariety among the passions of the soul. On the other hand, the third sort of difference does not make for diverse species, since if it did, then there would be infinitely many species of passions of the soul. Therefore, it is impossible for passions belonging to the same power of the soul to differ in species and yet not be contraries.

But contrary to this: Love and joy differ in species and exist in the concupiscible power. And yet they are not contrary to one another in a way that prevents the one from being a cause of the other. Therefore, there are passions of the soul belonging to the same power that differ in species and yet are not contraries.

I respond: The passions differ in accord with the agents (*activa*) that are the objects of the passions of the soul. And there are two possible ways to think of the differences among the agents: (a) with respect to the species or natures of the agents themselves, and (b) with respect to their diverse active powers.

The diversity of agents or movers with respect to the power of effecting movement can be applied to the passions in accord with a likeness to natural agents. For everything that effects movement either draws the patient toward itself in some way or repels it away from itself. When it draws it toward itself, it effects three things in it. First, the agent gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend toward it, as when a lightweight body located in a high place (*quod est sursum*) gives to a generated body a lightweightness through which it has an inclination toward or aptitude for being in a high place. Second, if the generated body is located outside its proper place, the agent gives it movement toward that place (*dat ei moveri ad locum*). Third, the agent gives it rest when it arrives at that place, since something comes to rest in a place in virtue of the same cause by which it is moved to that place. And one should think along similar lines of a repelling cause (*de causa repulsionis*).

Now in the movements of the appetitive part of the soul, the good has, as it were, the power to attract, whereas the bad has the power to repel.

Thus, first of all, the good causes in the appetitive power a certain inclination toward, or aptitude for, or connaturality with the good (*causat quandam inclinationem seu aptitudinem seu connaturalitatem ad bonum*). This pertains to the passion of love (*amor*); and corresponding to it, as its contrary on the side of the bad, is hatred (*odium*).

Second, if the good has not yet been attained, it gives the appetitive power a movement toward acquiring the good that is loved, and this pertains to the passion of desire (*desiderium*) or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And contrary to this, on the part of the bad, is withdrawal (*fuga*) or aversion (*abominatio*).

Third, when the good has been attained, it gives the appetite a certain sort of rest (*quaedam quietatio*) in the good that has been attained, and this pertains to pleasure (*delectatio*) or joy (*gaudium*). And the opposite of this on the part of the bad is pain (*dolor*) or sadness (*tristitia*).

Now in the case of the passions of the irascible power, what is presupposed is an aptitude for or inclination toward pursuing the good and withdrawing from the bad on the part of the concupiscible power, which has to do with the good and the bad absolutely speaking.

With respect to a good that has not yet been attained, there is hope (*spes*) and despair (*desperatio*). With respect to something bad that has not yet occurred, there is fear (*timor*) and daring (*audacia*). With

respect to a good that has already been attained, there is no passion in the irascible power, since, as was explained above (a. 3), such a good no longer has the character of something arduous. However, the passion of anger (*ira*) follows upon something bad that has already occurred.

So, then, it is clear that in the concupiscible power there are three groups of passions, viz., (a) love and hatred, (b) desire and withdrawal, and (c) joy and sadness. Similarly, in the irascible power there are three groups, viz., (a) hope and despair, (b) fear and daring, and (c) anger, which has no passion opposed to it. Therefore, the passions that differ in species number eleven in all—six in the concupiscible power and five in the irascible power. All the passions of the soul are contained under these.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the responses to the objections.

QUESTION 24

Goodness and Badness in the Passions of the Soul

Next we have to consider goodness and badness in the passions of the soul. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Can moral goodness and moral badness be found in the passions of the soul? (2) Is every passion of the soul morally bad? (3) Does every passion add to or diminish an act's goodness or badness? (4) Is any passion good or bad by its species?

Article 1

Is any passion morally good or morally bad?

It seems that no passion is either morally good or morally bad:

Objection 1: Moral goodness and badness are proper to man, since, as Ambrose says in *Super Lucam*, "Morals are properly called 'human'." But the passions are not proper to men; instead, they are shared in common with other animals as well. Therefore, no passion of the soul is either morally good or morally bad.

Objection 2: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "Man's goodness or badness has to do with being in accord with reason or being against reason (*secundum rationem vel praeter rationem*). But as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), the passions of the soul exist in the sentient appetite and not in reason. Therefore, they are not relevant to a man's goodness or badness, i.e., to the moral good.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, "We are neither praised nor blamed for passions." But it is because of what is morally good and morally bad that we are praised or blamed. Therefore, the passions are not morally good or morally bad.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine, speaking about the passions, says, "They are bad if the love is bad, and they are good if the love is good."

I respond: The passions of the soul can be thought of in two ways: (a) in their own right (*secundum se*) and (b) insofar as they are subject to the rule of reason and will (*secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis*).

Thus, if they are thought of in their own right, viz., insofar as they are certain movements of a non-rational appetite, then in this sense they do not have moral goodness or badness—which, as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5), depends on reason.

However, if they are thought of insofar as they are subject to the rule of reason and will, then in this sense they do have moral goodness and badness. For the sentient appetite is closer to reason and will themselves than are the exterior members of the body, and yet the movements and acts of the exterior members are morally good or bad insofar as they are voluntary. Hence, *a fortiori*, the passions themselves, insofar as they are voluntary, can be called morally good or morally bad. And they are called voluntary either because they are commanded by the will or because they are not prohibited by the will.

Reply to objection 1: The passions, considered in their own right, are common to men and other animals. However, insofar as they are governed by reason, they are proper to men.

Reply to objection 2: As *Ethics* 1 says, even the lower appetitive powers are called rational to the extent that they "participate in some way in reason."

Reply to objection 3: The Philosopher is claiming that we are not praised or blamed for the passions considered absolutely. But he does not deny that the passions can be made praiseworthy or blameworthy to the extent that they are regulated by reason (*secundum quod a ratione ordinantur*). Thus he adds, "For it is not the one who becomes fearful or angry who is praised or blamed; rather, it is the one who becomes fearful or angry in a certain way"—viz., in a way that is in accord with reason or beyond the limits of reason (*secundum rationem vel praeter rationem*).

Article 2

Is every passion of the soul morally bad?

It seems that every passion of the soul is morally bad:

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, “Some call the passions of the soul sicknesses or disturbances of the soul (*morbos vel perturbationes animae*).” But every sickness or disturbance of the soul is something morally bad. Therefore, every passion of the soul is morally bad.

Objection 2: Damascene says, “An operation is a movement in accord with nature (*secundum naturam*), whereas a passion is a movement beyond the limits of nature (*praeter naturam*).” But that which is against nature in the movements of the soul has the character of a sin and a moral evil. This is why he says elsewhere that the devil “turned away from what is in accord with nature and turned toward what is against nature.” Therefore, passions of this sort are morally bad.

Objection 3: Everything that leads one toward sin has the character of badness. But passions of the sort in question lead one toward sin; hence, in Romans 7:5 the passions are called “the passions of the sins.” Therefore, it seems that the passions are morally bad.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Upright love has all the upright affections. For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere, they sorrow in their sins, they rejoice in their good works.”

I respond: On this question there was a disagreement (*diversa fuit sententia*) between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. For the Stoics claimed that all the passions are bad, whereas the Peripatetics claimed that moderated passions are good (*dixerunt passionibus moderatas esse bonas*). Even though this difference does, to be sure, sound like a big one, there is in reality either no difference at all or a small one, once one takes into consideration what the two sides mean.

For the Stoics did not distinguish between the sensory power and the intellect and, as a result, they did not distinguish between the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite. Hence, they did not distinguish the passions of the soul from the movements of the will in keeping with the fact that the passions of the soul exist in the sentient appetite, whereas the simple movements of the will exist in the intellective appetite. Instead, they called every reasonable movement (*omnem rationabilem motum*) of the appetitive part ‘an act of will’, whereas they called any movement that went beyond the limits of reason ‘a passion’. And so, following their opinion, in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3 Tully calls all the passions “sicknesses of the soul.” From there he argues, “Those who are sick are not healthy, and those who are not healthy are foolish.” And this is why we call the foolish ‘unhealthy’.

By contrast, the Peripatetics call all the movements of the sentient appetite ‘passions’. Hence, they deem them good when they are moderated by reason and bad when they fall outside of reason’s moderation. From this it is clear that, in the same book, Tully, in arguing against the position of the Peripatetics, who approved of moderating the passions (*qui approbant mediocritatem passionum*), was wrong to say, “Every evil, even a moderate one (*mediocre*), should be avoided; for just as in the case of the body, one is not healthy even if he is only moderately sick, so too this sort of moderation in the sicknesses or passions of the soul is not healthy.” For the passions are not called ‘sicknesses’ or ‘disturbances’ except when they lack reason’s moderating influence (*nisi cum carent moderatione rationis*).

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 2: In every passion of the soul something is either added to or subtracted from the heart’s natural movement in the sense that the heart is moved either more intensely or less intensely by contraction and dilation (*intensius vel remissius movetur secundum systolen aut diastolen*); and accordingly the movement has the character of a passion. However, a passion need not always depart

from the order of natural reason.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as the passions of the soul lie outside the order of reason, they incline one toward sin; however, they pertain to virtue insofar as they are ordered by reason.

Article 3

Does a passion always diminish a moral act's goodness?

It seems that a passion always diminishes a moral act's goodness:

Objection 1: Everything that impedes reason's judgment, which the moral act's goodness depends on, thereby diminishes the moral act's goodness. But every passion impedes reason's judgment; for in *Bellum Catilinarium* Sallust says, "All men who take counsel about doubtful matters should be free of hatred, anger, friendship, and pity (*ab odio, ira, amicitia atque misericordia vacuos esse decet*)."

Therefore, every passion diminishes a moral act's goodness.

Objection 2: A man's act is better to the extent that it is more similar to God; hence, in Ephesians 5:1 the Apostle says, "Be imitators of God, as most dear children." But God and the holy angels "punish without anger and give help without compassionate sadness," as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 9. Therefore, it is better to do good works of this sort in the absence of a passion of the soul than in the presence of a passion.

Objection 3: Just as moral badness involves a relation to reason, so too does moral goodness. But moral badness is diminished by passion, since one who sins out of passion (*ex passione*) sins to a lesser degree than one who sins purposefully (*ex industria*). Therefore, one who does something good in the absence of a passion does a greater good than one who does it in the presence of a passion.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says that the passion of pity (*misericordia*) "is subject to reason when pity is shown in such a way that justice is preserved, as when help is given to someone who is poor, or when a penitent is forgiven." But nothing that is subject to reason diminishes moral goodness. Therefore, a passion of the soul does not diminish the goodness of a moral act (*non diminuit bonum moris*).

I respond: Just as the Stoics claimed that every passion of the soul is bad, so too they claimed as a result that every passion of the soul diminishes an act's goodness, since every good is either totally destroyed or made less good by being mixed with evil.

To be sure, this is true if by 'passions of the soul' we mean only disordered movements of the sentient appetite that are disturbances or sicknesses (*aegritudines*). However, if by 'passions' we simply mean all the movements of the sentient appetite, then it is part of the perfection of the human good that these passions should themselves be moderated by reason. For since a man's good lies in reason as its root, this sort of good will be more perfect to the extent that it is able to flow into more of the things that belong to a man. Hence, no one doubts that it is part of the perfection of the moral good that the acts of the exterior members should be directed by the rule of reason. Hence, since, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 7), the sentient appetite is able to obey reason, it is part of the perfection of the moral or human good that the passions of the soul should likewise be regulated by reason.

Therefore, just as it is better that a man should both will the good and do it by an exterior act, so too it is part of the perfection of the moral good that a man should be moved not only by his will but also by his sentient appetite—this according to Psalm 85:3 ("My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God"), where by 'heart' we understand the intellective appetite and by 'flesh' we understand the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible ways for the passions of the soul to be related to the judgment of reason.

One way is *antecedently*. In this way, since they cloud reason's judgment, which the moral act's goodness depends on, they diminish the act's goodness. For instance, it is more praiseworthy for someone do an act of charity because of reason's judgment than to do it solely out of the passion of pity (*misericordia*).

The second way is *consequently*. And this happens in two ways:

(a) *by way of redundancy*—specifically, because when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved toward something, the lower part likewise conforms to its movement. And in such a case the passion that consequently exists in the sentient appetite is a *sign* of the intensity of the will's act.

(b) *by way of choice*—specifically, when a man chooses by reason's judgment to be affected by some passion, in order that he might act more promptly because of the sentient appetite's cooperation. And in this way a passion of the soul *adds to* the action's goodness.

Reply to objection 2: There is no sentient appetite in God or the angels; neither do they have corporeal members. And so in them goodness does not involve the ordering of the passions or of corporeal acts, as it does in our case.

Reply to objection 3: A passion that tends toward evil and is antecedent to reason's judgment diminishes the sin, but a passion that is consequent in one of the ways explained above either *adds to* the sin or is a *sign* of the sin's being added to (*auget peccatum vel significat augmentum eius*).

Article 4

Is any passion of the soul morally good or bad by its species?

It seems that no passion of the soul is morally good or bad by its species:

Objection 1: Moral goodness and badness involve reason. But the passions exist in the sentient appetite, and so whatever has to do with reason is accidental to them. Therefore, since nothing that is *per accidens* is relevant to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or bad by its species.

Objection 2: Acts and passions have their species from their object. Therefore, if some passion were good or bad by its species, it would have to be the case that passions whose object is the good—e.g., love, desire, and joy—are good by their species, and passions whose object is the bad—e.g., hatred, fear, and sadness—are bad by their species. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that any passion is good or bad by its species.

Objection 3: There is no species of passion that is not found in other animals. But moral goodness is found only in man. Therefore, no passion of the soul is good or bad by its species.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, "Pity (*misericordia*) belongs to virtue." Again, in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that shame (*verecundia*) is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore, some passions are good or bad by their species.

I respond: It seems that one should repeat in the case of the passions what has been explained for the case of acts (q. 18, aa. 5-6), viz., that the species of an act or a passion can be thought of in two ways:

(a) insofar as it belongs to a *natural* genus (*in genere naturae*), and in this sense moral goodness and badness are irrelevant to the species of an act or a passion; and

(b) insofar as it belongs to a *moral* genus (*ad genus moris*), given that it participates in the voluntary and in the judgment of reason. And in this sense moral goodness and badness can belong to a species of passion to the extent that it takes as its object something that is of itself consonant with reason or at variance with reason (*de se conveniens rationi vel dissonum a ratione*)—as is clear in the case of shame (*verecundia*), which is a fear of what is base (*timor turpis*), and in the case of envy (*invidia*), which is sadness at the good of another (*tristitia de bono alterius*). For it is in this way that they are

relevant to the species of the exterior act.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the case of the passions insofar as they belong to a natural species, viz., insofar as the sentient appetite is thought of in its own right. But insofar as the sentient appetite obeys reason, the goodness or badness of reason exists in the passions *per se* and not *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 2: The passions that tend toward a good are good if it is a genuine good, and so are the passions that withdraw from a genuine evil. Conversely, passions that withdraw from a good and approach an evil are bad.

Reply to objection 3: In brute animals the sentient appetite does not obey reason. And yet insofar as brute animals are led by a certain natural estimative power that is subject to a higher reason, viz., God's reason, there is in them a certain likeness of moral goodness with respect to the passions of the soul.

QUESTION 25

The Ordering of the Passions with respect to One Another

Next we have to consider the ordering of the passions with respect to one another. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) How are the passions of the irascible power ordered with respect to the passions of the concupiscible power? (2) How are the passions of the concupiscible power ordered with respect to one another? (3) How are the passions of the irascible power ordered with respect to one another? (4) What are the four principal passions?

Article 1

Are the passions of the irascible power prior to the passions of the concupiscible power?

It seems that the passions of the irascible power are prior to the passions of the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: The order of the passions follows the order of their objects. But the object of the irascible power is the arduous good, which seems to be higher than all the other goods (*supremum inter alia bona*). Therefore, the passions of the irascible power seem to be prior to (*praeesse*) the passions of the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: What effects movement is prior to what is moved. But the irascible power is related to the concupiscible power in the way that what effects movement is related to what is moved; for as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the irascible power is given to animals in order to remove obstacles by which the concupiscible power is prevented from enjoying its object, and, as *Physics* 8 says, “that which removes an obstacle has the character of something that effects movement.” Therefore, the passions of the irascible power are prior to the passions of the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: Joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*) are passions of the concupiscible power. But joy and sadness follow upon the passions of the irascible power; for in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, “Punishing someone (*punitio*) puts to rest the force of anger, producing pleasure (*delectatio*) in the place of sadness.” Therefore, the passions of the concupiscible power are posterior to the passions of the irascible power.

But contrary to this: The passions of the concupiscible power are directed toward the good in an unrestricted sense (*respiciunt bonum absolutum*), whereas the passions of the irascible power are directed toward the good in a restricted sense (*respiciunt bonum contractum*), viz., the arduous good. Therefore, since the good in an unrestricted sense is prior to the good in a restricted sense, it seems that the passions of the concupiscible power are prior to the passions of the irascible power.

I respond: The passions of the concupiscible power are related to more things than are the passions of the irascible power. For among the passions of the concupiscible power there is (a) something, viz., desire, that has to do with movement and (b) something, viz., joy and sadness, that has to do with rest. But among the passions of the irascible power there is only something that has to do with movement and nothing that has to do with rest. The reason for this is that a good in which something is at rest no longer has the character of being difficult or arduous—which is the object of the irascible power.

Now since being at rest is the end of a movement (*quies est finis motus*), it is prior in intention and posterior in execution. Therefore, if the passions of the irascible power are compared to those passions of the concupiscible power that signify *resting in the good*, then the passions of the irascible power are clearly prior in the order of execution to passions of this sort that belong to the concupiscible power, in the way that hope (*spes*) is prior to joy (*gaudium*) and is thus a cause of joy—this according to the Apostle in Romans 12:12 (“Rejoicing in hope” (*spe gaudentes*)). On the other hand, a passion of the concupiscible power that signifies *resting in the bad*, e.g., sadness (*tristitia*), stands midway between two

passions of the irascible power. For sadness follows upon fear (*timor*), since it is caused when the evil that was feared has occurred; and it precedes the movement of anger, since when someone is aroused to retribution by a preceding sadness (*ex tristitia praecedente aliquis insurgit in vindictam*), this pertains to the movement of anger. And because paying back evils is apprehended as a good, an angry individual rejoices when he has accomplished this. And so it is clear that every passion of the irascible power is terminated in a passion of the concupiscible power that pertains to rest, viz., either joy or sadness.

However, if the passions of the irascible power are compared to the passions of the concupiscible power that imply movement, then the passions of the concupiscible part are clearly prior, because the passions of the irascible power add something to the passions of the concupiscible power, in the same way that the object of the irascible power adds arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible power. For instance, hope (*spes*) adds to desire (*desiderium*) a certain effort and elevation of the mind in order to attain an arduous good. Similarly, fear (*timor*) adds to withdrawal (*fuga*) or aversion (*abominatio*) a certain sinking of the mind because of the difficulty involved in the relevant evil (*addat quandam depressionem animi propter difficultatem mali*).

So, then, the passions of the irascible part stand between those passions of the concupiscible power that signify a movement with respect to the good or the bad (*important motum in bonum vel in malum*) and those passions of the concupiscible power that signify resting in the good or the bad. And in this way it is clear that the passions of the irascible power both (a) take their beginning from the passions of the concupiscible power and (b) are terminated in the passions of the concupiscible power.

Reply to objection 1: This argument would go through if something opposed to arduousness were part of the object of the concupiscible power in the way that being arduous belongs to the nature of the object of the irascible power. But since the object of the concupiscible power is the good absolutely speaking, it is naturally prior to the object of the irascible power in the way that what is general is prior to what is more specific (*sicut commune proprio*).

Reply to objection 2: Something that removes an obstacle is a mover *per accidens* and not *per se*. But here we are talking about the *per se* ordering of the passions.

Moreover, the irascible power removes what prevents the concupiscible power from resting in its own object. Hence, from this all that follows is that the passions of the irascible power precede those passions of the concupiscible power that have to do with rest.

Reply to objection 3: The third objection has to do with these same passions of the concupiscible power.

Article 2

Is love the first among the passions of the concupiscible power?

It seems that love (*amor*) is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: The concupiscible power is named from sentient desire (*concupiscentia*), which is the same passion as desire (*desiderium*). But as *De Anima* 2 says, a thing is named from what is most important. Therefore, sentient desire is more important than love.

Objection 2: Love implies a certain union, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, it is “a unitive and consolidating force” (*vis unitiva et concretiva*). But sentient desire or desire (*concupiscentia vel desiderium*) is a movement toward union with a thing that is longed for or desired (*ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae*). Therefore, sentient desire is prior to love.

Objection 3: A cause is prior to its effect. But pleasure (*delectatio*) is sometimes a cause of love; for as *Ethics* 8 says, some individuals love for the sake of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is prior to love. Therefore, love is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that all the passions are caused by love, since “love (*amor*) that longs to have what is loved is avid desire (*cupiditas*), and love that has what is loved and enjoys it is unrestrained delight (*laetitia*).” Therefore, love is the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

I respond: The objects of the concupiscible power are the good and the bad. But the good is prior to the bad, since the bad is a privation of the good. Hence, all the passions whose object is the good are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad. More specifically, each such passion is prior to its opposite; for the reason why the opposed evil is being rejected is that the good is being sought.

Now the good has the character of an end, which is prior in *its being intended* but posterior in *its being attained* (*est prior in intentione sed est posterior in consecutione*). Therefore, the ordering of the passions of the concupiscible power can be thought of either (a) in accord with good’s being intended or (b) in accord with the good’s being attained.

As regards its being attained, what is prior is what first comes to exist in that which tends toward the end. But it is clear that everything that tends toward an end has, first of all, a readiness for or proportion to the end (*primo habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem*); for nothing tends toward an end that is disproportionate to it. Second, it is moved toward the end. Third, it comes to rest in the end after the end has been attained.

Now the appetite’s very readiness for or proportion to the good is *love (amor)*, which is nothing other than being pleased with the good (*quid nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni*). On the other hand, the movement toward the good is *desire* or *sentient desire (desiderium vel concupiscentia)*, whereas rest in the good is *joy* or *pleasure (gaudium vel delectatio)*. And so in accord with this ordering, love precedes desire and desire precedes pleasure.

By contrast, in the order of the good’s being intended, the reverse holds. For intended pleasure causes desire and love, since pleasure is the enjoyment of the good (*fruitio boni*), and, as was explained above (q. 11, a. 3), it is in some sense the end, just as the good itself is.

Reply to objection 1: A thing is named in accord with what is known to us, since, according to the Philosopher, spoken words are signs of acts of understanding (*voces sunt signa intellectuum*). And in most cases we know a cause through its effect. Now when a thing that is loved is itself possessed, the effect of love is pleasure, whereas when it is not possessed, the effect of love is desire or sentient desire. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, “Love is felt more strongly when a lack [of the good] produces it.” Hence, among all the passions of the concupiscible power, the one that is most felt is sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And it because of this that the concupiscible power (*concupiscibilis*) is named from it.

Reply to objection 2: There are two types of union between the lover and the loved.

One type is a *real union*, viz., the conjoining of the lover to the thing itself. And this type of union involves joy or pleasure, which follows upon desire.

The second is an *affective union*, which has to do with the readiness or proportion—namely, in the sense that something already participates in some way in another by the fact that it has a readiness for and inclination toward that other. And it is in this sense that love implies a union. And this is the union that precedes the movement of desire.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure is a cause of love in the sense that it is prior to love in intention.

Article 3

Is hope the first among the passions of the irascible power?

It seems that hope (*spes*) is not the first among the passions of the irascible power.:

Objection 1: The irascible power (*irascibilis*) is named from anger (*ira*). Therefore, since a thing

is named from what is most important, it seems that anger is more important than and prior to hope.

Objection 2: The object of the irascible power is what is arduous. But it seems to be more arduous for someone to try to overcome a contrary evil that either (a) threatens him as something future, and this pertains to daring (*audacia*), or that (b) is already upon him as something present, and this pertains to anger (*ira*), than to try to simply acquire some good. Similarly, it seems to be more arduous for someone to try to conquer a present evil than a future evil. Therefore, anger seems to be a more important passion than daring, and daring seems to be a more important passion than hope. And so hope does not seem to be prior.

Objection 3: In a movement toward an end, withdrawing from a terminus is prior to approaching a terminus. But fear (*timor*) and despair (*desperatio*) imply a withdrawal from something, whereas daring (*audacia*) and hope (*spes*) imply an approach toward something. Therefore, fear and despair precede hope and daring.

But contrary to this: Something is prior to the extent that it is closer to what is first. But hope is closer to love, which is the first among the passions. Therefore, hope is first among all the passions of the irascible appetite.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), all the passions of the irascible power imply a movement with respect to something. Now there are two ways in which a movement with respect to something in the irascible power can be caused:

- (a) solely by the readiness for or proportion to the end, and this pertains to either love or hatred;
- (b) by the presence of the good or the bad itself, and this pertains to either sadness or joy. To be sure, as has been explained (q. 23, a. 4), no passion in the irascible power is caused by the presence of the good, but the passion of anger is caused by the presence of the bad.

Therefore, since, along the path of generation or attainment (*in via generationis seu consecutionis*), the proportion to or readiness for the end precedes the attainment of the end, it follows that among all the passions of the irascible power *anger (ira)* is the last in the order of generation. Among the other passions of the irascible power that imply a movement that follows upon love or hatred for the good or the bad, the passions whose object is the good, viz., *hope (spes)* and *despair (desperatio)*, are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad, viz., *daring (audacia)* and *fear (timor)*. However, this is so in such a way that *hope* is prior to *despair*, since hope is a movement toward the good as a good that is attractive by its nature, and so hope is a *per se* movement toward the good, whereas despair is a withdrawal from the good—a withdrawal that (a) belongs to the good not insofar as it is good, but insofar as it is something else, and hence a withdrawal that (b) is, as it were, *per accidens*. And by the same line of reasoning, since fear is a withdrawal from evil, it is prior to daring.

Now the claim that hope and despair are naturally prior to fear and daring is clear from the fact that just as a desire for the good (*appetitus boni*) is the reason why the bad is avoided, so too hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring. For daring follows upon the hope for victory and fear follows upon despairing of victory. On the other hand, anger follows upon daring, since, according to what Avicenna says in *De Naturalibus* 6, no one who desires vindication becomes angry unless he dares to vindicate himself.

So, then, it is clear that hope is the first among all the passions of the irascible power. And if we want to know the ordering of all the passions along the way of generation, the first to occur are *love* and *hatred*; second, *desire* and *withdrawal*; third, *hope* and *despair*; fourth, *fear* and *daring*; fifth, *anger*; and sixth, and last, *joy* and *sadness*, which, as *Ethics* 2 says, follow upon all the passions. Yet, as can be inferred from what has been said, this is so in such a way that love is prior to hatred, desire is prior to withdrawal, hope is prior to despair, fear is prior to daring, and joy is prior to sadness.

Reply to objection 1: Since anger is caused by other passions in the way that an effect is caused by causes that precede it, it follows that the irascible power is named from anger as something more manifest.

Reply to objection 2: It is not the arduousness that is a reason for approaching or desiring something, but rather its goodness. And so hope, which is aimed more directly at the good, is prior, even though daring, or even anger, is sometimes directed at something that is more arduous.

Reply to objection 3: The appetite is moved *per se* and primarily toward the good as its proper object, and its withdrawing from the bad is caused by this. For a movement of the appetitive part of the soul is likened not to a natural movement but to the tendency of a nature (*proportionatur non motui naturali sed intentioni naturae*), which tends toward the end prior to tending toward the removal of a contrary, something that is sought after only for the sake of attaining the end.

Article 4

Are the four principal passions joy and sadness, hope and fear?

It seems not to be the case that the four principal passions are joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*), hope (*spes*) and fear (*timor*) :

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine does not mention hope, but puts avid desire (*cupiditas*) in its place.

Objection 2: There are two orderings among the passions of the soul, viz., the order of intention and the order of attainment or generation. Therefore, either (a) the principal passions are taken from the order of intention, in which case only *joy* and *sadness*, which are ending passions (*passiones finales*) will be principal passions, or (b) the principal passions are taken from the order of attainment or generation, in which case *love* will be the principal passion. Therefore, there is no way in which one should claim that the four principal passions are these four: joy and sadness, hope and fear.

Objection 3: Just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Therefore, either (a) hope and despair should be posited as the principal passions in the sense of being causes, or (b) hope and daring should be posited as the principal passions in the sense of being close to one another.

But contrary to this: In *De Consolatione* Boethius, in enumerating the four principal passions, says, “Banish joys, banish fear. Away with hope, let pain (*dolor*) be not near.”

I respond: The four passions in question are commonly said to be the principal passions.

Two of them, viz., *joy* and *sadness*, are called principal passions because they are, absolutely speaking, culminating and final (*completivae et finales*) with respect to all the passions and so, as *Ethics* 2 says, they follow upon all the passions.

On the other hand, *fear* and *hope* are principal passions not in the sense that they are culminating absolutely speaking, but rather in the sense that they are culminating in the genus *appetitive movement toward something*. For with respect to the good, the movement begins in *love* (*amor*), continues in *desire* (*desiderium*), and terminates in *hope* (*spes*), whereas with respect to the bad, the movement begins in *hatred* (*odium*), continues in *withdrawal* (*fuga*), and terminates in *fear* (*timor*).

And so the enumeration of these four passions is usually taken in accord with the differences *present* and *future*. For a movement has to do with the future, whereas rest is in something present. Therefore, (a) with respect to a present good there is *joy*; (b) with respect to a present evil there is *sadness*; (c) with respect to a future good there is *hope*; and (d) with respect to a future evil there is *fear*.

Now all the other passions that have to do with a good or an evil that is present or future are traced back to these four as their culmination. Hence, some writers call the four passions in question ‘principal passions’ because they are general. And, to be sure, this is true as long as ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ designate any appetitive movement that tends in general toward something that is to be desired or avoided.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine posits desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*) in the place of hope because they seem to pertain to the same thing, viz., a future good.

Reply to objection 2: The passions in question are called the principal passions in accord with the order of intention and completion. And even though fear and hope are not the last passions absolutely speaking, they are nonetheless last in the genus *passions tending toward another as something future*.

The only possible counterexample is anger (*ira*). But anger cannot be posited as a principal passion, since it is a certain effect of daring, which, as will be explained in a moment, cannot be a principal passion.

Reply to objection 3: Despair implies a withdrawal from the good that is, as it were, *per accidens*, and daring implies an approach toward the bad that is likewise *per accidens*. And so these passions cannot be principal passions, since what is *per accidens* cannot be called 'principal'. And this is why anger, which follows upon daring, cannot be called a principal passion, either.

QUESTION 26

Love

Next we have to consider the passions of the soul individually, first the passions of the concupiscible power (questions 26-39) and, second, the passions of the irascible power (questions 40-48).

The first consideration will have three parts. For, first, we will consider love (*amor*) and hatred (*odium*) (questions 26-29); second, sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) and withdrawal (*fuga*) (question 30); and, third, pleasure (*delectatio*) and pain or sadness (*dolor vel tristitia*) (questions 31-39).

As regards love, there are three things to consider: first, love itself (question 26); second, the causes of love (question 27); and third, the effects of love (question 28).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Does love exist in the concupiscible power? (2) Is love a passion? (3) Is love (*amor*) the same as elective love (*dilectio*)? (4) Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*)?

Article 1

Does love exist in the concupiscible power?

It seems that love does not exist in the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: Wisdom 8:2 says, “Her,”—viz., Wisdom—“have I loved, and I have sought her out from my youth.” But since the concupiscible power is part of the sentient appetite, it cannot tend toward Wisdom, which is not comprehended by the sensory power. Therefore, love does not exist in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: Love seems to be identical with every passion; for in *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine says, “Love that longs to have what is loved is avid desire (*cupiditas*), while love that has and enjoys what is loved is delight (*laetitia*); love that flees from what is contrary to what is loved is fear (*timor*); and love that feels what is contrary to what is loved is sadness (*tristitia*).” But not every passion exists in the concupiscible power; instead, fear, which has just been enumerated here, exists in the irascible power. Therefore, one should not claim without qualification that love exists in the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius posits a certain sort of “natural” love. But natural love seems rather to pertain to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetative part of the soul. Therefore, love does not unqualifiedly exist in the concupiscible power.

But contrary to this: In *Topics* 2 the Philosopher says, “Love exists in the concupiscible power.”

I respond: Love is something that involves the appetite (*amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens*), since the good is the object of both of them. Hence, the distinction among the types of love follows the distinction among the types of appetite.

For instance, there is a certain type of appetite that follows another’s apprehension and not the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite; and an appetite of this sort is called a *natural appetite*. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, a. 1), natural things have an appetite for what is appropriate for them according to their nature, and yet they have this appetite not because of their own apprehension, but because of the apprehension of the One who establishes their nature.

There is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite, but it follows that apprehension *by necessity* and not by a free judgment (*ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero*). This is the type of appetite that exists in *brute animals*, and yet in men this type of appetite has some participation in freedom to the extent that it obeys reason.

On the other hand, there is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the one who has the appetite in accord with free choice (*secundum liberum arbitrium*). And this type of appetite is a *rational or intellectual appetite*, which is called the will.

Now in each of these types of appetite, what is called ‘love’ is the principle of the movement that tends toward the end that is loved. In a natural appetite, the principle of this sort of movement is the connaturality between the thing that has the appetite and the thing toward which it tends; and this is called *natural love*. For instance, the very connaturality of a heavy body with a place at the center is due to gravity, and it can be called ‘natural love’. Similarly, the bond (*coaptatio*) between the sentient appetite or the will and some good—i.e., its being pleased with the good (*ipsa complacentia boni*)—is called ‘sentient love’ or ‘intellective (or rational) love’.

Thus, in the same way that intellective love exists in the intellective appetite, sentient love exists in the sentient appetite. And this sentient love belongs to the concupiscible power, since ‘love’ is predicated with respect to the good absolutely speaking and not with respect to the arduous good, which is the object of the irascible power.

Reply to objection 1: This passage is talking about intellective or rational love.

Reply to objection 2: It not by its essence but because of what it causes (*non essentialiter sed causaliter*) that love is said to be fear, joy, desire, and sadness.

Reply to objection 3: Natural love exists not only in the powers of the vegetative soul but in all the powers of the soul, as well as in all the parts of the body and, in general, in all things. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “The beautiful and the good are lovable to everything,” since each entity has a connaturality with what is appropriate to it, given its nature.

Article 2

Is love a passion?

It seems that love is not a passion:

Objection 1: No virtue (*virtus*) is a passion. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, every type of love is “a certain sort of virtue.” Therefore, love is not a passion.

Objection 2: According to Augustine in *De Trinitate*, love is a certain sort of union or connection (*unio quaedam vel nexus*). But a union or connection is not a passion; instead, it is a relation. Therefore, love is not a passion.

Objection 3: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says that a passion is “a certain sort of movement.” But ‘love’ implies not a movement of the appetite, which is desire (*desiderium*), but a principle of such a movement. Therefore, love is not a passion.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Love is a passion.”

I respond: A passion is an agent’s effect within the patient. But a natural agent brings about two types of effect in the patient. For, first of all, it gives a form and, second, it gives the movement that follows upon that form. For instance, that which generates a body gives the body (a) heaviness (*gravitas*) and (b) the movement that follows upon heaviness. And it is the heaviness itself, which is a principle of the movement toward the place that is connatural to the body because of its heaviness, that can in a certain sense be called a *natural love*.

So, too, the desirable thing itself (*ipsum appetibile*) gives to the appetite, first of all, a certain bond with it (*dat quandam coaptationem ad ipsum*), which is the appetite’s being pleased with the desirable thing (*complacentia appetibilis*), and from this there follows a movement toward the desirable thing. For as *Ethics* 3 says, “The appetitive movement goes in a circle.” The desirable thing moves the appetite and fashions itself in some way in the appetite’s tendency (*faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione*), and the appetite tends toward attaining the desirable thing in reality, so that the movement ends where it began (*ut sit ibi finis motus ubi fuit principium*).

Thus, the first change effected in the appetite by the desirable thing is called *love*, which is nothing

other than the appetite's being pleased with the desirable thing; and from its being pleased there follows a movement toward the desirable thing, and this movement is *desire*; and, finally, there is rest, i.e., *joy*.

So, then, since love consists in a certain change in the appetite effected by the desirable thing, it is clear that (a) love is a passion, properly speaking, insofar as it exists in the concupiscible power, and that (b) love is a passion, in a general and extended sense, insofar as it exists in the will.

Reply to objection 1: Since 'virtue' signifies a principle of movement or of action, Dionysius is calling love 'a virtue' insofar as it is the principle of an appetitive movement.

Reply to objection 2: Union is relevant to love insofar as, through its being pleased (*per complacentiam*), the loving appetite is related to what it loves in the way it is related to itself or to something that belongs to it. And so it is clear that love is not the very relation of union; rather, the union follows upon the love. Hence, Dionysius says that love is "a unitive power," and in *Politics* 2 the Philosopher says that the union is the work of love (*unio est opus amoris*).

Reply to objection 3: Even though 'love' does not name the movement of an appetite that is tending toward a desirable thing, it nonetheless does name the movement of the appetite through which the appetite is changed by the desirable thing in order that the desirable thing might be pleasing to it.

Article 3

Is love (*amor*) the same as elective love (*dilectio*)?

It seems that love (*amor*) is the same as elective love (*dilectio*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that love and elective love are related in the same way that "*four and two times two are, and rectilinear figure and figure having straight lines are.*" But these signify the same thing. Therefore, 'love' (*amor*) and 'elective love' (*dilectio*) signify the same thing.

Objection 2: Appetitive movements differ from one another because of their objects. But the object of elective love is the same as the object of love. Therefore, they are the same.

Objection 3: If elective love and love differ in anything, they seem to differ in the fact that "'elective love' (*dilectio*) is used in the case of good things and 'love' (*amor*) is used in the case of bad things, according to some," as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 14. But they do not differ in this; for as Augustine points out in the same place, in Sacred Scripture both terms are used in the case of good things and in the case of bad things. Therefore, love and elective love do not differ from one another—and Augustine himself concludes in the same place that "It is not one thing to say 'love' (*amor*) and something else to say 'elective love' (*dilectio*)."

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It has seemed to some of the saints that the name 'love' (*amor*) is more divine than the name 'elective love' (*dilectio*).

I respond: There are four names that in one way or another point to the same thing (*ad idem quodammodo pertinentia*): 'love' (*amor*), 'elective love' (*dilectio*), 'charity' (*caritas*), and 'friendship' (*amicitia*). They differ from one another as follows:

Friendship (*amicitia*), according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, is a sort of habit, whereas love (*amor*) and elective love (*dilectio*) are signified in the manner of an act or a passion, and charity (*caritas*) can be taken in either of these two ways. However, the acts are signified differently by these last three names. For *love* is common to the three of them, since every act of elective love or act of charity is an act of love, but not vice versa.

More specifically, 'elective love' adds to 'love' a previous act of choosing, just as the name itself suggests (*dilectio/electio*). Hence, elective love exists only in the will and not in the concupiscible power, and it exists only in a rational nature.

On the other hand, ‘charity’ (*caritas*) adds to love a certain perfection of love (*addit supra amorem perfectionem quandam amoris*), insofar as that which is loved is thought of as having great worth (*id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur*), as the name itself (*carus/caritas*) suggests.

Reply to objection 1: Dionysius is talking about love and elective love insofar as they exist in the intellectual appetite, since in that case love and elective love are the same thing.

Reply to objection 2: The object of love (*amor*) is more general than the object of elective love (*dilectio*), since, as has been explained, love extends to more things than elective love does.

Reply to objection 3: Love and elective love are not differentiated by the differences *good* and *bad*, but are instead differentiated in the way that has been explained.

And yet in the intellectual part of the soul, love and elective love are the same thing. And it is in this sense that Augustine is talking about love (*de amore*) in the passage in question. That is why he adds a little later, “An upright act of will is a good act of love, and a perverse act of will is a bad act of love.”

Yet those who assigned the differences *good* and *bad* had a plausible reason for doing so (*habuerunt occasionem*), because the love that is a passion of the concupiscible power inclines many individuals toward what is bad.

Reply to the argument for the contrary: Some have claimed that even in the case of the will itself, the name ‘love’ (*amor*) is more divine than the name ‘elective love’ (*dilectio*). The reason is that ‘love’ implies a certain passivity (*passio*), mainly because love exists in the sentient appetite, whereas elective love (*dilectio*) presupposes the judgment of reason. But a man is better able to tend toward God through love (*per amorem*), having been attracted passively in a certain way by God Himself, than he is able to be led to this by his own reason—which, as has been explained, is what is involved in the nature of elective love. And in this sense love (*amor*) is more divine than elective love (*dilectio*).

Article 4

Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?

It seems that love is not appropriately divided into love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*):

Objection 1: Love (*amor*) is a passion, whereas friendship (*amicitiae*) is a habit, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8. But a habit cannot be a partition dividing a passion (*pars divisa passionis*). Therefore, love is not appropriately divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.

Objection 2: Nothing is divided by what is enumerated on the same level with it; for instance, *man* is not enumerated on the same level with *animal*. But *concupiscence* is enumerated on the same level with *love* as another passion that is distinct from love. Therefore, *love* is not divided by *concupiscence*.

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, there are three types of friendship: (a) friendship of utility, (b) friendship of pleasure, and (c) noble friendship (*amicitia utilis, delectabilis et honesta*). But friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure both involve concupiscence. Therefore, *concupiscence* should not be used to divide *friendship*.

But contrary to this: Some things we are said to love because we desire them; for instance, as *Topics* 2 points out, “someone is said to love wine because of the sweetness he desires in it.” But as *Ethics* 8 says, we do not have friendship with wine or other things of that sort. Therefore, love of concupiscence is one thing and love of friendship is something else.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “To love is to will a good for someone.” Therefore, the movement of love tends toward two things: (a) the good which one wills for someone, either for himself or for another (*in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii*); and (b) the one he wills the good for (*illud cui vult bonum*). Thus, *love of concupiscence* is had with respect to that good which

someone wills for another, and *love of friendship* is had with respect to the one that someone wills a good for. Hence, this distinction is a distinction between what is prior and what is posterior. For what is loved by a love of friendship is loved absolutely speaking and *per se*, whereas what is loved by a love of concupiscence is not loved absolutely speaking and in its own right (*secundum se*), but is instead loved for the sake of another.

For just as a being absolutely speaking (*ens simpliciter*) is that which has *esse*, whereas a being in a certain respect (*ens secundum quid*) is something that exists in another, so too *good*, which is convertible with *being*, is such that what is good absolutely speaking is that which itself has goodness, whereas what is good in a certain respect (*bonum secundum quid*) is that which is the good of another. As a result, a love by which something is loved in order that there be some good for it is loved absolutely speaking, whereas a love by which something is loved in order that it be the good of another is loved in a certain respect.

Reply to objection 1: *Love* is divided not by *friendship* and *concupiscence*, but by *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence*. For the one who is properly called a friend is he for whom we will some good, whereas we are said to desire (*concupiscere*) what we will for ourselves.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: In friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure, someone wills some good for his friend, and to that extent the nature of friendship is preserved in these cases. However, since the good in question is directed further toward pleasure or usefulness for oneself, it follows that to the extent that friendship of utility or friendship of pleasure is drawn closer to the love of concupiscence, it falls short of the nature of genuine friendship.

QUESTION 27

The Causes of Love

Next we have to consider the causes of love. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the good the only cause of love? (2) Is cognition a cause of love? (3) Is likeness a cause of love? (4) Are any other passions of the soul causes of love?

Article 1

Is the good the only cause of love?

It seems that the good is not the only cause of love:

Objection 1: The good is a cause of love only because it is loved. But it happens that the bad is loved as well—this according to Psalm 10:6 (“He who loves iniquity hates his own soul”). Otherwise, every instance of love would be good. Therefore, the good is not the only cause of love.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “We love those who acknowledge their own bad deeds.” Therefore, it seems that the bad is a cause of love.

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that not only the good, but also “the beautiful is lovable to all things.”

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says, “Surely, nothing is loved except the good.” Therefore, only the good is a cause of love.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), love belongs to the appetitive power, which is a passive power (*vis passiva*). Hence, its object is related to it as a cause of its movement or act. Therefore, the object of love must be a cause, properly speaking, of the love. But the proper object of love is the good, since, as has been explained (q. 26, aa. 1-2), love implies the lover’s connaturality with, or his being pleased with, what is loved (*amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum*). But the good for each thing is what is connatural to it and proportioned to it. Hence, it follows that the good is a proper cause of love.

Reply to objection 1: The bad is never loved except under some notion of goodness—more specifically, insofar as it is good in some respect and is apprehended as good absolutely speaking (*inquantum est secundum quid bonum et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum*). So an instance of love is bad insofar as it tends toward something that is not a genuine good absolutely speaking. And a man “loves iniquity” in the sense that through iniquity he acquires some good, e.g., pleasure or money or something else of this sort.

Reply to objection 2: Those who “acknowledge their own bad deeds” are loved not because of the bad deeds, but because they acknowledge the bad deeds. For acknowledging one’s own bad deeds has the character of something good, insofar as it does away with dissimulation or pretense (*inquantum excludit fictionem seu simulationem*).

Reply to objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good and differs from it only in concept (*sola ratione*). For since the good is what all things desire, it is part of the notion of the good that the appetite comes to rest in it, whereas it is part of the notion of the beautiful that the appetite comes to rest in seeing it or knowing it. Hence, the senses that are principally directed toward the beautiful are those that are especially cognitive, viz., seeing and hearing at the service of reason. For we talk of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. By contrast, in the case of the sensible objects of the other senses, we do not use the name ‘beauty’. For instance, we do not call tastes and odors ‘beautiful’.

So it is clear that *beautiful* adds to *good* a certain ordering toward the cognitive power, so that the good is that which pleases the appetite absolutely speaking, whereas the beautiful is such that the apprehension of it is itself pleasing.

Article 2

Is cognition a cause of love?

It seems that cognition is not a cause of love:

Objection 1: The fact that something is sought after stems from love. But some things that are sought after are unknown, e.g., the sciences. For since, in the case of the sciences, “having them is the same as knowing them,” as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, it follows that if they were known, they would be had and would not be sought after. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

Objection 2: Something’s being loved without being known seems to be the same sort of thing as something’s being loved more than it is known. But some things are loved more than they are known—e.g., God, who in this life can be loved in Himself but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

Objection 3: If cognition were a cause of love, then love could not exist where there is no cognition. But love exists in all things, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, whereas cognition does not exist in all things. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “No one can love anything that is unknown.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the good is a cause of love in the manner of an object. But the good is not the object of an appetite except insofar as it is apprehended. And so love requires some sort of apprehension of the good that is loved. Because of this, the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9 that the corporeal act of seeing is a principle of sentient love. And, similarly, the spiritual contemplation of beauty or goodness is a principle of spiritual love.

So, then, cognition is a cause of love for the same reason that the good is, viz., that the good cannot be loved unless there is a cognition of it.

Reply to objection 1: Someone who seeks after scientific knowledge is not altogether ignorant of it, but has some cognition of it beforehand, either in general, or in some of its effects, or through hearing it praised, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10. So what is the same as having scientific knowledge is not having *some* cognition of scientific knowledge, but rather having a *perfect* cognition of scientific knowledge.

Reply to objection 2: Something is required for perfection in the case of cognition that is not required for perfection in the case of love. For cognition involves reason, the role of which is to separate things that are conjoined in reality and to bring together, by comparing one to another, things that are diverse. And so for perfection in the case of cognition it is required that a man know individually whatever exists in a thing, e.g., its parts, powers, and properties. By contrast, love exists in the appetitive power, which is directed toward a thing as it exists in itself. Hence, for perfection in the case of love it is sufficient that a thing be loved insofar as it is apprehended in itself. Thus, the reason why it is possible for a thing to be loved more than it is known is that it can be loved perfectly even if it is not known perfectly.

This is especially clear in the case of the sciences, which some individuals love because of the summary cognition they have of them; for instance, they know that rhetoric is a science through which a man can give persuasive arguments, and they love this feature in rhetoric. And something similar should be said about loving God.

Reply to objection 3: Even natural love, which exists in all things, is caused by some sort of cognition—not, to be sure, by a cognition that exists in the natural things themselves, but rather, as was explained above (q. 26, a.1), by a cognition that exists in the One who institutes their nature.

Article 3

Is likeness a cause of love?

It seems that likeness (*similitudo*) is not a cause of love:

Objection 1: The same thing is not a cause of opposites. But likeness is a cause of hatred; for Proverbs 13:10 says, “Among the proud there are always contentions,” and in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says, “Potters quarrel with each other.” Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

Objection 2: In *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says, “One loves in another what he does not want to be; for instance, a man loves an actor and yet does not want to be an actor.” But this would not be so if likeness were a proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another what he himself has or wants to have. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

Objection 3: Each man loves what he himself needs, even if he does not have it; for instance, a sick man loves health and a poor man loves riches. But insofar as he both lacks and needs these things, he is unlike them. Therefore, it is not only likeness but also unlikeness that is a cause of love.

Objection 4: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “We love those who give us money and health, and, similarly, everyone loves those who retain their friendship for the dead.” But not everyone is like that. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, “Every animal loves its like.”

I respond: Likeness is, properly speaking, a cause of love. But notice that there are two ways in which a likeness among things can be thought of: (a) insofar as both have the same feature in actuality, in the way that two individuals that have whiteness are said to be like one another; and (b) insofar as the one has in potentiality and by some sort of inclination what the other one has in actuality, as when we say that a heavy body located outside its proper place is like a heavy body that is located in its proper place—or even insofar as a potentiality bears a likeness to the corresponding actuality, since the actuality in some sense exists within the potentiality itself.

The first type of likeness is a cause of the love of friendship or benevolence (*causat amorem amicitiae seu benevolentiae*). For from the fact that two individuals are like one another and have, as it were, one form, they are in some sense united in that form (*sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa*), in the way that two men are united in the species *human nature* and in the way that two white individuals are united in whiteness. And so the affections of the one tend toward the other as toward something that is one with himself, and he wills the good for the other just as he wills it for himself.

By contrast, the second type of likeness is a cause of the love of concupiscence, or a cause of a friendship of utility or of pleasure (*causat amorem concupiscentiae vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis*). For each thing that exists in potentiality has as such a desire for its own actuality, and, if it is something with sentience and cognition, then it delights in attaining that actuality.

Now it was explained above (q. 26, a. 4) that in a love of concupiscence the lover properly loves himself, since he wills the good that he desires. But each individual loves himself more than he loves another, since he is united with himself in his substance, whereas he is united to the other in a likeness of the same form. And so if he himself is impeded from attaining the good that he loves by the fact that there is someone else who is like him by participation in a form, then that individual becomes hateful to him, not insofar as he is like him, but insofar as the other poses an obstacle to his own good. And the reason why “potters quarrel with one another” is that each one poses an obstacle to the other’s own profit; and the reason why “among the proud there are contentions” is that each keeps the other from attaining the excellence that he desires for himself (*se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia quam concupiscunt*).

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: Even in the fact that someone loves in another what he does not love in

himself one finds the character of a likeness by proportionality. For the individual is related to what he loves in himself in the same way that the other individual is related to what is loved in him. For instance, if a good singer loves a good writer, there is a likeness of proportion insofar as each of them has what is appropriate for him in accord with his own art.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, someone who loves what he needs bears a likeness to what he loves in the way that potentiality bears a likeness to actuality.

Reply to objection 4: In accord with this same sort of likeness that potentiality bears to actuality, someone who is not generous (*non liberalis*) loves someone who is generous insofar as he expects from him what he desires. And the same line of reasoning holds for the case of an individual who perseveres in his friendship toward someone who does not persevere in friendship toward him. In both cases, there seems to be a friendship of utility.

An alternative reply is that even though not all men have virtues of the relevant sort by a perfect habit, they nonetheless have certain seeds of reason in accord with which someone who lacks virtue loves a virtuous individual insofar as the latter conforms to his own natural reason.

Article 4

Can any of the other passions be a cause of love?

It seems that some of the other passions can be a cause of love:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says that some individuals are loved for the sake of pleasure. But pleasure (*delectatio*) is a passion. Therefore, there is some other passion that is a cause of love.

Objection 2: Desire (*desiderium*) is a passion. But we love some individuals out of a desire for what we expect from them, as is obvious in every friendship that exists for the sake of utility. Therefore, there is some other passion that is a cause of love.

Objection 3: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "If someone has no hope of getting a thing, he either loves it tepidly or does not love it at all, even though he sees how beautiful it is." Therefore, hope is likewise a cause of love.

But contrary to this: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, all the other affections of the soul are caused by love.

I respond: There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose some instance of love. The reason for this is that every other passion of the soul involves either a movement toward something or resting in something. But every movement toward something or instance of resting in something proceeds from some sort of connaturality or bond (*ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptationem procedit*), and this belongs to the nature of love. Hence, it is impossible for any other passion of the soul to be a cause in general of every instance of love.

However, it does happen that some other passion is a cause of some instance of love, just as one good is likewise a cause of another good.

Reply to objection 1: When someone loves something for the sake of pleasure, the love is, to be sure, caused by pleasure, but that pleasure is, once again, caused by another previous instance of love. For no one takes pleasure except in a thing that is in some way loved.

Reply to objection 2: The desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But the desire for a thing can be a cause of another thing's being loved. For instance, someone who desires money loves for this reason the one from whom he receives money.

Reply to objection 3: Hope causes and increases love, both (a) by reason of pleasure, since hope is a cause of pleasure, and (b) by reason of desire, since hope fortifies desire, since we do not desire as intensely what we do not hope for. And yet the hope is itself a hope for some good that is loved.

QUESTION 28

The Effects of Love

Next we have to consider the effects of love. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is union (*unio*) an effect of love? (2) Is mutual indwelling (*mutua inhaesio*) an effect of love? (3) Is ecstasy (*extasis*) an effect of love? (4) Is jealousy (*zelus*) an effect of love? (5) Is love a passion that is hurtful (*passio laesiva*) to the lover? (6) Is love a cause of everything that a lover does?

Article 1

Is union an effect of love?

It seems that union (*unio*) is not an effect of love:

Objection 1: Absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for in Galatians 4:18 the Apostle says, “Always emulate the good in one who is good” (speaking of himself, as a Gloss says), “and not only when I am present among you.” Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

Objection 2: Union exists either (a) through the *essence*, in the way that form is united with matter, and an accident with its subject, and a part either with its whole or with another part to constitute a whole, or (b) through a *likeness* of either genus or species or accident. But love does not cause a union of essence; otherwise, love would never be had with respect to things that are divided by their essence. And love does not cause the sort of union that exists through likeness; instead, it itself is caused by such a union, as has been explained (q. 27, a. 3). Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: The sensory power in acting (*in actu*) becomes in actuality (*in actu*) the thing sensed, and the intellect in acting becomes in actuality the thing understood. But the one who is exercising an act of love (*amans in actu*) does not become in actuality the thing loved. Therefore, union is more an effect of cognition than it is of love.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that every instance of love is “a unitive power.”

I respond: A lover has two sorts of union with what is loved:

- (a) The one is a *real union* (*secundum rem*), viz., when the thing loved is now present to the lover.
- (b) The other is an *affective union* (*secundum affectum*), and this union has to be thought of as proceeding from a previous apprehension, since an appetitive movement follows upon an apprehension.

Now since there are two types of love, viz., love of concupiscence and love of friendship, both proceed from an apprehension of the unity of the thing loved with the lover. For when someone loves something in the sense of desiring it (*quasi concupiscens illud*), he apprehends it as relevant to his own well-being (*quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse*). Similarly, when he loves someone with a love of friendship, he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself; hence, he apprehends him as another self (*apprehendit eum ut alterum se*) insofar as he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself. Thus it is that a friend is said to be another self (*amicus dicitur esse alter ipse*), and in *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says, “Someone fittingly called his friend half of his soul.”

Therefore, love brings about the first type of union as an *efficient* cause (*effective*), since it effects a movement toward desiring and seeking the presence of the thing that is loved as something that is fitting for and relevant to oneself. However, it brings about the second type as a *formal* cause (*formaliter*), since love itself is just this sort of union or connection. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says that love is like “a life that connects, or seeks to connect, two things, viz., the lover and what is loved.” When he says ‘connects’, this refers to the *affective* union (*refertur ad unionem affectus*), without which there is no love, whereas when he says ‘seeks to connect’, this has to do with the *real* union.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for the case of a real union. *Pleasure* requires real union as its cause, whereas *desire* exists in the real absence of what is loved, and *love* exists both in

the absence of what is loved and in its presence.

Reply to objection 2: There are three ways in which an instance of union may be related to love:

(a) An instance of union may be a *cause of love*. This is a *substantial union* in the case of the love by which someone loves himself, while, as has been explained (q. 27, a. 3), it is a *union of likeness* in the case of the love by which someone loves other things.

(b) An instance of union may be *essentially the love itself*, and this is union by a *bond of affection* (*secundum adaptationem affectus*). This sort of union is assimilated to a *substantial union* in a case in which the lover is related to what is loved either in a love of friendship with respect to himself or in a love of concupiscence with respect to something of his own.

(c) An instance of union may be an *effect of love*. This is a *real union* that the lover seeks after with respect to what is loved. And this sort of union is appropriate for love (*est secundum convenientiam amoris*). For as the Philosopher reports in *Politics* 2, “Aristophanes claimed that lovers would desire to be united by the two becoming one,” but since “this would result in one or both of them being destroyed,” they seek a union that is appropriate and fitting, viz., to live together and converse together and to be joined in other such ways.

Reply to objection 3: Cognition is perfected by the fact that the thing known is united to the knower by a *likeness*. By contrast, as has been explained, love brings it about that *the very thing* that is loved is united in some way to the lover. This is why love is more unitive than cognition is.

Article 2

Is love a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa?

It seems that love is not a cause of mutual indwelling (*mutua inhaesio*) in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved, and vice versa:

Objection 1: What exists in another is contained in that other. But the same thing cannot be both the container and the contained. Therefore, love cannot be a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

Objection 2: Nothing can penetrate into the interior of any whole except through some sort of division. But to divide what is joined in reality pertains to reason and not to the appetite, in which love exists. Therefore, mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: If through love the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa, then it will follow that what is loved is united to the lover in the same way that the lover is united to what is loved. But as has been explained (a. 1), the union itself is the love. Therefore, it follows that the lover is always loved by what is loved, which is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that mutual indwelling is an effect of love.

But contrary to this: 1 John 4:16 says, “He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.” But charity (*caritas*) is the love of God (*amor Dei*). Therefore, for the same reason, every instance of love brings it about that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

I respond: This effect of mutual indwelling can be thought of both (a) with respect to the apprehensive power and (b) with respect to the appetitive power:

As regards the *apprehensive power*, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as what is loved lingers in the lover’s apprehension—this according to Philippians 1:7 (“..... because I have you in my heart”). On the other hand, the lover is said to exist by apprehension in what is loved insofar as the lover is not content with a superficial apprehension of what is loved, but instead tries to discover everything that belongs intrinsically to what is loved and so to enter into its depths (*ad interiora eius ingeditur*)—just as 1 Corinthians 2:10 says of the Holy Spirit, who is the Love of God, that He “searches

all things, even the deep things of God.”

As regards the *appetitive power*, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as it exists in his affections through his being pleased, so that either (a) he takes pleasure in it or in its good aspects when it is present or (b) in its absence he tends toward (i) what is loved itself through a love of concupiscence or (ii) toward the goods that he wills through a love of friendship for the one who is loved—not because of any extrinsic cause, as when someone desires something for the sake of something else or when someone wills a good for another for the sake of something else, but because he is pleased with the one he loves in a way that is interiorly rooted. This is why love is called ‘intimate’ and why one uses the expression ‘the bowels of charity’. Conversely, the lover exists in what is loved in one way through the love of concupiscence and in a different way through the love of friendship. For the love of concupiscence does not come to rest in any extrinsic or superficial attainment of or enjoyment of what is loved, but instead seeks to possess it perfectly—reaching its insides, as it were (*quasi ad intima illius perveniens*). By contrast, in the love of friendship the lover exists in what is loved in the sense of treating his friend’s goods or evils as his own, and his friend’s will as his own, so that he himself seems to undergo the good and the bad in his friend, as it were, and to be affected by them. Because of this, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9 and *Rhetoric* 2, it is proper for friends “to will the same things and to sorrow over and rejoice in the same things.” And so to the extent that he thinks of what belongs to his friend as his own, the lover seems to exist in the one who is loved and becomes, as it were, the same as the one who is loved. Conversely, to the extent that he wills and acts for the sake of his friend as for his own sake, thinking of his friend as if he were identical with himself, the one who is loved exists within the lover.

There is also a *third way* in which mutual indwelling can be thought of in the love of friendship, by way of reciprocation, insofar as the friends mutually love one another and will and do good things for one another.

Reply to objection 1: What is loved is contained in the lover in the sense that it is impressed in his affections through his being pleased. Conversely, the lover is contained in what is loved in the sense that the lover pursues in some way that which is innermost (*intima*) in what is loved. For nothing prohibits a thing’s being both container and contained in different senses, just as a genus is contained within its species and vice versa.

Reply to objection 2: Reason’s apprehension precedes love’s affection. And so, as is clear from what has been said, as reason investigates what is loved, love’s affection enters into it.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for the third mode of indwelling, which is not found in every instance of love.

Article 3

Is ecstasy an effect of love?

It seems that ecstasy is not an effect of love:

Objection 1: Ecstasy seems to imply a sort of loss of self (*extasis quandam alienationem importare videtur*). But love does not always bring about loss of self, since lovers sometimes have self-mastery (*amantes interdum sui compotes*). Therefore, love does not bring about ecstasy.

Objection 2: A lover desires to be united to what is loved. Therefore, he draws the lover toward himself instead of entering into what is loved by going outside of himself (*quam etiam pergat in amatum extra se exiens*).

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), love unites the lover to what is loved. Therefore, if the lover moves outside of himself in order to enter into what is loved, it follows that a lover always loves what is loved more than he loves himself. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that

ecstasy is an effect of love.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “God’s love brings about ecstasy, and God Himself undergoes ecstasy because of love.” Therefore, since, as is explained in the same place, every instance of love is a sort of participated likeness in God’s love, it seems that every instance of love is a cause of ecstasy.

I respond: Someone is said to undergo ecstasy when he is put outside himself. This happens both (a) with respect to the apprehensive power and (b) with respect to the appetitive power.

As regards the *apprehensive power*, someone is said to be put outside himself when he is put outside of the sort of cognition that is proper to him, either because (a) he is elevated to a higher sort of cognition—as a man, when he is elevated to comprehend things that lie beyond the senses and beyond reason, is said to undergo ecstasy in the sense of being put outside of the apprehension connatural to reason and the sensory power—or because (b) he sinks down to a lower level, as someone is said to undergo ecstasy when he falls into furiousness or mindlessness (*cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit*).

On the other hand, as regards the *appetitive part of the soul*, someone is said to undergo ecstasy when his desire for something carries him into the other and he in some sense goes outside himself.

As has been explained (a. 1), love effects the first type of ecstasy *as a disposing cause* (*dispositive*), viz., by bringing it about that one thinks about what is loved, where such intense thinking about this one thing draws his thoughts away from other things.

On the other hand, love effects the second type of ecstasy *directly* (*directe*). The love of friendship effects it absolutely speaking, whereas the love of concupiscence effects it in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking. For in the case of the love of concupiscence, the lover is carried outside of himself in the sense that, not content to rejoice over the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside of himself. But because he seeks to have that extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out of himself absolutely speaking; rather, this sort of affection ends up within himself after all. By contrast, in the case of the love of friendship, one’s affection goes outside himself absolutely speaking, since he wills the good for his friend and, for the sake of the friend himself, exercises care for him and provides for him (*operatur quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius propter ipsum amicum*).

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the first type of ecstasy.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for the case of the love of concupiscence, which, as has been explained, does not bring about ecstasy absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 3: To the extent that a lover goes outside of himself, he wills and does good things for his friend. However, he does not will his friend’s good more than his own. Hence, it does not follow that he loves another more than he loves himself.

Article 4

Is jealousy an effect of love?

It seems that jealousy or zeal (*zelus*) is not an effect of love:

Objection 1: Jealousy is principle of contention; hence, 1 Corinthians 3:3 says, “There is among you jealousy and contention” But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

Objection 2: The object of love is the good, which communicates itself. But jealousy is incompatible with such communication, since it seems to be part of jealousy that an individual does not tolerate sharing what is loved (*non patiatur consortium in amato*). For instance, husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, because they do not want them to have familiarity with others (*quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris*). Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: Jealousy does not exist without hatred, just as it does not exist without love; for Psalm 72:3 says, “I was jealous of the wicked (*zelavi super iniquos*).” Therefore, jealousy should not be called an effect of love more than an effect of hatred.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “God is called a jealous lover (*zelotes*) because of the great love He has for the things that exist.”

I respond: Jealousy (*zelus*), however it is understood, proceeds from love’s intensity. For it is clear that the more intensely a power tends toward something, the more forcefully it repels anything that is contrary or counteractive. Therefore, since, as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, “Love is a certain movement toward what is loved,” an intense love seeks to exclude everything that counteracts it.

Now this occurs in one way in the case of the love of concupiscence and in a different way in the case of the love of friendship.

For in the case of a love of concupiscence that intensely desires something, one moves against anything that counteracts the attainment or restful enjoyment of what is loved (*illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni quietae eius quod amatur*). And it is in this sense that husbands are jealous of their wives, lest the exclusiveness (*singularitas*) that they seek in a wife should be impeded by her familiarity with others. Similarly, someone who seeks excellence is moved against those who seem to excel, as if they were impeding his own excellence. This is the *jealousy of envy* (*zelus invidiae*) that is spoken of in Psalm 36:1 (“Do not emulate evildoers or be jealous of those who work iniquity”).

By contrast, the love of friendship seeks the friend’s good, and so when it is intense, it makes a man move against everything that counteracts his friend’s good. Accordingly, someone is said to be jealous or zealous on his friend’s behalf (*aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico*) when he is eager to repel anything said or done against his friend’s good. And, in the same way, someone is likewise said to be jealous or zealous on God’s behalf (*zelare pro Deo*) when he tries to repel, as much as he can, what is contrary to God’s honor or will—this according to 3 Kings 19:14 (“With zeal I have been jealous on behalf of the Lord of hosts”). And a Gloss on John 2:17 (“Zeal for your house consumes me”) says, “He is consumed with a good jealousy who seeks to remedy whatever evil he sees; but if he is unable to remedy it, then he bears it and laments it.”

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is here talking about the zeal of envy, which is a cause of contending not against what is loved, but on behalf of what is loved and against obstacles to it.

Reply to objection 2: A good is loved to the extent that it is communicable to the lover. Hence, everything that impedes the perfection of this communicability becomes odious. And this is the way in which jealousy is caused by loving the good.

Now because of a shortage of goodness (*ex defectu bonitatis*) it happens that certain scarce goods (*quaedam parva bona*) cannot be fully possessed by many at the same time. And the jealousy of envy is caused by loving goods of this sort. By contrast, the jealousy of envy is not, properly speaking, caused by loving goods that can be fully possessed by many. For instance, no one envies another’s cognition of a truth that can be fully possessed by many, though he may perhaps envy another’s excellence with respect to the cognition of this truth.

Reply to objection 3: The very fact that someone hates the things that counteract what is loved stems from love. Hence, jealousy is properly posited as an effect of love rather than of hatred.

Article 5

Is love a harmful passion?

It seems that love is a harmful passion (*passio laesiva*):

Objection 1: ‘Languor’ signifies a sort of harm on the part of the one who is languishing (*languor significat laesionem quandam languentis*). But love causes languor; for Song of Songs 2:5 says, “Sustain

me with flowers, surround me with apples, because I am languishing with love.” Therefore, love is a harmful passion.

Objection 2: Melting is a sort of dissolution (*liquefactio est quaedam resolutio*). But love causes melting; for Song of Songs 5:6 says, “My soul melted as my beloved spoke.” Therefore, love causes dissolution. Therefore, it is corruptive and harmful.

Objection 3: ‘Fervor’ (*fervor*) signifies a certain excess of heat, and this excess is corruptive. But fervor is caused by love; for in *De Caelestis Hierarchy*, chap. 7, Dionysius lists “hot,” “sharp,” and “highly fervent” among the properties that belong to the Seraphim’s love. And Song of Songs 8:6 says of love that “its splendors are the splendors of fire and flames.” Therefore, love is a harmful and corruptive passion.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Each thing loves itself in a way that holds it together,” i.e., in a way that conserves it (*singula seipsa amant contentive, idest conservative*). Therefore, love is not a harmful passion, but is instead a passion that conserves and perfects.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 26, aa. 1-2 and q. 27, a. 1), ‘love’ signifies a certain bond (*coaptatio*) between the appetitive power and some good. But nothing is bonded with anything fitting for it by the fact that it is harmed; rather, if it is possible, the thing is advantageous to it and makes it better. By contrast, it is harmed and made worse by the very fact that it is united to something that is not fitting for it. Therefore, love for a fitting good perfects the lover and makes him better (*est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis*), whereas love for a good that is not fitting for the lover is harmful to the lover and makes him worse (*est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis*). Hence, a man is perfected and made better especially by love for God, whereas he is harmed and made worse by a love for sin—this according to Hosea 9:10 (“They became abominable, just like the things they loved”).

To be sure, what has just been said about love applies to what is *formal* in it, i.e., what belongs to the appetite. By contrast, with respect to what is *material* in the passion of love, viz., the corporeal change, it happens that love might be harmful because of the excessiveness of the change—in the same way that this happens in the case of a sensory power and in the case of every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through a change in a corporeal organ.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: To the objections one should reply that four proximate effects can be attributed to love, viz., melting (*liquefactio*), enjoyment (*fruitio*), languor (*languor*), and fervor (*fervor*).

Among these the first is *melting*, which is opposed to freezing (*congelatio*). For things that are frozen are compressed within themselves, so that they cannot easily allow themselves to be entered into by another (*ut not possint de facili subintrationem alterius pati*). But it is part of love that the appetite is adapted to the reception of the good that is loved insofar as what is loved exists in the lover—in the way that has already been explained above (a. 2). Hence, the freezing or hardening of the heart (*congelatio vel duritia cordis*) is a disposition incompatible with love. By contrast, ‘melting’ implies a certain softening of the heart by which the heart shows itself ready to be entered into by what is loved.

Therefore, if what is loved is present and possessed, then what is effected is *pleasure or enjoyment*. On the other hand, if what is loved is absent, then two passions result, viz., (a) *sadness* over the absence, and this is signified by ‘*languor*’ (this is why, in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3, Tully mainly uses the word ‘sickness’ for this sadness), and (b) *intense desire* to attain what is loved, and this is signified by ‘*fervor*’.

These are, to be sure, the effects of love understood formally, i.e., in accord with the relation of the appetitive power to its object. However, in the case of the passion of love there are some effects, proportionate to these, that result from changes in the organ.

Article 6

Does a lover do everything out of love?

It seems that a lover does not do everything out of love:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 26, a. 2), love is a passion. But a man does not do everything he does out of passion; rather, as *Ethics* 6 explains, certain things he does by choice and others he does out of ignorance. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does everything he does out of love.

Objection 2: As is clear from *De Anima* 3, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals. Therefore, if someone does everything he does out of love, then the other passions of the appetitive part of the soul will be superfluous.

Objection 3: Nothing is caused simultaneously by contrary causes. But some things are done out of hatred. Therefore, not all things are done out of love.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It is because of the love of the good that each agent does everything."

I respond: As has been explained (q. 1, a. 2), every agent acts for the sake of some end. But the end is the good that each thing desires and loves. Hence, it is clear that every agent, whatever it might be, does every action out of some sort of love.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for the case of the love that is a passion in the sentient appetite. But we are now talking about love taken in general, insofar as it includes under itself intellectual love, rational love, animal love, and natural love. For this is how Dionysius is talking about love in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4.

Reply to objection 2: As has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4), desire, sadness, and pleasure are all caused by love, and as a result all the other passions are caused by love as well. Hence, every action that proceeds from any passion whatsoever also proceeds from love as a first cause. Hence, the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 29, a. 2), hatred is also caused by love.

QUESTION 29

Hatred

Next we have to consider hatred. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is the cause and object of hatred the bad? (2) Is hatred caused by love? (3) Is hatred stronger than love? (4) Can someone hate himself? (5) Can someone have hatred for the truth? (6) Can something be hated in general (*in universali*)?

Article 1

Is the cause and object of hatred the bad?

It seems that the bad is not the object and cause of hatred:

Objection 1: Everything that exists, insofar as it exists, is good. Therefore, if the object of hatred is the bad, it follows that no entity is hated (*nulla res odio habeatur*), but that only the defectiveness of an entity is hated. But this is clearly false.

Objection 2: It is praiseworthy to hate what is bad; thus, in praise of certain individuals 2 Maccabees 3:1 says that “the laws were very well kept, because of the piety of Onias the high priest, and their minds hated what was bad.” Therefore, if nothing is hated except what is bad, then it follows that every instance of hatred is praiseworthy. But this is clearly false.

Objection 3: The same thing is not simultaneously both good and bad. But the same thing is odious to some and lovable to others. Therefore, there is hatred not only of what is bad, but also of what is good.

But contrary to this: Hatred is contrary to love. But as has been explained (q. 26, a. 1 and q. 27, a. 1), the object of love is the good. Therefore, the object of hatred is the bad.

I respond: Since a natural appetite (*appetitus naturalis*) flows from an apprehension, even though this apprehension is not conjoined to it [in the same substance], the explanation for the inclination of an animal appetite, which, as was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), follows upon a conjoined apprehension, seems to be the same as that for the inclination of a natural appetite.

Now in the case of a natural appetite it is manifestly obvious that just as each thing has a natural consonance with or aptitude for, i.e., a natural love for, what is fitting for it, so too it has a natural dissonance from, i.e., a natural hatred for, what is repugnant to it and corruptive of it. So, then, in the case of an animal appetite, as well as in the case of an intellectual appetite, love is likewise an appetite for what is apprehended as fitting, whereas hatred is likewise the appetite’s dissonance from what is apprehended as repugnant and harmful.

Now just as everything that is fitting, insofar as it is fitting, has the character of being good, so too everything repugnant, insofar as it is repugnant, has character of being bad. And so just as the good is the object of love, so too the bad is the object of hatred.

Reply to objection 1: A being, insofar as it is a being, has the character of being fitting rather than the character of being repugnant, since all things share being in common. But a being, insofar as it is *this* determinate being, has the character of being repugnant to some other determinate being. It is in this way that one being is odious to another and is bad. Even if it is not odious in itself, it is nonetheless odious in relation to something else.

Reply to objection 2: Just as something that is not genuinely good is apprehended as good, so too something that is not genuinely bad is apprehended as bad. Hence, it sometimes happens that hatred for the bad is not good or that love for the good is not good.

Reply to objection 3: The reason why it happens, in the case of a natural appetite, that the same thing is lovable to some and odious to others is that one and the same thing is fitting by its nature for the one thing and repugnant by its nature to the other; for instance, heat is fitting for fire and repugnant to

water.

The reason why this happens in the case of an appetite that belongs to the soul (*secundum appetitum animale*) is that one and the same thing is apprehended by one individual as good (*sub ratione boni*) and by another individual as bad (*sub ratione mali*).

Article 2

Is love a cause of hatred?

It seems that love is not a cause of hatred:

Objection 1: As the *Categories* puts it, “Things that are divided by opposites are naturally simultaneous with one another.” But since love and hatred are contraries, they are divided by opposites. Therefore, they are naturally simultaneous with one another. Therefore, it is not the case that love is a cause of hatred.

Objection 2: One of two contraries is not a cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore, love is not a cause of hatred.

Objection 3: What is posterior is not a cause of what is prior. But it seems that hatred is prior to love; for hatred implies withdrawing from the bad (*recessus a malo*), whereas love implies drawing nearer to the good (*accessus ad bonum*). Therefore, love is not a cause of hatred.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that all the affections are caused by love. Therefore, even hatred, since it is a certain affection of the soul, is caused by love.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), love consists in a certain fit between the lover and what is loved, whereas hatred consists in a certain repugnance or dissonance. Now in every case one has to consider what is fitting prior to considering what is repugnant; for one thing is repugnant to another by virtue of the fact that it corrupts or impedes what is fitting. Hence, it is necessary that (a) love is prior to hatred and that (b) nothing is hated except in virtue of the fact that it is contrary to something fitting that is loved. Accordingly, every instance of hatred is caused by love.

Reply to objection 1: Among things that are divided by opposites, some are naturally simultaneous both *in reality* (*secundum rem*) and *in concept* (*secundum rationem*), e.g., two species of animal or two species of color. Some are simultaneous in concept, but the one is prior in reality to the other and a cause of it; this is clear in the case of the species of number, shape, and movement. On the other hand, some are simultaneous neither in reality nor in concept, e.g., substance and accident, given that (a) a substance is a cause in reality of its accident, and (b) ‘being’ is attributed to a substance conceptually prior to its being attributed to its accident, since it is attributed to the accident only insofar as the accident exists in the substance.

Now love and hatred are, to be sure, naturally simultaneous in concept, but not in reality. Hence, there is nothing to prevent love from being a cause of hatred.

Reply to objection 2: Love and hatred are contraries when they are taken with respect to the same thing. But when they are taken with respect to contraries, then they are not themselves contrary but result from one another. For the fact that something is loved is of the same nature as the fact that its contrary is hated. And so the love of one thing is a cause of its contrary being hated.

Reply to objection 3: As regards *execution*, withdrawing from the one terminus is prior to coming closer to the other terminus. But as regards *intention*, the converse holds; for one withdraws from the one terminus *in order to* draw nearer to the other terminus.

Now an appetitive movement has to do with intention rather than with execution. And so love is prior to hatred, since both of them are appetitive movements.

Article 3

Is hatred stronger than love?

It seems that hatred is stronger than love:

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “There is no one who does not flee from pain (*dolor*) more than he desires pleasure (*voluptas*).” But to flee from pain pertains to hatred, while the desire for pleasure pertains to love. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

Objection 2: The weaker is conquered by the stronger. But love is conquered by hatred, viz., when love is converted into hatred. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

Objection 3: The soul’s affections are made manifest by their effects. But a man persists more strongly in repelling what is odious than in pursuing what is loved—in the same way that, as Augustine notes in 83 *Quaestiones*, even beasts abstain from delectable things because of the whip. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

But contrary to this: The good is stronger than the bad, since “the bad acts only in the power of the good,” as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4. But hatred and love differ in accord with the difference between the good and the bad. Therefore, love is stronger than hatred.

I respond: It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. But as was explained above (a. 2), every instance of hatred proceeds from some instance of love as its cause. Hence, it is impossible for hatred to be stronger, absolutely speaking, than love.

But, further, it is necessary for love to be stronger, absolutely speaking, than hatred. For something moves toward an end more strongly than it does toward a means to that end. But a withdrawal from the bad is ordered toward attaining the good as its end. Hence, absolutely speaking, the soul’s movement with respect to the good is stronger than its movement with respect to the bad.

Yet sometimes hatred seems stronger than love, and this for two reasons:

First of all, hatred is felt more than love is (*odium est magis sensibile quam amor*). For since the sensory power’s perception involves a certain change, by the fact that something has already been changed, it is not sensed in the same way as when it is in the very process of being changed (*quando est in ipso immutari*). Hence, even though the heat of a chronic fever (*calor febris hecticae*) might be greater, it is not felt as much as the heat of an acute fever, since the heat of the chronic fever has by now become, as it were, habitual and natural. It is also because of this that love is felt more in the absence of what is loved; as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, “Love is not felt as much when need does not bring it forth.” And it is likewise because of this that the repugnance of what is hated is perceived in a more sensible way than the fittingness of what is loved.

Second, the hatred is not being compared to the love that corresponds to it. For corresponding to the diversity of goods there is a diversity of greater and lesser among the instances of love, and the opposite instances of hatred are proportioned to them. Hence, a hatred that corresponds to a greater love effects a greater movement than does a lesser love.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection. For the love of pleasure is not as great as the love of conserving oneself, which the avoidance of pain corresponds to. And so pain is avoided to a greater degree than pleasure is loved.

Reply to objection 2: Hatred never conquers love except because of a greater love to which the hatred corresponds. For instance, a man loves himself more than he loves his friend, and because of this he hates even his friend if his friend opposes him.

Reply to objection 3: The reason why a thing acts more intensely to repel what is odious is that hatred is felt to a greater degree.

Article 4

Can someone hate himself?

It seems that someone can hate himself (*aliquis possit seipsum odio habere*):

Objection 1: Psalm 10:6 says, “He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.” But there are many who love iniquity. Therefore, there are many who hate themselves.

Objection 2: We hate someone when we will what is bad for him and do what is bad to him. But sometimes someone wills what is bad for himself and does what is bad to himself, e.g., those who kill themselves. Therefore, there are some who hate themselves.

Objection 3: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 2 Boethius says, “Avarice makes men odious.” From this one can conclude that every man hates an avaricious man. But some men are avaricious. Therefore, those men hate themselves.

But contrary to this: In Ephesians 5:29 the Apostle says, “No one ever hated his own flesh.”

I respond: It is impossible for anyone, speaking *per se*, to hate himself. For each thing naturally desires the good, and no one can desire anything except as a good (*nisi sub ratione boni*). For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “To love someone is to will the good for him.” Hence, it is necessary for someone to love himself, and it is impossible for anyone, speaking *per se*, to hate himself.

Yet it is possible for someone to hate himself *per accidens*, and this in two ways.

First, on the part of *the good* that someone wills for himself. For it sometimes happens that what is desired as good in a certain respect (*secundum quid bonum*) is bad absolutely speaking (*simpliciter malum*) and, accordingly, someone *per accidens* wills what is bad for himself—which is what it is to hate oneself.

Second, on the part of *the man himself*, for whom he wills the good. For each thing is most especially that which exists more principally within itself; hence, the city-state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole city-state. Therefore, it is clear that a man is especially the man’s mind. But it happens that some men think themselves to be especially that which corresponds to their corporeal and sentient nature. Hence, they love themselves in a way that corresponds to what they take themselves to be, but they hate what they truly are when they will what is contrary to reason.

And it is in these two ways that “he who loves iniquity” hates not only “his own soul,” but even his very self.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: No one wills what is bad for himself and does what is bad to himself except insofar as he apprehends it as a good. For even those who kill themselves apprehend dying itself as a good insofar as it terminates some sorrow or pain.

Reply to objection 3: An avaricious man hates an accident of himself, but he does not for this reason hate himself—just as a sick man hates his own sickness in virtue of the very fact that he loves himself.

An alternative reply is that avarice makes men odious to others, but it does not make a man odious to himself. To the contrary, it is caused by a disordered love of oneself, in the sense that someone wills more temporal goods for himself than he should.

Article 5

Can someone hate the truth?

It seems that no one can hate the truth (*aliquis non possit habere odio veritatem*):

Objection 1: *Good* and *being* and *true* are convertible with one another. But no one is able to hate the good. Therefore, it is likewise the case that no one is able to hate the truth.

Objection 2: As it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, “All men by nature desire to know.” But scientific knowledge is only of the truth. Therefore, the truth is naturally desired and naturally loved. But what exists in someone naturally exists in him always. Therefore, no one is able to hate the truth.

Objection 3: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Men naturally love those who are not deceptive (*homines amant non fictos*).” But this is only for the sake of the truth. Therefore, a man naturally loves the truth. Therefore, he is not able to hate it.

But contrary to this: In Galatians 4:16 the Apostle says, “Have I become an enemy to you by telling you the truth?”

I respond: *Good* and *true* and *being* are the same in reality but differ in concept. For *good*, but not *being* or *true*, has the character of being desirable, since the good is “what all things desire.” And so the good under the concept *good* cannot be hated, either in general or in particular.

Now, to be sure, *being* in general and *true* in general cannot be hated, since dissonance (*dissonantia*) is a cause of hatred and fittingness (*convenientia*) a cause of love, and *being* and *true* are common to all things. However, there is nothing to prevent some *being* in particular or some *truth* in particular from being hated insofar as it has the character of being contrary and repugnant. For contrariety and repugnance are not at odds with (*non adversatur*) the notions *being* and *true* in the way that they are at odds with the notion *good*.

There are three ways in which some particular truth can be repugnant or contrary to a good that is loved:

(a) First, insofar as the truth exists by causality and by origin in the things themselves. And a man sometimes hates a truth in this sense when he wishes something that is true not to be true.

(b) Second, insofar as a truth that impedes a man’s pursuit of what he loves enters into his cognition. For instance, some men might wish not to know the truth of the Faith in order that they might sin freely. Job 21:14 says in the person of such individuals, “We do not want the knowledge of Your ways.”

(c) Third, a particular truth is hated as something repugnant insofar as it exists in the mind of another. For instance, when someone wants to lie hidden in some sin, he hates it that someone might learn the truth about his sin. Accordingly, in *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says that men “love the truth that enlightens and hate the truth that reproves.”

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: To know the truth is something lovable in its own right (*secundum se*); this is why Augustine says that they “love the truth that enlightens.” But cognition of the truth can be odious *per accidens* insofar as it keeps one from something he desires.

Reply to objection 3: From the fact that those who are not deceptive are loved it follows that a man loves in its own right the truth that non-deceptive men make manifest.

Article 6

Can there be hatred of something in general?

It seems that there cannot be hatred of something in general (*odium non possit esse alicuius in universali*):

Objection 1: Hatred is a passion of the sentient appetite, which is moved by sentient apprehension. But the sensory power cannot apprehend a universal (*non potest apprehendere universale*). Therefore, there cannot be hatred of something in general (*in universale*).

Objection 2: Hatred is caused by dissonance, which is repugnant to commonality (*quae communitate repugnat*). But commonality is part of the notion *universal*. Therefore, there cannot be hatred of something in general.

Objection 3: The object of hatred is the bad. But as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the bad “exists in things and not in the mind.” Therefore, since a universal exists only in the mind (*cum universale sit solum in mente*), which abstracts the universal from the particular, it seems that there cannot be hatred of something in general (*in universali*).

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Anger is always directed toward singulars, whereas hatred is also directed to things in general (*ad genera*); for everyone hates a thief and a backbiter (*furem odit et calumniatorem unusquisque*).”

I respond: There are two possible ways of talking about a universal: (a) talking about it insofar as it is the subject of an intention of universality (*secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis*); and (b) talking about the nature that such an intention is attributed to. For it is one thing to consider *man* as a universal, and it is another thing to consider a man insofar as he is a man (*alia est consideratio hominis universalis et alia hominis in eo quod homo*).

Thus, if a universal is taken in the first way, then no power of the sentient part—neither an apprehensive power nor an appetitive power—can be directed toward a universal (*non ferri potest in universale*). For a universal is fashioned by abstraction from the material individual in which every sentient power is rooted.

Nonetheless, it is possible for sentient powers—both the apprehensive power and the appetitive power—to be directed toward something in general (*ferri potest in aliquid universaliter*). For instance, we say that the object of the visual power is color in general (*color secundum genus*), not because the visual power has a cognition of the universal *color*, but because the fact that a color is susceptible to cognition by the visual power belongs to a color not insofar as it is *this* color, but insofar as it is a color absolutely speaking.

So, then, it is likewise the case that the hatred that belongs to the sentient part of the soul can be directed toward something in general (*potest respicere aliquid in universali*). For it is by its common nature, and not just by the fact that it is a particular, that something is an adversary of an animal—in the way that a wolf is an adversary of a sheep. Hence, a sheep hates wolves in general (*ovis odit lupum generaliter*). By contrast, anger is always caused by something particular, since it is caused by a harmful act and acts are particulars. This is why the Philosopher says that anger is always directed toward something singular, whereas hatred can be directed toward something in general.

However, insofar as hatred exists in the intellective part of the soul, it can exist with respect to a universal in both ways, since it follows upon the intellect’s universal apprehension.

Reply to objection 1: The sensory power does not apprehend a universal insofar as it is a universal, but it does apprehend something to which universality accedes through abstraction.

Reply to objection 2: What is common to *all* things cannot be a reason for hatred. But nothing prevents a thing from being common to *many* things and yet being dissonant with respect to others; and so it is odious to those other things.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through in the case of a universal insofar as it is the subject of an intention of universality. For in this sense it is not susceptible to either sentient apprehension or sentient appetite (*sic non cadit sub apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo*).

QUESTION 30

Concupiscence

Next we have to consider concupiscence or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does concupiscence exist just in the sentient appetite? (2) Is concupiscence a specific passion? (3) Is it the case that some instances of concupiscence are natural and others are non-natural? (4) Is concupiscence infinite or unlimited (*infinita*)?

Article 1

Does concupiscence or sentient desire exist just in the sentient appetite?

It seems that concupiscence or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) does not exist just in the sentient appetite:

Objection 1: As Wisdom 6:21 (“Concupiscence for wisdom (*concupiscentia sapientiae*) leads to the everlasting kingdom”) puts it, there is a certain concupiscence directed toward wisdom. But the sentient appetite cannot be directed toward wisdom. Therefore, concupiscence does not exist just in the sentient appetite.

Objection 2: The desire for God’s commandments (*desiderium mandatorum Dei*) does not exist in the sentient appetite; in fact, in Romans 7:18 the Apostle says, “There dwells not in me, i.e., in my flesh, that which is good.” But the desire for God’s commandments falls under concupiscence—this according to Psalm 118:20 (“My soul has had concupiscence (*concupivit*) to desire (*desiderare*) Your justifications”). Therefore, concupiscence does not exist just in the sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Every power is such that its proper good is an object of concupiscence for it (*cuilibet potentiae est concupiscibile proprium bonum*). Therefore, concupiscence exists in every power of the soul and not just in the sentient appetite.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, “The non-rational that is obedient to and persuadable by reason is divided into *concupiscence* and *anger*. This is the non-rational part of the soul, passive and appetitive.” Therefore, concupiscence exists in the sentient appetite.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Concupiscence is a desire for what is pleasurable (*appetitus delectabilis*).” Now as will be explained below (q. 31, aa. 3-4), there are two kinds of pleasure (*delectatio*), (a) one kind that is found in an intelligible good, i.e., a good of reason, and (b) another kind that is found in what is good according to the sensory power. The first kind of pleasure seems to belong only to the soul, whereas the second kind belongs to the soul and the body, since the sensory power is a power in a corporeal organ. Hence, what is good according to the sensory power is a good of the whole composite (*bonum totius coniuncti*). Now it seems to be the desire for this kind of pleasure that is *concupiscence*, since, as the name ‘con-cupiscence’ suggests, it pertains to both the soul and the body together. Hence, concupiscence, properly speaking, exists in the sentient appetite and in the concupiscible power, which takes its name from concupiscence.

Reply to objection 1: The desire (*appetitus*) for wisdom, or for other spiritual goods, is sometimes called ‘concupiscence’ either (a) because of a certain likeness or (b) because of the intensity of the desire which belongs to the higher part of the soul and from which there is an overflow into the lower appetite, so that (i) even the lower appetite itself simultaneously tends in its own way toward a spiritual good by following the higher appetite and so that (ii) even the body itself serves spiritual goods, just as Psalm 83:3 says (“My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God”).

Reply to objection 2: Properly speaking, ‘desire’ (*desiderium*) can pertain not only to the lower appetite but also to the higher appetite. For ‘desire’ (*desiderium*) does not imply any union [of soul and body] in longing for something (*non importat aliquam consociationem in cupiendo*), but instead implies a simple movement toward the thing that is desired (*simplicem motum in rem desideratum*).

Reply to objection 3: Each power of the soul is such that it desires its proper good by a *natural* appetite that does not follow upon an apprehension.

By contrast, desiring the good by means of an appetite belonging to a soul (*appetitu animali*), which does follow upon an apprehension, pertains solely to an appetitive power. And to desire something as a good pleasurable to the senses—which is, properly speaking, what it is to have concupiscence (*quod proprie est concupiscere*)—pertains to the concupiscible power.

Article 2

Is concupiscence a specific passion of the concupiscible power?

It seems that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: The passions are distinguished from one another by their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is what is pleasurable to the senses; and, according to the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 1, this is likewise the object of concupiscence. Therefore, concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Avid desire (*cupiditas*) is the love of transient things, and so it is not distinct as such from love.” But all the specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore, concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), each passion of the concupiscible power is such that some specific passion in the concupiscible power is opposed to it. But there is no specific passion in the concupiscible power that is opposed to concupiscence. For Damascene says, “An expected good gives rise to concupiscence, whereas a present good gives rise to joy; similarly, an expected evil gives rise to fear, whereas a present evil gives rise to sadness.” From this it seems that just as sadness is opposed to joy, so fear is opposed to concupiscence. But fear exists in the irascible power and not in the concupiscible power. Therefore, it is not the case that concupiscence is a specific passion in the concupiscible power.

But contrary to this: Concupiscence is caused by love and tends toward pleasure, and these are passions of the concupiscible power. And so concupiscence is distinct as a specific passion from the other passions of the concupiscible power.

I respond: As has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), the object of the concupiscible power is, generally speaking, the good that is pleasurable to the senses. Hence, it is by reference to the differences dividing this object that the diverse passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished from one another.

Now diversity in an object can result either (a) from the nature of the object itself or (b) from a diversity in its power to act. A diversity of active objects that stems from the nature of the thing makes for a *material* difference among the passions, whereas a diversity that stems from the power to act makes for a *formal* difference among the passions in accord with which the passions differ from one another in species.

However, the kind of power to effect movement that belongs to the end or good itself when it is *present* in reality is different from its power to effect movement when it is *absent*. For insofar as it is present, it brings about [the appetite’s] coming to rest in it (*facit in seipso quiescere*), whereas insofar as it is absent, it brings about movement toward itself. Hence, what is pleasurable to the senses is a cause of *love* insofar as the appetite adapts and conforms to it in a certain way, whereas it is a cause of *concupiscence* insofar as, when absent, it draws the appetite to itself, and it is a cause of *pleasure* insofar as, when present, it brings the appetite to rest in it. So, then, concupiscence is a passion that *differs in species* both from love and from pleasure.

On the other hand, it is having concupiscence for *this* or *that* pleasurable thing that makes for

numerically diverse instances of concupiscence.

Reply to objection 1: The pleasurable good is not, absolutely speaking, the object of concupiscence; instead, it is the pleasurable good *as something absent* (*sub ratione absentis*), in the same way that the object of memory is the sensible thing *as past*. For particular conditions of this sort make for diverse species among the passions or likewise among those powers of the sentient part of the soul that are directed toward particulars.

Reply to objection 2: This predication is based on the cause [of avid desire] and not on its essence (*illa praedicatio est per causam, non per essentiam*). For avid desire (*cupiditas*) is not love *per se*, but is instead an effect of love.

An alternative reply is that Augustine is here taking ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) broadly for any appetitive movement that can be directed toward a future good. On this reading it includes both love and hope within itself.

Reply to objection 3: The passion that is directly opposed to concupiscence—i.e., the passion that has the same relation to the bad that concupiscence has to the good—is unnamed. But because, like fear, it is directed toward an absent evil, fear is sometimes put in its place, just as hope* is sometimes put in the place of avid* desire* (*cupiditas*). For small goods or evils are, as it were, left out of account, and so hope and fear, which are directed toward the arduous good and the arduous bad, are posited for every movement of the appetite that is directed toward a future good or evil.

Article 3

Are some instances of concupiscence natural and others non-natural?

It seems not to be the case that some instances of concupiscence are natural and others are non-natural:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), concupiscence belongs to an appetite belonging to a soul. But *natural appetite* is divided off against *appetite belonging to a soul*. Therefore, no instance of concupiscence is natural.

Objection 2: Material diversity does not make for a diversity of species, but only makes for a diversity in number; and this sort of diversity does not fall under an art. But if some instances of concupiscence were natural and some non-natural, then they would differ only in a way that corresponds to diverse desirable things, which would make for a material difference and only a numerical diversity. Therefore, instances of concupiscence should not be divided into the natural and the non-natural.

Objection 3: As is clear from *Physics* 2, *reason* is divided off against *nature*. Therefore, if some non-natural instance of concupiscence existed in a man, it would have to be rational. But this cannot be the case; for since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sentient appetite and not to the will, which is reason’s appetite. Therefore, it is not the case that any instances of concupiscence are non-natural.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 and *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher claims that some instances of concupiscence are natural and some are non-natural.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), concupiscence is a desire for the pleasurable good. Now there are two ways in which something is pleasurable:

(a) In the first way, something is pleasurable because it is fitting for the nature of an animal; examples are food, drink and other things of this sort. Concupiscence for what is pleasurable in this sense is called *natural*.

(b) In the second way, something is pleasurable because it is fitting for an animal on the basis of apprehension, as when someone apprehends something as good and fitting and as a result takes pleasure

in it. And concupiscence for what is pleasurable in this sense is called *non-natural*, and it is often called ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) instead of ‘concupiscence’ (*concupiscentia*).

The former, or natural, instances of concupiscence are common to both men and the other animals, because they involve something that is fitting and pleasurable for both by nature. And all men agree in these; that is why in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher calls them “common and necessary.”

By contrast, the latter instances of concupiscence are peculiar to men, to whom it is proper to regard something that goes beyond what nature requires as good and fitting. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher says that the former instances of concupiscence are “non-rational” (*irracionales*), whereas the latter instances are “accompanied by reason” (*cum ratione*). And because different individuals think in different ways, in *Ethics* 3 the latter instances are also called “proper and apposite,” i.e., beyond the natural (*supra naturales*).

Reply to objection 1: The same thing that is desired by a natural appetite can be desired by an appetite belonging to a soul when that thing is apprehended. This is the sense in which there can be natural concupiscence with respect to food and drink and other things of this sort that are desired naturally.

Reply to objection 2: The distinction between natural concupiscence and non-natural concupiscence is not just a material distinction, but it is also in some sense formal, insofar as it proceeds from the distinction among the active objects.

Now the object of an appetite is an apprehended good. Hence, a distinction among acts of apprehending corresponds to the distinction among active objects. More specifically, (a) something is apprehended as fitting by an absolute apprehension, and natural concupiscence—which the Philosopher calls “non-rational” in the *Rhetoric*—is caused by this sort of apprehension; and (b) something is apprehended with deliberation, and non-natural concupiscence—which is thereby said to be “accompanied by reason” in the *Rhetoric*—is caused by this sort of apprehension.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 78, a. 4 and q. 83, a. 3), in a man there exists not only universal reason, which belongs to the intellective part of the soul, but also particular reason, which belongs to the sentient part. Accordingly, concupiscence that is accompanied by reason can also belong to the sentient appetite. Furthermore, the sentient appetite can also be moved by universal reason through the mediation of the particular imagination.

Article 4

Is concupiscence infinite or unlimited?

It seems that concupiscence is not infinite or unlimited (*infinita*):

Objection 1: The object of concupiscence is the good, which has the character of an end. But as *Metaphysics* 2 says, when one posits something infinite, he rules out an end. Therefore, concupiscence cannot be infinite.

Objection 2: Concupiscence is directed toward a fitting good, since it arises from love. But since what is unlimited is not proportionate to anything (*sit improporcionatum*), it cannot be fitting. Therefore, concupiscence cannot be unlimited.

Objection 3: It is impossible to traverse infinitely many things (*infinita non est transire*), and so among such things it is impossible to reach a last one (*non est pervenire ad ultimum*). But in someone who has concupiscence pleasure is effected by his attaining the last thing. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, it would follow that pleasure is never effected.

But contrary to this: In *Politics* 1 the Philosopher says, “Since concupiscence is unlimited, men desire infinitely many things (*in infinitum concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant*).”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), there are two sorts of concupiscence, the one natural and the other non-natural.

Thus, natural concupiscence cannot be actually unlimited. For natural concupiscence has to do with what nature requires, but nature always intends something finite and fixed (*finitum and certum*). Hence, a man never has concupiscence for an unlimited amount of food or an unlimited amount of drink (*numquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum vel infinitum potum*). However, just as it is possible for there to be in nature a potential infinity via succession, so too this sort of concupiscence can be infinite via succession—so that, namely, having acquired food, or any other thing that nature requires, a man desires food again in place of the other food; for when corporeal goods of this sort arrive, they do not last forever, but run out. Hence, in John 4:13 our Lord said to the Samaritan woman, “Whoever drinks this water will thirst again.”

By contrast, non-natural concupiscence is altogether unlimited. For as has been explained (a. 3), non-natural concupiscence follows reason, and it belongs to reason to proceed *ad infinitum*. Hence, someone who has concupiscence for riches can desire to be rich but not to any fixed limit; instead, he can desire simply that he should be as rich as possible.

Moreover, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, there is another possible explanation for why some instances of concupiscence are finite and some unlimited. For concupiscence directed toward an end is always unlimited, since an end, such as health, is desired *per se*; and so greater health is desired to a greater degree, and so on *ad infinitum*—just as, if white expands sight *per se* (*album per se disgregat*), then a brighter white expands sight to a greater degree. By contrast, concupiscence that is directed toward the means to an end is not unlimited; instead, the means to an end is desired to the degree that it is suitable for the end. Hence, those who have riches as their end have concupiscence for riches *ad infinitum*, whereas those who desire riches for the necessities of life desire limited riches that are sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says in the same place. And the same line of reasoning holds for concupiscence with respect to any other things as well.

Reply to objection 1: Everything that is the object of concupiscence (*omne quod concupiscitur*) is taken as something finite, either because it is finite in reality insofar as it is once actually desired, or because it is finite insofar as it falls under apprehension. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite (*sub ratione infiniti*), since, as *Physics* 3 puts it, “The infinite is such that however much one takes of its quantity, it is always possible to take something besides that.”

Reply to objection 2: In a certain sense reason has infinite power, insofar as it is able to consider something *ad infinitum*, as is clear in the case of the addition of numbers and of lines. Hence, the infinite taken in a certain way is proportionate to reason. For even the universal, which reason apprehends, is in a sense infinite, insofar as it contains infinitely many singulars in potentiality.

Reply to objection 3: In order for someone to have pleasure, it is not required that he acquire everything that he desires; rather, what is required is that he take pleasure in each desired thing that he acquires.

QUESTION 31

Pleasure in Itself

Next we have to consider pleasure or delight (*delectatio*) (questions 31-34) and sadness or pain (*tristitia*) (questions 35-39).

As regards pleasure, there are four things to be considered: first, pleasure itself in its own right (question 31); second, the causes of pleasure (question 32); third, the effects of pleasure (question 33); and, fourth, the goodness and badness of pleasure.

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is pleasure a passion? (2) Does pleasure exist in time? (3) Does pleasure differ from joy (*gaudium*)? (4) Does pleasure exist in the intellectual appetite? (5) How do the pleasures of the higher appetite compare with the pleasures of the lower appetite? (6) How do sentient pleasures compare with one another? (7) Is any pleasure non-natural? (8) Can one pleasure be contrary to another pleasure?

Article 1

Is pleasure a passion?

It seems that pleasure (*delectatio*) is not a passion:

Objection 1: In *De Fide* 2 Damascene distinguishes an operation from a passion, saying that “an operation is a movement in accord with nature, whereas a passion is a movement contrary to nature.” But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 7 and 10, pleasure is an operation. Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 3 says, “To undergo a passion is to be moved (*pati est moveri*).” But pleasure consists not in being moved but in having been moved (*non in moveri sed in motum esse*), since pleasure is caused by a good that has already been acquired. Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

Objection 3: Pleasure consists in a certain perfection on the part of the one taking pleasure, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, pleasure “brings an operation to perfection (*perficit operationem*).” But as *Physics* 7 and *De Anima* 2 explain, to be perfected is different from undergoing a passion or being altered (*perfici non est pati vel alterari*). Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14 Augustine posits pleasure, i.e., joy (*gaudium*) or gladness (*laetitia*), among the passions of the soul.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), a movement of the sentient appetite is properly called a ‘passion’. And every affection that proceeds from sentient apprehension is a movement of the sentient appetite. But this feature must belong to pleasure. For as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Pleasure is a movement of the soul, and the soul’s establishment, all at once and sensibly, into an existent nature (*delectatio est quidam motus animae et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem*).”

To understand this claim, notice that just as it happens among natural things that some of them attain their natural perfections, so too this happens among animals. And even though their *being moved toward* their perfection does not occur all at once, their *attainment of* their natural perfection does occur all at once (*est totum simul*). However, the difference between animals and other natural things is that when other natural things are established into what is fitting for them, they do not sense this, whereas animals do sense it (*hoc non sentiunt sed animalia hoc sentiunt*). And the sensing of it is a cause of a certain movement of the soul in the sentient appetite, and it is this movement that is the pleasure.

Thus, when one says that pleasure is “a movement of the soul,” pleasure is being placed in a *genus*. And when one says that pleasure is “the soul’s establishment into an existent nature”—i.e., into that which exists in the thing’s nature—what is being posited is the *cause* of pleasure, viz., the presence of a connatural good. On the other hand, when the establishment is said to occur “all at once,” this shows that

‘establishment’ should be taken not as ‘being established’ but rather as ‘having been established’—the terminus, as it were, of a movement. For pleasure is not an instance of generation, as Plato claimed, but consists rather in something’s having been effected, as *Ethics* 7 says. And when one says ‘sensibly’, this excludes the perfections of things that do not have sentience and in which there is no such thing as pleasure (*excluduntur perfectiones rerum insensibilium in quibus non est delectatio*).

So, then, it is clear that since pleasure is a movement in the animal appetite that follows upon sensory apprehension, it is a passion of the soul.

Reply to objection 1: As *De Anima* 2 proves, an unimpeded connatural operation is a secondary perfection. And so when a thing is established in a proper and unimpeded connatural operation, what follows is pleasure, which, as has been explained, consists in its having been perfected. So, then, when one claims that pleasure is an operation, this predication is based on the cause [of pleasure] and not on its essence (*non est praedicatio per essentiam sed per causam*).

Reply to objection 2: In the case of an animal, there are two sorts of movement that can be considered: (a) the one has to do with the *intending* of an end, and this belongs to the appetite; (b) the other has to do with *execution*, and this pertains to the exterior operation.

Thus, even though, in someone who has attained the good in which he takes pleasure, the movement of execution by which the appetitive part tends toward the end has ceased, nonetheless, what does not cease is that movement of the appetitive part by which (a) it previously desired the unpossessed good and by which (b) it afterwards takes pleasure in the possessed good. For even though pleasure is the appetite’s resting in a certain sense, given the presence of the good which gives pleasure and satisfies the appetite, nonetheless, what remains is the change effected in the appetite by the desirable good (*immutatio appetitus a appetibili*); and it is by reason of this change that pleasure is a certain movement.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1 and 4), even though the name ‘passion’ is more appropriate in the case of passions that are corruptive and tend toward what is bad—e.g., sicknesses in the body, and sadness and fear in the soul—nonetheless, there are also some passions that are ordered toward the good. And it is in this sense that pleasure is called a ‘passion’.

Article 2

Does pleasure exist in time?

It seems that pleasure exists in time:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, pleasure is a certain movement. But every movement exists in time. Therefore, pleasure exists in time.

Objection 2: A thing is called ‘long-lasting’ or ‘lingering’ in relation to time (*secundum tempus*). But some pleasures are called ‘lingering’. Therefore, pleasure exists in time.

Objection 3: The passions of the soul belong to a single genus. But some passions of the soul exist in time. Therefore, so does pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “It will not take time for one to receive pleasure (*secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem*).”

I respond: There are two ways in which a thing can exist in time: (a) in its own right (*secundum se*) and (b) through another (*per aliud*) and, as it were, *per accidens*.

For since time is the numbering of successive entities, the things that are said to exist in time in their own right are those whose nature is succession or something that pertains to succession, e.g., movement, rest, speaking, and other things of this sort.

By contrast, the things that are said to exist in time because of another (*secundum aliud*) and not *per se* are those whose nature is not any sort of succession and yet which are such that they are subject to

some sort of succession. For instance, being a man does not by its nature (*de sui ratione*) involve succession, since it is not a movement but is instead the terminus of a movement or change, viz., the man's being generated; however, because human *esse* is subject to changeable causes, being a man exists in time.

Therefore, one should reply that pleasure in its own right does not exist in time, since pleasure is taken in an already acquired good which is, as it were, the terminus of a movement. However, if that acquired good is subject to change, then the pleasure will exist *per accidens* in time. On the other hand, if the good in question is altogether unchangeable, then the pleasure will not exist either *per se* or *per accidens* in time.

Reply to objection 1: As *De Anima* 3 says, 'movement' has two senses (*motus dupliciter dicitur*):

In one sense, a movement is the act of what is imperfect—more specifically, of what exists in potentiality—insofar as it is imperfect; and a movement taken in this sense is successive and exists in time.

The second sort of movement is the act of what is perfect, i.e., of what exists in actuality, e.g., understanding, sensing, willing, etc.—and, likewise, taking pleasure. And a movement in this sense is not successive and does not exist *per se* in time.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure is said to be long-lasting or lingering insofar as it exists *per accidens* in time.

Reply to objection 3: The other passions do not have as their object an already acquired good, in the way that pleasure does. Hence, they have more of the character of an imperfect movement than pleasure does. As a result, it is more fitting for pleasure not to exist in time.

Article 3

Is joy altogether the same thing as pleasure?

It seems that joy (*gaudium*) is altogether the same thing as pleasure (*delectatio*):

Objection 1: The passions of the soul differ with respect to their objects. But the object of joy is the same as the object of pleasure, viz., a good that has been acquired. Therefore, joy is altogether the same as pleasure.

Objection 2: A single movement does not terminate in two endpoints. But the movement that terminates in joy is the same as the movement that terminates in pleasure, and that movement is concupiscence. Therefore, pleasure and joy are altogether the same thing.

Objection 3: If joy differs from pleasure, then it seems that, by parity of reasoning, 'gladness' (*laetitia*), 'exultation' or 'excitement' (*exultatio*), and 'delight' or 'enjoyment' (*iucunditas*) signify something different from pleasure, and so they will all be different passions. But this seems false. Therefore, it is not the case that joy differs from pleasure.

But contrary to this: In the case of brute animals we do not use the name 'joy'. But we do in their case use the name 'pleasure'. Therefore, it is not the case that joy and pleasure are the same thing.

I respond: As Avicenna says in his book *De Anima*, joy is a certain species of pleasure. For notice that, as was explained above (q. 30, a. 3), some instances of concupiscence are natural, whereas some are non-natural and follow upon reason. (Or, as Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa put it, some are "corporeal" and some "belong to the soul" (*sunt animales*)—which amounts to the same thing.) For we take pleasure both (a) in those things that we naturally desire, once we acquire them, and also (b) in those things that we desire because of reason. However, the name 'joy' has a place only in the pleasure that follows upon reason. This is why we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but instead attribute to them only the name 'pleasure'.

Now everything that we desire according to nature we can also desire with the pleasure of reason, but not vice versa. Hence, all the things with respect to which there is pleasure are such that there can also be joy with respect to them in individuals who have reason. However, there is not always joy with respect to all of them. For sometimes one feels some bodily pleasure (*aliquis sentit aliquam delectationem secundum corpus*) and yet does not rejoice in this according to reason. Because of this, it is clear that ‘pleasure’ applies to more things than (*est in plus quam*) ‘joy’ does.

Reply to objection 1: Since the object of an animal appetite is an apprehended good, the diversity of apprehensions is in some way relevant to a diversity of objects. And so pleasures belonging to the soul that are also joys are distinguished from corporeal pleasures, which are only called ‘pleasures’, in a way that corresponds to what was said above (q. 30, a. 3) about the kinds of concupiscence.

Reply to objection 2: A similar difference is likewise found in the case of concupiscence, so that ‘pleasure’ corresponds to ‘sentient desire’ or ‘concupiscence’ (*concupiscentia*) and ‘joy’ corresponds to ‘desire’ (*desiderium*), which seems to pertain to the ‘soul’s concupiscence’ (*ad concupiscentiam animalem*). And corresponding to the difference in the types of movement there is also a difference in types of rest.

Reply to objection 3: The other names relevant to pleasure are imposed because of pleasure’s effect. For instance, *laetitia* (‘gladness’) is imposed because of the widening (*dilatatio*) of the heart, as if one were saying *latitia* (‘width’). *Exultatio* (‘exultation’ or ‘excitement’) is imposed because of those exterior signs of interior pleasure that become apparent externally to the extent that the interior joy breaks out into the open. *Iucunditas* (‘delight’ or ‘enjoyment’) is imposed because of the special signs of, or effects of, gladness. And yet all these names seem to pertain to joy; for we use them only in the case of rational natures.

Article 4

Does pleasure exist in the intellectual appetite?

It seems that pleasure does not exist in the intellectual appetite:

Objection 1: In *Rhetoric* 1 Aristotle says, “Pleasure is a felt movement (*motus quidam sensibilis*).” But there is no felt movement in the intellectual part of the soul. Therefore, pleasure does not exist in the intellectual part.

Objection 2: Pleasure is a passion. But every passion exists in the sentient appetite. Therefore, pleasure exists only in the sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Pleasure is common to us and brute animals. Therefore, it exists only in that part of the soul that is common to us and brute animals.

But contrary to this: Psalm 36:4 says, “Take pleasure in the Lord (*delectare in domino*).” But only the intellectual appetite, and not the sentient appetite, can reach out to God. Therefore, pleasure can exist in the intellectual appetite.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), some instances of pleasure follow upon reason’s apprehension. However, it is not only the sentient appetite but also the intellectual appetite, called the ‘will’, that is moved at reason’s apprehension by means of an application to something particular. Accordingly, in the intellectual appetite, or will, there is pleasure that is called ‘joy’, though not corporeal pleasure.

Now the relation between the types of pleasure in the two appetites is that the sentient appetite’s pleasure is accompanied by some corporeal change, whereas the intellectual appetite’s pleasure is nothing other than a simple movement of the will. And this is why, in *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine says, “Avid desire (*cupiditas*) and gladness (*laetitia*) are nothing other than an act of will in agreement

with what we wish for (*voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus*).”

Reply to objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher’s, ‘felt’ is being used generally for any sort of apprehension. For in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “There is pleasure with respect to every sensory power, and, similarly, with respect to the intellect and speculative inquiry.”

A possible alternative reply is that the Philosopher is here defining pleasure for the case of the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure has the character of a passion, properly speaking, insofar as it occurs with some corporeal change. And it does not exist in this way in the intellective appetite. Rather, in the intellective appetite it exists as a simple movement; for this is also the way it exists in God and in the angels. Hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “God rejoices by a single simple operation.” And at the end of *De Caelesti Hierarchia* Dionysius says, “The angels are not susceptible to our passive pleasure, but instead they rejoice along with God with a gladness of incorruption.”

Reply to objection 3: In us there is not only the sort of pleasure that we share with brute animals, but also the sort of pleasure that we share with the angels. Hence, in the same place Dionysius says, “Holy men often participate in the pleasures of the angels.” And so in us pleasure exists not only in the sentient appetite, which we share with brute animals, but also in the intellective appetite, which we share with the angels.

Article 5

Are corporeal and sensible pleasures greater than intelligible spiritual pleasures?

It seems that corporeal and sensible pleasures are greater than intelligible spiritual pleasures:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, everyone pursues certain pleasures. But more people pursue sensible pleasures than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore, corporeal pleasures are greater.

Objection 2: The magnitude of a cause is known by its effect. But corporeal pleasures have more powerful effects, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, “They alter bodies and in some they cause insanity.” Therefore, corporeal pleasures are more powerful.

Objection 3: It is necessary to temper and curb corporeal pleasures because of their strength. But it is unnecessary to curb spiritual pleasures. Therefore, corporeal pleasures are greater.

But contrary to this: Psalm 118:103 says, “How sweet are Your words to my palate, more than honey to my mouth.” And in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “The greatest pleasure is that which stems from the operation of wisdom.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), pleasure stems from one’s being joined to something fitting that is sensed or known. Now in the works of the soul, principally the sentient and intellective works, one has to take into account that since they do not pass into an exterior matter, they are acts or perfections of the one who is operating, viz., by understanding, by sensing, by willing, etc. For the actions that pass into exterior matter are instead the actions and the perfections of the matter that is changed, since a movement is an act of the thing moved that comes from the thing that effects the movement (*motus est actus mobilis a movente*). So, then, the aforementioned actions of the sentient and intellective soul are themselves a certain good belonging to the one who operates, and they are also known through the sensory power or the intellect. Hence, pleasure arises from the actions themselves and not just from their objects.

Therefore, if intelligible pleasures are compared to sensible pleasures insofar as we take pleasure *in the actions themselves*, viz., in the sensory power’s cognition and in the intellect’s cognition, then there is no doubt that intelligible pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For a man takes much more

pleasure in knowing something by having an intellectual understanding of it than he does in knowing something by sensing it. For intellectual cognition is more perfect and even better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than the sensory power does. Intellectual cognition is also loved to a greater degree, since, just as Augustine claims in *De Civitate Dei*, there is no one who would not wish to be without corporeal vision rather than to be without intellectual vision, in the way in which beasts and simpletons are without intellectual vision.

On the other hand, if intelligible spiritual pleasures are compared to sensible corporeal pleasures *in their own right and simply speaking*, then the spiritual pleasures are greater. This is clear from the three things that are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the good that is conjoined, (b) that to which it is conjoined, and (c) the conjoining itself:

(a) For a spiritual good is itself greater than a corporeal good, and it is loved to a greater degree. An indication of this is that men abstain from even the greatest corporeal pleasures (*etiam a maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinere*) in order not to lose honor, which is an intelligible good.

(b) Similarly, the intellectual part of the soul is itself much more noble and more capable of cognition (*magis cognoscitiva*) than the sentient part.

(c) Again, the conjoining of the two is more intimate, more perfect, and more stable (*firma*). It is more intimate because the sensory power stops at a thing's exterior accidents, whereas the intellect penetrates through to a thing's essence; for the intellect's object is what a thing is (*quod quid est*). It is more perfect because a movement, which is an imperfect act, accompanies the conjoining of the sensory power to what is sensed, and for this reason sensible pleasures do not occur all at once, but instead something passes away in them while something else waits to be consummated, as is obvious in the case of the pleasures of food and sex. By contrast, intelligible things exist without movement, and for this reason pleasures of this sort occur all at once. Again, the conjoining is more firm because corporeal pleasures are corruptible and quickly pass away, whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.

However, *as things appear to us (quoad nos)*, corporeal pleasures are stronger (*magis vehementes*), and this for three reasons. First, sensible things are more known to us than intelligible things are. Second, since sensible pleasures are passions belonging to the sentient appetite, they are accompanied by some corporeal change; this does not happen in the case of spiritual pleasures, except in virtue of a sort of overflow from the higher appetite into the lower appetite. Third, corporeal pleasures are desired as a sort of remedy (*ut medicinae quaedam*) for corporeal defects or problems that result in sadness; hence, when corporeal pleasures supersede such sadness, they are felt more keenly and, as a result, they are welcomed to a greater degree than are spiritual pleasures. For, as will be explained below (q. 35, a. 5), spiritual pleasures do not have any contrary forms of sadness.

Reply to objection 1: The reasons why the majority pursues corporeal pleasures are that (a) sensible things are known to a greater degree and to a greater number of people, and also that (b) men need these pleasures as remedies for many pains and sorrows, and that (c) since the majority of men cannot attain to spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, they consequently fall back into corporeal pleasures (*declinent ad corporales*).

Reply to objection 2: Corporeal change is caused more by corporeal pleasures because they are passions of the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal pleasures accord with the sentient part of the soul, which is regulated by reason, and this is why they need to be tempered and curbed by reason. By contrast, spiritual pleasures accord with the mind, which is itself the rule, and so they are sober and moderate in their own right.

Article 6

**Are the pleasures associated with touch greater than
the pleasures associated with the other senses?**

It seems that the pleasures associated with touch (*delectationes secundum tactum*) are not greater than the pleasures associated with the other senses (*delectationes secundum alios sensus*):

Objection 1: The greatest pleasure seems to be a pleasure which is such that if it is excluded, all joy ceases. But such is the pleasure associated with sight; for Tobit 5:12 says, “What sort of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness and see not the light of heaven?” Therefore, the pleasure that stems from sight is the greatest among sensible pleasures.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Each thing is such that what is pleasurable to it is what it loves.” But among all the senses, sight is loved the most. Therefore, the pleasure associated with sight is the greatest.

Objection 3: Sight is especially the beginning of the friendship of pleasure. But pleasure is the cause of such friendship. Therefore, pleasure seems to be especially associated with sight.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that the greatest pleasures are associated with touch.

I respond: As has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4), each thing, insofar as it is loved, becomes pleasurable. Now as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* points out, the sensory powers are loved for two reasons, viz., for the sake of *cognition* and because of their *usefulness*. Hence, it is in both these ways that there can be pleasure associated with the sensory power.

However, since it is proper to man to apprehend cognition itself as a certain good, it follows that the first pleasures of the senses, viz., those associated with cognition, are proper to men, whereas to the extent that the pleasures of the senses are loved for their usefulness, they are common to all animals. Therefore, if we are speaking of the sensory pleasure that exists by reason of *cognition*, then it is clear that there is greater pleasure associated with *sight* than with any other sense.

However, if we are speaking of the sensory pleasure that exists by reason of *usefulness*, then the greatest pleasure is associated with *touch*. For the usefulness of sensible things has to do with their being ordered toward the conservation of animal nature. But it is the sensible objects of touch that are related more closely to this sort of usefulness, since touch has cognition of the things that an animal consists of, viz., hot and cold and other things of this sort. Accordingly, the pleasures associated with touch are greater in the sense of being more proximate to the end. Moreover, because of this, the other animals, which do not have sensible pleasure except by reason of its usefulness, do not take pleasure in the other senses except in relation to the sensible objects of touch. For as *Ethics* 3 puts it, “Dogs take pleasure not in smelling hares, but in eating them; and the lion takes pleasure not in the sound made by an ox, but in devouring the ox.”

Therefore, given that the pleasure of touch is the greatest in relation to usefulness and that the pleasure of sight is the greatest in relation to cognition, if someone wants to compare the two of them, he will find that to the extent that he remains within the confines of sensible pleasure, the pleasure of touch is greater, absolutely speaking, than the pleasure of sight. For, clearly, it is what is natural in any given thing that is the most powerful, and the pleasures of touch are the ones toward which natural concupiscence—e.g., the desire for food, sexual desire, etc.—is ordered. On the other hand, if we consider the pleasures of sight insofar as sight serves the intellect, then in this sense the pleasures of sight will be more powerful, for the same reason that intelligible pleasures are more powerful than sensible pleasures.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 3), ‘joy’ signifies pleasure that *belongs to the soul* (*animalem delectationem*) and this pertains especially to sight. But *natural* pleasure pertains

especially to touch.

Reply to objection 2: As is shown in the same place, sight is especially loved for the sake of cognition, since it shows us many of the differences among things.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure is a cause of carnal love in one way, and sight is a cause of it in another way. For pleasure—and especially the pleasure associated with touch—is a cause of the friendship of pleasure in the manner of an end, whereas sight is a cause in the sense of being the beginning of movement, insofar as it is through seeing what is lovable that one receives an impression of the likeness of the thing, and this entices one to love it and desire its pleasure.

Article 7

Are any pleasures non-natural?

It seems that no pleasure is non-natural (*innaturalis*):

Objection 1: Pleasure in the affections of the soul is like rest in the case of bodies. But a body's natural appetite comes to rest only in its natural place. Therefore, an animal appetite's rest, i.e., pleasure, can exist only in something natural. Therefore, no pleasure is non-natural.

Objection 2: What is contrary to nature is violent. But as *Metaphysics* 5 says, everything violent produces sadness. Therefore, nothing that is contrary to nature can be pleasurable.

Objection 3: As is clear from the Philosopher's definition cited above (a. 1), establishment into one's proper nature is, when it is sensed, a cause of pleasure. But establishment into its proper nature is natural to each thing, since a natural movement is a movement toward a natural terminus. Therefore, every pleasure is natural.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says that some pleasures "are sicknesses and contrary to nature."

I respond: As *Physics* 2 says, 'natural' means what is in accord with nature. Now in the case of a man, 'natural' can be taken in two senses:

(a) In one sense, insofar as the intellect and reason are most principally man's nature, since it is by reason that man is constituted in his species. And in this sense, what can be called man's 'natural' pleasures are those that lie in what is fitting for a man with respect to reason, in the way in which it is natural to a man to take pleasure in the contemplation of truth and in acts of virtue.

(b), 'Nature' can be taken in a second sense in the case of a man insofar as it is divided off from 'reason', so that what is natural is that which is common to men and other things and, especially, that which is not obedient to reason. Accordingly, things that pertain to the conservation of the body, either (a) in the individual, such as food, drink, sleep, etc., or (b) in the species, such as sexual intercourse, are said to be naturally pleasurable to a man.

Now with respect to both sorts of pleasures, it happens that some are non-natural absolutely speaking but natural in a certain respect. For it is possible for some principles that are natural to the species to be corrupted in a given individual, and in such a case what is contrary to the nature of the species becomes natural *per accidens* to *this* individual, in the way that it is natural to *this* heated water that it give warmth. So, then, it is possible for what is contrary to man's nature—either with respect to reason or what respect to the conservation of the body—to become connatural to *this* man because of some corruption of nature that exists in him. This corruption can be either (a) on the part of the body, due either (i) to sickness, as when bitter things seem sweet, and vice versa, to those who are feverish, or (ii) to some bad persistent condition (*propter malam complexionem*), as when someone takes pleasure in eating dirt or coal, etc., or even (b) on the part of the soul, as when out of custom some men take pleasure in eating men, or in having sex with beasts or with males, or other practices of this sort that are not in

accord with human nature.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 8

Is one pleasure contrary to another?

It seems that it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another:

Objection 1: The passions of the soul receive their species and their oppositions from their objects. But the object of pleasure is the good. Therefore, since it is not the case that one good is contrary to another, but instead, as the *Categories* says, “the good is contrary to the bad, and the bad to the bad,” it seems that it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another.

Objection 2: As *Metaphysics* 10 proves, it is a single thing that is contrary to a single thing. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore, it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another.

Objection 3: If one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only because of an opposition among the things in which one takes pleasure. But this difference is a material difference, whereas, according to *Metaphysics* 10, contrariety is a difference in form. Therefore, there is no contrariety between one pleasure and another.

But contrary to this: According to the Philosopher, contraries are things that impede one another and exist in the same genus. But as *Ethics* 10 says, there are pleasures that impede one another. Therefore, some pleasures are contrary to one another.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), pleasure in the affections of the soul is like rest in the case of bodies. Now two instances of rest are called ‘contrary’ when they exist in contrary termini, in the way that “a rest that exists above is contrary to a rest that exists below,” as *Physics* 5 puts it. Hence, in the case of the affections of the soul, it is possible for two pleasures to be contrary to one another.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage from the Philosopher ‘good’ and ‘bad’ should be interpreted as ‘virtues’ and ‘vices’. For two vices may be contrary to one another, whereas it is not the case that one virtue is contrary to another.

Now in other cases, there is nothing to prevent two goods from being contrary to one another, in the way that hot and cold, one of which is good for fire and the other of which is good for water, are opposed to one another. And it is in this way that one pleasure can be contrary to another. But this cannot happen in the case of the good of virtue, since the good of virtue exists only because of agreement with some single thing, viz., reason.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure is related to the affections of the soul in the way that natural rest is related to bodies, since it exists in something fitting and, as it were, natural. By contrast, sadness is like a violent rest, since what is painful is repugnant to the animal appetite in the way that a place of violent rest is repugnant to a natural appetite. But as *Physics* 5 explains, the natural rest of a body is opposed both by the violent rest of the same body and by the natural rest of another body. Hence, a pleasure is opposed both by a pleasure and by sadness.

Reply to objection 3: Since the things in which we take pleasure are the objects of pleasure, they make for not only a material difference but also a formal difference, as long as there are diverse types of pleasurable things. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 23, a. 1 and 4, and q. 30, a. 2), the diverse characters of the objects make for diverse species of acts or of passions.

QUESTION 32

The Causes of Pleasure

Next we have to consider the causes of pleasure. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is action or operation (*operatio*) a proper cause of pleasure? (2) Is movement a cause of pleasure? (3) Are hope and memory causes of pleasure? (4) Is sadness a cause of pleasure? (5) Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure for us? (6) Is doing good for someone else a cause of pleasure? (7) Is likeness a cause of pleasure? (8) Is wonder (*admiratio*) a cause of pleasure?

Article 1

Is operation a cause of pleasure?

It seems that action or operation (*operatio*) is not a proper and primary cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Taking pleasure consists in the sensory power’s undergoing something.” For as has been explained (q. 31, a. 1), cognition is required for pleasure. But the objects of operations are knowable prior to the operations themselves. Therefore, operation is not a proper cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Pleasure consists especially in an acquired end, since the end is what is principally desired. But it is not always the case that an operation is the end; instead, sometimes the end is the very thing that is done through the operation (*ipsum operatum*). Therefore, it is not the case that operation is a proper and *per se* cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Leisure and rest (*otium et requies*) bespeak the cessation of an operation. But as *Rhetoric* 1 points out, they are desirable things. Therefore, it is not the case that operation is a proper cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 and 10 the Philosopher says, “Pleasure is an unimpeded connatural operation (*operatio connaturalis non impedita*).”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the acquisition of a fitting good and (b) the cognition of this acquisition. Now each of these consists in a certain operation, since actual cognition is an operation and, similarly, we acquire a fitting good by some operation. In addition, the operation itself is a certain fitting good. Hence, it must be the case that every pleasure follows upon an operation.

Reply to objection 1: The objects of the operations are themselves pleasurable only insofar as they are joined to us either (a) through cognition alone, as when we take pleasure in thinking about or looking at certain things, or (b) in some other way along with cognition, as when one takes pleasure in knowing that he possesses some good, such as riches or honor, etc., that is pleasurable only if it is apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 2, “To think of something as one’s own is a great pleasure that proceeds from the natural love one has for himself.” For having things of this sort is nothing other than making use of them or being able to make use of them, and this occurs through an operation. Hence, it is clear that every pleasure is traced back to an operation that is a cause of it.

Reply to objection 2: Even in cases in which the things done through the operations—and not the operations—are the end, the things done are themselves pleasurable insofar as they are possessed or made, and this goes back to some operation or act of using.

Reply to objection 3: Operations are pleasurable to the extent that they are proportioned to and connatural to the one who operates. Now since human power is finite, an operation is proportioned to it by some measure. Hence, if the operation exceeds that measure, then it will no longer be proportionate or pleasurable, but will instead be laborious and tedious (*laboriosa et attædiens*). Accordingly, leisure and play and other things involving relaxation are enjoyable to the extent that they remove the sadness that stems from work.

Article 2

Is movement a cause of pleasure?

It seems that movement or change (*motus*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), it is a good that is presently possessed that is a cause of pleasure; hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says that pleasure is not like generation, but is instead like the operation of a thing that already exists. But what is moving toward something does not yet possess it; rather, it is in a certain sense on the path of generation with respect to it, since, as *Physics* 8 says, generation and corruption are adjoined to every movement. Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Movement is mainly a cause of laboriousness and weariness in operations (*in operibus*). But by the fact that operations are laborious and wearying, they are painful (*afflictivae*) rather than pleasurable. Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: ‘Movement’ or ‘change’ implies a certain newness that is opposed to custom (*opponitur consuetudine*). But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “What is customary is pleasurable to us.” Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 8 Augustine says, “What does this mean, Lord my God—though You are everlasting joy to Yourself and some things around You rejoice in You always, this local portion of things rejoices in alternating ebbs and flows, offenses and reconciliations?” From this one may infer that men rejoice and take pleasure in certain sorts of changes (*in quibusdam alternationibus*). And so movement or change seems to be a cause of pleasure.

I respond: Three things are required for pleasure, two of which are involved in the pleasurable conjoining, and the third of which is the cognition of this conjoining. And as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 7 and *Rhetoric* 1, it is in accord with these three things that movement or change becomes pleasurable.

For *on the part of us who take pleasure*, change (*transmutatio*) becomes pleasurable to us because our nature is changeable. For this reason, what is now fitting for us will not be fitting for us later on; for instance, getting warm in front of a fire is fitting for a man in the winter, but not in the summer.

Next, *on the part of the pleasurable good that is conjoined to us*, change is again pleasurable. For the continued action of any agent adds to the effect; for instance, the longer someone stays near a fire, the warmer and drier he becomes. But a ‘natural condition’ (*naturalis habitudo*) consists in a measure. And so when the continued presence of a pleasurable thing exceeds the measure of one’s natural condition, then the thing’s removal becomes pleasurable.

Next, *on the part of the cognition itself*, by reason of the fact that a man desires to have a complete and perfect cognition of a thing. Therefore, since some things cannot be apprehended all at once (*tota simul*), change is more pleasing in the case of these things, so that one part passes away and another part succeeds it, and in this way the whole thing comes to be sensed. Hence, in *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says, “You do not want the syllable to stay; instead, you want it to fly away so that others might come and you might hear the whole thing. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many but they do not all exist together at the same time, all of them, if they can all be sensed, are more pleasing than they are one by one.”

Therefore, if an entity is such that (a) its nature is unchangeable, and (b) its natural condition cannot be exceeded by a continuation of the pleasurable thing, and (c) it can intuit the pleasurable thing as a whole all at once, then change will not be pleasurable to it. And the closer a given pleasure comes to being like this, the more capable it is of being prolonged.

Reply to objection 1: Even if what is moving does not yet possess perfectly what it is moving toward, it nonetheless is already beginning to have something of what it is moving toward—and,

accordingly, the movement is itself pleasurable to a certain degree (*habet aliquid delectationis*). Yet it falls short of being a perfect pleasure, since the most perfect pleasures exist in unchangeable things.

Also, as was just explained, a movement or change also becomes pleasurable to the extent that because of it a thing that was previously unfitting either becomes fitting or ceases to exist.

Reply to objection 2: Movement leads to laboriousness and weariness to the extent that the natural condition is exceeded. But movement in this sense is not pleasurable; instead, it is pleasurable to the extent that it removes contraries of the natural condition.

Reply to objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasurable to the extent that it becomes natural. For custom is, as it were, a second nature (*altera natura*). Now movement or change is not pleasurable because it departs from custom; instead, it is pleasurable to the extent that it impedes the sort of corruption of the natural condition that could come from the prolongation of an operation. And so custom and the movement are both pleasurable by the same cause, viz., connaturality.

Article 3

Are hope and memory causes of pleasure?

It seems that hope and memory are not causes of pleasure:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, pleasure has to do with a good that is present. But memory and hope have to do with what is absent; for memory is about the past, whereas hope is about the future. Therefore, memory and hope are not causes of pleasure.

Objection 2: It is not the case that the same thing is a cause of contrary things. But hope is a cause of affliction, since Proverbs 13:12 says, “Hope deferred afflicts the soul.” Therefore, hope is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Just as hope agrees with pleasure in having to do with the good, so too do concupiscence and love. Therefore, hope should not be designated as a cause of pleasure any more than concupiscence or love are.

But contrary to this: Romans 12:12 says, “..... rejoicing in hope.” And Psalm 76:4 says, “I remembered God and was delighted.”

I respond: Pleasure is caused by the presence of a fitting good insofar as that good is sensed or perceived in some way or other. Now there are two ways in which something is present to us: (a) *by cognition*, viz., insofar as what is known exists in the knower by means of a likeness of it; and (b) *in reality*, viz., insofar as the one thing is joined in reality to the other, either in actuality or in potentiality, in accord with some mode of conjoining.

And since (a) a conjoining in reality is greater than a conjoining by means of a likeness, which is the sort of conjoining that belongs to cognition, and since likewise (b) the conjoining of a real thing is greater in actuality than in potentiality, it follows that the greatest pleasure is that which comes through the sensory power, and this requires the presence of the sensible thing.

However, in second place is the pleasure that belongs to hope, in which the pleasurable conjoining exists not only with respect to apprehension, but also with respect to one’s ability or power to acquire the good that gives pleasure.

And third place is occupied by the pleasure that belongs to memory, in which there is only a conjoining of apprehension.

Reply to objection 1: Hope and memory have to do with things which are absent absolutely speaking but which are present in a certain respect, viz., either through apprehension alone or through apprehension and ability, at least estimated ability.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing from being, in different respects, a cause of contraries. So, then, insofar as it involves a present judgment about a future good, hope is a cause of

pleasure, whereas insofar as the thing's presence is lacking, hope is a cause of affliction.

Reply to objection 3: Love and concupiscence are also causes of pleasure. For everything that is loved is pleasurable to the lover, because love is a sort of union or connaturality between the lover and what is loved. Similarly, everything for which there is concupiscence is pleasurable to the one who desires it, since concupiscence is mainly a desire for pleasure.

However, to the extent that hope involves a sort of certitude about the presence of a pleasurable good—something that neither love nor concupiscence involves—it is hope that is posited as a cause of pleasure more than love and concupiscence are. Similarly, hope is posited as a cause of pleasure more than memory is, because memory is of something that has already passed away.

Article 4

Is sadness a cause of pleasure?

It seems that sadness or pain (*tristitia*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: A contrary is not a cause of its contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore, it is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Contraries are the effects of contraries. But remembered pleasurable things are a cause of pleasure. Therefore, remembered sad things are a cause of pain and not of pleasure.

Objection 3: Sadness is related to pleasure as hatred is related to love. But as was explained above (q. 29, a. 2), hatred is not a cause of love, but instead vice versa. Therefore, sadness is not a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: Psalm 41:4 says, “Tears have been to me my bread, day and night.” But ‘bread’ here means pleasurable refreshment. Therefore, tears, which arise from sadness, can be pleasurable.

I respond: Sadness can be thought of in two ways: (a) insofar as it exists *in actuality* and (b) insofar as it exists *in memory*. And in both of these ways sadness can be a cause of pleasure.

Sadness that exists in actuality is a cause of pleasure insofar as it effects a memory of something beloved at the absence of which one is saddened and yet in the mere apprehension of which one takes pleasure.

On the other hand, the memory of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure in light of the later escape from sadness. For not possessing something bad is taken as a good (*accipitur in ratione boni*), and insofar as a man apprehends himself to have escaped from sadness and pain, the stuff of joy grows for him. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 22 Augustine says, “Often, while joyful, we remember sad things and, while healthy, we remember pains but without the pain, and because of this we become even more joyful and thankful.” And in *Confessiones* 8 he says, “The more danger there was in the battle, the more joy there will be in the victory.”

Reply to objection 1: A contrary is sometimes a *per accidens* cause of its contrary, in the way that, as *Physics* 8 points out, what is cold sometimes gives warmth. And, similarly, sadness is a *per accidens* cause of pleasure insofar as it effects the apprehension of something pleasurable.

Reply to objection 2: Remembered sad things are a cause of joy not insofar as they are sad and contrary to pleasurable things, but rather insofar as a man is now free of them.

Reply to objection 3: Hatred can likewise be a *per accidens* cause of love; for some individuals love one another because they agree in their hatred of one and the same thing.

Article 5

Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure for us?

It seems that the operations or actions (*actiones*) of others are not a cause of pleasure for us:

Objection 1: It is a conjoined good of one's own that is a cause of pleasure. But the operations of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore, they are not a cause of pleasure for us.

Objection 2: An operation is a good that belongs to the one who operates. Therefore, if the operations of others were a cause of pleasure for us, then by parity of reasoning all the other goods that belong to others would be a cause of pleasure for us. But this is clearly false.

Objection 3: An operation is pleasurable insofar as it proceeds from a habit that exists within us (*procedit ex habitu nobis innato*); this is why *Ethics* 3 says, "We must take as a sign of a generated habit the pleasure that is effected in its act." But the operations of others do not proceed from habits that exist in us, though they do in some cases proceed from habits that exist in those who are operating. Therefore, the operations of others are pleasurable not to us, but to the very individuals who are operating.

But contrary to this: 2 John, verse 4, says, "I rejoiced greatly to find some of your children walking in the truth."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the acquisition of a good for oneself (*consecutio proprii boni*) and (b) the cognition of this acquired good that belongs to one.

Therefore, there are three ways in which someone else's operation can be a cause of pleasure:

In the first way, insofar as *we acquire some good* through someone's operation. On this score, the operations of those who do some good for us are pleasurable to us, since it is pleasurable to be treated well by another (*bene pati ab alio est delectabile*).

In the second way, insofar as through the operations of others *some cognition of or judgment about our own good* is effected in us. The reason why men take pleasure in being praised or honored by others is that they thereby receive the assessment (*aestimatio*) that some good exists within themselves. And since this sort of assessment is more forcefully generated by the testimony of good and wise individuals, men take more pleasure in being praised and honored by such individuals. Moreover, since someone who flatters gives the appearance of praising (*quia adulator est apparens laudator*), flattery is also pleasurable to some individuals. And since love is directed toward something good, and since admiration is directed toward something great, it is pleasurable to be loved by others and to be held in admiration by them. For a man thereby gets an assessment of the goodness or greatness which belongs to him and which someone else takes pleasure in.

In the third way, insofar as the operations of others, if they are good, *are themselves thought of as our own good* because of the force of love, which makes one think of his friend as identical with himself. Moreover, because of hatred, which makes one think of someone else's good as contrary to his own good, an enemy's bad action becomes pleasurable; this is why 1 Corinthians 13:6 says that charity "does not rejoice over iniquity, but rejoices with the truth."

Reply to objection 1: Someone else's action can be joined to me either through its *effect*, as in the first way above; or through *apprehension*, as in the second way; or through *affection*, as in the third way.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through with respect to the third way above, but not with respect to the first two ways.

Reply to objection 3: Even if the actions of others do not proceed from habits that exist within me, they nonetheless either (a) cause something pleasurable in me, or else (b) they give me an assessment or apprehension of my own habits, or else (c) they proceed from a habit that belongs to someone who is united with me through love.

Article 6

Is doing good for another a cause of pleasure?

It seems that doing good for another (*benefacere alteri*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), pleasure is caused by the acquisition of one's own good (*ex consecutione proprii boni*). But doing good is more akin to expending one's own good than to acquiring it (*non pertinet ad consecutionem proprii boni, sed magis ad emissionem*). Therefore, doing good seems to be a cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "A lack of generosity (*illiberalitas*) is more natural to men than is prodigality." But doing good for others belongs to prodigality, whereas refraining from doing good belongs to a lack of generosity. Therefore, since, as *Ethics* 7 and 10 say, a natural operation is pleasurable to an individual, it seems that doing good for others is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But doing certain bad things to others (*quaedam quae pertinent ad malefacere*) is naturally pleasurable to a man—for instance, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, winning against another (*vincere*), disproving another (*redarguere*), rebuking another (*increpare*), and even, in the case of angry men, punishing another (*punire*). Therefore, doing good is a cause of sadness rather than a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Politics* 2 the Philosopher says, "It is very pleasurable to give gifts or assistance to friends or strangers."

I respond: There are three ways in which doing good for another can itself be a cause of pleasure:

In the first way, in relation to the *effect*, which is a good established in the other. On this score, to the extent that we think of the other's good as our own good because of a union of love, we take pleasure in the good that we do for others, especially our friends, in the same way that we take pleasure in our own good.

In the second way, in relation to the *end*, as when someone, by doing good for another, hopes to gain some good for himself, either from God or from man. But hope is a cause of pleasure.

In the third way, in relation to the *principle*. And on this score, there are three principles in relation to which doing good for another can be a cause of pleasure:

One of them is the *ability to do good* (*facultas benefaciendi*), and on this score doing good for another becomes pleasurable to the extent that it effects for a man some idea of the abundant good which exists within him and which it is possible to share with others. And so men take pleasure in their children and in their own works as something by which they share their own good.

A second principle is an *inclining habit* in accord with which it becomes connatural to someone to do good. Hence, generous individuals give to others with pleasure.

The third principle is *the motive*—as, for instance, when someone is moved by an individual he loves toward doing good for someone. For all the things that we do or undergo for the sake of a friend are pleasurable, since love is the main cause of pleasure.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as the expending points toward one's own good, it is pleasurable. But insofar as it empties one of one's own good, it can sadden one, as when it is immoderate.

Reply to objection 2: Prodigality is immoderate expending, which is contrary to nature. And this is why prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.

Reply to objection 3: To win against another, to disprove another, and to punish another are pleasurable not insofar as they are bad for the other, but insofar as they pertain to a man's own good, which he loves more than he hates what is bad for the other.

For instance, to win against another is naturally pleasurable insofar as it gives a man an assessment of his own excellence. And because of this, all games which involve competition (*omnes ludi in quibus est concertatio*) and in which there can be victory are especially pleasurable. And, in general, so are all competitions, insofar as they involve the hope for victory.

Now there are two ways in which disproving or rebuking another can be pleasurable. In one way, insofar as it gives a man some idea of his own wisdom and excellence (*facit homini imaginationem propriae sapientiae et excellentiae*). And to rebuke or to reproach another belongs to those who are wise and greater in a second way, insofar as someone, by rebuking and reproaching another, does something good for the other—and this, as has been explained, is pleasurable.

Now for someone who is angry it is pleasurable to inflict punishment, insofar as this seems to remove the apparent threat (*remove apparentem minorationem*) that seems to come from a previous wound. For when someone is wounded by another, it thereby appears to him that he is threatened, and so he seeks to be liberated from this threat by wounding in return (*per retributionem laesionis*).

And so it is clear that doing good for another can be pleasurable *per se*, whereas doing something bad to another is pleasurable only insofar as it seems to belong to one's own good.

Article 7

Is likeness a cause of pleasure?

It seems that likeness is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: 'To rule' (*principari*) and 'to preside over' (*praesesse*) imply a certain dissimilarity. But as *Rhetoric* 1 says, "It is naturally pleasurable to rule and to preside." Therefore, it is dissimilarity, rather than likeness, that is a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Nothing is more unlike pleasure than sadness. But as *Ethics* 7 says, it is those who suffer from sadness who especially pursue pleasures. Therefore, it is dissimilarity, rather than likeness, that is a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Those who are sated with certain types of pleasurable things (*repleti aliquibus delectabilibus*) do not take pleasure in them, but instead are disgusted by them (*fastidiunt ea*)—as is clear in the case of those who are sated with food. Therefore, it is not the case that likeness is a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), likeness is a cause of love. But love is a cause of pleasure. Therefore, likeness is a cause of pleasure.

I respond: Likeness is a kind of unity; hence, what is similar to someone is pleasurable insofar as it is united with him, in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), what is similar is lovable. And if what is similar adds to and does not corrupt the individual's own good, then it is pleasurable absolutely speaking, e.g., one man with respect to another, and one youth with respect to another.

By contrast, if it corrupts the individual's own good, then it becomes disdainful or painful *per accidens*—not insofar as it is united with the individual, but insofar as it corrupts something that is more united with him (*inquantum corrumpit id quod est magis unum*). Now there are two ways in which what is similar corrupts an individual's own good:

In one way, by corrupting the measure of his own good by a sort of excess. For the good, especially a corporeal good like health, consists in a certain balance (*in quadam commensuratione consistit*). Because of this, an overabundance of food or of any corporeal pleasure becomes loathsome.

In a second way, through a direct opposition to the individual's own good, in the way that potters dislike other potters—not insofar as they are potters, but insofar as, because of the others, they lose either their superiority or their money (*amittunt excellentiam propriam sive proprium lucrum*), which they desire as goods of their own.

Reply to objection 1: Since a leader and his subject share something in common (*est communicatio principantis ad subiectum*), there is some likeness in such a case—yet it is a likeness with respect to a certain excellence, given that ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of one's own good. For to rule and to preside belong to the wise and to one's betters (*sapientum et meliorum est*

principari et praeesse). Hence, this gives a man some idea of his own proper goodness.

An alternative reply is that by the fact that a man rules and presides, he does good for others, and this is pleasurable.

Reply to objection 2: Even if what the sad man takes pleasure in is not similar to sadness, it is nonetheless similar to the sad man. For sadness is contrary to the proper good of the one who is sad. And so those who are sad desire pleasure in order that it might contribute to their own good, insofar as it is medicine against its contrary (*inquantum est medicativa contrarii*). This is the reason why corporeal pleasures, which certain sorts of sadness are contrary to, are desired more than intellectual pleasures, which, as will be explained below (q. 35, a. 5), do not have contrary forms of sadness (*non habet contrarietatem tristitiae*).

From this it likewise follows that all animals naturally desire pleasure because an animal is always laboring through its sensory power and movement. This is also why youths especially desire pleasure, because of the many changes that occur within them while they are still growing (*dum sunt in statu augmenti*). Again, those who are melancholic strongly desire pleasures in order to expel sadness, since, as *Ethics* 7 puts it, “Their body is corroded, as it were, by a base humor.”

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal goods consist in a certain measure, and so an excess of similar things corrupts one’s own good. And thus such an excess becomes distasteful and saddening, insofar as it is contrary to a man’s own good.

Article 8

Is wonder a cause of pleasure?

It seems that wonder (*admiratio*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, someone who wonders is ignorant of nature. But it is scientific knowledge (*scientia*) rather than ignorance that is pleasurable. Therefore, wonder is not a source of pleasure.

Objection 2: As the beginning of the *Metaphysics* says, wonder is the beginning of wisdom—a path, as it were, to inquiring into the truth. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, “It is more pleasurable to contemplate what is already known than to inquire into what is unknown.” For the latter involves difficulty and obstacles, whereas the former does not, and, as *Ethics* 7 says, pleasure is caused by an unimpeded operation. Therefore, wonder is not a cause of pleasure, but instead impedes it.

Objection 3: Each individual takes pleasure in what he is used to; hence, the operations of habits acquired by custom are pleasurable. But as Augustine says in his commentary on the Gospel of John, what is customary is not an object of wonder (*consueta non sunt admirabilia*). Therefore, wonder is opposed to a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher says that wonder is a cause of pleasure.

I respond: As was said above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 31, a. 1), it is pleasurable to acquire what is desired. And so the more the desire for something that is loved grows, the more the pleasure over its acquisition grows. And there is even an increase in pleasure in the very increase in the desire, since hope is likewise effected with respect to the thing that is loved. For as was explained above (a. 3), the desire is itself pleasurable because of hope.

Now wonder is a certain sort of desire to know, and it arises in a man from the fact that he sees an effect without knowing its cause, or from the fact that the cause of such an effect exceeds his cognition or ability. And so wonder is a cause of pleasure insofar as there is adjoined to it the hope of acquiring cognition of what one desires to know.

Because of this, all things that give rise to wonder (*mirabilia*) are pleasurable, as are things that are rare and all representations of things—even of those things that are not pleasurable in themselves. For

the soul rejoices in connecting one thing with another, since, as the Philosopher says in his *Poetics*, connecting one thing to another is the proper and natural act of reason.

For this reason, moreover, “being freed from great dangers is more pleasurable because it gives rise to wonder,” as *Rhetoric* 1 puts it.

Reply to objection 1: Wonder is pleasurable not because it involves ignorance, but rather because it involves a desire to learn the cause and because someone who wonders learns something new, viz., that he did not know that anything was quite like this.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure involves two things, viz., (a) coming to rest in a good and (b) perceiving this rest.

Thus, as regards the first of these, since it is more perfect to contemplate a known truth than to inquire into what is unknown, acts of contemplation with respect to known things are, speaking *per se*, more pleasurable than are acts of inquiry into unknown things.

Still, as regards the second point, it happens *per accidens* that acts of inquiry are sometimes more pleasurable because they proceed from a more intense desire (*ex maiori desiderio procedunt*), given that desire is excited to a higher degree by the perception of ignorance. Hence, a man takes pleasure especially in those things that he discovers or learns for the first time (*de novo*).

Reply to objection 3: What is customary is pleasurable to do because it is, as it were, connatural. Yet what is rare can be pleasurable either (a) by reason of *cognition*, since knowledge of such things is desired because they give rise to wonder (*inquantum sunt mira*), or (b) by reason of *operation*, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, “the mind is more inclined by desire to operate intensely in new matters.” For a more perfect operation is a cause of a more perfect pleasure.

QUESTION 33

The Effects of Pleasure

Next we have to consider the effects of pleasure. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does pleasure widen (*dilatare*) an individual? (2) Is pleasure a cause of a thirst or desire for pleasure? (3) Does pleasure impede the use of reason? (4) Does pleasure bring an operation to perfection?

Article 1

Is being widened an effect of pleasure?

It seems that being widened (*dilatatio*) is not an effect of pleasure:

Objection 1: According to the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 6:11 (“..... our heart is widened (*dilatatum est*)”), being widened seems to have more to do with love. Hence, Psalm 118:96 says of the precept of charity, “Your commandment is exceedingly wide.” But pleasure is a passion distinct from love. Therefore, being widened is not an effect of pleasure.

Objection 2: By the fact that something is widened, it becomes more capacious for receiving things. But receiving has to do with desire, which is directed at a thing that is not yet possessed. Therefore, being widened seems relevant to desire rather than to pleasure.

Objection 3: Squeezing or holding on tightly to something (*constrictio*) is opposed to widening it (*dilatatio*). But it is holding on tightly to something that seems relevant to pleasure. For we hold on tightly to what we strongly want to keep, and this is the sort of appetitive affection that is directed toward something that gives pleasure. Therefore, being widened is irrelevant to pleasure.

But contrary to this: To express joy, Isaiah 60:5 says, “You will see and abound, and your heart will wonder and be widened (*dilatabitur cor tuum*).” Moreover, pleasure itself (*ipsa delectatio*) takes its name from ‘*dilatatio*’ (being widened), in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 31, a. 3), ‘*laetitia*’ (gladness) does.

I respond: Width (*latitudo*) is a dimension of corporeal magnitude, and so in the case of the affections of the soul it is predicated only metaphorically (*non nisi secundum metaphoram dicitur*). Now being widened is, as it were, a movement with respect to width, and it belongs to pleasure with respect to the two things that are required for pleasure:

One of them has to do with the *apprehensive* power, which apprehends the conjoining of some fitting good. Now by this apprehension a man apprehends that he has acquired a certain perfection, i.e., a ‘spiritual’ magnitude, and the man’s mind is accordingly said to be made larger or to be widened by the pleasure (*animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari seu dilatari*).

The other has to do with the *appetitive* power, which assents to the pleasurable thing and comes to rest in it by in some sense surrendering itself to it in order to grasp it interiorly. And so a man’s affections are widened by pleasure in the sense that they give themselves over, as it were, to containing interiorly the thing that gives pleasure.

Reply to objection 1: In the case of things that are predicated metaphorically, nothing prevents the same thing from being attributed to diverse things in accord with diverse likenesses. Accordingly, being widened pertains to *love* by reason of a certain extension, in the sense that the lover’s affections are extended to others, in order that he might care about not just what belongs to him but what belongs to others as well. By contrast, being widened pertains to *pleasure* because something is widened in itself in the sense of being rendered more capacious.

Reply to objection 2: Desire receives some amplification from imagining the desired thing, but much more amplification it received from the presence of a thing that is already giving pleasure. For the mind offers itself to a greater degree to a thing that is already giving pleasure than to a desired thing that is not yet possessed, since pleasure is a goal of desire.

Reply to objection 3: Someone who is taking pleasure does, to be sure, hold on tightly to the thing

that gives pleasure as long as he adheres to it strongly, but his heart grows larger in order that he might enjoy the pleasurable thing completely.

Article 2

Is pleasure a cause of a desire for pleasure itself?

It seems that pleasure is not a cause of a desire for pleasure itself (*non causet desiderium sui ipsius*):

Objection 1: Every movement ceases when it arrives at rest. But as was explained above (q. 25, a. 2), pleasure is a sort of rest associated with the movement of desire (*quasi quaedam quies motus desiderii*). Therefore, the movement of desire ceases when it arrives at pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is not a cause of desire.

Objection 2: An opposite is not a cause of its opposite. But as regards its object, pleasure is in a certain sense opposed to desire, since desire is directed toward a good that is not possessed, whereas pleasure is directed at a good that is already possessed. Therefore, pleasure is not a cause of a desire for pleasure itself.

Objection 3: A distaste for something is opposed to a desire for it. But pleasure is very often a cause of distaste. Therefore, it does not effect a desire for pleasure.

But contrary to this: In John 4:13 our Lord says, “Whoever drinks of this water will thirst again,” where, according to Augustine, ‘water’ signifies corporeal pleasure.

I respond: Pleasure can be thought of in two ways: insofar as it exists *in actuality*, and insofar as it exists *in memory*. Likewise, thirst or desire can be understood in two ways: *properly*, insofar as it implies an appetite for a thing that is not possessed, and *generally*, insofar as it implies [just] the exclusion of anything distasteful (*secundum quod importat exclusionem fastidii*).

Thus, insofar as it exists *in actuality*, pleasure is not, speaking *per se*, a cause of a thirst or desire for pleasure itself. Instead, it is only *per accidens* a cause of a thirst or desire for pleasure, as long as ‘thirst’ or ‘desire’ is being predicated of an appetite for a thing that is not possessed. For pleasure is an appetitive affection with respect to a thing that is present.

However, it is possible for a thing that is present not to be possessed perfectly. This can happen either on the side of *the thing that is possessed* or on the side of *the one who possesses it*:

On the side of *the thing that is possessed*, because the thing that is possessed does not exist all at once and so is received successively, and because while someone takes pleasure in what he does possess, he desires to enjoy what still remains. For instance, as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 4, someone who hears the first part of a verse and takes pleasure in it desires to hear the other part of the verse. And in this sense almost all corporeal pleasures are a cause of a thirst for themselves, up to the point of their being consummated. For pleasures of this sort follow a certain movement, as is clear in the case of the pleasures of food.

On the side of *the one who possesses it*, as when one possesses a thing that exists as a whole within him (*habet aliquam rem in se perfectam existentem*), but does not at once possess it completely and instead acquires it little by little. For instance, in this world we take pleasure when we perceive imperfectly something of the knowledge of God, and the pleasure itself excites a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge—this according to a possible interpretation of Ecclesiasticus 24:29 (“They who drink of me will still thirst”).

By contrast, if by ‘thirst’ or ‘desire’ one means just an intense affection without distaste, then it is spiritual pleasures that especially effect a thirst or desire for pleasure itself. For since increased, or even prolonged, corporeal pleasures overwhelm the natural condition (*faciunt superexcrementiam naturalis habitudinis*), they become distasteful (*efficiuntur fastidiosae*), as is clear in the case of the pleasures of

food. Because of this, when someone has already reached a completeness in corporeal pleasures, he finds them distasteful and sometimes desires other pleasures instead. By contrast, spiritual pleasures do not produce an overload in the natural condition, but instead perfect nature. Hence, when consummation is reached in the case of these pleasures, then they are more pleasurable—except perhaps *per accidens*, insofar as the contemplative operation has adjoined to it certain operations of the corporeal powers, which are wearied by persistent operation. And it is in this way that one can understand Ecclesiasticus 24:29 (“They who drink of me will still thirst.”) For even of the angels, who know God perfectly and take pleasure in Him, 1 Peter 1:12 says, “They desire to look at Him.”

On the other hand, if pleasure is thought of insofar as it exists *in memory* and not in actuality, then it is *per se* apt to be a cause of a thirst and desire for pleasure itself, viz., when the man returns to the disposition in which what has now passed was pleasurable to him. However, if he has departed from that disposition, then the memory of pleasure is a cause of aversion in him and not of pleasure, as in the case of the memory of food for one who is now full.

Reply to objection 1: When the pleasure is complete (*perfecta*), it then has rest in the full sense (*habet omnimodam quietem*), and the movement of desire toward what is not possessed ceases. But when pleasure is had incompletely (*imperfecte*), then the movement of desire toward what is not possessed does not cease altogether.

Reply to objection 2: What is had incompletely is had in one respect and not had in another respect. And so both desire and pleasure can exist simultaneously with respect to it.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, pleasures are a cause of aversion (*fastidium*) in one way and of desire in another way.

Article 3

Does pleasure impede the use of reason?

It seems that pleasure does not impede the use of reason:

Objection 1: Rest confers what is especially needed for the use of reason; hence, *Physics* 7 says, “When we sit and rest, the soul becomes knowledgeable and prudent,” and Wisdom 8:16 says, “Going into my house, I will repose with her,” i.e. with wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of rest. Therefore, it does not impede the use of reason, but instead assists it.

Objection 2: Things that do not exist in the same thing do not impede one another, even if they are contraries. But pleasure exists in the appetitive part of the soul, whereas the use of reason exists in the apprehensive part. Therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of reason.

Objection 3: What is impeded by another seems to be changed by it in some way. But the use of the apprehensive power affects pleasure instead of being affected by it, since it is a cause of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of reason.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Pleasure corrupts the judgment of prudence.”

I respond: As *Ethics* 10 says, “Proper pleasures add to operations, whereas extraneous pleasures impede them.” Thus, there is a certain pleasure which is had by the act of reason, as when someone takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning. This sort of pleasure does not impede the use of reason but instead assists it; for we do more attentively that which we take pleasure in, and attention aids an operation.

By contrast, there are three reasons why corporeal pleasures impede the use of reason:

First, because of *distraction*. For as has already been explained, we pay close attention to what we take pleasure in, and when attention is strongly fixed on a given thing, it is weakened with respect to other things or totally withdrawn from them. Accordingly, if a corporeal pleasure is great, then either it

will totally impede the use of reason by attracting the soul's attention to itself, or else it will impede it to a great degree.

Second, because of *opposition*. For certain pleasures, especially excessive ones, are contrary to the order of reason. And on this score the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6 that "corporeal pleasures corrupt the judgment of prudence, though not speculative judgments, e.g., that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles." (However, pleasure impedes both sorts of judgment in the first way mentioned above.)

Third, because of a sort of *shackling* (*secundum quandam ligationem*), viz., insofar as what follows upon pleasure is a certain corporeal change—even greater than in the case of the other passions, since the appetite is affixed more strongly to a present thing than to an absent thing. Corporeal disturbances of this sort impede the use of reason, as is clear in the case of drunkards, whose use of reason is shackled or impeded (*ligatum vel impeditum*).

Reply to objection 1: Corporeal pleasure does, to be sure, involve the appetite's coming to rest in the pleasurable thing, and this rest is sometimes contrary to reason. And on the part of the body, pleasure always involves a change. In both of these respects, pleasure impedes the use of reason.

Reply to objection 2: The appetitive and apprehensive parts of the soul are, to be sure, diverse parts, but they are parts of a single soul. And so when the soul's attention is strongly applied to the act of one of these parts, a contrary act by the other part is impeded.

Reply to objection 3: The use of reason requires the appropriate use of the imagination and other sentient powers, which employ a corporeal organ. And so the use of reason is impeded by a corporeal change when the acts of the imaginative power and of the other sentient powers are impeded.

Article 4

Does pleasure perfect an operation?

It seems that pleasure does not perfect an action or operation (*non perficiat operationem*):

Objection 1: Every human operation depends on the use of reason. But as has been explained (a. 3), pleasure impedes the use of reason. Therefore, pleasure weakens and does not perfect a human operation.

Objection 2: Nothing perfects either itself or its own cause. But as *Ethics* 7 and 10 explain, pleasure is an operation, and this has to be understood either with respect to its essence or with respect to its cause. Therefore, pleasure does not perfect an operation.

Objection 3: If pleasure perfects an operation, then it perfects it either as an end or as a form or as an agent. But not as an end, since operations are not sought for the sake of pleasure; instead, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2), it is just the opposite. Nor, again, in the manner of an efficient cause, since it is instead the operation that is an efficient cause of the pleasure. Nor, again, as a form, since, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, pleasure does not perfect an operation as a sort of habit. Therefore, pleasure does not perfect an operation.

But contrary to this: *Ethics* 10 says that pleasure perfects an operation.

I respond: There are two ways in which pleasure perfects an operation.

In the first way, in the manner of an *end*—not, to be sure, in the sense in which an end is *that for the sake of which* something exists, but rather in the sense in which every good that is *added by way of completion* can be called an end (*omne bonum completive superveniens potest dici finis*). Accordingly, in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, "Pleasure perfects an operation as a sort of supervening end," viz., in the sense that over and beyond the good which is the operation itself, there supervenes another good which is the pleasure and which involves the appetite's coming to rest in the previously mentioned good (*quae importat quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito*).

In the second way, on the side of the *agent cause*—not *directly*, to be sure, since in *Ethics* 10 the

Philosopher says that “pleasure perfects an operation not in the way that a physician perfects a healthy man, but in the way that health perfects him,” but instead *indirectly*, viz., insofar as an agent who takes pleasure in his action pays closer attention to that action and carries it out more diligently. Accordingly, *Ethics* 10 says, “Pleasures augment their own operations and impede extraneous operations.”

Reply to objection 1: It is not all pleasures that impede the act of reason, but rather corporeal pleasures, which do not follow upon an act of reason, but instead follow upon an act of the concupiscible part that is augmented by pleasure. By contrast, pleasure that follows upon an act of reason strengthens the use of reason.

Reply to objection 2: As *Physics* 2 says, it is possible for two things to cause one another in such a way that the first is an efficient cause of the second and the second is a final cause of the first. And in this way, as has been explained, an operation is a cause of pleasure as an efficient cause, whereas the pleasure perfects the operation in the manner of an end.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 34

The Goodness and Badness of Pleasures

Next we have to consider the goodness and badness of pleasures. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is every pleasure bad? (2) Given that not every pleasure is bad, is every pleasure good? (3) Is there some pleasure that is the best thing? (4) Is pleasure a measure or rule according to which goodness or badness is judged in morals?

Article 1

Is every pleasure bad?

It seems that every pleasure is bad:

Objection 1: Anything that corrupts prudence and impedes the use of reason seems to be bad in its own right (*secundum se*), since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a man's good is "to exist in accord with reason." But pleasure corrupts prudence and impedes reason, and the greater the pleasure, the more it does this. Hence, as *Ethics* 7 says, "in the midst of sexual pleasures," which are the greatest pleasures, "it is impossible to have an intellectual understanding of anything." And in *Super Matthaeum* Jerome says, "The presence of the Holy Spirit will not be granted at the time that conjugal acts are being performed, even if they involve an apparent prophet who is fulfilling the duty of generating." Therefore, pleasure is bad in its own right. Therefore, every pleasure is bad.

Objection 2: If there is anything that a virtuous man avoids and that a man deficient in virtue pursues, then that thing seems to be bad in its own right. For as *Ethics* 10 says, "The virtuous man is, as it were, the measure and standard (*mensura et regula*) of human acts." And in 1 Corinthians 2:15 the Apostle says, "The spiritual man is the judge of all things." But children and beasts, in whom there is no virtue, pursue pleasures, whereas the temperate man avoids them. Therefore, pleasures are bad in their own right and should be avoided.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 2 says, virtue and craft (*virtus et ars*) are directed toward what is both difficult and good. But no craft is ordered toward pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is not something good.

But contrary to this: Psalm 36:4 says, "Take pleasure in the Lord." Therefore, since a divine authority does not induce us toward anything bad, it seems that not every pleasure is bad.

I respond: As *Ethics* 10 explains, some have claimed that all pleasures are bad. The reason seems to have been that they were directing their attention only to sentient and corporeal pleasures, which are the most obvious ones; for in other matters as well, as the *De Anima* reports, the ancient philosophers did not distinguish intelligible things from sensible things, or the intellect from the sensory power. Now they thought that corporeal pleasures should all be called bad in order that in this way men, who are prone toward immoderate pleasures, might arrive at the mean of virtue by withdrawing themselves from pleasures.

But this way of thinking was not plausible (*non conveniens*). For since no one can live without any sentient and corporeal pleasure, if those who teach that all pleasures are bad are discovered submitting to some pleasures, then men will be more inclined toward pleasures by the example of their deeds, whereas the teaching of their words will be ignored. For in the case of human actions and passions, in which experience holds sway for the most part, example is more effective than words (*magis movent exempla quam verba*).

Thus, one should reply that some pleasures are good and some are bad. For (a) pleasure is the appetitive power's coming to rest in a good that is loved, and (b) it follows upon some operation. Hence, there are two possible explanations [for the goodness or badness of a pleasure]:

One is on the side of *the good* in which the one who comes to rest takes pleasure. For as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5) in moral matters, 'good' and 'bad' are predicated in accord with what agrees

or disagrees with reason, in the same way that among natural things something is called ‘natural’ because it agrees with nature and ‘unnatural’ because it disagrees with nature. Therefore, just as among natural things there is both (a) ‘natural rest’, viz., a coming to rest in what agrees with nature, e.g., when something heavy comes to rest down below, and also (b) ‘unnatural rest’, viz., a coming to rest in what is opposed to nature, as when a heavy body comes to rest up above, so too in moral matters there is (a) good pleasure, insofar as a higher or lower appetite comes to rest in what agrees with reason, and (b) bad pleasure, insofar as an appetite comes to rest in what disagrees with reason and with the law of God.

The other possible explanation is taken from the side of *the operations*, some of which are good and some bad. Now the pleasures that are joined to the operations have more affinity to those operations than do the sentient desires (*concupiscentiae*) that precede them in time. Hence, since the desires for good operations are themselves good and the desires for bad operations are themselves bad, *a fortiori* the pleasures that belong to the good operations are good, and the pleasures that belong to the bad operations are bad.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 33, a. 3), it is not the pleasures derived from an act of reason that impede reason and corrupt prudence; instead, it is extraneous pleasures such as corporeal pleasures. And, as was explained above (*ibid.*), these pleasures impede the use of reason either (a) because of the opposition of the appetite, which comes to rest in what is opposed to reason and because of which the pleasure is bad, or (b) because of the shackling of reason, as in the case of conjugal intercourse which, even though it agrees with reason, nonetheless impedes the use of reason because of the corporeal change that accompanies it.

However, conjugal intercourse does not for this reason acquire moral badness, just as sleep does not acquire moral badness if it is undertaken in accord with reason; for even reason itself dictates that the use of reason should sometimes be interrupted (*et ipsa ratio hoc habet ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur*). Still, we claim that even if this sort of shackling of reason by the pleasure of sexual intercourse is not morally bad—for it is neither a mortal sin nor a venial sin—it nonetheless stems from an instance of moral badness, viz., from the sin of the first parent. For as is clear from what was said in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 98, a. 2), this shackling of reason did not occur in the state of innocence.

Reply to objection 2: A temperate man does not avoid all pleasures, but avoids immoderate pleasures and those that do not agree with reason.

Now the fact that children and beasts pursue pleasures does not show that pleasures are always bad. For the natural appetite that exists in children and beasts comes from God, and this appetite is moved toward what is appropriate for them.

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 57, a. 3), a craft is aimed not at every sort of good, but at exterior things that are able to be made. By contrast, it is prudence and virtue, rather than craft, that has to do with actions and passions. Still, as *Ethics* 7 points out, some crafts, viz., “the arts of the cook and the perfumer,” do indeed produce pleasure.

Article 2

Is every pleasure good?

It seems that every pleasure is good:

Objection 1: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 5, a. 6), the good is divided into three: the upright, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything upright is good, and the same holds for everything useful. Therefore, every pleasure is likewise good.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 1 says, what is good *per se* is such that it is not sought for the sake of anything else. But pleasure is not sought for the sake of anything else; for it seems ridiculous to ask

someone why he wants to have pleasure (*quare vult delectari*). Therefore, pleasure is good *per se*. But what is predicated *per se* of something is predicated of it universally. Therefore, every pleasure is good.

Objection 3: What is desired by all seems to be good *per se*; for as *Ethics* 1 says, “The good is what all things desire.” But all, even children and beasts, desire some sort of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is good in its own right (*secundum se*). Therefore, every pleasure is good.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 2:14 says, “They are glad when they have done evil, and they rejoice in the most wicked things.”

I respond: Just as some Stoics claimed that all pleasures are bad, so the Epicureans claimed that pleasure is good in its own right (*secundum se*) and that, consequently, all pleasures are good. They seem to have been misled because they did not draw a distinction between what is good absolutely speaking (*bonum simpliciter*) and what is good as far as *this* individual is concerned (*bonum quoad hunc*). To be sure, what is good absolutely speaking is good in its own right. However, there are two ways in which it happens that what is not good in its own right is good for *this* individual:

In one way, because it is appropriate for him, given the condition in which he now finds himself (*secundum dispositionem in qua nunc est*), where this condition is not a natural one. For instance, it is sometimes good for a leper to eat certain poisonous things that are not agreeable to a human constitution absolutely speaking.

In a second way, because what is not appropriate is thought to be appropriate.

Since pleasure is the appetite’s coming to rest in a good, if what the appetite rests in is good absolutely speaking, then there will be pleasure absolutely speaking and that pleasure will be good absolutely speaking. By contrast, if what the appetite rests in is good as far as *this* individual is concerned but not good absolutely speaking, then there is pleasure with respect to this individual but not pleasure absolutely speaking (*nec delectatio est simpliciter sed huic*), and the pleasure will not be good absolutely speaking, but will instead be good in a certain respect or an apparent good (*nec simpliciter est bona sed bona secundum quid vel apparens bona*).

Reply to objection 1: The upright and the useful accord with reason, and so there is nothing upright or useful that is not good. By contrast, the pleasant accords with appetite, which sometimes tends toward what does not accord with reason. And so not everything pleasant is good in the sense of having moral goodness, which involves reason.

Reply to objection 2: The reason that pleasure is not sought for the sake of anything else is that it is a coming to rest in the end. But it is possible for ends to be good or bad, even though nothing is an end except insofar as it is good as far as some individual is concerned. And the same thing holds for pleasure as well.

Reply to objection 3: All have a desire for pleasure in the same way that all have a desire for the good, since pleasure is the appetite’s coming to rest in the good. But just as it happens that not every good that is desired is *per se* and genuinely good, so, too, not every pleasure is *per se* and genuinely good.

Article 3

Is any pleasure the best thing?

It seems that no pleasure is the best thing:

Objection 1: No instance of generation is the best thing, since generation cannot be an ultimate end. But pleasure follows upon an instance of generation, since, as was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), something takes pleasure from the fact that it is established into its own nature. Therefore, no pleasure can be the best thing.

Objection 2: The best thing is such that it cannot be made better by anything that is added to it. But pleasure is made better by something added to it; for pleasure is better when accompanied by virtue than when not accompanied by virtue (*est melior delectatio cum virtute quam sine virtute*). Therefore, pleasure is not the best thing.

Objection 3: The best thing is such that it is good in all respects (*universaliter bonum*), in the same way that it is good *per se*; for what is such-and-such *per se* is prior to and more important than what is such-and-such *per accidens*. But as has been explained (a. 2), pleasure is not good in every respect. Therefore, pleasure is not the best thing.

But contrary to this: Beatitude is the best thing, since it is the goal of human life. But beatitude does not exist without pleasure; for Psalm 15:11 says, “With Your countenance You will fill me with gladness; at Your right hand are pleasures even to the end.”

I respond: Plato did not, like the Stoics, claim that all pleasures are bad; nor did he, like the Epicureans, claim that all pleasures are good. Instead, he claimed that some pleasures are good and that some are bad, but in such a way that no pleasure is the highest good or the best thing (*nulla sit summum bonum vel optimum*).

However, as far as one can tell from his arguments, he is mistaken on two points:

First, since he saw that sensible and corporeal pleasures consist in a certain movement and generation, as is clear in the case of filling up with food and other such pleasures, he thought that *all* pleasures follow upon generation and movement. Hence, since generation and movement are incomplete acts (*actus imperfecti*), it would follow that pleasure does not have the character of an ultimate perfection.

However, this seems obviously false in the case of intellectual pleasures. For as was explained above (q. 31, a. 8), one takes pleasure not only in generating scientific knowledge, e.g., while he is learning or wondering, but also in contemplating in accord with the knowledge that has already been acquired.

Second, he claimed that the best thing is that which is the highest good absolutely speaking and, more specifically, that which is, as it were, the abstract and unparticipated Good itself, in the sense that God Himself is the highest good.

However, we are now talking about the best of *human* things. And in the case of each thing, the best is its ultimate end. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), there are two senses of ‘end’, viz., (a) the thing itself and (b) possessing that thing; for instance, the avaricious man’s end is either (a) money or (b) possessing money. Accordingly, a man’s ultimate end can be said to be either (a) God Himself, who is the highest good absolutely speaking or (b) the act of enjoying God, which involves taking a certain sort of pleasure in the ultimate end. And in this sense there is a pleasure belonging to a man that can be called the best thing among human goods.

Reply to objection 1: Not every pleasure follows upon an instance of generation; instead, as has been explained, some pleasures follow upon completed operations (*consequuntur operationes perfectas*). And so nothing prevents some particular pleasure from being the best thing, even if not every pleasure is the best thing.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through in the case of the thing which is the best absolutely speaking and through participation in which all things are good. Hence, this thing is such that it is not made better by any addition.

However, among other goods it is true in general that every good is made better by the addition of something else—although one could claim that, as *Ethics* 6 says, pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of a virtue.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure has its status as the best thing not from the fact that it is pleasure, but from the fact that it is a perfect coming to rest in the best thing. Hence, it need not be the case that every pleasure is the best or even that every pleasure is good. In the same way, some instance of

scientific knowledge, but not every instance of scientific knowledge, is the best (*sicut aliqua scientia est optima, non tamen omnis*).

Article 4

Is pleasure the measure or rule of moral goodness and badness?

It seems that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral goodness and badness:

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “All things are measured by what is first in their genus.” But pleasure is not the first thing in the genus of morals, but is instead preceded by love and desire. Therefore, pleasure is not the measure of goodness and badness in morals.

Objection 2: The measure and rule has to be uniform, and so, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, it is the movement that is maximally uniform that is the measure and rule of all movements. But pleasure varies and takes on many forms (*delectatio est varia et multiformis*), since some pleasures are good and some are bad. Therefore, pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.

Objection 3: One makes a more certain judgment about an effect on the basis of its cause, than vice versa. But the goodness and badness of actions is a cause of the goodness and badness of pleasures, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, “Good pleasures are those that follow upon good actions, whereas bad pleasures are those that follow upon bad actions.” Therefore, pleasures are not the rule and measure of goodness and badness in morals.

But contrary to this: In commenting on Psalm 7:10 (“God is the searcher of hearts and minds”), Augustine says, “The end of care and of deliberation (*finis curae et cogitationis*) is the pleasure that each one tries to reach.” And in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Pleasure is the architectonic end”—read: the principal end—“which we look to when we say of each thing that this one is bad absolutely speaking, whereas that one is good absolutely speaking.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 20, a. 1), moral goodness or badness lies principally in the will. Now whether an act of will is good or bad is known mainly from the end, and what is taken to be the end is what the will comes to rest in. But it is pleasure that is the will’s—or any appetite’s—resting in the good. And so a man is judged to be good or bad mainly according to the sort of pleasure that belongs to the human will; for a good and virtuous man is one who rejoices in the works of virtue, whereas a bad man is one who rejoices in bad works.

However, the pleasures of the sentient appetite are not a measure of moral goodness or badness; for instance, food is generally pleasurable to both good and bad men in accord with the sentient appetite. But the will of good men takes pleasure in such things according to their agreement with reason—something that the will of bad men does not care about.

Reply to objection 1: Love and desire are prior to pleasure in the order of generation (*in via generationis*). But pleasure is prior in relation to the notion of the end (*prior secundum rationem finis*). And in the case of actions the end has the character of a principle which is such that it is especially on the basis of it, as a rule or measure, that the judgment [regarding goodness or badness] is made.

Reply to objection 2: Every pleasure is uniform in the sense that it is a resting in some good, and it is on this score that it can be a rule or measure. For someone is good whose will rests in a genuine good, whereas someone is bad whose will rests in something bad.

Reply to objection 3: Since, as was explained above (q. 33, a. 4), pleasure perfects an action in the manner of an end, there cannot be a perfectly good action unless pleasure is also present in the good. For the goodness of a thing depends on its end, and so the goodness of the pleasure is in some sense a cause of the goodness in the action.

QUESTION 35

Pain or Sadness in Itself

Next we have to consider pain (*dolor*) and sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*). And on this topic we have to consider, first, sadness or pain in itself (question 35); second, its cause (question 36); third, its effects (question 37); fourth, the remedies for it (question 38); and, fifth, its goodness or badness (question 39).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is pain (*dolor*) a passion of the soul? (2) Is sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) the same as pain (*dolor*)? (3) Is sadness or pain contrary to pleasure? (4) Is every instance of sadness opposed to every instance of pleasure? (5) Is there any sort of sadness opposed to the pleasure of contemplation? (6) Is sadness to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired? (7) Is exterior pain greater than interior pain? (8) What are the species of sadness?

Article 1

Is pain a passion of the soul?

It seems that pain (*dolor*) is not a passion of the soul:

Objection 1: No passion of the soul exists in the body. But pain can exist in the body; for in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “The pain that is said to belong to the body is a sudden corruption of the health of a thing that the soul has subjected to corruption by using it badly.” Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

Objection 2: Every passion of the soul has to do with the appetitive power. But pain has to do more with the apprehensive power than with the appetitive power; for in *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, “The sensory power effects pain in the body when it resists a more powerful body.” Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

Objection 3: Every passion involves an animal appetite. But pain pertains more to a *natural* appetite than to an *animal* appetite; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “If nothing good had remained in the nature, there would be not be any pain involved in losing a good through punishment.” Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine claims that pain is among the passions of the soul, citing this passage from Virgil: “Through [these seeds] they fear and desire, they rejoice and sorrow (*hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque dolentque*).”

I respond: Just as two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the conjoining of something good [to the appetite] and (b) the perception of this conjoining, so also two things are required for pain, viz., (a) the conjoining of something bad (which is bad because it deprives one of some good), and (b) the perception of this conjoining.

Now if what is conjoined does not have the character of being good or bad for what it is conjoined to, then it cannot be a cause of pleasure or pain. From this it is clear that the object of pleasure or of pain is something taken *as good* or *as bad* (*aliquid sub ratione boni vel mali*). But the good and the bad are, as such, the objects of appetite. Hence, it is clear that pleasure and pain have to do with appetite.

Now every appetitive movement or inclination that follows upon an apprehension involves either an *intellective* appetite or a *sentient* appetite. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, aa. 1 and 3), a *natural* appetite’s inclination does not follow upon an apprehension on the part of the very thing that has the appetite. Therefore, since pleasure and pain presuppose a sensory power or some sort of apprehension within the same subject, it is clear that pain, like pleasure, exists in either an intellective appetite or a sentient appetite. But as was explained above (q. 22, aa. 1 and 3), every movement of the sentient appetite is called a passion—and especially those movements that bespeak a defect.

Hence, insofar as it exists in the sentient appetite, pain called a passion of the soul with complete propriety (*propriissime*), just as bodily maladies are properly called passions of the body. Hence, in *De*

Civitate Dei 14 Augustine specifically calls pain a sort of sickness (*dolorem specialiter aegritudinem nominat*).

Reply to objection 1: Pain is said to belong to the body because the *cause* of pain exists in the body—for instance, when we suffer some injury to the body. But the *movement* of pain always exists in the soul, since, as Augustine says, “The body cannot be in pain without the soul’s being in pain” (*corpus non potest dolere nisi dolente anima*).

Reply to objection 2: Pain is said to belong to the sensory power not because pain is an act of a sentient power, but because the sensory power is required for bodily pain, in the same way that it is required for bodily pleasure.

Reply to objection 3: Pain at the loss of a good shows the goodness of the nature not because the pain is an act of a natural appetite, but because the nature desires something as a good, and when it is sensed that this thing is being removed, the passion of pain follows in the sentient appetite.

Article 2

Is sadness or sorrow the same as pain?

It seems that sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) is not the same as pain (*dolor*):

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Pain (*dolor*) is in bodies.” But sadness (*tristitia*) is in the soul instead. Therefore, sadness is not pain.

Objection 2: Pain (*dolor*) exists only with respect to a present evil. But sadness (*tristitia*) can exist with respect to a past evil or a future evil; for instance, repentance (*poenitentia*) is sadness about the past, and anxiety (*anxietas*) is sadness about the future. Therefore, sadness is altogether different from pain.

Objection 3: Pain (*dolor*) seems to follow upon the sense of touch alone. But sadness (*tristitia*) can follow upon any of the senses. Therefore, sadness is not pain, but instead exists in more cases.

But contrary to this: In Romans 9:2 the Apostle says, “I have great sadness and continuous pain in my heart”—where he is using ‘sadness’ and ‘pain’ for the same thing.

I respond: There are two sorts of apprehensions by which pleasure and pain can be caused, viz., (a) an apprehension on the part of the *exterior* sensory power and (b) an *interior* apprehension on the part of either the intellect or the imagination.

Now interior apprehension extends to more things than does exterior apprehension, since whatever falls under exterior apprehension falls under interior apprehension, but not vice versa. Thus, as was explained above, only the sort of pleasure that is caused by interior apprehension is called ‘joy’ (*gaudium*). And, similarly, only the sort of pain (*dolor*) that is caused by interior apprehension is called ‘sadness’ or ‘sorrow’ (*tristitia*). And just as the sort of pleasure that is caused by exterior apprehension is called ‘pleasure’ but not ‘joy’, so, too, the sort of pain that is caused by exterior apprehension is called ‘pain’ but not ‘sadness’ or ‘sorrow’. So, then, sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) is a species of pain (*dolor*), in the same way that joy (*gaudium*) is a species of pleasure (*delectatio*).

Reply to objection 1: In the place cited here, Augustine is talking about the use of the word, since ‘pain’ (*dolor*) is used more in the case of bodily pains, which are more known to us, than in the case of spiritual pains.

Reply to objection 2: The exterior sensory power perceives only what is present, whereas the interior cognitive power can perceive what is present, past, or future. And so sadness or sorrow can exist with respect to the present, the past, or the future, whereas bodily pain, which follows upon apprehension by the exterior sensory power, can exist only with respect to something present.

Reply to objection 3: The sensible objects of touch are painful not only to the extent that they are

disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also to the extent that they are opposed to the nature. By contrast, the sensible objects of the other senses can be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are not opposed to the nature except in relation to the sensible objects of touch.

Hence, only man, who is the animal that is complete with respect to cognition (*animal perfectum in cognitione*), takes pleasure in a sensible object of the other senses in its own right, whereas the other animals, as *Ethics* 3 explains, take pleasure in such an object only insofar as it is related to the sensible objects of touch. And so pain, insofar as it is contrary to natural pleasure, is not attributed to the sensible objects of the other senses; instead, what is attributed to them is sadness, which is opposed to joy that belongs to the soul (*quae contrariatur gaudio animali*).

So, then, if ‘pain’ is used for bodily pain, which is the more common usage, then pain is divided off from sadness as its opposite, in accord with the distinction between interior apprehension and exterior apprehension—even though, as regards their objects, pleasure extends to more things than does bodily pain.

On the other hand, if ‘pain’ is taken in a general sense (*communiter*), then, as has been explained, *pain* is the genus for *sadness*.

Article 3

Is sadness or pain contrary to pleasure?

It seems that sadness or pain is not contrary to pleasure:

Objection 1: One of two contraries cannot be a cause of the other. But sadness can be a cause of pleasure; for Matthew 5:5 says, “Bless are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted (*consolabuntur*).” Therefore, they are not contraries.

Objection 2: One of two contraries does not denominate the other. But in some individuals pain or sadness is itself pleasurable. For instance, in *Confessiones* 3 Augustine says, “In the case of stage plays (*in spectaculis*), pain often gives pleasure.” And in *Confessiones* 4 he says, “Crying is a bitter thing, and yet sometimes it gives pleasure.” Therefore, pain is not contrary to pleasure.

Objection 3: One of two contraries is not the matter of the other, since contraries cannot exist together at the same time. But pain can be the matter of pleasure. For instance, in *De Poenitentia* Augustine says, “A penitent is always sorrowful (*doleat*), and he rejoices over his sorrow (*de dolore gaudeat*).” And in *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, conversely, that “a bad man feels pain at what he has taken pleasure in.” Therefore, pleasure and pain are not contraries.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Gladness (*laetitia*) is an act of will consenting to what we will, whereas sadness is an act of will dissenting from what we will the opposite of.” But consenting and dissenting are contraries. Therefore, gladness and sadness are contraries.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 10, contrariety is a difference with respect to form. But the form or species of a passion or movement is taken from its object or terminus. Hence, since the objects of pleasure and of sadness or pain are contraries, viz., a present good and a present evil, it follows that pain and pleasure are contraries.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents one contrary from being a *per accidens* cause of the other. And it is in this sense that sadness can be a cause of pleasure:

In one way, insofar as sadness about the absence of a thing or about the presence of its contrary leads to more forceful seeking after what one takes pleasure in (*tristitia vehementius quaerit id in quo delectetur*); for instance, someone who is thirsty more forcefully seeks after drink as a remedy for the sadness that he is suffering from.

In a second way, insofar as because of his great desire for some pleasure, an individual does not shy

away from undergoing sadness (*non recusat aliquis tristitias perferre*), in order that he might attain that pleasure.

It is in both of these ways that present mourning (*luctus praesens*) leads one toward the comfort (*ad consolationem*) of the future life. For by the very fact that a man mourns over his sins or over the postponement of glory (*luget pro peccatis vel pro dilatione gloriae*), he merits eternal comfort. Similarly, one likewise merits this comfort by the fact that in order to attain it, he does not shy away from undergoing hardships and difficulties for its sake (*labores et angustias propter ipsam sustinere*).

Reply to objection 2: Pain can itself be pleasurable *per accidens*, viz., insofar it has wonder adjoined to it (*admirationem adiunctam*), as in the case of stage plays, or insofar as it causes a memory of a thing that is loved and makes one perceive his love for that whose absence he grieves over. Hence, since this love is pleasurable, the pain and everything else that follows upon the love are likewise pleasurable to the extent that the love is felt in them. And it is likewise for this reason that the pain felt in the case of stage plays can be pleasurable to the extent that some sort of conceptualized love (*amor conceptus*) is felt for those who are portrayed in the plays.

Reply to objection 3: The will and reason reflect upon their own acts insofar as acts of will and act of reason are themselves understood as good or bad (*inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione boni et mali*). And it is in this sense that sadness is able—*per accidens* and not *per se*—to be the matter for pleasure, or vice versa, viz., insofar as both are understood as good or bad.

Article 4

Is every instance of sadness contrary to every instance of pleasure?

It seems that every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure (*omnis tristitia omni delectationi contrarietur*):

Objection 1: Just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color, so pleasure and pain are contrary species of the passions of the soul. But whiteness and blackness are universally opposed to one another. Therefore, pleasure and pain are, too.

Objection 2: Remedies (*medicinae*) are effected through contraries. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, every instance of pleasure is a remedy for every instance of sadness. Therefore, every instance of pleasure is contrary to every instance of sadness.

Objection 3: Contraries are such that they impede one another. But as is clear from what is said in *Ethics* 10, every instance of sadness impedes every instance of pleasure. Therefore, every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure.

But contrary to this: Contraries do not have the same cause. But the same habit is the source of someone's rejoicing over one thing and being sad about its opposite; for instance, it is out of charity that it is possible to "rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who weep," as Romans 12:15 puts it. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure.

I respond: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, contrariety is a difference with respect to form. But form is both generic and specific. Hence, some things happen to be contrary with respect to the forms of their genera (*secundum formam generis*), e.g., *virtue* and *vice*, and some things are contrary with respect to the forms of their species (*secundum formam speciei*), e.g., *justice* and *injustice*. Note, moreover, that certain things, e.g., substances and qualities, are specified by *absolute* forms, whereas other things are specified *in relation to something outside themselves* (*per comparisonem ad aliquid extra*), in the way that passions and movements receive their species from their termini or their objects.

Thus, in the case of things whose species are thought of in accord with *absolute* forms, it can happen that the species contained under contrary genera are not contrary to one another with respect to

the notion of their species (*non esse contrarias secundum rationem speciei*), and yet they do not happen to have any affinity to or agreement with one another. For instance, *intemperance* and *justice*, which fall under contrary genera, viz., *virtue* and *vice*, are not contrary to one another with respect to the notions of their proper species, and yet they do not have any affinity to or agreement with one another.

By contrast, in those things whose species are taken in accord with *a relation to something extrinsic*, it can happen that the species of contrary genera are not only not contrary to one another, but also have some sort of agreement with and affinity to one another. For to be related in the same way to contraries induces contrariety, in the way that moving toward whiteness and moving toward blackness have the character of contrariety, whereas to be related in contrary ways to contraries has the character of likeness, as in the case of receding from whiteness and moving toward blackness. This is especially evident in the case of contradiction, which is the source of opposition (*principium oppositionis*), since opposition consists in the same thing's being affirmed and denied (*in affirmatione et negatione eiusdem consistit oppositio*), e.g., *white and non-white*. But there is agreement and likeness in affirming the one opposite and denying the other, as in the case of *black and non-white*.

Now since sadness and pleasure are passions, they are specified by their objects. And, to be sure, they have contrariety with respect to their genera (*secundum genus*), since the one has to do with *pursuing* and the other with *avoiding*—which, as *Ethics* 6 says, stand to one another in the case of the passions as affirmation and negation stand to one another in the case of reason. And so sadness and pleasure with respect to the same thing have opposition to one another with respect to their species. However, sadness and pleasure with respect to diverse things, where those diverse things are disparate but not opposites, do not have opposition to one another with respect to the notions of their species, but are likewise disparate, e.g., being saddened at a friend's death and taking pleasure in contemplation. But if the diverse things in question are contraries, then pleasure and sadness not only do not have contrariety with respect to the notions of their species, but even have agreement and affinity, e.g., rejoicing over something good and being saddened at something bad.

Reply to objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not have their species from a relation to anything exterior to them, in the way that pleasure and sadness do. Hence, the argument is not the same in the two cases.

Reply to objection 2: As is clear from *Metaphysics* 8, the genus is taken from the matter. Now in the case of accidents, the subject takes the place of the matter; and it has been explained that pleasure and sadness are contraries with respect to their genera. So in every instance of sadness there is a disposition of the subject that is contrary to the disposition that exists in every instance of pleasure. For in each instance of pleasure the appetite is disposed toward accepting what it has, whereas in every instance of sadness the appetite is disposed toward fleeing from what it has.

Reply to objection 3: From this the reply to the third objection is clear.

An alternative reply is that even if not every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure with respect to its species, it is nonetheless the case that they are contrary with respect to their effects. For the nature of an animal is comforted by the one, but troubled by the other.

Article 5

Is there a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?

It seems that there is a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation (*delectationi contemplationis sit aliqua tristitia*):

Objection 1: In 2 Corinthians 7:10 the Apostle says, “The sadness that is in accord with God works penance steadfast unto salvation.” But to look to God pertains to higher reason, one role of which,

according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12, is to devote itself to contemplation. Therefore, there is a sadness opposed to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 2: Contraries are the effects of contraries. Therefore, if one contrary, when contemplated, is a cause of pleasure, then the other will be a cause of sadness. And so there will be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 3: Just as the object of pleasure is the good, so the object of sadness is the bad. But contemplation can have the character of something bad; for in *Metaphysics* 12 the Philosopher says, “There are some things that it is wrong to meditate on.” Therefore, there can be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 4: As *Ethics* 7 and 10 say, any operation is a cause of pleasure insofar as it is not impeded. But there are many ways in which the operation of contemplation can be impeded, so that it either does not exist at all or else exists with difficulty. Therefore, in contemplation there can be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure.

Objection 5: The affliction of the flesh is a cause of sadness. But Ecclesiastes 12:6 says, “Frequent meditation is an affliction of the flesh.” Therefore, contemplation involves a sadness that is contrary to pleasure.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 8:16 says, “Her”—i.e., wisdom’s—“conversation has no bitterness nor her company any tediousness, but gladness and joy.” But wisdom’s conversation and company come through contemplation. Therefore, there is no sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

I respond: There are two ways to understand the pleasure of contemplation:

First, in such a way that the act of contemplating is a *cause* of the pleasure and *not its object*. And in this sense the pleasure is directed not toward the contemplation itself but toward the thing that is being contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something disagreeable and sorrowful (*aliquid nocivum et contristans*), just as it is possible to contemplate something agreeable and pleasurable. Hence, if the pleasure of contemplation is understood in this sense, then there is nothing to prevent there being a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

There is a second way in which the pleasure of contemplation can be thought of, viz., in the sense that the act of contemplation is *an object and a cause* of the pleasure—as, for instance, when someone takes pleasure in the very fact that he is engaged in contemplating. And in that case, as Gregory of Nyssa says, “There is no sadness opposed to the pleasure that follows upon contemplation (*ei delectatione quae est secundum contemplationem*). And the Philosopher says the same thing in *Topics* 1 and *Ethics* 10.

However, this has to be understood as speaking *per se*. The reason for this is that an instance of sadness is *per se* contrary to an instance of pleasure that is directed toward a contrary object; for instance, sadness directed toward the cold is contrary to pleasure directed toward heat. However, the object of contemplation has nothing contrary to it. For the notions of contraries (*contrariorum rationes*) are not, insofar as they are apprehended, themselves contraries; instead, the one contrary is a means for understanding the other (*unum contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud*). Hence, speaking *per se*, there cannot be any sort of sadness that is contrary to the pleasure that exists in contemplating. But neither does this pleasure have any sort of sadness adjoined to it, as do corporeal pleasures, which are, as it were, remedies for certain troubles; for instance, someone takes pleasure in drink because he is troubled by thirst, but when his thirst has been completely driven away, the pleasure of drinking also ceases. For the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by the fact that some trouble is being driven off, but is instead caused by the fact that contemplation is pleasurable in its own right; for as has been explained (q. 31, a. 1), the act of contemplating does not involve generation, but is a certain complete operation.

However, sadness is mixed in *per accidens* with the pleasure of apprehension—and this in two ways: first, on the part of the organ and, second, because of impediments to apprehension. On the part of the organ, sadness or pain is mixed in with the apprehension either directly in the apprehensive powers of the sentient part, which have a corporeal organ, or because of a sensible thing that is contrary to the

normal condition of the organ, e.g., the taste of something bitter or the smell of something fetid, or because of the prolongation of an agreeable sensible object which, as was explained above (q. 33, a. 2), overwhelms the natural condition and is such that a sensible apprehension that was at first pleasurable becomes wearisome. However, these two considerations do not play a role directly in the case of the mind's act of contemplating, since the mind does not have a corporeal organ. This is why the passage cited above claims that the mind's contemplation has no "bitterness or tediousness."

Still, because in its act of contemplating the mind makes use of the sentient apprehensive powers, in whose acts weariness occurs, it follows that some affliction or pain is mixed in indirectly with contemplation. However, sadness is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation in either of the two ways in which it is adjoined *per accidens* with contemplation. For the sadness that derives from an impediment to contemplation is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but instead has an affinity or agreement with it, as is clear from what was said above (a. 4). And the sadness or affliction that derives from bodily weariness does not belong to the same genus and is thus altogether disparate.

And so it is clear that there is no sadness that is contrary to the pleasure that comes from contemplation itself, and there is no sadness adjoined to that pleasure except *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 1: The "sadness that is in accord with God" is not directed toward the mind's contemplation itself, but is instead directed toward something that the mind contemplates, viz., sin, which the mind considers to be contrary to God's love.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as things that are contraries in nature exist in the mind, they do not have contrariety. For it is not the case that the notions of contraries are themselves contraries; instead, the one contrary is a means for understanding the other. It is for this reason that one and the same science deals with the relevant contraries (*est una scientia contrariorum*).

Reply to objection 3: In its own right (*secundum se*), contemplation never has the character of something bad, since contemplation is nothing other than the consideration of what is true, and this is the intellect's good. Instead, contemplation has the character of something bad only *per accidens*, viz., either because the contemplation of what is more vile impedes the contemplation of what is better, or because the appetite is attached in a disordered way to the thing that is contemplated.

Reply to objection 4: As has been explained, the sort of sadness that is directed toward an impediment to contemplation is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but instead has an affinity to it.

Reply to objection 5: As has been explained, the "affliction of the flesh" is related *per accidens* and indirectly to the mind's act of contemplating.

Article 6

Is sadness to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired?

It seems that sadness is to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired (*magis sit fugienda tristitia quam delectatio appetenda*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "There is no one who does not avoid pain more than he desires pleasure." But what everyone generally agrees to seems to be natural. Therefore, it is natural and fitting that sadness be avoided more than pleasure is desired.

Objection 2: The action of a contrary contributes to the velocity and intensity of a movement; for instance, as the Philosopher says in *Meteorologia*, "Hot water freezes more quickly and more solidly." But an aversion to sadness (*fuga tristitiae*) arises from the saddened individual's contrariety, whereas the desire for pleasure does not arise from anything contrary but instead proceeds from the object's being agreeable to the individual who takes pleasure in it. Therefore, the aversion to sadness is greater than the

desire for pleasure.

Objection 3: The more someone fights a stronger passion in accord with reason, the more praiseworthy and virtuous he is, since, as *Ethics* 2 says, virtue has to do with what is difficult and good. But the courageous individual, who resists the movement by which pain is avoided, is more virtuous than the temperate individual, who resists the movement by which pleasure is desired; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “It is the courageous and the just who are most highly honored.” Therefore, the movement by which pain is avoided is more forceful than the movement by which pleasure is desired.

But contrary to this: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is stronger than the bad. But pleasure is desirable because of the good, which is its object, whereas the aversion to sadness is because of the bad. Therefore, the desire for pleasure is stronger than the aversion to sadness.

I respond: Speaking *per se*, the desire for pleasure is stronger than the aversion to pain (*appetitus delectationis est fortior quam fuga tristitiae*).

The reason for this is that the cause of pleasure is an agreeable good, whereas the cause of pain or sadness is some bad thing that is repugnant. But it is possible for a good to be agreeable without any sort of disagreeableness (*conveniens absque omni dissonantia*), whereas there cannot be anything that is totally bad and repugnant without any sort of agreeableness. Hence, it is possible for an instance of pleasure to be complete and perfect (*integra et perfecta*), but an instance of sadness is always partial. Hence, naturally speaking, the desire for pleasure is greater than the aversion to pain.

A second reason is that the good, which is the object of pleasure, is desired for its own sake (*propter seipsum*), whereas the bad, which is the object of sadness, is to be avoided because it is the privation of a good. But what is such-and-such in its own right (*per se*) is stronger than what is such-and-such through because of another (*per aliud*). A clear indication of this is found in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense at the end, when it is approaching the terminus that befits its nature than at the beginning, when it moving away from the terminus that does not befit its nature; it is as if a nature tends toward what befits it more than it flees from what is repugnant to it. Hence, speaking *per se*, the inclination of an appetitive power tends toward pleasure more strongly than it flees from sadness.

However, it is possible *per accidens* for someone to flee from sadness more intensely than he desires pleasure. There are three ways in which this happens.

First, on the part of *the apprehension*. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, “Love is felt more strongly when a lack [of the good] produces it.” But from the lack of the thing loved comes sadness, which proceeds from the loss of some good that is loved or from the incursion of some contrary evil. Pleasure, by contrast, does not involve a lack of the thing that is loved, but instead comes to rest in that thing once it is possessed. Therefore, since love is a cause of pleasure and of sadness, the greater the aversion to sadness, the more strongly the love is felt in the face of what is contrary to the love.

Second, on the part of the *cause* that saddens one or inflicts pain, when this cause is repugnant to a good that is loved to more than is the good in which we are taking pleasure. For instance, we love the body’s natural condition (*consistentiam corporis naturalem*) more than the pleasure of food. And so out of fear of the pain that comes from blows or other things of this sort, we forsake the pleasure of food or of other such things.

Third, on the part of the *effect*, viz., insofar as the sadness impedes not only a single instance of pleasure, but all of them.

Reply to objection 1: What Augustine says, viz., that pain is avoided more than pleasure is desired, is true *per accidens* and not *per se*. This is clear from what he adds: “For we see that even the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by their fear of pain,” where the pain is opposed to life, which is loved above all else.

Reply to objection 2: A movement that is from within differs from a movement that is from

without. For as was explained above for the case of a natural movement, a movement that is from within tends toward what is agreeable instead of receding from a contrary. By contrast, a movement that is from without is intensified by the contrariety itself, since each thing tries in its own way to resist its contrary, in the same way that it strives to conserve itself. Hence, a violent movement is intensified at the beginning, and becomes less intense at the end (*motus violentus intenditur in principio et remittitur in fine*).

Now a movement of the appetitive part of the soul is from within, since it moves from the soul to the things. And so, speaking *per se*, pleasure is desired more than sadness is avoided. But the movement of sentience (*motus sensitivae partis*) is from without and is, as it were, from the things to the soul. Hence, what is contrary to a greater degree is sensed to a greater degree. And so, *per accidens*, insofar as the sensory power is required for pleasure and sadness, sadness is avoided more than pleasure is desired.

Reply to objection 3: It is not just any sort of pain or sadness that a courageous individual is praised for not being overcome by in accord with reason. Rather, he is praised because he is not overcome by pain or sadness that involves the danger of death. This sort of sadness is fled from more intensely than the pleasures of food or sex, which are the objects of temperance, are desired, just as life is loved more intensely than food or sexual intercourse are. By contrast, as is clear from *Ethics* 3, the temperate individual is praised for not pursuing the pleasures of touch rather than for not fleeing from the contrary sorts of sadness.

Article 7

Is exterior pain greater than the interior pain of the heart?

It seems that exterior pain is greater than the interior pain of the heart:

Objection 1: Exterior pain is caused by a cause which attacks the good condition of the body that life consists in (*ex causa repugnante bonae consistentiae corporis in quo est vita*), whereas interior pain is caused by an act of imagining evil. Therefore, since life is loved more than an imagined good is, it seems that, given what has already been said, exterior pain is greater than interior pain.

Objection 2: A real thing moves one more than a likeness of a thing. But exterior pain comes from the real conjoining of some contrary [to the appetite], whereas interior pain comes from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore, exterior pain is greater than interior pain.

Objection 3: A cause is known from its effect. But exterior pain has more forceful effects; for a man dies because of exterior pains rather than because of interior pains. Therefore, exterior pain is greater than, and is fled from more intensely than, interior pain.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 25:17 says, “The sadness of the heart is all wounds, and the wickedness of a woman is all evils.” Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all wickedness—which is what is meant here—so, too, the sadness of the heart exceeds all exterior wounds.

I respond: Interior and exterior pain agree in one respect and differ in two respects. They agree in that each, as was explained above (a. 1), is a movement of the appetitive power, whereas they differ in the two things that are required for pain and pleasure, viz., the *cause*, which is a conjoined good or a conjoined evil, and the *apprehension*.

For the *cause* of exterior pain is a conjoined evil that attacks the body, whereas the cause of interior pain is a conjoined evil that attacks the appetite. Also, exterior pain follows upon the sensory power’s apprehension—and especially the sense of touch—whereas interior pain follows upon an interior apprehension by the imagination or even by reason. Therefore, if the cause of interior pain is compared with the cause of exterior pain, the one belongs *per se* to the appetite, to which both sorts of pain belong, whereas the other belongs to the appetite through something else (*per aliud*). For a pain is interior by the

fact something is attacking the appetite itself, whereas a pain is exterior from the fact that something is attacking the appetite because it is attacking the body. But it is always the case that what is such-and-such *per se* is prior to what is such-and-such through another (*per aliud*). Hence, on this score interior pain surpasses exterior pain (*dolor interior praeeminet dolori exteriori*).

The same thing holds on the part of the *apprehension*. For apprehension by reason and the imagination is higher than (*altior quam*) apprehension by the sense of touch. Hence, speaking absolutely and *per se*, interior pain surpasses (*potior est quam*) exterior pain. An indication of this is that an individual voluntarily undergoes exterior pain in order to avoid interior pain. And to the extent that exterior pain does not attack the interior appetite, it becomes in some sense pleasurable and agreeable by an interior joy.

However, sometimes exterior pain exists along with interior pain, and in such a case the pain is increased. For not only is interior pain greater than exterior pain, but it is also more general, since whatever is repugnant to the body can be repugnant to the interior appetite, and whatever is apprehended by the sensory power can be apprehended by the imagination and reason—but not vice versa. And the reason why the passage cited above explicitly says, “The sadness of the heart is all wounds” is that even the pain of exterior wounds is included under the interior sadness of the heart.

Reply to objection 1: Interior pain can also be directed at what is contrary to life. And so the comparison of interior pain with exterior pain should be made not according to the different evils that are the cause of the pain, but according to the different relations of this cause of pain to the appetite.

Reply to objection 2: Interior pain does not proceed from the likeness of an apprehended thing as its cause; for a man is saddened interiorly not by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing that it is a likeness of. This thing is apprehended more perfectly to the extent that the likeness is more immaterial and more abstract. And so, speaking *per se*, interior pain is greater insofar as it is directed toward a greater evil; for an evil is better known by an interior apprehension.

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal changes are caused to a greater extent by exterior pain, both because (a) the cause of exterior pain is a corrupting thing that is conjoined to the body (*corrumpens coniunctum corporaliter*), and this is a requirement for apprehension by the sense of touch; and also because (b) the exterior sensory power is more corporeal than the interior sensory power is, just as the sentient appetite is more corporeal than the intellective appetite is—and because of this, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3 and q. 31, a. 5), the body is changed to a greater degree by a movement of the sentient appetite. And, similarly, the body is changed to a greater degree by an exterior pain than by an interior pain.

Article 8

Is Damascene’s division of sadness into four species correct?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly identifies the four species of sadness as listlessness (*acedia*), distress (*acthos*) (or anxiety (*anxietas*), according to Gregory of Nyssa), pity (*misericordia*), and envy (*invidia*):

Objection 1: Sadness is opposed to pleasure. But no species are assigned to pleasure. Therefore, neither should species be assigned to sadness.

Objection 2: Repentance is a certain species of sadness. And, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, so are indignation (*nemesis*) and jealousy (*zelus*). But they are not included among the aforementioned species. Therefore, the division noted above is insufficient.

Objection 3: Every division should be made by means of opposites. But the aforementioned species are not opposed to one another. For according to Gregory, “Listlessness is sadness that cuts off

speech, anxiety is sadness that weighs one down, envy is sadness about goods that belong to others, and pity is sadness about evils that belong to others.” But it is possible for someone to be sad about both another’s goods and another’s evils, and at the same time both to be weighed down interiorly and to lose his voice exteriorly. Therefore, the aforementioned division is incorrect.

But contrary to this is the authority of the two of them, viz., Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene.

I respond: It belongs to the notion of a species (*ad rationem speciei*) to be had by an addition to the genus. Now there are two ways in which something can be added to a genus:

In one way, what is added pertains to the genus *per se* and is virtually contained within it, in the way that *rational* is added to *animal*. And as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7 and 8, this sort of addition effects genuine species of a given genus (*facit veras species alicuius generis*).

On the other hand, something may be added to a genus as something extraneous to its notion, in the way that *white*, or something of this sort, is added to *animal*. And this sort of addition does not effect genuine species of the genus in the sense in which we commonly speak of a genus and its various species. Nonetheless, once in a while something is said to be a species of a given genus because it contains something extraneous to which the notion of the genus is applied, as when *glowing coal* and *flame* are said to be species of *fire* because of the way the nature of fire is applied to some outside matter (*ad materiam alienam*). And by a similar way of speaking, astronomy (*astrologia*) and the science of perspective (*perspectiva*) are called species of mathematics, insofar as mathematical principles are being applied to natural matter. It is in this way that the species of sadness are being identified here through the application of sadness to something extraneous.

Now this extraneous thing can be taken either from the side of the *cause*, i.e., the *object*, or from the side of the *effect*.

The proper *object* of sadness is (a) something bad that is (b) one’s own (*proprium malum*).

Hence, an extraneous object of sadness can be taken from *just one* of these (*secundum alterum tantum*), viz., in the sense that it is *something bad that is not one’s own*, and in that case there is *pity* (*misericordia*), which is sadness about an evil that belongs to someone else insofar as it is nonetheless counted as one’s own evil.

Or the object can be extraneous with respect to *both* of them, viz., in the sense that the object of sadness is neither one’s own nor anything bad, but is instead *the good of another*, and in that case there is *envy*.

Now the proper *effect* of sadness consists in (a) a certain aversion (b) on the part of the appetite (*in quadam fuga appetitus*).

Hence, what is extraneous with respect to the effect of sadness can be taken from *just one* of these, viz., in the sense that the aversion is removed, and in that case there is *anxiety*, which weighs the soul down in such a way that there does not appear to be any escape—this is why it is also called by another name, viz., *emotional constriction* (*angustia*).

If, on the other hand, this heaviness proceeds in such a way that it immobilizes the exterior members from their work, then this pertains to *listlessness* (*acedia*), so that the effect will be extraneous in both respects, since neither is there an aversion nor does the effect exist in the appetite. And the reason why listlessness is specifically said to cut off speech is that among all the exterior movements, it is the voice that most expresses one’s interior conceptions and affections, not only among men, but, as *Politics* 1 says, among the other animals as well.

Reply to objection 1: Pleasure is caused by the good, which has [just] one sense. And so not as many species of pleasure are specified as are species of sadness, which is caused by evil; for as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, evil “occurs in many ways” (*multifariam contingit*).

Reply to objection 2: Repentance concerns one’s own evil, which is the proper object of sadness. Hence, it is not relevant to the species that concern us here. On the other hand, as will become clear below (*ST* 2-2, q.36, a. 2), indignation and jealousy are contained under envy.

Reply to objection 3: The division in question here is taken not from the opposition of the species but instead, as has been explained, from the diversity of the extraneous things that the nature of sadness is drawn to.

QUESTION 36

The Causes of Sadness or Pain

Next we have to consider the causes of sadness or pain (*tristitia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the cause of pain (*dolor*) a lost good or instead a conjoined evil? (2) Is concupiscence a cause of pain? (3) Is a desire for oneness (*appetitus unitatis*) a cause of pain? (4) Is a power that cannot be resisted a cause of pain?

Article 1

Is it a lost good that is a cause of pain rather than a conjoined evil?

It seems that it is a lost good (*bonum amissum*) that is a cause of pain (*dolor*) rather than a conjoined evil (*malum coniunctum*):

Objection 1: In *De Octo Quaestionibus Dulcitii* Augustine says that there is pain over the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, by the same line of reasoning, every pain occurs because of the loss of some good.

Objection 2: It was explained above (q. 35, a. 4) that an instance of pain that is contrary to an instance of pleasure is directed toward the the same thing that the pleasure is directed toward. But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 35, a.3), pleasure has to do with a good. Therefore, pain has to do mainly with the loss of a good.

Objection 3: According to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, love is a cause of sadness, just as it is a cause of the other affections of the soul. But the object of love is a good. Therefore, pain or sadness has more to do with a lost good than with a conjoined evil.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “An anticipated evil is a cause of fear (*timorem constituit*), whereas a present evil is a cause of sadness.”

I respond: If privations had the same status (*hoc modo se haberent*) in the soul’s apprehensions that they have among the things themselves, then this question, it seems, would be of no importance. For as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 10 and q. 48, a. 3), evil or badness (*malum*) is the privation of a good, and in the world of reality (*in rerum natura*) a privation is nothing other than a lack of the opposed disposition. And so, accordingly, being saddened over a lost good would be the same as being saddened over a possessed evil.

However, sadness is a movement of the appetite that follows upon an apprehension. And within apprehension a privation itself has the nature of a sort of entity and is thus called a ‘being of reason’ (*ens rationis*). And so since evil is a privation, it behaves in the manner of a contrary. Therefore, as regards the appetitive movement, it makes a difference whether this movement has to do mainly with a conjoined evil or a lost good.

Since the movement of an animal appetite has the same status among the works of the soul that a natural movement has among natural things, the truth can be ascertained by considering natural movements. For if we think about the notions *moving toward* (*accessus*) and *receding from* (*recessus*) in the case of natural movements, *moving toward* has to do *per se* with what is agreeable to the nature in question, whereas *receding from* has to do *per se* with what is contrary to the nature; for instance, a heavy body *per se* recedes from a higher place, whereas it naturally moves toward a lower place. But if we take the cause of these two movements, viz., heaviness (*gravitas*), the heaviness itself first inclines a thing toward a place below prior to withdrawing it from the place above from which it recedes as it tends downward.

So, then, since among the appetitive movements sadness is a sort of aversion or receding (*se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus*), whereas pleasure is a sort of pursuit or moving toward (*per modum prosecutionis vel accessus*), it follows that just as pleasure has to do in the first place with an acquired good as its object, so sadness has to do with a conjoined evil. But the cause of pleasure and of sadness,

viz., love, has to do with the good prior to having to do with the bad. So, then, in the sense in which a passion's object is its cause, the cause of sadness or pain is more properly a conjoined evil than a lost good.

Reply to objection 1: The loss of a good is itself apprehended as something bad (*sub ratione mali*), just as the loss of something bad is apprehended as a good (*sub ratione boni*). And this is why Augustine says that pain stems from the loss of temporal goods.

Reply to objection 2: An instance of pleasure and an instance of pain contrary to it have to do with the same thing but under contrary notions. For instance, if the pleasure is directed toward some good, then the sadness is directed toward the absence of that same good. Now as is clear from *Metaphysics* 10, one of two contraries includes the privation of the other. And so it is that the sadness that is directed toward a contrary is in some sense directed toward the same thing under a contrary notion.

Reply to objection 3: When many movements stem from a single cause, only the first of the movements, and not all of them, must have to do principally with what the cause has to do with principally. Each of the other movements has to do principally with what is appropriate for it, given its own nature.

Article 2

Is concupiscence a cause of pain or sadness?

It seems that concupiscence or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) is not a cause of pain or sadness:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), sadness *per se* has to do with what is bad. But concupiscence is a certain movement of the appetite toward what is good, and a movement that is directed toward one of two contraries is not a cause of a movement that has to do with the other contrary. Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of pain.

Objection 2: According to Damascene, pain has to do with the present, whereas concupiscence has to do with the future. Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of pain.

Objection 3: That which is *per se* pleasurable is not a cause of pain. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, concupiscence is pleasurable in its own right (*secundum seipsam*). Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of pain or sadness.

But contrary to this: In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "When ignorance of things that have to be done and a desire (*concupiscentia*) for harmful things find their way in, error and pain are added as attendants." But ignorance is a cause of error. Therefore, concupiscence is a cause of pain.

I respond: Sadness is a certain movement of the animal appetite. But as has been explained (a. 1), an appetitive movement bears a likeness to the movement of a natural appetite, for which two sorts of causes can be assigned: one in the manner of an *end*, and the other as *the source of the beginning* of the movement (*alia sicut unde est principium motus*). For instance, the cause, in the sense of the *end*, of the downward movement of a heavy body is a place down below (*locus deorsum*), whereas the beginning of the movement (*principium motus*) is the natural inclination that comes from heaviness (*ex gravitate*).

Now the cause, in the manner of an *end*, of an appetitive movement is the movement's object. And in this sense, as was explained above (a. 1), the cause of pain or sadness is a conjoined evil.

On the other hand, the cause, in the sense of *the source of the beginning* of such a movement, is the interior inclination of the appetite, which is first of all inclined toward a good and, as a result, is inclined toward rejecting the contrary evil (*ad repudiandum malum contrarium*). And so the first principle of this sort of appetitive movement is love, which is the appetite's first inclination toward attaining the good, whereas the second principle is hatred, which is the appetite's first inclination toward avoiding what is

bad. But since concupiscence or desire (*concupiscentia vel cupiditas*) is the first effect of love, which, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 6), we especially delight in, Augustine often substitutes ‘concupiscence’ (*concupiscentia*) or ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) for ‘love’ (*amor*)—as was likewise explained above (q. 30, a. 2). And this is the sense in which he claims that concupiscence is a universal cause of pain.

However, even when thought of according to its proper notion, concupiscence itself is sometimes a cause of pain. For everything that keeps a movement from reaching its terminus is contrary to that movement. But what is contrary to the appetite’s movement is a cause of sadness (*contristans*). And so, as a result, concupiscence becomes a cause of sadness insofar as we are saddened by the postponement of a desired good or by its being completely cancelled (*de retardatione boni concupiti vel totali ablatione*). However, concupiscence cannot be a *universal* cause of pain, since we sorrow more over the removal of present goods (*de subtractione bonorum praesentium*), in which we are already taking pleasure, than over the future goods that we have concupiscence for (*quae concupiscimus*).

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the appetite’s inclination toward attaining what is good is a cause of the appetite’s inclination toward avoiding what is bad. And this is why appetitive movements that have to do with the good are posited as a cause of appetitive movements that have to do with what is bad.

Reply to objection 2: Even if what is desired is future in reality, it is nonetheless present in a certain sense insofar as it is hoped for.

An alternative reply is that even if the desired good is itself future, nonetheless, what causes pain is an obstacle that is posed in the present.

Reply to objection 3: Concupiscence is pleasurable as long as hope remains for acquiring what one has concupiscence for. But if the hope is removed by an obstacle that is posed, then the concupiscence is a cause of pain.

Article 3

Is a desire for oneness a cause of pain?

It seems that a desire for oneness (*appetitus unitatis*) is not a cause of pain:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “This opinion,” which posited that being filled up (*repletio*) is a cause of pleasure and being cut off (*incisio*) is a cause of sadness, “seems to have been formed on the basis of the pleasures and pains associated with food.” But not every instance of pleasure or of sadness is of this sort. Therefore, a desire for oneness is not a universal cause of pain—given that being filled up has to do with oneness, whereas being cut off induces a multitude.

Objection 2: Any sort of separation is opposed to oneness. Therefore, if pain were caused by a desire for oneness, then no sort of separation would be pleasurable. But this is clearly false in the case of the separation of what is superfluous.

Objection 3: The reason why we desire to be conjoined to something good is the same reason why we desire to be separated from something bad. But just as being conjoined pertains to oneness, since oneness is a certain sort of union, so separation is contrary to oneness. Therefore, a desire for oneness should not be posited as a cause of pain more than a desire for separation is.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 Augustine says, “From the pain that beasts feel, it is quite evident how much their souls, in ruling and animating their bodies, desire oneness. For what is pain other than a sort of reluctant sensing of division or corruption?”

I respond: In the same way that having concupiscence or desire for the good is a cause of pain, so also love, or a desire for oneness, should be posited as a cause of pain. For the good of each thing consists in a certain sort of oneness, viz., insofar as each thing has united within itself the things that its

completeness (*perfectio*) consists in; this is why the Platonists claimed that the One is a principle in the same way that the Good is. Hence, each thing naturally desires oneness in the same way that it desires goodness. And because of this, just as love in the sense of a desire for the good is a cause of pain, so love in the sense of a desire for oneness is a cause of pain.

Reply to objection 1: It is not just any sort of union that brings the nature of the good to perfection, but only that sort of union that the entity's complete *esse* depends on (*sed solum illa unio a qua dependet esse perfectum rei*).

And, for this same reason, it is not, as some have thought, just any sort of desire for oneness that is a cause of pain or sadness. In the cited passage the Philosopher rules out their opinion by appealing to the fact that some instances of being filled up are not pleasurable, in the way that those who are filled up with food do not take pleasure in consuming food. For this sort of being filled up—or oneness—would be repugnant to complete *esse* rather than constitutive of it (*magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse quam ipsum constitueret*). Hence, pain is caused not by the desire for just any sort of oneness, but rather by the desire for the sort of oneness that the nature's perfection (*perfectio naturae*) consists in.

Reply to objection 2: Separation can be pleasurable either insofar as what is removed is contrary to the thing's perfection, or insofar as the separation has some sort of union adjoined to it—as, for instance, the union of a sensible object with the sensory power.

Reply to objection 3: The separation from things that are harmful or corrupting is desired insofar as such things destroy the right sort of oneness. Hence, the desire for a separation of this sort is not a first cause of pain, but is instead a desire for oneness.

Article 4

Should a greater power be posited as a cause of pain?

It seems that a greater power (*potestas maior*) should not be posited as a cause of pain:

Objection 1: What is within an agent's power is no longer present but future. But pain has to do with a present evil. Therefore, a greater power is not a cause of pain.

Objection 2: Inflicted harm is a cause of pain. But harm can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore, a greater power should not be posited as a cause of pain.

Objection 3: The causes of appetitive movements are the soul's interior inclinations. But a greater power is something exterior. Therefore, it should not be posited as a cause of pain.

But contrary to this: In *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, "The will resisting a greater power causes pain in the mind; the sensory power resisting a more powerful body causes pain in the body."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), a conjoined evil is a cause of pain or sadness in the manner of an object. Therefore, whatever causes the evil to be conjoined should be posited as a cause of pain or sadness. Now it is clearly contrary to the appetite's inclination for it to adhere in the present to what is bad. But what is contrary to a thing's inclination never reaches it except through the action of something more powerful. And this is why Augustine claims that a greater power is a cause of pain.

However, note that if a greater power is strong enough to change a contrary inclination into a proper inclination, then there will no longer be any repugnance or violence—as when a stronger agent, by corrupting a heavy body, removes from it the inclination by which it tends downward, at which point being borne upwards is natural to it and not violent. So, then, if some greater power is strong enough to remove the will's inclination or the sentient appetite's inclination, then pain or sadness does not follow from this. Instead, pain or sadness follows only when the appetite's inclination to the contrary remains. And this is why Augustine says that it is "the will *resisting* a greater power" that causes pain. For if it were not resisting, but if it instead ceded by consenting, then pleasure, and not pain, would follow.

Reply to objection 1: A greater power is a cause of pain not insofar as it is an agent in potentiality, but insofar as it is actually acting, viz., while it is effecting the conjoining of the corruptive evil.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents a power that is not greater absolutely speaking from being greater with respect to something. And in this sense it is able to inflict harm. But if it were not greater in any way at all, then it would not in any way be able to inflict harm and hence could not be a cause of pain.

Reply to objection 3: Exterior agents can be a cause of appetitive movements insofar as they cause the presence of the object. And it is in this sense that a greater power is posited as a cause of pain.

QUESTION 37

The Effects of Pain or Sadness

Next we have to consider the effects of pain or sadness (*de effectibus doloris vel tristitiae*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does pain remove the ability to learn something new? (2) Is the mind's being weighed down (*aggravatio animi*) an effect of sadness or pain? (3) Does sadness or pain weaken every operation? (4) Does sadness harm the body more than the other passions of the soul do?

Article 1

Does pain remove the ability to learn something new?

It seems that pain does not remove the ability to learn something new (*non auferat facultatem addiscendi*):

Objection 1: Isaiah 26:9 says, "When you issue your judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world will all learn justice." And further on (26:16): "In the tribulation of murmuring (*in tribulatione murmuris*) your teaching was with them." But pain or sadness follows in the hearts of men from God's judgments and from tribulation. Therefore, pain or sadness does not remove, but instead strengthens, the ability to learn something new.

Objection 2: Isaiah 28:9 says, "Whom shall He teach knowledge to? And whom shall He make to understand what is heard? Those who are weaned from milk, who are drawn away from the breast," i.e., from pleasures. But it is pain and sadness that especially take away pleasure. For as *Ethics* 7 explains, sadness impedes all pleasure; and Ecclesiasticus 11:29 says, "The affliction of an hour makes one oblivious to the greatest delights." Therefore, pain does not remove, but instead confers, the ability to learn something new.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 35, a. 7), interior sadness surpasses exterior pain. But a man is able to learn something new at the same time that he is sad. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he can learn something new at the same time that he is in bodily pain.

But contrary to this: In *Soliloquia* 1 Augustine says, "..... though I was tormented with a very sharp toothache in those days, so that I was able to turn over in my mind only those things that I had already securely learned, and I was altogether prevented from learning anything that required the full attention of my mind."

I respond: Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must be the case that when the soul's attention (*intentio animae*) is strongly drawn to the operation of one power, it is drawn back from the operation of another; for a single soul can only have one act of attention (*una intentio*). Because of this, if something draws all the mind's attention, or a large part of it, to itself, then that is incompatible with something else's needing close attention (*magnam attentionem*).

Now it is clear that sensible pain draws the soul's attention to itself to the highest degree, since, as is likewise apparent in the case of natural things, each thing naturally tends with full inclination (*tota intentione*) toward repelling what is contrary to it. Similarly, it is also clear that to learn something new (*addiscendum aliquid de novo*) requires study and effort along with close attention (*cum magna intentione*); this is clear from what Proverbs 2:4-5 says: "If you seek wisdom as if it were money, and dig for her as for a treasure, then you will understand the teaching." And so if the pain is intense, it keeps a man from being able to learn anything new. Moreover, pain can be intensified to such a degree that, at the instant of the pain, a man cannot even think about what he previously knew. However, on this point there is a diversity in accord with the different degrees of love that a man has for learning or thinking. The greater this love is, the more he keeps his mind's attention from being completely turned toward the pain.

Reply to objection 1: A moderate sadness that keeps the mind from wandering can contribute to the undertaking of learning—especially the learning of those things through which a man hopes he can be

freed from the sadness. And it is in this sense that in the “tribulation of murmuring” men are more receptive to God’s teaching (*homines doctrinam Dei magis recipit*).

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as they draw the soul’s attention to themselves, both pleasure and pain impede reason’s inquiry. Hence, *Ethics* 7 says, “In the midst of sexual pleasure, it is impossible to have an intellectual understanding of anything.”

Yet pain draws the soul’s attention to itself more than pleasure does. We likewise see in the case of natural things, too, that a natural body’s action is intensified against a contrary; for instance, heated water is acted upon more intensely by the cold, so that it freezes more solidly. Therefore, if the pain or the sadness is moderate, then it can contribute *per accidens* to learning something new insofar as it removes an excess of pleasure. But *per se* it impedes learning, and if it is intensified, it totally removes it.

Reply to objection 3: Exterior pain occurs because of some bodily damage, and so it has a greater corporeal change adjoined to it than does interior pain—even though interior pain is nonetheless greater because of the formal element in pain, which comes from the soul (*secundum illud quod est formale in dolore, quod est ex parte animae*). And so bodily pain is more of an obstacle to contemplation, which requires absolute quiet (*omnimodam quietem*), than is interior pain. And yet even interior pain, if it is intensified to a great degree, draws the mind’s attention in such a way that the man cannot learn anything new. Hence, because of sadness Gregory himself interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel.

Article 2

Is the mind’s being weighed down an effect of sadness?

It seems that the mind’s being weighed down (*aggravatio animi*) is not an effect of sadness:

Objection 1: In 2 Corinthians 7:11 the Apostle says, “Behold, this very fact that you were made sorrowful in accord with God—what great solicitude it works in you, what readiness for defense and indignation” But solicitude and indignation have to do with the mind’s being lifted up, which is the opposite of its being weighed down (*sollicitudo et indignatio ad quandam erectionem animi, quae aggravatione opponitur*). Therefore, the mind’s being weighed down is not an effect of sadness.

Objection 2: Sadness is opposed to pleasure. But being widened is an effect of pleasure (q. 33, a. 1), and it is being constricted—not being weighed down—that is opposed to being widened. Therefore, being weighed down should not be posited as an effect of sadness.

Objection 3: As is clear from what the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 2:7 (“Lest perhaps one who is of this sort should be absorbed by abundant sorrow”), it belongs to sadness to absorb. But what is weighed down is not absorbed; instead, it is pressed down under something heavy, whereas what is absorbed comes to be included within what absorbs it. Therefore, being weighed down should not be posited as an effect of sadness.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene both posit a sadness that weighs one down.

I respond: The effects of the passions of the soul are sometimes named metaphorically because of a likeness to sensible bodies, given that the movements of an animal appetite are similar to the inclinations of a natural appetite. It is in this way that intense heat (*fervor*) is attributed to love, being widened (*dilatatio*) is attributed to pleasure, and being weighed down is attributed to sadness. For a man is said to be weighed down because he is impeded from his proper movement by something heavy.

Now it is clear from what said above (q. 36, a. 1) that sadness has to do with a present evil, and this evil is such that by the very fact that it is opposed to the will’s movement, it weighs down the mind insofar as it keeps it from enjoying what it wants.

Now even if the mind is weighed down to the extent that at present it does not possess what it

wants, still, if the force of the evil that makes one sad is not great enough to take away the hope of escape, then there remains a movement to repel the harmful thing that makes one sad. On the other hand, if the force of the bad thing grows to such an extent that it excludes the hope of escape, then the tormented man's interior movement will be impeded absolutely speaking, so that it is unable to turn this way or that. And sometimes even the exterior movement of the body is impeded, so that the man remains stupefied within himself.

Reply to objection 1: This 'lifting up' of the mind has its source in the sadness that is "in accord with God," and this because of the hope, which is adjoined to it, for the remission of sins.

Reply to objection 2: As regards the appetitive movement, 'being constricted' and 'being weighed down' amount to the same thing. For from the fact that the mind is weighed down, so that it cannot proceed freely to exterior things, it withdraws into itself, as if constricted within itself.

Reply to objection 3: Sadness is said to absorb a man when the power of the evil that makes him sad affects the soul in such a way as to cut off all hope of escape. And so it is likewise in the same way that sadness weighs a man down and absorbs him.

For in the case of what is said metaphorically, certain claims follow which seem to be opposed to one another when they are taken in their proper senses.

Article 3

Does sadness impede every operation?

It seems that sadness does not impede every operation:

Objection 1: Solicitude is caused by sadness, as is clear from the passage adduced above from the Apostle (2 Corinthians 7:11). But solicitude helps one to operate well; hence, in 2 Timothy 2:15 the Apostle says, "Be solicitous to present yourself as a workman without disgrace." Therefore, sadness does not impede an operation, but instead helps one to operate well.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 7 says, in many men sadness is cause of concupiscence. But concupiscence makes for a more intense operation. Therefore, so does sadness.

Objection 3: Just as those who are rejoicing have certain proper operations, so too certain operations belong to those who are sad, e.g., to lament. But each thing is strengthened by what agrees with it. Therefore, there are some operations that are improved, and not impeded, because of sadness.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says that "pleasure perfects an operation," but that, on the contrary, "sadness impedes it."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 2), sometimes sadness does not weigh the mind down or absorb it to such an extent that it prevents every interior and exterior movement; instead, certain movements are in some cases caused by sadness itself. So, then, there are two ways in which an operation can be related to sadness:

In one way, as that which the sadness is directed toward (*id de quo est tristitia*). And on this score sadness impedes every operation, since what we do with sadness is such that we never do it as well as what we do with pleasure or without sadness. The reason for this is that the will is the cause of a human operation, and so when it is an operation with respect to which one is saddened, the action has to be weakened.

In the second way, an operation is related to the sadness as to its source and cause. And in this way such an operation has to be strengthened by the sadness, in the sense that the more someone is saddened by a given thing, the harder he tries to expel the sadness—as long as the hope of expelling it remains, since otherwise there would be no movement or operation caused by the sadness.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the objections.

Article 4

Is it sadness that inflicts the most harm on the body?

It seems that it is not sadness that inflicts the most harm on the body:

Objection 1: Sadness has spiritual *esse* in the soul. But things that have only spiritual *esse* do not cause corporeal change, as is clear in the case of the intentions of the colors which exist in the air and by which bodies are not colored. Therefore, sadness does not do harm to any corporeal thing.

Objection 2: If sadness does harm to some bodily thing, then this happens only insofar as it has some bodily change adjoined to it. But as was explained above (q. 22, aa. 1 and 3), a bodily change is found in every passion of the soul. Therefore, sadness does not harm the body more than the other passions of the soul do.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Anger and concupiscence drive some men mad,” and this seems to be the greatest harm, since reason is the most excellent thing that exists in a man. In addition, despair (*desperatio*) seems to be more harmful than sadness, since it is a cause of sadness. Therefore, sadness does not harm the body more than other passions of the soul do.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 17:22 says, “A joyful mind makes age flourish, a sorrowful spirit dries up the bones.” And Proverbs 25:20 says, “As a moth harms a garment, and a worm harms wood, so a man’s sadness harms the heart.” And Ecclesiasticus 38:19 says, “Out of sadness death comes speedily.”

I respond: Of all the passions of the soul, it is sadness that most harms the body. The reason for this is that sadness, unlike the other passions of the soul, is opposed to human life because of the very species of its movement and not just because of its measure or quantity. For human life consists in a certain motion (*humana vita consistit in quadam motione*) that is diffused from the heart into the other members of the body, and this motion belongs to human nature in a determinate measure. Therefore, if this motion exceeds the appropriate measure, it will be opposed to human life in the measure of its quantity, but not in the likeness of its species. On the other hand, if the course of the motion is impeded, then that will be opposed to human life in its species.

Now notice that in the case of all the passions of the soul, the bodily change that is the material element in the passions is conformed and proportioned to the appetite’s movement, which is the formal element, in the same way that matter is proportioned to form in all things. Therefore, those passions of the soul that involve a movement of the appetite toward pursuing something—e.g., love, joy, desire, etc.—are not opposed to the vital movement because of their species, but they can be opposed to it because of their quantity. And so they help the nature of the body because of their species, but can harm it because of their excess. By contrast, the passions that involve an appetitive movement with aversion or a sort of retraction are opposed to the vital motion not only because of their quantity but also because of the species of their movement, and so they are harmful absolutely speaking. Among these are fear, despair, and, above all, sadness, which weighs down the mind because of a present evil, the impression of which is stronger than is that of a future evil.

Reply to objection 1: Since the soul by its nature moves the body, the soul’s spiritual movement is naturally a cause of bodily change. Nor is there a similarity to spiritual intentions, since the latter do not have the natural role of moving other bodies that are not apt to be moved by the soul.

Reply to objection 2: The other passions involve bodily changes that are conformed in their species to the vital motion, but, as has been explained above, sadness involves a change that is contrary to the vital motion.

Reply to objection 3: The use of reason is impeded by less weighty causes (*ex leviori causa*) than those that life is corrupted by; for we see many sicknesses that undermine the use of reason and yet do not take away life.

Still, fear and anger do inflict bodily harm by being mixed in with sadness, and this because of the absence of what is desired.

Moreover, sadness itself takes away reason, as is clear in the case of those men who because of pain fall into melancholy or mania.

QUESTION 38

The Remedies for Pain or Sadness

Next we have to consider the remedies for pain or sadness. And on this topic there are five questions: (1) Is pain or sadness lessened by every instance of pleasure? (2) Is pain or sadness lessened by weeping? (3) Is pain or sadness lessened by the compassion of friends? (4) Is pain or sadness lessened by contemplating the truth? (5) Is pain or sadness lessened by sleeping and bathing?

Article 1

Is pain or sadness lessened by every instance of pleasure?

It seems not to be the case that every instance of pleasure lessens every instance of pain or sadness:

Objection 1: Pleasure lessens sadness only insofar as it is contrary to it; for as *Ethics* 2 says, “Medicines are made from contraries.” But as was explained above (q. 35, a. 4), not every instance of pleasure is contrary to every instance of sadness. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of pleasure lessens every instance of sadness.

Objection 2: What causes sadness does not lessen sadness. But some instances of pleasure cause sadness, since, as *Ethics* 9 says, “A bad man is saddened because he has taken pleasure (*quoniam delectatus est*).” Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of pleasure lessens sadness.

Objection 3: In *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says that he left his homeland, where he had been accustomed to sharing his life with his friend who was now dead, because his eyes would seek his friend less where he was not accustomed to seeing him. From this one can infer that what our dead or absent friends have shared with us becomes onerous to us when we grieve over their death or their absence. But what they especially shared with us were our pleasures. Therefore, those very pleasures become onerous to us when we are grieving. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of pleasure lessens every instance of sadness.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Pleasure expels sadness—whether it is a contrary pleasure or just any pleasure at all, if it is strong.”

I respond: As is clear from what has already been said (q. 23, a. 4), pleasure is the appetite’s coming to rest in an agreeable good (*quies appetitus in bono convenienti*), whereas sadness has its source in what opposes the appetite. Hence, pleasure is related to pain among the appetitive movements in the same way that, among bodies, rest is related to fatigue (*fatigatio*), which proceeds from a non-natural change. For sadness itself implies a sort of fatigue or sickness on the part of the appetitive power. Therefore, just as any sort of rest on the part of a body affords a remedy against any sort of fatigue, no matter what sort of non-natural cause it stems from, so any instance of pleasure affords a remedy to lessen any instance of sadness, no matter what it stems from.

Reply to objection 1: Even if it is not the case that every instance of pleasure is opposed by its species to every instance of pain, nonetheless, as was explained above (q. 35, a. 4), it is opposed to it by its genus. And so as far as the subject’s condition is concerned (*ex parte dispositionis subiecti*), any instance of sadness can be lessened by any instance of pleasure.

Reply to objection 2: The pleasures of bad men cause them sadness in the future and not in the present, viz., insofar as the bad men repent of the evils that have given them joy (*poenitent de malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt*). And this sort of sadness is relieved by contrary pleasures.

Reply to objection 3: When there are two causes that give inclinations toward contrary movements, each impedes the other, but the cause that finally wins out is the one that is stronger and more long-lasting.

Now in someone who is grieving over what he used to take pleasure in together with his dead or absent friend, there are two causes moving him in opposite directions. For when he thinks about his

friend's death or absence, this inclines him toward sorrow (*inclinat ad dolorem*), whereas his present good inclines him toward pleasure. Hence, each is diminished by the other. And yet since his present perceptions move him more strongly than do his memories of the past, and since his love for himself remains for a longer time than does his love for the other, in the end it is the pleasure that expels the sadness. Hence, a few lines later in the same place Augustine adds that his sorrow gave way to his former pleasures.

Article 2

Does weeping lessen sadness?

It seems that weeping (*fletus*) does not lessen (*non mitigat*) sadness:

Objection 1: No effect diminishes (*minuit*) its cause. But weeping or sighing (*fletus vel gemitus*) is an effect of sadness. Therefore, it does not diminish sadness.

Objection 2: Just as weeping or sighing is an effect of sadness, so laughing is an effect of rejoicing. But laughing does not diminish rejoicing. Therefore, weeping does not lessen sadness.

Objection 3: The bad thing that saddens us is represented in the weeping. But imagining a thing that saddens us increases our sadness, just as imagining a thing that delights us increases our rejoicing. Therefore, it seems that weeping does not lessen sadness.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 5 Augustine says that when he was grieving over the death of his friend, it was only in his sighs and tears that he found a little peace.

I respond: Tears and sighs naturally lessen sadness, and this in two ways:

First, because every harmful thing afflicts us all the more when it is closed up inside (*interius clausum*), since the soul's attention keeps growing with respect to it. But when it is diffused to the outside, then the soul's attention is in a certain sense dispersed toward exterior things, and so the interior pain is diminished. Because of this, when men who are in distress (*in tristitiis*) manifest their sadness by weeping or sighing, or even by talking (*fletu aut gemitu vel etiam verbo*), their sadness is lessened.

Second, because it is always the case that an operation that is appropriate for a man, given the condition he is in, is pleasurable to him. But weeping and sighing are operations appropriate for someone who is sad or in pain. And so they become pleasurable to him. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), every instance of pleasure in some way lessens sadness or pain, it follows that sadness is lessened by lamenting and sighing.

Reply to objection 1: The relation of a cause to its effect is itself contrary to the relation of what causes sadness to the one who is saddened. For every effect is agreeable to its cause and, as a result, pleases it, whereas a thing that causes sadness is contrary to the one who is sad. And so the effect of sadness bears to the one who is sad a relation that is contrary to the relation that the thing that causes sadness bears to the one who is sad. And because of this, sadness is lessened by an effect of sadness, by reason of the contrariety just explained.

Reply to objection 2: The relation that an effect bears to its cause is similar to the relation that someone who takes pleasure bears to that which gives pleasure, since there is agreeableness in both cases. But everything augments what is similar to itself. And this is why rejoicing is augmented by laughter and by the other effects of rejoicing—unless perhaps *per accidens*, because of its excessiveness, [the laughter lessens the rejoicing].

Reply to objection 3: Imagining the thing that effects the sadness, taken in its own right (*quantum est de se*), is apt to increase the sadness, but a certain pleasure arises from the very fact that a man imagines that which effects what is agreeable to him, given his condition. And for the same reason, as Tully points out in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3, if one bursts out laughing in a situation in which he

should be mourning, then he is saddened by the very fact that he is doing something inappropriate.

Article 3

Does the pain of a compassionate friend lessen sadness?

It seems that the pain of a compassionate friend does not lessen sadness:

Objection 1: It is contraries that are the effects of contraries. But as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 8, “When one rejoices with many others, each one has a more exuberant joy, since they are kindled and inflamed one by the other.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, when many are sad together, then it seems that there is more sadness.

Objection 2: As Augustine points out in *Confessiones* 4, friendship requires that each one give back to his friend in kind. But a friend who suffers with another (*amicus condolens*) grieves over the sadness of his sorrowful friend. Therefore, the friend who is already suffering his own evil is such that the compassionate friend’s sorrow for him is itself a cause of his suffering another’s evil. And so, since his pain is doubled, sadness seems to increase.

Objection 3: Every evil that belongs to a friend makes one sad in the same way that one’s own evil does, since “a friend is another self” (*amicus est alter ipse*). But pain is something bad. Therefore, the pain of a compassionate friend augments the pain of the friend with whom he is suffering.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says that in sorrows a friend who suffers with someone consoles him.

I respond: A friend who suffers with someone in his sorrows naturally consoles him (*naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis est consolativus*). In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher touches on two reasons for this:

The first is that since sadness weighs down the mind, it has the character of a burden that the one who is weighed down tries to have lightened. Therefore, when someone sees others saddened by his own sadness, he imagines that others are bearing that burden with him, trying, as it were, to make the burden lighter for him. And so he bears a lighter burden of sadness, as likewise happens in cases where one is carrying corporeal burdens.

The second, and better, reason is that by the fact that his friends are saddened for him, he sees that he is loved by them—and, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 5), this is pleasurable. Hence, since, as was explained above (a. 1), every instance of pleasure lessens sadness, it follows that a friend who suffers along with another lessens sadness.

Reply to objection 1: Friendship is shown in both respects, i.e., both in the fact that one rejoices with his rejoicing friend, and also in the fact that he suffers with his suffering friend. And each is rendered pleasurable by reason of the cause.

Reply to objection 2: The friend’s suffering itself makes one sad in its own right. But when one considers the cause of the pain, viz., love, he takes pleasure to a greater degree.

Reply to objection 3: This makes clear the reply to the third objection.

Article 4

Does contemplating the truth lessen pain?

It seems that contemplating the truth does not lessen pain (*contemplatio veritatis non mitiget dolorem*):

Objection 1: Ecclesiastes 1:18 says, “He who adds knowledge also adds pain.” But knowledge has to do with contemplating the truth. Therefore, it is not the case that contemplating the truth lessens pain.

Objection 2: Contemplating the truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But as *De Anima* 3 says, “The speculative intellect does not effect movement.” Therefore, since joy and pain are certain movements of the soul, it seems that contemplating the truth does nothing to lessen pain.

Objection 3: The remedy for a disease has to be applied where the disease is. But the contemplation of truth exists in the intellect. Therefore, it does not lessen pain, which exists in the sensory power.

But contrary to this: In *Soliloquia* 1 Augustine says, “It seemed to me that if the splendor of truth had opened itself to our minds, then either I would not have felt that pain, or at least I would not have endured it for nothing.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 3, a. 5), the greatest pleasure consists in contemplating the truth. But as was also explained above (a. 1), every pleasure lessens pain. And so contemplating the truth lessens sadness or pain; and the more perfectly someone is a lover of wisdom, the more it does so.

Moreover, it is because of the contemplation of God and of future beatitude that men rejoice in the midst of tribulations—this according to James 1:2 (“My brethren, count it all joy when you encounter various trials”). What’s more, joy of this sort is found even in the midst of bodily tortures; for instance, when the martyr Tiburtius was walking barefoot on the burning coals, he said, “It seems to me that I am walking on roses in the name of Jesus Christ.”

Reply to objection 1: He who adds knowledge adds pain either because of the difficulty and failures involved in finding the truth (*propter difficultatem et defectum inveniendae veritatis*), or because through knowledge a man comes to recognize many things that are contrary to his will. And so on the side of the things known, knowledge causes pain, whereas on the part of the act of contemplating the truth, it causes pleasure.

Reply to objection 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind through the thing that is being thought of (*ex parte rei speculatae*), but it does move the mind through the act of speculating itself, which is a certain human good and naturally pleasurable.

Reply to objection 3: There is an overflow in the powers of the soul from the higher ones to the lower ones. Accordingly, the pleasure of contemplating, which is in the higher part, overflows to lessen even that pain that exists in the sensory power.

Article 5

Do sleeping and bathing lessen sadness?

It seems that sleeping and bathing (*somnus et balneum*) do not lessen sadness:

Objection 1: Sadness exists in the soul. But sleeping and bathing have to do with the body. Therefore, they do nothing to lessen sadness.

Objection 2: It seems that the same effect cannot be caused by contrary causes. But since causes of the sort in question are corporeal, they are opposed to the contemplation of the truth, which, as has been explained (a. 4), causes the lessening of sadness. Therefore, sadness is not lessened by causes of the sort in question.

Objection 3: Insofar as sadness and pain have to do with the body, they consist in a certain change within the heart. But remedies of the sort in question seem to have to do with the exterior senses and exterior bodily members rather than with the interior condition of the heart. Therefore, sadness is not lessened by remedies of this sort.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 9 Augustine says, “I had heard that the name ‘bath’ (*balneum*; Greek: *βαλανεῖον*) comes from the fact that a bath drives anxiety from the mind.” And further on he says: “I slept, and woke up again, and found that my pain was more than a little lessened.” And he quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose, which says, “Sleep restores the tired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes anxious sorrows.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 37, a. 4), in its species sadness is opposed to the body’s vital motion. And so the things that restore corporeal nature to the normal state of its vital motion are opposed to sadness and lessen it. Moreover, by the fact remedies of the sort in question bring the nature back to its normal condition, they are a cause of pleasure; for, as was explained above (q. 31, a. 3), this is something that gives pleasure. Hence, since every instance of pleasure lessens sadness, sadness is lessened by corporeal remedies of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as it is felt, the normal condition of the body is itself such that it causes pleasure and, as a result, lessens sadness.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 8), one pleasure impedes another, and yet every instance of pleasure lessens sadness. Hence, it is not problematic for sadness to be lessened by causes that impede one another.

Reply to objection 3: As the book *De Causa Motus Animalium* explains, every good bodily disposition overflows in a certain way to the heart, which is the beginning and the end of corporeal motions.

QUESTION 39

The Goodness and Badness of Sadness or Pain

Next we have to consider the remedies for pain or sadness. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is every instance of sadness bad? (2) Can sadness be an upright good (*bonum honestum*)? (3) Can sadness be a useful good (*bonum utile*)? (4) Is bodily pain the greatest evil?

Article 1

Is every instance of sadness bad?

It seems that every instance of sadness is bad:

Objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa says, “Every instance of sadness is bad by its very nature (*sui ipsius natura*).” But what is bad by its nature is always and everywhere bad. Therefore, every instance of sadness is bad.

Objection 2: What all men, including virtuous men, avoid is bad. But all men, including virtuous men, avoid sadness; for as *Ethics* 7 says, “Even if a prudent man does not intend to take pleasure, he nonetheless does intend not to be saddened.” Therefore, sadness is bad.

Objection 3: Just as a bad corporeal thing is an object and cause of corporeal pain, so a bad spiritual thing is an object and cause of spiritual sadness. But every corporeal pain is bad for the body. Therefore, every instance of spiritual sadness is bad for the soul.

But contrary to this: Being sad about what is bad is opposed to taking pleasure in what is bad (*tristitia de malo contrariatur delectationi de malo*). But taking pleasure in what is bad is itself bad; hence, in denouncing certain people Proverbs 2:14 says, “They rejoiced over having done evil.” Therefore, being sad about what is evil is itself good.

I respond: There are two ways in which something can be said to be good or bad:

In one way, it can be said to be good or bad absolutely speaking and in its own right (*simpliciter et secundum se*). And in this sense every instance of sadness is something bad. For the very fact that a man’s appetite is troubled by a present evil (*anxiari de malo praesenti*) has the character of badness, since the appetite is thereby prevented from coming to rest in the good.

In the second way, a thing is said to be good or bad given some assumption about something else (*ex suppositione alterius*). For instance, as *Ethics* 9 points out, shame is said to be good on the assumption that some disgraceful deed has been committed. So, then, assuming the presence of something sad or painful, it is good (*ad bonitatem pertinet*) that someone should be saddened or pained by this present evil. For one could not fail to be saddened or pained unless either because he is insensitive (*non sentiret*) or because he does not regard the thing in question as repugnant—and each of these is manifestly bad. And so it is good that, given the presence of something bad, sadness or pain should follow. This is a point Augustine makes in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8: “It is a good thing for him to be saddened over the good he has lost. For if nothing good had remained in his nature, then there would have been no pain over the good that was lost in his punishment.”

However, since moral discourse is about singular cases, which are what actions (*operationes*) have to do with, what is good on an assumption ought to be judged good, in the same way that, as *Ethics* 3 says and as was established above (q. 6, a. 6), what is voluntary on an assumption is judged to be voluntary.

Reply to objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa is speaking of sadness from the side of the bad thing that causes sadness (*ex parte mali tristantis*) and not from the side of the one who perceives and repudiates that bad thing. It is likewise true from this perspective that everyone flees from sadness insofar as they flee from what is bad; however, they do not flee from perceiving and repudiating what is bad.

And one should reply in the same way about corporeal pain. For it attests to a good nature that one

should sense and reject what is bad for the body.

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: From this the replies to the second and third objections are clear.

Article 2

Does sadness have the character of an upright good?

It seems that sadness does not have the character of an upright good (*non habeat rationem boni honesti*):

Objection 1: What leads one to Hell (*ad inferos*) is opposed to what is upright. But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, “Jacob seems to have been afraid of being so troubled by his great sadness that he would go to the Hell of sinners and not to the rest of the blessed.” Therefore, sadness does not have the character of an upright good.

Objection 2: An upright good has the character of being praiseworthy and meritorious. But sadness lessens praise and merit; for in 2 Corinthians 9:7 the Apostle says, “Each one, as he has determined in his own heart, not out of sadness or necessity” Therefore, sadness is not an upright good.

Objection 3: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, “Sadness is has to do with what happens to us against our will.” But not to will what happens at present is to have an act of will that is opposed to the plan of God, whose providence is such that everything which happens is subject to it. Therefore, since, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 9), the human will’s being conformed to God’s will is part of the will’s uprightness (*cum conformitas humanae voluntatis ad divinam pertineat ad rectitudinem voluntatis*), it seems that sadness is contrary to uprightness of will. And so it does not have the character of an upright good.

But contrary to this: Whatever merits eternal life has the character of being upright. But sadness is one of these things, as is clear from what Matthew 5:5 says: “Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be consoled.” Therefore, sadness is an upright good.

I respond: Given the sense in which sadness is a good, it can be an upright good. For as has been explained (a. 1), sadness is a good because of the *recognition* and the *rejection* of what is bad.

In the case of bodily pain, these two things point to the goodness of nature, which is the source of (a) the sensory power’s act of sensing and of (b) the nature’s shrinking back from the hurtful thing that causes the pain.

On the other hand, in the case of interior sadness, the recognition of what is bad is sometimes the result of an upright judgment on the part of reason (*cognitio mali quandoque quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis*), and the rejection of what is bad is the result of a well-disposed will that detests what is bad (*recusatio mali est per voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum*). But every upright good proceeds from these two sources, viz., from uprightness on the part of reason and on the part of the will (*ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis*).

Hence, it is clear that sadness can have the character of an upright good.

Reply to objection 1: All the passions of the soul should be regulated by the rule of reason, which is the root of the upright good. Immoderate sadness goes beyond this rule and so recedes from the character of the upright good, and it is this sort of sadness that Augustine is talking about.

Reply to objection 2: Just as sadness about what is bad proceeds from an upright will and reason that detests what is bad, so sadness about what is good proceeds from a perverse will and reason that detest the good. And so this latter sort of sadness obstructs the praise or merit that belongs to an upright good, as in the case of someone who gives alms with sadness.

Reply to objection 3: There are some things that happen in the present, e.g., sins, that are done not in accord with God's will, but instead with God's permission (*non fiunt Deo volente sed Deo permittente*). Hence, a will that is opposed to sin either within itself or in another is not in disagreement with God's will.

On the other hand, evils of punishment (*mala poenalia*) occur in the present even in accord with God's will. However, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 10), uprightness of will requires not that a man will such things in their own right, but only that he not work against the order of God's justice.

Article 3

Can sadness be a useful good?

It seems that sadness cannot be a useful good:

Objection 1: Ecclesiasticus 30:25 says, "Sadness kills many, and there is no usefulness in it."

Objection 2: Choice has to do with what is useful for some end. But sadness is not the sort of thing that can be chosen (*tristitia non est eligibilis*); at the very least, as *Topics* 3 points out, "a thing without sadness should be chosen over the same thing with sadness." Therefore, sadness is not a useful good.

Objection 3: As *De Coelo* 2 says, "Every entity exists for the sake of its own operation." But as *Ethics* 10 says, "Sadness impedes an operation." Therefore, sadness does not have the character of a useful good.

But contrary to this: A wise man seeks only what is useful. But Ecclesiastes 7:5 says, "The heart of wise men is where sadness abides, and the heart of fools is where mirth abides." Therefore, sadness is useful.

I respond: There are two appetitive movements that arise in the face of a present evil:

There is one movement by which the appetite is opposed to the present evil. And on this score sadness does not have any usefulness, since what is present is unable not to be present.

The second movement rises up in the appetite to flee from or repel the evil that is causing the sadness. And on this score, sadness has usefulness if it is directed at something that should be fled from. For there are two reasons why something should be fled from:

First, because of its very self (*propter seipsum*), in light of its opposition to the good. Sin is of this sort. And so sadness about sin is useful in order that a man might flee from sin; as the Apostle puts it in 2 Corinthians 7:9: "I rejoice not because you have been saddened, but because you have been saddened unto repentance."

The second reason for which something should be fled from is not that it is bad in its own right (*non quia sit secundum se malum*), but that it is an occasion of something bad when a man adheres to it excessively out of love for it, or also when he thereby falls into something bad. Temporal goods are clearly of this sort. Accordingly, sadness about temporal goods can be useful in the way described in Ecclesiastes 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of feasting, for in the former we are reminded of the end of all men."

Now the reason why sadness about all the things that should be fled from is useful in that one's reasons for fleeing are doubled. For (a) the bad thing itself should be fled from in its own right, whereas (b) everyone flees from sadness itself in its own right—just as, similarly, everyone (a) desires the good and (b) desires to take pleasure in the good. Therefore, just as taking pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more eagerly, so, too, being sad about what is bad makes one flee from what is bad more resolutely (*vehementius*).

Reply to objection 1: This passage is talking about immoderate sadness, which absorbs the mind.

For as was explained above (q. 37, a. 2), sadness of this sort immobilizes the mind and makes it difficult for one to avoid what is bad.

Reply to objection 2: Just as everything that can be chosen becomes less choiceworthy because of sadness, so everything that should be fled from becomes, because of sadness, even more such that it should be fled from. And it is in this respect that sadness is useful.

Reply to objection 3: Sadness about an action impedes the action, but sadness about the cessation of an action makes one operate more eagerly.

Article 4

Is sadness the greatest evil?

It seems that sadness is the greatest evil:

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 8 says, “The worst is opposed to the best.” But there is an instance of pleasure that is the best, viz., that which belongs to happiness (*felicitas*). Therefore, some instance of sadness is the greatest evil.

Objection 2: Beatitude is man’s highest good, since it is man’s ultimate end. But as was explained above, beatitude consists in (a) a man’s having whatever he wills and in (b) his willing nothing bad. Therefore, man’s greatest good is the fulfillment of his will. But as is clear from Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 14, sadness consists in something’s happening against one’s will. Therefore, sadness is man’s greatest evil.

Objection 3: Augustine argues as follows in *Soliloquia*: “We are composed of two parts, viz., a soul and a body, and the body is the lower part (*pars deterior*). Now the highest good is the best thing that belongs to the better part (*melioris partis optimum*), whereas the greatest evil is the worst thing that belongs to the lower part (*pessimum deterioris*). But the best thing in the mind is wisdom, and the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man’s greatest good is to be wise, whereas his greatest evil is to suffer pain.”

But contrary to this: As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, a. 6), sin (*culpa*) is a greater evil than is punishment (*poena*). But sadness or pain has to do with the punishment for sin, in the same way that the enjoyment of mutable things is a sinful evil. For in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “What is the pain that is attributed to the soul, other than the soul’s being deprived of the mutable things that it used to enjoy or had hoped it would be able to enjoy? And this is the totality of all that is called evil, i.e., sin and the punishment for sin.” Therefore, it is not sadness or pain that is man’s greatest evil.

I respond: It is impossible that any instance of sadness or pain should be man’s greatest evil. For every instance of sadness or pain is directed either (a) toward something that is truly bad or (b) toward something that is apparently bad but truly good.

Now pain or sadness that is directed at something that is truly bad cannot be the greatest evil, since there is something worse than it, viz., either not to judge as bad what truly is bad, or not to reject it.

On the other hand, sadness or pain that is directed toward something apparently bad but truly good cannot be the greatest evil, since it would be worse to be altogether separated off from the true good (*peius esset omnino alienari a vero bono*).

Hence, it is impossible for any instance of sadness or pain to be man’s greatest evil.

Reply to objection 1: There are two goods common to both pleasure and sadness, viz., (a) true judgment about what is good and bad and (b) an proper ordering on the part of the will by which it approves of what is good and rejects what is bad (*ordo debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum*). And so it is clear that there is some good in an instance of pain or sadness which is such that if it is removed, then the pain or sadness can be made worse. But it is not the case that in every

pleasure there is some evil which is such that if it were removed, the pleasure would be made better. Hence, it is possible for some instance of pleasure to be man's highest good, in the way explained above (q. 34, a. 3), but it is impossible for an instance of sadness to be man's greatest evil.

Reply to objection 2: The very fact that the will opposes what is bad is a certain good. Because of this, sadness or pain cannot be the greatest evil, since it has some good mixed in with it.

Reply to objection 3: What harms the better part is worse than what harms the worse part. Now as Augustine explains in *Enchiridion*, something is called 'bad' because it is harmful. Hence, what is bad for the soul is a greater evil than what is bad for the body. Hence, the argument that Augustine adduces here—not in his own voice but in that of someone else (*non ex suo sensu sed ex sensu alterius*)—is not efficacious.

QUESTION 40

Hope and Despair

Next we have to consider the passions of the irascible part of the soul: first, hope (*spes*) and despair (*desperatio*) (question 40); second, fear (*timor*) and daring (*audacia*) (questions 41-45); and, third, anger (*ira*) (questions 46-48).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is hope the same thing as desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*)? (2) Does hope exist in the apprehensive power or in the appetitive power? (3) Does hope exist in brute animals? (4) Is despair contrary to hope? (5) Is experience a cause of hope? (6) Does hope abound in the young and the inebriated? (7) What is the relation of hope to love (*ordo spei ad amorem*)? (8) Is hope conducive to an operation?

Article 1

Is hope the same thing as desire or avid desire?

It seems that hope (*spes*) is the same thing as desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*):

Objection 1: Hope is posited as one of the four principal passions. But as is clear from *De Civitate Dei* 14, in enumerating the four principal passions, Augustine puts avid desire (*cupiditas*) in the place of hope. Therefore, hope is the same as avid desire or desire.

Objection 2: The passions differ from one another because of their objects (*secundum obiecta*). But the object of hope is the same as the object of avid desire or desire, viz., a future good. Therefore, hope is the same thing as avid desire or desire.

Objection 3: If someone replies that hope adds to desire the possibility of attaining the future good, then against this: What is related to the object *per accidens* does not alter the passion's species. But *possible* is related *per accidens* to *future good*, which is the object of avid desire (or desire) and of hope. Therefore, hope is a passion that does not differ in species from desire or avid desire.

But contrary to this: Diverse passions that differ in species belong to diverse powers. But hope exists in the irascible part of the soul, whereas desire and avid desire exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, hope differs in species from desire or avid desire.

I respond: The species of a passion is taken from its object. Now with respect to the object of hope there are four conditions to attend to:

The first is that the object be something *good*, since, properly speaking, hope exists only with respect to some good. And hope thereby differs from *fear* (*timor*), which has to do with what is bad.

The second condition is that the object be *future*, since there is no such thing as hope with respect to what is present and already possessed. And hope thereby differs from joy (*gaudium*), which has to do with a present good.

Third, it is required that the object be something *arduous* that is attainable with *difficulty*, since no one is said to hope for something insignificant (*minimum*) that is immediately within his power to have. And hope thereby differs from *desire* or *avid desire*, which has to do with a future good simply speaking (*de bono futuro absolute*) and so belongs to the concupiscible part of the soul, whereas hope belongs to the irascible part.

Fourth, it is required that this arduous object be *possible to attain*, since no one hopes for what cannot be attained in any way at all. And on this score hope differs from *despair*.

So, then, it is clear that hope differs from desire in the way that the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible part. Because of this, hope presupposes desire in the way, explained above (q. 25, a. 1), that all the passions of the irascible part presuppose passions of the concupiscible part.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine puts avid desire in place of hope because (a) both of them have to

do with a future good, and because (b) a good that is not arduous is, as it were, counted as nothing, with the result that avid desire seems mainly to tend toward an arduous good—which is what hope also tends toward.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, the object of hope is not a future good absolutely speaking, but a future good along with the arduousness and difficulty involved in attaining it.

Reply to objection 3: The object of hope adds to the object of desire not only possibility but also arduousness, and it is the latter that makes hope belong to a different power, viz., the irascible power, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), has to do with the arduous.

Moreover, *possible* and *impossible* are not related altogether *per accidens* to the object of the appetitive power. For the appetite is a principle of movement, and nothing is moved toward a thing except under the notion *possible* (*nihil movetur ad aliquid nisi sub ratione possibilis*), since no one moves toward what he judges to be impossible to attain. And because of this, hope differs from despair in accord with the [specific] differences *possible* and *impossible*.

Article 2

Does hope belong to the cognitive power?

It seems that hope belongs to the cognitive power (*spes pertineat ad vim cognitivam*):

Objection 1: Hope seems to be a certain sort of looking for (*expectatio quaedam*); for in Romans 8:25 the Apostle says, “If we hope for what we do not see, then we look for it with patience.” But looking for (*expectatio*) seems to belong to the cognitive power, the role which is to ‘look forward’ (*expectare*). Therefore, hope belongs to the cognitive power.

Objection 2: Hope seems to be the same thing as confidence (*fiducia*); hence, we call those who have hope ‘confident’, as if we were using ‘hoping’ and ‘confident’ for the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore, hope does, too.

Objection 3: Certitude is a property of the cognitive power. But certitude is attributed to hope. Therefore, hope belongs to the cognitive power.

But contrary to this: As has been explained (a. 1), hope is directed toward a good. But the good is as such the object of the appetitive power and not of the cognitive power. Therefore, hope belongs to the appetitive power and not to the cognitive power.

I respond: Since hope implies the appetite’s being extended in a certain way toward a good (*extensionem quandam appetitus in bonum*), it manifestly belongs to the appetitive power, since movement toward a thing properly belongs to the appetite. By contrast, the cognitive power’s action is completed not by the knower’s moving toward the things, but rather by the fact that the things known come to exist in the knower.

However, because the cognitive power moves the appetite by presenting the appetite’s object to it, diverse movements occur in the appetitive power in a way that corresponds to diverse conceptions of the apprehended object. For instance, one sort of movement follows in the appetite from the apprehension of a thing as good (*ex apprehensione boni*) and another sort of movement from the apprehension of a thing as bad (*ex apprehensione mali*); and, similarly, one sort of movement follows from an apprehension of a thing as present or as future, or as good or bad simply speaking or as arduous, or as possible or as impossible (*ex apprehensione praesentis et futuri, absoluti et ardui, possibilis et impossibilis*). Accordingly, hope is a movement of the appetitive power that follows upon the apprehension of something as a good which is future and arduous and possible to attain. That is, hope is the appetite’s being extended toward an object of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: Since hope has to do with a good that is possible, there are two ways in

which the movement of hope arises in a man, corresponding to the two ways in which something is possible for a man, viz., (a) by his own power and (b) by someone else's power.

Thus, someone is said only to 'hope for'—and not to 'look for'—what he hopes to attain by his own power. On the other hand, he is properly said to 'look for' what he hopes for through the assistance of someone else's power, so that he is said to 'look for something' (*expectare*) in the sense of looking for it from another (*ex alieno spectare*), viz., insofar as the prior apprehension (*vis apprehensiva praecedens*) has to do not only with the good he intends to attain, but also that by whose power he hopes to attain it—this according to Ecclesiasticus 51:10 ("I looked for the help of men"). Thus, the movement of hope is sometimes called a 'looking for' because of the cognitive power's prior assessment (*propter inspectionem virtutis cognitivae praecedentem*).

Reply to objection 2: A man believes that he will attain whatever he desires and judges to be possible for him to attain; and from this sort of faith in his prior cognitive movement, the appetitive movement that follows is called 'confidence'. For an appetitive movement is named on the basis of the prior cognitive movement, in the way that an effect is named from a better known cause. For the apprehensive power knows its own act better than it knows the appetite's act.

Reply to objection 3: Certitude is attributed not only to a sentient appetite's movement but also to a natural appetite's movement. For instance, one says that a rock will certainly tend downward, and this is so because of the infallibility that one has in light of the certitude of the cognition that precedes a sentient appetite's movement, or even a natural appetite's movement.

Article 3

Does hope exist in brute animals?

It seems that hope does not exist in brute animals:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, hope has to do with a future good. But having cognition of the future is something that does not belong to brute animals, which have only sentient cognition; for sentient cognition does not have to do with future things. Therefore, hope does not exist in brute animals.

Objection 2: The object of hope is a good that is possible to attain. But *possible* and *impossible* are differences that apply to *true* and *false*, which exist only in the mind, as the Philosopher points out in *Metaphysics* 6. Therefore, hope does not exist in brute animals, which do not have minds (*in quibus non est mens*).

Objection 3: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says, "Animals are moved by what is seen" (*animalia moventur visis*). But hope does not have to do with what is seen; for as Romans 8:24 says, "What someone sees—does he hope for that?" Therefore, hope does not exist in brute animals.

But contrary to this: Hope is a passion of the irascible part of the soul. But the irascible part exists in brute animals. Therefore, so does hope.

I respond: The interior passions of the animals can be discerned from their exterior movements. It is apparent from those movements that hope exists in brute animals. For instance, if a dog sees a rabbit or a hawk sees a bird too far off in the distance (*nimis distantem*), then it does not move toward it—as if having no hope of being able to catch it. But if it sees it close by, then it does move—as if acting on the hope of catching it.

For as was explained above (q. 35, a. 1), the sentient appetite of brute animals, as well as the natural appetite of non-sentient things, follow upon some intellect's apprehension—as does an intellective nature's appetite, which is called a 'will'. The difference is that the will is moved by the apprehension of an intellect that is conjoined to it, whereas the movement of a natural appetite follows upon the apprehension of an intellect which is separate from it and which institutes its nature; and the

same holds for the sentient appetite of brute animals, which act by a certain natural instinct. Hence, in the works of brute animals and of other natural things, the process is similar to that involved in the works of a craft (*in operibus artis*). And it is in this sense that hope and despair exist in brute animals.

Reply to objection 1: Even though brute animals have no cognition of the future, an animal is nonetheless moved by natural instinct toward something in the future as if it did foresee the future. For an instinct of this sort is instilled in brute animals by God's intellect, which foresees future things.

Reply to objection 2: The object of hope is not possible in the sense in which *possible* is a difference of [the genus] *true*, since what is possible in this sense follows upon the relation of a predicate to a subject. Instead, the object of hope is possible in the sense in which *possible* is predicated relative to a given power (*dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam*). For this is the way *possible* is divided in *Metaphysics* 5, viz., into the two senses of *possible* just explained.

Reply to objection 3: Even if what is future does not fall under the visual power, still, on the basis of what an animal sees in the present, its appetite is moved to either pursue or avoid something future.

Article 4

Is despair contrary to hope?

It seems that despair is not contrary to hope (*desperatio non sit contraria spei*):

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, "For a single thing there is a single contrary." But fear is contrary to hope. Therefore, it is not the case that despair is contrary to it.

Objection 2: Contraries, it seems, have to do with the same thing. But hope and despair do not have to do with the same thing. For hope has to do with the good, whereas despair exists because of something bad that impedes the attainment of the good. Therefore, hope is not contrary to despair.

Objection 3: It is a movement that is contrary to a movement, whereas rest is opposed to movement as its privation. But despair seems to imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore, it is not contrary to hope, which implies a movement that involves being extended toward the good that is hoped for.

But contrary to this: *De-speratio* (despair or desperation) is so called because it is contrary to *spes* (hope).

I respond: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 2), there are two sorts of contrariety involved in changes (*in mutationibus invenitur duplex contrarietas*):

One sort has to do with *being directed toward contrary termini* (*secundum accessum ad contrarios terminos*), and this sort of contrariety is found only in the passions of the concupiscible part of the soul, in the way that *love* and *hatred* are contraries.

The second sort has to do with *approaching toward and withdrawing from the same terminus* (*per accessum et per recessum respectu eiusdem termini*), and this sort of contrariety is found among the passions of the irascible part, in the way explained above (q. 23, a. 2).

Now the object of hope, which is an arduous good, has the character of something attractive, as long as it is thought of as being possible to attain; and so hope, which implies a movement of *approaching toward*, tends toward this object. By contrast, insofar as something has the character of being impossible to attain, it has the character of being repellent, since, as *Ethics* 3 explains, "When they come up against something impossible, men leave off." And so it is this object that despair has to do with. Hence, despair implies a movement of *withdrawing from*. And because of this, despair is contrary to hope in the way that withdrawing from something is contrary to approaching toward it.

Reply to objection 1: Fear is contrary to hope by a contrariety in the *objects*, viz., between *good* and *bad*, since this sort of contrariety is found among the passions of the irascible part insofar as they

flow from the passions of the concupiscible part. By contrast, despair is contrary to hope only by a contrariety between *approaching toward* and *withdrawing from*.

Reply to objection 2: Despair does not have to do with the bad as bad (*sub ratione mali*), although it sometimes has to do with the bad *per accidens*, insofar as what is bad makes something impossible to attain (*inquantum facit impossibilitatem adipiscendi*). However, despair can also have its source solely in the abundance of what is good.

Reply to objection 3: Despair implies not just a privation of hope, but also a certain withdrawal from the desired thing by reason of the fact that the thing is judged to be impossible to attain. Hence, despair presupposes desire, just as hope does, since we have neither despair nor hope with respect to what does not fall under our desire. And likewise, because of this, both despair and hope have to do with a good that falls under desire.

Article 5

Is experience a cause of hope?

It seems that experience is not a cause of hope:

Objection 1: Experience belongs to the cognitive power; hence, in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “Intellectual virtue requires experience and time.” But as has been explained (a. 2), hope exists not in the cognitive power, but in the appetitive power. Therefore, experience is not a cause of hope.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Old men find it difficult to have hope, because of their experience.” From this it appears that experience is a cause of a lack of hope. But it is not the case that the same thing is a cause of opposites. Therefore, experience is not a cause of hope.

Objection 3: In *De Caelo* 2 the Philosopher says, “To say something about everything and not to leave anything out is sometimes a sign of foolishness.” But the fact that a man attempts everything seems to involve a great deal of hope, while foolishness stems from inexperience. Therefore, it seems to be inexperience, rather than experience, that is a cause of hope.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “There are some who are of good hope because they have been victorious many times and over many.” But this pertains to experience. Therefore, experience is a cause of hope.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the object of hope is a future and arduous good that is possible to attain. Therefore, something can be a cause of hope either (a) because it makes something possible for a man or (b) because it makes him judge that something is possible.

In the first way, what causes hope is anything that increases a man’s power—wealth, fortitude, and, among other things, experience as well. For through experience a man acquires the ability to do something with ease, and hope follows from this. Hence, in *De Re Militari* Vegetius says, “No one fears doing what he is confident that he has learned well.”

In the second way, what causes hope is anything that makes someone judge that something is possible for him. And in this sense learning, along with any sort of persuasion, can be a cause of hope. And experience can be a cause of hope in this sense, too, viz., insofar as through experience a man comes to judge that something is possible for him which he had previously thought impossible.

However, in this same way experience can also be a cause of a lack of hope. For just as through experience a man can come to judge that something is possible for him which he had previously thought impossible, so too, conversely, through experience a man can come to judge that something is not possible for him which he had previously thought possible.

So, then, there are two ways in which experience is a cause of hope and one way in which it is a cause of a lack of hope. Because of this, we can say that it is more a cause of hope.

Reply to objection 1: Experience in action (*in operabilibus*) is a cause not only of knowledge but also of a certain habit, because of the action's becoming customary (*propter consuetudinem*), and this makes the operation easier.

On the other hand, intellectual virtue itself likewise gives one the power to do things with ease, since it demonstrates that certain things are possible. And in this way it is a cause of hope.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of old men, there is a lack of hope because of experience insofar as experience causes them to judge that something is impossible (*inquantum experientia facit existimationem impossibilis*). Hence, in the same place the Philosopher adds that many things have turned out badly for them (*eis multa evenerunt in deterius*).

Reply to objection 3: Foolishness and inexperience can be a cause of hope *per accidens*, as it were, viz., by setting aside the knowledge through which one judges truly that something is not possible. Hence, inexperience is a cause of hope in the same way that experience is a cause of a lack of hope.

Article 6

Are youthfulness and inebriation causes of hope?

It seems that youthfulness (*iuventus*) and inebriation (*ebrietas*) are not causes of hope:

Objection 1: Hope implies a sort of certitude and firmness; hence, Hebrews 6:19 compares hope to an anchor. But the young and the inebriated lack firmness, since they have minds that are easily changed. Therefore, youthfulness and inebriation are not causes of hope.

Objection 2: As was explained above (a. 5), anything that increases one's power is in a special way a cause of hope. But youthfulness and inebriation have a sort of weakness adjoined to them. Therefore, they are not causes of hope.

Objection 3: As was just explained (a. 5), experience is a cause of hope. But young people lack experience. Therefore, youthfulness is not a cause of hope.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "The inebriated are very hopeful" (*bene sperantes*). And in *Rhetoric* 2 he says, "The young are full of hope (*bonae spei*)."

I respond: As the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, there are three reasons why youthfulness is a cause of hope. And these three reasons can be thought of as corresponding to the three conditions of a good that is the object of hope, viz., as has been explained (a. 1), that it is *future*, that it is *arduous*, and that it is *possible*.

For young people have a long future ahead of them and little by way of a past (*multum habent de futuro et parum de praeterito*). And so since memory has to do with the past and hope with the future, they have little memory but live mostly in hope.

Again, because of their impassioned nature (*propter caliditatem naturae*), young people have high spirits, and so their hearts are bigger. But having a big heart makes one tend toward arduous tasks. And so young people are spirited and full of hope.

Similarly, those who have not suffered rejection and have not experienced obstacles in their undertakings are quick to believe that things are possible for them (*de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile*). And so they are full of hope.

Two of these conditions are likewise present in the inebriated because of wine, viz., (a) an impassioned nature and high spiritedness and, again, (b) a failure to take into account dangers and weaknesses. And for the same reason all foolish people (*omnes stulti*), failing to make use of deliberation, attempt everything and are full of hope.

Reply to objection 1: Even though in the young and in the inebriated there is no firmness as a

matter of fact, they nonetheless have firmness in their own judgment; for they think that they will surely get what they hope for.

Reply to objection 2: Similarly, the young and the inebriated have weakness as a matter of fact, but in their own judgment they have power, since they do not recognize their own defects.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained (a. 5), it is not only experience, but also inexperience, that is a cause of hope.

Article 7

Is hope a cause of love?

It seems that hope is not a cause of love:

Objection 1: According to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, the first among the affections of the soul is love. But hope is a certain affection of the soul. Therefore, love precedes hope. Therefore, hope is not a cause of love.

Objection 2: Desire precedes hope. But as has been explained (q. 25, a. 2), desire is caused by love. Therefore, hope likewise follows upon love. Therefore, it is not a cause of it.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 32, a. 3), hope is a cause of pleasure. But pleasure exists only with respect to a good that is loved. Therefore, love precedes hope.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Matthew 1:2 (“Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob”) says, “That is, faith begot hope, and hope begot charity.” But charity is love. Therefore, love is caused by hope.

I respond: There are two possible things that hope has to do with. For hope has to do with its object, the *good that is hoped for*. But since (a) the good that is hoped for is an arduous good that is possible and (b) it sometimes happens that what is arduous is possible for us through others and not through ourselves, hope also has to do with *what makes something possible for us*.

Therefore, insofar as hope has to do with the *good that is hoped for*, hope is caused by love, since there is hope only with respect to a good that is desired and loved.

On the other hand, insofar as hope has to do with *what makes something possible for us*, love is caused by hope and not vice versa. For from the fact that there is someone through whom we hope that it will be possible for certain goods to come to us, we are moved toward him as toward our good, and so we begin to love him. By contrast, it is not the case that we hope in someone by virtue of the fact that we love him—except *per accidens*, viz., insofar as we believe that we are to be loved by him in return. Hence, being loved by someone makes us hope in him, whereas our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objection are clear from what has been said.

Article 8

Does hope facilitate action?

It seems that hope does not facilitate action (*spes non adiuvat operationem*), but instead impedes it:

Objection 1: It belongs to hope to be carefree. But being carefree gives rise to negligence, which impedes an operation. Therefore, hope impedes action.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 37, a. 3), sadness impedes action. But hope is sometimes

a cause of sadness; for Proverbs 13:12 says, “Hope that is deferred afflicts the soul.” Therefore, hope impedes action.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 4), despair is contrary to hope. But despair, especially in matters of warfare, facilitates action; for 2 Kings 2:26 says, “Despair is very dangerous.” Therefore, hope brings about the contrary effect, viz., it impedes action.

But contrary to this: 1 Corinthians 9:10 says, “He who plows should plow in hope of obtaining fruit.” And the same line of reasoning holds for all other actions.

I respond: Hope is such that it *per se* facilitates action by intensifying it. It does this in two respects:

First, by reason of its *object*, which is a good that is arduous and possible. For the judgment that the good in question is arduous stimulates one’s attentiveness, whereas the judgment that it is possible does not slow down one’s effort. Hence, it follows that a man operates intensely because of hope.

Second, by reason of its *effect*. For as was explained above (q. 32, a. 3), hope is a cause of pleasure, which, as was likewise explained above (q. 33, a. 4), facilitates action.

Hence, hope facilitates action.

Reply to objection 1: Hope has to do with attaining what is good, whereas carefreeness has to do with avoiding what is bad. Hence, carefreeness seems opposed to fear rather than relevant to hope.

Reply to objection 2: Hope is *per se* a cause of pleasure, but, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 3), its causing sadness is *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 3: Despair becomes very dangerous in war because of a certain sort of hope that is adjoined to it. For those who despair of fleeing are weakened with respect to fleeing, but they hope to avenge their own death. And so they fight more fiercely because of this hope, and they thus become extremely dangerous to their enemies.

QUESTION 41

Fear in Itself

Next we have to consider, first, fear (*timor*) (questions 41-44) and, second, daring (*audacia*) (question 45).

As for fear, there are four things to consider: first, fear itself (question 41); second, the object of fear (question 42); third, the causes of fear (question 43); and, fourth, the effects of fear (question 44).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is fear a passion of the soul? (2) Is fear a specific passion (*passio specialis*)? (3) Is there such a thing as natural fear? (4) What are the species of fear?

Article 1

Is fear a passion of the soul?

It seems that fear (*timor*) is not a passion of the soul:

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “Fear is a virtue (*virtus*) that involves *sustole*—that is, being drawn inward (*contractio*)—“and that desires the essence” (*desiderativa essentiae*). But as is proved in *Ethics* 2, no virtue is a passion. Therefore, fear is not a passion.

Objection 2: Every passion is an effect that has its source in the presence of an agent. But as Damascene points out in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, fear has to do with something that is future and not with anything present. Therefore, fear is not a passion.

Objection 3: Every passion of the soul is a movement of the sentient appetite that follows upon an apprehension by the sensory power. But the sensory power apprehends the present and not the future. Therefore, since fear has to do with a future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine numbers fear among the other passions of the soul.

I respond: With the exception of sadness (*post tristitiam*), fear has more of the character of a passion than any of the other movements of the soul.

For as was explained above (q. 22, a. 1), the first thing relevant to the character of a passion is that a passion is the *movement of a passive power*, i.e., a movement to which its object is related in the manner of an active mover, so that a passion is the effect of an agent. And in this sense even acts of sensing and of intellective understanding are called passions or instances of being acted upon (*etiam sentire and intelligere dicuntur pati*). Second, what is more properly called a passion is a *movement of an appetitive power*. And what is even more properly called a passion is a movement which (a) belongs to an appetitive power having a corporeal organ and which (b) occurs along with some *corporeal change*. And, beyond that, what are most properly of all called passions are those movements that imply *some sort of harm*.

Now it is clear that since fear has to do with what is bad, it belongs to an *appetitive* power; for it is appetitive powers that have to do *per se* with the good and the bad. Moreover, fear belongs to the *sentient* appetite, since it occurs along with a certain change, viz., “being drawn inward” (*cum contractionem*), as Damascene puts it. And it also implies a certain relation to what is bad, insofar as what is bad in some sense gains a victory over something good. Hence, the character of being a passion belongs to fear in the truest sense (*verissime*).

Still, fear comes after sadness, which has to do with a present evil; for fear has to do with a future evil, and a future evil does not effect movement in the same way that a present evil does.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Virtue’ (*virtus*) names a principle of action, and so insofar as an appetitive power’s interior movements are principles of exterior actions, they are called ‘virtues’. By contrast, the Philosopher is denying that a passion is the sort of virtue that is a habit.

Reply to objection 2: Just as a passion in the case of a natural body has its source in the corporeal

presence of an agent, so, too, a passion in the case of the soul has its source in the ‘soul-like’ presence of an agent without a corporeal or real presence (*ex animali praesentia agentis absque praesentia corporali vel reali*), viz., insofar as the bad thing that is future in reality is present through the soul’s apprehension (*inquantum malum quod est futurum realiter est praesens secundum apprehensionem animae*).

Reply to objection 3: The sensory power does not apprehend the future, but on the basis of what it apprehends as present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good or to fear a future evil.

Article 2

Is fear a specific passion or a generic passion?

It seems that fear is not a specific passion (*timor non sit specialis passio*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “He whom fear does not distress is such that desire does not harass him, and sickness [read: sadness] does not wound him, and gesticulating and empty joy do not toss him around.” From this it seems that if fear is removed, then all the other passions are removed as well. Therefore, fear is a generic passion and not a specific passion (*non passio est specialis sed generalis*).

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, “Approaching and withdrawing (*prosecutio et fuga*) are related in the appetite in the same way that affirming and denying are related in the intellect.” But negation is not a species in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but is instead something common to many things. Therefore, neither is withdrawal a species in the appetite. But fear is nothing other than a certain sort of withdrawal from what is bad. Therefore, fear is not a specific passion.

Objection 3: If fear were a specific passion, then it would exist principally in the irascible part of the soul. But fear also exists in the concupiscible part. For in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Fear is a certain sort of sadness,” and Damascene says, “Fear is a virtue of desire” (*virtus desiderativa*), and, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), sadness and desire exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, fear is not a specific passion, since it belongs to diverse powers.

But contrary to this: As is clear from Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, fear is divided off on the same level with the other passions of the soul (*condividitur aliis passionibus animae*).

I respond: The passions of the soul take their species from their objects. Hence, a specific passion has an object that is specific. But fear has a specific object, just as hope does. For just as the object of hope is something good that is future, arduous, and possible to attain, so the object of fear is something bad that is future, difficult, and cannot be resisted (*cui resisti non potest*). Hence, fear is a specific passion of the soul.

Reply to objection 1: All the passions of the soul are derived from a single source, viz., love, in which they have a connection to one another. And it is by reason of this connection—and not because fear is a generic passion—that if fear is removed, then the other passions of the soul are removed as well.

Reply to objection 2: Not every instance of an appetite’s withdrawing is an instance of fear; instead, as has been explained, fear is withdrawal from a specific object. And so even though withdrawal is something generic, fear is nonetheless a specific passion.

Reply to objection 3: There is no sense in which fear exists in the concupiscible part of the soul, since it has to do not with something bad simply speaking, but with something bad that is accompanied by some difficulty or arduousness that makes it almost impossible to resist (*sed cum difficultate vel arduitate ut ei resisti vix possit*).

However, because, as was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), the passions of the irascible part have their source in the passions of the concupiscible part and are terminated in them, what belongs to the

concupiscible part is attributed to fear. For fear is said to be sadness insofar as the object of fear would produce sadness if it were present; hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that fear proceeds “from imagining a future evil that is corruptive and produces sadness.” Similarly, Damascene attributes desire to fear, since just as hope arises from the desire for something good (*a desiderio boni*), so fear arises from an aversion to something bad (*ex fuga mali*). For as is clear from what was said above (q. 25, a. 2 and q. 29, a. 2 and q. 36, a. 2), the aversion to something bad arises from the desire for something good.

Article 3

Is there such a thing as natural fear?

It seems that there is such a thing as natural fear (*timor aliquis sit naturalis*):

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “There is a sort of natural fear by which the soul is unwilling to be separated from the body.”

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 2), fear arises from love. But as Dionysius explains in *De Divinis Nominibus* 4, there is such a thing as natural love. Therefore, there is likewise such a thing as natural fear.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 40, a. 4), fear is opposed to hope. But there is such a thing as a hope that belongs to nature, as is clear from what Romans 4:18 says of Abraham, viz., that “against hope”—the hope of nature—“he believed in hope”—the hope of grace. Therefore, there is likewise such a thing as natural fear.

But contrary to this: What is natural is found generally among all things, animate and inanimate. But fear is not found among inanimate things. Therefore, there is no such thing as natural fear.

I respond: A movement is called ‘natural’ because nature inclines a thing toward it. But there are two ways in which this happens:

In one way, the whole of the movement is completed by the nature without any operation on the part of an apprehensive power, in the way that moving upwards (*moveri sursum*) is fire’s natural movement, and in the way that growth (*augeri*) is a natural movement belonging to plants and animals.

In a second way, what is called ‘natural’ is a movement that the thing’s nature inclines it toward, even if the movement is completed only through an apprehension—in the way that, as was explained above (q. 10, a. 1 and q. 17, a. 9), the movement of the cognitive and appetitive powers is traced back to the nature as its first principle. And in this sense, even the acts of an apprehensive power, e.g., understanding, sensing, and remembering, along with an animal’s appetitive movements as well, are sometimes called ‘natural’. This is the sense in which an instance of fear can be called ‘natural’.

And this natural fear is distinguished from non-natural fear by the diversity of their objects. For as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, there is a sort of fear that has to do with a corruptive evil that a nature shies away from because of its natural desire to exist (*refugit propter naturale desiderium essendi*); and it is this sort of fear that is called ‘natural’. Again, there is a sort of fear that produces sadness and that is repugnant not to the nature but to the appetite’s desire, and this sort of fear is called ‘non-natural’. In the same way, love, concupiscence, and pleasure were likewise divided into *natural* and *non-natural* above (q. 26, a. 1 and q. 30, a. 3 and q. 31, a. 7).

However, notice that certain passions of the soul, e.g., love, desire, and hope, are sometimes called ‘natural’ in the first sense of ‘natural’, whereas the others cannot be called natural in that sense. This is because *love* and *hatred* and *desire* and *aversion* imply a certain inclination toward pursuing what is good and avoiding what is bad, and this sort of inclination belongs to a natural appetite as well. And so a certain natural love and desire (or hope) can in some sense be attributed even to natural things that lack cognition. By contrast, the other passions of the soul imply certain movements for which a natural

inclination is in no way sufficient. This is so either because (a) sensation and cognition are part of the nature of these passions, in the sense, explained above (q. 31, a. 1 and q. 35, a. 1), in which apprehension is required by the nature of pleasure and pain, so that things which lack cognition cannot be said to take pleasure or to be saddened; or because (b) movements of the sort in question are contrary to the character of a natural inclination; for instance, despair withdraws from a good because of some difficulty, and fear withdraws from fighting against a contrary evil, even though there is a natural inclination toward doing this. And so passions of this sort are in no sense attributed to inanimate things.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Does Damascene correctly assign the species of fear?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly assigns six species of fear, viz., sluggishness (*segnities*), shamefacedness or embarrassment (*erubescencia*), shame (*verecundia*), wonder (*admiratio*), amazement (*stupor*), and agony (*agonia*):

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “Fear has to do with something bad that produces sadness (*de malo contristativo*).” Therefore, the species of fear ought to correspond to the species of sadness. But as was explained above (q. 35, a. 8), there are four species of sadness. Therefore, there should be just four species of fear corresponding to them.

Objection 2: Whatever consists in an act of ours is subject to our power. But as has been explained (a. 2), fear has to do with something bad that exceeds our power. Therefore, sluggishness, shamefacedness, and shame, which involve our action, should not be posited as species of fear.

Objection 3: As has been explained (aa. 1-2), fear has to do with the future. But as Gregory of Nyssa explains, “Shame (*verecundia*) has to do with a base act that has already been committed.” Therefore, shame is not a species of fear.

Objection 4: Fear has to do only with what is bad. But wonder (*admiratio*) and amazement (*stupor*) have to do with what is great and unusual, regardless of whether it is good or bad. Therefore, wonder and amazement are not species of fear.

Objection 5: As it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, philosophers are moved by wonder to inquire into the truth. But fear moves one to put off inquiry instead of moving one toward inquiry. Therefore, wonder (*admiratio*) is not a species of fear.

But contrary to this: The authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa suffices for the contrary.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 2), fear has to do with something bad that is future and that exceeds the power of the one who has the fear, with the result that it cannot be resisted.

Now just as a man’s good can be thought of either (a) as involving his own operation or (b) as involving exterior things, so too in the case of what is bad for him.

As for an operation that belongs to the man himself, there are two sorts of evil that can be feared:

The first sort of evil is work that weighs heavily on his nature (*labor gravans naturam*). And this is the cause of *sluggishness* or *dilatoriness* (*segnities*), viz., when someone shies away from acting because of his fear of too much work (*propter timorem excedentis laboris*).

The second sort of evil is disgrace that damages his reputation (*turpitude laedens opinionem*). And so if disgrace is feared in an act about to be committed, then there is *shamefacedness* (*erubescencia*), whereas if the fear has to do with a disgraceful act that has already been committed, then it is *shame* (*verecundia*).

On the other hand, there are three ways in which what is bad in exterior things can exceed a man’s

power to resist:

First, by reason of its magnitude (*ratione magnitudinis*), viz., when someone thinks about a great evil, the unfolding of which he is unable to take in (*magnum malum cuius exitum considerare non sufficit*). And this is *wonder* (*admiratio*).

Second, by reason of its unfamiliarity (*ratione dissuetudinis*), viz., because some evil that we are not used to thinking about is encountered, and so it is a great evil in our estimation. And then there is *amazement* (*stupor*), which is caused by imagining something unusual (*ex insolita imaginatione*).

Third, by reason of its unexpectedness (*ratione improvisionis*), viz., since it cannot be provided for ahead of time (*provideri non potest*)—in the way that future misfortunes are feared (*sicut futura infortunia timentur*). And this sort of fear is called ‘*agony*’ (*agonia*).

Reply to objection 1: The species of sadness that were posited above (q. 35, a. 8) are taken not from the diversity of their objects, but from their effects and from certain special characteristics. And so those species of sadness do not have to correspond to these species of fear, which are taken from a proper division of the object of fear.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as it is now being done, an operation is subject to the agent’s power (*subditur potestati operantis*). But something that exceeds the agent’s power, and because of which the agent shies away from the action, can be thought of with respect to the action. Accordingly, sluggishness, shamefacedness, and shame are posited as species of fear.

Reply to objection 3: Future insults or reproaches can be feared because of a past act. Accordingly, shame is a species of fear.

Reply to objection 4: Not every instance of wonder and amazement is a species of fear, but rather wonder that has to do with a great evil and amazement that has to do with an unfamiliar evil.

An alternative reply is that just as sluggishness shies away from the work of an exterior operation, so wonder and amazement shy away from the difficulty of thinking about great and unfamiliar things, regardless of whether they are good or bad, so that wonder and amazement are related to an act of the intellect in the same way that sluggishness is related to an exterior act.

Reply to objection 5: Someone who has wonder shies away at present from passing judgment about the thing he wonders about, fearing a mistake; but he will inquire into it in the future. The one who is amazed fears both to judge in the present and to inquire in the future. Hence, wonder is a source of philosophizing, whereas amazement is an impediment to philosophical thinking.

QUESTION 42

The Objects of Fear

Next we have to consider the objects of fear. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is the object of fear something good or something bad? (2) Are evils of nature (*malum naturae*) an object of fear? (3) Is there fear of evils of sin (*malum culpae*)? (4) Can fear itself be feared? (5) Are things that happen suddenly (*repentina*) feared to a greater degree? (6) Are things for which there is no remedy feared to a greater degree?

Article 1

Is the object of fear something good or something bad?

It seems that the object of fear is something good (*bonum sit obiectum timoris*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “We fear nothing except (a) losing what we love and have acquired or (b) not acquiring what we love and hope for.” But what we love is something good. Therefore, fear has something good as its proper object.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Power, and someone’s being over another (*super alium ipsum esse*), is something to be feared (*est terribile*).” But something of this sort is a good. Therefore, it is something good that is the object of fear.

Objection 3: There cannot be anything bad in God. But we are commanded to fear God—this according to Psalm 33:10 (“Fear the Lord, all you His holy ones”). Therefore, there is also fear of what is good.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “Fear has to do with a future evil.”

I respond: Fear is a certain movement of the appetitive power. Now as *Ethics* 6 explains, what belongs to the appetitive power is to approach and to withdraw (*prosecutio et fuga*); approaching has to do with what is good, whereas withdrawing has to do with what is bad. Thus, every movement of an appetitive power that implies an approach toward something has for its object what is good, whereas every movement that implies a withdrawal from something has for its object what is bad. Hence, since fear implies a withdrawal, in the first instance and *per se* it has as its proper object what is bad.

Now fear can also have to do with what is good insofar as what is good bears a relation to what is bad. And there are two ways in which this can be the case:

In one way, insofar as some good is being stripped away by the bad thing in question (*inquantum per malum privatur bonum*). Now something is bad by the very fact that it strips away a good. Hence, when someone withdraws from what is bad because it is bad, it follows that he is withdrawing from it because it strips away a good that he is approaching out of his love for it. And this is the sense in which Augustine claims that there is no reason for fear other than that one might lose a good that is loved.

In the second way, something good is related to what is bad as its cause, viz., in the sense that something good is by its power able to inflict some harm on a good that is loved. And so, in the same way in which it was explained above (q. 40, a. 7) that hope has to do with two things, viz., (a) the good thing toward which one is tending and (b) that through which he hopes to acquire the desired good, so, too, fear has to do with two things, viz., (a) the evil that one is shying away from and (b) the good thing that is able by its power to inflict that evil. This is the sense in which God is feared by a man insofar as He is able to inflict either spiritual or corporeal punishments. This is also the sense in which a man’s power is feared, especially when it is harmful or unjust, since such a man is ready to inflict harm. And this is also the sense in which “someone’s being over another” (*super alium esse*) is feared, i.e., being subject to another (*inniti alii*) in such a way that it is within the other’s power to inflict harm on us; for instance, someone who is privy to a crime is feared because he might reveal the crime.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 2

Is there fear of evils of nature?

It seems that there is no fear of evils of nature (*timor non sit de malo naturae*):

Objection 1: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Fear makes us deliberate (*timor facit consiliativos*).” But as *Ethics* 3 says, we do not deliberate about things that come from nature. Therefore, there is no fear of evils of nature.

Objection 2: Natural failings (*defectus naturales*) such as death and other things of this sort threaten men at all times. Therefore, if there were fear of such evils, then a man would always have to be in fear.

Objection 3: Nature does not effect movement toward contraries. But evils of nature have their source in nature. Therefore, the fact that someone might shy away from such evils through fear does not have its source in nature. Therefore, natural fear is not fear of evils of nature, and yet it is this sort of evil that seems pertinent to natural fear.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “The most fearful of all things is death,” and death is an evil of nature.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, fear comes from “imagining a future evil that is corruptive and causes sadness.” Now just as an evil that causes sadness is one that is contrary to the *will*, so a corruptive evil is one that is contrary to *nature*. And this is what an ‘evil of nature’ is. Hence, there can be such a thing as fear of an evil of nature.

But notice that an evil of nature sometimes comes from a natural cause, and in such a case it is called an evil of nature not only because it strips away a good of nature, but also because it is an effect of nature, e.g., natural death and other failings of this sort. Sometimes, however, an evil of nature comes from a non-natural cause, e.g., a death that is violently inflicted by an assailant. And in both of these senses, an evil of nature is in some way feared and in some way not feared. For since, as the Philosopher puts it, fear comes from “imagining a future evil,” anything that eliminates the imagining of a future evil removes fear as well.

Now there are two ways in which it can happen that an evil does not appear to be future:

In one way, from the fact that it is remote and distant, since because of the distance we imagine that it is not going to happen (*propter distantiam imaginamur ut non futurum*). And so either we do not fear the evil in question, or else we fear it very little. For as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, “Things that are a long way off are not feared; for instance, all men know that they will die, but because death is not imminent, they do not trouble themselves about it.”

In a second way, some evil that is future is judged as not future, and this because of an inevitability that makes one judge it to be present. Thus, in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Those who are already being executed are not afraid,” since they see the inevitability of their imminent death “but in order for someone to be afraid, there must be some hope of surviving.”

So, then, an evil of nature is not feared when it is not apprehended as future. However, if an evil of nature that is corruptive is apprehended as imminent and yet accompanied by some hope of escape, then it will be feared.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, sometimes an evil of nature does not have its source in nature.

However, insofar as such an evil does have its source in nature, it might nonetheless be capable of

being deferred even if it cannot be totally avoided. And given this sort of hope, there can be deliberation with respect to avoiding it.

Reply to objection 2: Even if an evil of nature is always threatening, it is nonetheless not always close by. And so it is not always being feared.

Reply to objection 3: Death and other failures of nature come from nature in general, and yet a particular nature fights against them as much as it can. And so because of the inclination of a particular nature, there is pain and sadness with respect to evils of this sort when they are present, and there is fear if they are imminent in the future.

Article 3

Is there fear of evils of sin?

It seems that there can be fear of evils of sin:

Objection 1: In his commentary on 1 John 4:18 Augustine says, “It is with a chaste fear that a man fears separation from God.” But nothing except sin separates us from God—this according to Isaiah 59:2 (“Your sins have divided you and your God”). Therefore, there can be fear of evils of sin.

Objection 2: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, “The things that we fear when they are future are the things by which we are saddened when they are present.” But it is possible for someone to grieve over or to be saddened by an evil of sin. Therefore, it is likewise possible for someone to fear an evil of sin.

Objection 3: Hope is opposed to fear. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, one can hope for the good of virtue. And in Galatians 5:10 the Apostle says, “I am confident of you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind.” Therefore, it is possible for there to be fear of evils of sin.

Objection 4: As was explained above (q. 41, a. 4), shame (*verecundia*) is a species of fear. But shame has to do with an unseemly deed, i.e., an evil of sin. Therefore, so does fear.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Not all evils are feared, e.g., that someone will be unjust or tardy.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 40, a. 1 and q. 41, a. 2), just as the object of hope is something good that is future, arduous, and such that one can attain to it, so fear has to do with something bad that is future, arduous, and such that it cannot easily be avoided. From this one can infer that what is completely subject to our own power and will does not have the character of something to be feared (*non habet rationem terribilis*); instead, what is to be feared is only that which has an extrinsic cause.

Now an evil of sin has its proper cause the human will, and so, properly speaking, it does not have the character of something to be feared.

However, since the human will can be inclined toward sinning by something exterior, if that thing which inclines it toward sinning has a great power to incline it, then in this sense there can be fear of an evil of sin, insofar as that evil comes from an exterior cause—as, for instance, when someone fears spending time in the company of bad men, lest he be induced by them to sin. But, properly speaking, in such a situation it is the seduction that the man fears more than the sin in its proper character, i.e., insofar as it is voluntary. For insofar as it is voluntary, it does not have the character of being such that it is feared.

Reply to objection 1: Separation from God is a certain punishment that follows upon sin, and every punishment is in some sense from an exterior cause.

Reply to objection 2: There is one thing that sadness and fear agree in, viz., that both have to do with what is bad, whereas there are two things that they disagree in. First, sadness has to do with a present evil, whereas fear has to do with a future evil. Second, since sadness exists in the concupiscible

part of the soul, it has to do with evil simply speaking and so can be directed toward any sort of evil whatsoever, whether great or small. By contrast, since fear exists in the irascible part, it has to do with an evil that involves arduousness and difficulty. However, arduousness and difficulty are ruled out to the extent that something is subject to the will. And so it is not the case that everything we are saddened by when it is present is such that we fear it when it is future. Rather, we fear just some of those evils, viz., the ones that are arduous.

Reply to objection 3: Hope has to do with something good that one can attain to. But someone can attain to the good thing either by himself or through another, and so there can be hope with respect to an act of virtue that is within our power. By contrast, fear has to do with something bad that is not subject to our power, and so it is always the case that an evil that we fear has its source in an extrinsic cause. By contrast, a good that is hoped for can have its source either in an intrinsic cause or in an extrinsic cause.

Reply to objection 4: As was explained above (q. 41, a. 4), shame is fear not with respect to the sinful act itself, but rather with respect to the disgrace or ignominy that follows upon the sinful act. And this disgrace or ignominy comes from an extrinsic cause.

Article 4

Can fear be feared?

It seems that fear cannot be feared:

Objection 1: Everything that is feared is guarded from being lost by fearing; for instance, someone who fears losing his health guards it by fearing. Therefore, if fear were feared, then a man would guard himself from fearing by fearing. But this seems absurd.

Objection 2: Fearing is a certain sort of withdrawing (*quaedam fuga*). But nothing withdraws from itself. Therefore, fear does not fear fearing.

Objection 3: Fear has to do with the future. But someone who fears already has fear. Therefore, he cannot fear the fear.

But contrary to this: A man can love his own love and be pained by his own pain. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, he can likewise fear his own fear (*potest timere timorem*).

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), whatever has the character of something to be feared has its source in an extrinsic cause and does not have its source in our own will.

Now fear has its source partly in an extrinsic cause, and it is partly subject to our will. It has its source in an extrinsic cause insofar as it is a passion that follows upon imagining some imminent evil. Accordingly, someone can fear fear, i.e., he can fear that there might be an imminent necessity for fearing due to the onslaught of some overwhelming evil.

Now this fear is subject to the will insofar as the lower appetite obeys reason, and so a man can repel the fear. In this respect, fear cannot be feared, just as Augustine claims in 83 *Quaestiones*. But because someone could use the arguments adduced by Augustine in order to show that fear cannot in any way at all be feared, it is necessary to reply to those arguments.

Reply to objection 1: Not every instance of fear is a single fear, but instead there are diverse instances of fear corresponding to the diverse things that are feared. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent its being the case that by one instance of fear someone saves himself from another instance of fear, and in this sense by fearing he guards himself against that later instance of fear.

Reply to objection 2: Since the instance of fear by which the imminent evil is feared is different from the instance of fear by which that very fear of the imminent evil is feared, it does not follow that the same thing withdraws from itself or that the same withdrawal is a withdrawal from itself.

Reply to objection 3: Because of the diversity among the instances of fear that has already been explained, a man can fear a future instance of fear by means of a present instance of fear.

Article 5

Are unfamiliar and sudden things more to be feared?

It seems not to be the case that unfamiliar and sudden things are more to be feared (*insolita et repentina non sint magis terribilia*):

Objection 1: Just as hope has to do with something good, so fear has to do with something bad. But experience makes for an increase of hope in the case of good things. Therefore, it also makes for an increase of fear in the case of bad things.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “It is those who are quiet and astute, and not those who are prone to sharp anger (*illi qui acutae irae sunt*), who are more to be feared.” But it is clear that those who are prone to sharp anger have movements that are more sudden. Therefore, what is sudden is less to be feared.

Objection 3: Things that are sudden are less able to be thought about. But some things are such that the more they are considered, the more they are feared; hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “Some men appear to be courageous because of ignorance; for if they discover that things are different from what they suspected, they run away.” Therefore, sudden things are less feared.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 2, Augustine says, “Fear shudders at what is unfamiliar and sudden and stands opposed to things that are loved, and it takes precautions to secure those things.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), the object of fear is an imminent evil that cannot be easily repelled. This occurs because of two elements: (a) the magnitude of the evil and (b) the weakness of the one who is fearful. Something’s being unfamiliar and sudden contributes to both of these elements.

First, it makes the imminent evil seem greater. For all corporeal things, both good ones and bad ones, appear less daunting (*minora apparent*) the more they are thought about. And so just as pain with respect to a present evil is lessened when it lasts for a long time, as is clear from Tully in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3, so, too, the fear of a future evil is diminished by one’s thinking about it ahead of time.

Second, something’s being unfamiliar and sudden contributes to the weakness of the one who is fearful insofar as it eliminates the remedies which a man can prepare ahead of time in order to repel future evils; such remedies cannot exist when the evil occurs unexpectedly.

Reply to objection 1: The object of hope is something good that one can attain to. And so whatever increases a man’s power is apt to increase his hope and, for the same reason, to diminish his fear, since fear has to do with something bad that cannot easily be resisted. Therefore, since experience makes a man more able to operate, it diminishes his fear in the same way that it increases his hope.

Reply to objection 2: Those who are sharply angry do not hide their anger, and so the harms they inflict are not so sudden that they cannot be foreseen. By contrast, quiet and astute men hide their anger, and so the harm that they threaten cannot be foreseen, but instead comes unexpectedly. And this is why the Philosopher says that it is the latter who are more to be feared.

Reply to objection 3: Speaking *per se*, corporeal goods or evils appear greater at the beginning. The reason for this is that each thing appears greater when its contrary is placed right next to it. Hence, when someone suddenly passes from poverty to wealth, he overestimates his wealth because of his previous poverty (*propter paupertatem praeexistentem divitias magis aestimat*), and, conversely, the rich have a greater fear of poverty immediately upon falling into it.

However, it can happen by some accident that the magnitude of a given evil is hidden, e.g., when

enemies cleverly conceal themselves. And in such a case it is true that the evil becomes more fearful upon careful consideration.

Article 6

Are evils for which there is no remedy more to be feared?

It seems not to be the case that evils for which there is no remedy are more to be feared (*ea quae non habent remedium non sint magis timenda*):

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 3), it is required for fear that some hope of escape should remain (*quod remaneat aliqua spes salutis*). But in the case of evils for which there is no remedy, no hope of escape remains. Therefore, such evils are in no way to be feared.

Objection 2: No remedy can be applied to the evil of death, since, in accord with nature, no return is possible from death to life. Yet, as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric 2*, it is not death that is most to be feared. Therefore, it is not the case that evils for which there is no remedy are more to be feared.

Objection 3: In *Ethics 1* the Philosopher says, “A good that lasts longer is no greater than one that lasts for a single day, and a good that is everlasting is no greater than one that is not everlasting.” But evils for which there is no remedy do not seem to differ from other evils except because they are long-lasting or everlasting. Therefore, they are not for that reason worse, or more to be feared.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “The fearsome things that are most to be feared are those which, if they have gone wrong, cannot be corrected or those which we cannot help, or cannot easily help.”

I respond: The object of fear is something bad, and so anything that contributes to an increase in the badness likewise contributes to an increase in the fear. Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 18, a. 3), badness is increased not only because of the species of the bad thing itself, but also because of its circumstances. And, of all the circumstances, being long-lasting, or even everlasting, seems to contribute most to an increase of badness. For things that exist in time are in some sense measured by temporal duration, and so if enduring something for such-and-such a length of time is bad, then the same thing endured for twice that length of time is thought of as twice as bad. And according to this line of reasoning, to endure the same thing for an infinitely long time (*pati idem in infinito tempore*), i.e., to endure it forever, in some sense makes for an infinite increase in the evil (*habet quodammodo infinitum augmentum*). But evils which are such that once they arrive, they cannot be remedied, or cannot be easily remedied, are taken to be everlasting or long-lasting. And so they are to be feared most of all.

Reply to objection 1: There are two sorts of remedies for an evil:

One, by the future evil’s been prevented from arriving at all. And if this sort of remedy is excluded, then hope is removed and, as a result, so is fear. Hence, we are not here talking about this sort of remedy.

The other sort of remedy for evil is one by which an evil that is already present is removed. And this is the sort of remedy that we are talking about here.

Reply to objection 2: Even if death is an evil without remedy (*irremediabile malum*), nonetheless, as was explained above (a.2), because it is not immediately threatening, it is not feared.

Reply to objection 3: In this passage the Philosopher is talking about something that is good taken in its own right (*de per se bono*), i.e., good by its species. In this sense of ‘good’, a thing becomes a greater good because of the nature of goodness itself and not by virtue of being long-lasting or everlasting.

QUESTION 43

The Causes of Fear

Next we have to consider the causes of fear. And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is love a cause of fear? (2) Is weakness (*defectus*) a cause of fear?

Article 1

Is love a cause of fear?

It seems that love (*amor*) is not a cause of fear:

Objection 1: That which 'introduces' (*introducitur*) a thing is a cause of it. But as Augustine says in his commentary on 1 John 4:18, "Fear introduces (*introducitur*) the love of charity." Therefore, fear is a cause of love, and not vice versa.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "The men who are feared the most are those from whom we expect bad things to threaten us." But by the fact that we expect something bad from someone, we are prompted to hate him rather than to love him (*magis provocamur ad odium eius quam ad amorem*). Therefore, fear is caused by hatred rather than by love.

Objection 3: It was explained above (q. 42, a. 3) that what comes from within ourselves does not have the character of something to be feared. But it is especially the case that what comes from love proceeds from the depth of our heart (*ex intimo cordis*). Therefore, fear is not caused by love.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Without doubt, there is no cause of fear except (a) losing what we love and have acquired or (b) not acquiring what we love and hope for." Therefore, every instance of fear is caused by the fact that we love something. Therefore, love is a cause of fear.

I respond: The objects of the passions are related to the passions in the way that forms are related to natural things or artifacts, since the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, in the same way that the things just mentioned take their species from their forms. Therefore, just as anything that is a cause of a form is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so, too, anything that is in any way a cause of the object of a passion is a cause of that passion.

Now something can be a cause of the object of a passion either in the manner of an *efficient cause* or in the manner of a *material disposition*. For instance, the object of pleasure is something good that is apprehended and fitting and conjoined [to the appetite] (*bonum apparens conveniens coniunctum*), where (a) its *efficient* cause includes anything that brings about the conjoining or that brings it about that the good thing in question is fitting or good or apprehended (*illud quod facit coniunctionem vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni*), while (b) its cause in the manner of a *material disposition* is a habit, or any sort of disposition, in accord with which the good that is conjoined to him becomes fitting for someone or is apprehended by him (*habitus vel quaecumque dispositio secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum*).

So, then, in the case under discussion, the object of fear is something judged to be evil and in the near future and such that it cannot easily be resisted (*obiectum timoris est aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non potest*). And so whatever is able to inflict such an evil is an *efficient* cause of the object of fear and thus of the fear itself. On the other hand, that by which someone is so disposed that something is an evil of the sort in question for him is a cause of fear and of its object in the manner of a *material disposition*. And it is in this latter sense that love is a cause of fear. For from the fact that someone loves a certain good, it follows that it is bad for him to be deprived of that good and, as a result, it follows that he fears being deprived of it as something bad.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 42, a. 1), fear has to do in the first place and *per se* with something bad which one is withdrawing from and which is opposed to a certain good

that is loved. And so fear arises *per se* from love.

However, in a secondary sense, fear has to do with the source of the relevant sort of evil (*secundario vero respicit ad id per quod provenit tale malum*). And so sometimes fear induces love *per accidens*, viz., insofar as a man who fears being punished by God keeps God's commandments, and so begins to hope; and as was explained above (q. 40, a. 7), hope introduces love.

Reply to objection 2: Someone from whom bad things are expected is, to be sure, at first hated (*primo quidem odio habetur*). However, after good things begin to be hoped for from him, then he begins to be loved.

Still, the good that the feared evil is contrary to was loved from the beginning.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to anything that is a cause of a fearsome evil in the manner of an *efficient* cause. But as has been explained, love is a cause of fear in the manner of a *material disposition*.

Article 2

Is weakness a cause of fear?

It seems that weakness is not a cause of fear (*defectus non sit causa timoris*):

Objection 1: Those who have power are feared most of all. But weakness is opposed to power. Therefore, weakness is not a cause of fear.

Objection 2: Those who are already being executed are in an especially weakened state (*illi qui iam decapitantur maxime sunt in defectu*). But as *Rhetoric* 2 points out, such men do not have fear. Therefore, weakness is not a cause of fear.

Objection 3: To contend with a rival has its source in courage and not in weakness (*decertare ex fortitudine provenit, non ex defectu*). But as *Rhetoric* 2 says, "Those who are contending have a fear of those who are fighting for the same things." Therefore, weakness is not a cause of fear.

But contrary to this: Contraries are causes of contraries. But as *Rhetoric* 2 says, "Fear is eliminated by wealth, and strength, and a multitude of friends, and power." Therefore, fear is caused by a weakness in such things.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), one can identify two sorts of causes of fear, (a) one in the manner of a *material disposition* on the part of the one who has the fear, and (b) the other in the manner of an *efficient cause* on the part of what is feared:

(a) Thus, as regards the first of these, weakness is, speaking *per se*, a cause of fear, since it happens that, because of some weakness in one's capacities (*ex aliquo defectu virtutis*), one is unable to easily repel an imminent evil. However, what is required in order to cause fear is a weakness of a certain measure. For a weakness that causes fear of a future evil is a lesser weakness than that which follows upon a present evil, with respect to which there is sadness. And the weakness would be still greater if one's perception of the evil, or one's love for the good whose contrary is feared, were totally eliminated (*si totaliter sensus mali auferretur vel amor boni cuius contrarium timetur*).

(b) On the other hand, as regards the second sort of cause of fear, it is power and strength that are, speaking *per se*, causes of fear. For by virtue of the fact that something apprehended as harmful is powerful, it happens that its effect cannot be repelled.

However, it is possible *per accidens* for a weakness on this side to be a cause of fear, viz., insofar as it happens that, because of some weakness on his part, someone wills to inflict a harm, e.g., to redress an injustice, either because he has previously been harmed by the other or because he fears being harmed by him (*puta propter iniustitiam, vel quia ante laesum fuit vel quia timet laedi*).

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for a cause of fear that is an *efficient* cause of

the fear.

Reply to objection 2: Those who are already being executed are suffering from a present evil. And so their weakness exceeds the measure involved in fear (*iste defectus excedit mensuram timoris*).

Reply to objection 3: Those who are contending are fearful not because of the power by which they are able to contest with their rival, but because of a weakness in their power, the result of which is that they are not confident that they will be victorious.

QUESTION 44

The Effects of Fear

Next we have to consider the effects of fear. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does fear make one to be drawn inward (*facit contractionem*)? (2) Does fear make one deliberative (*faciat consiliativos*)? (3) Does fear make one quiver (*faciat tremorem*)? (4) Does fear impede an operation (*impediat operationem*)?

Article 1

Does fear make one to be drawn inward?

It seems that fear does not make one to be drawn inward (*non faciat contractionem*):

Objection 1: When one is drawn inward (*contractione facta*), heat and animal spirits are drawn back toward the interior parts of the body (*ad interiora revocantur*). But when heat and the spirits are increased within, the heart is enlarged for boldly doing something aggressive (*ad audacter aliquid aggrediendum*), as is clear in case of those who are angry. But this is contrary to what happens in the case of fear. Therefore, fear does not make one to be drawn inward.

Objection 2: When heat and the spirits are increased within by a man's being drawn inward, what follows is that he bursts out loudly (*in vocem prorumpat*), as is clear in the case of those who are in pain (*ut patet in dolentibus*). But those who are afraid do not emit sounds; instead, they are rendered speechless. Therefore, fear does not make one to be drawn inward.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 41, a. 4), shame (*verecundia*) is a species of fear. But as Tully points out in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 and as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, those who are ashamed blush (*rubescunt*). And redness in the face attests not to being drawn inward, but to the opposite. Therefore, it is not an effect of fear that one is drawn inward.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, "Fear is a virtue (*virtus*) that involves *sustole*," i.e., being drawn inward (*idest secundum contractionem*).

I respond: As was explained above (q. 28, a. 5), in the case of the passions of the soul, the movement of the appetitive power is itself like a form, whereas the bodily change is like matter, and the one is proportioned to the other. Hence, the bodily change follows as a likeness to the appetitive movement and in keeping with the character of that movement (*secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi motus*).

Now as regards the soul's appetitive movement, fear implies being drawn inward in a certain way (*importat certam contractionem*). The reason for this is that, as was explained above (q. 41, a. 2), fear has its source in the imagining of some imminent evil that can be difficult to repel. But, as was explained above (q. 43, a. 2), the fact that something can be difficult to repel finds its source in the weakness of one's power. And to the extent that a power is weaker, it extends to fewer things. In this sense, an instance of being drawn inward follows from the very act of imagining that causes the fear. In the same way, we see in the case of those who are dying that their nature is drawn back toward the inside because of the weakness of their power. And we likewise see, in the case of cities, that when the citizens are afraid, they withdraw from the outer parts of the city and retreat as far as possible into the interior parts.

And by a likeness to this drawing inward that belongs to the soul's appetite, there is also in the case of fear, on the part of the body, a drawing of heat and spirits inward toward the interior parts of the body.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *De Problematis*, even if, in those who are afraid, the spirits are drawn from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts, the movement of the spirits is nonetheless not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid.

For in the case of those who are angry, because of the heat and subtlety of the spirits that has its source in the desire for retribution, the interior movement of the spirits is from the lower parts of the body

to the upper parts and so the spirits and heat gather around the heart. And the result of this is that those who are angry are rendered quick to attack and daring.

By contrast, in the case of those who are afraid, because of a coldness that thickens them (*propter frigiditatem ingrossantem*), the spirits move from the higher parts of the body to the lower parts, where this coldness results from imagining one's lack of power. And so the heat and spirits do not multiply around the heart, but instead withdraw from the heart. And because of this, those who are afraid are not quick to attack, but instead withdraw.

Reply to objection 2: It is natural for any being that is in pain, whether human or animal, to use whatever assistance he can to repel the harmful thing that is present and inflicting the pain. Hence, we see that animals in pain strike back with their jaws or their horns. Now the greatest assistance for everything in animals is heat and animal spirits. And so in an instance of pain, the nature conserves the heat and the animal spirits internally, in order to use them to repel what is harmful. This is why in *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says that when the heat and the spirits are increased inwardly, they have to be expressed vocally. And because of this, those who are in pain can scarcely keep themselves from crying out.

By contrast, as has been explained, in those who are afraid there is a movement of the interior heat and spirits away from the heart toward the lower parts of the body. And so fear counteracts the formation of sounds, which are effected by the emission of spirits toward the higher parts through the mouth. And it is because of this that fear renders people speechless. And this is also why fear makes one quiver, as the Philosopher points out in *De Problematibus*.

Reply to objection 3: The danger of death is not only contrary to the soul's desire but also contrary to the nature. Because of this, in the case of this sort of fear, there is a drawing inward not only on the part of the appetite, but also on the part of the body's nature. For an animal that draws heat toward the interior parts of the body because it is imagining death is disposed in the same way that it is when death is naturally imminent. And this is why, as *Ethics* 4 says, "Those who are fearing death turn pale."

By contrast, the evil that is feared by shame is opposed only to the soul's desire and not to the nature. And so there is, to be sure, a turning inward by the soul's appetite, but not by the body's nature. Instead, the soul—drawn into itself, as it were—gives free rein to the movement of heat and of the spirits. Hence, they are diffused to the exterior parts of the body. And this is why those who are ashamed blush.

Article 2

Does fear make one deliberative?

It seems that fear does not make one deliberative (*non faciat consiliativos*):

Objection 1: The same thing does not both make one deliberative and impede deliberation. But fear impedes deliberation, since every passion disturbs the quiet that is required for the good use of reason. Therefore, fear does not make one deliberative.

Objection 2: Deliberation is an act of reason by which it thinks and deliberates about future matters. But certain instances of fear "drive away thought and displace reason," as Tully puts it in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4. Therefore, fear does not make one deliberative, but instead impedes deliberation.

Objection 3: Just as deliberation is used for avoiding evils, so, too, it is used for pursuing goods. But just as fear has to do with evils to be avoided, so, too, hope has to do with goods to be pursued. Therefore, fear does not make one deliberative more than hope does.

But contrary to this: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Fear makes one deliberative (*timor*

consiliativos facit).”

I respond: There are two senses in which someone can be called ‘deliberative’:

The first is in virtue of one’s willing to, i.e., taking care to, deliberate (*voluntate seu sollicitudine consiliandi*). And this is the sense in which fear makes one deliberative. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “We deliberate about big matters with respect to which we distrust ourselves, as it were.” For as has already been explained (q. 42, a. 2), the things that strike fear into us are not just bad simply speaking, but have a certain magnitude, both because they are apprehended as things that can be repelled only with difficulty, and also because they are apprehended as being close by. Hence, it is especially in the presence of fear that men seek to deliberate.

In a second way, someone is called deliberative because he has the ability to deliberate well. And in this sense, neither fear nor any other passion makes one deliberative. For when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him either greater or smaller than they are in reality (*secundum rei veritatem*); for instance, to a lover, the things that he loves seem better, and to one who fears, the things that he fears seem more fearsome. And so due to this lack of rectitude in judging, each passion as such (*quantum est de se*) impedes the ability to deliberate well.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: The stronger a given passion is, the more the man affected by it is impeded. And so when his fear is strong (*fortis*), a man wills to deliberate, but he is so perturbed in his thoughts that he cannot succeed in his deliberation (*consilium adinvenire non potest*). On the other hand, if his fear is a weak one (*parvus timor*) that makes him take care to deliberate, then it does not disturb reason very much and can even contribute to his ability to deliberate well—this by reason of the care that results from the fear.

Reply to objection 3: Hope, too, makes one deliberative, since, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “No one deliberates about matters with respect to which he despairs”—in the same way that, as *Ethics* 3 points out, no one deliberates about what is impossible.

However, fear makes one more deliberative than hope does. For hope has to do with what is good to the extent that we are able to attain it, whereas fear has to do with what is bad insofar as it can hardly be repelled; and so fear deals with the nature of the difficult to a greater degree than hope does. But as has been explained, we deliberate about difficult matters, especially those with respect to which we do not trust ourselves.

Article 3

Is quivering an effect of fear?

It seems that quivering or trembling (*tremor*) is not an effect of fear:

Objection 1: Quivering has its source in coldness; for instance, we see that those who are very cold quiver. But fear does not seem to cause coldness; instead, it seems to cause a dry heat (*calorem dissicantem*), an indication of which is that those are afraid get thirsty—especially in the case of the greatest fears, as is clear with those who are being led off to death. Therefore, fear does not cause quivering.

Objection 2: The emission of excrement has its source in heat; hence, medicines that serve as laxatives are, for the most part, hot. But such emissions of excrement happen frequently in the presence of fear. Therefore, fear seems to cause heat. And so it does not cause quivering.

Objection 3: When fear occurs, heat is withdrawn from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts. Therefore, if it were because of this sort of withdrawal that a man quivers in his exterior parts, then it seems that quivering should be caused by fear in all the exterior members. But this does not

seem to be the case. Therefore, the body's quivering is not an effect of fear.

But contrary to this: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "Terror is followed by quivering, pallor, and the chattering of the teeth."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), in the case of fear there is a certain drawing inward from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts, and so the exterior parts remain cold. And because of this they are affected by quivering, which is caused by a weakness in the power that controls the members (*causatur ex debilitate virtutis continentis membra*). And this sort of weakness is especially brought about by a lack of heat, which, as *De Anima* 2 explains, is the instrument by which the soul effects movement.

Reply to objection 1: When heat is withdrawn from the exterior parts of the body into the interior parts, the interior heat increases, and especially with respect to the lower parts, i.e., with respect to the nutritive power. And so, since moisture is consumed, thirst follows and also sometimes the loosening of the bowels, along with the emission of urine and sometimes even of semen.

An alternative reply is that, as the Philosopher claims in *De Problematibus*, bodily emissions of the sort in question occur because of contractions in the abdomen and testicles.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: Since, in the presence of fear, heat leaves the heart and goes from the higher parts of the body to the lower parts, what mainly quivers in those who are afraid are the heart and those members that have some connection to the chest, where the heart is. Hence, those who are afraid have quivering especially in the voice, because of the closeness of the windpipe to the heart. The lower lip also quivers, along with the whole of the lower jaw, because of their connection to the heart, and from this follows the chattering of the teeth. And for the same reason, the arms and hands quiver.

Another, additional, reply is that the members that quiver are the ones that are more mobile. This is why the knees also quiver in those who are afraid—this according to Isaiah 35:3 ("Strengthen feeble hands, and firm up trembling knees").

Article 4

Does fear impede an operation?

It seems that fear impedes an operation (*impedit operationem*):

Objection 1: An operation is impeded most of all by a disturbance in reason, which directs one's work. But as has been explained (a. 2), fear disturbs reason. Therefore, fear impedes an operation.

Objection 2: Those who do something in the presence of fear fail more easily in their acting. For instance, if someone is walking on top of a log positioned in a high place, it is easy for him to fall because of his fear, whereas, because of a lack of fear, he would not fall if he walked on the same log positioned in a low place. Therefore, fear impedes an operation.

Objection 3: Laziness (*pigritia*), or sluggishness (*segnities*), is a species of fear. But laziness impedes an operation. Therefore, so does fear.

But contrary to this: In Philippians 2:12 the Apostle says, "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling." But he would not have said this if fear impeded a good operation. Therefore, fear does not impede a good operation.

I respond: A man's exterior operation is caused, to be sure, by the soul as a first mover, but also by the bodily members as instruments. Now it is possible for an operation to be impeded both (a) because of a defect in the instrument or (b) because of a defect in the principal mover.

Thus, as far as the corporeal instruments are concerned, fear, taken in itself (*quantum est de se*), is always apt to impede an exterior operation due to the lack of heat that occurs in the exterior members

because of fear.

However, as far as the soul is concerned, if the fear is moderate and does not disturb reason too much, then it contributes to operating well, insofar as it causes a certain carefulness and makes the man deliberate and act more attentively.

On the other hand, if the fear increases so much that it disturbs reason, then it impedes the operation even on the part of the soul. But in passage quoted above, the Apostle is not talking about this sort of fear.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: Those who fall off a log positioned in a high place are suffering from a disturbance in the imagination because of their fear of an imagined fall.

Reply to objection 3: Everyone who is afraid withdraws from what he fears, and so, since laziness (*pigritia*) is the fear of an operation itself insofar as that operation is laborious, it impedes an operation because it holds the will back from it.

By contrast, fear of other things aids an operation to the extent that it inclines the will to do those things by which the man escapes what he fears.

QUESTION 45

Daring

Next we have to consider daring or audacity (*audacia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is daring contrary to fear? (2) How is daring related to hope? (3) What are the causes of daring? (4) What are its effects?

Article 1

Is daring contrary to fear?

It seems that daring (*audacia*) is not contrary to fear (*timor*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Daring is a vice.” But vice is contrary to virtue. Therefore, since fear is not a virtue, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.

Objection 2: A single thing has a single contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore, daring is not contrary to fear.

Objection 3: Each passion excludes its opposed passion. But what is excluded by fear is carefreeness (*securitas*); for in *Confessiones* 2 Augustine says, “Fear guards against carefreeness.” Therefore, carefreeness is contrary to fear. Therefore, it is not the case that daring is contrary to fear.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Daring is contrary to fear.”

I respond: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, it is part of the nature of contraries that “they are maximally distant from one another.” But what is maximally distant from fear is daring. For fear withdraws from a future harm because of the harm’s victory over the one who fears it, whereas daring attacks the imminent danger for the sake of winning a victory over the danger itself. Hence, daring is clearly contrary to fear.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Anger’ (*ira*) and ‘daring’ (*audacia*)—and the names of all the passions—can be taken in two senses:

In one sense, insofar as they imply simply (*absolute*) the sentient appetite’s movement with respect to some good or bad object. And it is in this sense that they are the names of *passions*.

In a second sense, insofar as they imply, along with this movement, a departure from the order of reason; and in this sense they are the names of *vices*. This is the sense in which Augustine is talking about daring, whereas we ourselves are at present talking about daring in the first sense.

Reply to objection 2: There is no more than one contrary for a single thing in the same respect (*secundum idem*). But nothing prevents a single thing from having more than one contrary in different respects. And thus it was explained above (q. 23, a. 2 and q. 40, a. 4) that the passions of the irascible part of the soul have two contraries, one in accord with the opposition between *good* and *bad*, and the other in accord with the opposition between *approaching toward* and *withdrawing from*. And it is in this latter way that daring is opposed to fear, and that despair is opposed to hope.

Reply to objection 3: ‘Carefreeness’ (*securitas*) does not signify anything contrary to fear, but instead signifies only the exclusion of fear. For it is someone unafraid who is said to be carefree. Hence, carefreeness is opposed to fear as its *privation*, whereas daring is opposed to it as its *contrary*. And just as the contrary includes the privation within itself, so daring includes carefreeness within itself.

Article 2

Does daring follow upon hope?

It seems that daring does not follow upon hope (*non consequatur spes*):

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 3 says, daring has to do with what is bad and fearsome. But as was

explained above (q. 40, a. 1), hope has to do with what is good. Therefore, they have diverse objects and do not belong to a single ordering. Therefore, daring does not follow upon hope.

Objection 2: Just as daring is contrary to fear, so despair is contrary to hope. But fear does not follow upon despair; to the contrary, as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, despair excludes fear. Therefore, daring does not follow upon hope.

Objection 3: Daring intends a certain good, viz., victory. But it is hope that tends toward an arduous good. Therefore, daring is the same thing as hope. Therefore, it does not follow upon hope.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “Those who are full of hope are daring” (*illi qui bonae spei sunt audaces*). Therefore, daring seems to follow upon hope.

I respond: As has already been explained many times (q. 22, a. 2, *et alia*), the passions of the soul belong to the appetitive power.

Now every movement of the appetitive power is traced back to either *approach* or *withdrawal*. And a thing’s approach or withdrawal is either *per se* or *per accidens*. More specifically, approach is *per se* toward something good, whereas withdrawal is *per se* away from something bad; but there can be, *per accidens*, (a) an approach toward something bad, for the sake of some adjoined good, and (b) a withdrawal from something good, because of some adjoined evil.

Now what is such-and-such *per accidens* follows upon what is such-and-such *per se*. And so approaching something bad follows upon approaching something good, just as withdrawing from something good follows upon withdrawing from something bad.

Now these four movements belong to four passions: for approaching toward what is good belongs to *hope*, withdrawing from what is bad belongs to *fear*, pursuing (*insecutio*) what is fearsomely bad belongs to *daring*, and withdrawing from what is good belongs to *despair*. Hence, it follows that daring follows upon hope; for because one hopes to overcome something that is fearsome and imminent, one pursues it with daring (*audacter insequitur ipsum*). On the other hand, despair follows upon fear; for one despairs because he fears the difficulty involved with a hoped for good.

Reply to objection 1: This argument would go through if *good* and *bad* were objects that did not have an ordering with respect to one another. But since what is bad has a certain ordering to what is good—for what is bad is posterior to what is good in the way that a privation is posterior to its corresponding disposition—daring, which pursues what is bad, comes after hope, which pursues what is good.

Reply to objection 2: Even if *good* is, simply speaking, prior to *bad*, nevertheless, withdrawal is appropriate with respect to what is bad prior to being appropriate with respect to what is good—just as approach (*insecutio*) is appropriate with respect to what is good prior to being appropriate with respect to what is bad. And so just as hope is prior to daring, so, too, fear is prior to despair. And just as despair does not always follow from fear, but only when the fear is more intense, so, too, daring does not always follow from hope, but only when the hope is strong.

Reply to objection 3: Even if daring has to do with something bad which, in the judgment of the one who is daring, the good of victory is connected to, nonetheless, daring is directed toward something bad, whereas hope is directed toward the connected good thing. Similarly, despair has to do directly with what is good, which it withdraws from, whereas fear has to do with the connected bad thing.

Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a *part* of hope but is instead an *effect* of hope, just as despair is an effect of fear and not a part of it. Also, this is the reason why daring cannot be one of the principal passions (cf. q. 25, a. 4).

Article 3

Is some defect a cause of daring?

It seems that some defect is a cause of daring:

Objection 1: In *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says, “Lovers of wine are strong and daring.” But the defect of being inebriated follows from wine. Therefore, daring is caused by a defect.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “It is those who lack experience with dangers who are daring.” But the lack of experience is a certain defect. Therefore, daring is caused by a defect.

Objection 3: Those who suffer injustices (*iniusta passi*) are usually daring, “just like beasts who have been beaten,” as *Ethics 3* puts it. But to suffer an injustice is a sort of defect. Therefore, daring is caused by some defect.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says that the cause of daring “is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are near at hand and that what needs to be feared either does not exist or is far off.” But any relevant defect involves either the exclusion of the means of safety or the proximity of what needs to be feared. Therefore, nothing that involves a defect is a cause of daring.

I respond: As was explained above (aa. 1-2), daring follows upon hope and is contrary to fear, and so anything that is apt to cause hope or to remove fear is a cause of daring. However, since, given that they are passions, fear, hope, and daring consist in (a) a movement of the appetite and (b) a bodily change, there are two possible ways to think about a cause of daring, regardless of whether it involves evoking hope or removing fear: (a) on the part of the appetitive movement and (b) on the part of the bodily change.

As regards the appetitive movement that follows upon an apprehension, the hope that causes daring is evoked by whatever makes us judge that it is possible to attain victory, either (a) by our own power, e.g., by our bodily strength, or experience with dangers, or a lot of money, or other such things, or (b) by the power of others, e.g., by a large number of friends or other helpers, and especially if a man is confident of God’s help. Hence, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, “Those who have a good relationship with the divine are daring.”

On the other hand, again as regards the appetitive movement, fear is removed by excluding whatever is both fearsome and close by (*per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium*), e.g., by a man’s having no enemies, or by his having harmed no one, or by his not seeing that a danger is approaching. For dangers seem imminent most of all to those who have done harm to others.

As regards the bodily change, daring is caused—via hope’s being evoked and fear’s being excluded—by whatever builds up heat around the heart. Hence, in *De Partibus Animalium* the Philosopher says, “Those who have a quantitatively small heart are daring, and animals that have a quantitatively large heart are timid, because natural heat cannot heat up a large heart to the extent that it can a small one, just as a fire cannot burn a large house to the extent that it can a small one.” And in *De Problematibus* he says, “Those whose lungs contain a lot of blood are daring, because of the heating of the heart that follows from this.” And in the same place he says, “Lovers of wine are more daring because of the wine’s heat.” Hence, it was explained above (q. 40, a. 6) that inebriation gives one good hope, since heat in the heart repels fear and causes hope by extending and enlarging the heart.

Reply to objection 1: Inebriation causes daring not insofar as it is a defect, but insofar as it makes the heart larger and also insofar it makes a man judge that he is great in some way (*inquantum etiam facit aestimationem cuiusdam magnitudinis*).

Reply to objection 2: Those who lack experience with dangers are daring not because of their defect, but rather *per accidens*, viz., insofar as, because of their inexperience, they do not recognize their own weakness or the presence of dangers. And so daring follows because the causes of fear have been

excluded.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “Those who suffer injustice are rendered more daring, because they believe that God gives assistance to those who suffer injustice.”

And so it is clear that no defect causes daring except *per accidens*, viz., insofar as the defect has some excellence connected with it—regardless of whether it is a genuine excellence or something thought to be an excellence, and regardless of whether it is an excellence on one’s own part or on the part of someone else.

Article 4

Are those who are daring more eager at the beginning than in the midst of the dangers themselves?

It seems not to be the case that those who are daring are more eager at the beginning than in the midst of the dangers themselves (*non sint promptiores in principio quam in ipsis periculis*):

Objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (q. 44, a. 3), quivering is caused by fear, which is contrary to daring. But as the Philosopher points out in *De Problematibus*, those who are daring sometimes quiver at the beginning. Therefore, they are not more eager at the beginning than when they are in the midst of the dangers themselves.

Objection 2: A passion is increased by increasing its object; for instance, a good is lovable, and the more good it is, the more lovable it is. But the object of daring is what is arduous. Therefore, if the arduousness is increased, then the daring is increased. But a danger becomes more arduous and difficult when it is actually present. Therefore, daring should increase at that time as well.

Objection 3: Anger is provoked by wounds that have been inflicted. But anger causes daring; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Anger emboldens one.” Therefore, once men are in the midst of the dangers themselves and are struck, it seems that they are rendered more daring.

But contrary to this: *Ethics* 3 says, “The daring hasten along and are willing before the dangers, but in the midst of them they draw back.”

I respond: Since daring is a certain movement of the sentient appetite, it follows upon an apprehension by the sentient power. Now the sentient power does not collate and inquire into a thing’s singular circumstances, but instead makes a quick judgment (*non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium*).

Now it sometimes happens that, because of the quick apprehension, not everything that will pose a difficulty in a given situation can be recognized, and so a movement of daring rises up to meet the danger. Hence, when the men in question experience the danger itself, they sense that there is more difficulty than they had estimated. And so they draw back.

Reason, however, takes into account all the things that pose difficulties in a given situation. And so courageous men, who go out to meet dangers in accord with the judgment of reason (*ex iudicio rationis*), seem at the beginning to be relaxed, since they meet the dangers with due deliberation and not passively. And when they find themselves in the midst of the dangers themselves, they do not experience anything unexpected. And so they continue on steadfastly. Or, again, this is because they meet dangers for the sake of the good of virtue, and they persevere in willing this good, no matter how great the dangers are.

By contrast, as has been explained, those who are daring act solely on the basis of a judgment that makes for hope and excludes fear.

Reply to objection 1: Quivering also occurs in those who are daring, because of the withdrawal of heat from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts—just as likewise occurs in those who are afraid. But in the case of those who are daring, the heat withdraws to the heart, whereas in those who are

afraid, it withdraws to the lower parts.

Reply to objection 2: The object of love is the good simply speaking, and a good that is simply speaking increased increases the love. But the object of daring is composed of what is good and what is bad, and the movement of daring toward what is bad presupposes a movement of hope toward what is good. Therefore, if so much arduousness is added to a danger that the danger exceeds the hope, then the movement of daring will not follow, but will instead be diminished.

However, if there is in fact a movement of daring, then the greater the danger is, the greater the daring is judged to be.

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 46, a. 1), anger is not caused by a wound unless some sort of hope is presupposed. And if the danger were so great that it exceeded the hope of victory, anger would not follow. But it is true that if the anger does follow, then the daring will be increased.

QUESTION 46

Anger in Itself

Next we have to consider anger (*ira*). And we will consider, first, anger in its own right (question 46); second, the causes that effect anger, along with the remedy for anger (question 47); and, third, the effects of anger (question 48).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is anger a specific passion? (2) Is the object of anger something good or something bad? (3) Does anger exist in the concupiscible part of the soul? (4) Does anger involve reason (*utrum ira sit cum ratione*)? (5) Is anger more natural than concupiscence? (6) Is anger more grievous than hatred? (7) Is anger directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice? (8) What are the species of anger?

Article 1

Is anger a specific passion?

It seems that anger is not a specific passion (*ira non sit passio specialis*):

Objection 1: The irascible power (*potentia irascibilis*) derives its name from anger (*ira*). But there are many passions that belong to this power, and not just a single passion. Therefore, anger is not a single specific passion.

Objection 2: As is clear to anyone who goes through the passions one by one, there is a contrary for each specific passion. But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 3), there is no contrary for anger. Therefore, anger is not a specific passion.

Objection 3: One specific passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 2, it involves sadness and pleasure and hope (*est cum tristitia et cum delectatione et cum spe*). Therefore, anger is not a specific passion.

But contrary to this: Damascene posits anger as a specific passion. And so does Tully in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4.

I respond: There are two senses in which something is called 'generic' (*generale*):

(a) In the *first* sense, by *predication*, in the way that *animal* is generic with respect to all animals.

(b) In a *second* sense, by *causality*, in the way that, according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the sun is a generic or general cause (*causa generalis*) of all the things that are generated here below (*in his inferioribus*). For just as a genus, in a way similar to matter, contains many specific differences in potentiality (*genus continet multas differentias potestate secundum similitudinem materiae*), so an agent cause contains many effects that correspond to its active power.

(c) Now an effect can be produced by the concurrence of diverse causes, and since every cause remains in its effect in some way, one can also claim, in a *third* sense, that an effect produced by several causes coming together has a sort of generality in the sense that it *contains several causes* that are in some way actualized (*quodammodo in actu*).

Therefore, in the *first* sense, anger is not a generic passion, but, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), is instead divided off at the same level from the other passions (*condivisa aliis passionibus*).

Similarly, it is not a generic passion in the *second* sense, either. For it is not a cause of other passions. Rather, given this sense, it is *love* that can be called a generic passion, as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14. For as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4), love is the primary root (*prima radix*) of all the passions.

However, in the *third* sense anger can be called a generic passion, given that it is caused by the concurrence of several passions. For the movement of anger rises up only because some sort of sadness has been inflicted and only insofar as the desire for retribution is present, along with the hope of exacting it. For as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, "Someone who is angry hopes to inflict punishment,

since he desires the retribution that is possible for him” (*appetit vindictam ut sibi possibilem*). Hence, as Avicenna points out in his *De Anima*, if it is a person of very exalted status (*persona multum excellens*) who has inflicted the harm, then only sadness follows, and not anger.

Reply to objection 1: The irascible power derives its name from anger not because every movement of this power is an instance of anger, but rather because (a) all the movements of this power are terminated in anger, and because (b) anger is the most manifest of all the movements of this power.

Reply to objection 2: Since anger is caused by contrary passions, viz., by *hope*, which is directed toward something good, and by *sadness*, which is directed toward something bad, it includes contrariety within itself and so does not have a contrary outside itself—just as, within the mixed colors, one finds only the contrariety that belongs to the simple colors by which the mixed colors are caused.

Reply to objection 3: Anger includes several passions not in the way that a genus includes its species, but rather in the sense of containment that applies to causes and effects (*secundum continentiam causae et effectus*).

Article 2

Is the object of anger something bad?

It seems that the object of anger is something bad:

Objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa says that anger is “the sword-bearer of avid desire or concupiscence” (*armigera concupiscentiae*), viz., insofar as it attacks whatever impedes one’s desire. But every impediment has the character of something bad. Therefore, anger is directed toward something bad as its object.

Objection 2: Anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each has the effect of inflicting harm on another. But as was explained above (q. 29, a. 1), hatred is directed toward something bad as its object. Therefore, so is anger.

Objection 3: Anger is caused by sadness; hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Anger acts with sadness.” But the object of sadness is something bad. Therefore, so is the object of anger.

But contrary to this:

1. In *Confessiones* 2 Augustine says, “Anger desires retribution.” But a desire for retribution is a desire for something good, since retribution is a part of justice. Therefore, the object of anger is something good.

2. Anger always involves hope, and so, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, anger is a cause of pleasure. But the object of hope and pleasure is something good. Therefore, so is the object of anger.

I respond: The movement of an appetitive power follows upon an act of an apprehensive power. But there are two ways in which an apprehensive power apprehends something: (a) in the manner of something *simple* (*per modum incomplexi*), as when we understand what a *man* is; and (b) in the manner of something *complex* (*per modum complexi*), as when we understand *whiteness* to exist in a *man*. Hence, it is in both of these ways that an appetitive power can tend toward something good or toward something bad:

(a) *in the manner of something simple and incomplex*, as when the appetite simply pursues or adheres to something good or withdraws from something bad. Movements of this sort are *desire* and *hope*, *pleasure* and *sadness*, and others of this type.

(b) *in the manner of something complex*, as when the appetite is directed toward a good thing (or a bad thing) which exists in another or which is being done to another, either by tending toward this [object] or by withdrawing from it. This is manifestly obvious in the case of love and hatred. For instance, we love someone insofar as we want something good to exist in him, whereas we hate him

insofar as we want something bad to exist in him. And the same thing holds for anger. For whoever gets angry seeks to exact retribution from someone (*quaerit vindicari de aliquo*). And so the movement of anger tends toward two things, viz., (a) toward the *retribution* itself, which it desires and hopes for as something good, and hence takes pleasure in, and also (b) toward the *one against whom it seeks retribution* as against someone who is opposed to him and harmful, and this involves the character of something bad.

However, there are two noteworthy differences between anger, on the one hand, and hatred and love. The first is that anger is always directed toward two objects, whereas love and hatred are sometimes directed toward just one object, as when someone is said to love or to hate wine or something of this sort. The second is that each of the objects that love is directed toward is something good, since the lover wills something good for someone, insofar as that individual is agreeable to him (*vult amans bonum alicui tanquam sibi convenienti*). On the other hand, each of the objects that hatred is directed toward has the character of something bad, since one who hates wills something bad for someone, insofar as that individual is disagreeable to him. By contrast, anger has one object with the character of something good, viz., the retribution that it desires, and another object with the character of something bad, viz., the noxious man whom it wants to exact retribution from. And so anger is a passion that is in some sense composed of contrary passions.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the objections.

Article 3

Does anger exist in the concupiscible part of the soul?

It seems that anger exists in the concupiscible part of the soul (*ira sit in concupiscibili*):

Objection 1: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says that anger is a sort of desire (*libido quaedam*). But desire exists in the concupiscible part. Therefore, so does anger.

Objection 2: In *Regula* Augustine says, “Anger grows into hatred.” And in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, “Hatred is inveterate anger.” But like love, hatred exists in the concupiscible part. Therefore, anger exists in the concupiscible part.

Objection 3: Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa claim that anger is composed of sadness and desire. But both of these exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, anger exists in the concupiscible part.

But contrary to this: The concupiscible power is distinct from the irascible power. Therefore, if anger existed in the concupiscible power, then the irascible power would not derive its name from it.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible part in that the objects of the passions of the concupiscible part are something good or something bad simply speaking (*bonum et malum absolute*), whereas the objects of the passions of the irascible part are something good or something bad along with a certain loftiness or arduousness (*bonum et malum cum quadam elevatione vel arduitate*).

Now it has been explained (a. 2) that anger is directed toward two objects, viz., (a) the retribution that it desires and (b) the individual against whom it seeks retribution. And anger requires a certain arduousness in both, since the movement of anger arises only if there is a certain degree of magnitude in both objects (*non insurgit motus irae nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrum existente*). For as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “We judge to be of little worth anything that amounts to nothing or almost nothing.” Hence, it is clear that anger exists in the irascible part and not in the concupiscible part.

Reply to objection 1: Tully is using the name ‘desire’ (*libido*) to designate an appetite (*appetitus*)

for any sort of future good, with no distinction between arduous goods and non-arduous goods. Accordingly, he places *anger* under *desire* insofar as anger is a desire for retribution. But ‘desire’ (*libido*) in this sense is common to both the irascible part and the concupiscible part.

Reply to objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred not because numerically the same passion that was at first anger becomes hatred later on through a sort of aging process (*per qunadam inveterationem*), but because of a certain sort of causality. For when anger lasts for a long time, it causes hatred.

Reply to objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sadness and desire, not in the sense of being composed of *parts*, but in the sense of being composed of *causes*. Now it has already been explained above (q. 25, a. 2) that the passions of the concupiscible part are causes of the passions of the irascible part.

Article 4

Does anger involve an act of reason?

It seems that anger does not involve an act of reason (*ira non sit cum ratione*):

Objection 1: Since anger is a passion, it exists in the sentient appetite. But the sentient appetite follows the apprehension of the sentient part of the soul and not of reason. Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

Objection 2: Brute animals lack reason. And yet anger is found in them. Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

Objection 3: Inebriation constricts reason (*inebrietas ligat rationem*). But it is conducive to anger (*adiuvat ad iram*). Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “In some sense anger follows upon an act of reason.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), anger is a desire for retribution (*appetitus vindictae*). But this implies an act of collating the punishment to be inflicted with the harm that has been done to one (*collationem poenae infligendae ad nocumentum sibi illatum*); hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Inferring (*sylogizans*) that it is necessary to fight back against such an individual, he immediately gets angry.” But collating and inferring are acts of reason (*conferre et sylogizare est rationis*). And so anger in some sense involves an act of reason.

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which an appetitive power can involve an act of reason (*potest esse cum ratione*):

In one way, when reason *gives a command* (*cum ratione praecipiente*), and it is in this way that an act of willing involves an act of reason (*sic voluntas est cum ratione*); this is why the will is called a ‘rational appetite’.

In the second way, when reason *makes something known* (*cum ratione denunante*), and it is in this way that anger involves an act of reason. Hence, in *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says, “Anger involves an act of reason not in the sense that reason commands the anger, but in the sense that it makes manifest an injury.” For the sentient appetite obeys reason by the mediation of the will and not directly.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 40, a. 3), brute animals have a natural instinct which is instilled in them by God’s reason and through which they have interior and exterior movements similar to the movements of reason.

Reply to objection 3: As *Ethics* 7 says, “Anger listens to reason in a certain sense,” viz., insofar as reason makes it known (*nuntiat*) that one has been injured, “but it does not listen perfectly,” since it does not observe the rule of reason in measuring out the retribution (*in rependendo vindictam*). Therefore,

anger requires an act of reason and adds an impediment to reason. Hence, in *De Problematicis* the Philosopher says that (a) those who are greatly inebriated, in the sense that they have nothing of reason's judgment, do not get angry, but that (b) when they are just a little inebriated, in the sense of having reason's judgment, though an impaired judgment, they do get angry (*irascatur tamquam habentes iudicium rationis sed impeditum*).

Article 5

Is anger more natural than concupiscence?

It seems that anger is not more natural than concupiscence or avid desire (*ira non sit naturalior quam concupiscentia*):

Objection 1: It is proper to man to be an animal that is gentle by nature. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Gentleness is opposed to anger." Therefore, anger is not more natural than concupiscence, but seems to be altogether contrary to a man's nature.

Objection 2: *Reason* is divided off against *nature*. For we do not say that things that act in accord with reason act 'in accord with nature'. But as *Ethics* 7 says, "Anger involves an act of reason, but concupiscence does not involve an act of reason." Therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger.

Objection 3: Anger is a desire for retribution, whereas concupiscence is, more than anything, a desire for things that are pleasurable to the sense of touch, viz., food and sex. But these pleasures are more natural to a man than retribution is. Therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "Anger is more natural than concupiscence."

I respond: As is clear from *Physics* 2, the 'natural' is what is caused by nature. Hence, whether a passion is more or less natural can be perceived only on the basis of its cause. Now as was explained above (q. 36, a. 2), the cause of a passion can be thought of in two ways: (a) on the part of the *object*, and (b) on the part of the *subject*.

Thus, if the causes of anger and concupiscence are considered on the part of the *object*, then in this sense concupiscence—and especially concupiscence with regard to food and sex—is more natural than anger, since food and sex are more natural than retribution is.

On the other hand, if the cause of anger is considered on the part of the *subject*, then there is one sense in which anger is more natural and another sense in which concupiscence is more natural.

For a man's nature can be thought of either (a) in relation to the nature of the genus or (b) in relation to the nature of the species or (c) in relation to the temperament peculiar to an individual (*secundum complexionem propriam individui*).

Thus, if one thinks of the nature of the *genus*, i.e., the nature of this man insofar as he is an *animal*, then concupiscence is more natural than anger, since it is from the common nature itself that a man has a certain inclination toward desiring those things that conserve life either in the species or in the individual.

On the other hand, if we think of a man's nature on the part of the *species*, viz., insofar as the man is *rational*, then anger is more natural to a man than concupiscence is, since anger involves reason more than concupiscence does. Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "It is more human to punish," which pertains to anger, "than to be gentle." For each thing naturally rises up against what is contrary to it and harmful.

Again, if one considers the nature of *this* individual in accord with his *peculiar temperament*, then anger is more natural than concupiscence, since anger follows upon the natural disposition to get angry, which is part of one's temperament, more readily than concupiscence or any other passion follows upon

its corresponding natural disposition. For a man is disposed toward getting angry insofar as he has a choleric temperament, where, among the humors, yellow bile (*cholera*) is the one that moves most quickly, since it is similar to fire. And so someone who is disposed by his natural temperament toward anger gets angry more readily (*magis in promptu*) than someone who is disposed toward concupiscence experiences a desire (*quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum quod concupiscat*). This is why, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says that anger is more easily handed down from parents to children than is concupiscence.

Reply to objection 1: In the case of a man, one can consider both the body's natural condition, which is temperate, and reason itself.

On the part of the natural condition, a man does not by his species naturally have an excess of anger or of any other passion because of the temperament that belongs to his condition. By contrast, the other animals, insofar as they fall short of this sort of condition in the direction of a disposition to some extreme condition, are thereby naturally disposed toward the excess of some passion, in the way that a lion is disposed toward daring, a dog toward anger, a rabbit toward fear, etc.

On the part of reason, it is natural to a man both to get angry and to be gentle. For (a) reason in some sense causes anger, insofar as it makes known (*nuntiat*) the cause of anger, and (b) reason in some sense sedates anger, insofar as someone who is angry "does not pay complete attention to reason's command." This was explained above (a. 4).

Reply to objection 2: Reason itself is part of human nature. Hence, from the very fact that anger involves an act of reason it follows that it is in some sense natural to a man.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to anger and concupiscence on the part of the object.

Article 6

Is anger more grave than hatred?

It seems that anger is more grave than hatred (*ira sit gravior quam odium*):

Objection 1: Proverbs 27:4 says, "Anger has no mercy; nor does fury (*furor*) when it erupts." But hatred is sometimes accompanied by mercy. Therefore, anger is more grave than hatred.

Objection 2: Suffering an evil and grieving over the evil (*de malo dolere*) is something more than simply suffering an evil. But for someone who hates another it is enough that the one whom he hates should suffer evil, whereas for someone who is angry this is not sufficient; rather, as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric 2*, he wants the other to recognize the evil and to grieve over it. Therefore, anger is more grave than hatred.

Objection 3: The greater the number of things that come together in order to constitute something, the more stable that thing seems to be; for instance, a habit that is caused by many acts is more permanent. But as was explained above (a. 1), anger, but not hatred, is caused by the concurrence of several passions. Therefore, anger is more stable and more grave than hatred.

But contrary to this: In *Regula* Augustine says that hatred is like "a beam," whereas anger is like "a mote" (cf. Matthew 7:3).

I respond: The species of a passion, along with its concept (*species passionis et ratio ipsius*), is taken from its object.

Now the object of anger is the same *in subject* (*idem subiecto*) as the object of hatred; for just as the one who hates desires something bad for the one whom he hates, so someone who is angry desires something bad for the one whom he is angry with.

However, these objects are not the same *conceptually*. Instead, the one who hates desires what is

bad for his enemy insofar as it is something bad, whereas the one who is angry desires what is bad for the one he is angry with, not insofar as it is something bad, but insofar as it has the character of something good; for he thinks of it as something that is just, insofar as it effects retribution.

Hence, it was likewise explained above (a. 2) that hatred has to do with the application of what is bad to what is bad, whereas anger has to do with the application of what is good to what is bad.

Now it is clear that to desire something bad under the concept *just* has less of the character of badness than simply to will something bad for someone. For to will something bad for someone under the concept *just* can even be in accord with the virtue of justice if it is tempered by a precept of reason, whereas the only way that anger falls short is in not obeying the precept of reason when it exacts retribution.

Hence, it is clear that hatred is much worse and much more grave than anger.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible things to consider in the case of anger and hatred, viz., *what* is desired and the *intensity* of the desire.

As regards *what* is desired, anger has more mercy than hatred does. For since hatred desires what is bad in its own right (*malum secundum se*) for another, there is no measure of badness that satisfies it. For as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 1, things that are desired in their own right are desired without measure, in the way that an avaricious man desires wealth. Thus, Ecclesiasticus 12:16 says, “If an enemy finds the opportunity, he will not be satisfied with blood.” By contrast, anger desires something bad only under the concept *just retribution*. Thus, when the bad thing that has been inflicted exceeds the measure of justice in the judgment of the one who is angry, at that point he has mercy. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Someone who is angry will have mercy if many bad things happen, whereas someone who hates will not have mercy on any account.”

As regards the *intensity* of the desire, anger tends to exclude mercy more than hatred does, since the movement of anger is more impetuous because of the inflammation of the yellow bile. Hence, Proverbs adds right afterwards, “Who can bear the force of a spirit roused to violence?”

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, one who is angry desires what is bad for someone insofar as it has the character of just retribution. Now retribution is effected by inflicting a punishment. But it is part of the nature of punishment that it is contrary to the will of the one being punished, that it is painful, and that it is inflicted because of some fault. And so one who is angry desires that the individual on whom he inflicts this harm should perceive it, grieve over it, and recognize that it comes to him because of a harm inflicted on the one who is angry. By contrast, someone who hates another cares nothing about this, since he desires what is bad for the other insofar as it is bad.

Moreover, it is not true that what someone grieves over is worse; for as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “Even though injustice and imprudence are bad,”—still, because they are voluntary—“they do not grieve those in whom they exist.”

Reply to objection 3: What is caused by a number of causes is more stable when the causes are of the same type (*quando causae accipiuntur unius rationis*); however, it is possible for a single cause to dominate over many others.

Now hatred stems from a more permanent cause than does anger. For anger has its source in a sort of mental commotion (*ex aliqua commotione animi*) due to an inflicted injury, whereas hatred proceeds from a disposition on a man’s part to think of what he hates as something opposed to and harmful to himself. And so just as a passion passes away more quickly than a disposition or habit does, so anger passes away more quickly than hatred does. (Even though hatred is likewise a passion, it proceeds from this sort of disposition.) This is why in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Hatred is more incurable than anger is.”

Article 7

Is anger directed only toward individuals with respect to whom there is justice?

It seems that anger is not directed only toward individuals with respect to whom there is justice (*solum sit ad illos ad quos est iustitia*):

Objection 1: There is no human justice with respect to non-rational things. Yet sometimes a man is angry with non-rational things—as, e.g., when, out of anger, a writer throws his pen or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore, anger is not directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 5 says, “There is no such thing as justice with respect to oneself or with respect to what belongs to oneself.” But sometimes a man gets angry with himself, in the way that a penitent gets angry with himself because of his sin; hence, Psalm 4:5 says, “Be angry, and do not sin.” Therefore, anger is not directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice.

Objection 3: There can be justice and injustice with respect to a whole genus or with respect to a whole community—as, for instance, when a city does harm to someone (*cum civitas aliquem laesit*). But as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric* 2, anger is directed only toward singular individuals and not toward any genus. Therefore, anger is not, properly speaking, directed toward those with respect to whom there is justice and injustice.

But contrary to this is what the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 6), anger desires something bad insofar as it has the character of just retribution. And so anger is directed at those with respect to whom there is justice and injustice. For to exact retribution is something that pertains to justice, whereas to inflict harm is something that pertains to injustice. Hence, both on the part of its cause, which is an injury inflicted by another, and on the part of the retribution that is desired by the one who is angry, it is clear that anger pertains to the very same individuals with respect to whom there is justice and injustice (*ad eosdem pertinet ira ad quos iustitia et iniustitia*).

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 4), even though anger involves an act of reason, it can nonetheless exist in brute animals, which lack reason, to the extent that, by natural instinct, they are moved through their imagination toward something similar to the works of reason.

So, then, since in a man there is both reason and imagination, there are two ways in which the movement of anger can arise in a man:

(a) In one way, *with the imagination alone making the injury known (ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem)*. And in such a case a movement of anger arises even with respect to non-rational and non-living things—similar to the movement that exists in animals with respect to any sort of harm whatsoever.

(b) In the second way, *with reason making the injury known*. And in such a case, as the Philosopher puts it in *Rhetoric* 2, “there cannot in any way be anger with respect to non-sentient things or with respect to the dead.” This is both because (a) they do not experience pain (*non dolent*), which is especially what those who are angry want for those with whom they are angry, and also because (b) there is no such thing as retribution with respect to them, since they are not the sort of things that inflict injury (*cum eorum non sit iniuriam facere*).

Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, “There is a sort of metaphorical justice and injustice that a man has with respect to himself,” viz., insofar as reason governs the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. Accordingly, a man can likewise be said to exact retribution from himself and, as a result, to be angry with himself. However, no one can be angry with himself properly speaking and *per se*.

Reply to objection 3: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher assigns as a difference between hatred and anger that hatred can be directed toward a genus, in the way that we hate the whole genus of thieves,

whereas anger is directed only toward something singular. The reason for this is that hatred is caused by judging a quality of a given thing to be disagreeable to our disposition, and this can be either in general or in particular. By contrast, anger is caused by someone's injuring us through his act.

Now all acts are singulars, and so anger always has to do with something singular. And when a city as a whole wrongs us (*cum tota civitas nos laeserit*), then the whole city is being counted as a singular thing.

Article 8

Does Damascene correctly enumerate the species of anger?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly enumerates the three species of anger as wrath (*fel*), bitterness or rancor (*mania*), and fury or rage (*furor*):

Objection 1: The species of a genus are not differentiated by any accidents. But the three things in question are differentiated by accidents. For the beginning of the movement of anger is called *wrath* (*fel*), whereas persistent anger (*ira permanens*) is called *bitterness* or *rancor* (*mania*), and *fury* or *rage* (*furor*) is anger waiting for the time of retribution. Therefore, these are not three different species of anger.

Objection 2: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "Nascent anger (*excandescencia*) is called 'thumosis' in Greek, and is the kind of anger that now flares up and now subsides." But according to Damascene, *thumosis* is the same as fury (*furor*). Therefore, fury subsides with time and does not seek an opportunity for retribution.

Objection 3: In *Moralia* 21 Gregory posits three levels of anger, viz., "silent anger, anger with an utterance, and anger with an expressed phrase" (*iram sine voce et iram cum voce et iram cum verbo expresso*)—in accord with these three sayings of our Lord at Matthew 5:22: "Whoever is angry with his brother", where He touches on silent anger; and afterwards He adds, "Whoever says to his brother, 'Raca'", where He touches on anger with an utterance, but not yet formulated with a full phrase; and afterwards He says, "Whoever says to his brother, 'You fool'", where the utterance is expressed with a complete phrase. Therefore, since Damascene does not say anything about utterance, his division of anger is inadequate.

But contrary to this is the authority of Damascene and of Gregory of Nyssa.

I respond: The three species of anger posited by Damascene, and also by Gregory of Nyssa, are taken from things that augment anger in some way. This happens in three ways:

(a) because of the ease of the movement itself, and he calls this sort of anger *wrath* (*fel*), because it erupts quickly;

(b) because of a sadness that causes the anger and remains for a long time in the memory, and this feature belongs to *bitterness* or *rancor* (*mania*), which is called *mania* because it remains (*a manendo*);

(c) because of what the one who is angry desires, viz., retribution, and this has to do with *fury* or *rage* (*furor*), which does not die down until it metes out the punishment.

Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher calls some angry individuals 'sharp-tempered' (*acuti*) because they are quick to anger; others 'bitter' (*amari*) because they retain their anger for a long time; and others 'obstinate' (*difficiles*) because they never rest until they mete out punishment.

Reply to objection 1: Not all the features through which anger is in some way brought to completion are related to anger entirely *per accidens*. And so nothing prevents the species of anger from being assigned on the basis of such things.

Reply to objection 2: Nascent anger (*excandescencia*), which Tully posits, seems to be more relevant to the first species of anger, which is constituted (*perficitur*) by the quickness of the anger, than

it is to fury. But there is nothing to prevent the Greek '*thumosis*', which corresponds to the Latin '*furor*', from implying both things, viz., being quick to anger and being firm in the intention to punish.

Reply to objection 3: The grades of anger referred to here are distinct from one another as effects of anger, but they are not diverse ways of augmenting the movement of anger itself (*non autem secundum diversam perfectionem ipsius motus irae*).

QUESTION 47

The Causes of Anger, and its Remedies

Next we have to consider the efficient causes of anger, and its remedies. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the moving cause (*motivum*) of anger always something done to the one who gets angry? (2) Is the only moving cause of anger contempt or disdain (*parvipensio vel despectio*)? (3) What is the cause of anger on the part of the one who gets angry? (4) What is the cause of anger on the part of the one whom one gets angry with?

Article 1

Is it always because of something done to himself that someone gets angry?

It seems that it is not always because of something done to himself that someone gets angry:

Objection 1: A man cannot by sinning do anything to God; for Job 35:6 says, “If your iniquities multiply, what will you be doing to Him?” But God is said to get angry with men because of their sins—this according to Psalm 105:40 (“The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people”). Therefore, it is not always the case that someone gets angry because of something done to himself.

Objection 2: Anger is a desire for retribution. But someone desires to exact retribution even for things that are done to others. Therefore, it is not always the case that the moving cause of anger is something done to ourselves.

Objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, men get angry mainly with those “who look down upon (*despiciunt*) what they themselves are especially interested in; for instance, men who are interested in philosophy get angry with those who look down upon philosophy,” and the same thing holds for other cases. But to look down upon philosophy is not to harm the individual himself who is interested in it. Therefore, it is not always the case that we get angry because of what has been done to ourselves.

Objection 4: As Chrysostom points out, one who remains silent in the face of an individual who is insulting him (*tacet contra contumeliantem*) provokes that man to anger. But in remaining silent, he is not doing anything to him. Therefore, it is not always the case that someone’s anger is provoked by something that has been done to him.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Anger always comes from what has been done to oneself. By contrast, animosity (*inimicitia*) comes without anything having been done to oneself, since we hate anyone whom we think to be of a certain sort.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 46, a. 6), anger is a desire to harm another under the concept *just retribution*. Now retribution has a place only where there has been a previous injury. Nor is it the case that every injury provokes one to retribution; instead, it is only an injury that involves the one who desires retribution (*sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam*). For just as each thing naturally desires what is good for itself (*proprium bonum*), so, too, each thing naturally repels what is bad for itself (*proprium malum*).

Now an injury done by one individual pertains to another individual only if the former has done something that is in some sense against the latter. Hence, it follows that the moving cause of someone’s anger is always something done to himself.

Reply to objection 1: In the case of God, ‘anger’ is predicated not as a passion of the mind, but rather as a judgment of justice insofar as He wills to exact retribution for sin. For in sinning, the sinner cannot as an efficient cause do any harm to God, and yet on his own part he acts against God in two ways: (a) insofar as he shows disdain for God in His commands, and (b) insofar as he harms someone, either himself or another—something that pertains to God insofar as the one to whom the harm is done is included under God’s providence and protection.

Reply to objection 2: We get angry with those who harm others and seek retribution against them to the extent that those who are harmed belong to us in some sense, either by some sort of kinship, or by friendship, or at least by the nature that we share in common with them (*saltem per communionem naturae*).

Reply to objection 3: What we are especially interested in is such that we think of it as our good. And so when that thing is looked down upon, we regard ourselves as likewise looked down upon and judge that we ourselves have been harmed.

Reply to objection 4: Someone who remains silent provokes an injurious individual to anger when it appears that he is remaining silent out of contempt (*ex contemptu*) and is, as it were, treating the other's anger as of little account (*quasi parvipendat alterius iram*). For this very treating of it as of little account is itself an act.

Article 2

Is disdain or contempt the only moving cause of anger?

It seems that disdain or contempt (*parvipensio vel despectio*) is not the only moving cause of anger:

Objection 1: Damascene says, "It is when we have suffered an injury, or think ourselves to have suffered an injury, that we get angry." But a man can suffer an injury even in the absence of contempt or disdain. Therefore, disdain is not the only moving cause of anger.

Objection 2: To desire honor is the same thing as being saddened by disdain. But brute animals do not desire honor. Therefore, they are not saddened by disdain. And yet, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 3, "Anger is provoked in them because they are wounded." Therefore, disdain does not seem to be the only moving cause of anger.

Objection 3: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher posits many other causes of anger, e.g., "our being forgotten about by others, having others rejoice in our misfortunes, having others make bad things known to us, being prevented by others from fulfilling our own will (*oblivionem, et exultationem in infortuniis, denuntiationem malorum, impedimentum consequendae propriae voluntatis*)." Therefore, it is not only disdain that provokes anger.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says that anger is "a desire, accompanied by sadness, to punish someone because of apparent disdain shown in an unseemly fashion."

I respond: All the other causes of anger are traced back to disdain (*parvipensio*). For as *Rhetoric* 2 explains, there are three species of disdain (*tres species parvipensionis*), viz., (a) contempt (*despectio*), (b) obstructionism (*eperasmus*), i.e., preventing someone from doing what he wills (*impedimentum voluntatis implendae*), and (c) verbal abuse or insults (*contumeliatio*), and all the moving causes of anger are traced back to these three.

There are two possible ways to explain this:

The first explanation is that anger desires harm for another insofar as this harm has the character of just retribution, and so it seeks retribution to the extent that this seems just. Now just retribution is effected only in response to something that has been done unjustly, and so what provokes someone to anger always falls under the concept *unjust*. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "If men think that those who have done harm are suffering justly, then they do not get angry, since anger is not directed against what is just."

Now there are three ways in which harm can be inflicted, viz., out of *ignorance*, out of *passion*, and by *choice*. An individual does something unjust especially when he inflicts the harm *by choice* or *purposefully* or *out of fixed malice* (*ex electione vel industria vel ex certa malitia*), as *Ethics* 5 says. And so we get the most angry with those whom we think to have harmed us on purpose. For if we think that it

was through ignorance or passion that someone inflicted harm on us, then either we do not get angry with him or we get much less angry, since doing something out of ignorance or out of passion diminishes the act's character as an injury (*diminuit rationem iniuriae*) and in some sense gives rise to mercy and forbearance (*est quodammodo provocativum misericordiae et veniae*). By contrast, those who inflict harm on purpose seem to be sinning out of contempt, and so we get the most angry with them. Hence, in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "We either do not get angry at all, or we get less angry, with those who have done something out of anger; for they do not seem to have acted in order to show disdain (*propter parvipensionem*)."

The second explanation is that disdain is opposed to a man's excellence, since, as *Rhetoric 2* says, "Men disdain what they believe to have no worth." Now it is some sort of excellence that we seek from all our goods. And so every instance of harm inflicted on us is such that to the extent that it detracts from our excellence, it seems to involve disdain.

Reply to objection 1: If someone suffers harm from any cause other than contempt, that cause diminishes the harm's character as an injury. Instead, it is only contempt or disdain that strengthens the character of anger. And so contempt or disdain is a *per se* cause of someone's getting angry.

Reply to objection 2: Even though a brute animal does not desire honor under the concept *honor*, it nonetheless has a natural desire for a certain sort of excellence, and it gets angry with whatever detracts from that excellence.

Reply to objection 3: All the causes in question are traced back to some sort of disdain. For forgetting about someone (*oblivio*) is an obvious sign of disdain, since we fix more firmly in memory what we regard as important (*ea enim quae magna aestimamus magis memoriae infigimus*). Similarly, it is because of a certain sort of disdain that someone does not fear saddening an individual by making sad things known to him. Again, someone who shows signs of merriment at the misfortune of another seems to care very little about what is good or bad for him. Similarly, someone who prevents another from executing his plans, but not because of any advantage that thereby comes his way, seems not to care very much about his friend. And so all such things provoke anger insofar as they are signs of contempt.

Article 3

Is an individual's excellence a cause of his getting angry more easily?

It seems that an individual's excellence is not a cause of his getting angry more easily:

Objection 1: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "There are some people who get angry especially when they are saddened, e.g., the sick, the needy, and those who do not have what they desire." But all these things seem to involve defects. Therefore, defectiveness make one more prone toward anger than excellence does.

Objection 2: In the same place the Philosopher says, "There are some who get angry especially when there can be some suspicion that what they are looked down upon for does not exist in them or exists very weakly in them; by contrast, when they think that they excel in what they are looked down upon for, then they do not care." But the suspicion spoken of here arises from some defect. Therefore, it is defectiveness, rather than any sort of excellence, that causes someone to get angry.

Objection 3: What involves excellence makes men especially agreeable and full of hope. But in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "Men are not angry when they are playing, making jokes, taking part in a feast, completing their work, partaking in non-shameful pleasures, or when they are full of hope." Therefore, excellence is not a cause of anger.

But contrary to this: In the same book the Philosopher says that men become indignant because of their excellence.

I respond: There are two ways to understand the cause of anger in the one who is angry:

(a) In one way, as *a disposition toward the moving cause of anger (secundum habitudinem ad motivum irae)*. And in this sense *excellence* is a cause of someone's getting angry easily. For as has been explained (a. 3), the moving cause of anger is unjust disdain. Now it is clear that the more excellent someone is, the more unjust it is to disdain him in the matter in which he excels. And so those who have some sort of excellence are especially angered if they are disdained—e.g., if a rich man is disdained in matters that involve money, or a rhetorician in matters that involve speaking, and so on for other such cases.

(b) In a second way, the cause of anger in the one who is angry can be thought of as *a disposition that is left over in him by the sort of moving cause in question (ex parte dispositionis quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo)*. Now it is clear that nothing moves one to anger except harm that saddens him. But what involves *defectiveness* is especially saddening, since men are who are subject to defects are more easily harmed. And the reason why men who are sick or who suffer from other defects get angry more easily is that they are saddened more easily.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: Someone who is despised in a matter in which he clearly excels to a high degree does not think of himself as suffering any diminution, and so he is not saddened and on this score is less angry. However, from the other side, to the extent that he is despised less deservedly, he has more of a reason for getting angry—unless, perhaps, he thinks of himself as being envied or scorned not out of disdain, but out of ignorance or some other cause of this sort.

Reply to objection 3: All the things in question impede anger to the extent that they impede sadness. However, from the other side, these things are apt to provoke anger to the extent that they make a man less fit to be despised.

Article 4

Is an individual's defectiveness a cause of his being such that we more easily get angry with him?

It seems that an individual's defectiveness is not a cause of his being such that we more easily get angry with him (*defectus alicuius non sit causa ut contra ipsum facilius irascamur*):

Objection 1: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "We are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; instead, we are gentle with them. Hence, even dogs do not bite those who sit back down." But this involves lowliness and defectiveness. Therefore, someone's lowliness (*parvitas*) is a cause of our being less angry with him.

Objection 2: There is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases with respect to the dead. Therefore, someone's defectiveness is not a cause that provokes anger against him.

Objection 3: No one judges that someone is lowly by reason of the fact that he is his friend. But if our friends harm us or do not help us, then we suffer more; hence, Psalm 54:13 says, "If my enemy had reviled me, I at least would have been able to bear it." Therefore, someone's defectiveness is not a cause of our more easily getting angry with him.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, "The rich man gets angry with the poor man if the poor man despises him, and the prince gets angry with his subject."

I respond: As was explained above (aa. 2-3), unseemly contempt (*indigna despectio*) is what above all provokes anger. Therefore, the defectiveness or lowliness of the one with whom we are angry makes for an increase of anger insofar as it increases the unseemliness of the contempt (*inquantum auget indignam despectionem*). For just as the more prestigious someone is (*quanto aliquis est maior*), the more unseemly it is to look down upon him, so the more lowly someone is, the more unseemly it is for

him to look down upon anyone. And so nobles get angry if they are looked down upon by peasants, and the wise get angry if they are looked down upon by the foolish, and masters get angry if they are looked down upon by their servants.

On the other hand, if lowliness or defectiveness diminishes the unseemliness of the contempt, then this sort of lowliness diminishes anger and does not increase it. And in this sense those individuals diminish anger who repent of the injuries they have inflicted and confess that they have acted badly and humble themselves and seek forgiveness—this according to Proverbs 15:1: “A gentle response breaks anger,” viz., insofar as such men seem not to look down upon, but instead to think more highly of, those before whom they humble themselves.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases with respect to the dead. One is that they cannot grieve or perceive, which is what those who are angry especially seek in those with whom they are angry. The second reason is that they already seem to have arrived at the worst of all evils. Hence, anger likewise ceases with respect to those who have been gravely harmed, insofar as the evil that belongs to them exceeds the measure of just retribution.

Reply to objection 3: The disdain that comes from one’s friends seems to be more unseemly. And so the reason why we get more angry with them if they disdain us—by harming us or by not helping us—is similar to the reason why we get more angry with those who are more lowly than we are.

QUESTION 48

The Effects of Anger

Next we have to consider the effects of anger. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is anger a cause of pleasure? (2) Is it especially anger that is a cause of fervor or violent heat (*fervor*) in the heart? (3) Does anger especially impede the use of reason? (4) Is anger a cause of speechlessness (*taciturnitas*)?

Article 1

Is anger a cause of pleasure?

It seems that anger is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: Sadness excludes pleasure. But anger is always accompanied by sadness, since, as *Ethics* 7 says, “Everyone who does something because of anger does it while he is saddened.” Therefore, anger is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, “The act of punishing (*punitio*) quiets the force of anger, bringing about pleasure in the place of sadness.” From this one can infer that it is through the act of punishing that pleasure comes to the one who is angry. But the act of punishing eliminates the anger (*punitio excludit iram*). Therefore, when the pleasure arrives, the anger is gone. Therefore, the anger is not an effect that is conjoined to the pleasure.

Objection 3: No effect impedes its own cause, since it shares its form with its cause (*sit suae causae conformis*). But as *Rhetoric* 2 says, pleasure eliminates anger. Therefore, pleasure is not an effect of anger.

But contrary to this: In the same book the Philosopher adduces the proverb that anger “grows much sweeter than honey spreading through the hearts of men.”

I respond: As the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 7, instances of pleasure—especially sensible and bodily pleasure—are a sort of medicine against sadness, and so the greater the sadness or anxiety for which the pleasure is offered as a remedy, the greater the degree to which the pleasure is perceived. For instance, it is clear that when someone is thirsty, drinking becomes more pleasurable for him.

Now it is clear from what has been said above (q. 47, aa. 1 and 3) that the movement of anger arises from a saddening injury that has been inflicted, and that the remedy for this sadness is applied by exacting retribution (*cui tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam*). And so pleasure follows upon the presence of the retribution; and the greater the sadness was, the greater the pleasure is. Therefore, if the retribution is present *in reality*, then there is a complete pleasure (*perfecta delectatio*) that totally eliminates the sadness and thereby quiets the movement of anger.

However, there are two ways in which the retribution is present to the one who is angry *before* it is present in reality:

In one way, through *hope*. For as was explained above (q. 46, a. 1), no one gets angry unless he hopes for retribution.

In a second way, through *continuous thought* (*secundum continuam cogitationem*). For anyone who has a desire takes pleasure in lingering over the thought of what he desires; this is also why images from dreams are pleasurable. And so when someone who is angry keeps mulling over retribution in his mind (*multum in animo suo cogitet de vindicta*), he takes pleasure from this. Yet this pleasure is not the complete pleasure that eliminates sadness and thereby eliminates anger.

Reply to objection 1: Someone who is angry is not saddened by the same thing that he rejoices over. Rather, he is saddened by the injury that has been inflicted, whereas he takes pleasure in the retribution that he is thinking about and hoping for. Hence, the sadness is related to the anger as its source, while the pleasure is related to it as its effect or terminus.

Reply to objection 2: This objection goes through for the pleasure that is caused by the real presence of retribution, which totally eliminates the anger.

Reply to objection 3: Antecedent pleasures keep sadness from following and, as a result, they impede anger. But pleasure with respect to retribution follows upon anger.

Article 2

Is fervor an effect especially of anger?

It seems that fervor or violent heat (*fervor*) is not an effect especially of anger:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 28, a. 5), fervor pertains to love. But as was also explained above (q. 27, a. 4), love is the source and cause of all the passions. Therefore, since a cause is more powerful than its effect, it does not seem that it is especially anger that is a cause of fervor.

Objection 2: Things that in their own right (*de se*) excite fervor grow stronger by persisting through time (*per temporis assiduitatem magis augentur*); for instance, love grows stronger when it lasts for a long time (*sicut amor diuturnitate conualescit*). But anger becomes weaker through the course of time; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Time quiets anger.” Therefore, anger is not properly speaking a cause of fervor.

Objection 3: When fervor is added to fervor, it increases the fervor. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “When a greater anger is added to anger, it makes the former anger become gentle.” Therefore, anger is not a cause of fervor.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, “Anger is the fervor of the blood which surrounds the heart and which results from the evaporation of the bile” (*ex evaporatione fellis fiens*).

I respond: As has been explained (q. 44, a. 1), the bodily changes involved in the passions of the soul are proportioned to the appetite’s movement. Now it is clear that every desire, even a natural desire, tends more strongly toward what is contrary to itself if a contrary is present. Hence, we see that heated water freezes more solidly, since the cold acts more strongly, as it were, on what is hot.

Now anger’s appetitive movement is caused by an inflicted injury, which serves as a sort of contrary that is present. And so the appetite tends very forcefully (*potissime tendit*) toward repelling the injury through a desire for retribution, and it is from this desire that the great vehemence and impetuosity (*vehementia et impetuositas*) of anger’s movement follows. And since anger’s movement does not have the mode of a withdrawal (*non est per retractionis*), which is what cold is proportioned to, but instead has the mode of an incursion (*est per modum insecutionis*), which is what heat is proportioned to, the result is that anger’s movement is a cause of a certain fervor in the blood and spirits that surround the heart, which is itself an instrument of the passions of the soul. And from this it follows that because of the great disturbance of the heart that occurs in the case of anger, certain indications become especially apparent in the exterior members of those who get angry. For as Gregory says in *Moralia* 5, “The heart palpitates, inflamed with the stings of its own anger; the body quivers; the tongue stammers; the face becomes fiery; the eyes grow fierce; and an acquaintance becomes hardly recognizable. His mouth forms a sound, but his understanding does not know what he is saying.”

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, “Love itself is not felt in this way except when some need brings it forth.” And so when, because of an inflicted injury, a man suffers the loss of some excellence that he loves, his love is felt more keenly (*magis sentitur amor*). And so his heart becomes hotter (*ferventius*) in order to remove this obstacle to the thing he loves, with the result that the love’s fervor itself grows because of the anger and is felt more keenly.

However, the fervor that follows upon the heat pertains to love in one way and to anger in another way.

For the fervor of love is accompanied by a sort of sweetness and gentleness, since it is directed at a good thing that is loved. And so it is similar to the heat that belongs to the air and to blood. It is because of this that (a) sanguine individuals are more beloved and that (b) the liver, in which there is a sort of generation of blood, is said to “push one toward love” (*cogit amare iecur*).

By contrast, the fervor of anger is accompanied by a bitterness aimed at destruction (*ad consumendum*), since it tends toward punishing what is contrary to it. Hence, this sort of fervor is like the heat of fire and of yellow bile (*assimilatur calori ignis et cholorae*). This is why Damascene says that anger “proceeds from the evaporation of the bile and is called ‘bilious’” (*fellea nominatur*).

Reply to objection 2: Anything whose cause diminishes over time is necessarily weakened by time. Now it is clear that memory diminishes over time; for things that are very old (*antiqua*) easily slip out of memory. But anger is caused by the memory of an inflicted injury. And so the cause of anger diminishes little by little over time, up to the point of being completely eliminated.

Also, an injury seems greater when it is first perceived, and one’s estimation of it diminishes little by little as one recedes more and more from the present feeling of the injury.

Something similar occurs with love as well, if the cause of love remains solely in the memory. Hence, in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says, “If a friend’s absence lasts for a long time, then it seems to make one forgetful of the friendship.”

By contrast, in the friend’s presence the cause of friendship is always increasing over time, and so the friendship grows. And something similar holds for anger, if its cause is continually increased.

Yet the very fact that anger is quickly consumed attests to its vehement fervor. For just as a large fire is quickly extinguished once its matter is consumed, so, too, because of its own vehemence, anger quickly dies out.

Reply to objection 3: Every power that is divided into many parts is diminished. And so when an individual is angry with someone and then gets angry with someone else, by this very fact his anger with respect to the first individual diminishes—and especially if his anger is greater with respect to the second individual. For the injury that excited the anger against the first individual will seem like little or nothing in comparison to the second injury, which is judged to be greater.

Article 3

Does anger impede reason?

It seems that anger does not impede reason:

Objection 1: What involves an act of reason seems not to be an impediment to reason. But as *Ethics* 7 says, “Anger involves an act of reason.” Therefore, anger does not impede reason.

Objection 2: The more reason is impeded, the more its manifestation is diminished. But in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “An angry man does not hide himself, but is manifest” (*iracundus non est insidiator sed manifestus*). Therefore, anger does not seem to impede the use of reason in the way that, according to *Ethics* 7, concupiscence, which hides itself (*sicut concupiscentia quae est insidiosa*), does impede the use of reason.

Objection 3: Reason’s judgment is rendered more evident when a contrary is present, since contraries shine forth to a greater degree when they are juxtaposed with one another. But this sort of juxtaposition makes anger grow as well; for as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, “Men get more angry if there are preexisting contraries—as in the case of someone who has been honored in the past, if he is now being dishonored,” and so on for the others. Therefore, it is in virtue of the same thing that (a) anger grows and that (b) reason’s judgment is assisted. Therefore, it is not the case that anger impedes reason.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, “Anger takes away the light of understanding,

since it confuses the mind by agitating it.”

I respond: Even though the mind, or reason, does not use a bodily organ in its own proper act, nonetheless, since it needs various sentient powers for its acts, and since the acts of those powers are impeded when the body is agitated (*corpore perturbato*), bodily disturbances must likewise impede the use of reason, as is clear in the case of those who are inebriated or dreaming.

Now as has been explained (a. 2), what anger especially does is to cause a bodily disturbance around the heart in such a way that this disturbance also flows into the exterior members. Hence, of all the passions anger most manifestly impedes the use of reason—this according to Psalm 30:10 (“My eye is troubled with anger”).

Reply to objection 1: The source of anger (*principium irae*) lies in reason as regards the appetitive movement, which is what is *formal* in anger.

However, the passion of anger prevents reason from perfecting its judgment by not, as it were, listening to reason completely (*perfectum iudicium rationis praeoccupat quasi non perfecte audiens rationem*), and this because of the commotion caused by the rapidly moving heat, which is what is *material* in anger. And on this score, anger impedes reason.

Reply to objection 2: The angry man is said to be “manifest” (*manifestus*) not because it is manifest to him (*manifestum sibi*) what he should do, but because he acts openly (*manifeste operatur*) and without seeking concealment. This happens in part because reason is impeded, with the result that it is unable to discern what should be kept hidden and what should be made manifest, and also unable to devise ways of hiding. But it also happens in part because the heart is expanded, and this has to do with the magnanimity that anger produces. Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man that “he is manifest about what he loves and hates, and he speaks and operates openly.”

By contrast, concupiscence is said to be hidden and insidious because, in most cases, the pleasurable things that are desired involve shameful and softness (*habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem*), and in such matters a man wants to remain hidden. However, in matters that involve virility and excellence, e.g., exacting retribution, a man seeks to be out in the open (*quaerit homo manifestus esse*).

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, the movement of anger begins with an act of reason, and so the juxtaposition of the one contrary with the other both aids the judgment of reason and increases anger in the same respect. For when someone has honor or riches and afterwards incurs the loss of one of them, then that loss appears greater, both because of the close proximity of the contraries and because it was unexpected. And so the loss causes greater sadness, in the same way that great goods that come along unexpectedly cause greater pleasure. And as a result of this increase in the sadness that precedes the anger, there is an increase as well in the anger that follows.

Article 4

Does anger cause speechlessness?

It seems that anger does not cause speechlessness (*ira non causet taciturnitatem*):

Objection 1: Speechlessness is opposed to speech. But as anger increases, one arrives at the point of speaking, as is clear from the degrees of anger that our Lord designates in Matthew 5:22 when He says, “Whoever is angry with his brother and whoever says to his brother, ‘Raca’ and whoever says to his brother, ‘You fool’.” Therefore, anger is not a cause of speechlessness.

Objection 2: When reason’s watchfulness decreases, it happens that a man erupts into inordinate speech (*prorumpat ad verba inordinata*); hence, Proverbs 25:28 says, “Like a city that is open and not surrounded by walls, so is a man who cannot restrain his spirit in speaking.” But as has been explained

(a. 3), it is anger especially that impedes reason's judgment. Therefore, it is anger especially that makes someone issue forth into inordinate speech.

Objection 3: Matthew 12:34 says, "The mouth speaks from the abundance of the heart." But as has been explained (a. 2), it is especially through anger that the heart is agitated. Therefore, anger is especially a cause of speaking. Therefore, it is not a cause of speechlessness.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, "Anger that is closed up through silence rages more strongly within the mind."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 3 and q. 46, a. 4), anger both (a) involves an act of reason and (b) impedes reason. And on both scores, it can cause speechlessness.

On the part of the act of reason, when reason's judgment is vigorous enough that even if it does not restrain the affections from a disordered desire for retribution, it at least restrains the tongue from inordinate speech. Hence, in *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, "Sometimes anger in an agitated mind imposes silence as if by a judgment."

On the part of the impediment to reason, the disturbance of anger, as has been explained (a. 2), reaches all the way to the exterior members, and especially to those members in which the heart's vestiges shine forth more expressively, e.g., in the eyes and in the face and in the tongue. Hence, as was quoted above, "The tongue stammers; the face becomes fiery; the eyes grow fierce." Therefore, the disturbance of anger can be so great that the tongue is altogether prevented from exercising speech. And then what follows is speechlessness.

Reply to objection 1: The increase in anger sometimes reaches the point that reason is prevented from restricting the tongue. But at other times the anger proceeds further, to the point of preventing the movement of the tongue and of the other exterior members.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: The heart's agitation can sometimes abound to the point that the heart's inordinate movement prevents the movement of the exterior members. And in such a case it causes speechlessness, immobility in the exterior members, and sometimes even death.

However, if the agitation is not this great, then the mouth's speaking is what follows from the abundance of the heart's agitation.

QUESTION 49

The Substance of Habits

After acts and passions, we have to consider the principles of human acts: first, the intrinsic principles (questions 49-89) and, second, the extrinsic principles (questions 90-114).

Now the intrinsic principles are *power* and *habit*. But since we considered the powers in the First Part (*ST* 1, questions 77-89), it remains now to consider habits (questions 49-89). First, we will consider them in general (questions 49-54), and, second, we will consider virtues and vices and other habits of this sort that are principles of human acts (questions 55-89).

Concerning habits in general, there are four things to be considered: (a) the very substance of habits (question 49), (b) the subject of habits (question 50), (c) the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption (questions 51-53), and (d) the distinctions among them (question 54).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is a habit a quality? (2) Is habit a determinate species of quality? (3) Does *habit* imply an ordering toward an act (*utrum habitus importet ordinem ad actum*)? (4) Are habits necessary?

Article 1

Is a habit a quality?

It seems that a habit is not a quality:

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “The name ‘habit’ (*habitus*) comes from the verb ‘to have’ (*habere*).” But ‘to have’ belongs not just to *quality*, but to other categories (*ad alia genera*) as well. For we are said to have quantity and money and other such things. Therefore, a habit is not a quality.

Objection 2: As is clear from the *Categories*, *habit* is posited as one of the categories (*unum praedicamentum*). But it is not the case that one category is contained under another. Therefore, a habit is not a quality.

Objection 3: As it says in the *Categories*, “Every habit is a disposition.” But as *Metaphysics* 4 says, a disposition is “an ordering of that which has parts.” But this has to do with the category *position* (*situs*). Therefore, a habit is not a quality.

But contrary to this: In the *Categories* the Philosopher says, “A habit is a quality that is hard to change” (*qualitas de difficili mobilis*).

I respond: The name ‘habit’ (*habitus*) is taken from *having* (*ab habendo*). There are two senses in which the name ‘habit’ is derived from having: (a) insofar as a man, or any other entity, is said to have something, and (b) insofar as a given thing has or bears itself in some way, either in its own right or with respect to something else (*secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud*).

As for the first sense, notice that *having*, insofar as it is said with respect to anything whatsoever that is had, is common to diverse genera (*commune est ad diversa genera*). This is why the Philosopher places *having* among the post-predicaments (*inter post praedicamenta*) that follow upon the different genera of things, just like *opposites* and like *prior* and *posterior*, etc.

But among the things that are had there seems to be a distinction, so that (a) in the case of some of them there is no medium between *that which has* and *that which is had*; for instance, there is no medium between a subject and its quality or between a subject and its quantity.

By contrast, (b) in the case of others of them there is some medium between the two, but it is only a relation, in the way that someone is said to have a partner or a friend.

On the other hand, (c) in the case of some of them there is a medium—not, to be sure, an action or passion, but rather something like an action or passion (*aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis*); for

instance, there is one thing that adorns or covers and another that is adorned or covered. Hence, in *Metaphysics* 5 the Philosopher says that *having* bespeaks a sort of action of *having* and *being had*, as with the clothes that we have on. And so in the case of these things there is a special genus of things that is called the category *having* (*habitus*), which is a having that lies between (*habitus medius*) the one who has clothes on and the clothes that are had.

However, if *having* (*habitus*) is taken in the sense in which a thing is said to have or bear itself in some way, either in its own right or with respect to another, then in this sense a habit is a certain quality that the Philosopher is talking about in *Metaphysics* 5 when he says, “A habit is a disposition in accord with which what is disposed is disposed either well or badly, and this either in its own right or with respect to another (*aut secundum se aut ad aliud*), in the way that health is a certain habit.” This is the sense in which we are talking about habits in the present context. Hence, one should claim that a habit is a quality.

Reply to objection 1: This objection proceeds from *having* taken in the general sense. For as has been explained, in this sense *having* is common to many genera.

Reply to objection 2: This argument proceeds from habit insofar as it is understood to be a medium between *that which has* and *that which is had*. For as has been explained, in this sense *habit* is a one of the categories (*est quoddam praedicamentum*).

Reply to objection 3: A disposition does, to be sure, always involve an ordering of something that has parts, but, as the Philosopher immediately adds, there are three ways in which this happens, viz., either (a) with respect to *place* or (b) with respect to *potentiality* or (c) with respect to *species*. In this, as Simplicius remarks in his commentary on the *Categories*, he includes all dispositions. He includes *corporeal* dispositions in saying “with respect to place,” and this pertains to the category of *position* (*situs*), which is an ordering of parts in a place. In saying “with respect to potentiality” he includes all dispositions that are preparatory and not yet perfectly fit—as, for instance, inchoate scientific knowledge and virtue. And in saying “with respect to species” he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits—as, for instance, completed scientific knowledge and virtue (*scientia et virtus complete*).

Article 2

Is *habit* a determinate species of quality?

It seems that *habit* is not a determinate species of quality:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), insofar as a habit is a quality, it is a disposition according to which what is disposed is disposed either well or badly. But this is the case with every quality whatsoever. For it is possible for something to be well disposed or badly disposed with respect to shape (*secundum figuram*) and, again, with respect to heat and cold, and with respect to all qualities of this sort. Therefore, *habit* is not a determinate species of quality.

Objection 2: In the *Categories* the Philosopher says that heat and cold are dispositions or habits in the same way that sickness and health are. But heat and cold are in the *third* species of quality. Therefore, *habit* or *disposition* is not distinct from the other species of quality.

Objection 3: *Hard to change* is a difference that belongs not to the genus *quality* but instead to the genus *movement* (*motus*) or *being acted upon* (*passio*). But no genus is determined to its species by a difference that belongs to some other genus; instead, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 7, the differences must belong *per se* to a genus. Therefore, since a habit is a quality “that is hard to change,” it seems that *habit* is not a determinate species of quality.

But contrary to this: In the *Categories* the Philosopher says, “One species of quality is *habit and disposition*.”

I respond: In the *Categories* the Philosopher posits *disposition and habit* as the *first* among the four species of *quality*.

In his commentary on the *Categories* Simplicius assigns the differences among these species by claiming the following: “Some qualities are *natural*, and these exist in a thing always and according to its nature, whereas some qualities are *adventitious*, and these are effected from without and can be lost. The latter” — i.e., the adventitious ones — “are the *habits and dispositions*, which differ from one another by the differences *hard to lose* and *easy to lose* (*secundum facile et difficile amissibile differentes*). On the other hand, among the natural qualities, some exist insofar as something exists in potentiality, and this is the *second* species of quality. By contrast, some of them exist insofar as something exists in actuality, and this either in the depths or on the surface (*vel in profundum vel secundum superficiem*). If in the depths, then this is the *third* species of quality, whereas if they are on the surface, this is *fourth* species of quality, e.g., shape (*figura*) and form (*forma*), where form is the shape of a living thing.”

However, this division of the species of quality seems incorrect. For there are many shapes and passive qualities (*multae figurae et qualitates passibiles*) that are adventitious and not natural, e.g., health and beauty and others of this sort. Furthermore, this division does not accord with the ordering of the species, since what is more natural is always prior.

And so the distinction of dispositions and habits from the other qualities has to be thought of along different lines. For *quality*, properly speaking, expresses a certain mode of a substance (*modum substantiae*). But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, a mode “is what is fixed by a measure” and hence involves a certain determination in accord with some measure. And so just as that by which a matter’s potentiality is determined with respect to substantial *esse* is called the quality which is the substance’s *specific difference*, so, too, that by which a subject’s potentiality is determined with respect to accidental *esse* is called an *accidental quality*, which is likewise a sort of *difference*, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5.

Now a mode, i.e., the determination of a subject with respect to accidental *esse*, can be thought of either (a) in relation to the subject’s very *nature* or (b) with respect to the *acting* and *being acted on* that follow upon the principles of the nature (*secundum actionem et passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae*), i.e., the matter and the form, or (c) with respect to the *quantity*.

Now if the subject’s mode or determination is taken with respect to the *quantity*, then this is the *fourth* species of quality. And since by its nature quantity exists without movement and without the notions of *good* and *bad*, it follows that the fourth species of quality is irrelevant to whether the thing is doing well or badly (*sit bene vel male*), or whether it passes quickly or slowly (*cito vel tarde transiens*).

By contrast, the determination of the subject with respect to acting and being acted upon (*secundum actionem et passionem*) is considered in the *second* and *third* species of quality. And so in both cases one takes into account whether something is done easily or instead with difficulty, or whether it passes quickly or is long-lasting. However, one does not consider in these cases anything relevant to the notions *good* or *bad*; for movements and passions do not have the character of an end, whereas *good* and *bad* are said in relation to an end.

On the other hand, the subject’s mode and determination in relation to the nature of the thing is relevant to the *first* species of quality, which is *habit and disposition*; for in *Physics* 7 the Philosopher, in speaking of the habits of the soul and the body, says that they are certain “dispositions of the perfect with respect to the best, and I say ‘of the perfect’ in the sense that they are disposed in accord with the nature.” And since, as *Physics* 2 says, the very form and nature of a thing is its end and that for the sake of which the thing comes to be, it follows that *good* and *bad* are considered in the first species of quality—as well as *easy to change* and *hard to change* (*facile et difficile mobile*) insofar as a nature is the end of generation and of change. Hence, in *Metaphysics* 5 the Philosopher defines a habit as “a disposition according to which someone is well disposed or badly disposed.” And in *Ethics* 2 he says,

“Habits are that according to which we have or bear ourselves (*nos habemus*) well or badly with respect to the passions.” For when a mode befits a thing’s nature, then it has the character of something good, whereas when it does not befit the nature, it has the character of something bad. And since the nature is what is considered first in an entity, habit is posited as the *first* species of quality.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), *disposition* implies a certain ordering. Hence, one is said to be disposed through a quality only in relation to something. And if one adds *well* or *badly*, which pertain to the nature of *habit*, then the ordering has to be with respect to the nature, which is an end.

Hence, one is not said to be disposed well or badly by a shape, or by heat or cold, except in relation to the thing’s nature, insofar as [the quality] is fitting or unfitting for the nature. Hence, insofar as they are considered fitting or unfitting for the nature of the thing, shapes and passive qualities themselves pertain to habits or dispositions. For insofar as shape and color befit the nature of the thing, they pertain to comeliness, whereas insofar as heat and cold befit the nature of the thing, they pertain to health. And it is in this sense that the Philosopher places heat and cold in the *first* species of quality.

Reply to objection 2: This makes the reply to the second objection clear—even though, as Simplicius points out in his commentary on the *Categories*, some answer this objection in a different way.

Reply to objection 3: The specific difference *hard to change* does not distinguish *habit* from the other species of quality, but instead distinguishes *habit* from *disposition*.

Now *disposition* is taken in two ways: (a) insofar as it is the genus of *habit*, given that in *Metaphysics 5* *disposition* is posited in the definition of *habit*, and (b) insofar as it is something divided off from *habit*.

And there are two ways in which *disposition*, properly speaking, can be understood to be divided off from *habit*:

In the first way, they are divided as what is perfect and what is imperfect within the same species, so that [the quality] is called a *disposition* (retaining the common name) when it is in the thing imperfectly (*quando imperfecte inest*), so that it is easily lost, whereas it is called a *habit* when it is in the thing perfectly, so that it is not easily lost. And in this sense a disposition becomes a habit in the way that a boy becomes a man.

In the second way, they can be distinguished as diverse species under a single subalternate genus. In this sense, *dispositions* are those qualities of the first species to which it is fitting, according to their proper natures, to be easily lost, since they have changeable causes, e.g., sickness and health, whereas *habits* are those qualities which, according to their nature, are such that they are not easily changed, since they have unchanging causes, e.g., types of scientific knowledge (*scientiae*) and the virtues. And in this sense a disposition does not become a habit.

The latter seems more consonant with Aristotle’s meaning. Hence, in order to prove this distinction he adduces ordinary ways of speaking, according to which qualities that are easily changeable by their nature are called habits if they are rendered difficult to change by some accident, whereas the opposite holds for qualities that are by their nature difficult to change. For instance, if someone possesses a piece of scientific knowledge imperfectly, so that he is easily able to lose it, then he is said *to be disposed toward* (*disponi ad*) the knowledge rather than *to have* (*habere*) the knowledge. From this it is clear that the name ‘habit’ implies a sort of long-lastingness, whereas the name ‘disposition’ does not.

Nor is it a problem that on this account *easy to change* and *hard to change* are specific differences, given that they pertain to movement and being acted upon, and not to the genus of quality. For even though these specific differences seem to be related incidentally to quality, they nonetheless designate proper and *per se* differences among qualities. In the same way, even in the genus of *substance* accidental differences are often used in place of substantial differences, insofar as they designate essential principles.

Article 3

Does *habit* imply an ordering toward an act?

It seems that *habit* does not imply an ordering toward an act (*ordinem ad actum*):

Objection 1: Each thing acts insofar as it actual. But in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “When someone has knowledge in accord with a habit (*fit sciens secundum habitum*), then he is likewise in potentiality at that time, yet in a way different from the way he was in potentiality before he learned.” Therefore, *habit* does not imply a relation to an act (*habitudinem ad actum*).

Objection 2: What is posited in a thing’s definition belongs to that thing *per se*. But as is clear from *Metaphysics* 5, *being a principle of action* is posited in the definition of *power* (*in definitione potentiae*). Therefore, *being a principle of an act* belongs *per se* to a power, and that which exists *per se* is first in any given genus. Therefore, if a habit is likewise a principle of an act, then it follows that it is posterior to the power. And so *habit* and *disposition* will not be the *first* species of quality.

Objection 3: Health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But none of them is said in relation to an act. Therefore, it is not part of the nature of a habit to be the principle of an act.

But contrary to this: In *De Bono Coniugali* Augustine says, “A habit is that by which something is done when there is a work (*cum opus est*).” And in *De Anima* 3 the Commentator says, “A habit is that by which someone acts when he so wills.”

I respond: *Having a relation to an act* can belong to a habit both (a) in accord with the nature of the habit and (b) in accord with the nature of the subject in which the habit exists.

As for the nature of the habit, it belongs to every habit to have in some way an ordering toward an act. For it belongs to the nature of a habit that it implies a certain condition in relation to a thing’s nature, insofar as the habit either befits the nature or does not befit it. But a thing’s nature, which is the end of generation, is likewise further ordered to another end, which is either an operation or something which is done and which one arrives at through an operation (*vel operatio vel aliquid operatum quod quis pervenit per operationem*). Hence, a habit implies an ordering not only to the thing’s very nature but also, as a consequence, to an operation, insofar as that operation is the end of the nature or something that leads to that end. Hence, *Metaphysics* 5 says, in the definition of a habit, that a habit is “a disposition according to which what is disposed is disposed either well or badly either in its own right (*secundum se*), i.e., according to its own nature, or with respect to something else, i.e., in relation to its end.

On the other hand, there are some habits that, even on the part of the subject in which they exist, primarily and principally imply an ordering toward an act. For, as has been explained, *habit* primarily and *per se* implies a relation to a thing’s nature. Therefore, if the nature of the thing in which the habit exists consists in the ordering itself to an act, then it follows that the habit principally implies an ordering to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and character of a power is that it is the principle of an act. Hence, every habit which has a power as the subject in which it exists principally implies an ordering to an act.

Reply to objection 1: A habit is itself a certain act insofar as it is a quality, and it can accordingly be the principle of an operation. But it is in potentiality in relation to its operation. Hence, as is clear from *De Anima* 2, a habit is called a *first act* and the operation is called a *second act*.

Reply to objection 2: It is not part of the notion of a habit that it be related to a power; instead, it is part of its notion that it be related to a nature. And since *nature* precedes *action*, it follows that *habit* is posited as a species of quality prior to *power* being posited as a species of quality.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, health is called a habit, or habitual disposition, in relation to the nature. Yet insofar as the nature is a principle of an act, health implies as a result an

ordering to an act. Hence, in *De Historia Animalium* 10 the Philosopher says that a man—or one of his members—is called healthy “when he is able to carry out the operations of a healthy man.” And something similar holds for the other cases.

Article 4

Is it necessary for there to be habits?

It seems that it is unnecessary for there to be habits:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 3), habits are that by which a thing is disposed well or badly with respect to something. But a thing is disposed well or badly through its form, since it is through its form that a thing is good, just as it is through its form that a thing is a being. Therefore, there is no necessity for habits.

Objection 2: *Habit* implies an ordering to an act. But *power* sufficiently implies the principle of acting (*principium actus*), since natural powers are principles of acting even in the absence of habits. Therefore, it was not necessary for there to be habits.

Objection 3: *Habit* is related to *good* and *bad* in the same way that *power* is. And just as a power does not always act, so neither does a habit. Therefore, given that the powers exist, it was superfluous for there to be a habit.

But contrary to this: As *Physics* 7 says, habits are certain perfections. But perfection is especially necessary for a thing, since perfection has the character of an end. Therefore, it was necessary for there to be habits.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), *habit* implies a certain disposition in relation to a thing’s nature and to its operation or end, in accord with which the thing is either well disposed or badly disposed toward this. Now there are three things required in order for it to be the case that something needs to be disposed with respect to something else:

First, it is required that what is disposed be different from that toward which it is disposed, and so it is related to the latter as potentiality is related to actuality. Hence, if there is something whose nature is not composed of potentiality and actuality and whose substance is its own operation and which exists for the sake of itself, then in such a thing there is no place for a habit or disposition—as is clear in the case of God.

Second, it is required that what is in potentiality with respect to another be able to be determined in more than one way and to diverse things (*possit pluribus modis determinari et ad diversa*). Hence, if a thing is in potentiality with respect to another but is such that it is in potentiality only to that very thing, then in such a thing there is no place for a habit or disposition. For a subject of this sort has by its nature a set relation to such-and-such an act (*habet debitam habitudinem ad talem actum*). Hence, if a celestial body is composed of matter and form, then since, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 56, a. 2), the matter in question is not in potentiality with respect to any other form, there is no place in such a thing for a disposition or habit with respect to [substantial] form or even to operation, since the nature of a celestial body is in potentiality only with respect to a single determinate movement.

Third, it is required that many things come together in order to dispose the subject to one of the things with respect to which it is in potentiality; these things can be measured together in diverse ways (*diversis modis commensurari possunt*) in order for the subject to be disposed well or badly with respect to a form or with respect to an operation. Hence, we do not call the simple qualities of the elements, which come together in a single mode that is determined by the natures of the elements, dispositions or habits; instead, we call them simple qualities. On the other hand, we call health, comeliness, and other things of this sort dispositions or habits, since they involve a particular commensuration of many things

that can be measured together in diverse ways. As was pointed out above (a. 1), this is why, in *Metaphysics* 5, the Philosopher says that “a habit is a disposition” and that “a disposition is an ordering, within a thing that has parts, either with respect to place or with respect to power or with respect to species.” Therefore, since there are many entities such that it is necessary for their natures and operations that many things concur which can be measured together in various ways, it follows that it is necessary for there to be habits.

Reply to objection 1: A thing’s nature is perfected by its form, but the subject has to be disposed toward the form itself by some disposition.

Yet the form itself is further ordered toward operation, which is either the end or a path to the end. To be sure, if the form has determinately just a single determinate operation, then no disposition is required for operation beyond the form itself. However, if it is the sort of form, like a soul, that can operate in diverse ways, then it has to be disposed toward its operations by certain habits.

Reply to objection 2: A power is sometimes related to many things, and so it has to be determined in some way. However, if there is a power that is not related to many things, then, as has been explained, it does not need a determining habit. And for this reason, natural powers do not perform their operations by means of any habits; for they are determined to a single act in their own right.

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 54, a. 3), a habit is not related in the same way to *good* and *bad*. But it is the same power that is related to both *good* and *bad*. And so habits are necessary in order for powers to be determined to *good*.

QUESTION 50

The Subject of Habits

Next we have to consider the subject of habits. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Are there any habits in the body? (2) Is the soul the subject of habits with respect to its essence or with respect to its power (*secundum suam essentiam vel secundum suam potentiam*)? (3) Can there be any habits in the powers of the sentient part of the soul? (4) Are there any habits in the intellect itself? (5) Are there any habits in the will? (6) Are there any habits in separated substances?

Article 1

Are there any habits in the body?

It seems that there are no habits in the body:

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 3 the Commentator says, “A habit is that by which someone acts when he wills to.” But corporeal actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural actions. Therefore, there cannot be any habits in the body.

Objection 2: All corporeal dispositions are easy to change. But a habit is a quality that is hard to change. Therefore, no corporeal disposition can be a habit.

Objection 3: All corporeal dispositions are subject to alteration. But *alteration* is only in the third species of quality, which is divided off from *habit*. Therefore, there are no habits in the body.

But contrary to this: In the *Categories* the Philosopher says that bodily health and incurable illnesses are called habits.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 49. a. 2), a habit is a disposition of a subject that is in potentiality with respect to a *form* or with respect to an *operation*.

Thus, insofar as *habit* implies a disposition with respect to an *operation*, no habit is principally in the body as in a subject. For every operation that belongs to the body stems either (a) from a *natural quality* that belongs to the body or (b) from the *soul* moving the body.

Therefore, as regards the operations that stem from *nature*, the body is not disposed toward them by any habit, since the natural powers are determined to a single effect, whereas it was explained above (q. 49, a. 4) that a habitual disposition is required where the subject is in potentiality with respect to many effects.

By contrast, the operations that are from the *soul* through the body belong principally to the soul itself, though secondarily to the body itself. Now habits are proportioned to their operations; this is why, as *Ethics* 2 points out, similar habits are caused by similar actions. And so the dispositions toward operations of this sort are principally in the soul. On the other hand, they can exist secondarily in the body insofar as the body is disposed and rendered fit to assist promptly in the soul’s operations (*disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae*).

On the other hand, if we are talking about the subject’s disposition to a *form*, then there can be a habitual disposition in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is related to a form. And it is in this way that health and comeliness and other things of this sort are called habitual dispositions. Yet they do not have the character of habits completely (*perfecte*), since their causes are easily changeable by their nature.

By contrast, as Simplicius notes in his commentary on the *Categories*, Alexander claimed that there is no way in which a habit or disposition of the first species [of quality] exists in the body. Instead, he claimed that the first species of quality belongs only to the soul. And what Aristotle said in the *Categories* about health and sickness was not said in the sense that these things belong to the first species of quality; rather, it was said by way of example, so that its meaning is that just as sickness and health can be easy to change or hard to change, so too it is with the qualities of the first species, which are

called habits and dispositions.

However, this is clearly contrary to what Aristotle meant. For (a) he uses the same way of speaking in giving health and sickness as examples as in giving virtue and knowledge as examples, and (b) in *Physics* 7 he explicitly posits comeliness and health among the habits.

Reply to objection 1: This objection is talking about (a) *habit* insofar as a habit is a disposition toward *an operation* and about (b) those acts of the body that stem from *nature*, but not about © those acts of the body that stem from the *soul* and whose principle is the will.

Reply to objection 2: Corporeal dispositions are not, absolutely speaking, hard to change, and this because of the mutability of corporeal causes. However, these dispositions can be hard to change relative to such-and-such a subject—viz., because, for as long as that subject perdures, they cannot be done away with (*non possunt amoveri*), or because they are hard to change in comparison with other dispositions.

By contrast, the soul's qualities are, absolutely speaking, hard to change because of the subject's unchangeableness. And this is why he does not say that health is a habit that is, absolutely speaking, hard to change. Rather, he says that it is "like a habit (*ut habitus*)," as it has it in the Greek. By contrast, he says that the qualities of the soul are habits absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 3: Some have claimed that the corporeal dispositions that are in the *first* species of quality differ from the qualities in the *third* species in that the qualities of the third species are, as it were, coming-to-be or in-motion (*ut in fieri et ut in motu*); this is why they are called *passions* or *passive qualities*. And when they have attained completion, arriving, as it were, at their species, they will then be in the first species of quality (*quando iam pervenerint ad perfectum, quasi ad speciem, tunc iam sunt in prima specie qualitatis*).

However, Simplicius disproves this claim in his commentary on the *Categories*. For on this view the action of heating would be in the third species of quality, whereas heat would be in the first species, whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third species.

Again, as Simplicius reports, Porphyry claims that in bodies a passion or passive quality differs from a disposition or habit with respect to intensification and remission. For when a thing is receiving heat only in the sense of being-heated and so is not able to effect heat, then there is either a *passion* (if it passes quickly) or a *passive quality* (if it perdures). But once it has arrived at the point where it is able to effect heat in another, then there is a *disposition*, whereas if the disposition is strengthened to the point of being hard to change, then it will be a habit—so that a disposition is a certain intensification or perfection of a passion or passive quality, and a habit is a certain intensification of a disposition.

However, Simplicius disproves this claim by the fact that intensification and remission of this sort imply not a diversity on the part of the form itself, but instead a diversity in the subject's participation [in the form]. And so the species of quality are not diversified in this way.

Therefore, one must reply in another way, viz., that, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 2), it is the commensuration of the passive qualities themselves, in relation to their agreement with the nature, that has the character of a disposition. And so when an alteration is made in those passive qualities themselves, viz., *hot* and *cold* and *moist* and *dry*, an alteration takes place *as a result* with respect to sickness and health. But the alteration does not primarily and *per se* have to do with these sorts of habits and dispositions.

Article 2

Are habits in the soul with respect to its essence rather than with respect to its power?

It seems that habits are in the soul with respect to its essence rather than with respect to its power:

Objection 1: As has been explained (q. 49, a. 2), things are called dispositions and habits in

relation to the *nature*. But the nature has to do with the soul's essence more than with its powers, since it is by its essence that the soul is the nature of such-and-such a body and its form. Therefore, habits are in the soul with respect to its essence and not with respect to its power.

Objection 2: An accident does not belong to an accident (*accidentis non est accidens*). Now a habit is a certain accident. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 77, a. 1), the powers of the soul belong to the genus *accident*. Therefore, a habit is not in the soul by reason of its power.

Objection 3: A subject is prior to what exists in that subject. But since *habit* belongs to the *first* species of quality, it is prior to *power*, which belongs to the *second* species. Therefore, a habit is not in a power of the soul as in its subject.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 1, the Philosopher posits diverse habits in the diverse parts of the soul.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 49, aa. 2 and 3), *habit* implies a sort of disposition in relation to a *nature* or in relation to an *operation*.

Therefore, if *habit* is taken insofar as a habit has a relation to a *nature*, then it cannot exist in the soul if we are speaking about human nature, since the soul is itself the form that completes human nature (*ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae*); hence, on this score there can be a habit or disposition in the body in relation to the soul rather than a habit in the soul in relation to the body. However, if we are speaking instead about some higher nature in which a man is able to participate (*de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse particeps*)—this according to 2 Peter 1:4 (“... that we might be partakers of the divine nature”)—then, as will be explained below (q. 110, a. 4), nothing prevents a habit, viz., grace, from existing in the soul with respect to its essence.

On the other hand, if *habit* is taken in relation to an *operation*, then habits are especially found in the soul insofar as the soul is not determined to a single operation but is instead related to many operations—and this, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 4), is what is required for a habit. And since the soul is a principle of operations through its powers, it follows accordingly that habits exist in the soul with respect to its powers.

Reply to objection 1: The soul's essence belongs to human nature not as a subject to be disposed toward something else, but as a form and nature toward which someone is disposed.

Reply to objection 2: An accident cannot *per se* be the subject of an accident. But since there is likewise an ordering among accidents themselves, a subject insofar as it underlies one accident is understood to be the subject of another accident. And in this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another, in the way that a surface is said to be the subject of a color. And it is in this way that a power is able to be the subject of a habit.

Reply to objection 3: *Habit* precedes *power* to the extent that a given habit involves a disposition toward a *nature*, while *power* always implies an ordering toward an *operation*, which is posterior [to the nature], since a nature is a principle of operation. By contrast, a habit that has a power as its subject implies an ordering not toward a nature, but toward an operation. Hence, it is posterior to the power.

An alternative reply is that *habit* precedes *power* as the complete precedes the incomplete and as actuality precedes potentiality. For as *Metaphysics* 7 and 9 say, actuality is naturally prior, even though potentiality is prior in the order of generation and in the order of time.

Article 3

Can there be a habit in the powers of the sentient part of the soul?

It seems that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sentient part of the soul:

Objection 1: Just as the nutritive part is non-rational, so too is the sentient part. But no habits are

posited in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore, neither should any habits be posited in the powers of the sentient part.

Objection 2: The sentient parts are common to us and brute animals. But there are no habits in brute animals, since there is no will in them, and, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 3), the will is posited in the definition of a habit. Therefore, there are no habits in the sentient powers.

Objection 3: The soul's habits are the virtues and types of scientific knowledge (*scientiae et virtutes*), and just as scientific knowledge is related to the apprehensive power, so virtue is related to the appetitive power. But there is no scientific knowledge in the sentient powers; for scientific knowledge is about universals, which the sentient powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, the habits of the virtues likewise cannot exist in the sentient parts.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that some virtues, viz., temperance and fortitude, belong to the non-rational parts of the soul.

I respond: The sentient powers can be thought of in two ways: (a) insofar as they operate from an instinct of nature, and (b) insofar as they operate at the command of reason.

Thus, insofar as they operate from an instinct of nature, they are ordered toward a single effect, just as nature likewise is. And so just as there are no habits in natural powers, so too there are no habits in the sentient powers insofar as they are operating from an instinct of nature.

However, insofar as the sentient powers operate at the command of reason, they are ordered toward diverse effects. And in this way habits can exist in those powers by which the powers are well or badly disposed toward something.

Reply to objection 1: The powers of the nutritive part are not apt by their nature to obey reason's command, and so no habits exist in them. By contrast, the sentient powers are apt by their nature to obey reason's command, and so habits can exist in them. For as *Ethics* 1 says, they are called rational to the extent that they obey reason.

Reply to objection 2: In brute animals the sentient powers do not operate at reason's command; instead, if brute animals are left to themselves, they operate from an instinct of nature. And so in brute animals there are no habits ordered toward *operations*. Yet certain dispositions in relation to *nature*, such as health and comeliness, do exist in them.

However, since brute animals are disposed by *man's* reason through a certain sort of habituation (*per quamdam consuetudinem*) to do something in one way or another, in this way habits can in a certain sense be posited in brute animals. Hence, in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "We see that the most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain, and that when they have become accustomed to this, they are said to be tame and gentle." Yet the character of a habit is lacking as far as the will's use is concerned, since the beasts do not have control over using or not using [the disposition in question]—something that seems to belong to the character of a habit. And so, properly speaking, habits cannot exist in them.

Reply to objection 3: As *De Anima* 3 says, the sentient appetite is apt by nature *to be moved by* the rational appetite, whereas the rational apprehensive powers are apt by nature *to receive from* the sentient [apprehensive] powers. And so it is more fitting that habits should exist in the sentient appetitive powers than in the sentient apprehensive powers, since habits exist in the sentient appetitive powers only insofar as they operate at reason's command.

On the other hand, certain habits can be posited in the *interior* sentient apprehensive powers themselves, insofar as a man becomes good at remembering or thinking or imagining (*homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus*); this is why, in the chapter on memory, the Philosopher says, "Habituation contributes greatly to having a good memory." For these powers are likewise moved to operate by reason's command. By contrast, the *exterior* apprehensive powers such as seeing and hearing, etc., are not susceptible to any habits, but instead are ordered by the disposition of their nature toward their own determinate acts—just like the members of the body, which do not themselves have

habits but instead are such that the habits are in the powers that command their movements.

Article 4

Are there any habits in the intellect?

It seems that there are no habits in the intellect:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), habits are conformed to operations. But as *De Anima* 1 explains, a man's operations are common to the soul and the body. Therefore, so are his habits. But as *De Anima* 3 explains, intellectual understanding is not an act of the body. Therefore, the intellect is not the subject of any habits.

Objection 2: Whatever exists in a thing, exists in it according to the mode of what it exists in. But that which is a form without matter is actuality only, whereas what is composed of form and matter has potentiality and actuality together. Therefore, in what is just a form there cannot be anything that simultaneously exists both in actuality and in potentiality; instead, something like that exists only in what is composed of form and matter. Therefore, a habit, which has potentiality along with actuality and is, as it were, midway between the two of them, cannot exist in the intellect; rather, a habit can exist only in the conjoined entity, which is composed of the soul and the body.

Objection 3: As is explained in *Metaphysics* 5, a habit is a disposition by which someone is disposed well or badly toward something. But the fact that someone is disposed well or badly toward an act of intellectual understanding stems from a bodily disposition; hence, *De Anima* 2 even says, "We observe that those who have soft flesh are very adept mentally." Therefore, cognitive habits exist not in the intellect, which is separated, but in a power that is the actuality of some part of the body.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher posits wisdom and understanding, which is the habit with respect to principles, in the intellectual part itself of the soul.

I respond: There have been diverse opinions about cognitive habits (*circa habitus cognoscitivos diversimode sunt aliqui opinati*).

There have been those who, claiming that there is a single passive intellect in all men, were forced to claim that cognitive habits exist not in the intellect itself, but in the interior sentient powers. For it is obvious that men differ in their habits, and so cognitive habits cannot be placed directly in that which, being one in number, is common to all men. Hence, if the passive intellect is numerically one in all men, the habits of scientific knowledge, according to which men are diversified, will not be able to exist in the passive intellect as in a subject, but will instead exist in the sentient powers, which are diverse in diverse men.

However, this position is, first of all, contrary to what Aristotle meant. For as *Ethics* 1 explains, it is clear that the sentient powers are rational not by their essence, but only through participation. But the Philosopher places the intellectual virtues—viz., wisdom, knowledge, and understanding—in that which is rational through its essence. Hence, they exist not in the sentient powers, but in the intellect itself. Again, in *De Anima* 3 he explicitly says that when the passive intellect becomes singular things, i.e., when it is brought into actuality with respect to singular things through their intelligible species, "it is then in act in the way that someone who knows is said to be in act," which happens when one is able to operate on his own, viz. by considering something; and "at that time it is in potentiality in a certain way, but not in the same way as before it learned or discovered." Therefore, the passive intellect is itself that in which exists the habit of scientific knowledge by which one is *able to* consider a thing even when he is not actually considering it.

Second, the position in question is contrary to the truth of the matter. For just as the power belongs to what the operation belongs to, so too the habit belongs to what the operation belongs to. But to

understand intellectually and to consider are proper acts of the intellect. Therefore, it is likewise the case that a habit by which one considers exists properly in the intellect itself.

Reply to objection 1: As Simplicius reports in his commentary on the *Categories*, some have claimed that since, as the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 1, every one of a man's operations belong in some sense to the conjoined entity, it follows that no habit is in the soul alone, but that every habit is in the conjoined entity. And from this it follows that no habit exists in the intellect, since, as the argument in question continues, the intellect is separated.

But this argument is not cogent. For a habit is not a disposition on the part of an object toward a power, but rather a disposition on the part of the power toward the object. Hence, a habit has to exist in the power that is the principle of the act and not in that which is related to the power as its object. But as *De Anima* 1 says, intellectual understanding is not said to be common to the soul and the body except by reason of the phantasm, and, as *De Anima* 3 says, it is clear that the phantasm is related to the passive intellect as an object. Hence, it follows that an intellectual habit exists principally on the side of the intellect itself, and not on the side of the phantasm, which is common to the soul and the body.

And so one should reply that the passive intellect is the subject of the habit, since the subject of a habit belongs to what is in potentiality with respect to many things, and this feature belongs especially to the passive intellect. Hence, the passive intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.

Reply to objection 2: Just as potentiality with respect to sensible *esse* belongs to a material body, so potentiality with respect to intelligible *esse* belongs to the passive intellect. Hence, nothing prevents a habit, which lies in the middle between pure potentiality and perfect act, from existing in the passive intellect.

Reply to objection 3: Since the apprehensive powers interiorly prepare a proper object for the passive intellect, a man is rendered capable of understanding by those powers' good disposition, which the good disposition of the body contributes to. And so an intellectual habit can exist secondarily in those powers. However, it exists principally in the passive intellect.

Article 5

Are there any habits in the will?

It seems that no habits exist in the will:

Objection 1: Habits that exist in the intellect are intelligible species by which one has intellectual understanding in actuality. But the will does not operate by means of any species. Therefore, the will is not the subject of any habits.

Objection 2: Because the active intellect is an active power, no habits are posited in it in the way that they are in the passive intellect. But the will is an especially active power, because, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), it moves all the powers to their acts. Therefore, there are no habits in the will.

Objection 3: There are no habits in natural powers, since they are determined to something by their nature. But the will is ordered by its nature to tending toward a good ordained by reason. Therefore, there are no habits in the will.

But contrary to this: Justice is a certain habit. But justice exists in the will, since, as *Ethics* 5 says, justice is a habit according which men will and do just things. Therefore, the will is the subject of some habit.

I respond: Every power that can be ordered in diverse ways toward acting needs a habit by which it is well disposed toward its act. But since the will is a rational power, it can be ordered in diverse ways toward acting. And so one has to posit in the will a habit by which it is well disposed toward its act.

Again, by the very notion of a habit it is clear that a habit has a sort of primary relation to the will

(*quendam principalem ordinem ad voluntatem*), since a habit, as was explained above (a. 1), is something one uses when he so wills.

Reply to objection 1: Just as in the intellect there is a species that is a likeness of the object, so in the will, and in every appetitive power, there has to be something by which it is inclined toward its object, since, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 2), the act of an appetitive power is nothing other than a certain inclination. Therefore, with respect to those things toward which the will is sufficiently inclined through the nature of the power itself, it does not need any inclining quality. But since it is necessary for the end of human life that the appetitive power be inclined to something determinate toward which the will is not inclined by the nature of the power, which relates to many and diverse things, it follows that it is necessary that there be certain inclining qualities in the will and in the other appetitive powers.

Reply to objection 2: The active intellect is only an agent and in no way a patient. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the will, and every appetitive power, is a moved mover (*movens motum*). And so the explanation is not the same in the two cases, since being susceptible to a habit belongs to what is in some way in potentiality.

Reply to objection 3: The will is, by the very nature of the power, inclined toward the good of reason. But since this good is diversified in many ways, it is necessary for the will to be inclined to some determinate good of reason through a habit in order for a more prompt operation to follow.

Article 6

Are there habits in angels?

It seems that there are no habits in angels:

Objection 1: Maximus, in commenting on Dionysius, *De Caelestis Hierarchibus*, chap. 7, says, “It is not fitting to think that intellectual, i.e., spiritual, powers exist in the godly intellects, i.e., the angels, in the manner of accidents, as they do in us and as one thing is in another as in a subject; for any sort of accident is driven away from there.” But every habit is an accident. Therefore, there are no habits in angels.”

Objection 2: In *De Caelestis Hierarchibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The holy dispositions of the celestial essences participate in God’s goodness more than all other things.” But what is *per se* is always prior to and better than what is *per aliud*. Therefore, the essences of the angels are perfected through their very selves (*per seipsas*) with respect to their conformity to God. Therefore, they are not perfected through any habits. And this seems to be Maximus’s argument, when he adds, “For if that were the case, then their essence would not abide in itself, nor would it have been able to be deified *per se* as much as was possible.”

Objection 3: As *Metaphysics* 5 says, a habit is a sort of disposition. But as it says in the same place, a disposition is an ordering within a thing that has parts. Therefore, since angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions or habits in them.

But contrary to this: In *De Caelestis Hierarchibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “The angels of the first hierarchy are called Fire-bearers (*calefacientes*) and Thrones and the Outpouring of Wisdom, a godlike manifestation of their habits.”

I respond: Some have claimed that there are no habits in angels, but that instead whatever is predicated of them is predicated with respect to their essence (*essentialiter dicuntur*). Hence, Maximus, after the passage that we quoted above, says, “Their dispositions, and the powers that are in them, are of their essence (*essentiales sunt*) because of their immateriality.” And, likewise, in his commentary on the *Categories* Simplicius says, “The wisdom that exists in the soul is a habit, whereas the wisdom that exists in an intellect is its substance, since all things that are divine are sufficient *per se* and exist in their

own right (*in seipsis*).”

This position is partly true and partly false (*partim habet veritatem et partim continet falsitatem*).

For it is clear from what has gone before (q. 49, a. 4) that the subject of a habit is none other than a being in potentiality. The commentators just cited, taking into consideration that angels are immaterial substances and that the potentiality of matter does not exist in them, on this basis excluded habits from them, along with every accident. However, even though there is no potentiality of matter in angels, since there is nonetheless something of potentiality in them (for it is proper to God to be pure actuality), it follows that habits can be found in them to the extent that potentiality is found in them.

Still, since the potentiality of matter is not of the same character (*non est unius rationis*) as the potentiality of an intellectual substance, it follows as a result that habits are not of the same character in the two cases. Hence, in his commentary on the *Categories* Simplicius says, “The habits of an intellectual substance are dissimilar to those which exist here below, but are more like the simple and immaterial species which they contain within themselves.”

However, the angelic intellect is related to habits of this sort in a different way from the way in which the human intellect is related to them. For since the human intellect is the lowest in the order of intellects, it is in potentiality with respect to all intelligible things, just as primary matter is in potentiality with respect to all sensible forms, and so it needs habits in order to understand anything (*ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu*). By contrast, the angelic intellect does not stand as a pure potentiality in the genus of intelligible things, but instead as a certain sort of actuality—not, to be sure, as a pure actuality (for this belongs to God alone), but as an actuality with an admixture of potentiality; and the less potentiality an angelic intellect has, the higher it is. And so, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 55, a. 1), insofar as an angelic intellect is in potentiality, it needs to be perfected habitually by certain intelligible species for its proper operation, whereas insofar as it is in actuality, it is able to understand certain things—at least, itself—through its own essence and other things in the mode of its substance, as is explained in the *Liber de Causis*; and the more perfectly it understands, the more perfect it is. But since no angel reaches God’s perfection and every angel is infinitely distant from God, it follows that in order to attain to God Himself through their intellect and will, the angels need certain habits; for they are in potentiality with respect to that pure actuality. This is why Dionysius says that their habits are godlike, viz., those habits by which they are conformed to God.

On the other hand, habits that are dispositions with respect to natural *esse* do not exist in angels, because angels are immaterial.

Reply to objection 1: This passage from Maximus should be interpreted to be about material habits and accidents.

Reply to objection 2: As regards what belongs to angels through their essence, they do not need habits. But since they are not through themselves beings who participate in God’s wisdom and goodness, it is necessary to posit habits in them to the extent that they need to participate in something from the outside.

Reply to objection 3: In angels there are no parts of their essence, but there are parts with respect to potentiality insofar as their intellect is perfected through many species and their will is related to many things.

QUESTION 51

The Causes of Habits

Next we have to consider the cause of habits: first, with respect to their generation (question 51); second, with respect to their increase (question 52); third, with respect to their decrease and corruption (question 53).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Are any habits from nature? (2) Are any habits caused by acts? (3) Can a habit be generated by a single act? (4) Are any habits infused into men by God?

Article 1

Are there any habits from nature?

It seems that no habit is from nature:

Objection 1: What is from nature is not subject to the will's use. But as the Commentator says in *De Anima* 3, a habit is "that which someone uses when he wills to." Therefore, habits are not from nature.

Objection 2: Nature does not do through two things what it can do through one. But the powers of the soul are from nature. Therefore, if the habits that belong to the powers were from nature, then the habit and the power would be one.

Objection 3: Nature is not deficient in what is necessary. But as was explained above (q. 49, a. 4), habits are necessary in order to operate well. Therefore, if some habits were from nature, it seems that nature would be deficient if it did not cause all the necessary habits. But this is clearly false. Therefore, habits are not from nature.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 6 [the Philosopher] posits, among the habits, the intellectual understanding of principles (*intellectus principiorum*), which is from nature—that is why the first principles are said to be 'naturally known'.

I respond: There are two ways in which something can be 'natural to a thing' (*naturale alicui*): (a) with respect to the nature of the *species*, in the way that it is natural to a man to be risible and natural to fire to be borne upwards; and (b) with respect to the nature of the *individual*, in the way that it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined toward health in accord with his own proper makeup.

Again, corresponding to both these senses of 'nature', there are two ways in which something can be called 'natural': (a) because it is *wholly from nature* (*totum est a natura*); and (b) because it is *from nature in one respect and from an exterior principle in another respect* (*secundum aliquid est a natura et secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio*). For instance, when someone is cured on his own (*per seipsum*), his health is wholly from nature, whereas when someone is cured with the aid of a medicine, his health is partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle.

So, then, if we are talking about a habit insofar as it is a subject's disposition with respect to a *form* or *nature*, then it is possible for a habit to be natural in any of the ways just mentioned. For instance, there are natural dispositions which are fitting for the human species and which no man is found outside of. And this sort of disposition is natural with respect to the nature of the species. But since a disposition in this sense has a certain latitude, it is possible for diverse degrees of this sort of disposition to belong to diverse men with respect to the nature of the individual. Moreover, a disposition of this sort can be either wholly from nature or partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle, as was explained above with respect to those who are cured by art.

On the other hand, a habit which is a disposition toward an *operation* and whose subject is a power of the soul, can, as has been explained, be natural both with respect to the nature of the species and also

with respect to the nature of the individual: (a) with respect to the nature of the species insofar as it is had by the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the principle of the species (*principium specificum*), and (b) with respect to the nature of the individual, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. But in neither way is it possible for there to be in men natural habits of this sort that are *wholly* from nature. By contrast, this *is* possible in angels, since they have intelligible species that they are naturally endowed with—something that, as was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 55, a. 2 and q. 84, a. 4), does not belong to the human soul.

Thus, in men there are some natural habits that are partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle, though this occurs in one way in the apprehensive powers and in another way in the appetitive powers.

In the apprehensive powers there are natural habits by way of a their *beginnings* (*secundum inchoationem*), natural habits with respect to the *nature of the species*, and natural habits with respect to the *nature of the individual*:

With respect to the nature of the *species* and on the part of the soul itself, intellective understanding of principles is said to be a natural habit. For by the very nature of the intellective soul it belongs to a man that, upon having a cognition of what a whole is and what a part is, he understands that every whole is greater than its part—and similarly for other cases. But he cannot know what a whole is and what a part is except through intelligible species taken from phantasms. And for this reason, at the end of the *Posterior Analytics*, the Philosopher shows that the cognition of principles comes to us from the senses.

With respect to the nature of the *individual* there are some cognitive habits that are natural by way of their *beginnings*. For one man, because of the disposition of his organs, is more apt than another man to understand well, insofar as the intellect's operation needs the sentient powers.

On the other hand, in the appetitive powers, on the part of the soul itself, there are natural habits by way of their *beginnings* not with respect to the very *substance* of a habit, but only with respect to certain *principles* of a habit, in the way that the principles of common law (*principia iuris communis*) are said to be 'seminal virtues'. And the reason for this is that an inclination toward proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, belongs not to the habit but rather to the very character of the powers (*non pertinet ad habitum sed magis pertinet ad ipsam rationem potentiarum*). By contrast, on the part of the body there are certain appetitive habits that are natural by way of their *beginnings*. For some are disposed by the proper makeup of their bodies toward chastity or mildness or something else of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: This objection has to do with nature insofar as nature is divided off from reason and will, even though reason and will themselves belong to a man's nature.

Reply to objection 2: Something can be added, even naturally, to a power and yet not be able to belong to the power in its own right (*ad ipsam potentiam*). For instance, in angels one cannot add to the intellective power itself that it should know all things *per se*, since then it would have to be an act with respect to all things—something that belongs only to God. For that by which something is known has to be an actual likeness of that which is known. Hence, it would follow that if an angel's intellective power knew all things in its own right (*per seipsam*), then it would be a likeness and actuality with respect to all things. Hence, what must be added to an angel's intellective power are intelligible species that are likenesses of the things understood, since it is by a participation in God's wisdom, and not through their own essence, that the angels' intellects can in actuality be the things that they understand. And in this way it is clear that not everything that belongs to a natural habit can belong to the relevant power.

Reply to objection 3: Nature is not equally positioned with respect to causing all the diversity in habits, since, as was explained above, some habits can be caused by nature and some cannot be. And so it does not follow that if some habits are natural, then all habits are natural.

Article 2

Can a habit be caused by an act?

It seems that no habit can be caused by an act:

Objection 1: As has been explained (q. 49, a. 1), a habit is a type of quality. But every quality is caused in a subject insofar as that subject is receptive to something. Therefore, since an agent, by the fact that it is acting, does not receive anything but rather emits something from itself, it seems that no habit can be generated in an agent by its own acts.

Objection 2: That in which a quality is caused is moved toward that quality, as is clear in the case of a thing that is being heated or cooled, whereas that which produces the act that causes a quality effects movement, as is clear in the case of that which effects heating or cooling. Therefore, if a habit were caused in a thing by the thing's own act, it would follow that the same thing is mover and moved, an agent and a patient. But as *Physics 7* says, this is impossible.

Objection 3: An effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But a habit is more noble than an act that precedes it; this is clear from the fact that a habit renders acts more noble. Therefore, a habit cannot be caused by any act that precedes the habit.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics 2* the Philosopher teaches that the habits of virtues and vices are caused by acts.

I respond: Within an agent there is sometimes just an active principle with respect to its act, in the way that within fire there is just the active principle for effecting heat. And in the case of this sort of agent there cannot be any habit that is caused by its own act; this is why, as *Ethics 2* says, natural entities cannot be habituated to anything or dishabituated from anything.

However, there are some agents within which there is both an active principle and a passive principle with respect to its own act; this is clear in the case of human acts. For acts of an appetitive power proceed from the appetitive power insofar as it is moved by an apprehensive power that is presenting an object; and, further, the intellective power, insofar as it is reasoning about conclusions, has as an active principle a proposition that is known in its own right (*per se notam*). Hence, habits can be caused in agents by acts such as these—not, to be sure, habits with respect to the first active principle, but rather habits with respect to the principle of the act that effects movement while being moved. For everything that is acted upon and moved by another is disposed by the agent's act, and from repeated acts (*ex multiplicatis actibus*) a certain quality is generated in the power that is passive and moved, and this quality is called a habit. For instance, habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers insofar as those powers are moved by reason, and habits of scientific knowledge are caused in the intellect insofar as it is moved by the first propositions.

Reply to objection 1: An agent does not receive anything insofar as it is an agent. But insofar as it acts while being moved by another, it receives something from what moves it; and this is how a habit is caused.

Reply to objection 2: The same thing, in the same respect, cannot be both mover and moved. But as *Physics 7* proves, nothing prevents the same thing from being moved by itself in diverse respects.

Reply to objection 3: An act that precedes the habit, insofar as it proceeds from an active principle, proceeds from a principle that is more noble than the generated habit. For instance, reason itself is a more noble principle than is the habit of a moral virtue generated in the appetitive power by a series of acts (*per actuum consuetudines*), and the understanding of principles is a more noble principle than the scientific knowledge of conclusions.

Article 3

Can a habit be generated by just a single act?

It seems that a habit can be generated by just a single act:

Objection 1: A demonstration is an act of reason. But scientific knowledge (*scientia*), which is a habit with respect to the conclusion, is caused by a single demonstration. Therefore, a habit can be caused by a single act.

Objection 2: Just as an act can increase by being multiplied (*per multiplicationem*), so, too, an act can increase by becoming more intense (*per intensionem*). But when acts are multiplied, a habit is generated. Therefore, likewise, if a single act is greatly intensified, then it will be able to be a cause that generates a habit.

Objection 3: Health and sickness are certain sorts of habit. But a man can either be healed or made sick by a single act. Therefore, a single act can cause a habit.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, “Just as a single swallow or a single day does not make a spring, so neither does a single day or a short time make a man blessed or happy.” But as *Ethics* 1 says, beatitude is an operation in accord with the habit of perfect virtue. Therefore, the habit of a virtue is not caused by just a single act—nor, for the same reason, is any other habit.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 2), a habit is generated by an act insofar as a passive power is moved by some active principle. Now in order for a quality to be caused in a passive principle, the active principle must totally overcome the passive principle (*totaliter vincat passivum*). Hence, we see that because a given fire cannot immediately overcome something combustible, it does not immediately make it burst into flame; instead, it drives the contrary dispositions away little by little, so that by totally overcoming the combustible thing in this way, it impresses its likeness on it.

Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason cannot totally overcome an appetitive power in a single act. For an appetitive power is related in diverse ways to many things, whereas through reason one judges in a single act that something is to be desired with respect to determinate characteristics and circumstances. Hence, the appetitive power is not totally overcome by this judgment in such a way as to be borne toward the same thing in most cases in the manner of a nature (*ut in pluribus per modum naturae*)—which is what belongs to the habit of a virtue. And so the habit of a virtue cannot be caused by just a single act, but is instead caused by many acts.

Notice, however, that in the apprehensive powers there are two passive principles—one is the possible or passive intellect itself (*intellectus possibilis*) and the other is what Aristotle calls the ‘passive intellect’, viz., particular reason, i.e., the cogitative power along with the powers of memory and imagination. With respect to the first passive principle, there can be an active principle that totally overcomes its corresponding passive power in a single act; for instance, a single proposition that is known in its own right (*una propositio per se nota*) convinces the intellect to assent firmly to a conclusion—something that a probable proposition cannot do. Hence, as far as the possible or passive intellect is concerned, a habit with respect to an opinion has to be caused by many acts of reason, even on the part of the possible or passive intellect, whereas a habit of scientific knowledge can be caused by just a single act of reason. By contrast, as regards the lower apprehensive powers, it is necessary for the same acts to be repeated many times in order to imprint something firmly in the memory. This is why, in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, the Philosopher says, “Meditation (*meditatio*) strengthens memory.”

On the other hand, it is possible for corporeal habits to be caused by a single act, if the active principle has great power; for instance, sometimes a strong medicine induces health immediately.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Are any habits infused into men by God?

It seems that no habits are infused into men by God:

Objection 1: God is related equally to everyone. Therefore, if He infused certain habits into some men, He would infuse them into all men. But this is obviously false.

Objection 2: God works in all things according to the mode that is fitting for their natures, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “It belongs to God’s providence to preserve the nature.” But as has been explained (a. 2), habits are caused in a man by his acts. Therefore, God does not cause any habits in a man without acts.

Objection 3: If a habit is infused by God, then by means of that habit a man is able to produce many acts. But a similar habit is caused by those acts, as *Ethics 2* claims. Therefore, it follows that two habits of the same species exist in the same man, the one acquired and the other infused. But this seems impossible, since two forms of a single species cannot exist in the same subject. Therefore, it is not the case that any habit is infused into a man by God.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 15:5 says, “The Lord filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding.” But wisdom and understanding are certain habits. Therefore, some habits are infused into a man by God.

I respond: There are two reasons why some habits are infused into a man by God.

The first reason is that there are some habits by which a man is well disposed toward an end that exceeds the power of human nature, and, as was explained above (q. 5, a. 5), this end is man’s ultimate and perfect beatitude. And since habits have to be proportioned to that toward which a man is disposed by them, it follows that there have to be habits that dispose him toward an end of the sort that exceeds the power of human nature. Hence, such habits can never exist in a man except by divine infusion, as is the case with all the virtues associated with grace (*sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus*).

The second reason is that, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 105, a. 6), God is able to produce the effects of secondary causes in the absence of those causes themselves. Thus, just as, in order to show His power, He sometimes produces health without a natural cause, so, too, in order to show His power, He sometimes infuses in a man even such habits as can be caused by his natural power. For instance, He gave to the Apostles knowledge of the Scriptures and of all languages—a knowledge that men can acquire through study and habituation, though not as perfectly.

Reply to objection 1: As regards His nature, God is equally related to everyone, but for a fixed reason, in accord with the order of His wisdom, He gives to some what He does not give to others.

Reply to objection 2: The fact that God works in all things according to their own mode does not rule out God’s doing certain things that their nature is unable to do. Rather, from fact in question it follows that He does nothing that is contrary to what is fitting for their nature.

Reply to objection 3: The acts that are produced by an infused habit do not cause any habit but instead strengthen the pre-existing habit, in the same way that medicine given to a man who is through his nature healthy does not cause health but instead strengthens the health that was had beforehand.

QUESTION 52

The Growth of Habits

Next we have to consider the growth or increase of habits (*de augmento habituum*). And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Do habits grow? (2) Do they grow by addition? (3) Does each act make a habit grow?

Article 1

Can habits grow?

It seems that habits cannot grow (*augeri non possint*):

Objection 1: As *Physics* 5 says, growth has to do with quantity. But habits are in the genus *quality* and not in the genus *quantity*. Therefore, there cannot be any growth with respect to them.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 7 says, a habit is a certain sort of perfection. But since perfection implies an end and terminus, it seems that it cannot admit of more and less. Therefore, habits cannot grow.

Objection 3: Alteration can occur in things that admit of more and less; for instance, what becomes more hot from having been less hot is said to be altered. But as *Physics* 7 proves, there is no alteration in the case of habits. Therefore, habits cannot grow.

But contrary to this: Faith is a habit and yet it grows. Hence, as Luke 17:5 has it, the disciples say to our Lord, “Lord, increase our faith.” Therefore, habits grow.

I respond: Growth, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from corporeal quantities to intelligible spiritual realities—and this because of our intellect’s connaturality with corporeal realities, which fall under the imagination.

Now in the case of corporeal quantities, something is called large insofar as it attains the appropriate completion of its quantity (*ad debitam perfectionem quantitatis perducitur*), and this is why some quantities are thought of as large in a man which are not thought of as large in an elephant. Hence, in the case of forms we likewise say that something is large from the fact that it is perfect or complete (*perfectum*). And since *good* has the character of what is perfect, it follows that, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 6, “In things which are not great in quantity, to be bigger is the same as being better.”

Now there are two ways in which the perfection or completion (*perfectio*) of a form can be thought of: in one way, with respect to the *form itself*, and, in the second way, with respect to the *subject’s participation in the form* (*secundum quod subiectum participat formam*).

Thus, as regards the perfection of the form with respect to the *form itself*, the form itself is said to be *little* or *great* (*parva vel magna*), e.g., little or great health or scientific knowledge. On the other hand, as regards the perfection of the form with respect to the *subject’s participation*, it is said to be *more* or *less*, e.g., a thing is more or less white or more or less healthy. Now the basis for this distinction is not that the form has *esse* outside of its matter or subject, but rather that it is one thing to think of the form with respect to *the character of its species* (*secundum rationem speciei suae*) and another to think of it insofar as it is *participated in by a subject* (*secundum quod participatur in subiecto*).

Accordingly, as Simplicius reports in his commentary on the *Categories*, philosophers have held four opinions regarding the intensification and remission of habits and forms (*circa intensionem et remissionem habituum et formarum*).

Plotinus and other Platonists claimed that the qualities and habits themselves admit of more and less, since they are material, and on this score they possess a certain indeterminacy because of the limitlessness of matter.

By contrast, others claimed to the contrary that the qualities and habits do not in their own right (*secundum se*) admit of more and less, but are such that they are called more or less because of the diverse participations; for instance, it is not justice but the just thing that is said to be more just or less

just. Aristotle touches on this opinion in the *Categories*.

The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and it lies between the first two. For they claimed that some habits, e.g., the arts, admit of more and less in their own right, whereas others, e.g., the virtues, do not.

The fourth opinion belonged to those who claimed that immaterial qualities and forms do not admit of more and less, whereas material qualities and forms do.

Therefore, in order for the truth of the matter to be made clear, notice that what a thing receives its species from must be fixed and stable and, as it were, indivisible (*fixum et stans et quasi indivisibile*); for whatever attains to it is contained under the species, whereas whatever departs from it—whether by going beyond it or by falling short of it (*vel in plus vel in minus*)—belongs to some other species, either a more perfect species or a less perfect species. This is why the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 8 that the species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction varies the species. Therefore, if a form, or anything whatsoever, whether in its own right or because of something that belongs to it (*secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui*), receives the nature of a species, then it must, considered in its own right, have a determinate nature (*habeat determinatam rationem*), which it cannot go beyond or fall short of. Things of this sort include (a) heat and whiteness and other such qualities that are not said in relation to anything else, and (b), all the more, substance, which is a being *per se*.

By contrast, things that receive their species from something to which they are ordered or related (*ad quod ordinantur*) can in their own right be diversified with respect to going beyond or falling short (*in plus vel in minus*) and yet remain the same in species—and this because of the oneness of that to which they are ordered and from which they receive their species. For instance, a movement is in its own right more intense or less intense (*intensior et remissior*) and yet it remains the same in species because of the oneness of its terminus, from which it receives its species. And the same thing can be seen in the case of health. For a body attains the nature of health insofar as it has a disposition that is fitting for an animal's nature, for which diverse dispositions can be fitting. Hence, the disposition can vary with respect to going beyond and falling short (*potest variari in plus vel in minus*), and yet all the while the nature of health remains. This is why, in *Ethics* 10, the Philosopher says, "Health itself admits of more and less (*recipit magis et minus*), since the measure is not the same in all individuals, nor is it always the same in one and the same individual; but even when it diminishes (*remissa*), it remains health up to a certain point." Now the diverse dispositions or measures of health are related as what goes beyond and what is gone beyond; hence, if the name 'health' were imposed only on the most perfect balance (*soli perfectissimae commensurationi*), then health itself would not be said to be more or less.

So, then, it is clear how some qualities or forms can grow or diminish in their own right (*secundum seipsam*) and some cannot.

On the other hand, if we think of a quality or form with respect to the *subject's participation*, then we again find that some qualities and forms admit of more and less (*magis et minus*) and some do not. Now Simplicius gives as the reason for this diversity the fact that a substance cannot in its own right admit of more and less, because it is a being *per se*. And so every form that a subject participates in substantially (*substantialiter participatur in subiecto*) lacks growth and diminution (*caret intensione et remissione*); hence, in the genus *substance* there is nothing predicated as more and less (*secundum magis et minus*). And since *quantity* is close to *substance* and *shape* (*figura*) likewise follows upon *quantity*, it follows that nothing is said as more or less (*secundum magis et minus*) in the case of these things, either. This is why the Philosopher says in *Physics* 7 that when something receives form and shape, it is said not to be altered but rather to come to be (*non dicitur alterari sed magis fieri*).

By contrast, other qualities which are more distant from *substance* and which are associated with actions and passions admit of more and less (*magis et minus*) with respect to the subject's participation. The reason for this diversity can be explained still further. For as has been said, that from which a thing has its species must remain fixed and stable in what is indivisible.

Therefore, there are two ways in which it can happen that a form is not more and less participated in:

First, because that which participates has the species in its own right (*secundum seipsam*). And this is why no substantial form is more or less participated in. It is for this reason that the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 8 that just as a number does not admit of more and less, so neither does a substance taken with respect to its species, i.e., with respect to its participation in the form of its species. On the other hand, if it is taken with respect to its matter, i.e., with respect to its material dispositions, then more and less is found in a substance.

Second, it can happen because indivisibility is itself part of the nature of the form, and hence it has to be the case that if something participates in that form, it participates in it with the character of indivisibility. And this is why the species of *number* are not predicated according to more and less; for each of the species in *number* is constituted by an indivisible unity. And the same explanation holds in the case of (a) the species of *continuous quantity* which are taken from numbers, such as *two-cubit* and *three-cubit*, and (b) *relations* such as *double* and *triple*, and (c) *shapes* such as *three-sided* and *four-sided*. And this is the explanation that Aristotle gives in the *Categories*, when, explaining why *shape* does not admit of more and less, he says, “Things that receive the natures *three-sided* and *circular* are, likewise, *three-sided* and *circles*,” viz., because indivisibility belongs to their very nature, and so whatever participates in their nature has to participate in it in an indivisible way.

So, then, it is clear that since, as *Physics* 7 says, habits and dispositions are said in relation to something, there are two sorts of growth and diminution to be considered in the case of habits and dispositions. The first way is *in their own right* (*secundum se*), in the way that there is said to be greater or lesser health (*maior vel minor sanitas*), or greater or lesser scientific knowledge (*maior vel minor scientia*) in the sense that it extends to more or fewer things. The second way is *in accord with the subject's participation*, viz., in the way that an equal health or knowledge is received in one individual to a greater degree (*magis*) than in another, corresponding to their aptitudes, which are diverse either by nature or because of habituation. For habits and dispositions do not give a species to their subject; nor, again, do they include indivisibility in their nature.

It will be explained below (q. 66, a. 1) how this applies to the case of the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Just as the name ‘magnitude’ is transferred from corporeal quantities to the intelligible perfections of forms, so, too, with the name ‘growth’ or ‘increase’ (*nomen augmenti*), whose terminus is ‘great’ or ‘big’ (*magnum*).

Reply to objection 2: A habit is a certain perfection, but not a perfection of the sort that is its subject's terminus, i.e., that gives its subject the *esse* of a species (*esse specificum*). Nor does a habit include a terminus in its notion, in the way that the species of numbers do. Hence, nothing prevents a habit from admitting of more and less.

Reply to objection 3: Alteration is, to be sure, included among the qualities of the third species. But there can be alteration in qualities of the first species in a derivative way (*per posterius*). For instance, when an alteration occurs in heat and coldness, what results is that an animal is altered with respect to being healthy and being sick. Similarly, when an alteration takes place in the passions of the sentient appetite, or in the sentient apprehensive powers, then, as *Physics* 7 says, what follows is an alteration in the virtues and in scientific knowledge.

Article 2

Is the growth of a habit effected by addition?

It seems that the increase of a habit is effected by addition:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), the name ‘growth’ or ‘increase’ (*augmentum*) is transferred from corporeal quantities to forms. But in corporeal quantities there is no growth without addition; hence, *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1 it says. “Growth is an addition to a pre-existing magnitude.” Therefore, with habits it is likewise the case that there is no growth except through addition.

Objection 2: A habit is increased only by an agent. But every agent brings something about in a subject that is acted upon (*in subiecto patiente*), in the way that what effects heat brings about heat in the very thing that is heated. Therefore, there cannot be growth or increase unless some addition is made.

Objection 3: Just as what is not white is in potentiality to being white, so, too, what is less white is in potentiality to being more white. But what is not white becomes white only by the advent of whiteness. Therefore, what is less white does not become more white unless another whiteness is added to it (*nisi per aliquam albedinem supervenientem*).

But contrary to this: In *Physics* 4 the Philosopher says, “What is more hot comes from what is hot, without any hot thing being made in the matter that was not hot when the thing was less hot.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning, there is no addition in other forms that grow or increase, either.

I respond: The reply to this question depends on what was said above. For it was explained above (a. 1) that there is one way in which growth and diminution in forms that grow and diminution does not occur on the part of the form itself considered in its own right, but instead occurs because of diverse participations on the part of the subject. And so growth of this sort in habits and other forms does not occur through the addition of one form to another form, but instead occurs through the subject’s participating more or less perfectly in one and the same form. And just as, through an agent that is acting (*per agens quod est actu*), something becomes actually hot—not in the sense that it becomes the form itself, but in the sense that, as *Metaphysics* 7 proves, it begins to participate *de novo* in the form—so, too, through the agent’s increased action (*per intensam actionem*), that thing becomes more hot—not in the sense that something is added to the form, but in the sense that the thing participates in the form more perfectly.

For if it were through addition that one understood growth of this sort in the forms, then the addition would not be possible except (a) on the part of the form itself or (b) on the part of the subject. But if the addition were on the part of the form itself, then it has already been explained that such an addition or subtraction would vary the species, in the way that the species of color varies when something becomes white from having been pale. On the other hand, if this addition were understood to be on the part of the subject, then this would be possible only because either (a) some part of the subject which previously did not have the form now receives the form, as when coldness is said to increase in a man who was cold in one part beforehand when he now becomes cold in more parts, or (b) some other subject that participates in the same form is added, as when something hot is added to what is hot, or something white is added to what is white. However, in each of these two modes, the thing in question would not be called *more white* or *more hot*, but would instead be called a *bigger white thing* or a *bigger hot thing* (*non dicitur magis album vel calidum, sed maius*).

Still, because, as has been explained (a. 1), certain accidents grow or increase in their own right, increase can take place in some of them through addition. For instance, a movement is increased by something’s being added to it, either with respect to the temporal interval in which it exists or with respect to the path it exists in, and yet its species remains the same because of the oneness of its terminus. However, movements are likewise increased because of the subject’s participation, viz., insofar as the same movement can be done either more or less quickly or promptly. Similarly, scientific knowledge can likewise grow in its own right through addition; for instance, when someone learns more conclusions in geometry, what grows in him is a habit of the same knowledge in species. However, the knowledge likewise grows in an individual with respect to the subject’s participation, through intensity (*per intensionem*), viz., insofar as one man thinks about the same conclusions more quickly and more clearly than another.

Now in the case of corporeal habits, it does not much seem that they grow through addition. For an animal is not said to be healthy or beautiful, absolutely speaking, unless it is healthy or beautiful with respect to all its parts. And the fact that it reaches a more perfect commensuration is due to changes in its simple qualities, which grow increased only through intensity on the part of the subject that is participating in them.

Now it will be explained below (q. 66, a. 1) how this applies to the case of the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Even in the case of corporeal magnitude, there are two ways in which growth can occur. In one way, through the addition of one subject to another, as is the case with growth in living things. In a second way, solely through intensification without any addition, as occurs in things subject to rarefaction (*in his quae rarefiunt*), according to *Physics* 4.

Reply to objection 2: A cause that increases a habit always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. Rather, it brings it about that the subject participates more perfectly in a pre-existing form or that the subject extends itself more fully.

Reply to objection 3: What is not yet white is in potentiality with respect to the form itself insofar as it does not yet have the form, and so the agent causes a new form in the subject. By contrast, what is less hot or less white is not in potentiality with respect to the form, since it already has the form in actuality; instead, it is in potentiality with respect to a perfect mode of participation. And this is what follows upon the agent's action.

Article 3

Does each act make a habit grow?

It seems that each act make a habit grow:

Objection 1: When a cause is multiplied, its effect is multiplied. But as was explained above (q. 51, a. 2), acts are the cause of some habits. Therefore, a habit is increased whenever the acts are multiplied.

Objection 2: The same judgment is made about similar things. But as *Ethics* 2 explains, all the acts that proceed from the same habit are similar. Therefore, if some of the acts make the habit grow, then each of the acts makes the habit grow.

Objection 3: What is similar is made to grow by what is similar. But each act is similar to the habit from which it proceeds. Therefore, each act makes the habit grow.

But contrary to this: The same thing is not a cause of contrary effects. But as *Ethics* 2 says, some acts that proceed from a habit diminish the habit, because they are done carelessly (*negligenter*). Therefore, it is not the case that each act increases the habit.

I respond: As *Ethics* 2 says, similar acts cause similar habits. However, similarity and dissimilarity have to do not only with the same or diverse qualities, but also with the same or diverse modes of participation. For instance, not only is *black* dissimilar to *white*, but *less white* is also dissimilar to *more white*; for as *Physics* 5 points out, the movement from *less white* to *more white* is also like a movement from one opposite to another.

However, since, as was explained above (q. 50, a. 5), the *use* of habits consists in a man's act of willing (*in voluntate hominis consistit*), it follows that just as it is possible for someone who has a habit not to use that habit or even to do an act contrary to it, so, too, it is likewise possible for him to use the habit with an act that does not correspond proportionately to the habit's intensity. Therefore, if the act's intensity proportionately equals the habit's intensity or even exceeds its intensity, then each such act either makes the habit grow or disposes one toward its growing. The result is that we speak of the growth of habits in a way similar to an animal's growth. For not every instance of food that is actually

taken makes the animal grow, just as not every drop of water hollows out a rock; instead, as the food is multiplied, the growth comes in the end. So, too, as the acts are multiplied, the habit grows.

However, if the act's intensity falls proportionately short of the habit's intensity, then such an act does not dispose one toward the growth of the habit, but rather disposes one toward a diminution in the habit.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from this.

QUESTION 53

The Corruption and Diminution of Habits

Next we have to consider the corruption and diminution of habits (*de corruptione et diminutione habituum*). And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Can a habit be corrupted? (2) Can a habit be diminished? (3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?

Article 1

Can a habit be corrupted?

It seems that a habit cannot be corrupted (*corrumpi non possint*):

Objection 1: A habit inheres like a nature (*inest sicut natura*); this is why operations in accord with a habit are delightful. But a nature is not corrupted as long as the thing whose nature it is remains. Therefore, neither can a habit be corrupted as long as its subject remains.

Objection 2: Every instance of a form's being corrupted is effected either by the corruption of its subject or by some contrary; for instance, sickness is corrupted either when the animal is corrupted or when health supervenes. But scientific knowledge, which is a certain habit, cannot be corrupted by the corruption of its subject, since, as *De Anima* 1 says, "The intellect," which is the subject of scientific knowledge, "is a sort of substance and is not corrupted." Similarly, it cannot be corrupted by any contrary, since, as *Metaphysics* 7 says, intelligible species are not contrary to one another. Therefore, a habit of scientific knowledge can in no way be corrupted.

Objection 3: Every instance of corruption occurs through some movement. But a habit of scientific knowledge, which exists in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a *per se* movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved *per se*, but is instead moved *per accidens* through the body's movement. But no corporeal change seems able to corrupt the intelligible species that exist in the intellect, since the intellect is in its own right (*per se*), without the body, a locus of species, and this is why it is claimed that intellect's habits cannot be corrupted either by old age or by death. Therefore, scientific knowledge cannot be corrupted. And, consequently, neither can the habit of a virtue, which likewise exists in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, "The virtues are more permanent than the scientific disciplines (*virtutes sunt permanentiores disciplinis*)."

But contrary to this: In *De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae* the Philosopher says, "Forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of scientific knowledge." Again, by sinning one loses the habit of a virtue. And, as *Ethics* 2 says, the virtues are generated and corrupted by contrary acts.

I respond: A form is said to be corrupted in its own right (*secundum se*) by its contrary, whereas it is said to be corrupted *per accidens* by the corruption of its subject.

Therefore, if there is a habit whose subject is corruptible and whose cause has a contrary, then it can be corrupted in either of these ways, as is clear in the case of corporeal habits, e.g., health and sickness.

By contrast, habits whose subject is incorruptible cannot be corrupted *per accidens*. Still, there are certain habits such that even though they exist principally in an incorruptible subject, nonetheless exist secondarily in a corruptible subject, e.g., a habit of scientific knowledge, which, as was explained above (q. 50, a. 3), exists principally in the passive intellect and secondarily in the sentient apprehensive powers. And so on the part of the passive intellect, a habit of scientific knowledge cannot be corrupted *per accidens*; instead, it can be corrupted only on the part of the lower sentient powers.

Therefore, we have to think about whether habits of this sort can be corrupted *per se*. Thus, if there is a habit that has a contrary, either on its own part or on the part of its cause, then it will be able to be corrupted *per se*, whereas if it does not have a contrary, then it will not be able to be corrupted *per se*.

Now it is clear that an intelligible species that exists in the passive intellect does not have any

contrary. Nor, again, can there be any contrary to the agent intellect, which is a cause of the intelligible species. Hence, if there is a habit in the passive intellect that is caused immediately by the agent intellect, then such a habit is incorruptible both *per se* and *per accidens*. Now there are habits of this sort with respect to both speculative and practical first principles, and these habits cannot be corrupted by any sort of forgetfulness or deception—just as, in *Ethics* 6, the Philosopher says of prudence that “it cannot be lost through forgetfulness (*per oblivionem*).”

On the other hand, there is a certain habit in the passive intellect that are caused by reason, viz., a habit with respect to conclusions, which is called scientific knowledge (*scientia*) and the cause of which can have a contrary in two ways. In one way, on the part of the very propositions (*propositiones*) on the basis of which reason proceeds; for instance, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, the proposition (*enununtiatio*) *The good is not good* is contrary to the proposition *The good is good*. In the second way, with respect to the very process of reasoning (*quantum ad ipsum processum rationis*), in the way that a sophistical syllogism is opposed to a dialectical syllogism or a demonstrative syllogism. So, then, it is clear that a habit of true opinion, or even a habit of scientific knowledge, can be corrupted by false reasoning (*per falsam rationem*). That is why the Philosopher claims, as was said above, that deception is the corruption of scientific knowledge. Now as *Ethics* 6 says, certain virtues, which exist in reason itself, are intellectual virtues, and the same explanation that holds for scientific knowledge or opinion holds for them as well.

By contrast, some virtues, viz., the moral virtues, exist in the appetitive part of the soul, and the same explanation holds for their opposite vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused by reason’s capacity to move the appetitive parts. Hence, the habit of a virtue or of a vice is corrupted by reason’s judgment effecting a contrary movement in some way or other—namely, out of ignorance or from passion or even by choice.

Reply to objection 1: As *Ethics* 7 says, a habit bears a similarity to a nature, and yet it falls short of being a nature. And so given that there is *no way* in which a nature can be removed from a thing, it is *with difficulty* that a habit is removed.

Reply to objection 2: Even though there is nothing contrary to the intelligible species, still, as has been explained, there can be something contrary to the propositions and to the process of reasoning.

Reply to objection 3: Scientific knowledge is removed by a corporeal movement not with respect to the very root of the habit, but only with respect to an impediment to the act, and this insofar as the intellect in its own act needs the sentient powers, which are impeded by corporeal changes. However, it is even with respect to the very root of the habit that a habit of scientific knowledge can be corrupted by an intelligible movement of reason. And the habit of a virtue can likewise be corrupted in a similar way.

However, the claim that virtues are more permanent than the scientific disciplines should be understood to apply not to the subject or to the cause, but rather to the act. For the use of the virtues, but not the use of the disciplines, is continuous through all of one’s life.

Article 2

Can a habit be diminished?

It seems that a habit cannot be diminished (*diminui non possit*):

Objection 1: A habit is a quality and simple form. But what is simple is possessed as a whole and is lost as a whole. Therefore, even if a habit can be corrupted, it cannot be diminished.

Objection 2: What belongs to an accident belongs to it either in its own right (*secundum se*) or by reason of its subject. Now a habit does not increase and decrease in its own right (*secundum seipsum non intenditur et remittitur*); otherwise, it would follow that a species is predicated of its individuals as more

and less. Therefore, if it could be diminished with respect to the subject's participation, it would follow that something proper accedes to the habit that is not common to it and the subject. Now if something proper belongs to a form over and beyond its subject, then, as *De Anima* 1 says, that form is separable. Therefore, it follows that a habit is a separable form—which is impossible.

Objection 3: The notion and nature of a habit, just as of any accident, consists in its being united to its subject (*in concretionem ad subiectum*), and this is why every accident is defined through its subject. Therefore, if a habit does not increase or decrease in its own right (*secundum seipsum*), then, likewise, it cannot be diminished with respect to its union with its subject. And so there is no way in which a habit is diminished.

But contrary to this: Contraries are apt to affect the same thing. But growth and diminution are contraries. Therefore, since a habit can grow, it seems that a habit can likewise be diminished.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 52, a. 1), there are two ways in which habits are diminished, just as there are two ways in which they grow. And just as they grow by the same cause by which they are generated, so they are diminished by the same cause by which they are corrupted. For diminution is a path toward corruption, just as, conversely, the generation of a habit is the foundation for its growth.

Reply to objection 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form and diminution does not happen to it on this score. Rather, diminution happens to it because of a diversified mode of participation that stems from the indeterminacy of the power itself, which is able to participate in diverse ways in a single form, or which is able to extend itself to more or fewer things.

Reply to objection 2: This argument is based on the assumption that the very essence of a habit is not in any way diminished. But we do not claim this. Rather, we claim that a sort of diminution of a habit's essence has its source not in the habit, but in the one participating in the habit.

Reply to objection 3: No matter how an accident is signified, it has by its very nature a dependence on its subject, though in different ways.

For an accident signified in the *abstract* implies a relation to the subject that begins from the accident and is terminated in the subject; for instance, *whiteness* is defined as *that by which something is white* (*albedo dicitur qua aliquid est album*). And so in the definition of an accident taken as abstract (*in definitione accidentis abstracti*) the subject is posited not as the first part, i.e., the genus, of the definition, but instead as the second part, i.e., the difference. For instance, we define *snubnosedness* as *the curvature of the nose*.

By contrast, in the case of the *concrete* terms, the relation begins from the subject and is terminated in the accident. Because of this, in the definition of an accident [taken in the concrete] the subject is posited as the genus, i.e., the first part of the definition; for instance, we say that what is *snubbed* is a *nose that is curved*.

So, then, what belongs to accidents because of the subject (*ex parte subiecti*), and not by the very nature of the accident, is attributed to the accident in the *concrete* and not in the *abstract*. And it is in certain accidents of this sort that there is increase and decrease (*intensio et remissio*); this is why it is a *white thing*, and not *whiteness*, that is said to be more or less white.

The same explanation holds for the case of habits and other qualities—except for the fact that, as is clear from what was said above (q. 52, a. 2), some habits grow and diminish through a certain sort of addition.

Article 3

Is a habit corrupted or diminished just by a cessation from its acts?

It seems that a habit is not corrupted or diminished just by a cessation from its acts (*per solam cessationem ab opere*):

Objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (q. 49, a. 2 and q. 50, a. 1), habits are more permanent than passive qualities (*passibiles qualitates*). But passive qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by a cessation from their acts; for instance, whiteness is not diminished if it is not affecting anyone's sight, and heat is not diminished if it is not effecting heat in anything. Therefore, neither is it the case that habits are diminished or corrupted by a cessation from their acts.

Objection 2: Corruption and diminution are changes. But nothing is changed without some cause effecting the movement (*absque aliqua causa movente*). Therefore, since a cessation from acts does not imply any cause that effects movement, it does not seem that the diminution or corruption of a habit can occur because of a cessation from its acts.

Objection 3: Habits of scientific knowledge and virtue exist in the intellectual soul, which is beyond time (*est supra tempus*). But things that are beyond time are not corrupted or diminished by a long temporal duration. Therefore, habits of this sort are not corrupted or diminished, either, if they persist for a long time without being exercised.

But contrary to this: In *De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae* the Philosopher says that the corruption of scientific knowledge comes not only from deception but also from forgetfulness. And in *Ethics* 8 it says that a lack of interaction (*inappellatio*) dissolves many friendships. And for the same reason, other habits of the virtues are diminished or destroyed by a cessation from their acts.

I respond: As *Physics* 8 says, there are two ways in which something can effect a movement. One way is *per se*, i.e., by effecting a movement in accord with the nature of its proper form, in the way that fire effects heat. The other way is *per accidens*, as in the case of something that removes an obstacle.

It is in this latter way that a cessation from their acts causes the corruption or diminution of habits, viz., insofar as what is removed is an act that poses an obstacle to the causes that corrupt or diminish the habit. For it has been explained (a. 1) that habits are corrupted or diminished *per se* by a contrary agent. Hence, if any habit is such that its contraries grow over the course of time (*subcrescunt per temporis tractum*) and have to be counteracted (*oportet subtrahi*) by acts that proceed from the habit, then this sort of habit is diminished or even totally destroyed by a long cessation from its acts—as is clear in the case of scientific knowledge and of virtue.

For it is clear that the habit of a moral virtue makes a man prompt in choosing the mean in his operations and passions. But when one does not use the habit of a virtue to moderate his passions or operations, then many passions and operations outside of the mode of the virtue necessarily arise from the inclinations of the sentient appetite and of other things that effect movement from the outside. This is why the virtue is corrupted or diminished by a cessation from its acts.

Something similar happens as well with the intellectual virtues, in accord with which a man is prompt in judging correctly about things he has in his imagination (*de imaginatis*). Therefore, when a man stops using an intellectual habit, things arise in the imagination that are extraneous and sometimes lead to the contrary (*insurgunt imaginationes extraneae et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes*), so that, unless these extraneous imaginings are in some way cut off or restrained by the frequent use of the intellectual habit, the man is rendered less apt to judge correctly and sometimes becomes totally disposed toward the contrary. And in this way an intellectual habit is diminished or even corrupted by a cessation from its acts.

Reply to objection 1: Heat is likewise corrupted in the same way by a cessation from effecting heat if, because of this cessation, coldness, which corrupts heat, increases.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, the cessation from an act effects a movement toward corruption or diminution in the sense that it removes an obstacle to the corruption or diminution.

Reply to objection 3: The intellective part of the soul is in its own right (*secundum se*) beyond time, but the sentient part is subject to time. And so through the course of time the soul changes with respect to the passions of the appetitive part and also with respect to the apprehensive powers. This is why the Philosopher says in *Physics* 4 that time is a cause of forgetfulness.

QUESTION 54

The Distinctions among Habits

Next we have to consider the distinctions among habits (*de distinctione habituum*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Can there be many habits in a single power? (2) Are habits distinguished by their objects? (3) Are habits distinguished by *good* and *bad*? (4) Is one habit constituted from many habits?

Article 1

Can there be many habits in a single power?

It seems that there cannot be many habits in a single power:

Objection 1: Things that are distinguished by the same thing (*secundum idem distinguuntur*) are such that when the one is multiplied, the other is likewise multiplied. But powers and habits are distinguished by same thing, viz., by their acts and objects. Therefore, they are multiplied in similar ways. Therefore, there cannot be many habits in a single power.

Objection 2: A power (*potentia*) is a certain simple capacity (*virtus quaedam simplex*). But there cannot be a diversity of accidents in a single simple subject; for the subject is a cause of its accident, and it seems that only one thing can proceed from a single simple thing. Therefore, there cannot be many habits in a single power.

Objection 3: Just as a body is formed by its shape (*formatur per figuram*), so a power is formed by its habit. But a single body cannot be formed by diverse shapes at the same time. Therefore, neither can a single power be formed by diverse habits at the same time. Therefore, it is impossible that many habits should exist in a single power at the same time.

But contrary to this: The intellect is a single power, and yet habits with respect to diverse sciences exist in it (*in qua sunt diversarum scientiarum habitus*).

I respond: As was explained above (q. 49, a. 4), habits are certain dispositions of that which exists in potentiality with respect to something, either a *nature* or else an *operation* or *end*.

As regards those habits that are dispositions with respect to a *nature*, it is clear that many habits can exist in a single subject because the parts of the single subject can be thought of in different ways, and the habits are defined by the disposition of those parts. For instance, if one thinks of those parts of the human body that are humors, then, insofar as they are disposed in accord with human nature, there is the habit or disposition of *health*, whereas if one thinks of the parts that are similar, such as nerves and bones and flesh, then their disposition in relation to the nature is *physical strength* or *leanness* (*fortitudo aut macies*), and if one thinks of the limbs such as the hands and the feet and others of this sort, then their being disposed in a way appropriate to the nature is handsomeness or beauty (*pulchritudo*).

On the other hand, if we are talking about those habits which are dispositions with respect to *actions* (*ad opera*) and which properly belong to powers, then it is likewise possible for many habits to belong to a single power. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (q. 51, a. 2), the subject of a habit is a passive power, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 51, a. 2), a power that is exclusively active (*activa tantum*) is not the subject of any habit. But a passive power is related to a determinate act of a single species in the way that matter is related to form, since just as matter is determined to a single form by a single agent, so, too, a passive power is determined by the nature of a single object of action (*a ratione unius obiecti activi*) to acts that are one in species (*ad unum actum secundum speciem*). Hence, just as many objects can move a passive power, so a single passive power can be the subject of acts and perfections that are diverse in species. But habits are certain qualities or forms which inhere in a power and by which the power is inclined toward acts that are determinate in species (*ad determinatos actus secundum speciem*). Hence, many habits can belong to a single power,

just as many acts that differ in species can belong to a single power.

Reply to objection 1: Just as in natural things, according to *Metaphysics* 5, the diversity of species corresponds to form whereas the diversity of genera corresponds to matter (for things that are diverse in genus are such that their matter is diverse), so, too, the diversity of objects with respect to *genus* makes for a distinction among *powers* (which is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, “Things that differ in genus likewise belong to different parts of the soul”), whereas the diversity of objects with respect to *species* makes for diverse species of *acts* and, consequently, of *habits*.

Now if things are diverse in genus, then they are also diverse in species, but not vice versa. And so diverse powers have acts that are diverse in species and habits that are diverse in species, but it is not necessary for diverse habits to belong to diverse powers; instead, many habits can belong to a single power. And just as there are genera of genera and species of species, so, too, there can be diverse species of habits and powers.

Reply to objection 2: Even if a power is simple with respect to its essence, it is nonetheless virtually multiple (*multiplex virtute*) insofar as it extends itself to many acts that differ in species. And so nothing prevents a single power from having many habits that differ in species.

Reply to objection 3: A body is formed by a shape in the sense that the shape properly terminates it, whereas a habit is not the termination of a power, but is instead a disposition toward an act, which is the ultimate terminus. And so it is impossible for many acts to belong to a single power at the same time, except insofar as the one is included under the other, just as it is impossible for many shapes to belong to a single body, except insofar as the one exists within the other, in the way that a three-sided figure exists within a four-sided figure. For the intellect cannot have actual intellectual understanding of many things at the same time (cf. *ST* 1, q. 85, a.4), and yet it can know many things habitually at the same time.

Article 2

Are habits distinguished by their objects?

It seems that habits are not distinguished by their objects (*non distinguantur secundum obiecta*):

Objection 1: Contraries differ in species. But contraries fall under the same habit of scientific knowledge; for instance, health and sickness fall under medicine (*medicina est sani et aegri*). Therefore, habits are not distinguished by objects that differ in species.

Objection 2: Diverse sorts of scientific knowledge (*diversae scientiae*) are diverse habits. But the same knowable thing belongs to diverse sciences, in the way that, as *Physics* 2 says, both the natural philosopher (*naturalis*) and the astronomer (*astrologus*) demonstrate that the earth is round. Therefore, habits are not distinguished by their objects.

Objection 3: The same act has the same object. But the same act can belong to diverse habits of the virtues if it is related to diverse ends; for instance, if an act of giving money to someone is for the sake of God, then it belongs to charity, whereas if it is for the sake of paying a debt, then it belongs to justice. Therefore, it can likewise be the case that the same object belongs to diverse habits. Therefore, the diversity of habits does not correspond to the diversity of objects.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (q. 18, a. 5), acts differ in species because of the diversity of their objects. But habits are dispositions with respect to acts. Therefore, habits are likewise distinguished by diverse objects.

I respond: A habit is both a certain form and also a habit. Therefore, the distinction in species among habits can be looked at either (a) in the common manner in which forms are distinguished in species or (b) in a manner proper to the distinction among habits.

Now *forms* are distinguished from one another by their diverse *active principles*, because every

agent effects what is similar to it in species.

On the other hand, *habit* implies a relation to something. But all things that are predicated (*dicuntur*) with an ordering toward something are distinguished according to the distinction among the things with respect to which they are predicated. Now a habit is a certain disposition ordered toward two things, viz., a *nature* and an *operation* that follows upon the nature.

So, then, there are three things by which habits are distinguished in species. In one way, they are distinguished by the *active principles* of dispositions of this sort. In a second way, they are distinguished with respect to a *nature*. And in a third way, they are distinguished by their *objects*, which differ in species. This be explained in what follows

Reply to objection 1: In distinguishing powers, or even habits, what needs to be thought about is not the object taken materially (*non est considerandum ipsum obiectum materialiter*), but the notion (*ratio*) of the object as differing in species or even in genus.

Now even though contraries differ in species by a diversity among *things* (*differant diversitate rerum*), it is the same *notion* (*ratio*) by which one has cognition of the two of them, since the one contrary is known through the other. And so insofar as contraries agree in a single notion by which one has cognition of them (*in una ratione cognoscibilis*), they belong to the same cognitive habit.

Reply to objection 2: The natural philosopher demonstrates that the earth is round through one middle term and the astronomer demonstrates it through another middle term. For the astronomer demonstrates it through a mathematical middle term, e.g., through the shapes of eclipses or something else of this sort, whereas the natural philosopher demonstrates it through a natural middle term, e.g., through the movement of heavy things toward the middle [of the earth] or something else of this sort. Now as *Posterior Analytics* 1 says, the whole power of a demonstration, which is “a syllogism producing scientific knowledge (*sylogismus faciens scire*),” depends on the middle term. And so diverse middle terms are like diverse active principles by which the habits of scientific knowledge are diversified.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2 and *Ethics* 7, in practical matters the end is like a principle in demonstrative matters. And so a diversity of ends diversifies the virtues in the same way that a diversity of active principles does. Again, as is clear from what was said above (q. 18, a. 6 and q. 19, a. 2, and q. 34, a. 4), the ends themselves are objects of interior acts, which are especially relevant to the virtues.

Article 3

Are habits distinguished by *good* and *bad*?

It seems that habits are not distinguished by *good* (*bonum*) and *bad* (*malum*):

Objection 1: *Good* and *bad* are contraries. But as was established above (a. 2), contraries fall under the same habit (*idem habitus est contrariorum*). Therefore, habits are not distinguished by *good* and *bad*.

Objection 2: *Good* is convertible with *being* (*ens*), and so, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Topics* 4, since *good* is common to all things, it cannot be taken as the difference of any species. Similarly, since *bad* is a privation and a non-being, it cannot be the difference of any being. Therefore, habits cannot be distinguished in species by *good* and *bad*.

Objection 3: There can be diverse bad habits with respect to the same object, e.g., intemperance and insensibility with respect to sense desires (*circa concupiscentias*) and, similarly, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, there can be many good habits with respect to the same object, e.g., human virtue and heroic or divine virtue. Therefore, habits are not distinguished by *good* and *bad*.

But contrary to this: A good habit is contrary to a bad habit in the sense that virtue is contrary to

vice. But contraries are diverse in species. Therefore, habits differ in species with respect to the differences *good* and *bad*.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 2), habits are distinguished in species not only with respect to their objects and active principles, but also in relation to a nature. This happens in two ways:

In one way, according to the habit's appropriateness for a nature (*secundum convenientiam ad naturam*) or according to its inappropriateness for it as well. And it is in this way that good and bad habits are distinguished in species. For a habit is called good when it disposes one to an act that is appropriate for the agent's nature, whereas a habit is called bad when it disposes one to an act that is inappropriate for the nature. For instance, acts of the virtues are appropriate for human nature because they are in accord with reason, whereas acts of the vices are discordant with human nature because they are contrary to reason. And so it is clear that habits are distinguished in species by the differences *good* and *bad*.

In the second way, habits are distinguished with respect to nature by the fact that the one habit disposes one to an act that is appropriate for a lower nature, whereas another habit disposes one to an act that is appropriate for a higher nature. And it is in this way that human virtue, which disposes one to an act appropriate for human nature, is distinguished from divine or heroic virtue, which disposes one to an act appropriate for some higher nature.

Reply to objection 1: There can be a single habit with respect to contraries to the extent that the contraries agree in a single notion, and yet it never happens that habits belonging to contraries are one in species. For contrariety among habits corresponds to contrary notions (*est secundum contrarias rationes*). And so habits are distinguished with respect to *good* and *bad* insofar as the one habit is good and the other is bad, but not because the one is a habit with respect to something good and the other is a habit with respect to something bad.

Reply to objection 2: It is not *good* insofar as it is common to every entity that is the difference constituting a species of habit, but rather a certain determinate *good*, which has to do with appropriateness for a determinate nature, viz., human nature. Similarly, *bad* as a difference constitutive of a habit is not a pure privation, but is instead something determinate that conflicts with a determinate nature (*repugnans determinatae naturae*).

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, the many good habits that relate to the same thing in species are distinguished from one another by their appropriateness for diverse natures. On the other hand, the many bad habits with respect to doing the same thing are distinguished by their diverse types of conflict with what accords with the nature, just as many diverse vices with respect to the same matter are contrary to a single virtue.

Article 4

Is one habit constituted from many habits?

It seems that one habit is constituted from many habits:

Objection 1: If a thing's generation is completed successively, and not all at once, then it seems to be constituted from many parts. But as was established above (q. 51, a. 3), the generation of a habit takes place successively through many acts and not all at once. Therefore, one habit is constituted from many habits.

Objection 2: A whole is constituted from its parts. But many parts are assigned to a single habit, in the way that Tully posits many parts of fortitude and temperance and the other virtues. Therefore, one habit is constituted from many habits.

Objection 3: Scientific knowledge can be had, both actually and habitually, with respect to just a

single conclusion. But there are many conclusions that belong to an entire science, e.g., to geometry or arithmetic. Therefore, one habit is constituted from many habits.

But contrary to this: Since a habit is a simple quality, it is a simple form. But no simple form is constituted from many forms. Therefore, it is not the case that one habit is constituted from many habits.

I respond: A habit that is ordered toward an operation (which is the sort of habit we mainly have in mind here) is the perfection of a power. But every perfection is proportioned to the thing perfected. Hence, just as a power, even though it is one, extends itself to many things insofar as those things agree in some one thing, i.e., in some generic type of object (*in generali quadam ratione obiecti*), so, too, as is clear from what was said above (aa. 2 and 3), a habit extends itself to many things insofar as it is ordered toward some one thing, e.g., to one specific type of object, or one nature, or one principle.

Thus, if we consider a habit with respect to the things to which it extends itself, then we find a certain multiplicity in it. But because this multiplicity is ordered toward some one thing to which the habit is principally related, it follows that the habit is a simple quality and not constituted from many habits, even if it does extend itself to many things. For a single habit extends itself to many things only in relation to some one thing, from which it has its oneness.

Reply to objection 1: Successiveness in the generation of a habit occurs not because one part of the habit is generated after another part, but because the subject does not immediately attain to a disposition that is firm and hard to change, and because at first the disposition begins to exist in the subject in an incomplete way (*imperfecte*) and then is gradually brought to completion (*paulatim perficitur*)—just as is the case with other qualities as well.

Reply to objection 2: As will be explained below (q. 57, a. 6 and *ST* 2-2, q. 48), the parts that are assigned to the individual cardinal virtues are not *integral* parts, from which a whole is constituted, but *subjective* parts or *potential* parts.

Reply to objection 3: Someone who, through a demonstration, acquires the scientific knowledge of a single conclusion in a given science does, to be sure, have a habit, though he has it in an incomplete way. On the other hand, when he acquires through a demonstration the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, it is not the case that an additional habit is generated in him; instead, the habit which previously existed in him becomes more complete (*perfectior*) in the sense that it extends itself to more things. For the conclusions and demonstrations of a single science are ordered, and one is derived from another.

QUESTION 55

The Essence of a Virtue

Next we have to consider habits in a specific way (*in speciali*). And since, as has been explained (q. 54, a. 3), habits are distinguished by *good* and *bad*, we will first talk about good habits, i.e., the virtues (questions 55-67) and the other things adjoined to them, viz., the gifts, the beatitudes, and the fruits (questions 68-70); and, second, we will talk about bad habits, viz., vices and sins (questions 71-89).

As regards the virtues, there are five things to consider: first, the essence of virtue (question 55); second, the subject of virtue (question 56); third, the division of the virtues (questions 57-62); fourth, the cause of virtue (question 63); and, fifth, certain properties of the virtues (questions 64-67).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is a human virtue a habit? (2) Is a human virtue a habit ordered toward operation (*habitus operativus*)? (3) Is a human virtue a good habit? (4) What is the definition of *virtue*?

Article 1

Is a human virtue a habit?

It seems that a human virtue is not a habit:

Objection 1: As *De Caelo* 1 says, virtue (*virtus*) is “the limit of a power (*ultimum potentiae*).” But the limit (*ultimum*) of any given thing is traced back to the genus of which it is the limit, in the way that a point is traced back to the genus *line*. Therefore, virtue is traced back to the genus *power* and not to the genus *habit*.

Objection 2: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 2 Augustine says, “A virtue is the good use of free choice (*bonus usus liberi arbitrii*).” But the use of free choice is an act. Therefore, a virtue is an act and not a habit.

Objection 3: We merit with our acts and not with our habits; otherwise, a man would be continuously meriting, even while he was sleeping. But we merit with the virtues. Therefore, the virtues are acts and not habits.

Objection 4: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “Virtue is an ordering of love” (*ordo amoris*). And in 83 *Quaestiones* he says, “The ordering that is called *virtue* is to enjoy what should be enjoyed and to make use of what should be made use of.” But ‘order’ (*ordo*), i.e., ‘an ordering’ (*ordinatio*), names an act or a relation. Therefore, a virtue is an act or relation and not a habit.

Objection 5: Just as there are human virtues (*virtutes humanae*), so, too, there are natural virtues (*virtutes naturales*). But natural virtues are certain powers and not habits. Therefore, human virtues are not habits, either.

But contrary to this: In the *Categories* the Philosopher claims that scientific knowledge and virtue are habits.

I respond: ‘Virtue’ denominates a certain perfection of power. Now the perfection of any given thing is mainly thought of in relation to its end. But the end is the actualization of a power or potentiality (*potentiae actus*). Hence, a power is said to be perfect to the extent that it is determined to its act.

Now there are certain powers, such as natural active powers, that are in their own right (*secundum seipsas*) determined to their acts. And so natural powers of this sort are called ‘virtues’ in their own right. By contrast, rational powers, which are proper to a man, are not determined to a single act, but are related in an indeterminate way to many acts. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 49, a. 4), they are determined to their acts by habits. And so the human virtues are habits.

Reply to objection 1: Sometimes ‘virtue’ (*virtus*) is used for what the virtue is aimed at (*id ad quod est virtus*), viz., either the virtue’s object or its act; for instance, ‘faith’ is sometimes used for what is believed (*id quod creditur*), sometimes for the very act of believing, and sometimes for the habit itself

by which one believes.

Hence, when a virtue is called ‘the limit of a power’, ‘virtue’ is being taken for the *object* of the virtue; for what the power is ultimately capable of is that with respect to which it is called the thing’s virtue or strength. For instance, if someone is capable of carrying one hundred pounds and no more, then his ‘virtue’ or ‘strength’ is thought of in terms of one hundred pounds and not in terms of sixty pounds.

The objection, however, proceeded as if a virtue were *in its essence* (*essentialiter*) the limit of a power.

Reply to objection 2: It is by the same sort of reasoning that a virtue is called ‘a good use of free choice’, viz., that the good use of free choice is that toward which a virtue is ordered as toward its proper *act*. For the act of a virtue is nothing other than a good use of free choice.

Reply to objection 3: There are two ways in which we are said to merit ‘*with something*’:

In one way, with merit itself (*ipso merito*), in the way in which we are said to run with a run (*currere cursu*); and this is the sense in which we merit with our acts.

In the second way, we are said to merit by some principle of meriting, in the way that we are said to run with our power to move; and this is the sense in which we are said to merit with the virtues and habits.

Reply to objection 4: A virtue is called an order or ordering of love (*ordo vel ordinatio amoris*) in the sense that through the virtue the love in us is ordered toward what the virtue aims at (*id ad quod est virtus*).

Reply to objection 5: Natural powers are in their own right (*per se*) determined to one act, but rational powers are not. And so, as has been explained, the two cases are not parallel.

Article 2

Is it part of the concept of a human virtue that it is a habit ordered toward operation?

It seems that it is not part of the concept of a human virtue that it is a habit ordered toward operation (*non sit de ratione virtutis quod sit habitus operativus*):

Objection 1: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says that a virtue belongs to the soul in the way that health and beauty belong to the body. But health and beauty are not habits ordered toward operation. Therefore, neither is a virtue.

Objection 2: Among natural things one finds that virtue is ordered not only toward *acting* (*ad agere*) but also toward *being* (*ad esse*). For it is clear from the Philosopher in *De Caelo* 1 that some things have the virtue or strength to exist at all times, whereas other things have the virtue or strength to exist for some delimited time and not at all times. But human virtue plays a role in rational beings similar to the role that natural virtue plays in natural things. Therefore, human virtue is likewise ordered not only toward acting but also toward being.

Objection 3: In *Physics* 7 the Philosopher says, “Virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best.” But as Augustine proves in *De Moribus Ecclesiae* 2, the best thing that man needs to be disposed toward by virtue is God Himself, and the soul is disposed toward God by becoming similar to Him (*per assimilationem ad ipsum*). Therefore, it seems that a virtue is a certain quality of the soul in relation to God that makes one similar to Him and that it is not ordered toward an operation. Therefore, a virtue is not a habit ordered toward an operation.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “The virtue of any given thing is what makes its work good (*quae opus eius bonum reddit*).”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), ‘virtue’, by the very meaning of the name, implies a certain perfection of a power. Hence, since there are two kinds of power, viz., power with respect to

being (*potentia ad esse*) and power with respect to *acting* (*potentia ad agere*), the perfection of both sorts of power is called ‘virtue’. However, power with respect to *being* lies on the side of matter, which is being in potentiality, whereas power with respect to *acting* lies on the side of form, which is a principle of acting, since each thing acts insofar as it is actual.

Now in the constitution of a man, the body is like the matter (*sicut materia*), whereas the soul is like the form (*sicut forma*). And as regards the body, man shares it in common with the other animals—and the same holds true of the powers that are common to the soul and the body. It is only those powers that are proper to the soul, viz., the rational powers, that belong to man alone. And so human virtue, which is what we are talking about, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Hence, ‘human virtue’ implies an ordering not toward *being* but instead toward *acting*. And so it is part of the notion of a human virtue that it is a habit ordered toward operation.

Reply to objection 1: The mode of action follows upon the agent’s disposition, since each thing is such that what it does reflects how it is (*unumquodque quale est, talia operatur*). And so since a virtue is a principle of some sort of operation, a disposition that conforms to the virtue has to pre-exist in the agent. Now a virtue makes its operation well-ordered (*ordinatam*). And so a virtue is itself a certain well-ordered disposition in the soul in accord with which the powers of the soul are well-ordered in some way to one another and to what is outside. And this is why a virtue, insofar as it is a fitting disposition of the soul, is similar to health and beauty, which are fitting dispositions of the body. But this does not rule out a virtue’s also being a principle of action (*operationis principium*).

Reply to objection 2: The sort of virtue that has to do with *esse* is not proper to man, but only the virtue that has to do with the works of reason, which are proper to man.

Reply to objection 3: Since God’s substance is His action, the greatest assimilation of man to God is by an operation. Hence, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 2), happiness or beatitude (*felicitas sive beatitudo*), through which a man is maximally conformed to God and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.

Article 3

Is it part of the concept of a virtue that it is a good habit?

It seems that it is not part of the concept of a virtue that it is a good habit:

Objection 1: Sin is always taken as something bad. But even sin has some virtue or strength (*etiam peccati est aliqua virtus*)—this according to 1 Corinthians 15:56 (“The virtue of sin (*virtus peccati*) is the Law”). Therefore, a virtue is not always a good habit.

Objection 2: A virtue corresponds to a power. But power is related not only to what is good, but also to what is bad—this according to Isaiah 5:22 (“Woe to you who have power to drink wine, and are stout men at drunkenness”). Therefore, a virtue is likewise related both to what is good and also to what is bad.

Objection 3: According to the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 12:9, “Power (*virtus*) is made perfect in weakness.” But weakness is something bad. Therefore, virtue is related not only to what is good, but also to what is bad.

But contrary to this: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “No one would doubt that virtue makes the soul the best it can be.” And in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “Virtue is what makes the one who has it good and renders his works good.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), virtue implies the perfection of a power, and so, as *De Caelo* 1 puts it, the virtue of any given thing is directed toward the limit (*ultimum*) of which the thing is

capable. Now the limit which each thing is capable of must be good, since everything bad implies some defect. Hence, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, everything bad is weak. For this reason, it must be the case that the virtue of any given thing is predicated in relation to a good. Hence, human virtue, which is a habit ordered toward operation, is a good habit and productive of good (*boni operativus*).

Reply to objection 1: As with ‘perfect’, so too ‘good’ is used metaphorically in the case of bad things; for instance, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, we say of someone that he is a perfect thief or robber, and a good thief or robber. Accordingly, ‘virtue’ is likewise used metaphorically in the case of bad things. And the Law is called ‘the virtue of sin’ insofar as because of the Law sin is occasionally increased and, as it were, reaches its maximal power (*ad maximum suum posse pervenit*).

Reply to objection 2: The badness of drunkenness and excessive drinking consists in its deviating from the order of reason (*consistit in defectu ordinis rationis*). Now it is possible that, in company with the deviation from reason, some lower power should be perfected with respect to what belongs to its genus—even along with its repugnance to and deviation from reason. However, the perfection of this sort of power, when it is accompanied by a deviation from virtue, could not be called a human virtue.

Reply to objection 3: Reason is shown to be more perfect to the extent that it is able to overcome or tolerate the weaknesses of the body and of the lower parts [of the soul]. And so human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be perfected not, to be sure, in the weakness of reason, but rather in the weakness of the body and of the lower parts of the soul.

Article 4

Is the customary definition of virtue correct?

It seems that the customary definition of virtue is incorrect, viz., “A virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives uprightly and which no one uses badly and which God works in us without us” (*bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur*):

Objection 1: Virtue is a man’s goodness, since it is “what makes the one who has it good.” But goodness does not seem to be good, just as whiteness is not white, either. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that virtue is a good quality.

Objection 2: No specific difference is more common than its genus, since it divides the genus. But *good* is more common than *quality*, since *good* is convertible with *being*. Therefore, *good* should not be posited in the definition of *virtue* as a specific difference of *quality*.

Objection 3: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “When we begin to run across what is not common to us and the beasts, it pertains to the mind.” But as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 3, certain virtues belong even to the non-rational parts [of the soul]. Therefore, not every virtue is a good quality of the mind.

Objection 4: Uprightness (*rectitudo*) seems to belong to justice, and calling someone upright is the same as calling him just. But justice is a species of virtue. Therefore, it is incorrect to posit *upright* in the definition of virtue when it says “by which one lives uprightly.”

Objection 5: When someone is proud of something, he uses it badly. But there are many who are proud of their virtue; for in *Regula* Augustine says, “Pride undermines even good works, that they might perish.” Therefore, it is false that no one uses a virtue badly.

Objection 6: A man is justified through virtue. But in commenting on John 11:15 (“He shall do greater things than these”), Augustine says, “He who created you without you will not justify you without you.” Therefore, it is wrong to say that God works virtue in us without us.

I respond: The definition in question captures completely the whole nature of virtue. For the

complete definition of any given thing is gathered together from its causes, and the definition stated above includes all the causes of virtue.

For the *formal cause* of a virtue, as of anything, is taken from its genus and difference, when it is called ‘a good quality’. For the genus of a virtue is *quality*, whereas the difference is *good*. However, the definition would be more fitting if *habit*, which is a close genus (*genus propinquum*), were used instead of *quality*.

Now, like other accidents, a virtue does not have a *matter-out-of-which* (*materia ex qua*), but it does have a *matter-with-respect-to-which* (*materia circa quam*) and a *matter-in-which* (*materia in qua*), viz., its subject. The matter-with-respect-to-which is the virtue’s object, which could not be posited in the definition under discussion because a virtue is determined to its species by its object, whereas this definition is being assigned to virtue in general. Hence, the subject is posited in the place of the material cause, when it is said that it is a good quality ‘of the mind’.

Now since a virtue is a habit directed toward an operation (*sit habitus operativus*), the *end* of a virtue is the operation itself. But notice that some operative habits are always directed toward what is bad, as is the case with vicious habits. Others, by contrast, are sometimes directed toward what is good and sometimes toward what is bad; for instance, opinion (*opinio*) is related both to what is true and to what is false. On the other hand, virtue is a habit that is always related to what is good. And so, in order to distinguish virtue from those habits that are always related to what is bad, the definition says ‘by which one lives uprightly’, whereas in order to distinguish virtue from those habits that are sometimes related to what is bad, the definition says, ‘which no one uses badly’.

Now the *efficient cause* of infused virtue, which is what is being defined here, is God. For this reason, the definition says ‘which God works in us without us’. And if this part is left out, then the rest of the definition will be common to all virtues, both acquired and infused.

Reply to objection 1: What falls under the intellect in the first place is *being*; this is why we attribute to each thing apprehended by us that it is a being and that, as a result, it is one and good, since *one* and *good* are convertible with *being*. Hence, we say that an essence is a being and is one and is good, and that oneness is a being and is one and is good; and the same holds for goodness. However, there is no place for this in the case of specific forms such as whiteness and health. For it is not the case that everything we apprehend is such that we apprehend it under *white* and *healthy*.

Notice, however, that just as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings not because they themselves have *esse* but because something exists *by them*, so, too, they are called good or one not by some other goodness or oneness, but because something is good or one *by them*. So, then, virtue is likewise called good because something is good *by it*.

Reply to objection 2: The good that is posited in the definition of virtue is not the common *good* which is convertible with *being* and which is more extensive than *quality* (*est in plus quam qualitas*), but is instead the good of reason—this according to what Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4: “The good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.”

Reply to objection 3: As *Ethics* 1 says, a virtue can exist in the non-rational part of the soul only insofar as the non-rational part participates in reason. And so reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of a human virtue.

Reply to objection 4: As will become clear below (q. 60, a. 2 and *ST* 2-2, q. 58, a. 8), the uprightness proper to justice is the uprightness that has to do with exterior things which come into man’s use and which are the proper matter of justice. By contrast, the uprightness that implies an ordering to a fitting end and to divine law—which, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 4), is the rule of the human will—is common to every virtue.

Reply to objection 5: It is possible for someone to ‘use virtue badly’ *as an object*—viz., when someone thinks of virtue in the wrong way, as when he hates virtue or when he is proud of his virtue—but it is not possible to use virtue badly *as a principle of use* in such a way that the act of a virtue

would itself be bad.

Reply to objection 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without our acting, but not without our consenting. And this is the way to understand the phrase ‘which God works in us without us’. On the other hand, what is done by us is such that God causes it within us but not without our acting. For He operates in every act of will and every act of nature (*ipse operatur in omni voluntate et natura*).

QUESTION 56

The Subject of Virtue

Next we have to consider the subject of a virtue. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Does any virtue exist in a power of the soul as in its subject? (2) Can a single virtue exist in more than one power? (3) Can the intellect be the subject of any virtue? (4) Can the irascible and concupiscible powers of the soul be the subject of any virtue? (5) Can the [interior] sentient apprehensive powers be the subject of any virtue? (6) Can the will be the subject of any virtue?

Article 1

Does a virtue exist in a power of the soul as in its subject?

It seems that a virtue does not exist in a power of the soul as in its subject:

Objection 1: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 2 Augustine, “A virtue is that by which one lives uprightly.” But *to live* is from the soul’s essence and not from its power. Therefore, virtue exists in the essence of the soul and not in its power.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “A virtue is what makes the one who has it good and renders his work good.” But just as one’s work is constituted through a power, so, too, having a virtue is constituted through the soul’s essence. Therefore, it is not the case that a virtue belongs to a power of the soul more than to its essence.

Objection 3: *Power* is in the second species of *quality*. But as was explained above (q. 55, a. 4), a virtue is a certain quality, and no quality belongs to a quality. Therefore, it is not the case that a virtue exists in a power of the soul as in its subject.

But contrary to this: As *De Caelo* 1 says, a virtue is the limit of a power. But a limit exists in that of which it is the limit. Therefore, a virtue exists in a power of the soul.

I respond: There are three considerations from which it is clear that a virtue belongs to a power of the soul:

First, from the very concept *virtue*, which implies the perfection of a power, and a perfection exists in that of which it is a perfection.

Second, from the fact that, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), a virtue is a habit ordered toward an operation, and every operation is from the soul through some power.

Third, from the fact that a virtue disposes one toward what is best, and the best thing is the end, which is either the entity’s operation or else something that follows through an operation that comes from a power.

Hence, a human virtue exists in a power of the soul as in its subject.

Reply to objection 1: *To live* is taken in two ways. For sometimes *to live* means the very *esse* that belongs to a living thing, and in this sense it pertains to the soul’s essence, which is the principle of being for a living thing (*vivendi essendi principium*). In a second sense, *to live* means the operation of the living thing, and this is the sense in which one lives uprightly by means of a virtue, insofar as it is through the virtue that one acts uprightly.

Reply to objection 2: What is called good is either the end or what is ordered toward the end. And so since the good of one who is acting consists in his operation, the very fact that a virtue makes the one who is acting good is likewise traced back to an operation and, as a result, to a power.

Reply to objection 3: One accident is said to exist in another accident as in a subject not because an accident is in its own right (*per seipsum*) able to sustain another accident, but because the one accident inheres in the substance by the mediation of another accident, in the way that a color inheres in a body by the mediation of the body’s surface. That is why the surface is said to be the subject of the color. And it is in this sense that a power of the soul is said to be the subject of a virtue.

Article 2

Can a single virtue exist in two powers?

It seems that a single virtue can exist in two powers:

Objection 1: Habits are known through their acts. But a single act proceeds in diverse ways from diverse powers; for instance, walking proceeds from reason as from what *directs* it, from the will as from what *effects* it, and from the moving power as from what *executes* it. Therefore, the single habit of a virtue can likewise exist in more than one power.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that there are three things required for a virtue, viz., “to know, to will, and to operate in a fixed way (*immobiliter*).” But *to know* belongs to the intellect, whereas *to will* belongs to the will. Therefore, a virtue can exist in more than one power.

Objection 3: Prudence exists in reason, since, as *Ethics* 6 says, prudence is “right reason with respect to actions (*recta ratio agibilium*).” It also exists in the will, since it cannot exist in the presence of a perverse will (*non potest esse cum voluntate perversa*), as is pointed out in the same book. Therefore, a single virtue can exist in two powers.

But contrary to this: A virtue exists in a power of the soul as in a subject. But the same accident cannot exist in more than one subject. Therefore, a single virtue cannot exist in more than one power of the soul.

I respond: There are two possible ways for something to exist in two things:

In one way, so as to exist *equally* in both of them. And in this sense it is impossible for a single virtue to exist in two powers, since the diversity of powers corresponds to *general* conditions on their objects (*secundum generales condiciones obiectorum*), whereas the diversity of habits corresponds to *specific* conditions on their objects (*secundum condiciones speciales obiectorum*). Hence, whenever there is a diversity of powers, there is a diversity of habits, but not vice versa.

In the second way, something can exist in two or more things not equally, but *with a certain ordering*. And in this sense a single virtue can belong to more than one power in such a way that it exists in one of the powers principally and extends itself to the other powers in the manner of a diffusion or in the manner of a disposition, to the extent that the one power is moved by the other and to the extent that the one power receives something from the other.

Reply to objection 1: The same act cannot belong to diverse powers equally and within the same order, but it can belong to diverse powers in accord with diverse conceptions and in different orders.

Reply to objection 2: *To know* is required for moral virtue insofar as moral virtue acts in accord with right reason. But *in its essence* (*essentialiter*) moral virtue consists in appetition (*in appetendo*).

Reply to objection 3: Prudence as a real entity (*realiter*) exists in reason, but, as will be explained below (a. 3 and q. 57, a. 4), it presupposes uprightness of will.

Article 3

Is the intellect the subject of any virtue?

It seems that the intellect is not the subject of any virtue:

Objection 1: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says that every virtue is love. But the subject of love is exclusively the appetitive power and not the intellect. Therefore, no virtue exists in the intellect.

Objection 2: As is clear from what has been said above (q. 55, a. 3), a virtue is ordered toward the good. But the good is not the object of the intellect. Therefore, the subject of a virtue is the appetitive

power and not the intellect.

Objection 3: As the Philosopher puts it, “A virtue is what makes the one who has it good.” But a habit that perfects the intellect does not make the one who has it good, since a man is not called good because of his scientific knowledge or because of his craftsmanship (*non propter scientiam vel artem dicitur homo bonus*). Therefore, the intellect is not the subject of any virtue.

But contrary to this: ‘Mind’ means especially the intellect. But as is clear from the definition of virtue introduced above (q. 55, a. 4), the subject of a virtue is the mind. Therefore, the intellect is the subject of virtue.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), a virtue is a habit by which someone operates well. Now there are two ways in which a habit is ordered toward a good act:

In one way, there is the sort of habit that is such that through it a man acquires a facility (*facultas*) for a good act, in the way that through the habit of grammar (*per habitum grammaticae*) a man acquires a facility for speaking correctly. However, the habit of grammar (*grammatica*) does not make it the case that the man speaks correctly at all times; for a grammatical individual is able to utter barbarisms or to commit a solecism (*potest barbarizare aut soloecismum facere*). And the same line of reasoning holds for the other crafts and for the types of scientific knowledge.

In the second way, there is the sort of habit that not only effects a facility for acting but also makes it the case that one uses that facility correctly; for instance, justice makes it the case not only that a man has a prompt will for doing just things, but also that he acts justly. And since *good*, like *being*, designates a thing absolutely speaking insofar as it is actual (*est in actu*) and not insofar as it is potential (*est in potentia*), it follows that it is because of this sort of habit that a man is said to do good and to be good absolutely speaking, e.g., because he is just or temperate. And the same line of reasoning holds for similar habits.

Moreover, since a virtue is what makes the man who has it good and renders his works good, it is habits of this latter sort that are called virtues absolutely speaking; for they make his works good in actuality, and they make the one who has them good absolutely speaking. By contrast, habits of the first sort are not called virtues absolutely speaking, because they do not render the works good except in terms of a certain facility, and they do not make the one who has them good. For a man is not called good absolutely speaking (*bonus simpliciter*) from the fact that he is a craftsman or someone with scientific knowledge; instead, he is called good only in a certain respect (*bonus solum secundum quid*), e.g., a good workman or good at grammar. For this reason, as is clear from *Ethics* 6, scientific knowledge and craftsmanship (*scientia et ars*) are most commonly divided off from virtue, though sometimes they are called virtues.

Therefore, the subject of a habit that is called a virtue in a certain respect (*qui secundum quid dicitur virtus*) can be the intellect—not only the practical intellect, but also the speculative intellect in the absence of any ordering to the will. For this is the sense in which the Philosopher, in *Ethics* 6, claims that scientific knowledge (*scientia*), wisdom (*sapientia*), understanding (*intellectus*), and even art (*ars*) are intellectual virtues.

By contrast, the subject of a habit that is called a virtue absolutely speaking can only be either the will or a power insofar as it is moved by the will. The reason for this is that, as was established above (q. 9, a. 1 and q. 17, a. 1 and *ST* 1, q. 82, a. 4), the will moves all the other powers that are in any sense rational, and so the fact that a man acts well stems from the fact that the man has a good will. Hence, a virtue which makes one act well in actuality, and not just in his facility, must exist either in the will or in some power insofar as it is moved by the will.

Now it is possible for the intellect, like the other powers, to be moved by the will; for an individual considers something in actuality because he wills to. And so insofar as the intellect has an ordering to the will, it can be the subject of a virtue absolutely speaking. And it is in this way that the speculative intellect, or reason, is the subject of *faith*. For the intellect is moved to assent by the command of the will

to what belongs to the Faith, since no one has faith unless he wills to have it (*nullus credit nisi volens*). On the other hand, the practical intellect is the subject of *prudence*. For since prudence is right reason with respect to actions (*recta ratio agibilium*), it is required for prudence that the man be related in the right way to the principles of right reason with respect to things to be done, viz., the ends, to which a man is related in the right way by the uprightness of his will—just as it is through the natural light of the active intellect that he is related in the right way to the principles of the objects of the speculative intellect (*ad principia speculabilium*). And so just as the subject of scientific knowledge, which is right reason with respect to the objects of the speculative intellect, is the speculative intellect in relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in relation to right willing (*in ordine ad voluntatem rectam*).

Reply to objection 1: The passage from Augustine should be understood to be saying, about virtue absolutely speaking, not that every such virtue is love absolutely speaking, but that every such virtue depends in some way on love, insofar as it depends on the will, whose primary affection, as was explained above (q. 25, a. 1 and q. 27, a. 4), is love.

Reply to objection 2: The good of each thing is its end, and so, since the true is the intellect's end, to know what is true is a good act of the intellect. Hence, a habit that perfects the intellect in knowing what is true, whether in speculative matters or in practical matters, is called a virtue.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for virtue absolutely speaking.

Article 4

Can the irascible and concupiscible powers be the subject of any virtue?

It seems that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of any virtue:

Objection 1: Powers of this sort are common to us and brute animals. But at present we are speaking of virtue insofar as it is proper to man; for this is why it is being called 'human virtue'. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible powers, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), are parts of the sentient appetite, cannot be the subject of any human virtue.

Objection 2: The sentient appetite is a power that uses a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot exist in a man's body; for in Romans 7:18 the Apostle says, "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." Therefore, the sentient appetite cannot be the subject of any virtue.

Objection 3: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine proves that virtue exists in the soul and not in the body, because the body is governed by the soul. Thus, the fact that someone uses his body well is traced back entirely to the soul: "For instance, if my coachman, obeying me, governs well the horses he is driving, this is wholly due to me." But just as the soul governs the body, so, too, reason governs the sentient appetite. Therefore, it is wholly due to the rational part of the soul that the irascible and concupiscible powers are correctly governed. But as was explained above (q. 55, a. 4), virtue is "that by which one lives uprightly." Therefore, virtue exists only in the rational part of the soul and not in the irascible or concupiscible parts.

Objection 4: As *Ethics* 8 says, "The principal act of moral virtue is the act of choosing (*electio*)."

But as was explained above (q. 13, a. 2), the act of choosing is an act of reason and not an act of the irascible or concupiscible powers. Therefore, moral virtue exists in reason and not in the irascible or concupiscible powers.

But contrary to this: Fortitude is claimed to exist in the irascible power, whereas temperance is claimed to exist in the concupiscible power. Hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "These virtues belong to the non-rational parts of the soul."

I respond: There are two ways in which the irascible and concupiscible powers can be thought of:

In one way, they can be thought of *in their own right*, insofar as they are parts of the sentient appetite; and in this sense, it cannot belong to them to be the subject of any virtue.

In the second way, they can be thought of *insofar as they participate in reason* by being ready to obey reason (*per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire*). And in this sense the irascible power or concupiscible power can be the subject of a human virtue, since insofar as these powers participate in reason, they are a principle of a human act.

Moreover, it is necessary to posit virtues in these powers, since it is clear that some virtues exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers. For an act that proceeds from one power insofar as it is moved by another power cannot be perfect unless both powers are well disposed with respect to the act—just as a craftsman’s act cannot be fitting unless both the craftsman and also his instrument are well disposed toward acting. Therefore, in those matters with respect to which the irascible and concupiscible powers operate insofar as they are moved by reason, it is necessary that a habit that perfects one for acting well should exist not only in reason, but also in the irascible and concupiscible powers. And because the good disposition of a power that is a moved mover involves a conformity with the power that effects its movement, it follows that a virtue that exists in the irascible or concupiscible power is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of that power with reason.

Reply to objection 1: Considered in their own right (*secundum se*), the irascible and concupiscible powers, as parts of the sentient appetite, are common to us and brute animals. But it is insofar as they are rational by participation, as obedient to reason, that they are proper to man. And this is the sense in which they can be the subject of a human virtue.

Reply to objection 2: Just as a man’s flesh does not in its own right have the good of virtue but is nonetheless the instrument of a virtuous act insofar as, with reason as the mover, we use our members to serve justice, so, too, the irascible and concupiscible powers likewise have in their own right the infection of the stimulant [to sin] (*infectio fomitis*) and not the good of virtue, but insofar as they are conformed to reason, the good of moral virtue is begotten in them (*in eis adgeneratur bonum virtutis moralis*).

Reply to objection 3: The irascible and concupiscible powers are governed by reason in a way different from the way in which the body is governed by the soul.

For the body obeys the soul at will without contradiction in those things in which it is apt to be moved by the soul. This is why the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, “The soul governs the body by despotic rule,” i.e., in the way that a master governs his servant. And so the body’s entire movement is traced back to the soul. And this is why virtue exists only in the soul and not in the body.

By contrast, the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason at will, but have their own proper movements by which they sometimes oppose reason (*interdum rationi repugnant*). This is why in the same book the Philosopher says, “Reason governs the irascible and concupiscible powers with the political rule by which free men are ruled who have their own will in certain matters.” And this is why it is likewise necessary for there to be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers by which they might be well disposed toward their acts.

Reply to objection 4: There are two things in the act of choosing, viz., (a) the act of intending the end, which pertains to the moral virtues, and (b), as *Ethics* 6 says, the act of preferring a means to that end, which pertains to prudence. The fact that the act of choosing involves an upright intending of the end stems from the good disposition of the irascible and concupiscible powers. And so the moral virtues with respect to the passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers, whereas prudence exists in reason.

Article 5

Can any virtue exist in the interior sentient apprehensive powers?

It seems that a virtue can exist in the interior sentient apprehensive powers (*in viribus apprehensivis interioribus*):

Objection 1: The sentient appetite can be the subject of a virtue insofar as it obeys reason. But the interior sentient powers obey reason, since the powers of imagining, cogitating, and remembering operate at reason's command.

Objection 2: Just as the rational appetite, i.e., the will, can be impeded, as well as assisted, in its act by the sentient appetite, so, too, the intellect, i.e., reason, can be impeded, as well as assisted, by the powers in question. Therefore, just as a virtue can exist in the sentient appetitive powers, so, too, a virtue can exist in the sentient apprehensive powers.

Objection 3: Prudence is a virtue, and in *Rhetorica* Tully posits memory as a part of prudence. Therefore, there can likewise be a virtue in the power of remembering. And, for the same reason, there can be virtues in the other interior apprehensive powers (*in aliis interioribus apprehensivis viribus*).

But contrary to this: As *Ethics* 2 says, all the virtues are either intellectual virtues or moral virtues. But as is clear from *Ethics* 6, the moral virtues all exist in the appetitive part of the soul, whereas the intellectual virtues all exist in the intellect or reason. Therefore, no virtue exists in the interior sentient apprehensive powers.

I respond: Some habits are posited in the interior sentient apprehensive powers. This is clear mainly from what the Philosopher says in *De Memoria*: "In remembering one thing after another there is customary usage at work (*operatur consuetudo*), which is, as it were, a sort of nature." But this habit of customary usage (*habitus consuetudinalis*) is nothing other than a disposition (*habitus*) acquired through customary usage (*per consuetudinem*), which is something in the manner of a nature. This is why Tully, in his *Rhetorica*, says of a virtue that "it is a habit consonant with reason in the manner of a nature."

Still, in the case of a man, what is acquired by habituation in memory and the other sentient apprehensive powers is not, as was explained above (q. 50, a. 4), a habit *per se*; instead, it is something annexed to the habits of the intellective part of the soul. Yet even if there are habits in the powers in question, they cannot be called virtues. For a virtue is a perfect habit by which it is possible to do only what is good, and so a habit has to exist in a power that consummates a good work (*est consummativa boni operis*). But the cognition of what is true is not consummated in the sentient apprehensive powers; instead, powers of this sort are, as it were, a preparation for intellective cognition. And so in these powers there are no virtues by which what is true is known; instead, virtues of this sort exist in the intellect or reason.

Reply to objection 1: The sentient appetite is related to the will, which is reason's appetite, as something moved by the will. And so the work of the appetitive power is consummated in the sentient appetite. Because of this, the sentient appetite is the subject of virtues.

By contrast, the virtues of the sentient apprehensive part are related as movers with respect to the intellect, since, as *De Anima* 3 explains, the phantasms are related to the intellective soul in the way that colors are related to sight. And so the work of cognition is terminated in the intellect. And because of this, the cognitive virtues exist in the intellect or reason itself.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: Memory is posited as a part of prudence not in the way in which a species is a part of its genus—as if memory were a virtue in its own right (*per se*)—but rather in the sense that one of the things required for prudence is goodness of memory. As such, memory is in some sense related to prudence like an integral part.

Article 6

Is the will the subject of any virtue?

It seems that the will is not the subject of any virtue:

Objection 1: No habit is required for what belongs to a power by the power's very nature (*ex ipsa ratione potentiae*). But according to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, since the will exists in reason, it tends by its very nature toward what is good according to reason, and it is to this that every virtue is ordered. For each thing naturally desires its own good, and as Tully says in his *Rhetorica*, "A virtue is a habit that is consonant with reason in the manner of a nature." Therefore, the will is not the subject of any virtue.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 1 and 2 say, every virtue is either an intellectual virtue or a moral virtue. But intellectual virtue exists in the intellect and reason as in a subject and not in the will, whereas moral virtue exists, as in a subject, in the irascible and concupiscible powers, which are rational by participation. Therefore, no virtue exists in the will as in a subject.

Objection 3: All human acts—and the virtues are ordered toward human acts—are voluntary. Therefore, if there is a virtue in the will with respect to *some* human acts, then by parity of reasoning there will be a virtue in the will with respect to *all* human acts. Therefore, either (a) there will not be any virtues in any other power, or else (b) two virtues will be ordered to the very same act—which seems absurd. Therefore, the will cannot be the subject of any virtue.

But contrary to this: More perfection is required in what effects movement than in what is moved. But the will moves the irascible power and the concupiscible power. Therefore, virtue has to exist in the will much more than in the irascible power or concupiscible power.

I respond: Since a power is perfected in its acting by a habit, it is in those cases in which the power's proper nature is not sufficient that the power needs a habit that perfects it for acting well—which habit is a virtue.

Now every proper conception of a power involves an ordering to its object. Hence, since, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3), the will's object is a good of reason that is proportioned to the will, in this respect the will does not need a perfecting virtue. But if what confronts a man to be willed is a good that is disproportionate to the one willing—either (a) with respect to the whole human species, as in the case of the divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature or (b) with respect to an individual, as in the case of the good of his neighbor, then the will needs a virtue in such a case. And so virtues of the sort that order a man's affections toward God or toward his neighbor exist in the will as in a subject, e.g., charity, justice, and others of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: This argument has a place in the case of a virtue which orders one to the proper or private good of the one who is willing himself (*ad bonum proprium ipsius volentis*)—for instance, in the case of temperance and fortitude, which, as is clear from what has been said (q. 21, a. 1 and q. 25, a. 6), have to do with the human passions and other things of this sort.

Reply to objection 2: As *Ethics* 1 says, what is rational by participation is not just the irascible power and concupiscible power, but the appetitive as a whole, i.e., in general (*sed omnino, idest universaliter, appetitivum*). Now the will is included under the appetitive. And so if a virtue exists in the soul, then it will be a moral virtue—unless it is a theological virtue, as will become clear below (q. 58, a. 3 and q. 62, a. 3).

Reply to objection 3: Some virtues are ordered toward the good of moderated passion, which is proper to *this* man or *that* man, and in such cases it is not necessary for there to be a virtue in the will, since, as has been explained, the power's nature is sufficient for this. Rather, it is necessary only in the case of those virtues that are ordered toward an extrinsic good.

QUESTION 57

The Distinctions Among the Intellectual Virtues

Next we have to consider the distinctions among the virtues: first, as regards the intellectual virtues (question 56); second, as regards the moral virtues (questions 58-61); and, third, as regards the theological virtues (question 62).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Are the speculative intellectual habits virtues? (2) Are there three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding (*sapientia, scientia et intellectus*)? (3) Is an intellectual habit that is an art or craft (*ars*) a virtue? (4) Is prudence (*prudentia*) a virtue distinct from an art? (5) Is prudence a virtue that is necessary for a man? (6) Are good deliberation (*eubulia*) and two sorts of good judgment (*synesis et gnome*) virtues that are joined to prudence?

Article 1

Are the speculative intellectual habits virtues?

It seems that the speculative intellectual habits are not virtues:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), a virtue is a habit ordered toward an operation (*est habitus operativus*). But speculative habits are not ordered toward an operation (*non sunt operativi*), since the speculative is distinguished from the practical, i.e., from what is ordered toward an operation. Therefore, the speculative intellectual habits are not virtues.

Objection 2: Virtue is among the things by which a man is made happy or blessed, because, as *Ethics* 2 says, “Happiness (*felicitas*) is the reward of virtue.” But intellectual habits do not pay attention to human acts or the other human goods through which a man attains beatitude; instead, they pay attention to natural and divine entities. Therefore, habits of this sort cannot be called virtues.

Objection 3: Scientific knowledge (*scientia*) is a speculative habit. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Topics* 4, scientific knowledge and virtue are posited as diverse and non-subalternate genera. Therefore, speculative habits are not virtues.

But contrary to this: Only speculative habits pay attention to necessary things that cannot be otherwise. But in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher posits certain “intellectual virtues” in the part of the soul that considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise. Therefore, the speculative intellectual habits are virtues.

I respond: Since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), every virtue involves an ordering toward the good, it follows, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), that there are two ways in which a given habit is called a virtue: (a) in one way, because it effects a *facility* for acting well, and (b) in a second way, because, along with the facility, it also effects the *good use* of the facility. And this latter condition, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), applies only to those habits that have to do with the appetitive part of the soul, because it is the soul’s appetitive power that effects the use of all the powers and habits (*quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus*).

Therefore, since the speculative intellectual habits do not perfect the appetitive part of the soul, and since they have to do only with the intellective part and in no way with the appetitive part, it follows that while they can, to be sure, be called virtues insofar as they effect a facility for a good operation, viz., considering what is true (for this is the intellect’s good work), they are nonetheless not called virtues in the second way, i.e., in the sense that they bring it about that one uses the power or habit well. For one is not inclined to use a habit of speculative scientific knowledge by the fact that he has the habit; rather, his making use of the scientific knowledge that he has stems from the will’s moving him (*sed quod utatur scientia habita hoc est movente voluntate*).

And so a virtue that perfects the will, e.g., charity or justice, also makes it use speculative habits of

this sort well. Accordingly, there can likewise be merit in the acts of these speculative habits if they are done out of charity—just as Gregory says in *Moralia* 6: “The contemplative life is of greater merit than the active.”

Reply to objection 1: There are two sorts of works, exterior and interior. Thus, the practical or operative, which is divided off from the speculative, is taken from the exterior work, toward which a speculative habit has no ordering. Nevertheless, it does have an ordering toward the intellect’s interior work, which is to theorize about what is true (*speculari verum*). And in this sense it is a habit ordered toward an operation (*habitus operativus*).

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which a virtue ‘has to do with something’ (*virtus est aliquorum dupliciter*):

In one way, a virtue has to do with its objects (*sicut obiectorum*). And in this sense the speculative virtues do not have to do with the things through which a man is made blessed—except, perhaps, insofar as the preposition ‘through’ expresses the efficient cause or the object of complete beatitude, viz., God, who is the highest object of speculative knowledge (*quod est summum speculabile*).

In a second way, a virtue is said to have to do with its acts (*sicut actuum*). And in this sense the intellectual virtues have to do with those things through which a man is made blessed—both because (a) the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as has been explained, and also because (b) they constitute a certain beginning of perfect beatitude, which, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 7), consists in the contemplation of what is true.

Reply to objection 3: Scientific knowledge is divided off from virtue taken in the second sense explained above, which belongs to the appetitive power.

Article 2

Is it appropriate to distinguish three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding?

It seems that it is inappropriate to distinguish three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom (*sapientia*), scientific knowledge (*scientia*), and understanding (*intellectus*):

Objection 1: A species should not be divided off at the same level as its genus (*species non debet condividi generi*). But as *Ethics* 6 says, wisdom is a certain sort of scientific knowledge. Therefore, in the enumeration of the intellectual virtues, *wisdom* should not be divided off at the same level as *scientific knowledge*.

Objection 2: As is clear from what was said above (q. 54, a. 2 and *ST* 1, q. 77, a. 3), in the case of the distinction among powers, habits, and acts, which corresponds to their objects, one pays attention mainly to the distinction that corresponds to the formal conception of their objects (*quae est secundum rationem formalem obiectorum*). Therefore, diverse habits should be distinguished by the formal character of their objects and not by their material objects. Now a principle of demonstration is the formal characteristic by which one knows conclusions scientifically (*principium demonstrationis est ratio sciendi conclusiones*). Therefore, the understanding of the principles (*intellectus principiorum*) should not be posited as a habit or virtue distinct from the scientific knowledge of the conclusions.

Objection 3: An intellectual virtue is one that by its essence exists in the rational power itself. But just as reason, including speculative reason, reasons discursively by forming demonstrative syllogisms (*rationcinatur syllogizando demonstrative*), so too it reasons discursively by forming dialectical syllogisms (*syllogizando dialectice*). Therefore, just as having scientific knowledge (*scientia*), which is caused by a demonstrative syllogism, is posited as a speculative intellectual virtue, so, too, holding an opinion (*opinio*) is likewise a speculative intellectual virtue.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher posits just three speculative intellectual virtues, viz., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and understanding.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), a speculative intellectual virtue is a virtue by which the speculative intellect is perfected in its consideration of what is true; for this is what its good work is.

Now what is true can be considered in two ways: (a) insofar as it is known in its own right (*per se notum*), and (b) insofar as it is known through something else (*per aliud notum*).

Now what is *known in its own right* has the status of a starting point or principle (*se habet ut principium*), and it is perceived immediately by the intellect. And so the habit that perfects the intellect with respect to the consideration of this sort of truth is called *understanding (intellectus)*, which is a habit with respect to principles.

On the other hand, a truth that is *known through something else* is not perceived immediately (*non statim percipitur*) by the intellect, but is instead perceived through reason's inquiry, and so it has the status of an endpoint or terminus (*se habet in ratione termini*). Now there are two ways in which it can be a terminus: (a) insofar as it is *ultimate in some particular genus*, or (b) insofar as it is *ultimate with respect to the whole of human cognition*.

And since, as *Physics* 1 says, "Those things that are known later to us are prior and more known by their nature (*secundum naturam*), it follows that what is ultimate with respect to the whole of human cognition is what is first and maximally knowable by its nature (*secundum naturam*). And this is what *wisdom (sapientia)* is about, since, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, it is wisdom that considers the highest causes. Hence, it is appropriate for wisdom to pass judgment on and order all things, since perfect and universal judgment can be had only by tracing things back to their first causes (*non nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas*).

By contrast, it is *scientific knowledge (scientia)* that perfects the intellect with respect to what is ultimate in this or that genus of knowable things (*in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium*). And so there are diverse habits of scientific knowledge corresponding to the diverse genera of knowable things (*secundum diversa genera scibilium*), whereas wisdom is only unitary (*non sit nisi una*).

Reply to objection 1: Wisdom is a certain sort of scientific knowledge (*sapientia est quaedam scientia*), since it has what is common to all types of scientific knowledge, viz., that it demonstrates conclusions from principles. But because it has something proper over and beyond all the other types of scientific knowledge, viz., that it passes judgment on all of them—not only with respect to their conclusions but even with respect to their first principles—it follows that it has the character of a virtue that is more perfect than scientific knowledge.

Reply to objection 2: When the formal conception of an object (*ratio obiecti*) is referred to a power or habit under a single act, then in such a case the habits or powers are not distinguished into a formal conception of the object and a material object. For instance, it belongs to one and the same power of sight both to see a color and to see the light-source (*lumen*), where the light-source (*lumen*) is the formal reason for seeing the color (*ratio videndi colorem*) and is seen along with the color.

By contrast, the principles of a demonstration can be considered *separately* without considering the conclusions. They can, in addition, be considered *along with* the conclusions insofar as the principles lead to the conclusions (*prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur*). Thus, to consider the principles in this second way belongs to *scientific knowledge*, whereas to consider the principles in their own right (*secundum seipsa*) belongs to *understanding*.

Hence, if one thinks correctly about the three virtues in question, they are not distinguished from one another in exactly the same way (*ex aequo*); rather, they are distinguished by a certain ordering, as happens in the case of potential wholes, one part of which is more perfect than another—in the way that the rational soul is more perfect than the sentient soul and the sentient soul is more perfect than the vegetative soul. For in this way *scientific knowledge* depends on *understanding* as on what is more

important (*sicut a principaliori*). And both of them depend on wisdom as on that which is most important (*sicut a principalissimo*) and which contains under itself both understanding and scientific knowledge, insofar as it passes judgment both on the conclusions of the types of scientific knowledge and on the principles of those same types of scientific knowledge.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 55, aa. 3 and 4), the habit of a virtue is related in a determinate way to what is good, but is not in any way related to what is bad. Now the intellect's good is what is true, whereas what is bad for it is what is false. Hence, the only intellectual habits that are called virtues are those that always express what is true and never what is false.

By contrast, *holding an opinion* (*opinio*) and *having a suspicion* (*suspicio*) can be true or false. And so, as *Ethics* 6 says, they are not intellectual virtues.

Article 3

Is an art or craft an intellectual virtue?

It seems that an art or craft (*ars*) is not an intellectual virtue:

Objection 1: In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, "No one uses a virtue badly." But some craftsmen use their art badly, since a craftsman is able to act badly in accord with the knowledge of his art. Therefore, an art is not a virtue.

Objection 2: There is no virtue that belongs to a virtue. But as *Ethics* 6 says, "Some virtue belongs to an art." Therefore, an art is not a virtue.

Objection 3: The liberal arts (*artes liberales*) are more excellent than the mechanical arts (*artes mechanicae*). But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if an art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be numbered among the speculative virtues.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher claims that an art is a virtue, and yet he does not number art among the speculative virtues, whose subject he claims to be the scientific part of the soul.

I respond: An art or craft (*ars*) is nothing other than right reason concerning certain works to be made (*ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum*). Yet the good of those works consists not in the human appetite's being disposed in a certain way, but rather in the work that is made being itself good in its own right. For what is relevant to a craftsman's praiseworthiness insofar as he is a craftsman is not the sort of act of willing by which he makes his work (*non qua voluntate opus faciat*), but the quality of the work which he makes (*quale sit opus quod facit*).

So, then, an art is, properly speaking, a habit directed toward a work (*habitus operativus*); and yet an art shares something in common with the speculative habits, since it is likewise relevant to the speculative habits themselves how it stands with the things which they are considering and not how the human appetite is disposed toward those things. For when a geometer is demonstrating a truth, it does not matter what the condition of the appetitive part of his soul is (*non refert qualiter se habeat secundum appetitivam partem*), e.g., whether he is cheerful or angry—in the same way that, as has been explained, this does not matter in the case of the craftsman.

And so an art has the character of a virtue in the same way that a speculative habit does. More specifically, an art or a speculative habit makes a work good only as regards the *facility* for acting well and not as regards *use*, which is what is proper to a virtue that perfects the appetite.

Reply to objection 1: When someone who has an art makes a bad artifact, this is not a work of the art or craft—indeed, it is contrary to the art. Likewise, when someone who has scientific knowledge of the truth engages in deception instead, what he says is contrary to his scientific knowledge and not in accord with his scientific knowledge. Hence, as has been explained, an art is always related to the good in the same way that scientific knowledge is, and this is why it is called a virtue.

Still, it falls short of the complete concept of a virtue because it does not bring about good use itself; for this, something else is required, even though the good use could not exist in the absence of the art.

Reply to objection 2: In order that a man might make good use of an art that he possesses, what is required is a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; this is why the Philosopher claims that virtue belongs to an art, viz., moral virtue, insofar as some moral virtue is required for the good use of the art. For it is clear that it is through justice, which makes the will upright, that a craftsman is inclined to do his work reliably.

Reply to objection 3: Even in the case of the objects of the speculative intellect themselves (*etiam in ipsis speculabilibus*) there is something in the manner of a work, e.g., the construction of a syllogism or of an appropriate expression, or a work of enumerating or measuring. And so any speculative habits that are ordered toward these sorts of works of reason are called ‘arts’ because of a certain similarity—though they are called ‘liberal arts’ (*artes liberales*) in order to differentiate them from those arts which are ordered toward works exercised through the body and which are in some sense ‘servile’ arts, insofar as the body is subject as a servant to the soul, and insofar as a man is free (*liber*) because of the soul. By contrast, those types of scientific knowledge that are not ordered toward any work of this sort are called scientific knowledge absolutely speaking and not arts (*scientiae simpliciter, non autem artes*).

And it is not necessary that if the liberal arts are more noble, the concept *art* should apply to them to a higher degree.

Article 4

Is prudence a virtue distinct from an art?

It seems that prudence is not a virtue distinct from an art:

Objection 1: An art is right reason with respect to certain works. But diverse genera of works do not make anything lose the character of an art, since there are diverse arts with respect to very diverse works. Therefore, since prudence likewise is a type of right reason with respect to works, it seems that it should likewise be called an art.

Objection 2: Prudence shares more in common with an art than do the speculative habits, since, as *Ethics* 6 says, both prudence and art “have to do with what can be otherwise.” But certain speculative habits are called arts. Therefore, *a fortiori*, prudence should be called an art.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 6 says, “It belongs to prudence to deliberate well.” But as *Ethics* 3 points out, in the case of some arts it is likewise possible to deliberate, e.g., in the case of military art, and the art of governing, and the art of medicine. Therefore, prudence is not distinct from an art.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art.

I respond: Where one finds diverse conceptions of virtue, it is necessary to distinguish the virtues. Now it was explained above (a. 1 and q. 56, a. 3) that some habits have the character of a virtue solely from the fact that they confer a *facility* for a good work, whereas other habits have the character of a virtue from the fact that they confer not only a facility for a good work, but also the *use* [of that facility].

Now an art confers only a facility for a good work, since it does not involve the appetite (*non respicit appetitum*). By contrast, prudence effects not only a facility for a good work, but also use, since it does involve the appetite insofar as it presupposes uprightness of appetite. The reason for the difference is that art is right reason with respect to what can be *made* (*recta ratio factibilium*), whereas prudence is right reason with respect to what can be *done* (*recta ratio agibilium*). Now making (*facere*) and doing (*agere*) differ from one another in the sense that, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, making (*factio*) is a transient act on an exterior matter, e.g., building, cutting, etc., whereas doing (*agere*) is an act that

remains within the agent himself, e.g., seeing, willing, etc. So, then, prudence is related to human acts of this latter sort, which are the use of powers and habits, in the same way that art is related to exterior makings, since both are reason perfected with respect to the things to which they are related.

Now in speculative matters reason's perfection and rectitude depend on the principles from which reason constructs syllogisms—just as it has been explained (a. 2) that scientific knowledge (*scientia*) depends upon understanding (*intellectus*), which is a habit with respect to the principles, and presupposes understanding. And, as *Ethics* 7 claims, in the case of human acts the ends are like the principles in speculative matters. And so what is required for prudence, which is right reason with respect to what can be done, is that the man be well-disposed with respect to the ends, and this is effected by an upright appetite.

Now the good of artifacts is the good of the things that are made themselves (*bonum ipsorum operum artificialium*) and not the good of the human appetite, and so an art does not presuppose an upright appetite. This is why a craftsman who makes a mistake on purpose (*volens peccat*) is praised more than a craftsman who makes a mistake unwittingly (*nolens peccat*). By contrast, it is more contrary to prudence for someone to sin wittingly rather than unwittingly (*magis contra prudentiam quod aliquis peccat volens quam nolens*). For uprightness of will is part of the nature of prudence, but not part of the nature of an art (*est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de ratione artis*).

So, then, it is clear that prudence is a virtue distinct from an art.

Reply to objection 1: The diverse genera of things made by art (*diversa genera artificialium*) all exist outside of a man, and so the character of a virtue is not diversified by them. But prudence is right reason with respect to human acts themselves, and, as has been explained, this is the way in which the character of virtue is diversified from art.

Reply to objection 2: Prudence shares more in common with an art than the speculative habits do as regards their subject and matter. For both prudence and art exist in the part of the soul that deals with opinions (*utrumque est in opinativa parte animae*), and both of them have to do with what can be otherwise.

On the other hand, as has been explained (above and a. 3), art shares more in common with the speculative habits than with reason as far as the nature of a virtue is concerned.

Reply to objection 3: Prudence effects good deliberation about what pertains to a man's whole life and to the ultimate end of human life. But in some of the arts there is deliberation with respect to what pertains to the proper ends of those arts. Hence, insofar as certain individuals deliberate well about matters of war or about nautical matters, they are called prudent leaders or prudent ship-captains—but not prudent absolutely speaking. Rather, only those who deliberate well about what makes up a whole life are called prudent absolutely speaking.

Article 5

Is prudence a virtue that is necessary for living well?

It seems that prudence is not a virtue that is necessary for living well:

Objection 1: Prudence is related to what can be *done*, in accord with which a man's whole life is taken into account, in the same way that an art is related to what can be *made*; for art is right reason with respect to the latter and, as *Ethics* 6 says, prudence is right reason with respect to what can be done. But an art is necessary in the case of what can be made only in order for the things to come into existence, and not after they have been made. Therefore, prudence is not necessary for a man to live well *after* he has become virtuous; rather, it is perhaps necessary only with respect to his *becoming* virtuous.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 6 says, "It is prudence by which we deliberate well." But a man can act

not only on his own good counsel but also on someone else's good counsel. Therefore, for living well it is not necessary that a man himself have prudence; instead, it is sufficient that he follow the counsel of prudent individuals.

Objection 3: An intellectual virtue is a virtue by which it is possible always to say what is true and never what is false. But this does not seem to be possible in the case of prudence; for it is not human never to make a mistake in deliberating about what to do, since human actions are such that they could be otherwise. Hence, Wisdom 9:14 says, "The thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore, it seems that prudence should not be posited as an intellectual virtue.

But contrary to this: In Wisdom 8:7 prudence is enumerated with the other virtues necessary for human life when it says of divine wisdom: "She teaches temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such that men can have nothing more useful in life."

I respond: Prudence is a virtue that is necessary to the highest degree for human life. For to live well consists in acting well (*in bene operari*). But in order for someone to act well, what is important is not only *what* he does but also *how* he does it, viz., that he act in accord with a correct choice (*secundum electionem rectam*) and not just out of impulse or passion.

Now since the act of choosing (*electio*) has to do with the means to an end, two things are required for a correct choice, viz., (a) a fitting end and (b) what is appropriately ordered toward the fitting end. Now a man is appropriately disposed toward a fitting end by the sort of virtue which perfects the appetitive part of the soul, the object of which is the good and the end. On the other hand, a man has to be directly disposed by a habit of reason toward what is appropriately ordered toward a fitting end, since deliberating and choosing, which have to do with the means to an end, are acts of reason.

And so it is necessary for there to exist in reason some intellectual virtue by which reason is perfected with respect to being appropriately related to the means to an end. And this virtue is prudence. Hence, prudence is a virtue necessary for living well.

Reply to objection 1: The good of an *art* is thought of as existing not in the craftsman himself, but rather in the artifact itself, since an art is right reason with respect to what can be made. For the making, which passes into an exterior matter, is a perfection not of the one who makes the artifact but of the artifact that is made, in the way that a movement is the actuality of a thing that can be *moved*—though art has to do with what can be *made*.

By contrast, the good of *prudence* exists in the very agent whose perfection is the acting itself; for as has been explained (a. 4), prudence is right reason with respect to things that can *done*. And so what is required for an art is not that the craftsman should act well, but that he should make a good work. Indeed, if it were proper to the artifacts to act rather than to be acted upon (for they do not have dominion over their acts), it would rather be required that the *artifact itself* should act well, e.g., that the knife should carve well or that the saw should cut well.

This is why a craftsman's art or craft is not necessary in order for him to live well himself; rather, it is necessary only in order for him to make good artifacts and to conserve them. By contrast, prudence is necessary in order for a man to *live well* and not only for him to *become good*.

Reply to objection 2: When a man acts well not in accord with his own reason but insofar as he is moved by someone else's counsel, his action is not yet altogether perfect as regards his reason directing him and his appetite moving him. Hence, if he does something good, he is not acting well, i.e., living well, absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 3: As *Ethics* 6 says, 'the truth of practical reason' (*verum intellectus practici*) is understood in a way different from 'the truth of speculative reason'. For 'the truth of speculative reason' is understood through a conformity of the intellect to the thing. And since the intellect can be infallibly conformed to the things only in necessary matters and not in contingent matters, it follows that only a speculative habit with respect to necessary matters—and no speculative habit with respect to contingent matters—is an intellectual virtue.

By contrast, ‘the truth of the practical intellect’ is understood through a conformity to an upright appetite. This sort of conformity has no place in the case of necessary matters, which are not effected by the human will; instead, it has a place only in the case of contingent matters that we are able to effect, whether they be interior actions or exterior things that can be made. And so virtues of the practical intellect are posited only with respect to contingent things, viz., *art* with respect to what can be made and *prudence* with respect to what can be done.

Article 6

Are good deliberation (*eubilia*), and two sorts of good judgment (*synesis* and *gnome*) appropriately joined to prudence?

It seems that good deliberation (*eubilia*) and two sorts of good judgment (*synesis* and *gnome*) are not appropriately joined to prudence:

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 6 says, good deliberation (*eubilia*) is a habit by which we deliberate well. But as it says in the same book, it belongs to prudence to deliberate well. Therefore, good deliberation is not a virtue joined to prudence but is instead prudence itself.

Objection 2: It belongs to what is higher to pass judgment on what is lower. Therefore, the virtue whose act is judgment seems to be the highest. But good judgment (*synesis*) is what judges well. Therefore, good judgment is not a virtue joined to prudence but is rather itself the main virtue.

Objection 3: Just as there are diverse matters that have to be judged, so, too, there are diverse matters that have to be deliberated about. But a single virtue, viz., good deliberation (*eubilia*), is posited with respect to all matters that can be deliberated about. Therefore, in order to judge well about things to be done, it is unnecessary to posit, besides *synesis*, another virtue, viz. *gnome*.

Objection 4: In *Rhetorica* Tully posits three parts of prudence, viz., “memory of things past (*memoria praeteritorum*), understanding of things present (*intelligentia praesentium*), and foresight over things future (*providentia futurorum*).” In *Super Somnium Scipionis* Macrobius posits, in addition, certain other parts of prudence, viz., “caution (*cautio*), docility (*docilitas*),” and others of this sort. Therefore, the virtues in question do not seem to be the only virtues joined to prudence.

But contrary to this is the authority of the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, where he claims that the three virtues in question are joined to prudence.

I respond: Among all ordered powers, the power that is more principal is the one that is ordered toward the more principal act.

Now there are three acts of reason with respect to what can be done: first, to *deliberate* (*consiliari*); second, to *judge* (*iudicare*); and third, to *command* (*praecipere*). The first two correspond to two acts of the speculative intellect, viz., to *inquire* (*inquirere*) and to *pass judgment* (*iudicare*); for deliberation is a certain sort of inquiry. But the third act is proper to the practical intellect, insofar as it is ordered toward action (*est operativus*), since reason does not have to command what cannot be done by a man.

Now it is clear that in what is done by a man, the principal act is to *command*, and the others are ordered toward it. And so it is joined to the virtue which is to command well, viz., prudence, as its more principal act, whereas *eubilia*, which is good deliberation, and *synesis* and *gnome*, which are the parts that concern judgment, are joined to prudence as secondary acts. (The distinction between *synesis* and *gnome* will be explained in a moment.)

Reply to objection 1: Prudence involves deliberating well (*est bene consiliativa*) not in the sense that its act is directly to deliberate well, but in the sense that it perfects the act of deliberating by the mediation of a virtue which is subject to it, viz., good deliberation (*eubilia*).

Reply to objection 2: In the case of things to be done, judgment is ordered toward something further. For it is possible to make a good judgment about what is to be done and yet not to execute that judgment correctly. Rather, the ultimate fulfillment is reached when reason has commanded well with respect to what is to be done.

Reply to objection 3: A *judgment* regarding a given thing is made through its *proper* principles. But an *inquiry* is not made through the thing's proper principles, since once these principles are had, then there is no need for inquiry, but the matter is already figured out (*iam res esset inventa*). And so just one virtue is ordered toward deliberating well, whereas two virtues are ordered toward judging well, since the distinction between them lies not in the *common* principles, but instead in the *proper* principles. Likewise, in speculative matters there is a single sort of dialectical inquiry about all things, whereas the demonstrative sciences, which pass judgment, are diverse with respect to diverse things.

Now *synesis* and *gnome* are distinguished from one another by the diverse rules by which they judge. For *synesis* passes judgment about what is to be done in accord with common law, whereas *gnome* passes judgment in accord with natural reason itself in cases in which common law is lacking. This will be explained more fully below (*ST* 2-2, q. 51, a. 4).

Reply to objection 4: Memory, understanding, and foresight—and, likewise, caution, docility and other things of this sort—are not virtues distinct from prudence, but are in some sense related to prudence like *integral parts*, insofar as they are all required for the perfection of prudence. There are also certain *subjective parts*, or *species*, of prudence, e.g., economic prudence, governing prudence, etc. But the three virtues under discussion here are, as it were, *potential parts* of prudence, since they are ordered to prudence in the way that what is secondary is related to what is principal. More will be said about this below (*ST* 2-2, qq. 48ff.).

QUESTION 58

The Distinction between the Moral Virtues and the Intellectual Virtues

Next we have to consider the moral virtues: first, as regards the distinction of the moral virtues from the intellectual virtues (question 58); second, as regards the distinction of the moral virtues from one another according to their proper matter (questions 59-60); and, third, as regards the distinction of the principal, i.e., cardinal, virtues from the others (question 61).

On the first topic there are five questions: (1) Is every virtue a moral virtue? (2) Is a moral virtue distinguished from an intellectual virtue? (3) Is *virtue* adequately divided into *intellectual virtue* and *moral virtue*? (4) Can moral virtue exist without intellectual virtue? (5) Conversely, can intellectual virtue exist without moral virtue?

Article 1

Is every virtue a moral virtue?

It seems that every virtue is a moral virtue:

Objection 1: Moral (*moralis*) virtue takes its name from *mos*, i.e., custom (*consuetudo*). But we can become accustomed to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, every virtue is a moral virtue.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “A moral virtue is an elective habit consisting in a mean of reason (*in meditare rationis*).” But every virtue seems to be an elective habit, since we can do the acts of any virtue by choice. Also, as will be explained below (q. 64, aa. 1 and 2 and 3), every virtue consists in some sense in a mean of reason (*in medio rationis*). Therefore, every virtue is a moral virtue.

Objection 3: In *Rhetorica* Tully says, “A virtue is a habit consonant with reason in the manner of a nature.” But since every human virtue is ordered toward a man’s good, it has to be consonant with reason; for as Dionysius says, a man’s good is “to exist in accord with reason.” Therefore, every virtue is a moral virtue.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, “In speaking about morals (*de moribus*), we do not say that a man is wise or intelligent; instead, we say that he is gentle or sober.” So, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues, and yet, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 2), they are virtues. Therefore, not every virtue is a moral virtue.

I respond: To get clear on this matter, we have to think about what *mos* is, since it is in this way that we can come to know what a moral (*moralis*) virtue is. Now there are two things *mos* signifies:

Sometimes it signifies custom (*consuetudo*), in the way it says in Acts 15:1, “Unless you are circumcised after the custom of Moses, you will not be able to be saved.”

On the other hand, sometimes *mos* signifies a certain natural or quasi-natural inclination to do something; in this sense, even brute animals are said to have *mores*. Hence, 2 Maccabees 11:11 says, “Rushing violently upon the enemy, as lions do by inclination (*leonum more*), they slew them.” And it is in this sense that *mos* is taken in Psalm 67:7, when it says, “Who makes men of the same inclination (*unius moris*) to dwell in the house.”

And these two significations are not distinguished in any way among the Latins, as far as the pronunciation is concerned (*quantum ad vocem*). By contrast, they are distinguished in the Greek, since *ethos*, which signifies *mos* for us, sometimes has a long first vowel and is written with an *eta*, whereas sometimes it has a short first vowel and is written with an *epsilon*.

Now ‘moral virtue’ comes from *mos* (*dicitur virtus moralis a more*) insofar as *mos* signifies a certain natural or quasi-natural inclination to do something. And this signification is close to the other signification, by which it signifies ‘custom’. For a custom is in some sense turned into a nature and makes for an inclination similar to a natural inclination.

Now it is clear that an inclination to act belongs, properly speaking, to an appetitive power, whose

role, as is clear from what was said above (q. 9, a. 1), is to move all the powers toward acting. And so not every virtue is called a moral virtue, but only a virtue that exists in an appetitive power.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for *mos* insofar as it signifies a custom.

Reply to objection 2: Every act of a virtue can be done by choice (*potest ex electione agi*), but only a virtue that exists in the appetitive part of the soul effects a correct act of choosing. For it was explained above (q. 13, a. 1) that the act of choosing is an act of the appetitive part. Hence, the only elective habits, i.e., habits which are a *principle* of an act of choosing, are those that perfect the appetitive power, even though the acts of other habits can also fall under an act of choosing.

Reply to objection 3: As *Physics* 2 says, “A nature is a principle of movement.” But to move something toward acting is proper to the appetitive part of the soul. And to be like a nature in consenting to reason is proper to those virtues that exist in the appetitive part.

Article 2

Is a moral virtue distinguished from an intellectual virtue?

It seems that a moral virtue is not distinguished from an intellectual virtue:

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 4 Augustine says, “A virtue is an art of living well.” But an art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, a moral virtue does not differ from an intellectual virtue.

Objection 2: *Knowledge (scientia)* is often posited in the definition of the moral virtues. For instance, some define perseverance as ‘a knowledge or habit with respect to those things that should or should not be persisted in’, and sanctity as ‘knowledge that makes men to be faithful and to observe what is just with respect to God’. But knowledge is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, one should not distinguish a moral virtue from an intellectual virtue.

Objection 3: In *Soliloquia* 1 Augustine says, “A virtue is right and perfected reason.” But as is clear from *Ethics* 6, this pertains to an intellectual virtue. Therefore, a moral virtue is not distinct from an intellectual virtue.

Objection 4: Nothing is distinct from what is posited in its definition. But *intellectual virtue* is posited in the definition of *moral virtue*. For in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “A moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean determined by reason, in the way that a wise man would determine it.” But as *Ethics* 6 explains, this sort of right reason, which determines the mean of a moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue. Therefore, a moral virtue is not distinguished from an intellectual virtue.

But contrary to this: *Ethics* 1 says, “Virtue is determined by a difference, since we call some of them intellectual virtues and others moral virtues.”

I respond: Reason is the first principle of all human works, and if there are any other principles of human works, they in some sense obey reason, though in different ways.

For some of them obey reason completely at will, without any opposition—like bodily limbs, as long as they remain in their natural condition (*si fuerint in sua natura consistentia*). For as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot moves into action (*movetur ad opus*). Hence, in *Politics* 1 the Philosopher says, “The soul governs the body by despotic rule,” i.e., in the way that a master governs a servant who does not have the right to oppose him. Thus, some have claimed that it is in this way that all the active principles that exist in a man are related to reason. And, indeed, if this were true, then reason’s being perfected would be sufficient for acting well. Hence, since a virtue is a habit by which we are perfected in acting well, it would follow that virtue exists in reason alone, and so there would be no virtues except intellectual virtues. And this was the opinion of Socrates, who claimed, as *Ethics* 6 reports, that as long as knowledge existed in a man, he was unable to sin, and that if anyone sinned, he sinned because of ignorance.

However, this opinion proceeds from a false assumption. For the appetitive part of the soul obeys reason not completely at will, but with some opposition. This is why the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, “Reason governs the appetitive part by political rule (*principatu politico*), i.e., by the sort of rule by which one presides over free men, who have the right to oppose him in some matters.” Hence, in *Super Psalmos* Augustine says, “Sometimes understanding leads the way and desire follows slowly or not at all”—even to the point that the passions or habits of the appetitive part of the soul sometimes act in such a way as to impede the use of reason in a particular case. Accordingly, what Socrates said, viz., that when knowledge is present, one does not sin, is true in a certain sense, as long as this condition extends right up to the use of reason in a particular situation of choice.

So, then, in order for a man to act well, what is required is not only that his reason be well disposed through a habit of intellectual virtue, but also that his appetitive power be well disposed through a habit of moral virtue. Therefore, in the same way that appetite is distinguished from reason, so moral virtue is distinguished from intellectual virtue. Hence, just as an appetite is a principle of a human act insofar as it participates in reason in some way, so a moral habit has the character of a human virtue insofar as it is conformed to reason.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine commonly uses ‘art’ for any sort of right reason. And so ‘art’ includes even prudence, which is right reason with respect to what can be done, just as art is right reason with respect to what can be made. Accordingly, what Augustine said, viz., that virtue is the art of living well, belongs to prudence in its essence (*essentialiter convenit prudentiae*) and to the other virtues by participation (*participative*), insofar as they are directed in accord with prudence.

Reply to objection 2: Definitions of the sort in question, no matter who gives them, proceed from Socrates’s opinion and should be interpreted in the way that ‘art’ was just interpreted above.

Reply to objection 3: Something similar should be said in reply to the third objection.

Reply to objection 4: *Right reason that accords with prudence* is posited in the definition of moral virtue not as part of its essence but as something that is participated in by all the moral virtues, insofar as prudence directs all the moral virtues.

Article 3

Is human virtue adequately divided into moral virtue and intellectual virtue?

It seems that *human virtue* is not adequately divided into *moral virtue* and *intellectual virtue*:

Objection 1: Prudence seems to be something in between a moral virtue and an intellectual virtue; for in *Ethics* 6 prudence is numbered among the intellectual virtues, and it also commonly numbered by everyone among the four cardinal virtues, which, as will become clear below (q. 61, a. 1), are moral virtues. Therefore, *virtue* is not adequately divided into *intellectual* and *moral* with no intermediate (*dividitur per intellectualem et moralem sicut per immediata*).

Objection 2: Continence and perseverance, and patience as well, are not counted among the intellectual virtues. But neither are they moral virtues, since they do not hold to a mean within the passions; instead, the passions abound in them. Therefore, *virtue* is not adequately divided into *intellectual virtues* and *moral virtues*.

Objection 3: Faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues, since the intellectual virtues are such that, as has been explained (q. 57, aa. 2 and 3 and 5), there are just five of them, viz., scientific knowledge (*scientia*), wisdom (*sapientia*), understanding (*intellectus*), prudence (*prudentia*), and art or craft (*ars*). But neither are they moral virtues, since they do not deal with the passions, which moral virtue deals with especially. Therefore, *virtue* is not adequately divided into *intellectual virtues* and *moral virtues*.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “There are two sorts of virtue, intellectual and moral.”

I respond: A human virtue is a habit that perfects a man with respect to acting well. Now there are just two principles of human acts in a man, viz., (a) the intellect or reason and (b) appetite; for as *De Anima* says, these are the two things that effect movement in a man (*haec sunt duo moventia in homine*). Hence, every human virtue must perfect one of these principles (*perfectiva alicuius istorum principiorum*). Therefore, if the virtue in question perfects the speculative or practical intellect with respect to some good act of a man, then it will be an intellectual virtue, whereas if it perfects the appetitive part of the soul, then it will be a moral virtue. Hence, it follows that every human virtue is either an intellectual virtue or a moral virtue.

Reply to objection 1: As far as its essence is concerned, prudence is an intellectual virtue. However, as far as its matter is concerned, it fits in with the moral virtues, since, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 4), it is right reason with respect to what can be done. And because of this it is counted among the moral virtues.

Reply to objection 2: Continence and perseverance are not perfections of the sentient appetitive power. This is clear from the fact that disordered passions abound in one who is being continent and in one who is persevering—something that would not be the case if the sentient appetite had been perfected by a habit that conforms it to reason.

To the contrary, continence (or perseverance) is a perfection of the rational part of the soul, which is holding itself firm against the passions (*se tenet contra passiones*), so as not to be led away by them. Yet such a habit falls short of having the character of a virtue, because an intellectual virtue that makes reason behave well in moral matters presupposes an upright desire for the end, so that it is correctly related to the principles, i.e., the ends, from which it reasons—something that is missing in the case of the one who is being continent and the one who is persevering.

Nor can there be a perfect operation that proceeds from two powers unless each of the powers is perfected by an appropriate habit—in just the same way that an agent’s action through an instrument is not perfect unless the instrument is well disposed, no matter how perfect the principal agent is. Hence, if the sentient appetite, which is moved by the rational part, is not perfect, then no matter how perfect the rational part is, the action that follows will not be perfect. Hence, neither will the principle of the action be a virtue.

For this reason, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 7, continence with respect to sensory pleasures (*continentia a delectationibus*) and perseverance in the face of pain and sadness (*perseverantia a tristitiis*) are not virtues, but something less than virtues.

Reply to objection 3: Faith, hope, and charity lie beyond the human virtues (*sunt supra virtutes humanas*), since they are the virtues that belong to a man insofar as he has become a participant in God’s grace.

Article 4

Can moral virtue exist without intellectual virtue?

It seems that moral virtue can exist without intellectual virtue:

Objection 1: As Tully says, “A virtue is a habit in the manner of a nature, consonant with reason.” But even if a nature is consonant with a higher reason that is moving it, that higher reason still does not have to be joined to the nature in the same subject (*in eodem*); this is clear in the case of natural things that lack cognition. Therefore, it is possible for moral virtue to exist in a man, inclining him to consent to reason, even though that particular man’s reason is not perfected by an intellectual virtue.

Objection 2: Through an intellectual virtue a man attains the perfect use of reason. But it sometimes happens that individuals in whom the use of reason is not very strong are virtuous and acceptable to God (*Deo accepti*). Therefore, it seems that moral virtue can exist without intellectual virtue.

Objection 3: A moral virtue effects an inclination toward acting well. But some individuals have a natural inclination toward acting well, even in the absence of reason's judgment. Therefore, moral virtues can exist without intellectual virtue.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 22 Gregory says, "Unless the other virtues enact prudently what they desire, they can in no way be virtues." But as was explained above (q. 57, a. 5), prudence is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, moral virtues cannot exist without intellectual virtues.

I respond: Moral virtue can exist without certain intellectual virtues, e.g., wisdom, scientific knowledge, and art. But moral virtue cannot exist without *understanding* and *prudence*.

Moral virtue cannot exist without *prudence*, because moral virtue is an elective habit, i.e., a habit that effects a good act of choosing (*habitus faciens bonam electionem*), and two things are required for a good act of choosing. The first is that the act of intending the end be good, and this is effected by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive power toward a good that is consonant with reason, i.e., toward a fitting end. The second is that the man correctly perceive the means to the end, and this cannot happen except through reason's correctly deliberating, judging, and commanding—and this, as was explained above (q. 57, aa. 5 and 6), pertains to prudence and the virtues joined to it.

Hence, moral virtue cannot exist without prudence and, as a result, it cannot exist without *understanding*, either. For it is through understanding that one has cognition of naturally known principles (*per intellectum cognoscuntur principia naturaliter nota*), both in speculative matters and matters having to do with action. Hence, just as in speculative matters right reason presupposes an understanding of naturally known principles insofar as it proceeds from those principles, so too with prudence, which is right reason with respect to what can be done.

Reply to objection 1: In the case of things that lack reason, the inclination of a nature exists without the act of choosing, and so an inclination of this sort does not necessarily require reason. By contrast, the inclination that belongs to a moral virtue exists with the act of choosing, and so for its perfection it needs reason to be perfected by an intellectual virtue.

Reply to objection 2: In a virtuous individual the use of reason does not have to be strong with respect to all things, but only with respect to what has to be done in accord with virtue. And this is the sense in which the use of reason is strong in all virtuous individuals. Hence, even those who seem simple because they lack worldly wisdom (*caerent mundana astutia*) can be prudent—this according to Matthew 10:16 ("Be as prudent as serpents and as simple as doves").

Reply to objection 3: The natural inclination toward the good of virtue is a sort of beginning of virtue, but it is not perfected virtue. For the stronger an inclination of this sort is, the more dangerous it can be, unless it is joined to right reason, through which correct choices are made with respect to what is consonant with a fitting end—in the same way that if a running horse is blind, the more vigorously it runs, the harder it falls and the more seriously it is hurt. And so even if moral virtue is not *identical with* right reason in the way that Socrates claimed it is, still, not only is it the case that moral virtue is *in accord with* right reason insofar as it inclines one toward what is in accord with right reason, as the Platonists claimed, but it is also the case that moral virtue *must exist along with* right reason, as Aristotle claims in *Ethics* 9.

Article 5

Can intellectual virtue exist without moral virtue?

It seems that intellectual virtue can exist without moral virtue:

Objection 1: The perfection of what is prior does not depend on the perfection of what is posterior. But reason is prior to the sentient appetite and moves the sentient appetite. Therefore, intellectual virtue, which is the perfection of reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is the perfection of the appetitive part of the soul. Therefore, intellectual virtue can exist without moral virtue.

Objection 2: Morals are the matter of prudence, in the way that what can be made is the matter of an art or craft (*materia artis*). But an art can exist without its proper matter; for instance, a blacksmith without iron. Therefore, prudence can likewise exist without the moral virtues, and yet of all the intellectual virtues, prudence seems to be the one that is especially conjoined to the moral virtues.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 6 says, prudence is a virtue by which one deliberates well (*virtus bene consiliativa*). But there are many individuals who deliberate well and yet lack the moral virtues. Therefore, prudence can exist without moral virtue.

But contrary to this: *To will what is bad* is directly opposed to moral virtue, but it is not opposed to anything that can exist without moral virtue. But as *Ethics* 6 says, sinning on purpose (*volens peccat*) is opposed to prudence. Therefore, it is not the case that prudence can exist without moral virtue.

I respond: The other intellectual virtues can exist without moral virtue, but prudence cannot exist without moral virtue.

The reason for this is that prudence is right reason with respect to what can be done—not only in general, but also in particular cases, among which are actions. But right reason requires principles from which reasoning proceeds, and with respect to particular matters reason needs to proceed not only from *universal* principles but also from *particular* principles.

As regards the universal principles of what can be done, a man is correctly related to them through (a) the natural understanding of principles, through which a man knows that nothing bad is to be done, and also through (b) some sort of practical knowledge.

However, this is not sufficient for reasoning correctly about particular matters. For it sometimes happens that a universal principle of the sort in question, known through understanding or knowledge, is corrupted in a particular case by some passion. For instance, when concupiscence overcomes a man who has an avid sensory desire, what he desires seems good to him even though it is contrary to reason's universal judgment. And so, just as a man is disposed toward being correctly related to the universal principles through natural understanding or through a habit of knowledge, so, too, in order for him to be correctly related to the *particular* principles of what is to be done, i.e., the ends, he must be perfected by habits in accord with which it becomes in some sense connatural to the man to judge correctly concerning the end. And this is effected by moral virtue. For the virtuous individual judges correctly about the end of virtue, since, as *Ethics* 3 says, "Such as an individual is, so the end appears to him." And so what is required for right reason with respect to what can be done, i.e., for prudence, is that the man have moral virtue.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as reason apprehends the end, it precedes the desire for the end, but the desire for the end precedes reason's reasoning about choosing the means to the end, which is what pertains to prudence—just as, in the case of speculative matters, the understanding of the principles is the starting point for reason's syllogizing.

Reply to objection 2: The principles of things that are made are judged well or badly by us not in accord with the disposition of our appetite—in the way that ends, which are the principles of moral matters, are judged—but only through reason's consideration. And so, unlike prudence, an art or craft does not require a virtue that perfects the appetite.

Reply to objection 3: Prudence not only deliberates well, but also judges well and commands well. But this is impossible unless one removes the obstacle of passions that corrupt prudence's judgment and command. And this obstacle is removed through moral virtue.

QUESTION 59

The Relation of the Moral Virtues to the Passions

Next we have to consider the distinction of the moral virtues from one another. And since those moral virtues that have to do with the passions are distinguished in a way corresponding to the diversity of the passions, we must consider, first, the relation of virtue to the passions (question 59) and, second, the distinctions among the moral virtues according to the passions (question 60).

On the first topic there are five questions: (1) Is a moral virtue a passion? (2) Can a moral virtue exist along with a passion? (3) Can a moral virtue exist along with sadness? (4) Does every moral virtue have to do with some passion? (5) Are there moral virtues that can exist without any passion?

Article 1

Is a moral virtue a passion?

It seems that a moral virtue is a passion:

Objection 1: The mean belongs to the same genus as the extremes. But a moral virtue is a mean among the passions. Therefore, a moral virtue is a passion.

Objection 2: Since *virtue* and *vice* are contraries, they are in the same genus. But certain passions are called vices, e.g., envy and anger. Therefore, certain passions are virtues.

Objection 3: Pity (*misericordia*) is a passion, since, as was explained above (q. 35, a. 8), pity is sadness over bad things that happen to others (*tristitia de alienis malis*). But Cicero, the great orator, did not hesitate to call pity a virtue, as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 9. Therefore, a passion can be a moral virtue.

But contrary to this: *Ethics* 2 says that the passions are neither virtues nor vices (*neque virtutes neque malitiae*).

I respond: A moral virtue cannot be a passion. There are three reasons why this is clear:

First of all, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), a passion is a certain movement of the sentient appetite. But a moral virtue is not a movement; instead, it is a principle of an appetitive movement, a certain existent habit.

Second, the passions do not in their own right (*ex seipsis*) have the character *good* or *bad*. For the good or bad for a man has to do with reason, and so the passions, considered in themselves, are related to the good and the bad to the extent that they are capable of harmonizing or not harmonizing with reason. But nothing like this can be a virtue, since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), a virtue is directed only toward the good.

Third, even if there is a passion that is in some fashion directed only toward the good or only toward the bad, still, the movement of the passion, insofar as it is a passion, has its beginning in the appetite itself and its terminus in reason, where the appetite's tendency conforms to reason. But the movement of a virtue is in the opposite direction, having its beginning in reason and its terminus in an appetite insofar as the appetite is moved by reason. This is why, in giving the definition of a moral virtue, *Ethics* 2 says, "A virtue is an elective habit consisting in a mean determined by reason, in the way that a wise man will determine it."

Reply to objection 1: A virtue is a mean between the passions not in its *essence* (*non secundum suam essentiam*), but rather in its *effect* (*secundum suum effectum*), since it sets up a mean between the passions.

Reply to objection 2: If what is being called a vice is a habit according to which one acts badly, then it is clear that no passion is a vice. On the other hand, if what is being called a vice is a sin, i.e., a vicious act, then nothing prevents a passion from being a vice in this sense or, conversely, from being concomitant with an act of virtue, depending on whether the passion is contrary to or in conformity with

the act of reason.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine puts it in the same place, pity is called a virtue, i.e., an *act* of virtue, insofar as “that movement of the mind is obedient to reason, so that pity is offered in such a way as to preserve justice, as when someone needy is given money, or as when someone who is repentant is forgiven.” On the other hand, if ‘pity’ means a *habit* by which a man is perfected in having reasonable sorrow, then nothing prevents pity from being called a virtue. And the same line of reasoning holds for similar passions.

Article 2

Can moral virtue exist along with a passion?

It seems that moral virtue cannot exist along with a passion:

Objection 1: In *Topics* 4 the Philosopher says, “A gentle man is one who does not experience passion (*non patitur*), whereas a patient man is one who experiences passion and is not carried away.” And the same line of reasoning holds for all the moral virtues. Therefore, every moral virtue exists without passion.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 7 says, a virtue is an upright state of the soul (*recta habitudo animae*), like health is of the body. Hence, as Tully puts it in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus*, “Virtue seems to be something like the health of the soul.” The passions, by contrast, are called “certain sicknesses of the soul,” as Tully says in the same book. But health is not compatible with sickness. Therefore, neither is virtue compatible with a passion of the soul.

Objection 3: Moral virtue requires the perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But this is impeded by the passions; for in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “Sensory pleasures corrupt the judgment of prudence (*corrumpunt existimationem prudentiae*),” and in *De Coniuratione Catilinae* Sallust says, “When they, i.e., the passions of the mind, get in the way, it is not easy for the mind to perceive the truth.” Therefore, moral virtue cannot exist along with a passion.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “If the will is perverse, these movements that it has, viz., the movements of the passions, will be perverse, whereas if the will is upright, then the movements will not only be non-culpable, but will even be praiseworthy.” But nothing praiseworthy is excluded by moral virtue. Therefore, moral virtue does not exclude the passions but can exist along with them.

I respond: As Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 9, on this topic there was a disagreement between the Stoics and the Peripatetics.

The Stoics claimed that the passions of the soul cannot exist in one who is wise or virtuous, whereas the Peripatetics, whose sect Aristotle founded (as Augustine reports in *De Civitate* 9), claimed that the passions can exist along with moral virtue, as long as they are brought back to a mean.

As Augustine remarks in the same place, this difference is more a verbal difference than a difference in their views. For since the Stoics did not draw a distinction between the *intellective* appetite, i.e., the will, and the *sentient* appetite, which is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, they did not distinguish, in the way the Peripatetics did, the passions of the soul from other human affections by claiming that the passions of the soul are movements of the sentient appetite, whereas the other affections, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite, which is called the will. Instead, they claimed only that ‘the passions’ are any affections that oppose reason. If they arise as a result of deliberation, then they cannot exist in one who is wise or virtuous, whereas if they arise suddenly, then this can happen in one who is virtuous, because, as Augustine reports the words of Gellius in *De Civitate Dei* 9, “the mind’s visions, which they call ‘fancies’ (*quae appellant phantasias*), are not

such that it is within our power whether they sometimes arise in our mind; and when they arise from fearful things, they necessarily move the mind of one who is wise, so that he is slightly startled by fear or depressed by sorrow as long as these fancies prevent the use of reason; and yet the wise do not approve of these fancies or consent to them.”

So, then, if what is being called a ‘passion’ is a disordered affection, then, as the Stoics claimed, passions cannot exist in the virtuous individual in such a way that he consents to them after deliberation. On the other hand, if what is being called a ‘passion’ is any movement of the sentient appetite, then passions can exist in the virtuous individual to the extent that they are ordered by reason. Hence, in *Ethics 2* Aristotle says, “Some describe virtue as being a state of impassivity and rest (*determinant virtutes impassibilitates quasdam et quietes*); this is incorrect, because they are speaking in an unqualified way. Instead, they should say that the virtues are a respite from passions that are not as they should be and that occur when they should not occur.”

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher uses this example, like many others in his books on logic, not in accord with his own opinion, but in accord with the opinion of others.

Now the opinion expressed here was that of the Stoics, viz., that the virtues exist without the passions of the soul. This is an opinion that the Philosopher rules out in *Ethics 2*, when he claims that the virtues are not states of impassivity (*non esse impassibilitates*).

Still, one could reply that in “the gentle man is one who does not experience passion,” “passion” should be understood as “disordered passion.”

Reply to objection 2: This argument, and all the similar arguments that Tully puts forth in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 4*, have to do with the passions insofar as ‘passions’ signifies disordered affections.

Reply to objection 3: If a passion that precedes reason’s judgment prevails in the mind to the extent that it is consented to, then it impedes reason’s deliberation and judgment. On the other hand, if the passion follows upon reason’s judgment and is, as it were, commanded by reason, then it aids in the execution of reason’s command.

Article 3

Can virtue exist along with sadness?

It seems that virtue cannot exist along with sadness (*cum tristitia*):

Objection 1: According to Wisdom 8:7 (“She”—i.e., divine wisdom—“teaches sobriety and justice, prudence and virtue”), the virtues are the effects of wisdom. But “the conversation of wisdom has no bitterness,” as we read afterwards (Wisdom 8:16). Therefore, neither can the virtues exist along with sadness.

Objection 2: As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 7* and 10, sadness is an obstacle to operation. But an obstacle to a good operation is contrary to virtue. Therefore, sadness is incompatible with virtue.

Objection 3: Sadness is a sort of sickness of the soul, as Tully calls it in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus 3*. But a sickness of the soul is contrary to virtue, which is a good condition of the soul. Therefore, sadness is contrary to virtue and cannot exist along with it.

But contrary to this: Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sadness in Him, as Matthew 26:38 reports (“My soul is sorrowful even unto death”). Therefore, sadness can exist along with virtue.

I respond: As Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei 14*, the Stoics claimed that in the mind of one who is wise there are three *eupatheiai*, i.e., three good passions, in place of three perturbations, viz., *will* (*voluntas*) in place of avid desire (*cupiditas*), *joy* (*gaudium*) in place of *mirth* (*laetitia*), and *caution*

(*cautio*) in place of fear (*metus*).

By contrast, they denied that there can be anything in the mind of the wise man in place of sadness—and this for two reasons:

First, sadness has to do with something bad that has already happened. But they believe that nothing bad can happen to a wise man, since they believed that, just as a man's only good is virtue and no corporeal goods are among a man's good, so the only thing bad for a man is what is ignoble (*inhonestum*), which cannot exist in a virtuous man.

However, this argument is unreasonable. For since a man is composed of a soul and a body, whatever contributes to conserving the body's life is something good for a man—though not the greatest good, since he is able to use it badly. Hence, something bad that is contrary to this good can exist in a virtuous man and induce a moderate sadness. Furthermore, even if there can be a virtuous man without grave sin, there is nonetheless no one who leads a life without any less serious sins—this according to 1 John 1:8 (“If we say that we do not have sin, we deceive ourselves”). Third, even if a virtuous man did not have sin now, he might have had sin at some time in the past. And it would be praiseworthy for him to be sad about this—this according to 2 Corinthians 7:10 (“The sorrow that is in accord with God brings about steadfast penance unto salvation”). Fourth, it is likewise praiseworthy to be sad about the sin of another. Hence, in the same way that moral virtue is compatible with other passions that are moderated by reason, it is likewise compatible with sadness.

Second, they were moved by the fact that sadness is directed toward a present evil, whereas fear (*timor*) is directed toward a future evil, just as pleasure is directed toward a present good, whereas desire is directed toward a future good. Now it can pertain to virtue that someone should enjoy a good that he has or that he should desire a good that he does not have, or even that he should be wary of a future evil (*etiam malum futurum caveat*). But it seems altogether contrary to reason that a man's mind should be depressed by a present evil, and hence sadness cannot exist along with virtue.

However, this argument is unreasonable. For as has been explained, it is possible for something bad to be present to a virtuous man. But reason detests anything bad. Hence, the sentient appetite follows reason's hatred in that it is saddened over something bad of this sort—yet in a moderate way, in accord with reason's judgment. Now as has been explained (a. 1), it pertains to virtue that the sentient appetite should be conformed to reason. Hence, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, it pertains to virtue that one should be moderately sad over things that one should be sad about. And sadness is also useful for fleeing from evils. For just as goods are sought more promptly because of pleasure, so evils are more forcefully fled from because of sadness.

So, then, one should reply that sadness directed toward what accords with virtue cannot exist along with virtue, since virtue delights in what belongs to it. But virtue is moderately saddened by those things that are in any way incompatible with virtue.

Reply to objection 1: From this passage one can infer that the wise man is not saddened by wisdom. Yet he is saddened by what impedes wisdom. And so in those who are blessed in heaven (*in beatis*), in whom there can be no impediment to wisdom, sadness has no place.

Reply to objection 2: Sadness impedes an operation about which we are sad, but it assists us in more promptly executing those things through which sadness is fled from.

Reply to objection 3: Immoderate sadness is a sickness of the soul, but moderate sadness belongs to the good condition of the soul in the state of the present life.

Article 4

Does every moral virtue have to do with the passions?

It seems that every moral virtue has to do with the passions:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “Moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains (*circa voluptates et tristitias*).” But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 31, a. 1 and q. 35, aa. 1-2), pleasure (*delectatio*) and pain (*tristitia*) are passions. Therefore, every moral virtue has to do with the passions.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 1 says, what is rational through participation is the subject of the moral virtues. But as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), this is the part of the soul in which the passions exist. Therefore, every moral virtue has to do with the passions.

Objection 3: In every moral virtue one can find some passion. Therefore, either all the moral virtues have to do with the passions or none of them do. But as *Ethics* 3 says, some virtues, such as fortitude and temperance, have to do with the passions. Therefore, all moral virtues have to do with the passions.

But contrary to this: As *Ethics* 5 says, justice, which is a moral virtue, does not have to do with the passions.

I respond: Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by ordering it toward the good of reason. But the good of reason is that which accords with moderated or ordered reason. Hence, it is possible for moral virtue to have to do with whatever can be ordered and moderated by reason.

Now reason not only orders the passions of the sentient appetite, but also orders the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e., the will, which, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), is not a subject of passions. And so not every moral virtue has to do with the passions. Rather, some have to do with the passions and some have to do with actions (*circa operationes*).

Reply to objection 1: Not every moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains as its *proper matter*, but instead every virtue has to do with them as something that *follows upon* its proper act. For every virtuous individual delights in the act of a virtue and is pained by a contrary act. Hence, after the quoted passage, the Philosopher adds, “... if the virtues have to do with actions and passions; but every action or passion is followed by pleasure or pain, and because of this virtue will have to do with pleasures and pains,” viz., as something that *follows upon* virtue.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, what is rational through participation includes not only the sentient appetite, which is the subject of the passions, but also the will, in which no passions exist.

Reply to objection 3: Some virtues have the passions as their proper subject matter, whereas others do not. Hence, as will be shown below (q. 60, a. 2), it is not the case that the same line of reasoning holds for all the virtues.

Article 5

Can a moral virtue exist without any passion?

It seems that a moral virtue can exist without any passion:

Objection 1: The more a moral virtue overcomes the passions, the more perfect it is. Therefore, in its most perfect *esse*, it exists altogether without the passions.

Objection 2: Each thing is perfect when it is removed from its contrary and from what inclines it toward its contrary. But the passions incline one toward sin, which is contrary to virtue; hence, in

Romans 7:5 the passions are called “passions of sins.” Therefore, perfect virtue exists without any passion.

Objection 3: As is clear from Augustine in *De Moribus Ecclesiae*, it is through virtue that we are conformed to God. But God acts without passion. Therefore, the most perfect virtue exists without any passion.

But contrary to this: As *Ethics* 1 says, “No man is just who does not rejoice in just actions.” But joy is a passion. Therefore, justice cannot exist without passion, and *a fortiori*, the same holds for the other virtues.

I respond: If, as the Stoics posited, what we are calling ‘passions’ are disordered affections, then it is clear that a perfect virtue exists without any passions.

On the other hand, if what are calling ‘passions’ are all the movements of the sentient appetite, then it is plain that those moral virtues that have to do with the passions as their proper matter cannot exist without the passions. The reason for this is that, given the Stoic view, it would follow that moral virtue renders the sentient appetite altogether superfluous. But it does not pertain to virtue that the powers that are subject to reason should be deprived of their own acts; rather, what pertains to virtue is that those powers should execute reason’s command by engaging in their proper acts. Hence, just as a virtue orders the members of the body toward the appropriate exterior acts, so it orders the sentient appetite toward its own well-ordered movements.

On the other hand, those moral virtues that have to do with actions and not with the passions can exist without the passions (and justice is a virtue of this type), since through these virtues it is the will that is applied to its proper act, which is not a passion. Yet joy (*gaudium*), which is not a passion, does follow upon an act of justice, at least in the will. And if this joy is increased by justice’s being perfected, then there will be an overflow of joy even into the sentient appetite, given that, as was explained above (q. 24, a. 3), the lower powers follow the movement of the higher powers. And so because of an overflow of this sort, the more perfect the virtue is, that more it causes a passion.

Reply to objection 1: A virtue overcomes disordered passions, but produces moderate passions.

Reply to objection 2: Passions that are disordered lead one into sinning, but if they are moderate, the passions do not lead one into sinning.

Reply to objection 3: The good in each thing is thought of in a way corresponding to the status of its nature. Now in God and in the angels there is no sentient appetite, as there is in a man. And a good action belonging to God or to an angel exists altogether without passion, just as it exists without a body, whereas a man’s good action exists with passion, just as it exists with the help of a body.

QUESTION 60

The Distinctions among the Moral Virtues

Next we have to consider the distinctions of the moral virtues from one another. And on this topic there are five questions: (1) Is there just a single moral virtue? (2) Are the moral virtues that have to do with actions or operations (*circa operationes*) distinguished from the moral virtues that have to do with the passions? (3) Is there just a single moral virtue that has to do with operations? (4) Do diverse moral virtues have to do with diverse passions? (5) Are the moral virtues distinguished in a way that corresponds to the diverse objects of the passions?

Article 1

Is there just a single moral virtue?

It seems that there is just a single moral virtue:

Objection 1: Just as, in the case of moral acts, directing them belongs to reason, which is the subject of the intellectual virtues, so, too, the inclination [toward them] belongs to the appetitive power, which is the subject of the moral virtues. But there is a single intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which does the directing in the case of all moral acts. Therefore, there is likewise just a single moral virtue that does the inclining in the case of all moral acts.

Objection 2: Habits are distinguished by the formal character of their objects and not by their material objects. But there is a single formal character of the good toward which moral virtue is ordered, viz., the mode of reason. Therefore, it seems that there is just a single moral virtue.

Objection 3: As has been explained (q. 1, a. 3), moral entities (*moralia*) take their species from their end. But there is a single common end of all the moral virtues, viz., happiness (*felicitas*), whereas there are infinitely many proper and proximate ends. But it is not the case that there are infinitely many moral virtues. Therefore, it seems that there is just a single moral virtue.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (q. 56, a. 2), a single habit cannot exist in diverse powers. But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 80, a. 2 and q. 81, a. 2), is distinguished into diverse powers. Therefore, there cannot be just a single moral virtue.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 58, aa. 1-3), moral virtues are certain habits of the appetitive part [of the soul], and as was also explained above (q. 54, a. 2), habits differ in species according to the specific differences among their objects.

Now the species of a desirable object, just like the species of anything else, has to do with the form of the species, which comes from the agent. However, we must take into consideration that there are two ways in which the matter that is acted upon is related to the agent:

For sometimes the matter receives the form of the agent with the same definition (*secundum eandem rationem*) that it has in the agent, as occurs in the case of all *univocal* agents. And if the agent is of a single species in such a case, then the matter must receive the form of a single species; for instance, nothing is generated univocally by fire unless it is something in the species of fire.

On the other hand, sometimes the matter receives a form that is not the same in definition as the agent's form; this is clear in the case of things that are *non-univocal* generating causes (*patet in generantibus non univocis*), as when an animal is generated by the sun. And in such cases the forms received in the matter from the same agent are not of a single species but are instead diversified in accord with the matter's diverse dispositions (*secundum diversam proportionem materiae*) toward receiving the agent's influence. For instance, we see that in accord with the matter's diverse dispositions, animals of diverse species are generated through putrefaction by the sun's single action.

Now it is clear that in the case of moral entities reason is like that which commands and effects

movement, whereas the appetitive power is like that which is commanded and moved. But it is not the case that the appetite receives reason's influence (*non recipit impressionem rationis*) in, as it were, a univocal way, since, as *Ethics* 1 points out, the appetite is rational by participation and not through its essence. Hence, desirable things are established in diverse species by reason's movement, because they are related to reason in diverse ways. And so it follows that the moral virtues are diverse in species, and that there is not just a single moral virtue.

Reply to objection 1: The object of reason is *the true* (*obiectum rationis est verum*). But the character of the true is the same in all moral entities, which are contingent doable things. That is why there is just a single directive virtue among them, viz., prudence.

By contrast, the object of the appetitive power is *the desirable good*, the character of which is diverse in accord with its diverse relations to directive reason.

Reply to objection 2: The formal character in question is one in *genus* because of the oneness of the agent. But as has been explained, it is diversified in *species* because of diverse dispositions of the recipients.

Reply to objection 3: Moral entities have their species not from their ultimate end, but from their proximate ends, which are such that, even if they are infinitely many in *number*, they are not infinitely many in *species*.

Article 2

Are moral virtues distinguished from one another by the fact that some have to do with actions or operations, while others have to do with the passions?

It seems that moral virtues are not distinguished from one another by the fact that some have to do with actions or operations (*circa operationes*), while others have to do with the passions:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that moral virtue “does what is best (*est optimorum operativa*) with respect to pleasures and sorrows.” But as was explained above (q. 31, a. 1 and q. 35, a. 1), pleasures and sorrows are passions. Therefore, the same virtue that has to do with the passions also has to do with operations, since it does something (*utpote operativa existens*).

Objection 2: The passions are principles of exterior operations. Therefore, if there are virtues that rectify the passions, then they must, as a result, likewise rectify operations. Therefore, the same virtues have to do both with the passions and with operations.

Objection 3: The sentient appetite is moved either well or badly with respect to every exterior operation. But the movements of the sentient appetite are passions. Therefore, the same virtues that have to do with operations have to do with passions.

But contrary to this: The Philosopher posits justice (*iustitia*) with respect to operations, and temperance (*temperantia*), fortitude (*fortitudo*), and gentleness (*mansuetudo*) with respect to certain passions.

I respond: There are two possible ways in which operation and passion can be related to virtue:

In the first way, *as effects* of virtue. And in this sense, as was explained above (q. 59, a. 4), every moral virtue involves (a) good operations that it produces and (b) some pleasure or sorrow, which are passions.

In the second way, an operation can be related to a moral virtue *as the matter that a moral virtue has to do with* (*materia circa quam*). And on this score, it is necessary for the moral virtues that have to do with operations to be distinct from the moral virtues that have to do with passions.

The reason for this is that some operations are good or bad in their own right (*secundum seipsas*), no matter what affections the man has with respect to them; more specifically, their goodness or badness

is taken from how they measure up to something else. And for operations of this sort there has to be a virtue that directs the operations in their own right—as, for instance, in the case of buying and selling and all operations of this sort that involve the character of what is owed or not owed to another. Because of this, *justice*, along with the parts of justice, have to do with operations properly speaking as their proper matter.

By contrast, the goodness or badness of other operations has to do solely with how they measure up with respect to the agent (*attenditur solum secundum commensurationem ad operantem*). And so these actions have to be thought of as good or bad to the extent that the man is affected well or badly with respect to them. Because of this, virtues with respect to such operations have to do mainly with the interior affections, which are called the passions of the soul; this is clear in the case of *temperance* and *fortitude* and other virtues of this sort.

Now in the case of operations that are directed toward another, it is possible for the good of virtue to be neglected because of a disordered passion of the soul. And in that case, insofar as the due measure of the exterior operation is corrupted, there is a corruption of justice, whereas insofar as the measure of the interior passions is corrupted, there is a corruption of some other virtue. For instance, when one man strikes another out of anger, *justice* is corrupted in the undue striking, whereas *gentleness* is corrupted in the immoderation of the anger. And the same thing is clear in other cases.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: From this the response to the objections is clear. For the first objection is about the operation insofar as it is an effect of a virtue. The other two objections go through on the assumption that the operation and the passion concur with respect to the same thing. But in some cases the virtue has to do mainly with an operation and in other cases the virtue has to do mainly with the passion—in the way just explained.

Article 3

Is there just a single moral virtue with respect to operations?

It seems that there is just a single moral virtue with respect to operations:

Objection 1: The uprightness of all exterior operations seems to pertain to justice. But justice is a single virtue. Therefore, there is just a single virtue with respect to operations.

Objection 2: Operations that are ordered toward the good of a single individual seem to differ maximally from operations that are ordered toward the good of a multitude of individuals. But this sort of diversity does not diversify the moral virtues; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, legal justice, which orders men's acts toward the common good, differs only conceptually (*secundum rationem*) from the sort of virtue that orders a man's act toward just an individual good (*ad unum tantum*). Therefore, it is not the case that there are diverse virtues for diverse operations.

Objection 3: If there were diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse operations, then the diversity of the moral virtues would have to correspond to the diversity of operations. But this is clearly false; for as is clear from *Ethics* 5, it belongs to justice to establish uprightness in diverse genera of transactions (*in diversis generibus commutationum*) and also in distributions. Therefore, it is not the case that there are diverse virtues for diverse operations.

But contrary to this: *Religion* is a virtue different from *piety*, and yet both of them have to do with operations.

I respond: All the moral virtues that are directed toward operations agree in a certain general conception of justice (*conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae*), which has to do with what is owed to another, and they are distinguished by diverse specific conceptions. The reason for this is that in the case of exterior operations, the order of reason is instituted in the way explained above (a. 2)—not

according to its relation to a man's affections, but instead according to the appropriateness of the thing in its own right. And the concept *what is owed*, on the basis of which the nature of justice is constituted, is taken from this sort of appropriateness; for it evidently pertains to justice that someone should render what is owed. Hence, all virtues of the sort that have to do with operations have the character of justice in one way or another.

However, what is owed does not have the same character in all cases (*non est unius rationis in omnibus*). For instance, something is owed to an equal in one way, to a superior in another way, and to an inferior in still another way; again, something is owed in different ways because of a contract or because of a promise or because of some benefit that has been received. And corresponding to the diverse sorts of debt there are diverse virtues—e.g., *religion*, by which one renders what is owed to God; *piety*, by which one renders what is owed to one's parents; *gratitude* (*gratia*), by which one renders what is owed to a benefactor; and so on for the others.

Reply to objection 1: Justice is properly speaking a single *specific* virtue that has to do with the perfect notion of what is owed, which it is possible to repay in full (*secundum aequivalentiam*).

However, the name 'justice' is also used *in an extended sense* (*dicitur et ampliato nomine iustitia*) that includes any sort of rendering of what is owed. And in this sense justice is not a single specific virtue.

Reply to objection 2: The sort of justice that intends the common good is a virtue different from the justice that is ordered toward someone's private good, and this is why common right (*ius commune*) is distinguished from private right, and why Tully posits a special virtue, viz., piety, which orders one toward the good of the fatherland.

However, the sort of justice that orders a man toward the common good is general in its command, because all the acts of the virtues order one toward its end, viz., toward the common good. Now insofar as it is commanded by justice of this sort, virtue also receives the name 'justice'. And so *virtue* differs from *legal justice* only conceptually, in the sense that virtue that operates in its own right differs only conceptually from virtue that operates at the command of another.

Reply to objection 3: In all of the operations that belong to special justice one finds the same concept of *what is owed*. And so there is the same virtue of justice, especially with respect to exchanges. For *distributive justice* might perhaps belong to a species different from that of *commutative justice*. But we will ask about this below (*ST* 2-2, q. 61, a. 1).

Article 4

Are there diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions?

It seems that there are not diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions:

Objection 1: As is especially clear in the case of the sciences, there is a single habit with respect to things that agree in both their principle and their end. But as was established above (q. 25, aa. 1-4 and q. 27, a. 4), there is a single principle of all the passions, viz., love (*amor*), and all the passions terminate in the same end, viz., either pleasure or sadness (*ad delectationem vel tristitiam*). Therefore, there is just a single moral virtue with respect to all the passions.

Objection 2: If there were diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions, then it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as there are passions. But this is clearly false, since with respect to opposed passions there is one and the same moral virtue; for instance, fortitude has to do with instances of fear and daring, and temperance has to do with pleasures and pains (*circa delectationes et tristitias*). Therefore, there do not have to be diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions.

Objection 3: As was established above (q. 23, a. 4), love (*amor*), sentient desire (*concupiscentia*),

and pleasure (*delectatio*) are passions that differ from one another in species. But there is just a single virtue with respect to them all, viz., temperance. Therefore, it is not the case that there are diverse moral virtues with respect to diverse passions.

But contrary to this: As it says in *Ethics* 3 and 4, fortitude has to do with fear and daring, temperance has to do with sentient desire, and gentleness has to do with anger.

I respond: One cannot reply that there is just a single moral virtue with respect to all the passions. For there are passions that belong to diverse powers, since, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the passions that belong to the irascible power are different from the passions that belong to the concupiscible power.

Yet neither does it have to be the case that every difference among the passions is sufficient to diversify the moral virtues. For, first of all, there are some passions that are opposed to one another as contraries (*opponuntur secundum contrarietatem*), e.g., joy and sadness, fear and daring, and others of this sort. And there has to be one and the same virtue with respect to passions that are opposed in this way. For since a moral virtue consists in a sort of mean (*in quadam medietate consistat*), a single mean (*medium secundum eandem rationem*) is set up with respect to the contrary passions, just as, in the case of natural things, there is a single mean (*idem medium*) that lies between contraries, e.g., between white and black.

Second, diverse passions are found to conflict with reason in the same way, viz., either with an impulse toward what is contrary to reason or with a drawing away from what is in accord with reason. And so the diverse passions of the concupiscible power do not belong to diverse moral virtues because their movement follows a certain ordering with respect to one another; for they are ordered toward the same thing, viz., toward pursuing something good or toward receding from something bad. For instance, sentient desire proceeds from love, and from the desire one arrives at pleasure. And the same thing holds for their opposites, since fleeing or abhorring (*fuga*) follows from hate (*odium*) and arrives at sadness or pain (*tristitia*). By contrast, the passions of the irascible power do not belong to a single ordering, but are instead ordered toward diverse things; for instance, daring and fear are ordered toward some big danger, whereas hope and despair are ordered toward some difficult good, and anger is ordered toward overcoming a contrary that has inflicted harm. And so there are diverse virtues ordered toward these passions, viz., *temperance* with respect to the passions of the concupiscible power, *fortitude* with respect to fear and daring, *magnanimity* with respect to hope and despair, and *gentleness* with respect to anger.

Reply to objection 1: All the passions share a single *common* (*commune*) principle and *common* end, but they do not share a *particular* (*proprium*) principle or end. Hence, this consideration is not sufficient for there being just a single moral virtue (*non sufficit ad unitatem virtutis moralis*).

Reply to objection 2: Just as, in the case of natural entities, the principle by which one recedes from the one endpoint is the same as the principle by which one approaches the other endpoint, and just as, in the case of beings of reason (*in rationalibus*), contraries involve the same concept, so, too, moral virtue, which consents to reason in the manner of a nature, is such that there is a single moral virtue with respect to contrary passions.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, the three passions in question are ordered toward the same object with a certain ordering, and for this reason they pertain to the same moral virtue.

Article 5

**Are the moral virtues distinguished in a way that corresponds
to the objects of the passions?**

It seems that the moral virtues are not distinguished in a way that corresponds to the objects of the passions:

Objection 1: Just as there are objects of the passions, so, too, there are objects of operations. But the moral virtues that have to do with operations are not distinguished in a way that corresponds to the objects of the operations; for instance, buying or selling a house or a horse pertain to one and the same virtue of justice. Therefore, the moral virtues that have to do with the passions are not diversified by the objects of the passions, either.

Objection 2: The passions are certain acts or movements of the sentient appetite. But more diversity is required for a diversity of habits than for a diversity of acts. Therefore, diverse objects that do not diversify the species of passion will not diversify the species of moral virtue, with the result that there will be a single moral virtue with respect to all pleasures, and so on for the others.

Objection 3: Species are not diversified by *more* and *less*. But diverse pleasurable things differ only with respect to *more* and *less*. Therefore, all pleasurable things pertain to a single species of virtue—and, for the same reason, all fearful things, and so on for the others.

Objection 4: Just as virtue does what is good (*est operativa boni*), so, too, it impedes what is bad (*est impeditiva mali*). But there are diverse virtues with respect to sentient desires for the good, e.g., *temperance* (*temperantia*) with respect to sentient desires for the pleasures of touch and *wittiness* (*eutrapelia*) with respect to the pleasures of play. Therefore, there should likewise be diverse virtues with respect to the fear of bad things.

But contrary to this: *Chastity* (*castitas*) has to do with sexual pleasure, whereas *fasting* or *dieting* (*abstinentia*) has to do with the pleasures of food, and *wittiness* (*eutrapelia*) with the pleasures of play.

I respond: The perfection of a virtue depends on reason, whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sentient appetite itself. Hence, the virtues have to be diversified by their ordering with respect to reason, whereas the passions have to be diversified by their ordering with respect to the appetite. Therefore, insofar as the objects of the passions are related in different ways to the sentient appetite, they cause diverse species of passion, whereas insofar as they are related to reason, they cause diverse species of virtue.

However, the movement of reason is not the same as the movement of the sentient appetite. Hence, nothing prevents (a) there being some difference of objects which causes a diversity of passions but which does not cause a diversity of virtues—as, for instance, in the case explained above (a. 4), when a single virtue has to do with many passions—or, likewise, (b) there being some difference of objects which causes a diversity of virtues but which does not cause a diversity of passions, as occurs when diverse virtues are ordered toward a single passion, e.g., pleasure. And since, as has been explained (a. 4), different passions that belong to diverse powers always belong to diverse virtues, it follows that the diversity of objects that corresponds to the diversity of the powers—viz., *something good absolutely speaking* and *something good involving some difficulty*—always diversifies the species of virtue. And since there is a certain order by which reason governs a man's lower parts and by which it likewise extends itself toward exterior things, it also follows that insofar as a single object of the passions is apprehended by the sensory power or by the imagination (or even by reason), and insofar as it belongs to the soul or to the body or to exterior entities, it will have diverse relations to reason and will as a consequence be apt to diversify the virtues.

Therefore, the good of a man, which is the object of love (*amor*), sentient desire (*concupiscentia*), and pleasure (*delectatio*), can be taken to pertain either (a) to the body's sensory power or (b) to the

soul's interior apprehension. And this in turn is ordered either (a) toward the man's good within himself, whether with respect to the body or with respect to the soul, or (b) toward the man's good in his relation to others. And all diversity of this sort diversifies virtue because of the diverse relations to reason.

So, then, consider some good. If this good is apprehended by the sense of touch and has to do with sustaining human life in the individual or in the species—as do the pleasurable goods of food and sexual intercourse—then it will pertain to the virtue of *temperance*. By contrast, since the pleasures associated with the other sensory powers are not vehement, they do not present any difficulty to reason, and so no virtue is posited with respect to them; for as *Ethics 2* says, virtue, like art, has to do with what is difficult.

On the other hand, there are goods, e.g., money and honor, which are apprehended not by a sensory power but by an interior power and which pertain to the man himself in his own right. Of these goods, money can of itself be ordered toward the good of the body, whereas honor consists in the soul's apprehension. Now these two goods can be considered either (a) absolutely speaking, insofar as they pertain to the concupiscible power, or (b) as involving some difficulty, insofar as they pertain to the irascible power. (This distinction has no place in goods that delight the sense of touch, since goods of this sort are the lowest and belong to man insofar as he shares something in common with brute animals.)

Thus, as regards money absolutely speaking, insofar as it is an object of sentient desire or pleasure or love, there is [the virtue of] *liberality* or *generosity* (*liberalitas*), while as regards this good thought of as involving difficulty, there is *magnificence* (*magnificentia*). On the other hand, as regards honor taken absolutely speaking, insofar as it is an object of love, there is a certain virtue that is called *philotimia*, i.e., the love of honor, whereas if honor is thought of as involving difficulty, in the sense that it is an object of hope, then there is *magnanimity* (*magnanimitas*). Hence, liberality and philotimia are seen to exist in the concupiscible power, whereas magnificence and magnanimity exist in the irascible power.

Now the good of a man in relation to another does not seem to involve difficulty, but is thought of as taken absolutely and as an object of the passions of the concupiscible power. This good can be pleasurable to someone insofar as he is related to another either in serious matters (*in his quae serio fiunt*), i.e., in actions that are ordered by reason toward some due end (*ad debitum finem*), or in playful matters (*in his quae fiunt ludo*), i.e., in actions ordered just toward pleasure and which are not related to reason in the same way that serious matters are. There are two ways one behaves toward another in serious matters: The first lies in being pleasant by fitting words and deeds (*ut delectabilem decentibus verbis et factis*), and this pertains to a virtue which Aristotle names *friendship* and which can be called *affability*. The other way in which one behaves toward another lies in being truthful in word and deed (*ut manifestum per dicta et facta*), and this pertains to another virtue, which Aristotle calls *truthfulness* (*veritas*). For being truthful (*manifestatio*) comes closer to reason than does pleasure, and serious matters come closer than do playful matters. Hence, as regards the pleasures of play there is another virtue, which the Philosopher calls *wittiness* (*eutrapelia*).

So, then, it is clear that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues that have to do with the passions, viz., *fortitude*, *temperance*, *liberality*, *magnificence*, *magnanimity*, *philotimia*, *gentleness*, *friendship*, *truthfulness*, and *wittiness*. And they are distinguished by diverse matters or diverse passions or diverse objects. Thus, if *justice*, which has to do with operations, is added in, then there will be eleven virtues in all.

Reply to objection 1: All the objects of that which is the same *operation* in species have the same relation to reason, but not all the objects of that which is the same *passion* in species. For operations conflict with reason in a way different from the way the passions do.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, the passions are diversified in a way different from the way that the virtues are diversified.

Reply to objection 3: *More* and *less* do not diversify species except because of diverse relations to reason.

Reply to objection 4: What is good is stronger at effecting movement that is what is bad, because,

as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, what is bad acts only in the power of the good. Hence, the bad does not create a difficulty for reason that requires a virtue, unless it is excessive, and there seems to be a single excessive evil in a single genus of passion. Hence, there is just a single virtue, viz., *gentleness*, with respect to every instance of anger, and, similarly, just a single virtue, viz., *fortitude*, with respect to every instance of daring. By contrast, the good involves the sort of difficulty that requires virtue even if it is not excessive in the genus of the relevant passion. And, as has been explained, this is why diverse moral virtues are posited with respect to sentient desires.

QUESTION 61

The Cardinal Virtues

Next we have to consider the cardinal virtues. And on this topic there are five questions: (1) Is it moral virtues that should be called cardinal, i.e., principal, virtues? (2) How many cardinal virtues are there? (3) Which moral virtues are cardinal virtues? (4) Do the cardinal virtues differ from one another? (5) Are the cardinal virtues appropriately classified as political virtues, purifying virtues, virtues of a purified mind, and exemplary virtues (*dividuntur convenienter in virtutes politicas et purgatorias et purgati animi et exemplares*)?

Article 1

Is it moral virtues that should be called cardinal, i.e., principal, virtues?

It seems that moral virtues should not be called cardinal, i.e., principal, virtues:

Objection 1: According to the *Categories*, “Things that are divided by opposites are simultaneous in nature,” and so one is not more principal than the other. But all the virtues divide the genus *virtue* as opposites. Therefore, none of them should be called ‘principal’.

Objection 2: The end is more principal than the means to that end. But the theological virtues have to do with the end, whereas the moral virtues have to do with the means to that end. Therefore, it is the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, that should be called principal or cardinal virtues.

Objection 3: What is such-and-such through its essence is more principal than what is such-and-such through participation. But as was explained above (q. 58, a. 3), the intellectual virtues belong to the rational part of the soul through their essence, whereas the moral virtues belong to the rational part through participation. Therefore, it is the intellectual virtues, rather than the moral virtues, that are the principal virtues.

But contrary to this: In *Super Lucam* Ambrose, while expounding the passage, “Blessed are the poor in spirit” (Luke 6:20), says, “We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz., temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude.” But these are moral virtues. Therefore, it is moral virtues that are cardinal virtues.

I respond: When we speak simply of virtue, we are understood to be speaking of human virtue. But as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), a human virtue, in the most perfect sense of *virtue*, is a virtue that requires rectitude of appetite, since a virtue not only bestows a facility for acting well but is also a cause of the very execution of a good work (*usum boni operis causat*). Still, in a less perfect sense of *virtue*, a virtue does not require rectitude of appetite, since it only bestows a facility for acting well but is not a cause of the execution of a good work.

Now it is clear that what is perfect is more principal than what is imperfect. And so the virtues that include rectitude of appetite are called the principal ones. Now moral virtues are of this sort and, among the intellectual virtues, the only one of this sort is prudence, which, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 4), is also in some sense a moral virtue with respect to its subject matter. Hence, prudence is appropriately placed among the moral virtues which are called principal virtues, i.e., cardinal virtues.

Reply to objection 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the parts of the division are related as equals (*ex aequo*) with respect to the nature of the genus—even if, in reality (*secundum naturam rei*), one species is more principal and more perfect than another, in the way that *man* is more perfect than the other animals.

However, when the division is of an analogue that is said of many things in accord with what is prior and what is posterior (*dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius*), then nothing prevents one from being more principal than another even with respect to the common nature, in the way that *substance* is called *being* in a more principal way than *accident* is. And the division of the virtues into

the diverse genera of virtues is like this, because the good of reason is not found in all things according to the same ordering.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 58, a. 3), the theological virtues lie beyond man. Hence, they are properly called super-human virtues or divine virtues rather than human virtues.

Reply to objection 3: Even if the intellectual virtues other than prudence are more principal than the moral virtues as regards the subject they belong to (*quantum ad subiectum*), they are not more principal as far as the nature of virtue is concerned, since virtue has to do with the good, which is the object of the appetite.

Article 2

Are there four cardinal virtues?

It seems that there are not four cardinal virtues:

Objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 4), prudence directs the other moral virtues. But that which directs others is more principal. Therefore, prudence alone is a principal virtue.

Objection 2: The principal virtues are in some sense moral virtues. But as *Ethics* 6 says, we are ordered toward moral actions or operations (*ad operationes morales*) by practical reason and by upright appetite. Therefore, there are just two cardinal virtues.

Objection 3: Among the other sorts of virtues, it is likewise the case that one is more principal than another. But in order for a virtue to be called a principal virtue, it is not required that it be principal with respect to all the virtues; rather, it is required only that it be principal with respect to some virtues. Therefore, it seems that there are many more [than four] principal virtues.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, "The whole structure of good works arises from a foundation of four virtues."

I respond: The number of any given things can be taken either (a) from their *formal principles* or (b) from their *subjects*, and on both counts there are four cardinal virtues.

The *formal principle* of virtue about which we are now talking is *the good of reason*, which can be thought of in two ways. In one way, insofar as it consists in *reason's consideration itself*. And on this score there is one principal virtue, which is called *prudence*. In the second way, insofar as the order of reason is posited *with respect to something*. And this something will be either (a) *operations*, in which case there is *justice*, or (b) *the passions*, and here it is necessary for there to be two virtues. For one must posit the order of reason with respect to the passions by considering how the passions conflict with reason. And there are two ways in which this can occur. First, insofar as a passion *impels one toward something contrary to reason*, in which case the passion has to be repressed; and it is from this that *temperance* takes its name. Second, insofar as the passion *holds one back from what reason dictates*, in the way that fear of dangers or of hard work does, in which case a man has to be firmed up in what accords with reason, in order not to recede from it; and it is from this that *fortitude* takes its name.

Similarly, the same number is found with respect to the *subjects*. For there are four subjects of the sort of virtue of which we are now speaking, viz., (a) what is *rational through its essence*, and this is perfected by *prudence*, and (b) what is *rational through participation*. The latter is divided into three, viz., *the will*, which is the subject of *justice*; *the concupiscible power*, which is the subject of *temperance*; and *the irascible power*, which is the subject of *fortitude*.

Reply to objection 1: Prudence is, absolutely speaking, more principal than all the others. But each of the others is posited as principal within its own genus.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, what is rational through participation is divided into three.

Reply to objection 3: All other virtues which are such that one is more principal than another are traced back to the four under discussion, both with respect to their *subject* and with respect to their *formal principles*.

Article 3

Should any other virtues be called more principal than these?

It seems that there are other virtues that should be called more principal than these:

Objection 1: What is maximal in any given genus seems to be more principal. But as *Ethics* 4 says, “Magnanimity does something great in all the virtues.” Therefore, *magnanimity* should especially be called a principal virtue.

Objection 2: That through which other virtues are strengthened seems especially to be a principal virtue. But humility is like this; for Gregory says, “He who brings together the other virtues without humility is like someone who carries straw against the wind.” Therefore, *humility* seems especially to be a principal virtue.

Objection 3: What is most perfect seems to be principal. But this is true of patience—this according to James 1:4 (“Patience has a perfect work”). Therefore, *patience* should be posited as a principal virtue.

But contrary to this: In his *Rhetorica* Tully traces all the other virtues back to the four under discussion.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), the four cardinal virtues under discussion are taken from the four formal notions of virtue as we are now speaking of it. These four formal notions are found principally in certain acts or passions. For instance, the good consisting in *reason’s own consideration* is found principally in reason’s *command* itself and not, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 6), in either its deliberation or its judgment. Similarly, the good of reason as it is posited in *operations* in accord with the upright and the fitting (*secundum rationem recti et debiti*) is found principally in exchanges or distributions *which involve others as equals* (*quae sunt ad alterum cum aequalitate*). On the other hand, the good of *curbing the passions* is found principally in the case of the passions that are especially difficult to repress, viz., *the pleasures of touch*. And the good of *being firm in persevering* in the good of reason in the face of the contrary impulse of the passions is found principally in the case of *the danger of death*, in the face of which it is most difficult to persevere.

So, then, there are two ways in which we can think of the four virtues under discussion:

The first way is in accord with their *common* formal notions. And on this score, they are called ‘principal’ in the sense that they are *general* with respect to all the virtues—so that, namely, (a) every virtue that contributes to the good in reason’s consideration is called *prudence*, and (b) every virtue that contributes to what is due and upright in operations is called *justice*, and (c) every virtue that restrains and represses the passions is called *temperance* (*temperantia*), and (d) every virtue that contributes to the mind’s firmness in the face of any given passion is called *fortitude*. And it is in this sense that many writers, both sacred doctors and also philosophers, speak of these virtues. And in this sense the other virtues *are contained under them* in such a way that all the objections are answered.

In the second way, these virtues can be taken insofar as they are denominated *from what is most important in a given subject matter*. And in this sense they are *special* or *specific* virtues (*speciales virtutes*), divided off from the other virtues. Yet they are still called *principal* in relation to the other virtues, because of the importance of their subject matter, so that what is preceptive is called *prudence*, and what has to do with fitting actions among equals is called *justice*, and what represses sentient desires for the pleasures of touch is called *temperance*, and what firms one up in the face of the danger of death

is called *fortitude*.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The objections are answered on this second reading as well, since other virtues can have other sorts of importance, but the virtues under discussion are called ‘principal’ by reason of their subject matter.

Article 4

Are the four virtues under discussion diverse virtues and distinct from one another?

It seems that the four virtues under discussion are not diverse virtues and are not distinct from one another:

Objection 1: In *Moralia* 22 Gregory says, “There is no true prudence that is not just, temperate, and brave; there is no perfect temperance that is not brave, just, and prudent; there is no complete fortitude that is not prudent, temperate, and just; and there is no true justice that is not prudent, brave, and temperate.” But this would not be possible if the four virtues under discussion were distinct from one another, since diverse species of the same genus do not denominate one another. Therefore, the virtues under discussion are not distinct from one another.

Objection 2: When things are distinct from one another, what is attributed to the one is not attributed to the other. But what is attributed to temperance is attributed to fortitude; for in *De Officiis* 1 Ambrose says, “It is correctly called fortitude when an individual conquers himself and is not weakened or bent by any enticements.” Again, he says of temperance that it “preserves the manner or order of all the things that we decide to do or to say.” Therefore, it seems that these virtues are not distinct from one another.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that what is required for virtue is “first, that one should *act knowingly*; second, that he should *choose*, and choose *for its own sake (propter hoc)*; third, that he should have the virtue and *act from it firmly and unchangeably*.” But the first of these conditions seems to pertain to *prudence*, which is right reason with respect to things that can be done; the second, viz., to choose, seems to belong to *temperance*, so that one acts not out of passion but by choice, with the passions under control; the third, viz., that one act for the sake of a due end, demands a certain rectitude that seems to pertain to *justice*; the other, viz., firmness and unchangeableness, pertains to *fortitude*. Therefore each of these virtues is general and applies to all virtues (*est generalis ad omnes virtutes*). Therefore, they are not distinguished from one another.

But contrary to this: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine says, “Virtue is fourfold because of the varying affects of love itself,” and he applies this to the four virtues under discussion. Therefore, the four virtues are distinct from one another.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), there are two ways in which the four virtues under discussion have been taken by different authors.

Some authors take them as signifying certain *general conditions* of the human mind that are found in all the virtues—so that, more specifically, *prudence* is nothing other than a certain rectitude of discrimination (*quaedam rectitudo discretionis*) in any act or in any subject matter; and *justice* is a certain rectitude of mind through which a man does what he ought to do in any subject matter; *temperance* is a certain disposition of the mind which imposes moderation on any passion or operation, lest it be carried beyond its due limit; and *fortitude* is a certain disposition of the soul through which it is firmed up in what accords with reason against any impetus of the passions or any laboriousness in the actions. These four conditions are distinct in such a way that they do not imply a *diversity* of virtuous habits as regards justice, temperance, and fortitude. For (a) by the fact that each moral virtue is a *habit*, it is such that a certain firmness belongs to it, so that it is not moved by a contrary—something that was

said to pertain to *fortitude*; moreover, (b) by the fact that it is a *virtue*, it is such as to be ordered toward the good, which implies the nature of the upright and fitting—something that was said to pertain to *justice*; and (c) by the fact that it is a *moral virtue* participating in reason, it is such that it preserves the measure of reason (*modum rationis servet*) in all things and does not extend beyond it—something that was said to pertain to *temperance*. On the other hand, the having of discrimination, which was attributed to *prudence*, is the only thing that seems to be distinguished from the other three, since it belongs to reason itself *through its essence*, whereas the other three imply a *participation* in reason in the sense of a sort of application of reason to the passions or to operations. So, then, given what has just been explained, prudence would be a virtue distinct from the other three, but the other three would not themselves be virtues distinct from one another, since it is clear that one and the same virtue is (a) a *habit* and (b) a *virtue* and (c) a *moral virtue*.

By contrast, other authors—and more correctly (*melius*)—take these four virtues insofar as they are *determined by a specific subject matter*—each of them by a singular subject matter because of which, as was explained above (a. 3), the corresponding general condition from which the name of the virtue is taken is mainly praised. And on this interpretation it is clear that the virtues under discussion are diverse habits that are distinct from one another because of the diversity of their objects.

Reply to objection 1: Gregory is talking about the four virtues under discussion in accord with the first interpretation.

An alternative reply is that these four virtues are denominated by one another through a certain sort of overflowing (*per redundantiam quandam*). For what belongs to prudence overflows into the other virtues insofar as they are directed by prudence. On the other hand, each of the other virtues overflows into the others because one who is capable of what is more difficult is likewise capable of what is less difficult. Hence, someone who is able to restrain sentient desires for the pleasures of touch from exceeding their measure—something that is very difficult—is by that very fact rendered more able to restrain his audacity, when he is in danger of death, from proceeding beyond its own measure—something that is far easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be ‘tempered’. Temperance is likewise called brave from the fact that fortitude overflows into temperance, viz., insofar as someone who through fortitude has a firm mind in the face of the danger of death—something that is very difficult—is more able to preserve his firmness of mind in the face of the impulse of pleasures. For as Tully says in *De Officiis* 1, “It would be incongruous for someone who is not broken by fear to be broken by desire, or for someone who has shown himself to be unconquered by hard work to be conquered by lust.”

Reply to objection 2: This also makes clear the reply to the second objection. For it is in this way that temperance preserves the mean in all cases and that fortitude preserves the mind unbent in the face of the enticement of pleasure—viz., either insofar as these virtues name certain general conditions of virtue or through an overflowing of the sort just explained.

Reply to objection 3: The four general conditions of a virtue that the Philosopher posits are not proper to the virtues under discussion. But they can be appropriated to them in the way already explained.

Article 5

Are the four virtues under discussion appropriately classified as exemplary virtues, virtues of a purified mind, purifying virtues, and political virtues?

It seems that the four virtues under discussion are not appropriately classified as exemplary virtues (*virtutes exemplares*), virtues of a purified mind (*virtutes purgati animi*), purifying virtues (*virtutes purgatoriae*), and political virtues (*virtutes politicas*):

Objection 1: As Macrobius says in *Super Somnium Scipionis* 1, “The exemplary virtues are those which abide in God’s mind itself.” But in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, “It is ridiculous to attribute justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God.” Therefore, the virtues in question cannot be exemplary virtues.

Objection 2: The virtues called the virtues of a purified mind exist without the passions (*sunt absque passionibus*); for in the same place Macrobius says, “The temperance of a purified mind does not repress earthly desires, but is completely oblivious to them, while its fortitude does not conquer the passions, but instead does not know them.” But it was explained above (q. 59, a. 5) that these virtues cannot exist without the passions. Therefore, these virtues cannot be virtues of a purified mind.

Objection 3: Macrobius says that the purifying virtues belong to those who “by fleeing what is human have devoted themselves solely to what is divine.” But this seems to be depraved (*vitiosum*); for in *De Officiis* 1 Tully says, “I regard not only as not praiseworthy, but even as depraved, those who claim that they despise what most men admire, viz., the power of rule and political office.” Therefore, there are no purifying virtues.

Objection 4: Macrobius says that the political virtues are those “by which good men work for the good of the republic and guard their cities.” But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, it is legal justice alone that is ordered toward the common good. Therefore, the other virtues should not be called political virtues.

But contrary to this: Macrobius says, “Plotinus, the prince, along with Plato, of the teachers of philosophy, says, ‘There are four genera of the four virtues. Of these, the first are called political virtues, the second are called purifying virtues, the third are called virtues of a purified mind, and the fourth are called exemplary virtues’.”

I respond: As Augustine says in *De Moribus Ecclesiae*, “The soul must follow something in order for virtue to be able to be born in it, and this something is God; for if we follow God, we live well.” Therefore, the exemplar of human virtue must preexist in God, just as the conceptions of all things exist in Him. So, then, virtue can be thought of insofar as it exists in an exemplary way in God (*prout est exemplariter in Deo*), and in this sense [the virtues in question] are called *exemplary virtues*—so that, namely, the divine mind itself is called *prudence* in God, whereas *temperance* is the turning of God’s intention toward Himself, just as in us what is called temperance is that through which the concupiscible power is conformed to reason, and God’s *fortitude* is His immutability, while God’s *justice* is the observance of the eternal law in all His works, as Plotinus said.

And since man is by his nature a political animal, these virtues are called *political virtues* insofar as by these virtues a man behaves uprightly in conducting human affairs. This is the way in which we have been speaking of these virtues up to now.

On the other hand, since a man must also draw closer to divine things as much as he can—something that even the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10 and that is commended to us many times in Sacred Scripture, as, for instance in Matthew 5:48 (“Be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect”)—one must posit certain virtues that fall between the political virtues, which are *human* virtues, and the exemplary virtues, which are *divine* virtues. These virtues are distinguished by a diversity of movements and endpoints. More specifically, there are some virtues that belong to those who are ‘passing through’ and who are tending toward a likeness of God, and these are called the *purifying virtues*. More specifically, by the contemplation of divine things *prudence* looks down upon all worldly matters and directs all the soul’s thinking toward divine things alone, whereas *temperance* leaves behind, as far as nature allows, what having a body requires; and what belongs to *fortitude* is that the soul should not be afraid of drawing away from the body and approaching the things above, while *justice* ensures that the soul consents wholeheartedly to the way dictated by this resolve.

By contrast, there are the virtues that belong to those who have already attained the likeness of God, and these are called *the virtues of a now purified mind*. More specifically, *prudence* thinks about

divine things alone, *temperance* is oblivious to earthly desires, *fortitude* does not know the passions, and, by imitating God's mind, justice is united with it by an everlasting covenant. We claim that these are the virtues of the blessed in heaven or of those who are the most perfect in this present life.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is talking about the virtues insofar as they have to do with human affairs, i.e., *justice* with respect to selling and buying, *fortitude* with respect to fears, and *temperance* with respect to sentient desires. For in this sense it is indeed ridiculous to attribute these virtues to God.

Reply to objection 2: The human virtues, i.e., the virtues of men who live together in this world, have to do with the passions. But the virtues of those who attain full beatitude exist without the passions. Hence, Plotinus says: "The political virtues soften the passions," i.e., they reduce them to a mean; "the second sort," i.e., the purifying virtues, "eliminate them; the third sort," i.e., the virtues of a purified mind, "are oblivious to them; and it is impious to even name them in connection with the fourth sort," i.e., the exemplary virtues.

However, one could [alternatively] reply that he is speaking here of the passions insofar as 'passion' signifies certain disordered movements.

Reply to objection 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity imposes them upon us is depraved; otherwise, it is virtuous. Hence, a little before the quoted passage Tully says, "Perhaps one should make a concession for not engaging in public life to those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning, and also to those who, impeded by failing health or by some other more serious cause, have withdrawn from public life, when they yielded the power and glory of public administration to others." This is consonant with what Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 19: "The love of truth demands a holy leisure; the necessity of charity undertakes just works. If no one imposes this latter burden on us, we should take time for the discovery and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is imposed on us, it must be taken up because of the necessity of charity."

Reply to objection 4: Legal justice alone is directly related to the common good, but, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, by its command it draws the other virtues toward the common good. For one should notice that what pertains to the political virtues, as they are being called here, is not only to act well with respect to the common good, but also to act well with respect to the *parts* of the common good, i.e., with respect to the household or with respect to the individual person.

QUESTION 62

The Theological Virtues

Next we have to consider the theological virtues. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Are there any theological virtues? (2) Are the theological virtues distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? (3) How many theological virtues are there, and which virtues are they? (4) What is the order of the theological virtues?

Article 1

Are there any theological virtues?

It seems that there are no theological virtues:

Objection 1: *Physics* 7 says, “A virtue is a disposition of what is complete toward what is best (*dispositio perfecti ad optimum*), where by ‘complete’ I mean ‘disposed in accord with its nature’.” But what is divine lies beyond man’s nature. Therefore, theological virtues are not the virtues of a man.

Objection 2: The theological virtues are, as it were, God’s virtues (*virtutes divinae*). But as has been explained (q. 61, a. 5), God’s virtues are *exemplary virtues* and exist in God, not in us. Therefore, theological virtues are not virtues that belong to a man.

Objection 3: Theological virtues are virtues by which we are ordered toward God, who is the first principle and ultimate end of things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, a man has an ordering toward the first principle and ultimate end. Therefore, there is no need for any habits of the theological virtues, by which man’s reason and will might be ordered toward God.

But contrary to this: The precepts of the Law have to do with the acts of the virtues. But precepts that have to do with acts of faith (*fides*), hope (*spes*), and charity (*caritas*) are given in divine law. For instance, Ecclesiasticus 2:8ff. says, “You who fear God, believe in Him,” and again, “Hope in Him,” and again, “Love Him.” Therefore, faith, hope, and charity are virtues that order one toward God. Therefore, they are theological virtues.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 5, a. 7), a man is perfected through the acts by which he is ordered toward beatitude. But as was explained above (q. 5, a. 5), man’s beatitude or happiness is twofold. One sort of beatitude is proportioned to human nature, viz., the beatitude which a man is able to attain through the principles of his own nature. The other sort is a beatitude which exceeds man’s nature and which a man can attain only by God’s power, through a certain participation in the divine nature (*secundum quandam divinitatis participationem*)—this according to 2 Peter 1:4, which says that through Christ we are made “partakers of the divine nature.”

Since this second sort of beatitude exceeds any proportion to human nature, a man’s natural principles, by which he proceeds to act well in a way proportioned to his nature (*secundum suam proportionem*), are not sufficient for ordering the man toward this beatitude. Hence, principles by which he might be so ordered toward supernatural beatitude have to be divinely added to a man—in just the way in which he is ordered by his natural principles toward his connatural end (though not without God’s help). And these principles are called *theological virtues*, not only because (a) they have God as their object, but also because (b) they are infused in us by God alone and because (c) these virtues are made known (*traduntur*) to us only through divine revelation, in Sacred Scripture.

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which a nature can be attributed to a given thing. In one way, *essentially*, and in this sense the theological virtues exceed a man’s nature. In the second way, *by participation (participative)*, in the way that a piece of wood that is on fire participates in the nature of fire, and, as has been explained, this is the sense in which a man becomes a partaker in the divine nature. And so the theological virtues befit a man in accord with his *participated nature*.

Reply to objection 2: The virtues in question are not called ‘God’s virtues’ in the sense of being virtues by which God is virtuous, but are instead called ‘God’s virtues’ in the sense that they are virtues

by which we are made virtuous by God and in relation to God. Hence, they are not *exemplary virtues*, but are instead *copied virtues* (*non sunt exemplares sed exemplatae*).

Reply to objection 3: Man's reason and will are ordered toward God naturally in the sense that God is the principle and end of human nature, yet in a way proportioned to the nature. But man's reason and will are not by their nature adequately ordered toward God insofar as He is the object of supernatural beatitude.

Article 2

Are the theological virtues distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues?

It seems that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues:

Objection 1: If the theological virtues exist in a human soul, they must perfect it either with respect to its intellective part or with respect to its appetitive part. But the virtues that perfect the intellective part are called intellectual virtues, whereas the virtues that perfect the appetitive part are moral virtues. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues.

Objection 2: The virtues that are called theological order us toward God. But among the intellectual virtues there is one that orders us toward God, viz., wisdom, which has to do with divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.

Objection 3: In *De Moribus Ecclesiae* Augustine shows that the four cardinal virtues are the order of love. But love (*amor*) is charity (*caritas*), which is posited as a theological virtue. Therefore, the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological virtues.

But contrary to this: What lies beyond man's nature (*est supra naturam hominis*) is distinct from what accords with man's nature (*est secundum naturam hominis*). But the theological virtues lie beyond man's nature, while, as was shown above (q. 58, a. 3), by their nature the intellectual and moral virtues accord with man's nature. Therefore, they are distinct from one another.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 54, a. 2), habits are distinct in species according to the formal differences among their objects. But the object of the theological virtues is the ultimate end of things, God Himself, *insofar as He exceeds our reason's cognition*. By contrast, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something that *can be comprehended by human reason*. Hence, the theological virtues are distinct in species from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Reply to objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite in a way proportioned to human nature, whereas the theological virtues perfect them supernaturally.

Reply to objection 2: The wisdom that the Philosopher posits as an intellectual virtue considers divine things *insofar as they can be investigated by human reason*. By contrast, a theological virtue has to do with divine things *insofar as they exceed human reason*.

Reply to objection 3: Even though charity is love, not every sort of love is charity. Therefore, when one claims that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in a general sense or of the love of charity (*de amore communiter dicto vel de amore caritatis*). If the claim is being made about love in a general sense, then every virtue is said to be the order of love in the sense that well-ordered affection is required for each of the cardinal virtues, where, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4 and q. 28, a. 6 and q. 41, a. 2), love is the root and principle of every affection. On the other hand, if the claim is being made about the love of charity, then it means not that every other virtue is essentially charity, but instead that, as will become clear below (q. 65, a. 2 and *ST* 2-2, q. 23, a. 7), all the other virtues in some way depend upon charity.

Article 3

Is it appropriate to posit three theological virtues?

It seems that it is inappropriate to posit three theological virtues:

Objection 1: The theological virtues are related to divine beatitude in the same way that the inclination of our nature is related to our connatural end. But among the virtues ordered toward our connatural end, there is just a single natural virtue, viz., the understanding of principles (*intellectus principiorum*). Therefore, just one theological virtue should be posited.

Objection 2: The theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. But faith is not posited among the intellectual virtues; instead, it is something less than a virtue, since it is an imperfect sort of cognition. Similarly, hope is not posited among the moral virtues; instead, it is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Therefore, *a fortiori*, faith and hope should not be posited as theological virtues.

Objection 3: The theological virtues order a man's soul toward God. But a man's soul cannot be ordered toward God except through its intellective part, in which the intellect and the will exist. Therefore, there should be only two theological virtues, one of which perfects the intellect and the other of which perfects the will.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 13:13 the Apostle says, "Now there remain these three: faith, hope, and charity."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), the theological virtues order a man toward supernatural beatitude in the same way that a man is ordered by natural inclination toward the end that is connatural to him. The latter occurs in two respects:

First, *as regards reason or intellect*, insofar as it contains universal first principles known to us by the natural light of the intellect (*per naturale lumen intellectus*), from which reason proceeds both in the case of things to be theorized about and in the case of things to be done (*ex quibus procedit ratio tam in speculandis quam in agendis*).

Second, *through rectitude of the will*, which naturally tends toward the good of reason.

However, these two things fall short of the order of supernatural beatitude—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:9 ("Eye has not seen, nor has ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love Him"). Hence, in both respects something has to be added to a man supernaturally to order him toward his supernatural end.

First, as regards the intellect, what are added to man are certain supernatural principles that are grasped by a divine light (*divino lumine capiuntur*), and these are the things to be taken on faith (*credibilia*), with respect to which there is *faith*.

Second, the will is ordered toward its supernatural end both (a) with respect to the movement of intention, which tends toward the end as something possible to attain, and this pertains to *hope*, and also (b) with respect to a certain spiritual union through which the will is in some sense transformed into its end, and this is accomplished through *charity*. For each thing's appetite naturally moves and tends toward the end that is connatural to it, and this movement proceeds from the thing's being conformed in some way to its end (*iste motus provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem*).

Reply to objection 1: The intellect needs intelligible species by which it understands, and so one has to posit in the intellect a natural habit that is added to its power.

By contrast, the very nature of the will is sufficient for its natural ordering toward its end, whether (a) with respect to its tending toward the end (*quantum ad intentionis finis*) or (b) with respect to its being conformed to the end (*quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum*). However, in relation to what lies beyond its nature, this power's nature does not suffice for either of these things. And so a supernatural

habit has to be added with respect to each of them.

Reply to objection 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection, since faith is of what is not seen and hope is for what is not had. Hence, to have faith and hope with respect to what is subject to human power falls short of the nature of a virtue. By contrast, to have faith and hope with respect to what lies beyond the power of human nature exceeds every virtue proportioned to man—this according to 1 Corinthians 1:25 (“God’s weakness is stronger than men”).

Reply to objection 3: There are two things that belong to appetite, viz., (a) a movement toward the end and (b) being conformed to the end through love. And so it is necessary to posit two theological virtues, viz., hope and charity, in the human appetite.

Article 4

Is the order of the theological virtues such that faith is prior to hope and hope is prior to charity?

It seems that the order of the theological virtues is not such that faith is prior to hope and hope is prior to charity:

Objection 1: The root is prior to what comes from the root. But charity is the root of all the virtues—this according to Ephesians 3:17 (“Rooted and grounded in charity”). Therefore, charity is prior to the other virtues.

Objection 2: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “One cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, then by acting well he will bring it about that he also has hope.” Therefore, it seems that faith precedes charity and charity precedes hope.

Objection 3: As was explained above (a. 2), love is the principle or beginning (*principium*) of every affection. But ‘hope’ names a certain affection, since, as was explained above (q. 25, a. 2), it is a passion. Therefore, charity, i.e., love, is prior to hope.

But contrary to this is the order in which the Apostle enumerates them: “Now there remain these three: faith, hope, and charity.”

I respond: There are two sorts of order, viz., an order of *generation* and an order of *perfection*.

In the order of *generation*, according to which matter is prior to form in one and the same thing, and according to which what is imperfect is prior to what is perfect, faith precedes hope and hope precedes charity as far as their *acts* are concerned (for the *habits* are infused simultaneously). For an appetitive movement cannot tend toward anything by hoping for it or loving it unless that thing is apprehended by the sensory power or by the intellect. But it is through faith that the intellect apprehends what it hopes for and loves. Hence, in the order of generation faith precedes hope and charity. Similarly, a man loves something by the fact that he apprehends it as his good. But by the fact that a man hopes that he can get a good from someone, he regards the one in whom he has hope as a certain good of his. Hence, from the fact that he places his hope in someone, he proceeds to love him. And so, in the order of generation as regards the acts, hope precedes charity.

By contrast, in the order of *perfection*, charity precedes faith and hope, because both faith and hope are informed by charity and acquire the perfection of virtue through charity (*per caritatem formatur et perfectionem virtutis acquirit*). For as will be explained below (*ST* 2-2, q. 23, aa. 7-8), charity is the mother and root of all the virtues in the sense that it is the form of all the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what has just been said.

Reply to objection 2: Augustine is speaking of the hope by which someone will come to beatitude because of merits that he already possesses, i.e., the merits of *informed* hope, which *follows upon* charity. However, someone can have hope before he has charity, not because of merits that he already has, but

because of merits that he hopes he will have.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above when we were talking about the passions (q. 40, a. 7), hope has to do with two things:

One is its *principal object*, viz., the good that is hoped for. And in this respect, love always precedes hope, since a good is never hoped for unless it is desired and loved.

Hope also has to do with the *one from whom* the individual hopes he can obtain the good. And in this respect, hope at first precedes love, even though afterwards the hope is increased by the love itself. For by the fact that an individual thinks that he can obtain some good through someone else, he begins to love him, and from the fact that he loves him, he afterwards places his hope more strongly in him.

QUESTION 63

The Cause of Virtue

Next we have to consider the cause of virtue. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does virtue exist in us by nature? (2) Is any virtue caused in us by the habituation of actions (*ex assuetudine operum*)? (3) Do any moral virtues exist in us through infusion? (4) Is a virtue that we acquire by the habituation of actions the same in species as an infused virtue?

Article 1

Does virtue exist in us by nature?

It seems that virtue exists in us by nature:

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “The virtues are natural and exist equally in everyone.” And in a sermon to the monks Anthony says, “If the will were to change its nature, there would be perversity; let its condition be preserved, and it is virtue.” And a Gloss on Matthew 4:23 (“Jesus went about . . .”) says, “He teaches natural virtues (*naturales iustitias*), viz., chastity, justice and humility, which a man has naturally.”

Objection 2: As is clear from what has been said (q. 55, a. 4), the good of virtue is to be in accord with reason. But what accords with reason is natural to a man, since reason is a man’s nature. Therefore, virtue exists in a man by nature.

Objection 3: What is said to be natural to us is what exists in us from birth. But virtues exist in some of us from birth; for Job 31:18 says, “From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb.” Therefore, virtue exists in a man by nature.

But contrary to this: What exists in a man by nature is common to all men and is not destroyed by sin; for as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, natural goods remain even in the demons. But virtue does not exist in all men, and it is driven out by sin. Therefore, virtue does not exist in a man by nature.

I respond: As regards corporeal forms, some have claimed that they are totally from within (*totaliter ab intrinseco*), e.g., those who posit that the forms are latent (*ponentes latitationem formarum*). By contrast, others hold that corporeal forms are totally from without (*ab extrinseco*), e.g., those who posit that corporeal forms come from a separated cause. And still others claim that these forms are partly from within, viz., insofar as they preexist in potentiality in the matter, and partly from without, viz., insofar as they are rendered actual by an agent (*inquantum reducuntur ad actum per agens*).

So, too, as regards the virtues and types of scientific knowledge (*circa scientias et virtutes*), some have claimed that they are totally from within, viz., in such a way that all virtues and types of scientific knowledge preexist naturally within the soul, and that impediments to virtue and scientific knowledge, which affect the soul because it is weighed down by the body (*ex corporis gravitate*), are removed through learning and acting (*per disciplinam et exercitium*), in the way that iron is made brighter by being filed down (*sicut ferrum clarificatur per limationem*). This was the opinion of the Platonists.

By contrast, others have claimed that virtue and scientific knowledge are totally from without, i.e., from the influence of the Agent Intellect, as Avicenna held.

Still others have claimed, as the Philosopher does in *Ethics* 2, that the virtues and types of scientific knowledge exist in us by nature with respect to our aptitude for them, but not with respect to their perfection. And this is closer to the truth (*est verius*).

To see this clearly, we must take into account that there are two ways in which something is said to be *natural* to a man: (a) in one way, *by the nature of the species*, and (b) in the second way, *by the nature of the individual*.

Since each thing has its species because of its form (*secundum suam formam*) and is individuated because of its matter (*secundum materiam*), where a man’s form is his rational soul and the matter is his

body, it follows that what belongs to a man because of his rational soul is natural to him by the nature of his species, whereas what is natural to him because of the determinate makeup of his body (*secundum determinatam corporis complexionem*) is natural to him by the nature of the individual. (For what is natural to a man on the part of his body because of his *species* is in some sense referred back to the soul, viz., insofar as this sort of body is proportionate to this sort of soul.)

Now virtue is natural to a man in both senses as far as its beginnings are concerned (*secundum quandam inchoationem*): (a) with respect to the *nature of the species*, insofar as (i) a man has by nature in his reason certain naturally known principles with respect to both things to be known and things to be done (*principia tam scibilium et agendorum*), and these principles are, as it were, the seeds of the intellectual and moral virtues (*sunt quaedam seminalia intellectualium virtutum et moralium*), and insofar as (ii) a man has in his will a sort of natural desire for that good which accords with reason; and (b) with respect to the *nature of the individual*, insofar as, because of their bodily disposition, individuals are more or less disposed toward certain virtues. More specifically, this is because the sentient powers are acts that belong to certain parts of the body, and these powers are either aided or impeded in their acts by the dispositions of those parts of the body—and, as a result, the rational powers, which those sentient powers serve, are likewise aided or impeded in their acts. Accordingly, one man has a natural aptitude for scientific knowledge, another for fortitude, another for temperance. And it is in these ways that both the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues exist in us by nature because of a certain initial aptitude (*secundum quandam aptitudinis inchoationem*). However, the consummation of the virtues does not exist in us by nature. For nature is determined to a single effect, whereas the consummation of these virtues involves not just a single mode of action, but a diversity of modes of action corresponding to the diverse subject-matters and diverse circumstances in which the virtues operate.

So, then, it is clear that the virtues exist in us by nature as regards our aptitude for them and as regards their beginnings, but not as regards their perfected states (*secundum aptitudinem et inchoationem, non autem secundum perfectionem*)—except for the theological virtues, which are totally from the outside.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the objections. For the first two arguments go through in the sense that the seeds of the virtues exist in us by nature insofar as we are rational. On the other hand, the third argument goes through in the sense that because of the body's natural disposition, which it has from birth, one individual has an aptitude for being merciful, another for living temperately, and others for other virtues.

Article 2

Can virtues be caused in us by the habituation of actions?

It seems that virtues cannot be caused in us by the habituation of actions (*virtutes in nobis causari non possint ex assuetudine operum*):

Objection 1: Augustine's gloss on Romans 14:23 ("All that is not from faith is sin") says, "The whole life of non-believers is a sin, and nothing is good without the highest good. Where cognition of the truth is missing, the virtue is false even in the best behavior." But faith cannot be acquired by works; instead, it is caused in us by God—this according to Ephesians 2:8 ("By grace you are saved through faith"). Therefore, no virtue can be acquired in our case by the habituation of actions.

Objection 2: Since sin is contrary to virtue, it is incompatible with virtue (*non compatitur secum virtutem*). But a man is unable to avoid sin except through God's grace—this according to Wisdom 8:21 ("I have learned that I could not otherwise be continent, except God granted it"). Therefore, no virtues can be caused in us by the habituation of actions; instead, they can be caused only by God's gift.

Objection 3: Acts that lead to a virtue (*actus qui sunt ad virtutem*) fall short of the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. Therefore, a virtue cannot be caused by acts that precede the virtue.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that the good is more virtuous than the bad. But the habits of the vices are caused by bad acts. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the habits of the virtues can be caused by good acts.

I respond: The generation of habits from acts was explained above in general (q. 51, a. 2). But as regards virtue in particular, one should note that, as was explained above (q. 55, aa. 3-4), a man's virtue perfects him with respect to his good. But since, as Augustine says in *De Natura Boni*, the nature of the good consists in "mode, species, and order"—or, as Wisdom 11:21 puts it, in "number, weight, and measure"—a man's good has to be thought of in relation to some rule (*secundum aliquam regulam*). And, as was explained above (q. 19, aa. 3-4), this rule is twofold, viz., (a) human reason and (b) God's law (*ratio humana et lex divina*).

Now since God's law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is regulated by human reason is likewise regulated by God's law, but not vice versa. Therefore, a human virtue that is ordered toward a good that is regulated by the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts insofar as those acts proceed from reason, since this sort of good lies within the power and rule of reason.

By contrast, a virtue that orders a man toward the good insofar as it is regulated by God's law and not by human reason cannot be caused by human acts, whose principle is reason, but is instead caused in us solely by God's action. And this is why, in defining a virtue of this sort, Augustine put the phrase "that God works in us without us" into his definition of virtue.

Reply to objection 1: The first argument goes through for virtues of this last sort.

Reply to objection 2: Divinely infused virtue, especially if it is considered in its perfection, is not compatible with any mortal sin. But humanly acquired virtue can be compatible with a sinful act, even a mortal sin, since, as was explained above (q. 49, a. 3), the use of a habit in our case is subject to our will, and the habit of an acquired virtue is not corrupted by just a single sinful act. For it is not an act, but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit.

And so even though a man cannot without grace avoid mortal sin in the sense of never committing a mortal sin, this does not prevent him from being able to acquire the habit of a virtue through which he might abstain from bad actions in most cases (*ut in pluribus*) and especially from actions that are strongly opposed to reason (*ab his operibus quae sunt valde rationi contraria*). There are also some mortal sins that a man cannot in any way avoid without grace, viz., those that are directly opposed to the theological virtues, which exist in us by a gift of grace. But this will become clearer below (q. 109, a. 4).

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1 and q. 51, a. 1), certain seeds or principles of the acquired virtues preexist in us by nature. These principles are more noble than the virtues acquired by their power, just as the intellectual understanding of theoretical principles is more noble than the scientific knowledge of conclusions, and just as the natural rectitude of reason is more noble than rectification of the appetite, which comes about through its participation in reason and which pertains to moral virtue. So, then, insofar as human acts proceed from higher principles, they are able to be a cause of the acquired human virtues.

Article 3

Are there other virtues infused in us by God besides the theological virtues?

It seems that there are no other virtues infused in us by God besides the theological virtues:

Objection 1: What is able to be done by secondary causes is not done directly (*immediate*) by

God, except perhaps sometimes miraculously; for as Dionysius says, “It is God’s rule (*lex divinitatis est*) to bring about the last things through the middle things.” But as has been explained (a. 2), the intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us through our own acts. Therefore, it is inappropriate for them to be caused in us by infusion.

Objection 2: In God’s works there is much less that is superfluous than in the works of nature. But the theological virtues are sufficient to order us toward our supernatural good. Therefore, there are no other supernatural virtues that have to be caused in us by God.

Objection 3: Nature does not do through two things what it can do through one, and, *a fortiori*, this holds for God. But as a Gloss on Hebrews 1 says, God placed the seeds of the virtues in our soul. Therefore, it is unnecessary for Him to cause any other virtues in us through infusion.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 8:7 says, “She teaches us sobriety and justice, prudence and virtue.”

I respond: An effect has to be proportioned to its causes and principles. But as has been explained (a. 1 and q. 51, a. 1), all the virtues, both intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our own acts proceed from natural principles that preexist in us. In place of these natural principles God confers on us the theological virtues, by which, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 1), we are ordered toward our supernatural end. Hence, corresponding proportionately to these theological virtues there have to be other habits which are caused in us by God and which are related to the theological virtues in the same way that the moral and intellectual virtues are related to the natural principles of the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Certain moral and intellectual virtues can be caused in us by our own acts, but these virtues are not proportionate to the theological virtues. And so it is necessary for other virtues that are proportionate to the theological virtues to be caused directly by God.

Reply to objection 2: The theological virtues are sufficient to order us toward our supernatural end, as a sort of beginning (*secundum quandam inchoationem*), viz., with respect to God Himself. But the soul has to be perfected by other infused virtues with respect to other things, though in relation to God.

Reply to objection 3: The power of the principles that we are naturally endowed with (*virtus illorum principiorum naturaliter inditorum*) does not extend beyond a proportion to our nature. And so in relation to his supernatural end, a man needs to be perfected through other additional principles.

Article 4

Do the infused virtues differ in species from the acquired virtues?

It seems that the infused virtues do not differ in species (*non sint alterius speciei*) from the acquired virtues:

Objection 1: According to what has been said (a. 3), an acquired virtue and an infused virtue seem to differ only in their ordering toward the ultimate end. But human habits and acts acquire their species from their proximate ends and not from their ultimate end. Therefore, the infused intellectual and moral virtues do not differ in species from the acquired intellectual and moral virtues.

Objection 2: Habits are known through their acts. But the act that belongs to infused temperance is the same as the act that belongs to acquired temperance, viz., to moderate the sentient desires associated with the sense of touch (*moderari concupiscentias tactus*). Therefore, the habits do not differ in species.

Objection 3: An acquired virtue and an infused virtue differ insofar as the one is effected directly by God and the other is effected directly by a creature. But the man whom God formed (Genesis 2:7) is the same in species as a man whom nature generates, and the eye that God gave to the man born blind

(John 9:6-7) is the same in species as an eye that the formative power causes. Therefore, it seems that an acquired virtue is the same in species as an infused virtue.

But contrary to this: When the specific difference posited in a definition is changed (*differentia in definitione posita mutata*), it diversifies the species. But as was noted above (q. 55, a. 4), the phrase ‘that God works in us without us’ is posited in the definition of an infused virtue. Therefore, an acquired virtue, which this phrase does not fit in with, is not the same in species as an infused virtue.

I respond: There are two ways in which habits are distinguished from one another in species:

In one way, as was explained above (q. 54, a. 2 and q. 56, a. 2 and q. 60, a. 1), because of the *specific and formal characters of their objects*. Now the object of any given virtue is the good considered in some proper subject matter, in the way that the object of temperance is the good of what is pleasurable in the sentient desires associated with the sense of touch (*bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus*). The formal character of this object comes from reason, which establishes a mean in the relevant sentient desires, whereas the material aspect of the object is what comes from the sentient desires. Now it is clear that the mean imposed on these desires by the rule of human reason is different in character (*est alterius rationis*) from the mean imposed by God’s rule. For instance, in the case of the consumption of food, the mean established by human reason is that the consumption of food should not harm the health of the body or impede the act of reason, whereas according to the rule of God’s law it is required that a man “castigate his body and bring it into subjection” (1 Corinthians 9:27) through fasting from food and drink and other things of this sort. Hence, it is clear that infused temperance and acquired temperance differ from one another in species. And this same line of reasoning holds for the other virtues.

The second way in which habits are distinguished from one another in species is according to *what they are ordered toward*; for a man’s health is not the same in species as a horse’s health, and this is because of the diverse natures toward which they are ordered. In this same sense, the Philosopher says in *Politics* 3 that the virtues of citizens are diverse, depending on what it is for citizens to be related in the right way to diverse types of political regime. And in this same sense the infused moral virtues, through which men are related in the right way to being “citizens with the saints of the household of God” (Ephesians 2:19) differ in species from the other, acquired, virtues, by which a man is related in the right way to human affairs.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, infused virtue and acquired virtue differ not only with respect to their ordering toward the ultimate end, but also with respect to their ordering toward their proper objects.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, acquired temperance modifies sentient desires for the pleasures of touch in a way different from the way in which the infused virtue does. Hence, the two virtues do not have the same act.

Reply to objection 3: God made the eye of the man born blind for the same act for which other eyes are formed by nature, and this is why the eyes were the same in species. And the same line of reasoning would hold if God willed to cause in men virtues of the sort that are acquired from acts. But this is not so in the case under discussion, as has been explained.

QUESTION 64

The Mean of the Virtues

Next we have to consider the properties of the virtues: first, the mean of the virtues (question 64); second, the connectedness of the virtues (question 65); third, the equality of the virtues (question 66); and, fourth, the duration of the virtues (question 67).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Do the moral virtues stand in a mean (*sint in medio*)? (2) Is the mean of a moral virtue a mean that belongs to the things or a mean of reason? (3) Do the intellectual virtues consist in a mean? (4) Do the theological virtues consist in a mean?

Article 1

Do the moral virtues consist in a mean?

It seems that the moral virtues do not consist in a mean (*non consistat in medio*):

Objection 1: What is ultimate or a limit (*ultimum*) is incompatible with the character of a mean. But it is part of the character of virtue that it is a limit; for *De Caelo* 1 says, “A virtue is the limit of a power.” Therefore, a moral virtue does not consist in a mean.

Objection 2: What is maximal (*maximum*) is not a mean. But certain virtues tend toward something maximal, in the way that, as *Ethics* 4 says, magnanimity has to do with the greatest honors, and magnificence has to do with the greatest expenditures. Therefore, not every virtue lies in a mean.

Objection 3: If it were part of the character of a moral virtue to exist in a mean, then a moral virtue would have to be corrupted and not perfected by tending toward an extreme. But certain moral virtues are perfected by tending toward an extreme, in the way that virginity, which abstains from every sort of sexual pleasure, both embraces an extreme in this way and is also the most perfect sort of chastity. Likewise, to give everything away to the poor is the most perfect form of mercy or liberality. Therefore, it seems that it not part of the nature of a moral virtue to exist in a mean.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “A moral virtue is an elective habit that stands in the middle (*in medietate existens*).”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 55, a. 3), by its nature a virtue orders a man toward the good. Now a moral virtue properly perfects the appetitive part of the soul with respect to some determinate subject matter, and the measure and rule of an appetitive movement with respect to what is desirable is reason itself. But the good of anything that is measured and regulated consists in its being conformed to its rule, just as the good in the case of artefacts is that they measure up to the rule of their craft (*ut consequantur regulam artis*). As a result, what is bad in these matters is for something to depart from its rule or measure. This happens either by its *going beyond* the measure or by its *falling short* of it, as is manifestly obvious in all things that are regulated and measured.

And so it is clear that the good of a moral virtue consists in its conformity to reason’s measure (*consistit in adaequatione ad mensuram rationis*). But it is evident that the mean or middle (*medium*) is a balance or symmetry between excess and deficiency (*inter excessum et defectum medium est aequalitas sive conformitas*). Hence, it is manifestly obvious that a moral virtue consists in a mean.

Reply to objection 1: A moral virtue has its goodness from the rule of reason, and it has passions or operations for its subject matter.

Therefore, if a moral virtue is compared to *reason*, then, insofar as it belongs to reason, it has the character of one extreme (*habet rationem extremi unius*), viz., a *conformity*, whereas excess and deficiency have the character of the other extreme, viz., a *deformity*.

On the other hand, if a moral virtue is considered in comparison with its *subject matter*, then it has the character of a mean, insofar as it makes a passion conform to the rule of reason (*inquantum passionem reducit ad regulam rationis*). Hence, in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that a virtue is “a mean in its substance,” insofar as the rule of the virtue is posited with respect to its proper subject matter,

whereas “with regard to the best and the good, it is an extreme,” viz., because of its conformity to reason.

Reply to objection 2: It is in accord with diverse circumstances that the mean and the extremes are thought of in the case of actions and passions, and thus nothing prevents something from being an extreme for a given virtue in one circumstance and yet a mean in other circumstances, because of its conformity with reason. And so it is in the case of magnificence and magnanimity. For if one considers the *absolute quantity* of what the magnificent individual or the magnanimous individual tends toward, it will be called an extreme and a maximum, but if one instead considers this quantity *in relation to the other circumstances*, then it has the character of a mean. For these virtues tend toward such a quantity in accord with the rule of reason, that is, *where* it is right and *when* it is right and for the right *end*. By contrast, it would be an excess if one tended toward this maximum *when* it was not right, or *where* it was not right, or for an *end* that was not right, whereas it would be a deficiency if one did not tend toward this maximum *when* it was right to do so or *where* it was right to do so. And this is just what the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, viz., that “the magnanimous individual is, to be sure, extreme with respect to the magnitude, but he observes the mean in doing what is right.”

Reply to objection 3: The same line of reasoning that applies to magnanimity applies to virginity and poverty. For virginity abstains from all sexual pleasures, and poverty abstains from all riches, for the sake of what is right and insofar as it is right—according to God’s command and for the sake of eternal life.

However, if virginity or poverty were undertaken in a way that was not right, e.g., because of some illicit superstition or even for the sake of vainglory, then that would be an *excess* (*superfluum*). On the other hand, if they were not undertaken when it was right to undertake them, or if they were not undertaken in the right way, then that would be a vice through *deficiency*, as is clear in the case of those who break the vow of virginity or the vow of poverty.

Article 2

Is the mean of a moral virtue a mean that belongs to the things or a mean of reason?

It seems that the mean of a moral virtue is a mean that belongs to the things and not a mean of reason (*non sit medium rationis sed medium rei*):

Objection 1: The good of a moral virtue consists in its being a mean. But as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the good exists in the things themselves. Therefore, the mean of a moral virtue is a mean that belongs to the things.

Objection 2: Reason is an apprehensive power. But a moral virtue consists not in a mean among apprehensions, but in a mean among operations and passions. Therefore, the mean of a moral virtue is a mean that belongs to the things and not a mean of reason.

Objection 3: A mean that is an arithmetical or geometric ratio is a mean that belongs to the things. But as *Ethics* 5 says, this is what the mean of justice is like. Therefore, the mean of a moral virtue is a mean that belongs to the things and not a mean of reason.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “A moral virtue consists in a mean that is relative to us, and it is determined by reason (*virtus moralis in medio consistit quoad nos determinata ratione*).”

I respond: There are two ways in which ‘mean of reason’ can be understood:

In one way, insofar as a mean exists *in the very act of reason*, in the sense that the act of reason itself observes a mean (*quasi ipse actus rationis ad medium reducatur*). And in this sense, since a moral virtue perfects an act of an appetitive power and not an act of reason, the mean of a moral virtue is not a mean of reason.

In a second way, ‘mean of reason’ can be used for a mean that is *posited by reason in some subject matter* (*id quod a ratione ponitur in aliqua materia*). And in this sense the mean of a moral virtue is a mean of reason. For, as has been explained (a. 1), a moral virtue is said to consist in a mean because of its conformity to right reason (*per conformitatem ad rationem rectam*).

However, it sometimes happens that a mean of reason is also a mean that belongs to the things, and in such a case the mean of the moral virtue has to be a mean that belongs to the things; this occurs in the case of [the virtue of] justice. On the other hand, sometimes the mean of reason is not a mean that belongs to the things, but is instead taken from its relation to us; this occurs in the case of all the other moral virtues.

The reason for this is that justice has to do with operations, which consist in exterior things and in which, as was explained above (q. 60, a. 2), what is right has to be established absolutely speaking and in itself (*simpliciter et secundum se*). And so in the case of justice the mean of reason is the same as the mean that belongs to the things; for justice gives to each individual what is owed to him—no more and no less. By contrast, the other moral virtues have to do with the interior passions, in which what is right cannot be established in the same way, because men are related in diverse ways to their passions. And so the rectitude of reason within the passions has to be established in relation to us, who are affected by our passions.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the objections. For the first two arguments go through with respect to the mean of reason that is found in the very act of reason. And the third argument goes through for the case of the mean of justice.

Article 3

Do the intellectual virtues consist in a mean?

It seems that the intellectual virtues do not consist in a mean:

Objection 1: The moral virtues consist in a mean insofar as they are conformed to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues exist in reason itself, and so they do not seem to have a higher rule. Therefore, the intellectual virtues do not consist in a mean.

Objection 2: The mean of a moral virtue is determined by an intellectual virtue; for *Ethics 2* says, “Virtue consists in a mean determined by reason, in the way that someone wise would determine it” (*prout sapiens determinabit*). Therefore, if an intellectual virtue once again consists in a mean, that mean would have to be determined by some other virtue. And in this way there would be an infinite regress among virtues.

Objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics 10*, a mean properly lies between contraries. But there does not seem to be any contrariety in the intellect, since even contraries themselves are not contrary insofar as they exist in the intellect; rather, they are understood together, as with *white* and *black*, and *healthy* and *sick*. Therefore, there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.

But contrary to this: As *Ethics 6* says, an art or craft (*ars*) is an intellectual virtue, and yet, as *Ethics 2* points out, there is a mean that belongs to an art. Therefore, even an intellectual virtue consists in a mean.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the good of each thing consists in a mean, insofar as it is conformed to a rule or measure that it is possible to exceed and possible to fall short of. Hence, insofar as the good of an intellectual virtue involves some measure, it involves the character of a mean.

Now the good of an intellectual virtue is the true. The good of a speculative intellectual virtue is, as *Ethics 6* says, the true absolutely speaking, whereas the good of a practical intellectual virtue is the true as regards its conformity to right appetite.

Now when the true that belongs to our intellect is considered absolutely speaking, then it is, as it were, measured by the things. For as *Metaphysics* 10 says, the real thing is the measure of our intellect, since truth exists in an opinion or in speech because the thing is or is not such-and-such.

So, then, the good of a speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean through its conformity to the thing itself, i.e., insofar as the intellect asserts to exist what in fact exists, or asserts not to exist what does not exist (*secundum quod dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est*)—which is what the nature of the true consists in. On the other hand, *excess* has to do with a false affirmation, by which what does not exist is asserted to exist, whereas *deficiency* has to do with a false negation, through which what exists is asserted not to exist.

Now when the true that belongs to a practical intellectual virtue is compared to the things, then it has the character of what is measured. And so in this sense the mean involves being conformed to the thing in the practical intellectual virtues as well as in the speculative intellectual virtues.

However, with respect to the appetite the mean has the character of a rule and measure. Hence, the same mean, viz., the rectitude of reason, that belongs to a moral virtue also belongs to prudence itself, but it is a mean that belongs to prudence insofar as prudence regulates and measures, whereas it is a mean that belongs to a moral virtue insofar as the moral virtue is measured and regulated. Similarly, excess and deficiency are taken in diverse ways in the two cases.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, even an intellectual virtue has its own measure, and a mean is involved in such a virtue through its conformity to that measure.

Reply to objection 2: An infinite regress among virtues is not necessary, because the measure and rule of an intellectual virtue is the thing itself and not any other genus of virtue.

Reply to objection 3: The contrary things themselves do not have contrariety in the soul, since the one contrary is the explanation for the cognition of the other (*quia unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum*). Yet there does exist in the intellect a contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as is explained in the last chapter of *De Interpretatione*. For even though *to be* and *not to be* are contradictory opposites and not contraries if one thinks about the things signified insofar they exist in the things—for a being is one thing and what is purely a non-being is another—still, if they are referred back to an act of the soul, then they both posit something. Hence *to be* and *not to be* are contradictories, but the opinion by which we think *What is good is good* is contrary to the opinion by which we think *What is good is not good*. And an intellectual virtue is a mean between contraries of this sort.

Article 4

Does a theological virtue consist in a mean?

It seems that a theological virtue consists in a mean:

Objection 1: The good of the other virtues consists in a mean. But a theological virtue exceeds the other virtues in goodness. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a theological virtue exists in a mean.

Objection 2: ‘Mean of a virtue’ is taken in such a way that the mean of moral virtue has to do with our appetite being regulated by reason and the mean of intellectual virtue has to do with our intellect being measured by the things. But as was explained above (q. 62, a. 3), theological virtues perfect both the intellect and the appetite. Therefore, theological virtues likewise consist in a mean.

Objection 3: Hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Similarly, as Boethius points out in *De Duabus Naturis*, faith advances means between contrary heresies; for instance, the fact that we confess in Christ one person and two natures is a mean between the heresy of Nestorius, which claims that there are two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutychus, which claims that there is one person and one nature. Therefore, theological virtues consist in a mean.

But contrary to this: In all the cases in which a virtue consists in a mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But one cannot sin by excess with respect to God, who is the object of a theological virtue. For Ecclesiasticus 43:33 says, “Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise.” Therefore, theological virtues do not consist in a mean.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), ‘mean of a virtue’ is taken for a virtue’s conformity to its rule or measure, insofar as it is possible to exceed this measure or to fall short of it. Now there are two possible measures of a theological virtue:

One sort of measure has to do with the *very character of the virtue (secundum ipsam rationem virtutis)*. And in this sense the measure and rule of a theological virtue is God Himself. For our faith is regulated by God’s truth, whereas our charity is regulated by His goodness and our hope is regulated by the greatness of His omnipotence and kindness. And this measure exceeds every human power; hence, a man can never love God as much as God should be loved, and he can never believe in Him or hope in Him as much as he ought to. Hence, *a fortiori*, there cannot be an excess here. And the good of such a virtue does not consist in a mean; instead, the closer the virtue gets to the maximum (*ad summum*), the better it is.

By contrast, the other sort of rule or measure of a theological virtue is *on our part*, since even if we cannot be moved toward God as much as we ought to be, we nonetheless should be moved toward him by believing, hoping, and loving in accord with the measure of our condition. Hence, there can, *per accidens*, be a mean and extremes in a theological virtue, on our part.

Reply to objection 1: The good of the intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean through conformity to a rule or measure that it is possible to exceed. But as has been explained, this is not so in the case of the theological virtues, speaking *per se*.

Reply to objection 2: The moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule, whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated measure and rule. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: Hope is a mean between presumption and despair, *on our part*, viz., insofar as someone is said to be presumptuous because he hopes for a good from God that exceeds his condition, or he despairs by not hoping for what he is able to hope for, given his condition. However, there cannot be too much hope *with respect to God (non potest esse superabundantia spei ex parte Dei)*, since His goodness is infinite.

Likewise, faith also provides a mean between contrary heresies—not through a comparison to its object, which is God, whom one cannot believe in too much, but insofar as a human opinion is itself a mean between contrary opinions. This is clear from what was said above (a. 3).

QUESTION 65

The Connectedness of the Virtues

Next we have to consider the connectedness of the virtues (*de connexione virtutum*). On this topic there are five questions: (1) Are the moral virtues connected with one another? (2) Can the moral virtues exist without charity? (3) Can charity exist without the moral virtues? (4) Can faith and hope exist without charity? (5) Can charity exist without faith and hope?

Article 1

Are the moral virtues necessarily connected with one another?

It seems that the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another:

Objection 1: As is proved in *Ethics* 2, the moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts. But a man can be well versed (*potest exercitari*) in the acts of one virtue without being well versed in the acts of another virtue. Therefore, one moral virtue can be had without another.

Objection 2: Magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. But someone can have other moral virtues without having magnificence and magnanimity. For in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, “A poor man cannot be magnificent,” even though he can have certain other virtues; and he also says, “One who is worthy in small things and dignifies himself in them is temperate, but he is not magnanimous.” Therefore, the moral virtues are not connected.

Objection 3: Just as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues are not connected, since someone can have one type of scientific knowledge without having another. Therefore, the moral virtues are not connected, either.

Objection 4: If the moral virtues were connected, this would only be because they are connected in prudence. But this is not sufficient for the connectedness of the moral virtues. For it seems that someone can be prudent with respect to actions (*agibilia*) that belong to one virtue without being prudent with respect to actions that belong to another virtue—just as someone can have an art or craft (*ars*) with respect to certain makeable things (*factibilia*) without having an art or craft with respect to other things. But prudence is right reason with respect to what is doable (*recta ratio agibilium*). Therefore, it is not necessary for the moral virtues to be connected.

But contrary to this: In *Super Lucam* Ambrose says, “The virtues are connected and concatenated, with the result that whoever has one of them seems to have more.” Likewise, in *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “The virtues that exist in a man’s mind are in no way separated from one another.” And in *Moralia* 22 Gregory says, “One virtue without the others is either nothing at all or imperfect.” And in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 2 Tully says, “If there is a virtue that you admit not having, then it must be that you have no virtues at all.”

I respond: A moral virtue can be thought of as either *perfect* or *imperfect*.

An *imperfect* moral virtue, e.g., temperance or fortitude, is nothing other than an inclination that exists in us for doing some action in a genus of good actions (*ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum*), whether this inclination is in us by nature or by habituation (*a natura sive ex assuetudine*). And if we understand the moral virtues in this way, then they are not connected with one another. For instance, we see that someone, whether by natural temperament or by habituation, is prompt with respect to acts of generosity but not prompt with respect to acts of chastity.

By contrast, a *perfect* virtue is a habit that inclines one to do a good action in the right way (*in bonum opus bene agendum*). And if we understand the moral virtues in this way, then one must assert that they are connected—as is claimed by almost everyone.

Two arguments can be given for this, given that different authors distinguish the cardinal virtues in different ways.

For as has been explained (q. 61, aa. 3-4), some authors distinguish the cardinal virtues as certain *general conditions of the virtues*, so that no matter what subject matter is being thought of, discernment (*discretio*) pertains to *prudence*, rectitude to *justice*, moderation to *temperance*, and firmness of mind to *fortitude*. And on this score, the explanation for the connectedness is readily apparent. For instance, firmness does not receive the praise that belongs to virtue if it exists without moderation, rectitude, or discernment. And the same line of reasoning holds for the others. This is the argument for connectedness that Gregory uses in *Moralia* 22, when he says that, given the nature of a virtue, “the virtues cannot be perfect if they are not joined together, since there is no true prudence that is not just, temperate, and firm.” And he adds the same thing about the other virtues. Augustine gives a similar argument in *De Trinitate* 6.

Others, however, distinguish the cardinal virtues by their *subject matters* and, accordingly, the explanation for connectedness is the one given by Aristotle in *Ethics* 6. For as was explained above (q. 58, a. 4), no moral virtue can be had without prudence, because it is proper to a moral virtue to make a correct choice, since a virtue is an elective habit. But what is sufficient for a correct choice is not only an inclination toward a fitting end, which comes directly through the habit of a moral virtue, but also one’s directly choosing a means to that end, which comes through prudence and which involves deliberation, judgment, and command with respect to the means to an end (*quod est consiliativa et iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem*). Likewise, prudence cannot be had unless the moral virtues are had, since prudence is right reason with respect to what is doable, and so prudence proceeds, as from its principles, from the ends of doable things—and one is rightly ordered toward these ends by the moral virtues. Hence, just as speculative scientific knowledge cannot be had without an understanding of its principles, so neither can prudence be had without the moral virtues. From this it clearly follows that the moral virtues are connected.

Reply to objection 1: Some moral virtues perfect man in accord with his *common condition*, i.e., with respect to doing what occurs generally in every human life. Hence, a man has to be simultaneously well versed in the subject matters of all the moral virtues. And, to be sure, if he is well versed in operating in the right way with respect to all these subject matters, then he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. However, if he is well versed in acting in the right way with respect to one subject matter but not with respect to another—for instance, if he behaves well with respect to anger but not with respect to sentient desires—then he will acquire a habit of refraining from anger, but this habit will not have the character of a virtue because of his lack of prudence, which is corrupted with respect to sentient desires—in the same way that natural inclinations do not have the perfect character of a virtue if prudence is lacking.

On the other hand, there are certain moral virtues, e.g., magnificence and magnanimity, that perfect a man in accord with some *lofty condition* (*secundum aliquem eminentem statum*). And because being well versed in the subject matters of these virtues is not something that occurs to everyone in general, it is possible for someone to have other moral virtues without having the habits of these virtues *in actuality*—speaking now of the acquired virtues. Yet once he has acquired the other virtues, he will have the virtues in question *in proximate potentiality*. For when someone becomes adept, through practice, at being generous with respect to moderate donations and expenditures (*circa mediocres donationes et sumptus*), then if a large sum of money comes his way, he will, with a modicum of practice, acquire the habit of magnificence—just as a geometer, with a modicum of study, acquires scientific knowledge of a conclusion that he has never before thought about. But we are said to have what we are on the verge of having (*illud habere dicimur quod in promptu ut habeamus*)—this according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 2 (“What is barely lacking seems not to be lacking at all”).

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: The intellectual virtues have to do with diverse subject matters that are not ordered toward one another, as is clear in the case of the diverse arts and of the diverse types of scientific

knowledge. And so one does not find among them the sort of connection that is found among the moral virtues, which have to do with passions and operations and which clearly do have an ordering toward one another. For all the passions, which proceed from certain primary passions, viz., love and hate, are terminated in certain other passions, viz., pleasure and sadness. And, similarly, all the operations that are the subject matter of a moral virtue have an ordering toward one another, as well as toward the passions. And so the entire subject matter of the moral virtues falls under the unified consideration of prudence (*sub una ratione prudentiae cadit*).

To be sure, all intelligible things have an ordering toward their first principles. And, accordingly, all the intellectual virtues depend on the intellective understanding of first principles in the way that, as has been explained, prudence depends on the moral virtues. However, the universal principles that understanding has to do with do not depend on the conclusions that the other intellectual virtues have to do with, in the way that the moral virtues depend on prudence. For as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1 and q. 58, a. 5), there is a sense in which the appetite moves reason, and there is another sense in which reason moves the appetite.

Reply to objection 4: What the moral virtues incline one toward is related to prudence as a principle, but makeable things are related to an art or craft solely as their matter and not as principles. But it is clear that even if reason can be correct or right in one part of a subject matter and not in another, there is no way in which reason can be called ‘right reason’ if there is a defect in any of its principles. For instance, if someone erred with respect to the principle ‘Every whole is greater than its part’, then he would not be able to have geometrical scientific knowledge, since he would have to depart greatly from the truth in his conclusions. What’s more, as has been explained, doable things are ordered to one another, but makeable things are not. And so a lack of prudence with respect to one set of doable things would also induce a lack of prudence with respect to other doable things. But this does not happen in the case of makeable things.

Article 2

Can the moral virtues exist without charity?

It seems that the moral virtues can exist without charity:

Objection 1: Prosper’s *Liber Sententiarum* says, “Every virtue except for charity is common to good and bad individuals.” But as is pointed out in the same place, “Charity can exist only in good individuals.” Therefore, the other virtues can be had without charity.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 2 says, the moral virtues can be acquired by human acts. But charity is had only by infusion—this according to Romans 5:5 (“The charity of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.”) Therefore, the other virtues can be had without charity.

Objection 3: The moral virtues are connected with one another, insofar as they depend on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence—this according to Ephesians 3:19 (“The charity of Christ, which surpasses all knowledge ...”). Therefore, the moral virtues are not connected with charity and can exist without it.

But contrary to this: 1 John 3:14 says, “He who does not love abides in death.” But the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrii* 2, “It is by the virtues that one lives rightly.” Therefore, the virtues cannot exist without the love that belongs to charity.

I respond: As has been explained (q. 63, a. 2), insofar as the moral virtues do what is good in relation to an end that does not exceed a man’s natural power, they can be acquired through human actions. And in this sense they can exist without charity, as they did in many Gentiles.

However, insofar as the moral virtues do what is good in relation to our supernatural end, then in

this sense they have the character of virtue perfectly and truly, and they are infused by God and cannot be acquired by human acts. And moral virtues of this sort cannot exist without charity. For it was explained above (q. 58, aa. 4-5) that the other moral virtues cannot exist without prudence, and that prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues, since the moral virtues bring it about that one is related in the right way to certain ends from which prudence's reasoning proceeds. But the right reason that belongs to prudence requires much more that a man be related in the right way to his ultimate end—a relation that is effected by charity—than that he be related in the right way to other ends—a relation that is effected by the moral virtues—just as right reason in speculative matters especially requires the first indemonstrable principle, viz., that contradictories are not simultaneously true. Hence, it is clear that infused prudence cannot exist without charity and, as a result, neither can the other moral virtues, which cannot exist without prudence.

Thus, it is clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect virtues, and only the infused virtues should be called virtues absolutely speaking, since they order a man in the right way, absolutely speaking, toward his ultimate end. The other virtues, i.e., the acquired virtues, are virtues in a certain respect and not virtues absolutely speaking, since they order a man in the right way with respect to the ultimate end in a certain genus, but not with respect to the ultimate end absolutely speaking. Hence, Augustine's Gloss on Romans 14:23 ("All that is not of faith is sin") says, "Where cognition of the truth is lacking, there is false virtue even in good behavior."

Reply to objection 1: 'Virtues' is being taken here in the imperfect sense of virtue. Alternatively, if 'moral virtue' is being taken in the perfect sense of virtue, then it makes the one having it good and, as a result, it cannot exist in bad individuals.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for the case of the acquired moral virtues.

Reply to objection 3: Even if charity surpasses prudence and scientific knowledge, nonetheless, as has been explained, prudence depends on charity and, as a result, so do all the infused moral virtues.

Article 3

Can charity be had without the other moral virtues?

It seems that charity can be had without the other moral virtues:

Objection 1: What one thing is sufficient for is such that it is inappropriate for more than one thing to be ordered toward it. But as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:4ff ("Charity is patient, charity is kind ..."), charity is sufficient for doing all the works of the virtues. Therefore, it seems that once charity is had, the other virtues are superfluous.

Objection 2: If an individual has the habit of a virtue, then it is easy for him to do what belongs to the virtue and pleases him in its own right; hence, as *Ethics* 2 says, "A sign of a habit is the pleasure that is effected in its work." But there are many who have charity, existing without mortal sin, and who nonetheless experience difficulty with the works of the virtues and take pleasure in them not in their own right but only insofar as they are referred back to charity. Therefore, there are many individuals who have charity but do not have the other virtues.

Objection 3: Charity is found in all the saints. But some are saints and yet lack certain virtues; for Bede says that the saints are humiliated by the virtues that they do not have more than they glory in the virtues that they do have. Therefore, it is not necessary for an individual who has charity to have all the moral virtues.

But contrary to this: The whole law is fulfilled through charity, since Romans 13:8 says, "He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law." But the whole law can be fulfilled only by all the moral virtues together, since, as *Ethics* 5 says, the law has precepts concerning all the acts of the virtues.

Therefore, whoever has charity has all the moral virtues. Again, in a certain letter Augustine says that charity includes within itself all the cardinal virtues.

I respond: All the moral virtues are infused simultaneously with charity. The reason for this is that God does not operate less perfectly in the works of grace than He does in the works of nature. But we see in the case of the works of nature that there is no principle of any work in any entity that is not necessary for perfecting works of that sort; for instance, in animals there are organs by which the works which the soul has to power to carry out are perfected.

Now it is clear that insofar as charity orders a man toward his ultimate end, charity is a principle of all the good works that can be ordered toward the ultimate end. Hence, it is necessary for all the moral virtues by which a man perfects every genera of good works to be infused along with charity. And so it is clear that the infused moral virtues are connected not only because of prudence, but also because of charity, and that an individual who loses charity through mortal sin loses all the infused moral virtues.

Reply to objection 1: The perfection of a work of a lower power requires not only that perfection be present in the higher power but also that perfection be present in the lower power; for even if the principle agent were what it ought to be, a perfect action would not follow if its instrument were not well disposed. Hence, in order for a man to act well in regard to the means to his end, it is necessary for him to have not only the virtue by which he is well ordered toward his end, but also the virtues by which he is well ordered toward the means to that end. For a virtue that has to do with the end is like a principle and motive with respect to the means to that end. And so it is necessary for him to have the other moral virtues along with charity.

Reply to objection 2: It sometimes happens that someone who has a habit experiences difficulty in acting and, as a result, does not feel any pleasure or satisfaction in his act, and this because of some impediment that comes from the outside—as when someone who has the habit of a type of scientific knowledge experiences difficulty in understanding because of drowsiness or because of some sickness. Similarly, habits of the infused moral virtues sometimes experience difficulty in acting because of certain contrary dispositions that are left over from previous acts. This sort of difficulty does not occur in the same way in the case of the acquired moral virtues, because contrary dispositions are removed through the exercise of the acts by which those virtues are acquired.

Reply to objection 3: Some saints are said not to have certain virtues because, for the reason already explained, they experience difficulty with the acts of those virtues—even though they have the habits of all the virtues.

Article 4

Do faith and hope ever exist without charity?

It seems that faith and hope never exist without charity:

Objection 1: Since faith and hope are theological virtues, they seem to have more dignity than the moral virtues—even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot exist without charity. Therefore, neither can faith or hope.

Objection 2: As Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, “No one has faith unless he wills to” (*nullus credit nisi volens*). But as was explained above (q. 62, a. 3), charity exists in the will as its perfection. Therefore, faith cannot exist without charity.

Objection 3: In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “Hope cannot exist without love” (*sine amore*). But love is charity (*caritas*), since he is talking about that sort of love in the place cited. Therefore, hope cannot exist without charity.

But contrary to this: An interlinear Gloss on Matthew 1:2 says, “Faith generates hope, whereas

hope generates charity.” But what generates is prior to what is generated and can exist without it. Therefore, faith can exist without hope, and hope can exist without charity.

I respond: Just as the moral virtues can be thought of in two ways, so, too, faith and hope can be thought of in two ways: (a) *in an inchoative state (secundum inchoationem quandam)* and (b) as *having the perfect esse of a virtue (secundum perfectum esse virtutis)*. For since a virtue is ordered toward doing a good work, the virtue is called ‘perfect’ from the fact that it is capable of the good work in a perfect or complete way, which occurs when it is the case not only that there is a good that is effected but also that this good is effected in the right way (*bene fit*). Otherwise, if a good were effected but were not effected in the right way, then the habit which is the principle of such a work would not perfectly possess the character of a virtue. For instance, if someone were to do just works, he would do what is good, but the work would not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he did it in the right way, i.e., in accord with a correct choice, which comes about through prudence; and this is why justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.

So, then, there is, to be sure, a sense in which faith and hope can exist without charity; however, without charity they do not have the character of perfect virtues. For since it is a work of faith to put one’s faith in God (*credere Deo*), where putting one’s faith in someone is to assent by one’s own will, it follows that if one does not will this in the right way, i.e., through charity, then the work of faith will not be perfect. But the fact that one wills in the right way comes from charity, which perfects the will, since, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, every upright movement of the will proceeds from an upright love. So, then, faith exists without charity, but not as a perfect virtue—in the way that temperance or fortitude exists without prudence.

The same thing should be said about hope. For hope’s act is to expect future beatitude from God. This act is perfect if it is done on the basis of the merits one has—but this cannot be the case without charity. On the other hand, if one expects future beatitude from God on the basis of merits that he does not have but intends to acquire in the future, then the act of hope will be imperfect—and this can be the case without charity.

And so faith and hope can exist without charity, but without charity they are not, properly speaking, virtues. For as *Ethics* 2 says, it belongs to the nature of a virtue not only that we do some good in accord with the virtue, but also that we do it in the right way (*sed etiam bene*).

Reply to objection 1: The moral virtues depend on prudence, but infused prudence cannot have the character of a virtue without charity, i.e., without having the appropriate relationship to its first principle, which is the ultimate end.

However, faith and hope, according to their proper concepts, depend on neither prudence nor charity. And so they can exist without charity, even though, as has been explained, they are not virtues without charity.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for the case of a faith that has the perfect character of a virtue.

Reply to objection 3: In the cited passage Augustine is talking about hope insofar as one expects future beatitude because of the merits that he already has—which cannot be the case without charity.

Article 5

Can charity exist without faith and hope?

It seems that charity can exist without faith and hope:

Objection 1: Charity is love for God (*caritas est amor Dei*). But God can be naturally loved by us, even without presupposing either faith or the hope of future beatitude. Therefore, charity can exist

without faith and hope.

Objection 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues—this according to Ephesians 3:17 (“Rooted and founded in charity”). But sometimes a root exists without branches. Therefore, charity can sometimes exist without faith and hope and the other virtues.

Objection 3: Perfect charity existed in Christ. Yet He did not have faith and hope, since, as will be explained below (*ST* 3, q. 7, aa. 3-4), He was the perfect ‘comprehender’. Therefore, charity can exist without faith and hope.

But contrary to this: In Hebrews 11:6 the Apostle says, “Without faith it is impossible to please God,” and, as is obvious, this applies especially to charity—this according to Proverbs 8:17 (“I love those who love me”). Hope is likewise something that leads one into charity, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 4). Therefore, charity cannot be had without faith and hope.

I respond: ‘Charity’ signifies not only love for God but also a certain sort of friendship with Him, which, as *Ethics* 2 says, adds to love a certain mutual return of love along with a mutual sharing (*addit mutuum redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione*). What is said in 1 John 4:16 makes it clear that this belongs to charity: “The faithful God, by whom you have been called into fellowship with His Son.” Now this fellowship of man with God, which is an intimate sharing of life with Him (*quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso*), begins in the present life through grace but will be perfected in the future life through glory—both of which theses are held to by faith and hope. Hence, just as one could not have friendship with anyone if he disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of having fellowship or close communion with him, so, too, one cannot have friendship with God, i.e., charity, unless he has faith by which he believes in this sort of fellowship and communion of man with God, and unless he hopes that he will attain to this fellowship. And so there is no way in which charity can exist without faith and hope.

Reply to objection 1: Charity is not just any sort of love for God, but a love for God by which He is loved as the object of the beatitude toward which we are ordered by faith and hope.

Reply to objection 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope insofar as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But as was explained above (q. 62, a. 4), according to their *proper concepts*, faith and hope are presupposed by charity. And so charity cannot exist without them.

Reply to objection 3: Faith and hope were missing in Christ because they involve some imperfection (*propter id quod est imperfectionis in eis*). But in place of faith, He had the clear vision [of God], and instead of hope, He had full comprehension. And so perfect charity existed in Him.

QUESTION 66

The Equality of the Virtues

Next we have to consider the equality of the virtues (*de aequalitate virtutum*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Can a virtue be greater or lesser? (2) Are all the virtues that exist in the same individual at the same time equal to one another? (3) How do the moral virtues compare to the intellectual virtues? (4) How do the moral virtues compare to one another? (5) How do the intellectual virtues compare to one another? (6) How do the theological virtues compare to one another?

Article 1

Can a virtue be greater or lesser?

It seems that a virtue cannot be greater or lesser (*virtus non possit esse maior vel minor*):

Objection 1: Apocalypse 21:16 says that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal, where a Gloss on the passage says that the sides signify the virtues. Therefore, all the virtues are equal. Therefore, there cannot be a virtue that is greater than another virtue.

Objection 2: Nothing whose character consists in a maximum can be greater or lesser. But the character of a virtue consists in a maximum, since, as the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 1, virtue is “the limit of a power” (*est virtus ultimum potentiae*); and in *De Libero Arbitrio* 2 Augustine likewise says, “Virtues are maximal goods that no one can make bad use of.” Therefore, it seems that a virtue cannot be greater or lesser.

Objection 3: An effect’s quantity is measured by the agent’s power. But perfect virtues, i.e., the infused virtues, are from God, whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore, it seems that a virtue cannot be greater or lesser.

But contrary to this: There can be inequality whenever it is possible for there to be increase and greater abundance (*augmentum et superabundantia*). But greater abundance and increase are found among the virtues. For Matthew 5:20 says, “Unless your justice is greater than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” And Proverbs 15:5 says, “In abundant justice lies the greatest virtue.” Therefore, it seems that a virtue can be greater or lesser.

I respond: When one asks whether one virtue can be greater than another, there are two possible ways to understand the question:

One way is to understand it as having to do with *virtues that differ from one another in species*. And on this score it is clear that one virtue is greater than another. For it is always the case that a cause is more powerful than its effect; and, among the effects, the greater something is, the closer it is to its cause. But it is clear from what has been said (q. 18, a. 5 and q. 61, a. 2) that the cause and root of the human good is reason. And so *prudence*, which perfects reason, is greater in goodness than the other moral virtues, which perfect the appetitive power insofar it participates in reason. And among these latter virtues, one is better than another to the extent that it approaches closer to reason. Hence, *justice*, which exists in the will, is better than the other moral virtues, and *fortitude*, which exists in the irascible power, is greater than *temperance*, which exists in the concupiscible power—where, as is clear from *Ethics* 7, the concupiscible power participates to a lesser degree in reason.

In the second way, the question can be understood as having to do with *virtues of the same species*. And on this score—in accord with what was said above (q. 52, a. 1) when we were talking about the intensity of habits—there are two ways in which a virtue can be called greater or lesser, viz., (a) *in its own right* (*secundum seipsam*) and (b) *on the part of the subject who participates in it*.

Thus, if a virtue is considered *in its own right*, then its greatness or smallness has to do with what it extends to. Now if someone has a virtue, say temperance, then he has it with respect to everything that temperance extends to. This is not the case with scientific knowledge or art; for instance, it is not the case that a grammarian knows everything that belongs to grammar. And on this score the Stoics were

correct in claiming, as Simplicius reports in his commentary on the *Categories*, that virtue does not admit of *more* and *less* in the way that scientific knowledge and art do, because virtue consists in a maximum.

By contrast, if virtue is considered *on the part of the participating subject*, then it is possible for a virtue to be greater or lesser—whether in the same subject at different times or in different men. For one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of a virtue, which is in accord with right reason—and this either because of more habituation, or because of a better natural disposition or because of a more perspicacious judgment on the part of reason, or even because of a greater gift of grace, which, as Ephesians 4:9 says, is given to each individual “in accord with the measure of Christ’s giving.” And on this score the Stoics were mistaken in thinking that no one can be called virtuous if he is not maximally disposed toward virtue (*aestimantes nullum esse virtuosum dicendum nisi qui summe fuerit dispositus ad virtutem*). For the character of a virtue does not require that a virtue attain to the indivisible mean of right reason (*non exigitur quod attingat rectae rationis medium in indivisibili*), as the Stoics maintained; instead, as *Ethics* 2 says, it is enough for it to be close to the mean. For as is clear in the case of archers shooting at a fixed target, one individual gets closer to the same indivisible target than another does, and one does so more readily than another.

Reply to objection 1: The sort of equality in question does not have to do with absolute quantity, but has to be understood as a proportion (*secundum proportionem*), since, as will be explained below (a. 2), the virtues grow proportionately in a man.

Reply to objection 2: The limit that is relevant to a virtue can have the character of a greater or lesser good in the ways explained above, since, as has been explained, it is not an indivisible limit.

Reply to objection 3: God operates not by a necessity of nature but in accord with the order of His wisdom, according to which He gives men diverse measures of virtue—this according to Ephesians 4:7 (“To every one of you is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ”).

Article 2

Are all the virtues in one and the same individual equally intense?

It seems that it is not the case that all the virtues in one and the same individual are equally intense:

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 7:7 says, “Each one has his own gift from God, one in this way and another in that way.” But it would not be the case that one gift is more proper to an individual than another gift if each individual had all the virtues infused by God’s gift equally. Therefore, it seems that it is not the case that all the virtues are equal in one and the same individual.

Objection 2: If all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same individual, then it would follow that if one individual surpassed another in a single virtue, then he would surpass him in all the other virtues as well. But this is obviously false, since different holy men are especially praised for different virtues, e.g., Abraham for his faith, and Moses for his gentleness, and Job for his patience. Again, the reason why the Church sings of each confessor, “There is no one like him in keeping the law of the most High,” is that each of them was outstanding in some virtue. Therefore, it is not the case that all the virtues are equal in one and the same individual.

Objection 3: The more intense a habit is, the more a man exercises it readily and with delight. But it is clear from experience that a given man performs the act of one virtue more readily and with more delight than he performs the act of some other virtue. Therefore, it is not the case that all the virtues are equal in one and the same individual.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “Those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance, etc.” This would not be the case unless all the virtues that belong to one man were equal.” Therefore, all the virtues that belong to one man are equal.

I respond: As is clear from what has been said (a. 1), there are two possible ways to think of the quantity of the virtues:

In one way, according to *the nature of the species*. And on this score there is no doubt that one of a man's virtues is greater than another, in the way that charity is greater than faith and hope.

In the second way, one can think of the quantity according to *the subject's participation*, i.e., insofar as a virtue is intensified or weakened in its subject (*prout intenditur vel remittitur in subiecto*). And on this score all the virtues that belong to one man are equal by a certain sort of proportional equality insofar as they grow at an equal pace in a man—in the way that the fingers of a hand are unequal in quantity but proportionately equal because they grow in proportion to one another.

Now we have to understand the character of this latter sort of equality in the same way that we understood connectedness, since equality is a sort of connectedness with respect to quantity among the virtues. And it was explained above (q. 65, a. 1) that there are two possible ways to think of the reason for the connectedness of the virtues:

In one way, in accord with the interpretation of those who understand the four virtues in question as *four general conditions that belong to the virtues*, one of which is found together with the others in any given subject matter. And on this interpretation, a virtue, in whatever subject matter it is found, can be called 'equal' only if it has all these conditions to an equal degree (*habeat omnes istas condiciones aequales*). And this is the explanation for the equality of the virtues that Augustine gives in *De Trinitate* 4 when he says, "If you claim that the two individuals are equal in fortitude, but that this one is superior in prudence, then it follows that the other one's fortitude is less prudent. And, consequently, they are not equal in fortitude when the one's fortitude is more prudent. And you will find that the same thing holds for the other virtues, if you run through them one by one with the same sort of reasoning."

In the second way, the explanation for the connectedness of the virtues accords with those who understand these virtues to have *determinate subject matters*. And on this interpretation, the explanation for the connectedness of the virtues is taken from prudence—and from charity in the case of the infused virtues—but not, as was explained above (q. 65, a. 1), from any inclination that exists in the subject. So, then, the nature of the equality of the virtues can likewise be taken from prudence as regards what is *formal* in all the moral virtues. For when a complete nature exists equally (*esistente ratione aequaliter perfecta*) in one and the same individual, then it must be the case that the mean is constituted proportionately, in accord with right reason, in every subject matter. On the other hand, as regards what is *material* in the virtues, viz., the very inclination toward the act of the virtue, it is possible for a individual man to be more prompt with respect to the act of one virtue than with respect to the act of another virtue—either by nature, or because of habituation, or even because of a gift of grace.

Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Apostle can be understood as having to do with the gifts of gratuitous grace (*de donis gratiae gratis datae*), which are not common to everyone and which are not equal even in one and the same individual.

An alternative reply is that the Apostle is talking about the measure of sanctifying grace (*refertur ad mensuram gratiae gratum facientis*), in accord with which one individual abounds in all the virtues more than another individual because of his abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.

Reply to objection 2: One saint is praised mainly for one virtue and another for another virtue because of a more surpassing promptitude with respect to the act of one virtue than with respect to the act of another virtue.

Reply to objection 3: This likewise makes clear the reply to the third objection.

Article 3

Are the moral virtues preeminent over the intellectual virtues?

It seems that the moral virtues are preeminent over the intellectual virtues (*virtutes morales praeemineant intellectualibus*):

Objection 1: What is more necessary and more permanent is better. But the moral virtues are more permanent than the scientific disciplines (*permanetiores etiam disciplinis*), which are intellectual virtues, and they are also more necessary for human life. Therefore, they are to be preferred to the intellectual virtues.

Objection 2: It belongs to the nature of a virtue that it makes the one who has it good. But a man is called good because of his moral virtues and not because of his intellectual virtues—except, perhaps, prudence alone. Therefore, moral virtue is better than intellectual virtue.

Objection 3: An end is more noble than the means to that end. But as *Ethics* 4 says, “Moral virtue makes the intending of the end correct, whereas prudence makes the choosing of the means to that end correct.” Therefore, moral virtue is more noble than prudence, which is an intellectual virtue that has to do with moral matters.

But contrary to this: As *Ethics* 1 says, moral virtue exists through participation in the rational part of the soul, whereas intellectual virtue exists through its essence in the rational part of the soul. But what is rational through its essence is more noble than what is rational through participation. Therefore, intellectual virtue is more noble than moral virtue.

I respond: There are two ways in which something can be called greater or lesser: (a) *absolutely speaking (simpliciter)* and (b) *in a certain respect (secundum quid)*. For nothing prevents something from being better absolutely speaking, in the way that being a philosopher is better than being rich (*ut philosophari quam ditari*), even though there is a certain respect in which it is not better, viz., for one who lacks the necessities of life.

Now a thing is being thought of *absolutely speaking* when it is thought of with respect to the proper character of its species. But as has been said (q. 54, a. 2 and q. 60, a. 1), a virtue has its species from its object. Hence, absolutely speaking, the virtue that is more noble is the one that has a more noble object. But it is clear that reason’s object is more noble than the appetite’s object, since reason apprehends a thing in general (*in universali*), whereas the appetite tends toward things that have particularized *esse (esse particulare)*. Hence, absolutely speaking, the intellectual virtues, which perfect reason, are more noble than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite.

However, if virtue is thought of *in relation to its act*, then on this score moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, the role of which, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), is to move the other powers to their acts, is the more noble. And since something is called a virtue is because it is the principle of an act (for a virtue is the perfection of a power), it also follows that the character of a *virtue* belongs more to the moral virtues than to the intellectual virtues, even though the intellectual virtues are more noble *habits* absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 1: The moral virtues are more permanent than the intellectual virtues because they are exercised in matters that belong to ordinary life (*propter exercitium earum in his quae pertinent ad vitam communem*). But it is clear that the objects of the scientific disciplines, which are necessary and always the same, are more permanent than the objects of the moral virtues, which are particular things that can be done.

On the other hand, the fact that the moral virtues are more necessary for human life shows not that they are more noble absolutely speaking, but only that they are more necessary in a certain respect. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues are more dignified (*digniores*) by the very fact that they are not ordered toward anything else in the way that what is useful is ordered toward an end. This is so

because through these virtues there in some sense exists within us a beginning of beatitude, which, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 6), consists in the cognition of truth.

Reply to objection 2: The reason why it is due to his moral virtues, and not his intellectual virtues, that a man is called good absolutely speaking is that, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Hence, this objection proves only that moral virtue is better in a certain respect.

Reply to objection 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in choosing the means to an end, but also in establishing the end (*sed etiam in praestituendo finem*). Now the end of every moral virtue is to attain the mean in its proper subject matter and, as *Ethics* 2 and 4 point out, this mean is determined in accord with the right reason that belongs to prudence.

Article 4

Is justice the principal moral virtue?

It seems that justice is not the principal moral virtue (*iustitia non sit praecipua inter virtutes morales*):

Objection 1: It is better to give someone what belongs to oneself than to render to someone what is owed to him. But the former pertains to generosity (*pertinent ad liberalitatem*), whereas the latter pertains to justice. Therefore, it seems that generosity is a greater virtue than justice.

Objection 2: It seems that what is greatest in any given matter is what is most perfect in it. But as James 1:4 says, “Patience has a perfect work.” Therefore, it seems that patience is greater than justice.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 4 says, “Magnanimity does what is great in all the virtues.” Therefore, it likewise does what is great in justice itself (*magnificat etiam ipsam iustitiam*). Therefore, magnanimity is greater than justice.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “Justice is the greatest of the virtues” (*iustitia est praeclarissima virtutum*).

I respond: A virtue can be called greater or lesser in its species either *absolutely speaking* or in a *certain respect*:

As was explained above (a. 1), a virtue is called greater *absolutely speaking* insofar as a greater good of reason is reflected in it. And on this score justice excels among all the moral virtues because it is closer to reason. This is clear both from its *subject* and from its *object*. It is clear from its *subject*, since it exists in the will as its subject and, as is clear from what has been said (q. 8, a. 1 and q. 26, a. 1), the will is a rational appetite. On the other hand, it is clear from its *object* or *matter*, since it has to do with operations, by which a man is ordered not only within himself but also with respect to others. This is why, as *Ethics* 5 says, “Justice is the greatest of the virtues.” And among the other moral virtues, which have to do with the passions, the good of reason is more reflected in each of them to the extent that a greater appetitive movement is subject to reason. But the greatest among the things that belong to a man is his life, on which all other things depend. And so fortitude, which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in those matters that pertain to life and death, holds first place among those moral virtues that have to do with the passions, even though it ranks below justice. This is why the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “The greatest virtues have to be those that are honored over the others, since virtue is a power for doing good. Because of this, people especially honor the brave and the just; for the former,” viz., fortitude, “is useful in war,” and the latter,” viz., justice, “is useful both in war and in peace.” After fortitude ranks temperance, which subjects to reason the appetite for those things that are directly ordered toward life, either life in numerically the same individual or life in the same species—i.e., the appetite for food and sex. And so these three virtues, along with prudence, are said to be the principal virtues in

dignity as well.

Now a virtue is called greater *in a certain respect* insofar as it serves as an aid to or embellishment of a principal virtue. In the same way, a substance has more dignity than an accident absolutely speaking, but an accident may have more dignity than a substance in a certain respect, insofar as it perfects the substance in some sort of accidental *esse*.

Reply to objection 1: An act of generosity must be founded on an act of justice, since, as *Politics* 2 says, “There would be no generous giving if one did not give of what is his own.” Hence, there could be no generosity without justice, which separates what is one’s own from what is not one’s own. By contrast, justice could exist without generosity. Hence, justice is greater than generosity absolutely speaking, as something that is more general than generosity and grounds it, whereas generosity is greater in a certain respect, since it is a sort of embellishment of justice and a complement to it.

Reply to objection 2: Patience is said to have a perfect act in tolerating evils. In such cases patience not only excludes *unjust vengeance*, which justice likewise excludes, and *hatred*, which charity excludes, and *anger*, which gentleness excludes, but it also excludes *disordered sadness*, which is the root of all of the things just mentioned. And so patience is greater and more perfect in extirpating the root in this subject matter.

However, patience is not more perfect than all the other virtues absolutely speaking. For fortitude not only puts up with troubles without being disturbed, which belongs to patience, but also fights against them when this is necessary. Hence, whoever is brave is patient, but not vice versa; for patience is a certain part of fortitude.

Reply to objection 3: As *Ethics* 4 says, magnanimity cannot exist unless the other virtues exist before it. Hence, it is related to the other virtues as their embellishment. And so it is greater than all the others in a certain respect, but not absolutely speaking.

Article 5

Is wisdom the greatest of the intellectual virtues?

It seems that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues (*sapientia non sit maxima inter virtutes intellectuales*):

Objection 1: What commands is greater than what is commanded. But prudence seems to command wisdom; for *Ethics* 1 says that political science, which, as *Ethics* 8 explains, belongs to prudence, “determines which scientific disciplines should exist in the cities, which ones each individual should learn, and to what extent.” Therefore, since wisdom is also included among the scientific disciplines, it seems that prudence (*prudentia*) is greater than wisdom (*sapientia*).

Objection 2: It belongs to the nature of a virtue to order a man toward happiness, since, as *Physics* 7 says, virtue is “the disposition of what is perfect toward what is best.” But prudence is right reason with respect to things that can be done, and it is through prudence that a man is led to happiness, whereas wisdom does not consider the human acts by which one is led to beatitude. Therefore, prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Objection 3: Cognition seems to be greater to the extent that it is more perfect. But we have a more perfect cognition of human things, with respect to which there is scientific knowledge, than we do of divine things, with respect to which there is wisdom—to use Augustine’s distinction in *De Trinitate* 12. For divine things are incomprehensible—this according to Job 36:26 (“Behold, God is great, surpassing all our knowledge”). Therefore, scientific knowledge (*scientia*) is a greater virtue than wisdom (*sapientia*).

Objection 4: The cognition of principles has more dignity than does the cognition of conclusions.

But wisdom, like the other types of scientific knowledge, draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles, with respect to which there is understanding. Therefore, understanding (*intellectus*) is a greater virtue than wisdom (*sapientia*).

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that wisdom is, as it were, the head of the intellectual virtues (*est sicut caput inter virtutes intellectuales*).

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), a virtue's greatness with respect to species is thought of on the basis of its object. But the object of wisdom is the most excellent among the objects of all the intellectual virtues. For as is explained at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, wisdom considers the highest cause, i.e., God. And since an effect is judged by its cause, and since lower causes are judged by higher causes, it follows that (a) wisdom passes judgment on all the other intellectual virtues and that (b) it belongs to wisdom to order all of them, and that (c) wisdom is, as it were, architectonic with respect to all of them.

Reply to objection 1: Since prudence has to do with human things, whereas wisdom has to do with the highest cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom—unless, as *Ethics* 4 explains, man is the greatest of the things in the world. Hence, one should reply that, as the same book says, prudence does not command wisdom itself, but instead just the opposite, since, as 1 Corinthians 2: says, “The spiritual man judges all things, and he himself is judged by no man.” For prudence does not have the wherewithal to deal with the highest things that wisdom considers; instead, prudence issues commands about things that are ordered toward wisdom—more specifically, it issues commands about how men should arrive at wisdom. Hence, in this role prudence, or political science, is the servant of wisdom, since it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her like a doorkeeper for the king.

Reply to objection 2: Prudence considers those things by which one arrives at happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, i.e., the highest intelligible thing. And if wisdom's consideration with respect to its object were perfect, then there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom. But since in this life wisdom's act is imperfect with respect to its principal object, viz., God, it follows that the act of wisdom is a sort of beginning of or participation in the happiness that is to come. and so wisdom is closer to happiness than prudence is.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 1, one type of knowledge (*una notitia*) has preference over another either because it is of more noble things or because of its certitude. Therefore, if the subjects are equal in goodness and nobility, then the type of knowledge that is more certain will be the greater virtue.

However, a type of knowledge that is less certain and about higher and greater things has preference over a type of knowledge that is more certain but about lower things. This is why in *De Caelo* 2 the Philosopher says, “It is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial entities, even if in a weaker and merely probable way.” And in *De Partibus Animalium* 1 he says, “It is better to know a little about more noble things than a lot about less noble things.” Thus, wisdom, to which the cognition of God belongs, is unable, especially in this life, to arrive perfectly at possessing Him, as it were; instead, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, “This belongs to God alone.” And yet the modicum of cognition that can be had of God through wisdom has preference over all other cognition.

Reply to objection 4: The truth of, and cognition of, indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of their terms; for instance, from the the cognition of what a whole is and what a part is, it is immediately known that a whole is greater than its part. But it pertains to wisdom to have cognition of the concepts of being and non-being, and of a whole and a part, and of other things that follow upon being, from which the indemonstrable principles are constituted as from their terms. For being in general (*ens commune*) is the proper effect of the highest cause, viz., God. And so wisdom makes use of the indemonstrable principles, with respect to which there is understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, in the way that the other types of scientific knowledge do, but also by passing judgment on them and by disputing with those who deny them. Hence,, it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.

Article 6

Is charity the greatest of the theological virtues?

It seems that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues (*caritas non sit maxima inter virtutes theologicas*):

Objection 1: Since, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 3), faith exists in the intellect, whereas hope and charity exist in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is related to hope and charity in the same way that intellectual virtue is related to moral virtue. But as is clear from what has been said (a. 3), intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue. Therefore, faith is greater than hope and charity.

Objection 2: What results from addition to another seems to be greater than the latter. But hope, it seems, results from an addition to charity; for as Augustine says in *Enchiridion*, hope presupposes love and adds to it a certain movement of stretching out toward the thing that is loved. Therefore, hope is greater than charity.

Objection 3: A cause is more powerful than its effect. But faith and hope are causes of charity; for a Gloss on Matthew 1:2 says, “Faith generates hope, and hope generates charity.” Therefore, faith and hope are greater than charity.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 13:13 the Apostle says, “Now these three remain: faith, hope, charity; and the greatest of these is charity.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), a virtue’s greatness with respect to species is thought of on the basis of its object. Now since the three theological virtues have God as their proper object, one of them can be called greater than another not because it has a greater object but rather because it is situated closer to the object than the other. And on this score charity is greater than the others. For the others imply in their nature a certain distance from their object, since faith is of things not seen and hope is of things not had. But the love that belongs to charity (*amor caritatis*) is of something that is already had, since what is loved exists in a certain way within the lover, and the lover is also drawn toward union with what is loved. This is why 1 John 4:16 says, “The one who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.”

Reply to objection 1: Faith and hope are not at all related to charity in the way that prudence is related to moral virtue—and this for two reasons:

First, because the theological virtues have an object which lies beyond the human soul, whereas prudence and the moral virtues have to do with what is lower than man. Now in the case of those things that lie beyond man, affection is more noble than cognition (*nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio*). For cognition is perfected to the extent that what is known exists in the knower, whereas affection is perfected to the extent that the one who has the affection is drawn toward the thing he has affection for. But what lies beyond man is more noble in itself than when it exists in a man, since each thing exists in another in the manner of that in which it exists. On the other hand, the opposite point holds in the case of those things that are lower than man.

Second, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements that belong to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement that tends toward God and belongs to the theological virtues. Instead, faith merely exhibits the object, whereas the appetitive movement toward the object surpasses human cognition—this according to Ephesians 3:19 (“... the charity of Christ, which surpasses all knowledge”).

Reply to objection 2: Hope presupposes the love of that which one hopes to attain, and this is a love of concupiscence—a love by which the one who desires the good loves himself rather than anything else. By contrast, charity implies a love of friendship, which, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 4), one arrives at by means of the hope.

Reply to objection 3: A perfecting cause (*causa perficiens*) is more powerful than its effect, but a

disposing cause (*causa disponens*) is not more powerful. Otherwise, the heat of a fire would be more perfect than the soul for which it disposes the matter—which is clearly false. But this is the sense in which faith generates hope and in which hope generates charity, viz., insofar as the former disposes one for the latter.

QUESTION 67

The Duration of the Virtues after this Life

Next we have to consider the duration of the virtues after this life (*de duratione virtutum post hanc vitam*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Do the moral virtues remain after this life? (2) Do the intellectual virtues remain? (3) Does faith remain? (4) Does hope remain? (5) Does anything of faith or hope remain? (6) Does charity remain?

Article 1

Do the moral virtues remain after this life?

It seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life:

Objection 1: As Matthew 22:30 says, men in the state of future glory will be like the angels. But as *Ethics* 10 says, it is ridiculous to posit moral virtues in the angels. Therefore, neither is it the case that there will be moral virtues in men after this life.

Objection 2: The moral virtues perfect a man in his active life. But the active life does not remain after this life; for in *Moralia* 6, Gregory says, “The works of the active life pass away with the body.” Therefore, the moral virtues do not remain after this life.

Objection 3: As the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 3, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, belong to the non-rational parts of the soul. But the non-rational parts of the soul are corrupted when the body is corrupted, because they are acts of corporeal organs. Therefore, it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 1:15 says, “Justice is perpetual and immortal.”

I respond: As Augustine reports in *De Trinitate* 14, Cicero claimed that after this life the four cardinal virtues do not exist, but that in that other life men will be beatified solely by the cognition of that nature in which nothing is better or more lovable—or, as Augustine puts it in the same place, “that nature which created all natures.” However, afterwards Augustine himself determines that these four virtues do exist in the future life, but in a different mode.

To see this clearly, notice that in these virtues there is something *formal* and something *material*. What is *material* in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part of the soul toward passions and operations in accord with a certain mode. But since this mode is determined by reason, it follows that what is *formal* in all the virtues is the very order of reason.

So, then, one should reply that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life as regards what is *material* in them. For in the future life sensory desires and the pleasures of food and sex will have no place, and neither will fear and audacity with respect to the dangers of death, or, again, the distribution and sharing of those things that are useful in the present life.

However, as regards what is *formal*, these virtues will remain absolutely perfect in the blessed in heaven, since each individual’s reason will be perfectly upright with respect to those things that pertain to him in that state, and each individual’s appetite will be completely moved in accord with the order of reason in the matters that pertain to that state. Hence, in the same place Augustine says, “Prudence will exist there without any danger of error, fortitude without the irksomeness of tolerating evils, and temperance without resistance from disordered desires—so that it will belong to prudence not to prefer any good to God or to equate any good with God, and it will belong to fortitude to cling to Him with utter firmness, and it will belong to temperance to take delight without any harmful effect.” On the other hand, as regards justice, it is even clearer what act it will have in that state, viz., to be subject to God, since even in this life it belongs to justice to be subject to a superior.

Reply to objection 1: In the cited passage the Philosopher is talking about the moral virtues with respect to what is *material* in them, viz., in the case of justice, exchanges and distributions; in the case of fortitude, terrors and dangers; and in the case of temperance, disordered sensory desires.

Reply to objection 2: The reply to the second objection is similar. For what belongs to the active life is related *materially* to the virtues.

Reply to objection 3: There are two states after this life: (a) before the resurrection, when souls will be separated from their bodies, and (b) after the resurrection, when souls will once again be united with their bodies.

Thus, in the state of resurrection, there will be non-rational powers in the bodily organs, just as there now are. Hence, fortitude will be able to exist in the irascible power and temperance in the concupiscible power, since both powers will be perfectly disposed toward obeying reason.

On the other hand, in the pre-resurrection state the non-rational parts will not exist in actuality in the soul; instead, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 77, a. 8), they will exist only as roots in the soul's essence (*solum radicaliter in essentia ipsius*). Hence, the two virtues in question will likewise exist in actuality only in their root, viz., in reason and the will, in which, as has been explained (q. 63, a. 1), there are certain seeds of these virtues. By contrast, justice, which exists in the will, will remain even in actuality. This is why it is specifically said of justice that it is "perpetual and immortal"—both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible, and also because of the similarity of its act, as was just explained above.

Article 2

Do the intellectual virtues remain after this life?

It seems that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life:

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 13:8-9 the Apostle says, "Knowledge (*scientia*) will be destroyed," and the reason is that "we know in part." But just as the cognition that belongs to scientific knowledge is "in part," i.e., imperfect, so too with the cognition that belongs to the other intellectual virtues for as long as this life endures. Therefore, all the intellectual virtues will cease to exist after this life.

Objection 2: In the *Categories* the Philosopher says that since scientific knowledge is a habit, it is a quality that is difficult to change; for it is not easily lost, except perhaps because of some vehement change or illness. But there is no change in the human body as great as that which occurs through death. Therefore, scientific knowledge and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.

Objection 3: The intellectual virtues perfect the intellect for performing its proper act well. But it seems that the act of the intellect does not exist after this life, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, the soul does not understand anything without a phantasm; but phantasms do not remain after this life, since they exist only in corporeal organs. Therefore, the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life.

But contrary to this: The cognition of universal and necessary things is more firm than the cognition of particular and contingent things. But the cognition of particular contingent things remains in a man after this life, more specifically, the cognition of those things that someone has done or undergone—this according to Luke 16:25 ("Remember that you received good things in your life, and Lazarus received bad things"). Therefore, *a fortiori*, the cognition of universal and necessary things remains, and this belongs to scientific knowledge and the other intellectual virtues.

I respond: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 6), there are some who have claimed that (a) intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect (*in intellectu possibili*) except during the time when it is actually engaged in intellectual understanding, and that (b) when actual thinking ceases, there is conservation of species only in the sentient powers, viz., in the powers of imagination and memory, which are acts of corporeal organs. Powers of this sort are corrupted when the body is corrupted. And so on this opinion scientific knowledge will not in any way remain after this life when the body is corrupted—and neither will any other intellectual virtue remain.

However, this opinion is contrary to the view of Aristotle, who in *De Anima* 3 says, “The passive intellect is actualized when it becomes each thing in knowing it, whereas it is in potentiality with respect to actually engaging in thinking.” The opinion in question is likewise contrary to reason, since intelligible species are received unchangeably in the passive intellect, in accord with the mode of the recipient. Hence, the passive intellect is called “the place for species” (*locus specierum*), because it conserves the intelligible species. By contrast, the phantasms, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 84, a. 7), are such that it is in turning toward them that a man has intellectual understanding in this life by applying the intelligible species to them, are corrupted when the body is corrupted.

Hence, with respect to the phantasms, which are, as it were, what is *material* in the intellectual virtues, the intellectual virtues are destroyed when the body is destroyed, whereas with respect to the intelligible species, which exist in the passive intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. But in the case of the intellectual virtues, the species behave as what is *formal*.

Hence, the intellectual virtues remain after this life with respect to what is *formal* in them, but not with respect to what is *material* in them—just like the moral virtues, in the way explained above (a. 1).

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle’s words should be understood as having to do with what is material in scientific knowledge and with the mode of understanding, since the phantasms do not remain when the body is destroyed, and there will be no use of scientific knowledge by turning to the phantasms.

Reply to objection 2: Illness corrupts the habit of scientific knowledge with respect to what is material in it, viz., the phantasms, but not with respect to the intelligible species, which exist in the passive intellect.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 89, a. 1), after death the separated soul has a different mode of intellectual understanding than it has by turning to phantasms. And on this score scientific knowledge remains, though not with the same mode of operating—just as has been explained (a. 1) concerning the moral virtues.

Article 3

Does faith remain after this life?

It seems that faith remains after this life:

Objection 1: Faith (*fides*) is more noble than scientific knowledge (*scientia*). But as has been explained, scientific knowledge remains after this life. Therefore, so does faith.

Objection 2: 1 Corinthians 3:11 says, “No one can lay a different foundation from the one that has been laid, which is Christ Jesus”—i.e., faith in Christ Jesus. But when the foundation has been removed, what is built upon it does not remain. Therefore, if faith does not remain after this life, no other virtue remains.

Objection 3: The cognition belonging to faith and the cognition belonging to glory differ as the imperfect and the perfect. But an imperfect cognition can exist along with a perfect cognition. For instance, in an angel evening knowledge (*cognitio vespertina*) can exist along with morning knowledge (*cognitio matutina*); and a man can have, with respect to the same conclusion, scientific knowledge through a demonstrative syllogism along with opinion through a dialectical syllogism. Therefore, after this life faith can exist along with the cognition belonging to glory.

But contrary to this: In 2 Corinthians 5:6-7 the Apostle says, “As long as we are in the body, we wander from the Lord, since we walk by faith and not by sight.” But those who exist in the state of glory do not wander from the Lord, but instead are present to Him. Therefore, faith does not remain after this life in the state of glory.

I respond: Opposition is the *per se* and proper cause of one thing’s being excluded from another,

viz., insofar as the opposition of an affirmation and a negation is included in all opposites.

Now in some cases there is an opposition *with respect to contrary forms*, e.g., *white* and *black* among the colors. On the other hand, in some cases the opposition is *with respect to the perfect and the imperfect*; hence, in the case of alterations *more* and *less* are taken as contraries—e.g., as *Physics* 5 points out, when what is less hot becomes more hot. And since the perfect and the imperfect are opposed to one another, it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to exist together in the same respect.

However, notice that an imperfection sometimes belongs to the *nature* of a thing and pertains to its species; for instance, a lack of reason belongs to the nature of the species of a horse or an ox. And since a thing that remains numerically one and the same cannot be transferred from one species to another, it follows that if this sort of imperfection is removed, then the species of the thing is destroyed; for instance, a thing would no longer be an ox or a horse if it were rational. By contrast, sometimes an imperfection does not belong to the nature of the species, but occurs to an individual *in some other respect* (*sed accidit individuo secundum aliquid aliud*); for instance, a lack of reason sometimes occurs in a man to the extent that his use of reason is obstructed because of sleep or drunkenness or something of the sort. And it is clear that when this sort of imperfection is removed, the entity's substance still remains.

Now it is clear that an imperfection of cognition belongs to the nature of faith. For imperfection is posited in the definition of faith given in Hebrews 11:1: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that are not apparent." And Augustine says, "What is faith? To believe what you do not see." Now the fact that a cognition is lacking in evidentness or vision (*sit sine apparatione vel visione*) pertains to an imperfection of cognition. And so an imperfection of cognition belongs to the nature of faith. Hence, it is clear that faith cannot be a perfect cognition while remaining numerically the same cognition.

However, we should consider further whether or not faith can exist together with a perfect cognition. For nothing prevents a certain sort of imperfect cognition from sometimes existing along with a perfect cognition. Therefore, notice that there are three possible ways for a cognition to be imperfect: (a) on the part of the *object* of the cognition; (b) on the part of the *medium*; and (c) on the part of the *subject*.

It is on the part of the *object* of cognition that morning knowledge and evening knowledge differ as the perfect and the imperfect in the angels. For morning knowledge (*cognitio matutina*) is of things insofar as they have *esse* in the Word, whereas evening knowledge (*cognitio vespertina*) is of things insofar as they have *esse* in their own proper natures, which is imperfect in relation to the first sort of *esse*.

As for the *medium*, a cognition that is of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium and a cognition that is of a conclusion through a probabilistic medium differ as the perfect and the imperfect.

And as for the *subject*, opinion, faith, and scientific knowledge differ as the perfect and imperfect. For it belongs to the nature of an opinion that one thing is accepted with a fear of the opposite, so that an opinion does not have firm adherence (*non habet firmam inhaesionem*). By contrast, it belongs to the nature of scientific knowledge that it has firm adherence along with intellectual vision, since it has a certitude that comes from the understanding of the principles. And faith falls in between them, since it goes beyond opinion in having firm adherence, whereas it falls short of scientific knowledge in not having vision.

Now it is clear that the perfect and the imperfect cannot exist together with respect to the same thing (*secundum idem*); however, things that differ as perfect and imperfect with respect to some same thing can exist together in some other same thing (*ea quae differunt secundum aliquid idem possunt simul esse in aliquo alio eodem*).

So, then, cognitions that are perfect and imperfect on the part of the *object* cannot in any way have the same object (*nullo modo possunt esse de eodem obiecto*); however, they can share the same medium

and the same subject (*possunt convenire in eodem medio et in eodem subiecto*). For nothing prevents one man from having a cognition of two objects at one and the same time through one and the same medium, where one of the two objects is perfect and the other imperfect, e.g., *sickness* and *health*, or *good* and *evil*.

Again, it is impossible for cognitions that are perfect and imperfect on the part of the *medium* to share the same medium. But nothing prevents them from sharing the same object and the same subject, since one man can have cognitions of the same conclusion through a probabilistic medium and through a demonstrative medium.

Again, it is likewise impossible for cognitions that are perfect and imperfect on the part of the *subject* to exist together in the same subject. But faith by its nature has an imperfection that is on the part of the subject, viz., that the one who has faith does not see what he believes in, whereas beatitude by its nature has perfection on the part of the subject, so that, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 8), one who is blessed in heaven sees that by which he is beatified. Hence, it is clear that it is impossible for faith to remain along with beatitude in the same subject.

Reply to objection 1: Faith is more noble than scientific knowledge on the part of the *object*, since its object is the First Truth. But scientific knowledge has a more perfect mode of cognition that is not incompatible with the perfection of beatitude, viz., vision, in the way that the mode of faith *is* incompatible with it.

Reply to objection 2: Faith is the foundation as regards what it contains of cognition. And so when that cognition is perfected, the foundation will be more perfect.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Does hope remain after death in the state of glory?

It seems that hope remains after death in the state of glory:

Objection 1: Hope perfects the human appetite in a more noble way than the moral virtues do. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 14, the moral virtues remain after this life. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so does hope.

Objection 2: Fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life, both a filial fear in the blessed in heaven, which remains forever, and a fear of punishment in the damned. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, hope is able to remain.

Objection 3: Just as hope is of a future good, so, too, is desire. But in the blessed in heaven there is a desire for a future good, both (a) with respect to the glory of the body, which the souls of the blessed desire, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 24, and (b) with respect to the soul's glory—this according to Ecclesiasticus 24:29 ("They who eat me will still hunger, and they who drink me will still thirst") and 1 Peter 1:12 ("... at whom the angels desire to look"). Therefore, it seems possible for hope to exist in the blessed after this life.

But contrary to this: In Romans 8:24 the Apostle says, "Who sees what he hopes for?" But the blessed in heaven see that which is the object of hope, viz., God. Therefore, they do not hope.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), that which by its nature implies the imperfection of its subject cannot exist along with the subject when the opposed perfection has been brought to completion. For instance, it is clear that a movement by its nature implies the imperfection of its subject, since a movement is the act of something that exists in potentiality insofar as it exists in potentiality, so that when that potentiality is actualized (*quando illa potentia reducitur ad actum*), the movement then ceases. For a thing is not still becoming white after it has already been made white.

Now as is clear from what we said above about the passion of hope (q. 40, aa. 1 and 2), hope implies a certain movement toward that which is not had. And so once what is hoped for, viz., the enjoyment of God, is had, hope will no longer be able to exist.

Reply to objection 1: Hope is more noble than the moral virtues as regards its object, viz., God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of beatitude in the way that the act of hope is—except perhaps by reason of their subject matter, with respect to which the moral virtues do not remain. For it is not the case that a moral virtue perfects the appetite only with respect to what is not yet had; instead, it also perfects the appetite with respect to what is had at present.

Reply to objection 2: As will be explained below (ST 2-2, q. 19, a. 2), there are two types of fear, *servile fear* and *filial fear*:

Servile fear is the fear of punishment and cannot exist in the state of glory, since no possibility of punishment remains.

Filial fear, on the other hand, has two acts, viz., (a) to revere God (*revereri Deum*), and filial fear remains with respect to this act, and (b) to fear separation from Him, and filial fear does not remain with respect to this act. For to be separated from God has the character of an evil, whereas nothing evil will be feared in the state of glory—this according to Proverbs 1:33 (“Abundance will be enjoyed, and the fear of evils will be removed”). But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 2 and q. 40, a. 1), fear is opposed to hope by the opposition between *good* and *evil*, and so the fear that remains in the state of glory is not opposed to hope.

Now in the damned there can be fear of punishment more than there can be hope of glory in the blessed. For in the damned there will be a succession of punishments, and so the character of the future, which is an object of fear, remains in that state, whereas the glory of the saints exists without succession insofar as it is a certain participation in eternity, in which there is no past or future, but only the present. Yet even in the case of the damned fear does not exist properly speaking. For as was explained above (q. 40, a. 2), fear never exists without some hope for escape, which will not at all exist in the damned. Hence, neither will fear exist—except perhaps in the common way of speaking, according to which *any* expectation of a future evil is called ‘fear’.

Reply to objection 3: As regards the *soul’s state of glory*, there cannot be any desire in the blessed, insofar as desire looks to the future—and this for the reason already explained. However, hunger and thirst are said to exist in that state because weariness is removed (*per remotionem fastidii*), and for the same reason desire is said to exist in the angels.

As regards the *glory of the body*, in the souls of the saints there can, to be sure, be a desire for it, but not hope properly speaking, either (a) insofar as hope is a theological virtue, since the object of hope is God and not any created good, or (b) insofar as hope is taken in general. For as was explained above (q. 40, a. 1), the object of hope is something arduous, whereas a good for which we now have an inevitable cause is not related to us as something arduous (*in ratione ardui*). Hence, it is not proper to say that someone who has silver money *hopes* that he will have something that it is immediately within his power to eat. Similarly, those who have the glory of the soul are properly said only to *desire* the glory of the body and not to *hope* for it.

Article 5

Does anything of faith or hope remain in the state of glory?

It seems that something of faith or hope remains in the state of glory:

Objection 1: When what is proper has been removed, what is common remains—as is explained in the *Liber de Causis*: “When *rational* is removed, *living* remains, and when *living* is removed, *being*

remains.” But in faith there is something that it shares in common with beatitude, viz., cognition itself, while there is something proper to itself, viz., darkness (*aenigma*), since faith is a cognition of mystery (*cognitio aenigmatica*). Therefore, when the darkness of faith is removed, the cognition itself that belongs to faith remains.

Objection 2: Faith is a certain sort of spiritual light that belongs to the soul—this according to Ephesians 1:17-18 (“... the eyes of your heart enlightened in the knowledge of God”). But this light is imperfect in relation to the light of glory, of which Psalm 35:10 says, “In your light we shall see light.” Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light arrives; for instance, a candle is not extinguished when the sun’s brightness arrives. Therefore, it seems that the light of faith itself remains along with the light of glory.

Objection 3: The substance of a habit is not removed by the fact that its subject matter is removed. For instance, a man is able to retain the *habit* of generosity even when he has lost his money; it is the *act* that he cannot have. Now the object of faith is the First Truth but not as seen (*veritas prima non visa*). Therefore, when this is removed by the fact that the First Truth is seen, the habit itself of faith is still able to remain.

But contrary to this: Faith is a simple habit. But what is simple either is removed as a whole or remains as a whole. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 3), faith does not remain as a whole but is instead removed, it seems that it is taken away as a whole.

I respond: Some have claimed that hope is totally removed, but that faith is partly removed, viz., with respect to the darkness, and partly remains, viz., with respect to the substance of the cognition.

If this is interpreted to mean that what remains is the same *in genus* but not the same *in number*, then it is absolutely true, since faith agrees with the heavenly vision in genus, i.e., the genus *cognition*. By contrast, hope does not agree with beatitude in genus, since hope is related to the enjoyment of beatitude in the way that a movement is related to rest at its terminus.

However, if the claim is interpreted to mean that numerically the same cognition which constitutes faith remains in heaven, then it is altogether impossible. For it is not the case that if the difference of a given species is removed, the substance of the genus remains numerically the same; for instance, if the difference that constitutes whiteness is removed, then it is not the case that numerically the same substance of color remains, as if numerically the same color were sometimes white and sometimes black. For the genus is not related to the difference in the way that matter is related to form, so that the substance of the genus might remain when the difference is removed in the way that the numerically the same substance of matter remains when the form is removed. For the genus and difference are not *parts* of the species; otherwise, they would not be predicated of the species. Rather, just as the species signifies the whole, i.e., the whole composed of matter and form among material things, so, too, the difference signifies the whole, and so does the genus. However, the genus denominates the whole from something that is like the matter (*ab eo quod est sicut materia*), whereas the difference denominates the whole from something that is like the form (*ab eo quod est sicut forma*), and the species denominates the whole from both. For instance, in a man the sentient nature is related as matter (*materialiter*) to the intellective nature, so that *animal* is predicated because the whole has a sentient nature, *rational* is predicated because the whole has an intellective nature, and *man* is predicated because the whole has both natures. And so the same whole is signified by those three notions, but not *from* the same thing. Hence, it is clear that since the difference designates only what the genus designates (*differentia non nisi designativa generis*), if the difference is removed, then the same substance of the genus cannot remain. For it is not the case that the same animality exists if some other type of soul constitutes the animal.

Hence, it cannot be the case that numerically the same cognition, which was previously dark, later becomes a clear vision. And so it is clear that nothing of faith that is the same in number or in species remains in heaven; instead, only something that is the same in genus remains.

Reply to objection 1: As is clear from what has been said, when *rational* is removed, the *living* that remains is the same in genus and not the same in number.

Reply to objection 2: The imperfection of the candle's light is not opposed to the perfection of the sun's light, since it does not have to do with the same subject. By contrast, the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another, and they have to do with the same subject. Hence, they cannot exist together, just as the brightness of the air cannot exist along with its darkness.

Reply to objection 3: Someone who loses his money does not lose the possibility of having money, and so it is appropriate for the habit of generosity to remain. By contrast, in the state of glory the object of faith, which is something not seen, is removed not only in actuality but also with respect to its possibility—and this because of the permanence of beatitude.

Article 6

Does charity remain after this life in the state of glory?

It seems that charity does not remain after this life in the state of glory:

Objection 1: As 1 Corinthians 13:10 says, "When what is perfect comes, what is in part [read: what is imperfect] shall be done away with." But the charity that belongs to this life (*caritas viae*) is imperfect. Therefore, it shall be done away with when the perfection of glory comes.

Objection 2: Habits and acts are distinguished by their objects. But the object of love is a good that is apprehended. Therefore, since the apprehension that belongs to the present life is different from the apprehension that belongs to the future life, it seems not to be the case that the same charity remains in both the present life and the future life.

Objection 3: Things that share the same nature are such that the imperfect can arrive at an equality of perfection through continuous growth. But the charity that belongs to this life (*caritas viae*), no matter how much it grows, can never arrive at an equality with the charity that belongs to heaven (*caritas patriae*). Therefore, it seems that the charity of this life does not remain in heaven.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 13:8 the Apostle says, "Charity never passes away."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), when the imperfection of a given thing does not belong to the nature of its species, then nothing prevents numerically the same thing that was previously imperfect from afterwards becoming perfect, in the way that a man is perfected through growth and in the way that an instance of whiteness is perfected through intensification.

Now charity is love (*amor*), and there is no imperfection that belongs to it by its nature; for love can be either of something had or of something not had, and it can be of something seen or of something not seen. Hence, charity is not done away with by the perfection of glory, and so numerically the same charity remains.

Reply to objection 1: The imperfection of charity is related to it *per accidens*, since imperfection does not belong to the nature of love. But when what is *per accidens* is removed, the substance of the thing remains. Hence, when the imperfection of charity is done away with, charity itself is not done away with.

Reply to objection 2: Charity does not have the cognition itself as its object, since in that case it would not be the same in this life and in heaven. Instead, it has for its object the very thing that the cognition is of, and this remains the same, viz., God Himself.

Reply to objection 3: The charity that belongs to this life cannot through growth arrive at equality with the charity that belongs to heaven—and this because of a difference that lies on the side of the cause; for as *Ethics* 9 says, vision is, as it were, a cause of love. And the more perfect the cognition of God is, the more perfectly He is loved.

QUESTION 68

The Gifts of the Holy Spirit

We next have to consider the gifts. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Do the gifts differ from the virtues? (2) Are the gifts necessary for salvation? (3) Are the gifts habits? (4) How many gifts are there, and what are they? (5) Are the gifts connected? (6) Do the gifts remain in heaven? (7) How are the gifts related to one another? (8) How are the gifts related to the virtues?

Article 1

Do the gifts differ from the virtues?

It seems that the gifts are not distinct from the virtues:

Objection 1: In *Moralia* 1 Gregory, in commenting on the passage from Job, “Seven sons were born to him,” says, “Seven sons are born to us when, through the conception of good thoughts, the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit arise within us.” And he cites the passage from Isaiah 11:2-3, “The spirit of understanding will rest upon him,” where the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are enumerated. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are virtues.

Objection 2: In the book *Quaestiones Evangeliorum* Augustine, commenting on the passage from Matthew 12, “Then he goes and takes with him seven other spirits,” says, “The seven vices are the contraries of the seven virtues of the Holy Spirit, i.e., the seven gifts.” But the seven vices are contrary to the commonly named virtues. Therefore, the gifts are not distinct from the commonly named virtues.

Objection 3: When the definitions of things are the same, the things are likewise the same. But the definition of a virtue belongs to the gifts, since each of the gifts is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly, etc. Similarly, the definition of a gift belongs to the infused virtues, since, according to the Philosopher, a gift is an unreturnable donation. Therefore, the virtues and the gifts are not distinct from one another.

Objection 4: Several of the things counted among the gifts are virtues. For as was explained above (q. 57, a. 2), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues; again, counsel has to do with prudence, piety is a species of justice, and fortitude is a one of the moral virtues. Therefore, it seems that the virtues are not distinct from the gifts.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 1 Gregory distinguishes the seven gifts, which he says are signified by the seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which he says are signified by the three daughters of Job. And in *Moralia* 2 he distinguishes the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says are signified by the four corners of the house.

I respond: If we are speaking of gifts and virtues as regards the definitions of the names, then in this sense they have no opposition to each another. For the definition of a virtue, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 3), is taken from the fact that a virtue perfects a man with respect to acting well, whereas the definition of a gift is taken from its relation to the cause from which it comes. And nothing prevents it from being the case that what comes from another as a gift should be perfective of someone with respect to his acting well—especially in light of our having explained above (q. 63, a. 3) that certain virtues are infused in us by God. Hence, on this score a gift cannot be distinguished from a virtue. And this is why some have claimed that the gifts should not be distinguished from the virtues.

However, they are left with the not insignificant difficulty of explaining why some of the virtues, but not all of them, are called gifts, and why some of the things counted as gifts are not counted as virtues, as is clear from the case of fear.

Hence, others have claimed that the gifts are to be distinguished from the virtues, but have not

given an appropriate account of the distinction, i.e., one which is common to all the virtues in such a way that it does not apply to any of the gifts, and vice versa.

For instance, some authors, taking into consideration that four of the seven gifts, viz., wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel, have to do with reason and that three of them, viz., fortitude, piety, and fear, have to do with the appetitive power, have claimed that the gifts perfect free choice insofar as it is a faculty of reason, whereas the virtues perfect free choice insofar as it is a faculty of the will. For they found just two virtues, viz., faith and prudence, in the intellect or reason, and the others in the appetitive or affective power.

However, if this distinction were appropriate, then all the virtues would have to exist in the appetitive power and all the gifts would have to exist in reason.

So others, taking into consideration that in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says that “the gift of the Holy Spirit, which forms temperance, prudence, justice and courage in a mind that is subject to it, fortifies that same mind against particular temptations through the seven gifts,” have claimed that the virtues are ordered toward acting well, whereas the gifts are ordered toward resisting temptations.

But this distinction does not seem adequate, either. For the virtues likewise resist the temptations that induce one toward sins contrary to those virtues, since everything naturally resists its own contrary. This is especially clear in the case of charity, of which Song of Songs 8:7 says, “Many waters could not extinguish charity.”

So others, taking into consideration that, as is clear from Isaiah 11:2-3, the gifts are spoken of in Sacred Scripture insofar as they existed in the Christ, have claimed that the virtues are ordered toward acting well in general (*simpliciter*), but that the gifts are ordered toward conforming us to Christ—especially with respect to what He suffered, since it was in His passion that these gifts principally shined forth.

However, this distinction is likewise inadequate. For our Lord Himself leads us to conform to Him mainly through humility and meekness—this according to Matthew 11:29 (“Learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart”)—and through charity—this according to John 15:12 (“Love one another as I have loved you”). And these virtues likewise shined forth especially in Christ’s passion.

Therefore, in order to distinguish the gifts from the virtues, we must follow the way of speaking found in Sacred Scripture, in which the gifts are made known to us not under the name ‘gifts’ but rather under the name ‘spirits’; for Isaiah 11:2-3 says, “Upon him will rest the spirit of wisdom and understanding,” and so on. These words clearly convey that the seven spirits are enumerated here insofar as they exist in us by divine inbreathing (*inspiratio*). But ‘inbreathing’ signifies a movement from the outside. For note that in man there are two moving principles: the one is interior, and this is reason, while the other is exterior, and this is God, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 4). The Philosopher likewise asserts this in the chapter on good fortune.

Now it is clear that anything that is moved must be proportioned to its mover, and the perfection of a movable thing *qua* movable is the disposition by which it is disposed to being moved in the appropriate way by its mover. Therefore, the higher the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition by which the movable thing is proportioned to the mover. For instance, we see that a student must be more perfectly disposed in order to grasp a deeper doctrine from his teacher.

Now it is clear that the human virtues perfect a man insofar as the man is apt to be moved by reason in the things he does interiorly and exteriorly. Therefore, there must exist in a man higher perfections in accord with which he is disposed toward being moved by God. And these perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because through them a man is disposed toward becoming promptly movable by God’s inspiration—this according to Isaiah 50:5 (“The Lord has opened my ears, and I do not resist Him; I have not turned back”). Likewise, in the chapter on good fortune, the Philosopher says that for those who are moved by divine instinct it does not help to take counsel

according to human reason; rather, they should follow their interior inclination, since they are being moved by a principle that is better than human reason. And some put it this way: The gifts perfect a man with respect to acts that are higher than the acts of the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Gifts of the sort in question are sometimes counted as virtues according to the ordinary meaning of ‘virtue’. However, they contain something that goes beyond the ordinary notion of a virtue, because they are divine virtues that perfect a man insofar as he is moved by God. Hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher likewise posits, over and beyond ordinary virtue, a certain sort of heroic or divine virtue in accord with which some men are called divine.

Reply to objection 2: To the extent that vices are contrary to the good of reason, they are contrary to the virtues, whereas to the extent that they are contrary to divine instinct, they are contrary to the gifts. For the same thing is contrary to both God and reason, since the light of reason is derived from God.

Reply to objection 3: The definition in question applies to virtue according to the ordinary mode of virtue. Hence, if we want to restrict the definition to the virtues insofar as they are distinct from the gifts, then we will stipulate that the phrase “by which one lives rightly” must be understood to concern that rectitude of life which accords with the rule of reason.

In the same way, a gift, insofar as it is distinct from an infused virtue, can be said to be that which is given by God in relation to His own promptings (*motio*), so that it makes a man follow God’s promptings (*instinctus*) in the right way.

Reply to objection 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue insofar as it proceeds from the judgment of reason, whereas it is called a gift insofar as it operates by divine prompting (*ex instinctu divino*). And the same thing holds for the other examples.

Article 2

Are the gifts necessary for human salvation?

It seems that the gifts are not necessary for human salvation:

Objection 1: The gifts are ordered toward a certain sort of perfection over and beyond the common perfection of virtue. However, it is not necessary for a man’s salvation that he should pursue perfection of the sort that goes beyond the ordinary state of virtue, since perfection of this sort falls under a counsel rather than a precept. Therefore, the gifts are not necessary for human salvation.

Objection 2: It suffices for a man’s salvation that he act well in relation to both divine matters and human matters. But it is through the theological virtues that a man acts well in relation to divine matters, whereas it is through the moral virtues that he acts well in relation to human matters. Therefore, the gifts are not necessary for human salvation.

Objection 3: In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “The Holy Spirit gives wisdom to counter foolishness, understanding to counter dullness, counsel to counter rashness, fortitude to counter fear, knowledge to counter ignorance, piety to counter hardness of heart, fear to counter pride.” But an adequate remedy for removing all these defects can be had through the virtues. Therefore, the gifts are not necessary for human salvation.

But contrary to this: Among the gifts the greatest seems to be wisdom, whereas the least seems to be fear. Yet both of these are necessary for salvation; for Wisdom 7:28 says of wisdom that “God loves only those who live with wisdom,” whereas Ecclesiasticus 1:28 says of fear that “if anyone lacks fear, he cannot be justified.” Therefore, the other gifts are likewise means that are necessary for salvation.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the gifts are certain human perfections by which a man is

disposed toward following God's prompting (*divinus instinctus*) in the right way. Hence, it follows that in those matters for which human reason is not sufficient and the prompting of the Holy Spirit is necessary, a gift is necessary.

Now there are two ways in which human reason is perfected by God: (a) by its *natural* perfection, i.e., in accord with the natural light of reason, and (b), as was explained above (q. 62, a. 1), by a certain *supernatural* perfection through the theological virtues. Even though this second sort of perfection is greater than the first, nonetheless, the first is had by a man in a more complete way than is the second. For the first sort of perfection is had by a man as a full possession, as it were, whereas the second is had as an incomplete possession, since we know and love God in an incomplete way.

Now it is clear that if a thing has a nature or form (or virtue) completely, then it can operate in its own right (*per se*) in accord with that nature or form (though this is not to exclude the operation of God, who operates interiorly in every nature and will). By contrast, if a thing has a nature or form (or virtue) incompletely, then it cannot operate in its own right without being moved by another. For instance, because the sun possesses light in a complete way (*est perfecte lucidus*), it can give light in its own right, whereas the moon, in which the nature of light exists incompletely, does not give light without itself being illuminated. Likewise, a physician who has complete knowledge of the art of medicine can work in his own right, whereas a student of his who has not yet been completely instructed cannot work in his own right without being instructed by the physician.

So, then, with respect to what falls under human reason, i.e., in relation to man's connatural end, a man can operate through the judgment of reason. (Still, if a man is aided by God through a special inspiration even in these matters, then this will be from God's superabundant goodness. Hence, according to the philosophers, not everyone who has the acquired moral virtues also has the heroic or divine virtues.)

On the other hand, with respect to man's ultimate and supernatural end, toward which reason moves one insofar as it is formed in an incomplete way by the theological virtues, the movement of reason is not itself sufficient without the prompting and movement of the Holy Spirit from above—this according to Romans 8:14, 17 ("Those who act by the Spirit of God are the children of God; and if children, then heirs"). And Psalm 142:10 says, "Your good spirit leads me to the right land," i.e., because no one can enter into the inheritance of that land of the blessed without being moved and led by the Holy Spirit. And so in order to reach this end, a man must have the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 1: The gifts exceed the ordinary perfection of the virtues not with respect to the genus of the acts, in the way that the counsels exceed the precepts, but rather with respect to the mode of acting, insofar as a man is being moved by a higher principle.

Reply to objection 2: For the reasons already explained, a man is not perfected by the theological and moral virtues in such a way that he does not always need to be moved by the higher prompting of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 3: It is not the case that all things, or all possible things, are known by human reason—this regardless of whether reason is taken as perfected by its natural perfection or as perfected by the theological virtues. Hence, reason cannot repel all dullness or other defects of this sort that are mentioned in the objection. However, by moving us, God, to whose knowledge and power all things are subject, keeps us safe from all foolishness and ignorance and dullness and hardness of heart and the rest. And this is why the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which make us follow His promptings in the right way, are said to be given in opposition to these defects.

Article 3

Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit habits?

It seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits:

Objection 1: A habit is a quality that persists in a man; for as it says in the *Categories*, a habit is a quality that is difficult to change (*qualitas difficile mobilis*). But as Isaiah 11:2-3 says, it is proper to the Christ that the gifts of the Holy Spirit should rest upon Him. Again, John 1:33 says, “The one whom you see the Spirit descend upon and remain over, He is the one who baptizes.” In commenting on this passage in *Moralia* 2, Gregory says, “The Holy Spirit comes to dwell in all the faithful, but it is only in the Mediator that He persists always in a unique way.” Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1-2), the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect a man insofar as he acts from God’s Spirit. But to the extent that a man acts from God’s Spirit, he is in some way an instrument with respect to God’s Spirit. But it is absurd that an instrument should be perfected by a habit; instead, it is the principal agent that is so perfected. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits.

Objection 3: Just as the gifts of the Holy Spirit come through divine inbreathing, so too does the gift of prophecy. But prophecy is not a habit, since the spirit of prophecy is not always present in the prophets—as Gregory explains in Homily 1 on Ezechiel. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not habits, either.

But contrary to this: In speaking of the Holy Spirit in John 14:17, our Lord says to His disciples, “He will remain with you, and He will be within you.” Therefore, His gifts remain in men. Therefore, they are not only acts or instances of being acted upon, but also persistent habits.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are human perfections by which a man is disposed toward following the promptings of the Holy Spirit in the right way. But it is clear from what has been explained above (q. 56, a. 4 and q. 58, a. 2) that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power insofar as it participates in some way in reason; more specifically, they affect the appetitive power to the extent that it is apt to be moved by reason’s command. Thus, the gifts of the Holy Spirit bear to a man in regard to the Holy Spirit the same relation that the moral virtues bear to the appetitive power in regard to reason. Now the moral virtues are habits by which the appetitive powers are disposed to obey reason promptly. Hence, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are likewise habits by which a man is perfected with regard to promptly obeying the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 1: Gregory answers the objection in the same place by asserting that in the case of those gifts without which one cannot attain [eternal] life, the Holy Spirit remains in the elect at all times, whereas in the case of the other gifts He does not remain at all times. But as has been explained (a. 2), the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are necessary for salvation. Hence, as far as these gifts are concerned, the Holy Spirit remains at all times in those who are holy.

Reply to objection 2: This objection goes through in the case of an instrument whose role is not to act but only to be acted upon. But a man is not that sort of instrument; rather, he is acted upon by the Holy Spirit in such a way that he also acts, insofar he has free choice. Hence, he stands in need of a habit.

Reply to objection 3: Prophecy is included among the gifts that are for the manifestation of the Spirit, but it is not included among the gifts that are necessary for salvation. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Article 4

Are the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are not appropriately enumerated [in Isaiah 11:2-3]:

Objection 1: In this enumeration four of the gifts that are posited have to do with the intellectual virtues—viz., wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which has to do with prudence—but none is posited that has to do with art (*ars*), which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Similarly, the passage posits a gift having to do with justice, viz., piety, and a gift having to do with fortitude, viz., the gift of fortitude, but none of the gifts posited there has to do with temperance.

Objection 2: Piety is a part of justice. But in the case of fortitude what is posited is fortitude itself and not some part of fortitude. Therefore, justice itself should have been posited, and not piety.

Objection 3: The theological virtues order us toward God in the highest way. Therefore, since the gifts perfect a man insofar as he is moved toward God, it seems that some gifts pertaining to the theological virtues should have been posited.

Objection 4: Just as God is feared, so too He is loved, and one hopes in Him, and delights in Him. But love, hope, and delight are passions opposed to fear. Therefore, just as fear is posited as a gift, so too these other three should also be posited as gifts.

Objection 5: Joined to understanding is wisdom, which directs it, and joined to fortitude is counsel, which directs it, and joined to piety is knowledge, which directs it. Therefore, some directive gift should be added to fear.

Therefore, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are not appropriately enumerated.

But contrary to this is the authority of Sacred Scripture, Isaiah 11:2-3.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), the gifts are habits that perfect a man so that he follows without delay the promptings of the Holy Spirit, in the same way that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey reason. But just as the appetitive powers are apt to be moved by reason's commands, so all the human powers are apt to be moved by the promptings of God as a higher power. And so just as there are virtues for all the human powers that can be principles of human actions, viz., reason and the appetitive powers, so too there are gifts for all those powers.

Now reason is speculative and practical, and in both speculative reason and practical reason there is (a) apprehension of truth, which pertains to discovery, and (b) judgment concerning truth. Thus, with respect to the apprehension of truth, speculative reason is perfected by *understanding*, whereas practical reason is perfected by *counsel*. And with respect to judging correctly, speculative reason is perfected by *wisdom*, whereas practical reason is perfected by *knowledge* (cf. ST 2-2, q. 8, a. 6).

On the other hand, in those matters that have to do with others, the appetitive power is perfected by *piety*, whereas in those matters that have to do with oneself, it is perfected by *fortitude* in the face of the fearful dangers and by *fear* in the face of a disordered desire for pleasant things—this according to Proverbs 15:27 (“By the fear of the Lord all turn away from evil”) and Psalm 118:120 (“Pierce my flesh with your fear; for I fear your judgments”).

And so it is clear that these gifts extend to everything that the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend to.

Reply to objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect a man in those matters that pertain to living well; art is ordered not to this, but to exterior things that can be made. For as *Ethics* 6 says, art is right reason with respect to what can be made and not with respect to what can be done. On the other hand, one can claim that as far as the infusion of the gifts is concerned, art belongs to the Holy Spirit, who is the principal mover, but not to men, who are, as it were, the instruments (*organa*) of the Holy

Spirit for as long as they are being moved by Him.

Now the gift of fear corresponds in some sense to temperance. For just as it pertains to the virtue of temperance, in accord with its proper nature, that one draws back from evil pleasures because of the good of reason, so too it pertains to the gift of fear that one draws back from evil pleasures because of the fear of God.

Reply to objection 2: The name ‘justice’ is imposed because of the rectitude of reason, and this is why the name ‘virtue’ is more appropriate than the name ‘gift’.

By contrast, the name ‘piety’ connotes the reverence that we have for our father and for our homeland. And as Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 10, since the father of all is God, the worship of God is likewise called ‘piety’. And so it is appropriate to give the name ‘piety’ to the gift by which one does good to everyone out of reverence for God.

Reply to objection 3: The human mind is moved by the Holy Spirit only if it is united to Him in some way—just as an instrument is moved by a craftsman only through contact or through some other sort of union. Now the first union a man has [with the Holy Spirit] is through faith, hope, and charity. Hence, the gifts presuppose these virtues as the roots, so to speak, of the gifts. Hence, all the gifts have to do with these three virtues insofar as they are certain derivatives of these virtues.

Reply to objection 4: Love, hope, and delight have a good as their object. Now the highest good is God, and so the names of these passions are transferred to the theological virtues by which the soul is joined to God.

By contrast, fear has an evil as its object, and so it does not convey union with God, but instead conveys a withdrawal from certain things out of reverence for God. And so ‘fear’ is the name not of a theological virtue but of a gift that draws one back from evil in a more eminent way than a moral virtue does.

Reply to objection 5: It is through wisdom that both man’s understanding and man’s affections are directed. And this is why two things are posited as corresponding to wisdom in its directive role—viz., the gift of understanding to direct the intellect and the gift of fear to direct the affections. For the notion of the fear of God is based principally on a consideration of God’s excellence, which is what wisdom considers.

Article 5

Are the gifts of the Holy Spirit connected?

It seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not connected:

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 12:8 the Apostle says, “To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge through the same Spirit.” But wisdom and knowledge are numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to different men and are not connected with one another in the same man.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “Most of the faithful do not have knowledge, though they do have faith.” But some of the gifts—at least the gift of fear—come along with faith. Therefore, it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected within one and the same man.

Objection 3: In *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “Wisdom counts for little if one lacks understanding; and understanding is altogether useless if it does not stem from wisdom. Counsel is worthless in one who lacks the work of fortitude, and fortitude is wholly undermined unless it is supported by counsel. Knowledge amounts to nothing if it does not have the advantage of piety, and piety is useless if it lacks

the discretion of knowledge. Also, fear itself does not rise up to any good action if it does not have those virtues.” From this it seems that one gift can exist without another. Therefore, it is not the case that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected.

But contrary to this: In the same place Gregory prefaces his remarks by saying, “It seems worth noting that in this feast of Job’s sons they feed one another.” But the gifts of the Holy Spirit are signified by the “sons of Job” of whom he is speaking. Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected by the fact that they reinforce one another.

I respond: The truth concerning this question can easily be inferred from what has been said. For it was explained above (a. 3) that all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts in relation to the Holy Spirit as a mover in the same way that the appetitive powers are disposed by the moral virtues in relation to the rule of reason. But the Holy Spirit dwells in us through charity—this according to Romans 5:5 (“The love (*caritas*) of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who is given to us”)—in the same way that our reason is perfected by prudence. Hence, just as the moral virtues are connected with one another in prudence, so too the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected with one another in charity, so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Spirit, none of which can be had without charity.

Reply to objection 1: One way in which wisdom and knowledge can be thought of is as gratuitous graces (*gratiae gratis datae*), i.e., in the sense that someone abounds in the cognition of divine and human matters to such an extent that he can instruct the faithful and refute adversaries. This is the sense in which the Apostle is speaking of wisdom and knowledge in the cited passage, which is why he makes explicit mention of the “word” (*sermo*) of wisdom and knowledge.

In a second sense, wisdom and knowledge can be thought of as gifts of the Holy Spirit. And in this sense wisdom and knowledge are nothing other than perfections of the human mind in accord with which one is disposed toward following the promptings of the Holy Spirit in the cognition of divine and human matters. And in this sense it is clear that these gifts exist in all who have charity.

Reply to objection 2: In this place Augustine is talking about knowledge in commenting on the passage from the Apostle that was just cited. Hence, he is talking about knowledge understood in the way already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the fact that he adds, “It is one thing to know what a man must believe in order to attain the blessed life, which is nothing if not eternal life. But it is another thing to know how this very thing might be imparted to the pious and defended against the impious—and this is what the Apostle seems to be calling by the name ‘knowledge’ (*scientia*) in the proper sense.”

Reply to objection 3: Just as, in keeping with what was said above (q. 65, a. 1), one way of proving the connectedness of the cardinal virtues is by appeal to the fact that one of them is perfected by another, so Gregory wants to prove the connectedness of the gifts in the same way, by appealing to the fact that one of them cannot be perfect without another. Hence, he prefaces his remarks by saying, “If the one virtue does not support the other, then each of them is wholly destitute.” Therefore, his meaning is not that one gift can exist without another, but rather that understanding would not be a gift if it existed without wisdom—just as temperance would not be a virtue if it existed without justice.

Article 6

Do the gifts of the Holy Spirit remain in heaven?

It seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit do not remain in heaven:

Objection 1: In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “With the seven gifts the Holy Spirit instructs the mind against every temptation.” But there will be no temptations in heaven—this according to Isaiah 11:9 (“They shall not harm or kill on all my holy mountain”). Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit will not exist in heaven.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 3), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habits. But a habit is useless when the corresponding act cannot exist, and the acts corresponding to some of the gifts cannot exist in heaven; for in *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “Understanding makes one penetrate what one hears, and counsel keeps one from being rash, and fortitude keeps one from fearing adverse circumstances, and piety fills the inner heart with acts of mercy.” But these acts do not belong to the state of heaven. Therefore, gifts of the sort in question will not exist in the state of glory.

Objection 3: Some of the gifts, e.g., wisdom and understanding, perfect a man in the contemplative life, while others, e.g., piety and fortitude, perfect him in the active life. But as Gregory says in *Moralia* 6, “The active life ceases with this present life.” Therefore, not all the gifts of the Holy Spirit will exist in the state of glory.

But contrary to this: In *De Spiritu Sancto* Ambrose says, “The city of God, that heavenly Jerusalem, is not washed by the flow of any earthly river; rather, proceeding from the font of life, the Holy Spirit, with whom we are filled in the present brief interval, seems to flow more copiously in those celestial spirits, boiling over in full measure with the flow of the seven spiritual virtues.”

I respond: There are two ways in which we can talk about the gifts:

In the first way, we can speak of the *essence* of the gifts, and in this sense the gifts exist most perfectly in heaven, as is clear from the passage cited from Ambrose. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect the human mind with respect to following the movements of the Holy Spirit, and this will take place in a special way in heaven, when God will be “all things in all things,” as 1 Corinthians 15:28 puts it, and when a man will be totally subject to God.

In the second way, we can consider the *matter* with respect to which the gifts act. And in this sense, the gifts have an action in our present state with respect to certain matters that they will not have any action with respect to in the state of glory. In this sense, they will not remain in heaven—just as was explained above (q. 67, a. 1) concerning the cardinal virtues.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage Gregory is speaking of the gifts insofar as they belong to our present state, since in this state we are *protected* by the gifts from the temptations to evil things. By contrast, in the state of glory, when all evils cease, we will be *perfected* in the good by the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of each gift, Gregory is, as it were, pointing out something that passes away with the present state and something that remains even in the future state.

For instance, he says that “wisdom remakes the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things”—where, of these two items, the hope passes away whereas the certainty remains.

With respect to understanding, he says that “in the mind it penetrates what is heard, remaking the heart, and it illuminates its shadows”—where what is heard passes away, since, as Jeremiah 31:34 says, “A man will not teach his brother,” while the illumination of the mind will remain.

As for counsel, he says that it “prevents him from being rash,” which is necessary in our present state, and again, that it “fills the mind with reason,” which is necessary even in the future state.

Concerning fortitude he says that it “does not fear adversity,” which is necessary in the present state, and, again, that it “sets before us the food of trust,” which remains even in the future state.

In the case of knowledge he posits just one thing, viz., that it “conquers the barrenness of ignorance.” But he does add “in the womb of the mind,” and this can be understood figuratively as the fullness of knowledge (*repletio cognitionis*), which pertains even to the future state.

As for piety, he says that “it fills the bowels of his heart with the works of mercy.” If we consider the words, this pertains only to our present state. But the inner affection for one’s neighbors, signified by “the bowels,” pertains likewise to our future state, in which piety will exhibit not the works of mercy, but the affection of communal joyfulness (*affectus congratulationis*).

In the case of fear, he says that “it presses the mind not to be proud in present things”—which pertains to our present state—and that “it strengthens us with the food of hope for future things”—which likewise pertains to the present state as far as the hope is concerned, but can also pertain to the future state as regards the strengthening with respect to things hoped for here and obtained there.

Reply to objection 3: This arguments goes through with respect to the matter of the gifts. For the works of the active life will not be the matter of the gifts. Rather, they will have all their acts with respect to things pertaining to the contemplative life, i.e., the blessed life (*vita beata*).

Article 7

Is the relative dignity of the gifts preserved by the way they are enumerated in Isaiah 11?

It seems that the relative dignity of the gifts (*dignitas donorum*) is not preserved by the way they are enumerated in Isaiah 11:2-3:

Objection 1: The most important among the gifts seems to be the one that God especially requires of man. But what God especially requires of man is fear. For Deuteronomy 10:12 says, “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you other than that you fear the Lord your God?” And Malachi 1:6 says, “If I am the Lord, then where is the fear of me?” Therefore, it seems that fear, which is the last gift enumerated [in Isaiah 11], is not the least of the gifts but instead the most important.

Objection 2: Piety seems to be a universal good; for in 1 Timothy 4:8 the Apostle says, “Piety is useful for all things.” But a universal good is preferable to a particular good. Therefore, piety, which is enumerated in the penultimate position, seems to be the most important of all the gifts.

Objection 3: Knowledge perfects man’s judgment (*iudicium*), whereas counsel perfects his deliberation (*inquisitio*). But judgment is more important than deliberation. Therefore, knowledge is a more important gift than counsel, and yet it is enumerated after counsel.

Objection 4: Fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, whereas knowledge pertains to reason. But reason is more eminent than the appetitive power. Therefore, knowledge is more eminent than fortitude, and yet fortitude is the first gift enumerated.

Therefore, the dignity of the gifts is not preserved by the order in which they are enumerated.

But contrary to this: In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Spirit, of which Isaiah speaks, fits in with these levels and assertions [mentioned in Matthew 5], except for the ordering. For there [viz., in Isaiah] the enumeration begins from the more excellent ones, whereas here it begins from the lesser ones.”

I respond: There are two possible ways to preserve the ordering of the gifts: (a) absolutely speaking, viz., in relation to their proper acts insofar as they proceed from their principles, and (b) relatively speaking, viz., in relation to their matter.

Now absolutely speaking, the principle of comparison among the gifts is the same as that among the virtues. For as was explained above (a.4), the gifts perfect a man with respect to all the acts of the soul’s powers. Hence, just as the intellectual virtues take precedence (*praeferuntur*) over the moral virtues, and just as, among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative virtues take precedence over the active virtues (for wisdom, understanding, and knowledge take precedence over prudence and art, yet in such a way

that wisdom takes precedence over understanding and understanding takes precedence over knowledge, just as prudence and good judgment (*synesis*) take precedence over good deliberation (*eubulia*), so too, among the gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel take precedence over piety, fortitude, and fear, and among the latter piety takes precedence over fortitude and fortitude over fear, just as justice takes precedence over fortitude and fortitude over temperance.

By contrast, as far as the matter is concerned, fortitude and counsel are preferred to knowledge and piety, since fortitude and counsel have a place in difficult matters, whereas piety and even knowledge have a place in more commonplace matters.

So, then, the dignity of the gifts corresponds to the order of enumeration (a) in part absolutely speaking, insofar as wisdom and understanding take precedence over all of them, and (b) in part according to the ordering of the matter, insofar as counsel and fortitude take precedence over knowledge and piety.

Reply to objection 1: Fear is especially required as a sort of prerequisite for the perfection of the gifts because “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,” and not because it has more dignity than the other gifts. For in the order of generation a man must first recede from evil—which is accomplished through fear, as Proverbs 16:6 and 15:27 say, before doing good, which is accomplished through the other gifts.

Reply to objection 2: In this passage from the Apostle piety is being compared not to all the gifts of God but only to “the bodily toil,” of which he says before this that “it is useful for moderation.”

Reply to objection 3: Even though knowledge takes precedence over counsel by reason of its judgment, still, counsel takes precedence by reason of its matter. For as *Ethics* 3 points out, counsel has a place only in difficult matters, whereas the judgment of knowledge has a place in all matters.

Reply to objection 4: Directive goods, which pertain to reason, are more dignified than executionary goods if they are considered in relation to the acts insofar as they proceed from their powers; for reason takes precedence over the appetitive power in the way that what regulates takes precedence over what is regulated.

On the other hand, counsel is joined to fortitude by reason of its matter in the way that what directs takes precedence over what executes and, again, in the way that knowledge takes precedence over piety—viz., because counsel and fortitude have a place in difficult matters, whereas knowledge and piety also have a place in commonplace matters. And so by reason of the matter, counsel, along with fortitude, is enumerated before knowledge and piety.

Article 8

Should the virtues take precedence over the gifts?

It seems that the virtues should take precedence over the gifts:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine, in talking about charity, says, “There is no divine gift more excellent than this one. It alone is what divides the children of the eternal kingdom and the children of perdition. Other gifts are also given through the Holy Spirit, but without charity they count for nothing.” But charity is a virtue. Therefore, virtue is more important (*potior*) than the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 2: Things that are naturally prior seem to be more important. But the virtues are naturally prior to the gifts of the Holy Spirit; for in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “In the mind subject to it, the gift of the Holy Spirit forms, before anything else, justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, and in

this way He soon strengthens the same mind with His seven virtues [i.e., seven gifts], giving wisdom to counter foolishness, understanding to counter dullness, counsel to counter rashness, fortitude to counter fear, knowledge to counter ignorance, piety to counter hardness of heart, fear to counter pride.” Therefore, the virtues are more important than the gifts.

Objection 3: As Augustine says, “No one can make bad use of the virtues.” But someone can use the gifts badly; for as Gregory says in *Moralia* 1, “We offer up the sacrifice of our prayer, lest wisdom should puff us up; lest understanding, as it runs with subtlety, should lead us astray; lest counsel, as it multiplies itself, should confound us; lest fortitude, as it gives confidence, should become rash; lest knowledge, when it knows and does not love, should inflate us; lest piety, in inclining itself outside the bounds of rectitude, should become distorted; lest fear, as it justly makes us more fearful, should plunge us into a pit of despair.” Therefore, the virtues have more dignity than the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

But contrary to this: As is clear from passage cited above (a. 2), the gifts are given to aid the virtues against defects, and so it seems that the gifts bring to perfection what the virtues are unable to bring to perfection. Therefore, the gifts are more important than the virtues.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 3 and q. 62, a. 1), the virtues are divided into three kinds: some of them are theological virtues, some are intellectual virtues, and some are moral virtues. The theological virtues are those by which the mind is joined to God, the intellectual virtues are those by which reason itself is perfected, and the moral virtues are those by which the appetitive powers are perfected so as to obey reason. On the other hand, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are those gifts by which all the powers of the soul are disposed toward being subject to divine promptings.

So, then, the relation of the gifts to the theological virtues, through which man is united to the Holy Spirit as prompter, seems to be the same as the relation of the moral virtues to the intellectual virtues, through which reason, which moves the moral virtues, is perfected. Hence, just as the intellectual virtues take precedence over the moral virtues and regulate them, so the theological virtues take precedence over the gifts of the Holy Spirit and regulate them. Hence, in *Moralia* 1 Gregory says, “The seven sons [i.e., the gifts] do not come to the perfection of the number *ten* unless everything they do is done in faith, hope, and charity.”

On the other hand, if we compare the gifts to the other intellectual or moral virtues, then the gifts take precedence over the virtues. For the gifts perfect the powers of the soul in relation to the Holy Spirit as prompter, whereas the virtues perfect either reason itself or the other powers in relation to reason. But it is clear that a movable thing must be disposed by a greater perfection in relation to a higher mover. So in this sense the gifts are more important than the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue, and we agree that it is more important than the gifts.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing is prior to another.

In one way, it is prior in the order of perfection and dignity, in the way that the love of God is prior to the love of neighbor. And in this sense the gifts are prior to the intellectual and moral virtues, though posterior to the theological virtues.

In the second way, something is prior in the order of generation or disposition, in the way that the love of neighbor precedes the love of God as far as the acts are concerned. And in this sense the moral and intellectual virtues are prior to the gifts. For by the fact that a man has the right relation to his own reason, he is disposed toward having the right relation to God.

Reply to objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and other things of this sort are gifts of the Holy Spirit insofar as they are informed by charity, which “deals not perversely,” as 1 Corinthians 13:4 puts it. And so no one can make bad use of wisdom or understanding or the others insofar as they are gifts of the Holy Spirit. But one gift is aided by another in order that they not withdraw from the perfection of charity. And this is what Gregory intends to assert.

QUESTION 69

The Beatitudes

We next have to consider the beatitudes. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Do the beatitudes differ from the gifts and the virtues? (2) Do the rewards attributed to the beatitudes have to do with this life? (3) How many beatitudes are there? (4) Are the rewards attributed to the beatitudes appropriate?

Article 1

Do the beatitudes differ from the virtues and the gifts?

It seems that that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and the gifts:

Objection 1: In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine attributes the beatitudes enumerated in Matthew to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, whereas in *Super Lucam* Ambrose attributes the beatitudes enumerated in Luke to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore, the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and the gifts.

Objection 2: As has been established (q. 19, a. 3-4), there are just two rules for the human will, viz., reason and the eternal law. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 68, a. 1), the virtues perfect a man in relation to reason, whereas the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, there cannot be anything other than the virtues and the gifts that has to do with the rectitude of the human will. Therefore, the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

Objection 3: Meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues, are posited in the enumeration of the beatitudes. Therefore, the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

But contrary to this: Certain things enumerated in the beatitudes are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g., poverty, mourning, and peace. Therefore, the beatitudes differ from both the virtues and the gifts.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 2, a. 7), beatitude is the ultimate end of human life. Now someone is even now said to have an end because of his hope of attaining that end. Hence, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says that children are called happy because of their hopefulness, and in Romans 8:24 the Apostle says, “We are saved by hope.” But hope with respect to attaining an end arises from the fact that one is moving in the right way toward the end and approaching it—and this is accomplished through certain actions.

Now one moves toward and approaches the end of beatitude through the works of the virtues—and especially through the works of the gifts, if we are speaking of eternal beatitude. For reason is insufficient for this end; instead, one is led toward it by the Holy Spirit, and it is through the gifts that we are perfected in being obedient to Him and in following Him. And so the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts not in the sense that they are habits distinct from those habits, but rather in the way that acts differ from their corresponding habits.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine and Ambrose attribute the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues in the way that acts are attributed to their corresponding habits.

Now as was explained above (q. 68, a. 8), the gifts are more eminent than the cardinal virtues. And this is why Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes proposed to the crowds, attributed them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, in explaining the beatitudes proposed on the mount to the disciples, who were more perfect than the crowds, attributed them to the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 2: This argument proves that there are no habits that rectify human life besides the virtues and the gifts.

Reply to objection 3: Meekness is being taken here for an *act* of meekness, and the same should

be said of justice and mercy. And even though they might seem to be virtues, they are nonetheless attributed to the gifts, since, as has been explained (q. 68, a. 2), in all the things in which the virtues perfect a man, the gifts likewise perfect him.

Article 2

Do the rewards attributed to the beatitudes belong to this life?

It seems that the rewards attributed to the beatitudes do not belong to this life:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), some are said to be happy because of their hope of attaining rewards. But an object of hope is something future. Therefore, the rewards in question belong to the future life.

Objection 2: In Luke 6:25 punishments are posited in direct contrast to the beatitudes, when it is said, “Woe to you are filled, for you shall hunger. Woe to you who are now laughing, for you shall mourn and weep.” But these punishments are not understood to belong to this life, since men are frequently not punished in this life—this according to Job 21:13 (“They spend their days in wealth”). Therefore, the rewards of the beatitudes do not belong to this life, either.

Objection 3: As Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 19, the kingdom of heaven, which is posited as the reward for poverty, is a heavenly beatitude. Again, full satisfaction (*saturitas*) is had only in the future life—this according to Psalm 16:15 (“I shall be satisfied when Your glory appears”). For the vision of God and the manifestation of our divine filiation belong to the future life—this according to 1 John 3:2 (“We are now the children of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be; for we know that when it does appear, we shall be like Him, because we will see Him as He is”). Therefore, the rewards in question belong to the future life.

But contrary to this: In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe they were fulfilled in the case of the apostles. For the many-faceted change promised after this life—a change even into an angelic form—cannot be expressed in words.”

I respond: Commentators on Sacred Scripture have expressed diverse opinions about the rewards in question. Some, like Ambrose in *Super Lucam*, claim that all of these rewards belong to future beatitude, while Augustine claims that they belong to the present life. Chrysostom, however, claims in *Homiliae* that some of them belong to the future life and some to the present life.

In support of this last claim, note that there are two ways in which the hope for future beatitude can exist in us, viz., (a) because of some sort of *preparation for* or *disposition toward* future beatitude, and this is the mode of *merit*, or (b) through the *imperfect beginning* of future beatitude, even in this life, in holy men. For the hope one has for the fruitfulness of a tree when the tree is becoming green with leaves is different from the hope one has when the first fruits have already begun to appear.

So, then, the things mentioned in the beatitudes as *meritorious* (*merita*) are certain preparations for or dispositions toward beatitude, whether perfect beatitude or the beginnings of beatitude. On the other hand, the things posited as *rewards* can be either (a) perfect beatitude itself, in which case they belong to the future life, or (b) a certain beginning of beatitude, as occurs with men of perfection, in which case the rewards belong to the present life. For when someone begins to be proficient in the acts of the virtues and gifts, he can have the hope of attaining both the perfection of the pilgrimage (*ad perfectionem viae*) and the perfection of heaven (*ad perfectionem patriae*).

Reply to objection 1: Hope for future beatitude as the ultimate end can also be hope for the assistance of grace as the means leading to that end—this according to Psalm 27:7 (“My heart hoped in

God, and I was assisted”).

Reply to objection 2: Even if it sometimes happens that bad men do not suffer temporal punishments in this life, they nonetheless suffer spiritual punishments. Hence, in *Confessiones* 1 Augustine says, “Lord, you have commanded—and so it is—that the disordered mind should be a punishment unto itself.” And in *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says of evil men, “Their soul struggles with itself; this part pulls this way and that part pulls that way.” And afterwards he concludes, “If it is thus miserable to be evil, then one should avoid wickedness with all one’s strength.”

The same holds in reverse for good men. Even if it sometimes happens that they do not receive corporeal rewards in this life, they are never lacking in spiritual goods, even in this life—this according to Matthew 19:29 and Mark 10:30 (“You will receive a hundredfold even in this world”).

Reply to objection 3: To be sure, all the rewards in question will be perfectly consummated in the future life; yet they are also initiated in some way even in this life. For as Augustine says, the kingdom of heaven can be understood as the beginning of perfect wisdom insofar as the Spirit begins to reign in men. Again, possession of the earth signifies the good affections of a soul that through its desire is at rest in the stability of a perpetual inheritance, signified by the earth. Moreover, they are consoled in this life by participating in the Holy Spirit, who is called the Paraclete, i.e., the Consoler. Again, in this life they are filled with the food of which our Lord says, “My food is to do the will of my Father.” Again, in this life men seek God’s mercy. Likewise, even in this life, with one’s eyes cleansed by the gift of understanding, God can in some sense be seen. Again, even in this life those who pacify their own movements, becoming more like God, are called children of God. Yet these things will exist more perfectly in heaven.

Article 3

Are the beatitudes appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the beatitudes are not appropriately enumerated:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), the beatitudes are attributed to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But certain of the gifts, viz., wisdom and understanding, pertain to the contemplative life, whereas there is no beatitude posited for the act of contemplation; instead, all the acts involved in the beatitudes have to do with the active life. Therefore, the beatitudes are not appropriately enumerated.

Objection 2: It is not only the executionary gifts that pertain to the active life, but the directive gifts as well, e.g., knowledge and counsel. But none of the posited beatitudes seems to pertain directly to the act of the gift of knowledge or to the act of the gift of counsel. Therefore, the beatitudes are not adequately touched upon.

Objection 3: Among the gifts that are executionary with respect to the active life, fear is thought of as pertaining to poverty, whereas piety seems to pertain to the beatitude concerning mercy. But there is nothing posited that pertains directly to fortitude. Therefore, the beatitudes are not adequately enumerated.

Objection 4: There are many other beatitudes mentioned in Sacred Scripture. For instance, Job 5:17 says, “Blessed is the man who is corrected by the Lord.” And Psalm 1:1 says, “Blessed the man who has not walked in the counsel of the wicked.” And Proverbs 3:13 says, “Blessed the man who has found wisdom.” Therefore, the beatitudes are not adequately enumerated.

But contrary to this: It seems that the number of beatitudes is too great:

1. There are seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. But eight beatitudes are mentioned.

2. In Luke 6 only four beatitudes are posited. Therefore, the seven, or eight, enumerated in Matthew are too many.

I respond: The beatitudes are enumerated most appropriately. To see this, note that various authors have posited three kinds of beatitude. For some have posited beatitude in the pleasurable life (*vita voluptuosa*), some in the active life (*vita activa*), and some in the contemplative life (*vita contemplativa*).

Now these three kinds of beatitude are related in different ways to future beatitude, the hope for which is said to make us happy here and now. For the beatitude of pleasure, which is a false beatitude and contrary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude, whereas the beatitude of the active life disposes one toward future beatitude. On the other hand, contemplative beatitude, if it is perfect, is in essence future beatitude itself, whereas if it is imperfect, it is a certain beginning of future beatitude.

And so our Lord first posited certain beatitudes which, as it were, remove the obstacle posed by the *pleasurable life*. For the pleasurable life consists in two things.

First, it consists in an affluence of exterior goods, whether riches or honors. A man is drawn back from these goods by the virtues in such a way that he uses them with moderation, whereas he is drawn back from them by the gifts in such a way that he has total contempt for them. Hence, we have the first beatitude, “Blessed are the poor in spirit,” which can be taken to refer either to the contempt for riches or to the contempt for honors that results from humility.

Second, the pleasurable life consists in following one’s passions, whether the passions of the irascible part of the soul or the passions of the concupiscible part.

Virtue draws a man away from following the passions of the irascible part by keeping them from abounding in him, in accord with the rule of reason; the gifts, on the other hand, do this in a more excellent way, viz., in such a way that the man is rendered wholly undisturbed by them, in accord with God’s will. Hence, we have the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek.”

Virtue keeps one from following the passions of the concupiscible part by making use of those passions with moderation, whereas the gifts accomplish this by totally casting them aside, if this is necessary—or even by taking on a willful sorrow, if this is necessary. Hence, we have the third beatitude, “Blessed are they who mourn.”

On the other hand, the *active life* consists principally in what we render to our neighbors, either as a debt or as a spontaneous gift.

Virtue disposes us toward the former in such a way that we do not refuse to render what we owe to our neighbors, and this pertains to justice. On the other hand, the gifts induce us to do the same thing with a more abundant affection, so that it is with a fervent desire that we fulfill the works of justice, in the way that the hungry and the thirsty fervently desire food or drink. Hence, we have the fourth beatitude, “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for justice.”

As for spontaneous gifts, virtue perfects us in such a way that we make gifts to those to whom reason dictates that they should be given, viz., friends or others who are joined to us, and this pertains to the virtue of generosity (*liberalitas*). On the other hand, out of reverence for God, the gifts take only necessity into account in those on whom free gifts are bestowed. Hence, Luke 14:12-13 says, “When you fix a dinner or a supper, do not invite your friends or brothers ... but invite the poor and the maimed” And this is, properly speaking, to show mercy. And so we have the fifth beatitude, “Blessed are the merciful.”

Now anything that pertains to the *contemplative life* is either final beatitude itself or some beginning of it, and so these things are posited in the beatitudes not as merits, but instead as rewards. However, those effects of the active life by which a man is disposed toward the contemplative life are indeed posited as merits. As regards the virtues and gifts by which a man is perfected in himself, the effect of the active life is the cleansing of the heart, so that a man’s mind is not defiled by his passions.

Hence, we have the sixth beatitude, “Blessed are the clean of heart.”

On the other hand, as regards the virtues and gifts by which a man is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace—this according to Isaiah 32:17 (“The work of justice is peace”). And so we have the seventh beatitude, “Blessed are the peacemakers.”

Reply to objection 1: The acts of the gifts pertaining to the active life are expressed in the merits themselves, but the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life are expressed in the rewards, and this for the reason just explained. For to see God corresponds to the gift of understanding, and to be conformed to God by a certain type of adoptive filiation pertains to the gift of wisdom.

Reply to objection 2: As even the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, in the case of what pertains to the active life, cognition is sought not for its own sake but for the sake of acting. And so since ‘beatitude’ connotes something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include acts of those gifts that are directive in the active life, i.e., the acts that those gifts elicit in the way that giving counsel is an act of the gift of counsel and that judging is an act of the gift of knowledge. Rather, what are attributed to these gifts are the operative acts with respect to which they give direction; for instance, mourning is attributed to the gift of knowledge, and being merciful is attributed to the gift of counsel.

Reply to objection 3: There are two things to take into consideration in the attribution of the beatitudes to the gifts.

The first is conformity to the *subject matter*. In this regard, the first five beatitudes can all be attributed to the gifts of knowledge and counsel insofar as those gifts are *directive*. On the other hand, these beatitudes are distributed among the *executionary* gifts, viz., in such a way that (a) hungering and thirsting for justice, as well as being merciful, pertain to the gift of piety, which perfects a man in those matters that have to do with others, and that (b) meekness is attributed to the gift of fortitude, since Ambrose says in *Super Lucam* that “the role of fortitude is to conquer anger and to control indignation,” given that fortitude has to do with the passions of the irascible part of the soul, and that (c) poverty and mourning are attributed to the gift of fear, by which a man draws himself back from the desires and pleasures of the world.

Second, we can consider the *motives* embodied by the beatitudes. If we do so, then in the case of some of the beatitudes we have to attribute them to the gifts in a different way. For it is reverence for God that principally moves one to meekness, and this pertains to the gift of piety. Again, what moves one to sorrow is mainly knowledge, through which a man knows his own defects and the defectiveness of worldly things—this according to Ecclesiastes 1:18 (“He who adds knowledge, adds also sorrow”). Again, it is mainly fortitude of mind that moves one to hunger after the works of justice. On the other hand, it is mainly God’s counsel that moves one to be merciful—this according to Daniel 4:24 (“Let my counsel be pleasing to the king, and redeem your sins with alms and your iniquities with works of mercy to the poor”). And this is the mode of attribution that Augustine follows in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*.

Reply to objection 4: All the beatitudes posited in Sacred Scripture must be traced back to the beatitudes in question, either with respect to the merits or with respect to the rewards. For it is necessary that all beatitudes have something to do with either the active life or the contemplative life. Hence, the saying, “Blessed the man who is corrected by the Lord,” has to do with the beatitude concerning sorrow. And the saying, “Blessed the man who has not walked in the counsel of the wicked,” has to do with cleanness of heart. And the saying, “Blessed the man who has found wisdom,” has to do with the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same thing is clear with all the other beatitudes that might be cited.

Reply to argument 1 for the contrary: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and manifestation of all the preceding ones. For the fact that someone is confirmed in poverty of spirit, in meekness, and in the others results in his not withdrawing from those goods because of persecution of any sort. Hence, the

eighth beatitude pertains in some sense to the seven that precede it.

Reply to argument 2 for the contrary: Luke reports that our Lord's sermon was delivered to the crowds. Hence, he numbers the beatitudes in keeping with the capacity of the crowds, which knew only pleasurable and temporal and earthly beatitude. Hence, by the four beatitudes our Lord rules out the four things that seem to pertain to this sort of beatitude. The first is an abundance of exterior things, which he rules out by saying, "Blessed are the poor." The second is a man's being well off with respect to his body, in food and drink and other such things; and he rules this out in the second beatitude by saying, "Blessed are those who hunger." The third is a man's being well off with respect to hearty enjoyment (*cordis iucunditas*), and he rules this out with the third beatitude by saying, "Blessed are they who are now mourning." The fourth is external favor in the eyes of men, and he rules this out with the fourth beatitude by saying, "Blessed will you be when men hate you." As Ambrose puts it, "Poverty has to do with temperance, which does not seek enticements; hunger pertains to justice, since one who hungers is compassionate and, by being compassionate, is generous; mourning pertains to prudence, which laments perishable things; and suffering men's hatred pertains to fortitude."

Article 4

Are the rewards of the beatitudes appropriately enumerated?

It seems that the rewards of the beatitudes are not appropriately enumerated:

Objection 1: All goods are contained in the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal life. Therefore, once the kingdom of heaven is posited [in the first beatitude], there is no need to posit any other rewards.

Objection 2: The kingdom of heaven is posited as a reward in both the first beatitude and the eighth beatitude. Therefore, for the very same reason, it should have posited in all the beatitudes.

Objection 3: As Augustine puts it, the beatitudes proceed in ascending order. The rewards, however, seem to proceed in descending order. For possessing the earth is something less than the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, these rewards are not appropriately assigned.

But contrary to this is the authority of our Lord Himself, who proposed the rewards.

I respond: The rewards in question are assigned in a most appropriate way if we consider the relation of the beatitudes to the three kinds of beatitude noted above (a. 3).

For the first three beatitudes involve withdrawing from that which constitutes *pleasurable beatitude*, which a man desires by seeking what is naturally desired, but seeking it where he ought not to seek it, viz., in temporal and perishable things.

And so the rewards for the first three beatitudes correspond to the things that some men look for in earthly beatitude. For in exterior things, viz., riches and honors, men seek a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are signified by the kingdom of heaven, through which a man attains an excellence and abundance of goods in God. And so our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to those who are poor in spirit.

Again, fierce and wild men seek to acquire security for themselves by destroying their enemies through conflicts and wars. Hence, to the meek our Lord promised the secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living (*terra viventium*), which signifies the solidity of eternal goods.

Again, in the desires and pleasures of the world men seek consolation in the face of the hardships of the present life. And so our Lord promised consolation to those who mourn.

On the other hand, two of the other beatitudes have to do with the works of *active beatitude*, i.e., the works of those virtues which order a man toward his neighbor and which some men draw back from

because of their disordered love for their own good. And so for these beatitudes our Lord assigned rewards for the sake of which men draw back from these works of virtue.

For some men draw back from the works of justice by not repaying their debts, but by instead taking advantage of others in order to be filled up with temporal goods. And so our Lord promised satisfaction to those who thirst for justice.

Again, some draw back from the works of mercy by not immersing themselves in the sufferings of others. And so to the merciful our Lord promised mercy, through which they are liberated from all suffering.

The two last beatitudes pertain to contemplative happiness or beatitude, and the rewards are given in a way corresponding to the dispositions posited in the merits.

For the cleansing of the eye disposes one toward seeing clearly, and so the vision of God is promised to those who are clean of heart.

On the other hand, making peace, either within himself or between others, shows a man to be an imitator of God, who is the God of unity and peace. And so as a reward he is given the glory of divine filiation, which is consummated through wisdom in a perfect union with God.

Reply to objection 1: As Chrysostom says, all these rewards are one thing in reality, viz., eternal beatitude, which the human intellect cannot grasp. And so it was necessary to describe it by means of the different goods known to us, while preserving a correspondence with the merits to which the rewards are assigned.

Reply to objection 2: Given that the eighth beatitude is a certain confirmation of all the beatitudes, the rewards of all the beatitudes should be assigned to it. And so this beatitude goes back to the beginning, in order that all the rewards might be thought of as being attributed to it as consequences.

An alternative reply is that, according to Ambrose, the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit with respect to the glorification of the soul, whereas it is promised to those who suffer bodily persecution with respect to the glorification of the body.

Reply to objection 3: The rewards are likewise ordered to one another by addition. For it is more to possess the land (*terra*) of the kingdom of heaven than simply to have the kingdom of heaven, since we have many things which we do not possess peacefully and with security. It is also more to be consoled in the kingdom than to have and possess the kingdom, since we possess many things with sorrow. Likewise, it is more to have one's fill than simply to be consoled, since having one's fill implies an abundance of consolation. Yet mercy exceeds having one's fill, in the sense that a man receives more than he has merited or could desire. And it is still greater to see God, just as it is greater for someone not only to dine in the king's court but also to see the king's face. Moreover, the king's son has the highest place in the royal household.

QUESTION 70

The Fruits of the Holy Spirit

We next have to consider the fruits of the Holy Spirit. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are the fruits of the Holy Spirit acts? (2) Do they differ from the beatitudes? (3) How many fruits of the Holy Spirit are there? (4) In what sense are they opposed to the works of the flesh?

Article 1

Are the fruits of the Holy Spirit named by the Apostle in Galatians 5 acts?

It seems that that the fruits of the Holy Spirit named by the Apostle in Galatians 5:22-23 are not acts :

Objection 1: That which has something else as a fruit (*fructus*) should not itself be called a fruit, since otherwise there would be an infinite regress. But our acts bear fruit; for instance, Wisdom 3:15 says, “Glorious is the fruit of our labors,” and John 4:36 says, “He who reaps receives his wages, and he gathers fruit unto everlasting life.” Therefore, our acts should not themselves be called fruits.

Objection 2: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, “We enjoy (*fruor*) the things we know when our will comes to rest in them because they are pleasing (*delectata*) in themselves.” But our will should not come to rest in our acts for their own sake. Therefore, our acts should not be called fruits.

Objection 3: The Apostle numbers among the fruits of the Holy Spirit certain of the virtues, viz., charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. But virtues are not acts; instead, they are habits, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 1). Therefore, the fruits are not acts.

But contrary to this: Matthew 12:33 says, “A tree is known by its fruit”—i.e., a man is known by his works, according to the way this passage is explained by the saints. Therefore, human acts are themselves called fruits.

I respond: The name ‘fruit’ (*fructus*) is here being transferred from corporeal things to spiritual things.

In the case of corporeal things, what is called a fruit is something which is produced by a plant that has reached maturity (*perfectio*) and which has a certain pleasingness (*delectatio*). Such fruit can be thought of either in relation to the tree that produces it or in relation to the man who possesses the fruit that comes from the tree.

Accordingly, in the case of spiritual things we can take the name ‘fruit’ in either of two ways: (a) so that what we call a man’s fruit is what is produced by him, in the way that fruit is produced by a tree; or (b) so that what we call a man’s fruit is what he possesses.

Now not everything a man possesses has the character of a fruit; rather, it is only what comes along last and is pleasing (*est ultimum et habet delectationem*). For the man possesses both the field and the tree, neither of which is called a fruit; instead, the only thing called a fruit is what comes along last, i.e., what the man intended to get from the field and the tree. In this sense, then, it is a man’s ultimate end, when it is his to enjoy, that is called a man’s fruit.

On the other hand, if what is being called a man’s fruit is what is produced by the man, then human acts are themselves called fruits. For an action (*operatio*) is the agent’s second act (*actus secundus operantis*) and is pleasing if it suits the agent. Therefore, if a man’s act proceeds from the man in accord with his faculty of reason, then it is called a fruit of reason; and if it proceeds from the man in accord with a higher virtue, i.e., a virtue of the Holy Spirit, then the man’s action is said to be a fruit of the Holy Spirit—the fruit, as it were, of a divine seed. For 1 John 3:9 says, “Anyone who is born of God does not sin, because His seed remains in him.”

Reply to objection 1: Since a fruit has the character of being last or final in some way or other, nothing prevents one fruit from being the fruit of another fruit, just as one end may be ordered toward another end. Therefore, our works have the character of a fruit insofar as they are the effects of the Holy Spirit working within us, whereas insofar as they are ordered toward the end of eternal life, they are more like blossoms (*flores*). Hence, Ecclesiasticus 24:23 says, “My blossoms are the fruit of honor and uprightness.”

Reply to objection 2: There are two possible ways to understand the will’s being pleased with something for its own sake (*propter se*).

In the first way, the phrase ‘for its own sake’ expresses a final cause, and on this reading it is only the ultimate end that someone is pleased with for its own sake.

In the second way, the phrase ‘for its own sake’ designates a formal cause, and on this reading someone can be pleased with anything for its own sake if that thing is pleasing because of its form. For instance, it is clear that a sick person is pleased with health for its own sake as an end, whereas he is pleased with good-tasting medicine (*medicina suavis*) not as an end but as something that has a pleasing taste; and yet he would not be pleased with bitter medicine for its own sake in either of these ways, but would instead be pleased with it only for the sake of something else.

So, then, one should reply that a man ought to be pleased with God for His own sake as an ultimate end, whereas he should be pleased with virtuous acts not as an end but rather because of the uprightness they contain, which is something pleasing to virtuous men. Hence, Ambrose says that virtuous works are called fruits “because they refresh those who have them with a holy and sincere delight.”

Reply to objection 3: The names of the virtues are sometimes taken for their acts, as when Augustine says, “Faith is believing what you do not see” and “Charity is a movement of the mind toward loving God and neighbor.” And it is in this way that the names of virtues are being used in the enumeration of the fruits.

Article 2

Do the fruits of the Holy Spirit differ from the beatitudes?

It seems that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 69, a. 1), the beatitudes are attributed to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But the gifts perfect a man with respect to his being moved by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the beatitudes are themselves fruits of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 2: The fruits of the present life are related to the beatitudes of the present life, which have to do with hope, in the same way that the fruit of eternal life is related to future beatitude. But the fruit of eternal life is future beatitude itself. Therefore, the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes themselves.

Objection 3: It is part of the concept (*ratio*) of a fruit that it is something pleasing that comes along last. But as was explained above (q. 3, a. 1), this pertains to the concept of beatitude or happiness. Therefore, a fruit and a beatitude have the same concept. Therefore, they should not be distinguished from one another.

But contrary to this: Things that contain diverse species are themselves diverse from one another. But as is clear from the enumeration of the fruits and the beatitudes, the two of them are divided into diverse parts. Therefore, the fruits differ from the beatitudes.

I respond: More is required for the concept (*ratio*) of a beatitude than for the concept of a fruit.

For it is enough for the concept of a fruit that the thing have the character of being pleasing and being last, whereas the concept of a beatitude requires further that it be perfect and excellent. Hence, all the beatitudes can be called fruits, but not vice versa. For every virtuous action is a fruit that a man is pleased with, but the only things called beatitudes are perfect works which also, by reason of their perfection, are attributed more to the gifts than to the virtues, as has been explained (q. 69, a. 1).

Reply to objection 1: This argument proves that the beatitudes are fruits, but not that every fruit is a beatitude.

Reply to objection 2: The fruit of eternal life is last and perfect absolutely speaking, and so it is not distinct from future beatitude. However, the fruits of the present life are not last or perfect absolutely speaking, and that is why not all fruits are beatitudes.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, the concept of a beatitude includes something more than the concept of a fruit does.

Article 3

Did the Apostle correctly enumerate the fruits in Galatians 5?

It seems that the Apostle did not correctly enumerate twelve fruits in Galatians 5:22-23:

Objection 1: In other places he says that there is just one fruit of the present life—this according to Romans 6:22 (“You will have your fruit in holiness”). Again, Isaiah 27:9 says, “This is all the fruit: that sin be taken away.” Therefore, it was incorrect for twelve fruits to be posited.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1), the fruit comes from a spiritual seed. But in Matthew 13:23 our Lord posits three kinds of fruit that grow out of good earth from the spiritual seed, viz., “fruit a hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold.” Therefore, it was incorrect for twelve fruits to be posited.

Objection 3: A fruit contains within its concept that it is something that comes last and is pleasing. But this concept is not found in all of the fruits enumerated by the Apostle. For instance, patience and longsuffering seem to be for those who are displeased (*contristantes*), whereas faith has the character of a first foundation rather than the character of something that comes last. Therefore, too many fruits of the Holy Spirit are enumerated by the Apostle.

But contrary to this: It seems that there are too few and not enough fruits enumerated. For it was claimed above (a. 2) that all the beatitudes can be called fruits; and yet not all the beatitudes are enumerated in this passage. Also, in this passage nothing is said about the act of wisdom or about the acts of many of the other virtues. Therefore, it seems that the fruits were incorrectly enumerated.

I respond: The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is correct, and these twelve fruits are perhaps signified by the twelve fruits of which Apocalypse 22:2 says, “On both sides of the river was the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits.”

Since a fruit is said to proceed from some source (*ex aliquo principio*) as from a seed or root, the distinctions among these fruits should be thought of in a way corresponding to the diversified working of the Holy Spirit in us. This working is thought of as follows: first, a man’s mind is ordered *within itself*; second, it is ordered to what is *joined to it*; and, third, it is ordered to things *below it*.

Now a man’s mind is well disposed within itself when it behaves appropriately in the face of both goods and evils.

The first disposition of the human mind toward the good is through love, which is the first affection and the root of all affections, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4). And so among the fruits of the Holy Spirit the first one posited is *charity* (*caritas*), in which the Holy Spirit is given in a special way, as in a

proper likeness of Himself, since He Himself is the Love (*Amor*) (cf. *ST* 1, q. 37). Hence, Romans 5:5 says, “The love (*caritas*) of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.”

Now joy necessarily follows upon the love of charity. For every lover rejoices at being joined to what he loves. But charity always has God, whom it loves, present—this according to 1 John 4:16 (“Whoever remains in charity remains in God, and God in him”). Hence, what follows from charity is joy (*gaudium*).

Moreover, the perfection of joy is peace and this in two respects:

The first involves repose from external disturbances, since one cannot rejoice perfectly over a loved good if his enjoyment of it is disturbed by other things. Again, one who has his heart perfectly resting in one thing cannot be troubled by other things, since he regards all other things as nothing. Hence, Psalm 118:165 says, “Much peace have they who love Your law, and to them there is no stumbling block,” viz., because they are not disturbed by exterior things in such a way that they do not enjoy God.

The second respect involves the pacification of restless desire. For one does not rejoice perfectly over something if what he rejoices over does not satisfy him (*cui non sufficit*).

So peace implies two things, viz., (a) that we are not disturbed by exterior matters, and (b) that our desires come to rest in one thing. Hence, after charity and joy, the third fruit posited is *peace* (*pax*).

Now there are two respects in which a mind does well in the face of evils. First, the mind is not disturbed by the threat of evil things, and this pertains to *patience* (*patientia*). Second, it is not disturbed when good things are delayed, and this pertains to *longsuffering* (*longanimitas*). For as *Ethics* 5 says, “To lack a good has the character of an evil.”

Now as for what *is joined to* a man, viz., his neighbor (*proximus*), a man’s mind is well disposed, first, when it intends to act well, and the relevant fruit is *goodness* (*bonitas*). Second, our minds are well disposed when we execute our good actions (*ad beneficentiae executionem*), and the relevant fruit here is *kindness* (*benignitas*); for kind men are those whom the good fire of love makes fervent in doing good for their neighbors. Third, our minds are well disposed when we bear with equanimity the evils inflicted on us by our neighbors, and the relevant fruit is *meekness* (*mansuetudo*), which curbs anger. Fourth, our minds are well disposed when we do no harm to our neighbors, either through anger or through fraud or deceit; and here the relevant fruit is *faith* (*fides*), as long as faith is being understood as *faithfulness* (*fidelitas*). (However, if faith is understood as that by which one believes in God, then through faith in this sense a man is ordered toward that which lies *above him* in such a way that he subjects his intellect to God and, as a result, subjects everything which is his to God.)

As for what *lies below* him, a man is well disposed, first, with respect to exterior actions, through *modesty* (*modestia*), which preserves a careful measure (*modus*) in everything that is said and done. Second, with respect to sense desires, a man is well disposed through *continence* (*continentia*) and *chastity* (*castitas*), where the two are distinguished either (a) by the fact that chastity curbs a man’s unlawful desires, whereas continence curbs his lawful desires, or (b) by the fact that a continent man experiences sense desires but is not led astray by them, whereas a chaste man neither experiences them nor is led astray by them.

Reply to objection 1: Sanctification is effected through all the virtues, and it is also through all the virtues that sins are taken away. Hence, in the cited passage ‘fruit’ is taken in the singular because of the unity of the genus, which is then divided into many species insofar as there are said to be many fruits.

Reply to objection 2: The hundredfold fruit, the sixtyfold fruit, and the thirtyfold fruit are differentiated not by diverse species of virtuous acts but rather by diverse levels of perfection even within a single virtue. For instance, conjugal continence is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit, the continence of widows by the sixtyfold fruit, and virginal continence by the hundredfold fruit. And there are also other ways in which the saints distinguish the three evangelical fruits in accord with the three

degrees of virtue. (They posit three degrees because the perfection of any given thing has a beginning, a middle, and an end.)

Reply to objection 3: The very fact that someone is not disturbed in the face of sorrows has the character of something pleasing. Again, even if ‘faith’ is taken for the foundational [virtue], it has the character of something that comes last and is pleasing to the extent that it contains certitude. Hence, a Gloss on this passage says, “Faith, i.e., certitude concerning invisible things”

Reply to the argument for the contrary: As Augustine points out in *Super Epistolam ad Galatas*, the Apostle did not undertake here to teach what either the works of the flesh or the fruits of the Holy Spirit are; rather, he was trying to show in general which things are to be avoided and which things pursued. Hence, more (or, for that matter, fewer) fruits could have been enumerated. And yet all the acts of the gifts and the virtues can appropriately be traced back to the ones he mentions, insofar as all the virtues and gifts necessarily order the mind in one of the ways mentioned above. Hence, the act of wisdom and the acts of all the other gifts that order one toward the good are traced back to charity, joy, and peace. Yet the reason why he enumerated these fruits rather than others is that the ones enumerated in this passage convey either the fruition of goods or the allaying of evils—and this seems pertinent to the notion of a fruit.

Article 4

Are the fruits contrary to the works of the flesh enumerated by the Apostle?

It seems that the fruits are not contrary to the works of the flesh enumerated by the Apostle:

Objection 1: Contraries belong to the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called ‘fruits’ of the flesh. Therefore, the fruits of the Spirit are not their contraries.

Objection 2: A single thing is a contrary to just one thing. But the Apostle enumerates more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore, the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contraries.

Objection 3: Among the fruits of the Spirit the first ones mentioned are charity, joy, and peace, which do not correspond to the works of the flesh that are enumerated first, viz., fornication (*fornicatio*), uncleanness (*immunditia*), and immodesty (*impudicitia*).

But contrary to this: The Apostle says in the same place that “the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.”

I respond: There are two possible ways to understand the works of the flesh and the fruits of the Holy Spirit.

The first way is according to their *general* concepts. And in this sense the fruits of the Holy Spirit are contrary to the works of the flesh. For the Holy Spirit moves the human mind toward that which accords with reason or, better, toward that which lies beyond reason, whereas the appetite of the flesh, i.e., the sentient appetite, draws the mind toward sensible goods, which lie below man. Hence, just as upward movements and downward movements are contrary to one another in the case of natural things, so the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Holy Spirit in the case of human works.

The second possible way to think of them is according to the *proper* concepts of each of the enumerated fruits. And in this sense it need not be the case that the individual fruits of the Holy Spirit are counterposed to individual works of the flesh. For as was pointed out above (a. 3), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the spiritual works or all the works of the flesh. Still, in *Super Epistolam ad Galatas* Augustine, making a sort of adaptation, counterposes individual fruits to individual works of the

flesh: “*Charity*, through which the soul is joined to the God and in which there is also true *chastity*, is opposed to *fornication*, which is the love of satisfying one’s sexual desire separated from licit marriage. *Uncleanness* of various sorts, which consists in disturbances that find their source in this fornication, is opposed to the *joy* of tranquillity. *Slavery to idols*, for the sake of which war is waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to *peace*. Against *sorcery* (*veneficium*), *enmities* (*inimicitiae*), *contentions* (*contentiones*), *jealous rivalries* (*aemulationes*), *animosities* (*animositates*), and *quarrels* (*dissensiones*), there is *longsuffering*, to bear the evils inflicted by the men among whom we live; *kindness*, to cure those evils; and *goodness*, to forgive them. *Faith* is opposed to *heresy*, *meekness* to *envy*, and *continence* to instances of *drunkenness* and *revelry* (*ebrietatibus et comessationibus*).”

Reply to objection 1: What comes from a tree in opposition to the tree’s nature is not said to be its fruit, but is instead called a sort of corruption. And it is because the works of the virtues are connatural to reason, whereas the works of the vices are contrary to reason, that the works of the virtues, but not the works of the vices, are called fruits.

Reply to objection 2: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Good occurs in a single way, whereas evil occurs in many ways.” Hence, more than one vice is opposed to a single virtue. For this reason, it is not surprising that more works of the flesh are posited than fruits of the Spirit.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to this objection is obvious from what has been said.

QUESTION 71

Vices and Sins in Themselves

Next we have to consider vices and sins (*vitia et peccata*). On this topic there are six things to consider: first, vices and sins in themselves (question 71); second, the distinctions among them (question 72); third, a comparison of sins and vices to one another (question 73); fourth, the subject of sin (question 74); fifth, the causes of sin (questions 75-84); and, sixth, the effects of sin (questions 85-89).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Is vice contrary to virtue? (2) Is vice contrary to nature? (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act? (4) Can a vicious act exist together with virtue? (5) Does every sin involve an act? (6) What about Augustine's definition of sin, posited in *Contra Faustum* 22, viz., that a sin is "a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law"?

Article 1

Is vice contrary to virtue?

It seems that vice (*vitium*) is not contrary to virtue (*non contrarietur virtuti*):

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 10 proves, a single thing has a single contrary. But sin and badness (*peccatum et malitia*) are contrary to virtue. Therefore, vice is not contrary to virtue, since something is called a 'vice' or 'blemish' (*vitium*) even if it is an unsuitable disposition on the part of bodily members or on the part of anything whatsoever.

Objection 2: 'Virtue' (*virtus*) designates a certain sort perfection that belongs to a power (*potentia*). But 'vice' does not designate anything that has to do with a power. Therefore, vice is not contrary to virtue.

Objection 3: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "Virtue is a certain sort of health of the soul." But it is a sickness or a disease (*aegritudo vel morbus*), rather than a vice or a blemish, that is opposed to health. Therefore, vice is not contrary to virtue.

But contrary to this: In *De Perfectione Iustitiae* Augustine says, "A vice is a quality because of which the mind is bad." But as is clear from what was said above (q. 55, aa. 3-4), a virtue is a quality that makes the one who has it good. Therefore, a vice is contrary to virtue.

I respond: There are two things we can think about with regard to a virtue, viz., (a) *the very essence of the virtue* (*ipsam essentiam virtutis*) and (b) *what the virtue is ordered toward* (*id ad quod est virtus*).

As regards *the essence of a virtue*, there is (a) something that can be considered *directly* and (b) something that can be thought of *as a consequence*.

Thus, 'virtue' *directly* implies a certain disposition of something that behaves appropriately, given the mode of its nature (*dispositionem quandam alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae*). Hence, in *Physics* 2 the Philosopher says, "A virtue is a disposition of what is complete toward what is best (*dispositio perfecti ad optimum*), where by 'complete' I mean 'disposed in accord with its nature'." And the *consequence* that follows is that a virtue is a certain sort of goodness. For each thing's goodness consists in its behaving appropriately, given the mode of its nature.

On the other hand, as is clear from what was said above (q. 56, a. 3), *what a virtue is ordered toward* is a good act.

Accordingly, there are three things opposed to virtue (*virtus*):

(a) One of them is a *mistake* or *sin* (*peccatum*), which is opposed to virtue in the sense of being opposed to what a virtue is ordered toward. For 'mistake' or 'sin' (*peccatum*) properly names a disordered act (*actus inordinatus*), just as an act of virtue is an act that is rightly ordered and fitting (*actus ordinatus et debitus*).

(b) On the other hand, insofar as it follows upon the notion of a virtue that a virtue is a certain sort

of goodness, it is *badness* (*malitia*) that is opposed to virtue.

(c) But as regards what belongs directly to the notion of a virtue, it is *vice* (*vitium*) that is opposed to virtue. For the vice of any given thing seems to be that it is not disposed in a way that is appropriate to its nature. Hence, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 Augustine says, “Look for what is lacking to the perfection of the nature, and call it vice.”

Reply to objection 1: The three things in question are not contrary to virtue in the same respect. Instead, a mistake or sin (*peccatum*) is contrary to virtue insofar as a virtue is productive of what is good (*est operativa boni*); badness (*malitia*) is contrary to virtue insofar as a virtue is a certain sort of goodness; and vice (*vitium*) is contrary to virtue insofar as a virtue is a virtue.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Virtue’ not only implies the perfection of a power that is a principle of acting, but also implies the right sort of disposition on the part of the one whose virtue it is—and this because each thing operates to the extent that it is actualized (*secundum quod actu est*). Therefore, in order for something to be productive of what is good, it is required that it should be well-disposed within itself. And this is the sense in which vice is opposed to virtue.

Reply to objection 3: As Tully says in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4, “Sickness and disease are parts of viciousness (*partes sunt vitiositatis*). For among bodies what is called a ‘sickness’ (*morbus*) is a corruption of the whole body, e.g., a fever or something of that sort, whereas what is called a ‘disease’ (*aegrotatio*) is a sickness accompanied by feebleness, and there is a ‘blemish’ (*vitium*) when the parts of the body do not fit well with one another.” And even though in the body there is sometimes a sickness without a disease, e.g., when someone is not well disposed interiorly, but is not exteriorly kept from his usual actions, still, “in the soul,” as Tully says, “these two things cannot be separated except in thought.” For it is necessary that whenever someone is not well disposed interiorly and has disordered affections, this renders him too weak to perform the actions he ought to perform, since “every tree is known by its fruit”—i.e., a man is known by his works, as Matthew 12:33 says.

However, as Tully says in the same place, “The mind’s vice is a habit or affection of the mind that is capricious and in conflict with itself throughout a whole lifetime.” And this sort of thing is also found in the absence of sickness or disease—as, for instance, when one sins from weakness or from passion. Hence, ‘vice’ extends to more things than ‘disease’ or ‘sickness’ does, just as ‘virtue’ extends to more things than ‘health’ does. Indeed, health is even posited as a certain sort of virtue in *Physics* 7. And so ‘vice’ or ‘blemish’ is more appropriately opposed to ‘virtue’ than is either ‘disease’ or ‘sickness’.

Article 2

Are vices contrary to nature?

It seems that vices are not contrary to nature:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), vice is contrary to virtue. But virtues do not exist in us by nature; instead, as has been explained (q. 63, aa. 1-3), they are caused in us either by infusion or by habituation (*per infusionem aut ab assuetudine*). Therefore, vices are not contrary to nature.

Objection 2: Things that are contrary to nature cannot be made habitual; for instance, as *Ethics* 2 puts it, “A rock is never habituated to being borne upwards.” But some individuals are habituated to vices. Therefore, vices are not contrary to nature.

Objection 3: Nothing that is contrary to a nature is found in a great number of things that have that nature (*in habentibus illam naturam ut in pluribus*). But vices are found in a great number of men; for as Matthew 7:13 says, “Wide is the way that leads to perdition, and many there are who walk along it.” Therefore, vices are not contrary to nature.

Objection 4: As is clear from what was said above (a. 1), a sin is related to a vice as an act is

related to its habit. But as is clear from Augustine in *Contra Faustum*, a sin is “a word or deed or desire contrary to Divine law.” But Divine law is beyond nature (*supra naturam*). Therefore, one should claim that a vice is contrary to *law* rather than contrary to *nature*.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “Every vice, by the very fact that it is a vice, is contrary to nature.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), a vice is contrary to virtue. But as was explained above (a. 1), the virtue of each thing consists in its being well disposed in a way appropriate to its nature. Hence, it must be the case that in any given thing, a vice is so-called by the fact that the thing is disposed in a way that is contrary to what is appropriate to its nature. And, thus, each thing is blamed for this, given that, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3, the name ‘blame’ (*vituperatio*) is taken to be drawn from ‘vice’ (*vitium*).

However, notice that the nature of each thing is first and foremost (*potissime*) the form in accord with which the thing receives its species. Now a man is constituted in his species by the rational soul. And so what is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of a man insofar as he is a man, whereas what accords with reason accords with the nature of a man insofar as he is a man. But as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “What is good for man is to be in accord with reason, whereas what is bad for man is to be outside of reason (*praeter rationem*).” Hence, human virtue, which makes a man good and renders his work good, is in accord with man’s nature to the extent that it agrees with reason, whereas vice is contrary to man’s nature to the extent that it is contrary to the order of reason.

Reply to objection 1: Even if the virtues are not caused by nature with respect to their perfect *esse*, they nonetheless incline one toward what is in accord with nature, i.e., in accord with the order of reason. For instance, in his *Rhetorica* Tully says, “A virtue is a habit in the mode of a nature that agrees with reason.” And this is the sense in which a virtue is said to be in accord with nature and in which, on the other side, a vice is understood to be contrary to nature.

Reply to objection 2: The Philosopher is here talking about what is contrary to nature in the sense in which *being contrary to nature* (*esse contra naturam*) is opposed to *being from nature* (*esse a natura*), but not in the sense in which *being contrary to nature* is opposed to *being in accord with nature* (*esse secundum naturam*). For virtues are said to be in accord with nature in the sense that they incline one toward what agrees with one’s nature.

Reply to objection 3: There are two natures in a man, viz., rational and sentient. And since it is through the operation of the sensory power that a man arrives at an act of reason, more men follow the inclinations of their sentient nature than the order of reason; for there are more men who attain the beginning of a given matter than make it all the way to the end (*plures sunt qui assequuntur principium rei quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt*). Now vices and sins proliferate among men because they follow the inclination of their sentient nature in opposition to the order of reason.

Reply to objection 4: Whatever is contrary to the conception of an artifact (*contra rationem artificiatam*) is also contrary to the nature of the craft by which the artifact is produced. But the eternal law is related to the order of human reason in the way that a craft is related to an artifact. Hence, the fact that a vice or sin is contrary to the order of human reason is of a piece with (*eiusdem rationis*) the fact that it is contrary to the eternal law. This is why, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 3, Augustine says, “All natures have from God the fact that they are natures, and they are vicious to the extent that they depart from that craft by which they were made.”

Article 3

Is a vice, i.e., a bad habit, worse than a sin, i.e., a bad act?

It seems that a vice, i.e., a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e., a bad act (*vitium, id est habitus malus, est peius quam peccatum, id est actus malus*):

Objection 1: Just as something good that is long-lasting is better, so something bad that is long-lasting is worse. But a vicious habit is more long-lasting than are vicious acts, which pass away at once. Therefore, a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

Objection 2: A plurality of bad things is more to be avoided than is a single bad thing. But a bad habit is a virtual cause (*virtualiter est causa*) of many bad acts. Therefore, a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

Objection 3: A cause is more powerful than its effect. But a habit brings its act to completion both in its goodness and in its badness. Therefore, a habit is more powerful than its act both in its goodness and in its badness.

But contrary to this: One is justly punished for a vicious act, but not for a vicious habit, as long as the habit does not proceed into an act. Therefore, a vicious act is worse than a vicious habit.

I respond: A habit is situated midway between a power and its act. Now it is clear that, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, an act exceeds its power in goodness and badness; for it is better to act well than to be able to act well and, similarly, it is more blameworthy to act badly than to be able to act badly. Hence, it also follows that a habit has a middle level of goodness and badness between a power and its act—so that, more specifically, just as a good (or bad) habit exceeds its power in goodness (or badness), so too it is likewise exceeded by its act.

This is also clear from the fact that a habit is called good or bad only because it inclines one toward a good or bad act. Hence, it is because of the goodness or badness of the act that a habit is called ‘good’ or ‘bad’. And so the act is more potent in goodness or badness than the habit is; for that because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents one thing from exceeding another absolutely speaking (*nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter altero potior*), even though it falls short of the other in some respect (*secundum quid ab eo deficit*). For something is judged to exceed another absolutely speaking when it exceeds the other with respect to what is thought of as being *per se* in each of them, whereas it is judged to exceed it in a certain respect when it exceeds the other with respect to what is related to each of them *per accidens*.

Now it has been shown on the basis of the very conceptions of an act and of a habit that an act exceeds the corresponding habit in goodness and badness. But the fact that a habit is more long-lasting than an act stems from the fact that both of them are found in a nature that is such that it cannot always be acting and such that its action occurs in a passing movement. Hence, absolutely speaking, an act exceeds the corresponding habit both in goodness and in badness, whereas the habit exceeds the act in a certain respect.

Reply to objection 2: It is in a certain respect, viz., virtually (*virtute*)—and not absolutely speaking—that a habit is a plurality of acts. Hence, one cannot infer from this that a habit exceeds an act absolutely speaking in goodness or badness.

Reply to objection 3: A habit is a cause of an act in the genus *efficient cause*, but an act is a cause of a habit in the genus *final cause*, in accord with which the notions of goodness and badness are thought of. And this is why an act exceeds the corresponding habit in goodness and badness.

Article 4

Can a vicious act, i.e., a sin, exist together with a contrary virtue?

It seems that a vicious act, i.e., a sin or mistake, cannot exist together with a virtue (*actus vitiosus sive peccatum non possit simul esse cum virtute*):

Objection 1: Contraries cannot exist together in the same subject. But as has been explained (a. 1), a sin or mistake is in a certain sense contrary to virtue. Therefore, a sin cannot exist together with virtue.

Objection 2: A sin or mistake is worse than a vice; that is, a bad act is worse than a bad habit. But a vice cannot exist together with a virtue in the same subject. Therefore, neither can a sin.

Objection 3: As *Physics* 2 says, a sin or mistake occurs in natural affairs in the same way that it occurs in voluntary affairs. But a sin or mistake never occurs in natural affairs except through some sort of corruption in a natural power, in the way that “monsters occur because of some corrupt principle in the seed,” as *Physics* 2 puts it. Therefore, it is likewise the case in voluntary affairs that a sin or mistake does not occur except through some corrupted power of the soul (*nisi corrupta aliqua virtute animae*). And so a sin and a virtue cannot exist in the same subject.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that a virtue is generated and corrupted by contraries. But as was established above (q. 51, a. 3), a single virtuous act does not cause a virtue. Therefore, neither does a single sinful act destroy a virtue. Therefore, they can exist together in the same subject.

I respond: A sin is related to a virtue in the way that a bad act is related to a good habit. But a habit in the soul behaves differently from a form in a natural thing. For a natural form necessarily produces an operation that agrees with the form, and so an act of a contrary form cannot exist together with a natural form; for instance, an act of cooling cannot exist together with heat, and an act of descending cannot exist together with lightness, except perhaps because of the violence caused by an exterior mover. By contrast, a habit in the soul does not necessarily produce its own operation; instead, a man makes use of the habit when he wills to. Hence, even while the habit exists in a man, he is able not to use the habit and able to perform a contrary act. And so it is possible for someone who has a virtue to proceed into a sinful act.

Now if a sinful act is compared to the virtue itself insofar as the virtue is a certain habit, the act cannot corrupt it as long as it is just a single act; for as was explained above (q. 63, a. 2), just as a habit cannot be generated by a single act, so, too, neither can it be corrupted by a single act.

But if a sinful act is compared to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for certain virtues to be corrupted by a single sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues insofar as they are virtues, and so, given that charity has been excluded, a single mortal sin excludes as a result all the infused virtues insofar as they are virtues. (I add this qualifier because of faith and hope, whose habits, unformed [by charity], remain after a mortal sin; and so these habits are not virtues.) On the other hand, a venial sin, which is not contrary to charity and does not exclude it, consequently does not exclude the other virtues, either.

By contrast, acquired virtues are not destroyed by a single sinful act of any type whatsoever.

So, then, a mortal sin cannot exist together with the infused virtues, although it can exist together with acquired virtues. On the other hand, a venial sin can exist together with both infused virtues and acquired virtues.

Reply to objection 1: A sin is not contrary to a virtue as such (*non secundum se*), but is instead contrary to the virtue’s act (*sed secundum suum actum*). And so a sin cannot exist together with the act of the relevant virtue, but it can nonetheless exist together with the habit.

Reply to objection 2: A vice is directly contrary to a virtue, just as a sin is directly contrary to a

virtuous act. And so the vice excludes the virtue, just as the sin excludes an act of the virtue.

Reply to objection 3: Natural powers (*virtutes*) act by necessity and so, as long as a given power remains intact, a sin or mistake is never found in its act. But the virtues (*virtutes*) of the soul do not produce their acts by necessity, and so the line of reasoning is not parallel.

Article 5

Does every sin involve an act?

It seems that every sin involves an act (*in quolibeto peccato sit aliquis actus*):

Objection 1: Sin is related to a vice in the way that merit is related to a virtue. But there cannot be any merit in the absence of an act. Therefore, neither can there be any sin in the absence of an act.

Objection 2: In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “Every sin is voluntary to such an extent that if it is not voluntary, it is not a sin.” But nothing can be voluntary except through an act of willing. Therefore, every sin involves some act.

Objection 3: If there were a sin in the absence of any act, it would follow that someone sinned by the very fact that he desisted from doing a required act. But there is someone who continually desists from a required act, viz., the one who never does the required act. Therefore, it would follow that he is sinning continually—which is false. Therefore, there is no sin in the absence of an act.

But contrary to this: James 4:17 says, “For one who knows he is to do good and does not do it, to him it is a sin.” Therefore, there can be a sin in the absence of an act.

I respond: This question is raised mainly because of sins of omission, concerning which different people have different opinions.

For there are those who claim that in every sin of omission there is some act, either *interior* or *exterior*: (a) an interior act, as when someone wills not to go to church when he is obligated to go, (b) an exterior act, as when someone, at the very hour he is supposed to go to church (or even before), occupies himself with something by which he is kept from going to church. And the second case seems in some sense to reduce to the first. For someone who wills something with which something else cannot simultaneously exist wills as a consequence to lack that something else—unless perhaps he does not take into consideration that by willing to do the one thing he is prevented from doing what he is supposed to do, in which case he could be judged blameworthy because of negligence.

By contrast, others claim that no act is required in the case of a sin of omission. For it is a sin not to do what one is obligated to do.

Now each of these opinions is true in a certain respect. For if the only thing understood in a sin of omission is what belongs *per se* to the nature of a sin, then in this sense (a) it is sometimes the case that a sin of omission occurs with an interior act, as when someone wills not to go to church, whereas (b) it is sometimes the case that it occurs without any interior or exterior act at all, as when, at the hour at which someone is supposed to go to church, he has no thought at all about going or not going to church.

On the other hand, if the causes or occasions for the omission are also understood in a sin of omission, then there has to be some act involved in every sin of omission. For there is no sin of omission unless someone omits something that he is able to do and able not to do. But the fact that someone ends up not doing something that he is able to do and able not to do stems only from some antecedent or concomitant cause or occasion (*non est nisi ex aliqua causa vel occasione coniuncta vel praecedente*).

Now if the cause in question is not within the man’s power, then the omission does not have the character of a sin—as, for instance, when someone omits going to church because of an illness. By contrast, if the cause or occasion of the omission is subject to the man’s will, the omission has the character of a sin, and in that case it is always necessary for the cause, insofar as it is voluntary, to

involve some act, at least an interior act of willing.

This act is sometimes directed immediately toward the omission itself, as when someone wills not to go to church in order to avoid the effort. And in such a case the act belongs *per se* to the omission, since the act of willing any sort of sin belongs *per se* to that sin, given that voluntariness belongs to the nature of a sin.

But sometimes the act of willing is immediately directed toward something else by which the man is kept from the required act—either because (a) what the act of willing is directed toward is *conjoined* to the omission, as when someone wills to engage in some amusement (*vult ludere*) when he should be going to church, or because (b) what the act of willing is directed toward is something antecedent to the omission, as when someone wills to stay up too late at night (*diu vigilare de sero*) and from this it follows that he will not go to church the next morning (*non vadat hora matutinali ad ecclesiam*). And in this sort of case the interior or exterior act is related *per accidens* to the omission, since the omission follows outside [the agent's] intention, and, as is clear from *Physics* 2, we call something '*per accidens*' when it falls outside [the agent's] intention. Hence, it is clear that in such a case the sin of omission does, to be sure, involve some concomitant or antecedent act, and yet this act is related *per accidens* to the sin of omission.

Now one's judgment about things should be made on the basis of what is *per se* and not on the basis of what is *per accidens*. Hence, it is closer to the truth to say that there can be a sin in the absence of any act. Otherwise, circumstantial acts and occasions would likewise belong to the essence of other sins that consist in acts (*alioquin etiam ad essentiam aliorum peccatorum actualium pertinerent actus et occasiones circumstantes*).

Reply to objection 1: More things are required for goodness than for badness, because, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "Goodness results from an entire integrated cause, whereas badness results from a single defect (*bonum contingit ex tota integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus*).” And so a sin can occur regardless of whether someone does what he ought not to do or does not do what he ought to do, whereas merit is impossible unless someone voluntarily does what he ought to do. And so merit cannot exist in the absence of an act, whereas sin can exist in the absence of an act.

Reply to objection 2: As *Ethics* 3 points out, something is called 'voluntary' not only because an act of willing is directed toward it, but also because its being done or not being done lies within our power. Hence, even an instance of not willing can itself be called voluntary, insofar as it is within the man's power to will or not to will.

Reply to objection 3: A sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept that always imposes an obligation, but not *for all times* (*contrariatur praecepto affirmativo quod obligat semper sed non ad semper*). And so the only time at which someone sins by ceasing to perform an act is the time *for* which the affirmative precept imposes an obligation on him.

Article 6

Is it correct to define a sin as “a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law”?

It seems that it is incorrect to define a sin as “a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law”:

Objection 1: 'Word or deed or desire' implies an act. But as has been explained (a. 5), not every sin involves an act. Therefore, the definition in question does not include every sin.

Objection 2: In *De Duabus Animabus* Augustine says, “A sin is an act of willing to hold on to or to pursue what justice forbids.” But an act of willing is included under 'desire' (*concupiscentia*), insofar as 'desire' is taken in a broad sense for any sort of appetite (*pro omni appetitu*). Therefore, it would have

been sufficient to say, “A sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law,” and it was not necessary to add “a word or a deed.”

Objection 3: A sin seems properly to consist in a turning away from an end, since, as was explained above (q. 18, a. 6), goodness and badness are mainly thought of in connection with an end. Hence, in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine defines a sin by its relation to an end when he says, “To sin is nothing other than to pursue temporal things while neglecting eternal things.” And in 83 *Quaestiones* he says, “Every form of human perversity consists in using what should be enjoyed and enjoying what should be used.” But in the definition in question there is no mention of a turning away from the correct end. Therefore, that definition of sin is inadequate.

Objection 4: Something is said to be forbidden by reason of the fact that it is contrary to the law. But not all sins are bad because they are forbidden; instead, some of them are forbidden because they are bad. Therefore, “contrary to Divine law” should not be put into the general definition of a sin.

Objection 5: As is clear from what has been said (a. 1 and q. 21, a. 1), ‘sin’ signifies a bad act on the part of a man. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a bad act on the part of a man is contrary to reason. Therefore, one should say, “A sin is contrary to reason” rather than “A sin is contrary to the eternal law.”

But contrary to this is the authority of Augustine.

I respond: As is clear from what has been said (a. 1 and q. 21, a. 1), a sin is nothing other than a bad human act. Now as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), an act is a human act from the fact that it is voluntary, regardless of whether it is voluntary in the sense of being *elicited* by the will, as in the case of an act of willing or an act of choosing, or in the sense of being *commanded* by the will, as in the case of exterior acts of speaking or operating.

Now a human act is bad from the fact that it lacks a due measure. And every measure of any given thing involves a comparison to some rule which is such that if the thing departs from that measure, it will lack measure (*incommensurata erit*). And there are two measures of the human will: One is a proximate and homogeneous measure, viz., human reason itself, whereas the other is the first measure, viz., the eternal law, which is, as it were, God’s reason.

This is why Augustine posits two things in his definition of sin. One of them pertains to a human act’s *substance*, which is, as it were, the *material* element in a sin; this is where he says, “A word or deed or desire.” The other pertains to the *nature of evil* and is, as it were, the *formal* element in a sin; this is where he says, “contrary to the eternal law.”

Reply to objection 1: An affirmation and corresponding negation belong to the same genus, in the way that, in the case of God, *begotten* and *unbegotten* belong to the genus of relation, as Augustine points out in *De Trinitate* 5. And so ‘word’ and ‘non-word’ and ‘deed’ and ‘non-deed’ should be taken for the same thing.

Reply to objection 2: The first cause of sin exists in the will, which commands other voluntary acts, and it is in voluntary acts alone that sin is found. This is why Augustine sometimes defines sin just in terms of the act of willing. But since, as has been explained (q. 20, aa. 1-3), exterior acts themselves likewise belong to the substance of a sin when they are bad in their own right, something pertaining to exterior acts also had to be put into the definition of a sin.

Reply to objection 3: The eternal law primarily and principally orders a man toward his end, and yet as a consequence it makes a man to be related in a good way to the means to the end. And so by the fact that it says “contrary to the eternal law” it touches on both (a) turning away from the end and (b) all the other types of disorderliness.

Reply to objection 4: When the objection says, ‘Not every sin is bad because it is forbidden’, this is understood of a prohibition that is made through positive law. By contrast, if it were referring to natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law and secondarily in human reason’s natural judgement, then *every* sin is bad because it is forbidden. For by the very fact that a sin is disordered, it is

in conflict with natural law.

Reply to objection 5: Theologians consider sin mainly insofar as it is an offense against God, whereas a moral philosopher considers sin mainly insofar as it is contrary to reason. And so it was more appropriate for Augustine to define sin on the basis of its being contrary to the eternal law than on the basis of its being contrary to reason, especially given that we are regulated by the eternal law in many matters that exceed human reason, as in the case of those matters that belong to the Faith.

QUESTION 72

The Distinctions among Sins

Next we have to consider the distinctions among sins or vices. On this topic there are nine questions: (1) Are sins distinguished in species by their objects? (2) What of the distinction between spiritual sins and carnal sins (*de distinctione peccatorum spiritualium et carnalium*)? (3) Are sins distinguished in species by their causes? (4) Are sins distinguished in species by reference to those against whom one sins (*secundum eos in quos peccatur*)? (5) Are sins distinguished in species by the different degrees of guilt (*secundum diversitatem reatus*)? (6) Are sins distinguished in species by reference to omission and commission? (7) Are sins distinguished in species by reference to the different stages of a sin (*secundum diversum processum peccati*)? (8) Are sins distinguished in species by reference to excess and defect (*secundum abundantiam et defectum*)? (9) Are sins distinguished in species by their different circumstances (*secundum diversas circumstantias*)?

Article 1

Do sins differ in species according to their objects?

It seems that sins do not differ in species according to their objects (*non differant specie secundum obiecta*):

Objection 1: As was shown above (q. 18, a. 6), human acts are called ‘good’ or ‘bad’ mainly in relation to their end. Therefore, since, as has been explained (q. 21, a. 1 and q. 71, a. 1), a sin is nothing other than a man’s bad act, it seems that sins should be distinguished in species by their ends rather than by their objects.

Objection 2: Since badness is a privation, it is distinguished in species by the different species of opposites. But a sin is something bad in the genus of human acts. Therefore, sins are distinguished in species by opposites rather than by their objects.

Objection 3: If sins differed in species according to their objects, then it would be impossible to find specifically the same sin having diverse objects. But as Gregory points out in *Moralia* 34, pride (*superbia*) exists in both spiritual affairs and corporeal affairs; again, avarice (*avaritia*) exists with respect to different genera of things. Therefore, sins are not distinguished in species by their objects.

But contrary to this: A sin is “a word or deed or desire contrary to God’s law.” But words and deeds and desires are distinguished in species by their diverse objects, since, as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5), acts are distinguished by their objects. Therefore, sins are likewise distinguished in species by their objects.

I respond: As has been explained (q. 71, a. 6), two things come together for the nature of a sin, viz., (a) a voluntary act and (b) the act’s disorder, which exists because of its departure from God’s law (*quae est per recessum a lege Dei*). Now the first of these two things is related *per se* to the sinner, who intends to exercise such-and-such a voluntary act with respect to such-and-such a matter, whereas the second, viz., the act’s disorder, is related *per accidens* to the sinner’s intention, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “No one acts by intending the bad.”

Now it is clear that each thing receives its species in accord with what is *per se* and not in accord with what is *per accidens*, since what is *per accidens* lies outside the nature of the species. And so sins are distinguished in species by the voluntary acts rather than by the disorder that exists in the sin. But as was shown above (q. 18, a. 5), voluntary acts are distinguished in species by their objects. Hence, it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects.

Reply to objection 1: The end is what principally possesses the character of goodness, and so it is related to the act of willing, which is primordial in every sin, as an object. Hence, for sins to differ from one another according to their objects amounts to the same thing as for sins to differ from one another

according to their ends.

Reply to objection 2: A sin is not a pure privation, but is instead an act that is deprived of its due ordering. And so sins are distinguished in species according to the objects of the acts rather than according to opposites.

Again, even if they were distinguished by the virtues opposed to them, this would amount to the same thing; for as was established above (q. 60, a. 5), the virtues are distinguished in species by their objects.

Reply to objection 3: There is nothing to prevent one from finding in diverse things that differ in species or genus a single formal nature that belongs to the object and from which a sin receives its species. In this way, pride seeks to excel with respect to different matters, whereas avarice seeks an excessive amount (*abundantiam*) of what is accommodated to man's use.

Article 2

Is it appropriate to distinguish spiritual sins from carnal sins?

It seems inappropriate to distinguish spiritual sins from carnal sins:

Objection 1: In Galatians 5:19-21 the Apostle says, "The works of the flesh are obvious, viz., fornication (*fornicatio*), uncleanness (*immunditia*), immodesty (*impudicitia*), lust (*luxuria*), idolatry (*idolorum servitus*), sorcery (*veneficia*)," etc. From this it seems that all the kinds of sin are works of the flesh. But it is carnal sins that are being called "works of the flesh." Therefore, it is not the case that carnal sins should be distinguished from spiritual sins.

Objection 2: Whoever sins walks according to the flesh—this according to Romans 8:13 ("If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if you put to death the deeds of the flesh, you shall live"). But living or walking according to the flesh seems to pertain to the notion of a carnal sin. Therefore, all sins are carnal. Therefore, it is not the case that carnal sins should be distinguished from spiritual sins.

Objection 3: The higher part of the soul, i.e., the mind or reason (*mens vel ratio*) is called the 'spirit'—this according to Ephesians 4:23 ("Be renewed by the spirit of your mind," where 'spirit' is being used for 'reason', as a Gloss points out in that place). But every sin that is committed according to the flesh flows from reason through its consent, since, as will be explained below (q. 74, a. 7), it belongs to higher reason to consent to an act of sinning. Therefore, the same sins are both carnal and spiritual. Therefore, they should not be distinguished from one another.

Objection 4: If some sins are by their species carnal sins, then it seems that the best way to understand this is in regard to those sins by which someone sins against his own body (*quibus aliquis in corpus suum peccat*). But as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 6:18, "Every sin whatsoever that a man commits exists outside of his body, but the one who fornicates sins against his own body." Therefore, fornication alone would be a carnal sin—even though in Ephesians 5:3 the Apostle also numbers avarice among the carnal sins.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 31 Gregory says, "Five of the seven capital vices are spiritual, and two are carnal."

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), sins take their species from their objects. But every sin consists in a desire for some changeable good that is desired in a disordered way, and, as a result, one takes pleasure in it in a disordered way once it is had.

Now as is clear from what has gone before (q. 31, a. 3), there are two sorts of pleasure:

One of them is *pleasure that belongs to the soul* (*delectatio animalis*); this sort of pleasure is consummated solely in the apprehension of a thing which is had in response to a longing (*rei ad votum habitae*), and it can also be called 'spiritual pleasure'—as, for instance, when someone delights in human

praise or something of that sort.

The other sort of pleasure is *corporeal* or *natural pleasure* (*delectatio coporalis sive naturalis*); this sort of pleasure is brought to completion within the corporeal sense of touch itself, and it can also be called ‘carnal pleasure’.

So, then, those sins that are brought to completion in spiritual pleasure are called ‘spiritual sins’; on the other hand, those sins that are brought to completion in carnal pleasure are called ‘carnal sins’, e.g., gluttony, which is brought to completion in the pleasure of food, and lust, which is brought to completion in the pleasure of sex.

Hence, in 2 Corinthians 7:1 the Apostle says, “Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit.”

Reply to objection 1: As a Gloss on the same passage says, the vices in question are called works of the flesh “not because they are brought to completion in the pleasure of the flesh; instead, ‘flesh’ is being used here for a man who, as long as he lives on his own (*secundum se*), is said to live ‘according to the flesh’.” Augustine says the same thing in *De Civitate Dei* 14. The reason for this is that every defect of human reason has its beginning in some way from the carnal sensory power.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: Even in the case of carnal sins there is some spiritual act, viz., an act of reason. However, the sins in question have an end from which they are named, and that end is carnal pleasure (*delectatio carnis*)

Reply to objection 4: As a Gloss on the same passage says, “In the sin of fornication the soul is subservient to the body in a special way, insofar as a man is not at liberty to think of anything else at that very moment.” By contrast, even though the pleasure of gluttony is carnal, it does not absorb reason in this same way.

An alternative reply is that in the sin of fornication a certain sort of injury is inflicted on one’s body for as long as the body is defiled in a disordered way (*dum inordinate maculatur*). And so it is through this sin alone that a man sins against the body in a special way. On the other hand, ‘avarice’, which is counted among the carnal sins, is being used for adultery, which is the unjust usurpation of another’s wife. Or one could claim that the thing in which an avaricious man takes pleasure is a certain sort of corporeal thing and that it is in this respect that avarice is counted among the carnal sins. However, the pleasure itself belongs to the spirit and not to the flesh, and so according to Gregory avarice is a spiritual sin.

Article 3

Are sins distinguished in species according to their causes?

It seems that sins are distinguished in species according to their causes:

Objection 1: A thing has its species from the same thing that it has its *esse* from. But sins have *esse* from their causes. Therefore, they also receive their species from their causes. Therefore, sins differ in species according to the diversity of their causes.

Objection 2: Among the other causes, it is the material cause that seems to have the least relevance to the species. But in the case of a sin the object is like a material cause. Therefore, since sins are distinguished in species according to their objects, it seems that, *a fortiori*, sins are distinguished in species according to the other types of cause as well.

Objection 3: In his commentary on Psalm 79:17 (“Things set on fire and dug under”), Augustine says, “Every sin stems from a fear that abases one in a bad way or from a love that inflames one in a bad way.” Also, 1 John 2:16 says, “Everything that is in the world is the concupiscence of the

flesh (*concupiscentia carnis*), or the concupiscence of the eyes (*concupiscentia oculorum*), or pride of life (*superbia vitae*).” But as Augustine points out in *Super Ioannem*, something is said to be “in the world” because of sin, insofar as it is those who love the world who are being signified by the name ‘world’. Again, in *Moralia* 31 Gregory distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. But all divisions of this sort have to do with the causes of sins. Therefore, it seems that sins differ in species by the diversity of their causes.

But contrary to this: On this view all sins would belong to a single species, since they are caused by a single cause. For Ecclesiasticus 10:15 says, “The source of every sin is pride,” and 1 Timothy 6:10 says, “The root of all evils is avarice (*cupiditas*).” But it is obvious that there are diverse species of sins. Therefore, it is not the case that sins are distinguished in species according to the diversity of their causes.

I respond: Since there are four types of causes, they are attributed to different things in different ways. For the formal and material causes have properly to do with the substance of a thing, and so substances are distinguished in species and in genus according to their form and matter.

On the other hand, the agent cause and the end have to do directly with movement and action, and so movements and actions are distinguished in species according to causes of this sort, though in different ways. For active natural principles are always determined to the same acts, and so in the case of natural acts diverse species are derived not only from the objects, viz., the ends or termini, but also from the active principles. For instance, to heat and to cool are distinguished in species by [the principles] *hot* and *cold*.

However, in the case of voluntary acts, including sinful acts, the active principles are not by necessity directed toward a single outcome (*non se habent ex necessitate ad unum*), and so diverse species of sin can proceed from a single active or moving principle. For instance, from “a fear that humbles one in a bad way” it can come about that a man steals or that he kills or that he deserts a flock that has been entrusted to him; and these same acts can proceed from love.

Hence, it is clear that sins differ in species not by their diverse active or moving causes, but only by the diversity of their final causes. Now the end is the will’s object, since it was shown above (q. 1, a. 3 and q. 18, a. 6) that human acts have their species from their end.

Reply to objection 1: Since, in the case of voluntary acts, their active principles are not determined to a single outcome, they are not able to produce human acts unless the act of willing is determined to a single outcome by the act of intending the end (*non sufficiunt producendum humanos actos nisi determinetur voluntas ad unum per intentionem finis*); this is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 9. And so both the *esse* and the species of a sin are brought to completion by the end.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as the objects are compared to the exterior acts, they have the character of a *matter-with-respect-to-which* (*materia circa quam*), but insofar as they are compared to the will’s interior act, they have the character of an end, and it is in light of the latter that they give the act its species.

Again, even though, as is explained in *Physics* 5 and *Ethics* 10, insofar as the objects are the *matter-with-respect-to-which*, they have the character of termini by which the movements are specified, it is nonetheless the case that the termini of a movement likewise give species to the movements insofar as they have the character of an end.

Reply to objection 3: These divisions of sins are put forward not in order to distinguish species of sins, but rather to make clear the diverse causes of sins.

Article 4

Is it appropriate to divide sin into sins against God, sins against one's neighbor, and sins against oneself ?

It seems inappropriate to divide sin into sins against God, sins against one's neighbor, and sins against oneself (*in Deum, in proximum, et in seipsum*):

Objection 1: What is common to every sin should not be posited as one part of a division of sins. But it is common to every sin that it is against God (*contra Deum*), since, as was explained above (q. 71, a. 6), it is posited in the definition of a sin that a sin is "contrary to God's law." Therefore, 'sin against God' should not be posited as one part of a division of sins.

Objection 2: Every division should be made through opposites. But the three types of sin under discussion are not opposites, since everyone who sins against his neighbor is also sinning against himself and against God. Therefore, it is inappropriate for sin to be divided by the three parts in question.

Objection 3: Things that exist extrinsically do not confer a species. But God and our neighbor exist outside of us. Therefore, sins are not distinguished in species by them. Therefore, it is inappropriate for sins to be divided into these three parts.

But contrary to this: When distinguishing sins in *De Summo Bono*, Isidore says, "A man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbor."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 71, a. 1), a sin is a disordered act. Now in a man there should be three sorts of order:

The first is in comparison to *the rule of reason*, viz., in the sense that all our actions and passions ought to be measured by the rule of reason. The second order is in comparison to *the rule of divine law*, by which a man ought to be directed in all things. And if man were naturally a solitary animal, then these two orders would be sufficient. However, since, as *Politics* 1 proves, man is naturally a political and social animal, it is necessary that there be a third order by which a man is ordered *with respect to the other men* he has to live together with.

Now the second of these orders contains the first and goes beyond it. For whatever is contained under the order of reason is contained under the order of God Himself, but some of the things contained under the order of God Himself exceed human reason, e.g., those things that belong to the Faith and are owed to God alone. Hence, someone who sins in such matters is said to *sin against God*, e.g., the heretic, the sacrilegious man, and the blasphemer.

Similarly, the [first] order includes the third and goes beyond it. For in all the matters in which we are ordered toward our neighbor, we have to be directed by the rule of reason, but in certain matters we are directed by reason with respect to just ourselves and not with respect to our neighbor. And when he sins in such matters, a man is said to *sin against himself*, as is clear in the case of the gluttonous man, the lustful man, and the prodigal man. By contrast, when a man sins in those matters in which he is ordered toward his neighbor, he is said to *sin against his neighbor*, as is clear in the case of the thief and the murderer.

Now the matters in which a man is ordered toward God, toward his neighbor, and toward himself are diverse. Hence, this distinction among sins exists because of their objects, by which the species of sin are diversified. Hence, this distinction among sins is, properly speaking, in accord with the diverse species of sin. For it is likewise the case that the virtues to which the sins are opposed are distinguished in species by this sort of difference, since it is obvious from what has been said (q. 62, a. 1 and q. 66, aa. 4 and 6) that by the theological virtues a man is ordered toward God, whereas by temperance and fortitude he is ordered toward himself, and by justice he is ordered toward his neighbor.

Reply to objection 1: To sin against God, in the sense that the order that is directed toward God includes every human order, is common to every sin. But in the sense in which God's order exceeds the

other two orders, *sin against God* is a special genus of sin.

Reply to objection 2: When two things which are such that the one includes the other are distinguished from one another, then the distinction is thought of as being made not because the one is *contained in* the other, but because the one *exceeds* the other. This is clear with the division of numbers and of shapes. For instance, a triangle is divided off from a quadrangle not because it is contained in the latter, but because it is exceeded by it. And the same holds in the case of the numbers *three* and *four*.

Reply to objection 3: Even though God and neighbor are exterior to the sinner himself, they are not extraneous to the act of sinning. Rather, they are related to the act as its proper objects.

Article 5

Does the division of sins according to the degree of guilt—as, e.g., when sin is divided into mortal sin and venial sin—make for a diversity of species?

It seems that the division of sins according to their degree of guilt (*secundum reatum*)—as, e.g., when sin is divided into mortal sin and venial sin—makes for a diversity of species:

Objection 1: Things that are infinitely different from one another cannot belong to a single species or even to a single genus. But venial sin and mortal sin are infinitely different from one another, since venial sin deserves a temporal punishment, whereas mortal sin deserves an eternal punishment. But a punishment's duration corresponds to the degree of guilt (*mensura poenae respondet quantitati culpa*)—this according to Deuteronomy 25:2 (“According to the measure of the crime shall the measure also of the blows be”). Therefore, venial sin and mortal sin do not even belong to the same genus, not to mention the same species.

Objection 2: Some sins, e.g., homicide or adultery, are mortal by their genus, whereas other sins, e.g., engaging in idle conversation or excessive laughter, are venial by their genus. Therefore, venial sins and mortal sins differ in species.

Objection 3: A sin is related to a punishment in the same way that a virtuous act is related to a reward. But the reward is the end of a virtuous act. Therefore, the punishment is likewise the end of a sin. But as has been explained (a. 3), sins are distinguished in species according to their ends. Therefore, they are likewise distinguished in species according to the degree of punishment deserved for them (*secundum reatum poenae*).

But contrary to this: The things that constitute a species, e.g., the specific differences, are prior to the species. But punishment follows upon a sin as its effect (*poena sequitur culpam sicut effectum eius*). Therefore, sins do not differ in species according to the degree of punishment deserved for them.

I respond: Two sorts of differences are found among things that differ in species:

One sort of difference *constitutes* the diversity of the species, and this sort of difference is never found except in diverse species, e.g., *rational* and *non-rational*, *living* and *non-living*.

However, there is another sort of difference that *follows upon* the diversity of the species, and even if this sort of difference follows upon a diversity of species in some cases, it can nonetheless in other cases be found within the same species. For instance, *white* and *black* follow upon the diverse species *crow* and *swan*, but this difference is found within the same species *man*.

Therefore, one should reply that the differences *venial* and *mortal* as applied to *sin*—or any other difference that is taken from the degree of guilt—cannot be differences that *constitute* a diversity of species. For what is *per accidens* never constitutes a species. But as is clear from *Physics* 2, what lies outside the agent's intention is *per accidens*. And it is obvious that punishment lies outside the sinner's intention. Hence, the punishment is related to the sin *per accidens* from the perspective of the sinner himself (*poena per accidens se habet ad peccatum ex parte ipsius peccantis*). Instead, it is ordered

toward the sin from without, viz., from the justice of the judge who inflicts diverse punishments according to the diverse status of the sins. Hence, the difference that stems from the degree of punishment deserved for the sins can *follow upon* the diverse species of sins but does not *constitute* the diversity of species.

Now the difference between *venial sin* and *mortal sin* follows upon the differences in disorderedness that bring the character of sinfulness to completion (*quae complet rationem peccati*). For there are two sorts of disorderedness, the one of which stems from removing the source of the order (*per subtractionem principii ordinis*) and the other of which, while preserving the source of the order, is a disorderedness with respect to things that come after the source—just as, in an animal body, a disordered condition (*inordinatio complexionis*) sometimes progresses to the point of destroying the principle of life, and this is *death*, whereas, given that the principle of life is preserved, there is sometimes a disorder in the humors, and in that case there is a *sickness*.

Now the source of all order in moral matters is the ultimate end, which, as *Ethics* 7 says, bears the same relation to matters of action that an indemonstrable principle bears to speculative matters. Hence, when the soul is disordered by sin to the point of turning away from the ultimate end (*usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine*), viz., God, to whom we are united through charity, then there is a *mortal sin*, whereas when there is a disorder without a turning away from God (*citra aversionem a Deo*), then it is a *venial sin*. For just as, in the case of corporeal things, the disorder of death, which occurs through the removal of the principle of life, is irreparable through nature, whereas the disorder of sickness can be repaired because the principle of life is preserved, so, too, something similar occurs in matters that pertain to the soul.

For in speculative matters someone who is mistaken about the principles is unpersuadable, whereas someone who makes a mistake while preserving the principles can be brought back through the principles themselves. Similarly, in matters of action someone who in sinning turns away from his ultimate end has an irreparable fall as far as the nature of his sin is concerned, and so he is said to sin mortally and to deserve to be punished eternally. On the other hand, someone who sins without turning away from God is by the very nature of his sin disordered in a reparable way, since the principle is preserved, and so he is said to sin venially. That is to say, he does not sin in such a way as to merit an interminable punishment.

Reply to objection 1: Mortal sin and venial sin differ infinitely from one another with respect to the turning-away (*ex parte aversionis*), but not with respect to the turning-toward (*non autem ex parte conversione*) by which one is related to the object that is the source of the sin's species. Hence, there is nothing to prevent mortal and venial sins from belonging to the same species. For instance, the first movement in the genus *adultery* is a venial sin; and idle conversation, which is a venial sin most of the time, can also be a mortal sin.

Reply to objection 2: From the fact that some sins are mortal by their genus and some sins are venial by their genus it follows that the difference between mortal sins and venial sins *follows upon* the diversity of sins in species and does not *cause* that diversity. Moreover, as has been explained, this sort of difference can likewise be found in sins that belong to the same species.

Reply to objection 3: The reward is part of the intention of the one who performs a meritorious act or who acts virtuously, but the punishment is not part of the sinner's intention (*non est de intentione peccantis*). Instead, it is contrary to his will. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Article 6

Do sins of commission differ in species from sins of omission?

It seems that sins of commission differ in species from sins of omission:

Objection 1: *Offense (delictum)* is divided off against *sin (peccatum)*—this according to Ephesians 2:1 (“When you were dead in your offenses and sins”). And a Gloss for this passage explains, “‘Offenses’, i.e., not doing what was commanded, and ‘sins’, i.e., doing what was forbidden.” From this it is clear that ‘offense’ means a sin of omission and ‘sin’ means a sin of commission. Therefore, they differ in species, since they are divided off as diverse species by opposites.

Objection 2: It belongs *per se* to a sin that it is contrary to God’s law, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 71, a.6), this is part of the definition of a sin. But in God’s law there are some affirmative precepts that sins of omission are contrary to and some negative precepts that sins of commission are contrary to. Therefore, sins of omission differ in species from sins of commission.

Objection 3: Commission and omission differ as an affirmation and a negation. But it cannot be the case that the affirmation and the negation belong to the same species, since a negation does not have a species; for as the Philosopher says, “There is neither a species nor a difference for *non-being*.” Therefore, omissions and commissions cannot belong to the same species.

But contrary to this: Omissions and commissions are found within the same species of sin. For instance, an avaricious man both (a) seizes what belongs to another, which is a sin of commission, and (b) does not give what is his own to those he ought to give it to, which is a sin of omission. Therefore, omission and commission do not differ in species.

I respond: There are two sorts of differences found among sins, the one *material* and the other *formal*. The *material* difference is associated with the natural species of a sinful act, whereas the *formal* difference is associated with the act’s being ordered toward a single proper end, i.e., toward its proper object. Hence, there are some acts that differ in species *materially* and yet belong *formally* to the same species of sin because they are ordered toward the same thing. For instance, even though cutting someone’s throat, stoning him, and stabbing him differ in species as regards their *natural* species (*secundum speciem naturae*), they all belong to the single species *homicide*.

Therefore, if we are talking *materially* about the species of sins of omission and sins of commission, then they differ in species—though this is to speak about species in a broad sense in which a negation or privation can have a species. On the other hand, if we are talking *formally* about the species of sins of omission or commission, then they do not differ in species, since they are ordered toward the same thing and proceed from the same motive. For instance, it is in order to accumulate money that an avaricious man both (a) steals and (b) fails to give what he ought to give. Similarly, it is in order to satisfy his palate that the gluttonous man both (a) eats too much and (b) omits an obligatory fast. And we see the same thing in other cases as well. For among real things a negation is always based upon an affirmation that is in some sense its cause. Hence, among natural things, the fact that a fire gives heat to something has the same explanation (*est eiusdem rationis*) as the fact that it does not make the thing cold.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the division in question, made by reference to *omission* and *commission*, yields only diverse *material* species and not diverse *formal* species (*non est secundum diversas formales species sed materiales tantum*).

Reply to objection 2: Diverse affirmative and negative precepts had to be proposed within God’s law in order that men might be introduced to virtue step by step—first by abstaining from what is bad, which we are led to by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing what is good, which we are led to by the affirmative precepts. And so the affirmative and negative precepts do not pertain to different virtues, but instead pertain to diverse degrees of [the same] virtue. As a result, they do not have to be opposed to sins that are diverse from one another in species.

Moreover, a sin does not have its species from the turning-away (*ex parte aversionis*), since on this score it is a negation or privation; instead, a sin has its species from the turning-toward (*ex parte conversionis*) insofar as this turning-toward is an act.

Hence, sins are not diversified in species by the diverse precepts of the law.

Reply to objection 3: This objection has its source in the material diversity of the species.

Note, moreover, that even if a negation does not properly speaking belong to a species, it is nonetheless constituted in a species by being traced back to the affirmation that it follows upon.

Article 7

Is it appropriate to divide sins into sins of the heart, sins of the mouth, and sinful deeds?

It seems inappropriate to divide sins into sins of the heart, sins of the mouth, and sinful deeds (*in peccatum cordis, oris, et operis*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine posits three stages (*gradus*) of sin: The first occurs “when the carnal senses offer some enticement,” i.e., a sin of thought (*peccatum cogitationis*). The second stage occurs “when one is content just with taking pleasure in the thought.” The third stage occurs when one decides by his consent to do something.” But these three stages all pertain to sins of the heart. Therefore, it is inappropriate to posit *sins of the heart* as a single genus of sin.

Objection 2: In *Moralia* 4 Gregory posits four stages of sin; The first is “a sin hidden in the heart.” The second is “when the sin is made public exteriorly.” The third is “when the sin is performed habitually (*consuetudine*).” The fourth is “when the man proceeds either to a presumption of God’s mercy or to despair.” Here, sinful deeds are not distinguished from sins of the mouth, and two other stages of sin are added. Therefore, the first division mentioned above is inappropriate.

Objection 3: A sin cannot exist in the mouth or in a deed unless it existed beforehand in the heart. Therefore, these sins do not differ in species. Therefore, they should not be divided off against one another.

But contrary to this: In *Super Ezechiel* Jerome says, “There are three general sorts of offenses (*delicta*) to which the human race is subject. For we sin either in thought or in word or in deed.”

I respond: There are two ways in which given things differ from one another in species: (a) first, because both have a *complete species*, in the way that a horse and an ox differ in species; (b) second, insofar as diverse species are associated with the *diverse stages* within some generation or movement, in the way that, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, the act of building (*aedificatio*) is the complete generation of a house, whereas the act of laying the foundation and the act of erecting the walls are incomplete species (*collocatio fundamenti et erectio parietis sunt species incompletae*).

So, then, sin is not divided by *sin of the mouth*, *sin of the heart*, and *sinful deed* in the sense of being divided by diverse *complete species*. For the consummation of a sin lies in the deed, and because of this the sinful deed (*peccatum operis*) has a complete species. But the first beginning of the sin has, as it were, a foundation in the heart, whereas the second stage exists in the mouth insofar as a man readily breaks out into speech in order to manifest the conception of his heart, and the third stage then exists in the consummation of the deed. And so the three of them differ as the diverse stages of a sin.

However, it is clear that all three belong to a single *complete species* of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For instance, given the fact that someone who is angry desires retribution, he is first disturbed in his heart, and, second, he breaks out into contentious words, and, third, he proceeds to his injurious deeds. And the same thing is clear in the case of lust, as well as with every other sin.

Reply to objection 1: All sins of the heart agree in being hidden, and because of this ‘sin of the heart’ is posited as a single stage. Yet this stage is itself divided into three, viz., the stage of thought, the stage of pleasure, and the stage of consent.

Reply to objection 2: Sins of the mouth and sinful deeds agree in being made manifest, and it is because of this that they are counted as one by Gregory. Jerome, on the other hand, distinguishes them from one another because in the case of sins of the mouth it is the manifestation alone that is principally intended, whereas in a sinful deed what is principally intended is the fulfillment of the heart’s interior

conception, and the manifestation comes along as a consequence.

On the other hand, habituation and despair are stages that follow after the sin's species is complete, in the way that adolescence and young adulthood (*adolescentia et iuventus*) follow after human generation is complete.

Reply to objection 3: The sin of the heart and the sin of the mouth are distinguished from the sinful deed not when they are all joined together simultaneously, but insofar as each of them is found existing on its own (*per se*). In the same way, a part of a movement is not distinguished from the whole movement when the movement is continuous; rather, it is distinguished from the whole movement only when that movement stops in the middle.

Article 8

Do excess and defect make for diverse species of sin?

It seems that excess (*superabundantia*) and defect (*defectus*) do not make for diverse species of sin:

Objection 1: Excess and defect differ as *more* and *less*. But *more* and *less* do not make for diverse species. Therefore, excess and defect do not make for diverse species.

Objection 2: Just as, in matters of action, a sin results from a departure from the rectitude of reason, so too, in speculative matters, falsity results from a departure from the truth of reality. But the species of falsity are not diversified by someone's asserting that there is more or there is less than exists in reality. Therefore, the species of sin are likewise not diversified by someone's departing by excess or by defect from the rectitude of reason (*ex hoc quod recedit a rectitudine rationis in plus vel in minus*).

Objection 3: As Porphyry says, "It is not the case that a single species is constituted from two species." But excess and defect are united in a single sin; for instance, some men are simultaneously ungenerous and prodigal, and of these two being ungenerous is a sin of defect, whereas being prodigal is a sin of excess. Therefore, excess and defect do make for diverse species of sin.

But contrary to this: Contraries differ in species, since, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, "Contrariety is a difference in form." But vices that differ according to excess and defect are contraries, in the way that being ungenerous is contrary to being prodigal. Therefore, they differ in species.

I respond: Given that a sin involves two things, viz., (a) the act itself and (b) its disorderliness in receding from the order of reason and of God's law, the sin's species is taken not from the side of the disorderliness—which, as has been explained (a. 1), falls outside the sinner's intention—but rather from the side of the act itself insofar as it is terminated in the object that the sinner's intention is directed toward. And so whenever there are diverse motives inclining one's intention toward sinning, there are diverse species of sin.

Now it is clear that the motive for sinning in the case of sins that involve excess is not the same as in the case of sins that involve defect; in fact, the motives are contrary. For instance, the motive in a sin of intemperance is the love of bodily pleasures, whereas the motive in a sin of insensibility is a hatred for those pleasures. Hence, sins of this sort not only differ in species but are also contrary to one another.

Reply to objection 1: Even if *more* and *less* are not a cause of diversity among species, they nonetheless sometimes follow upon diverse species insofar as they stem from different forms—as, for instance, if one says that fire is lighter than air. Hence, in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says that those who have denied that there are diverse species of friendship because these diverse species are predicated in accord with *more* and *less* "have put their trust in an insufficient indicator."

And the way in which exceeding what is in accord with reason, or falling short of it (*superexcedere rationem vel deficere ab ea*), belongs to sins that are diverse in species is that the sins follow upon diverse motives.

Reply to objection 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason, and so it is not the case that sins of excess and defect belong to the same species because they depart from the same rectitude of reason. However, someone who says what is false sometimes intends to hide the truth, and so in this regard it does not matter whether he says more or says less.

On the other hand, if departing from the truth lies beyond the speaker's intention, then it is clear that someone may be moved by diverse motives to say more or to say less, and in this regard there are diverse kinds of falsity. This is clear in the case of the braggart, who goes to excess in saying what is false out of a desire for glory, and in the case of the cheat, who says little in order to evade paying his debts. In this sense, it is even the case that certain false opinions are contrary to one another.

Reply to objection 3: Someone can be both prodigal and ungenerous in different respects—as when someone is ungenerous in taking what is not due to him and prodigal in giving away what he does not owe. But there is nothing to prevent contraries from existing in the same thing in different respects.

Article 9

Are vices and sins diversified in species by diverse circumstances?

It seems that vices and sins are diversified in species by diverse circumstances:

Objection 1: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Badness arises from each single defect.” But singular defects are corruptions of singular circumstances. Therefore, singular species of sin follow from singular corrupted circumstances.

Objection 2: Sins are a certain sort of human act. But as was established above (q. 18, a. 10), human acts sometimes take their species from the circumstances. Therefore, sins differ in species to the extent that diverse circumstances are corrupted.

Objection 3: Diverse species of gluttony are assigned by the words contained in the following verse: “Too quickly, too sumptuously, too much, too eagerly, too fastidiously (*praepropere, laute, nimis, ardentius, studiose*).” But these involve diverse circumstances: ‘too quickly’ means ‘before it is necessary’, ‘too much’ means ‘more than is necessary’, and the same thing is clear in the other cases. Therefore, the species of sin are diversified by diverse circumstances.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 and 5 the Philosopher says that *individual* vices sin by acting “more than is necessary and when it is not necessary,” and so on for all the other circumstances. Therefore, it is not in this way that the species of sin are diversified.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 8), whenever there is another motive for sinning, there is another species of sin, since the motive for sinning is the end and the object.

Now it sometimes happens that the same motive exists in the corruption of diverse circumstances; for instance, it is by the same motive that an ungenerous man is moved to take something *when* he should not and *where* he should not and to take *more than* he should, and so on for the other circumstances. For he does all this because of his disordered desire for accumulating money. And in such cases the corruption of diverse circumstances does not make for diverse species of sin; instead, it belongs to one and the same species of sin.

By contrast, it sometimes happens that the corruption of diverse circumstances proceeds from diverse motives. For instance, the fact that someone eats too quickly can stem from the fact that the man cannot tolerate a delay in eating because he easily becomes dehydrated (*propter facilem consumptionem humiditatis*), whereas the fact that he desires an immoderate amount of food can occur because he has a natural power capable of converting vast amounts of food; and the fact that he desires dainty foods happens because of his desire for the pleasure associated with food. Hence, in such cases the corruption of diverse circumstances makes for diverse species of sin.

Reply to objection 1: Badness as such is a privation, and so it is diversified in species in the way that the corresponding dispositions (*ea quae privantur*) are diversified in species—just as in the case of any other privation. But as has been explained (a. 1), a sin receives its species not from the side of the privation, i.e., the turning-away, but rather from the act's turning toward its object.

Reply to objection 2: Circumstances never transfer an act to another species except when there is another motive.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, there are diverse motives for the diverse species of gluttony.

QUESTION 73

The Relation of Sins to One Another

Next we have to consider the relation of sins to one another (*de comparatione peccatorum ad invicem*). On this topic there are ten questions: (1) Are all sins and vices connected? (2) Are all sins and vices equal? (3) Does the gravity of sins have to do with their objects? (4) Does the gravity of sins have to do with the dignity of the virtues that the sins are opposed to? (5) Are carnal sins more grave than spiritual sins? (6) Does the gravity of sins have to do with the causes of the sins? (7) Does the gravity of sins have to do with their circumstances? (8) Does the gravity of sins have to do with the amount of harm they inflict? (9) Does the gravity of sins have to do with the status of the person who is sinned against? (10) Is a sin aggravated by the greatness of the person (*magnitudo personae*) who commits the sin?

Article 1

Are all sins connected?

It seems that all sins are connected:

Objection 1: James 2:10 says, “Whoever has kept the whole law, but offends in one point, becomes guilty of all.” But being guilty of breaking all the commandments of the law is the same thing as having all sins, since, as Ambrose puts it, “A sin is a transgression against God’s law and disobedience with respect to the heavenly commandments.” Therefore, whoever sins by one sin is the subject of all sins.

Objection 2: Every sin excludes the virtue that is opposed to it. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 65, a. 1), whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all. Therefore, whoever sins by one sin is deprived of all the virtues. But whoever lacks a virtue has the vice that is opposed to it. Therefore, whoever has one sin has all sins.

Objection 3: As was established above (q. 65, aa. 1-2), all the virtues that agree in a single source are connected. But just as virtues agree in a single source, so too do sins; for as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, just as “the love of God, which builds up the City of God,” is the source and root of all virtues, so too “the love of self, which builds up the City of Babylon,” is the root of all sins. Therefore, all vices and sins are likewise connected in such a way that whoever has one of them has all of them.

But contrary to this: As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, certain vices are contrary to one another. But it is impossible for contraries to exist in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another.

I respond: A agent’s intention in acting virtuously (*intentio agentis secundum virtutem*) is related to his following reason differently from the way in which a sinner’s intention is related to his deviating from reason.

For an agent’s intention in acting virtuously is to follow the rule of reason, and so in the case of all virtues the intention is directed toward the same thing. Because of this, as was explained above (q. 65, a. 1), all the virtues have a connection with one another in right reason with respect to actions, i.e., in prudence (*in ratione recta agibilium quae est prudentia*).

By contrast, a sinner’s intention is not directed toward receding from what is in accord with reason, but tends instead toward some desirable good, and it is from this good that the intention takes its species. Now goods of this sort, toward which the sinner’s intention is directed as it departs from reason, are diverse and have no connection with one another; in fact, sometimes they are even contraries. Therefore, since sins and vices get their species from what they are turned toward, it is clear that sins have no connection with one another as regards what brings their species to completion. For unlike what occurs

in the case of virtues that are connected, in sinning one does not pass from multiplicity to unity, but instead recedes from unity into multiplicity (*non peccatum committitur in accedendo a multitudine ad unitatem, sed potius in recedendo ab unitate ad multitudinem*).

Reply to objection 1: James is not talking about sin insofar as it involves a turning-toward (*loquitur de peccato non ex parte conversionis*), in accord with which, as has been explained (q. 72, a. 1), sins are distinguished from one another; instead, he is talking about sin insofar as it is a turning-away, viz., insofar as in sinning a man departs from the commandment of the law. Now as he himself says in the same place, all the commandments of the law come from one and the same source, and so God hates the same thing in every sin. And it is in light of this that he says that “whoever offends in one point becomes guilty of all,” viz., since in sinning by one sin a man incurs guilt deserving of punishment because he holds God in contempt, and it is in the contempt of God that the guilt of all sins has its source.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 71, a. 4), it is not the case that the opposed virtue is removed by each sinful act. For a venial sin does not remove a virtue; and while a mortal sin removes *infused* virtue insofar as the sinner turns away from God, even an act of mortal sin does not remove the habit of an *acquired* virtue.

However, if the acts are multiplied to the point that a contrary habit is generated, then the habit of an acquired virtue is excluded. And once it is excluded, prudence is excluded, since when a man acts contrary to any virtue, he acts contrary to prudence. But as was explained above (q. 58, a. 4 and q. 65, a. 1), without prudence no moral virtue can exist. And so, as a result, all the moral virtues are excluded as regards the complete and formal *esse* of a virtue that the virtues have insofar as they participate in prudence—though inclinations toward acts of those virtues remain without having the character of a virtue.

But it does not follow that because of this a man incurs all vices or sins. First of all, more than one virtue is opposed to a given virtue, so that a virtue can be eliminated by one of them even if none of the others is present. Second, as has been explained (q. 71, a. 1), a sin is directly opposed to a virtue as regards the virtue’s inclination toward an act, and so as long as some virtuous inclinations remain, one cannot claim that the man has the opposed vices or sins.

Reply to objection 3: Love for God is integrative (*congregativus*) insofar as it leads a man’s affections from many things to one thing, and this is why the virtues, which are caused by loving God, have a connection with one another.

By contrast, love of self scatters (*disgregat*) man’s affections in diverse directions, viz., insofar as a man loves himself by desiring for himself temporal goods that are varied and diverse, and this is why sins and vices, which are caused by loving oneself, are not connected with one another.

Article 2

Are all sins equal?

It seems that all sins are equal:

Objection 1: To sin is to do what is not permitted. But to do what is not permitted is blamed in one and the same way in all cases (*uno et eodem modo in omnibus reprehenditur*). Therefore, to sin is blamed in the one and the same way. Therefore, it is not the case that one sin is more grave than another.

Objection 2: Every sin consists in a man’s transgressing the rule of reason, which is related to human acts in the way that a linear ruler is related to corporeal things. Therefore, to sin is like crossing a line. But crossing a line happens in a single way and equally, regardless of whether one departs farther from the line or stays close by, since privations do not admit of *more* and *less*. Therefore, all sins are equal.

Objection 3: Sins are opposed to virtues. But as Tully claims in *Paradoxa*, all virtues are equal. Therefore, all sins are equal.

But contrary to this: At John 19:11 our Lord says, “He who handed me over to you has the greater sin.” And yet it is clear that Pilate had some sin. Therefore, one sin is greater than another.

I respond: The Stoics held the position, adopted by Tully in *Paradoxa*, that all sins are equal. And this position is the source of the error of certain heretics who, claiming that all sins are equal, assert that all the punishments of hell are likewise equal.

As far as one can tell from what Tully says, the Stoics were moved to make this claim because they were thinking of a sin only as a privation, i.e. only insofar as it involves a departure from reason (*recessus a ratione*). Hence, believing that absolutely no privation is susceptible to *more* and *less*, they claimed that all sins are equal.

But if one considers the matter carefully, he will find that there are two kinds of privation:

Some privations are *simple* and *pure* privations, and they consist, as it were, in something’s *having been corrupted* (*consistit quasi in corruptum esse*), in the way that death is the privation of life and in the way that darkness is the privation of light. Privations of this sort do not admit of *more* and *less*, since nothing is left of the opposed disposition. Hence, someone is no less dead on the first day of death or the third day or the fourth day than he is after a year, when his corpse has decayed. And, similarly, a house is no darker if the lamp is covered with several shades than it would be if it were covered with only one shade that shut out all the light.

However, there are other privations that are *not simple* but retain something of the opposed disposition. This sort of privation consists in something’s *being in the process of being corrupted* rather than in its *having been corrupted* (*consistit in corrumpi quam in corruptum esse*). An example is a sickness, which undermines the appropriate balance of the humors (*privat debitam commensurationem humorum*) but in such a way that something of that balance remains; otherwise, the animal would not remain alive. The same holds for deformity (*turpitude*) and other conditions of this sort. Now privations of this latter sort admit of *more* and *less* on the part of what remains of the contrary disposition (*ex parte eius quod remanet de habitu contrario*). For with a sickness or deformity, it matters a great deal whether the departure from the appropriate balance of the humors or the bodily members is greater or smaller.

Something similar should be said of vices and sins. For in their case the appropriate measure of reason is absent in such a way that the order of reason is not entirely destroyed; otherwise, as *Ethics* 4 puts it, “If the badness is complete, it destroys itself.” For the substance of the act, or the agent’s affections, would not be able to remain unless something of the order of reason remained. And so it is greatly relevant to the gravity of a sin whether it departs to a greater or a lesser degree from the rectitude of reason. And accordingly one should claim that it is not the case that all sins are equal.

Reply to objection 1: It because of the disorderedness (*deordinatio*) had by sins that it is not permitted to commit them. Hence, sins that contain a greater disorderedness are more impermissible (*magis illicita*) and, as a result, they are more grave.

Reply to objection 2: This argument proceeds on the assumption that a sin is a pure privation.

Reply to objection 3: The virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same way. However, one virtue exceeds another in dignity according to its species, and, as was explained above (q. 66, aa. 1-2), one man is likewise more virtuous than another within the same species of virtue.

Yet even if all the virtues were equal, it would not follow that the vices are all equal. For the virtues have a connection with one another, whereas vices or sins do not.

Article 3

Does the gravity of sins vary according to their objects?

It seems that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects.:

Objection 1: The gravity of a sin has to do with a *mode* or *quality* of the sin itself. But the object is the *matter* of the sin itself. Therefore, the gravity of sins does not vary according to their diverse objects.

Objection 2: The gravity of a sin is the intensity of its badness. But a sin has the character of badness not because it turns toward its proper object, which is a certain desirable good, but rather because it turns away [from reason and from God]. Therefore, the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects.

Objection 3: Sins that have diverse objects belong to diverse genera. But as *Physics* 7 proves, things that belong to diverse genera are not comparable with one another. Therefore, it is not because of the diversity of their objects that one sin is more grave than another.

But contrary to this: As is clear from what was said above (q. 72, a. 1), sins take their species from their objects. But one sin is more grave than another because of its species, in the way that homicide is more grave than theft. Therefore, the gravity of sins differs according to their objects.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 71, a. 5), the gravity of sins differs in the way in which one sickness is more grave than another. For just as the good of health consists in a certain measure in the humors that is appropriate to an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain measure in a human act that is appropriate to the rule of reason.

Now it is clear that a sickness is more grave to the extent that the disorder which undermines the appropriate measure of the humors belongs to a more general principle (*prioris principii*); for instance, a sickness in the human body that comes from the heart, which is the source of life, or from somewhere close to the heart, is more dangerous. Hence, it must likewise be the case that a sin is more grave to the extent that the disorder has to do with a principle which is prior in the order of reason. But reason orders all matters of action in light of the end (*ratio ordinat omnia in agibilibus ex fine*). And so, among human acts, the higher the end that a given sin has to do with, the graver the sin.

Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 72, a. 3), the objects of acts are their ends. And so the diversity in degrees of gravity among sins stems from the diversity of their objects. For instance, it is clear that exterior things are ordered to man as their end, whereas a man is further ordered toward God as his own end. Hence a sin that has to do with a man's substance itself, e.g., homicide, is more grave than a sin that has to do with exterior goods, e.g., theft. And still more grave is a sin that is committed directly against God, e.g., infidelity or blasphemy or something else of this sort. And in an ordering of all these sins, one sin is more [or less] grave than another insofar as it has to do with something more important or less important. And since sins have their species from their objects, the differences in degrees of gravity that stem from the objects are the first and principal differences, since they follow upon the species.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 72, a. 3), even if the object is the matter with respect to which the act is terminated, it nonetheless has the character of a form to the extent that the agent's intention is directed toward it. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 18, a. 6 and q. 72, a. 6), the form of a moral act depends on its end.

Reply to objection 2: Turning away from an unchangeable good, in which the character of badness is brought to completion, follows from inappropriately turning toward some changeable good. And this is why the diverse degrees of gravity of badness in the sins must have to do with the diversity of those things that one turns toward (*secundum diversitatem eorum quae pertinent ad conversionem*).

Reply to objection 3: All the objects of human acts have an ordering with respect to one another, and so in a sense all human acts belong to a single genus insofar as they are ordered to the

ultimate end. And so nothing prevents all sins from being comparable to one another.

Article 4

Does the gravity of sins differ according to the dignity of the virtues to which the sins are opposed, in the sense that a graver sin is opposed to a greater virtue?

It seems that the gravity of sins does not differ according to the dignity of the virtues to which the sins are opposed, in the sense that a graver sin is opposed to a greater virtue:

Objection 1: As Proverbs 15:5 says, “In abundant justice there is the greatest virtue.” But as our Lord points out at Matthew 5:20, an “abundant” justice hinders anger, which is a lesser sin than homicide, whereas homicide is hindered by a less abundant justice. Therefore, it is a lesser sin that is opposed to a greater virtue.

Objection 2: *Ethics* 2 says, “Virtue has to do with the difficult and the good.” From this it appears that a greater virtue has to do with what is more difficult. But if a man falls short in a more difficult matter, then his sin is a lesser one than if he falls short in a less difficult matter. Therefore, it is a lesser sin that is opposed to the greater virtue.

Objection 3: As 1 Corinthians 13:13 explains, charity is a greater virtue than faith and hope. But hatred, which is opposed to charity, is a lesser sin than infidelity or despair, which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore, it is a lesser sin that is opposed to a greater virtue.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says, “The worst is contrary to the best.” But the best in moral matters is the greatest virtue, whereas the worst is the most grave sin. Therefore, the most grave sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.

I respond: In one sense, a sin is opposed to a virtue *principally and directly* when they have to do with the same object; for contraries have to do with the same thing. And in this sense it has to be the case that a graver sin is opposed to a greater virtue. For just as a greater degree of gravity in a sin stems from the object, so too does the greater dignity of a virtue. For as is clear from what has already been said (q. 60, a. 5 and q. 72, a. 1), in both cases the species is taken from the object. Hence, it must be the case that the greatest sin is contrary to the greatest virtue in the sense that it is maximally distant from that virtue within the same genus.

In a second sense, the opposition of a virtue to a sin can be thought of as a certain extension of the virtue insofar as it hinders the sin (*secundum quandam extensionem virtutis cohibentis peccatum*), since the greater a virtue is, the more it distances a man from a sin that is contrary to it, so that it hinders not only the sin itself but also the things that induce one toward that sin. And in this sense it is clear that a virtue is greater to the extent that it hinders lesser sins—just as, to the extent that one’s health is greater, it hinders even minor ailments. And in this sense a lesser sin is opposed to a greater virtue as far as the virtue’s effect is concerned (*ex parte effectus*).

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through with respect to the opposition that has to do with hindering sin. For in this sense an abundant justice hinders even lesser sins.

Reply to objection 2: It is a sin that has to do with a more difficult evil that is directly contrary to a greater virtue, which has to do with a more difficult good. For in both cases one finds a certain preeminence by which the will is shown to be more strongly inclined toward good or toward evil by the fact that it is not conquered by difficulty.

Reply to objection 3: Charity is not just any sort of love, but is instead the love of God. Hence, what is directly opposed to it is not hatred, but rather hatred of God, which is gravest of sins.

Article 5

Are carnal sins lesser faults than spiritual sins?

It seems that carnal sins are not lesser faults (*non minoris culpa*) than spiritual sins:

Objection 1: Adultery is a graver sin than theft; for Proverbs 6:30-32 says, “The fault is not so great when a man has stolen, but he who is an adulterer destroys his own soul by the folly of his heart.” But theft involves avarice, which is a spiritual sin, whereas adultery involves lust, which is a carnal sin. Therefore, carnal sins are greater faults.

Objection 2: In *Super Leviticum* Augustine says, “The devil rejoices most over the sins of lust and idolatry (*de peccato luxuriae et idololatriae*).” But he rejoices more over a greater fault. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that carnal sins are the greatest faults.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher proves that being incontinent with respect to concupiscence is worse than being incontinent with respect to anger. But anger is a spiritual sin according to Gregory in *Moralia* 31, whereas concupiscence has to do with carnal sins. Therefore, a carnal sin is more grave than a spiritual sin.

But contrary to this: Gregory says that carnal sins involve less guilt and more shame (*sunt minoris culpa et maioris infamiae*).

I respond: Spiritual sins are greater faults than carnal sins. This should not be understood to mean that every spiritual sin is a greater fault than every carnal sin. Rather, it should be understood to mean that if one thinks just of the difference between *being spiritual* and *being carnal*, spiritual sins are, all other things being equal, graver than the other sins.

Three reasons can be given for this:

First, on the part of the *subject*. Spiritual sins belong to the spirit, which is either turned toward God or turned away from Him, whereas carnal sins are consummated in the pleasure of the carnal appetite, which is mainly turned toward the corporeal good. And so a carnal sin as such involves more of a turning-toward (*plus habet de conversione*) and because of this involves a greater adherence, whereas a spiritual sin involves more of a turning-away, which is the source of the character of sinfulness (*ex qua procedit ratio culpa*). And so a spiritual sin is, as such, a greater fault.

A second line of reasoning can be taken from *what is sinned against*. For a carnal sin as such is directed toward one’s own body, which, according to the order of charity, is to be loved less than God or one’s neighbor, against whom one sins through spiritual sins. And so spiritual sins as such are greater faults.

A third line of argument can be taken from the *motive*. As will be explained below (a. 6), the greater the impulse toward sin, the less a man sins. But carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz., the very concupiscence of the flesh that is innate in us. And so spiritual sins are as such greater faults.

Reply to objection 1: Adultery involves not only a sin of lust but also a sin of injustice. And in this respect, it can be traced back to avarice, according to a Gloss on Ephesians 5:5 (“No fornicator, or unclean or covetous person”). And thus adultery is more grave than theft, since a man’s wife is more dear to him than his possessions.

Reply to objection 2: The devil is said to rejoice most over the sin of lust because it involves the most adherence and it is only with difficulty that a man can be torn away from it. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “The desire for pleasure is insatiable.”

Reply to objection 3: The reason why the Philosopher claims that being incontinent with respect to concupiscence is more shameful than being incontinent with respect to anger is that concupiscence has less participation in reason. And on this score he also claims in *Ethics* 3 that “sins of intemperance are especially worthy of reproach, because they have to do with pleasures that are common to us and the brute animals.” Hence, in a certain sense a man becomes like a brute animal through such

sins. And this is why Gregory says that carnal sins are more shameful.

Article 6

Does the gravity of a sin have to do with the cause of the sin?

It seems that the gravity of a sin does not have to do with the cause of the sin:

Objection 1: The greater the cause of a sin is, the more strongly it moves one toward sinning, and so the more difficult it is to resist. But a sin is diminished by the fact that it is more difficult to resist; for it pertains to a sinner's weakness that he does not easily resist a sin, and a sin that stems from weakness is judged more leniently. Therefore, it is not the case that a sin has gravity from its cause.

Objection 2: Concupiscence is a sort of general cause of sin; hence, a Gloss on Romans 7:7 ("For I had not known concupiscence") says, "The law is good, because in prohibiting concupiscence it prohibits everything that is bad." But the greater the concupiscence by which a man is overcome, the lesser is his sin. Therefore, a sin's gravity is diminished by the greatness of its cause.

Objection 3: Just as the rectitude of reason is a cause of a virtuous act, so a defect in reason seems to be a cause of sin. But the greater the defect of reason is, the lesser is the sin—to the extent that someone who lacks the use of reason is completely excused from sin, and someone who sins out of ignorance sins less gravely (*levius peccat*). Therefore, the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause.

But contrary to this: When the cause is increased (*multiplicata causa*), its effect is increased. Therefore, if there is a greater cause of a sin, then the sin will be more grave.

I respond: In the genus of sin, just as in every other genus, there are two possible sorts of causes:

The one is a *proper and per se cause* of a sin, viz., the very act of willing to sin (*ipsa voluntas peccandi*). For as a Gloss on Matthew 7:18 ("A good tree cannot bear bad fruit") points out, the act of willing to sin is related to the sinful act as a tree is related to its fruit. And the greater a cause of this sort is, the more grave the sin will be, since the greater the will to sin is, the more gravely the man sins.

The other causes of sins are understood as *extrinsic and remote causes*, viz., causes by which the will is inclined toward sinning. And one must distinguish among causes of this sort:

Some of them induce the will to sin in accord with its very nature—an example is the *end*, which is the will's proper object. And a sin is increased by this sort of end, since someone sins more gravely when his will is inclined himself toward sinning by intending a worse end.

On the other hand, there are some causes that incline the will to sin in a way that goes beyond the nature and order of the will itself, which is apt by its nature to be moved freely by itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Hence, a cause which (a) diminishes reason's judgment, e.g., *ignorance*, or which (b) diminishes the free movement of the will, e.g., *weakness* or *violence* or *fear* or something of this sort, diminishes the sin in the same way that it diminishes voluntariness, to the extent that if an act is completely involuntary, then it does not have the character of a sin.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for the case of an extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness, since, as has been explained, an increase in this sort of cause diminishes the sin.

Reply to objection 2: If even the very movement of the will is included under 'concupiscence', then where there is a greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin.

On the other hand, if 'concupiscence' names a certain passion that is a movement of the concupiscible power [of the soul], then a greater concupiscence that *precedes* reason's judgment and the will's movement diminishes the sin, since someone who sins after being stimulated by a greater

concupiscence falls to a greater temptation, and so less is imputed to him.

However, if ‘concupiscence’ is taken in such a way that the concupiscence *follows upon* reason’s judgment and the will’s movement, then where there is a greater concupiscence in this sense, there is a greater sin. For a greater movement of concupiscence sometimes floods forth (*insurgit*) because the will is tending in an unrestrained way toward its object.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for the case of a cause that causes involuntariness, and, as has been explained, this sort of cause lessens the sin.

Article 7

Do the circumstances aggravate a sin?

It seems that the circumstances do not aggravate a sin:

Objection 1: A sin has its gravity from its species. But circumstances do not give a sin its species, since they are its accidents. Therefore, a sin’s gravity is not determined by its circumstances.

Objection 2: The circumstance in question is either bad or not bad. If the circumstance is bad, then it itself is a *per se* cause of a certain species of badness, whereas if it is not bad, then it does not have what it takes to augment the act’s badness. Therefore, there is no way in which a circumstance increases the sin.

Objection 3: A sin’s badness comes from its being a turning-away [from reason and God] (*ex parte aversione*). But the circumstances follow upon the sin by reason of its being a turning-toward [some good] (*ex parte conversione*). Therefore, they do not increase a sin’s badness.

But contrary to this: Ignorance of circumstances lessens the sin; for as *Ethics* 3 says, someone who sins out of ignorance of a circumstance deserves leniency. But this would not be the case if the circumstance in question did not aggravate the sin. Therefore, the circumstance aggravates the sin.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2 about the habit of a virtue, each thing is apt to be increased by the same thing that it is caused by. But it is clear that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance, since one departs from the order of reason by virtue of his not observing the required circumstances in his acting. This happens in three ways:

First, insofar as a circumstance *transfers the act into a different genus of sin*. For instance, the sin of fornication consists in a man having sexual intercourse with someone who is not his wife (*accedit ad non suam*), but if one adds the circumstance that the woman with whom he has sexual intercourse is someone else’s wife, then the act is now transferred to another genus of sin, viz., injustice, insofar as the man has usurped what belongs to someone else (*inquantum homo usurpat rem alterius*). Accordingly, adultery is a more grave sin than fornication.

On the other hand, sometimes a circumstance aggravates a sin not by turning it into another kind of sin, but only *by increasing its character as a sin* (*quia multiplicat rationem peccati*). For instance, if someone who is prodigal gives something away *when* he ought not to and *to someone* to whom he ought not give it, he sins in more ways (*multiplicius*) in the same genus of sin than if he only gave it to *someone* to whom he ought not give it. And because of this his sin is more grave, just as a sickness is likewise more grave if it afflicts more parts of the body. Hence, in *Paradoxa* Tully says, “In violating the life of his father, a man commits many sins. For the one who is violated is the one who procreated him, who fed him, who taught him, who set him up in his land, in his house, and in the republic.”

The third way in which a circumstance aggravates a sin is that it *augments the deformity that arises from some other circumstance*. For instance, taking what belongs to another constitutes the sin of stealing, but if one adds the circumstance that someone takes a large amount from the other, then the sin is more grave—even though *taking much* and *taking little* do not of themselves imply the character of

goodness or badness.

Reply to objection 1: As was established above (q. 18, a. 10), some circumstances do indeed confer a species on a moral act. And yet a circumstance that does not confer a species is able to aggravate a sin. For just as a thing's goodness comes not only from its species, but also from certain accidents, so too an act's badness comes not only from the species of the act, but also from its circumstances.

Reply to objection 2: A circumstance can aggravate a sin in either of the two ways in question. For if the circumstance is bad, it nonetheless does not thereby always have to constitute the sin's species; for as has been explained, it can add to the character of badness within the same species. On the other hand, if the circumstance is not bad, it is able to aggravate the sin in relation to the badness of some other circumstance.

Reply to objection 3: Reason has to order an act not only with respect to its object, but also with respect to all its circumstances. And so some instances of turning away from the rule of reason involve the corruption of a circumstance—as, for instance, when someone does something *when* he ought not to or *where* he ought not to. And this sort of turning away is sufficient for the character of badness. Moreover, turning away from God, to whom a man should be joined through right reason, follows upon turning away from the rule of reason.

Article 8

Is a sin's gravity increased by its doing greater harm?

It seems that a sin's gravity is not increased by its doing greater harm (*secundum maius nocumentum*):

Objection 1: Harm is a certain outcome (*eventus*) that is consequent upon a sinful act. But as was explained above (q. 20, a. 5), a consequent outcome (*eventus consequens*) does not add to an act's goodness or badness. Therefore, a sin is not aggravated by a greater harm.

Objection 2: Harm is found especially in sins against one's neighbor, since no one wills to harm himself and no one is able to harm God—this according to Job 35:6-8 (“If your iniquities be multiplied, what shall you do against Him? Your wickedness will hurt a man who is like you”). Therefore, if a sin were aggravated by its doing greater harm, then it would follow that a sin by which one sins against his neighbor is more grave than a sin by which one sins against God or against oneself.

Objection 3: More harm is inflicted on someone when he is deprived of the life of grace than when he is deprived of his natural life; for the life of grace is better than natural life to such an extent that a man ought to hate his natural life in order not to lose the life of grace. But someone who induces a woman to fornicate, given just the action in its own right (*quantum est de se*), deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into a mortal sin. Therefore, if a sin were more grave because of its doing greater harm, then it would follow that a simple fornicator would sin more gravely than a murderer—which is manifestly false. Therefore, it is not the case that a sin is more grave because it does more harm.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 Augustine says, “Because a vice is contrary to nature, badness is added to the vices to the same degree to which the nature's integrity is diminished.” But the diminishment of a nature's integrity is harm. Therefore, a sin is more grave to the extent that there is more harm.

I respond: There are three possible ways for harm to be related to a sin:

(a) Sometimes the harm that stems from a sin is *foreseen and intended*—for instance, when someone does something with the intention of harming another, as with homicide or theft. And in such a case the amount of harm directly increases the gravity of the sin. For in a case like this the harm is a *per*

se object of the sin.

(b) Sometimes, however, the harm is *foreseen but not intended*—for instance, when someone who is taking a short cut through a planted field on his way to committing fornication knowingly inflicts damage on what is planted in the field, though without intending the damage. In such a case the amount of harm aggravates the sin but does so indirectly, viz., to the extent that because of a will that is intensely inclined toward sinning, it happens that someone does not avoid doing the sort of damage, to himself or to another, which he would not will absolutely speaking.

(c) On the other hand, sometimes the harm is *neither foreseen nor intended*.

In that case, if the harm is related *incidentally* to the sin, then it does not aggravate the sin directly. However, because the man neglected to consider the sorts of harm that could ensue, he is thought of as punishable for the bad things that happen outside his intention, given that he was performing an illicit deed (*si dabat operam rei illicitae*).

By contrast, if the harm follows *per se* from the sinful act, then even if it was neither intended nor foreseen, it directly aggravates the sin, since whatever follows *per se* upon a sin belongs in some way or other to the very species of the sin. For instance, if someone fornicates openly, many people are scandalized as a result; and even if he himself did not intend the scandal and perhaps did not even foresee it, the sin is directly aggravated by it.

However, it seems to be otherwise with the sort of penal harm that the sinner himself incurs. If harm of this sort is related incidentally to the sinful act and was neither foreseen nor intended, then it does not aggravate the sin or follow upon a greater gravity on the part of the sin—as when someone who is running in order to commit murder strikes his foot and hurts it. On the other hand, if this sort of harm follows *per se* upon the sinful act, then even if it is neither foreseen nor intended, the greater harm does not make the sin more grave; to the contrary, it is the graver sin that induces the graver harm. For instance, a non-believer who has heard nothing about the punishments of hell suffers a graver punishment in hell for a sin of homicide than he does for a sin of theft. For since he neither intends nor foresees this punishment, his sin is not aggravated by it (as does happen in the case of a believer, who seems to sin more gravely by the very fact that he holds greater punishments in contempt in order to fulfill his will to sin), but instead the gravity of the harm is caused only by the gravity of the sin.

Reply to objection 1: As was also explained above (q. 20, a. 5) when we were discussing the goodness and badness of exterior acts, a consequent outcome adds to the goodness or badness of an act if it is foreseen and intended.

Reply to objection 2: Even though the harm aggravates the sin, it does not follow that the sin is aggravated *only* by the harm without its being the case that, as was explained above (aa. 2-3), the sin is *per se* more grave because of its disorderedness. Hence, the harm itself aggravates the sin insofar as it makes the act to be more disordered. Hence, it does not follow that if harm has a place especially in sins that are directed against one's neighbor, then those sins are the most grave. For a much greater disorder is found in sins that are directed against God, as well as in certain sins that are directed against oneself.

Yet one can also claim that even if no one can harm God as far as His substance is concerned, it is nonetheless possible to attack Him in what belongs to Him, e.g., by eradicating the Faith or violating sacred things, where these are extremely grave sins (*peccata gravissima*). Likewise, one sometimes knowingly and willingly inflicts harm on himself, as is clear in the case of those who kill themselves, even though this act is referred to an apparent good as an end, e.g., that they might be freed from their troubles.

Reply to objection 3: This argument does not follow, and for two reasons:

First, because a murderer directly intends harm to his neighbor, whereas a fornicator who seduces a woman intends pleasure and not harm.

Second, because homicide is a *per se* and sufficient cause of corporeal death, whereas no one can

be a *per se* and sufficient cause of someone else's spiritual death, since no one dies spiritually except by sinning through his own will.

Article 9

Is a sin aggravated by the status of the person who is sinned against?

It seems that a sin is not aggravated by the status of the person who is sinned against (*propter conditionem personae in quam peccatur*):

Objection 1: If this were so, then a sin would be maximally aggravated when someone sinned against a just and holy man. But a sin is not aggravated in such a case, since a virtuous man, who tolerates the sin with equanimity, is harmed less by the inflicted injury than other people who are harmed interiorly by being scandalized. Therefore, the status of the person who is sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

Objection 2: If the status of the person aggravated the sin, then a sin would be especially aggravated by close kinship (*ex propinquitate*), since as Tully says in *Paradoxa*, "Someone who slays a servant commits just one sin; someone who violates the life of his father commits many sins." But the close kinship of the person who is sinned against does not seem to aggravate the sin, since each person has a maximally close kinship with himself, and yet someone who inflicts damage on himself sins to a lesser degree than does someone who inflicts damage on another. For instance, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, someone sins to a lesser degree if he kills his own horse than if he kills someone else's horse. Therefore, close kinship with the person does not aggravate the sin.

Objection 3: The status of the person who sins aggravates his sin mainly by reason of his dignity or knowledge—this according to Wisdom 6:7 ("The mighty shall suffer mighty torments") and Luke 12:47 ("The servant who knew the will of his master and did not do it will be beaten with many stripes"). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, as regards the person who is sinned against, the dignity or knowledge of the person who is sinned against would aggravate the sin to a greater degree. But it does not seem that someone sins more gravely by inflicting injury on a more wealthy or powerful person than by inflicting injury on a poor person, since "there is no respecting of persons with God," by whose judgment the gravity of a sin is assessed. Therefore, the status of the person who is sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

But contrary to this: In Sacred Scripture sins that are committed against the servants of God are especially vituperated—as, for example, in 3 Kings 19:14 ("They have destroyed your altars, and they have slain your prophets with the sword"). Likewise, sins are especially vituperated that are committed against persons who are close relatives—this according to Micah 7:6 ("The son dishonors his father, and the daughter rises up against her mother"). Again, sins committed against persons who have been set up in dignified positions are also especially vituperated, as is clear from Job 34:18 ("He said to the king, 'You apostate', he called the leaders impious"). Therefore, the status of the person who is sinned against aggravates the sin.

I respond: A person who is sinned against is in some sense an object of the sin. Now it was explained above (a. 3) that the gravity of a sin stems from the object. Indeed, to the extent that a given object is a more principal end, a greater gravity in the sin stems from it.

Now the principal ends of human acts are God, the man himself, and his neighbors, since whatever he does, he does for the sake of one or another of these three, even though the one of these three is subordinated to another. Therefore, it is in regard to these three that one can think of the greater or lesser gravity of a sin according to the status of the one who is sinned against.

First, then, as regards God, the more virtuous or more sacred to God someone is, the more he is

joined to God. And so an injury inflicted on such a person redounds more upon God—this according to Zachariah 2:8 (“He who touches you, touches the apple of my eye”). Hence, a sin becomes more grave by reason of the fact that it is committed against a person who is more joined to God, either by reason of his virtue or by reason of his office.

As regards oneself, it is clear that someone sins more gravely to the extent that he sins against someone who is more closely conjoined to himself, whether by natural affinity or by benefits received or in some other way. For he seems to be sinning against himself and because of this he sins more gravely—this according to Ecclesiasticus 14:5 “He who does evil to himself, whom will he be good to?”).

As regards one’s neighbor, someone sins more gravely to the extent that his sin affects more people. And so a sin that is committed against a public person who bears the personage of the whole multitude, e.g., a king or a prince, is more grave than a sin committed against an individual private person; hence, Exodus 22:28 says specifically, “You shall not curse the prince of your people.” Similarly, an injury done to any famous person seems to be more grave because it scandalizes and disturbs more people.

Reply to objection 1: Someone who inflicts injury on a virtuous man is, as far as he himself knows (*quantum est in se*), disturbing the man both interiorly and exteriorly. On the other hand, the fact that the man is not interiorly disturbed stems from his own goodness, and this does not diminish the sin of the one who injures him.

Reply to objection 2: The harm that someone inflicts on himself with respect to those things that are subject to the dominion of his own will, e.g., his own possessions, has less of the character of a sin than if it were inflicted on someone else. For he acts by his own will. But in the case of those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, e.g., natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict harm on himself. For instance, someone who kills himself sins more gravely than someone who kills another. By contrast, since what belongs to those who are close to us is not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument that the sin is lesser with respect to harms inflicted on their goods does not go through—unless perhaps they will it or give their agreement.

Reply to objection 3: There is no respecting of persons if God punishes someone more gravely for sinning against more excellent persons. For this happens because such a sin redounds to the harm of more people.

Article 10

Does the greatness of the person who commits a sin aggravate the sin?

It seems that the greatness of the person who commits a sin (*magnitudo personae peccantis*) does not aggravate the sin:

Objection 1: A man is rendered great especially by the fact that he adheres to God—this according to Ecclesiasticus 25:13 (“How great is he who finds wisdom and knowledge! But there is none above the one who fears the Lord”). But the more someone adheres to God, the less something is imputed to him as a sin; for 2 Paralipomenon 30:10-19 says, “The Lord who is good will show mercy to all those who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers, and He will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified”). Therefore, a sin is not aggravated by the greatness of the person who sins.

Objection 2: As Romans 2:11 says, “There is no respecting of persons with God.” Therefore, He does not punish one man more than another for one and the same sin. Therefore, a sin is not aggravated by the greatness of the person who sins.

Objection 3: No one should reap disadvantage from the good he has (*ex bono*). But someone would so reap if what he did were imputed to him in a higher degree as a sin. Therefore, a sin is not aggravated because of the greatness of the person who sins.

But contrary to this: In *De Summo Bono* 2 Isidore says, “The greater the one who sins is, the greater is his sin known to be.”

I respond: There are two kinds of sin:

Some sins arise suddenly (*ex subreptione*) because of the weakness of human nature. And sins of this sort are imputed as lesser sins to someone who is greater in virtue, because he is less neglectful in repressing such sins—even though the weakness of human nature does not allow him to escape them altogether.

However, the other sort of sin proceed from deliberation (*ex deliberatione*). And the greater someone is, the greater the degree to which these sins are imputed to him. There are four reasons that can be given for this:

First, because greater men, e.g., those who excel in knowledge and virtue, are more easily able to resist these sins. Hence, in Luke 12:47 our Lord says, “The servant who knew the will of his master and did not do it will be beaten with many stripes.”

Second, because of ingratitude. For every good by which someone is made great is a gift from God, whom a man becomes ungrateful to by sinning. And in this respect, any sort of greatness, even greatness in temporal goods, aggravates the sin—this according to Wisdom 6:7 (“The mighty shall suffer mighty torments”).

Third, because of the special repugnance an act of sinning bears to the greatness of a person—as when a prince, who is the guardian of justice, violates justice, or as when a priest, who has taken a vow of chastity, commits fornication.

Fourth, because of the example or scandal given. For as Gregory says in *Pastoralis*, “Sin is extended much more forcefully by example when the sinner is honored out of reverence for his status.” The sins of great people also come to be known by many, and men treat them more severely (*magis homines indigne ferunt*).

Reply to objection 1: These passages are talking about things that are done carelessly with the suddenness of human weakness.

Reply to objection 2: God is not respecting persons if He punishes great men more, since, as has been explained, their greatness makes for gravity in their sins.

Reply to objection 3: A great man reaps disadvantage not from the good that he has, but from the bad use that he makes of that good.

QUESTION 74

The Subject of Sins

Next we have to consider the subject of vices or sins (*de subiecto vitiorum vel peccatorum*). On this topic there are ten questions: (1) Can the will be the subject of sin? (2) Is the will alone a subject of sin? (3) Can sensuality or the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*) be a subject of sin? (4) Can the sentient appetite be the subject of a mortal sin? (5) Can reason be the subject of sin? (6) Does lingering or non-lingering pleasure have lower reason as its subject? (7) Does the sin of consenting to an act have higher reason as its subject? (8) Can lower reason be the subject of a mortal sin? (9) Can higher reason be the subject of a venial sin? (10) Can there be a venial sin in higher reason with respect to its proper object?

Article 1

Can the will be the subject of sin?

It seems that the will cannot be the subject of a sin:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “What is bad lies outside the will and outside one’s intention.” But sin has the character of something bad. Therefore, sin cannot exist in the will.

Objection 2: The will is directed toward a good or an apparent good (*voluntas est boni vel apparentis boni*). But the will does not sin by reason of the fact that it wills a good, whereas the fact that it wills an apparent good that is not truly good seems to involve a defect in the apprehensive power rather than a defect in the will. Therefore, there is no way in which sin exists in the will.

Objection 3: The subject of a sin cannot be the same as its efficient cause, since, as *Physics* 2 says, the efficient cause and material cause do not coincide (*non incidunt in idem*). But the will is an efficient cause of a sin, since “the first cause of sinning is the will,” as Augustine puts it in *De Duabus Animalibus*. Therefore, the will is not the subject of sin.

But contrary to this: In *Retractiones* Augustine says, “The will is that by which one sins and that by which one lives in an upright way.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 71, aa. 1 and 6), a sin is a certain sort of act.

Now some acts, e.g., burning and cutting, pass into an exterior matter, and acts of this sort have as their matter and their subject the thing into which the action passes; as the Philosopher says in *Physics* 3, “A movement is the act of the thing moved as coming from the thing that effects the movement.”

By contrast, other acts, e.g., desiring and having a cognition, do not pass into an exterior matter but remain within the agent. All moral acts—whether they are acts of virtue or sinful acts—are acts of this sort.

Hence, the proper subject of a sinful act has to be the power that is the source (*principium*) of the act. But since, as was established above (q. 1, a. 1 and q. 18, a. 6) it is proper to moral acts to be voluntary, it follows that the will, which is the source of voluntary acts—whether good acts or bad acts, i.e., sins—is the source of sins. And so it follows that sins exist in the will as their subject.

Reply to objection 1: What is bad is said to lie “outside” the will in the sense that the will does not tend toward anything under the concept *bad*. But the will sometimes desires what is bad because something bad is an apparent good. And it is in this way that sin exists in the will.

Reply to objection 2: If the defect in the apprehensive power were in no way subject to the will, as is clearly the case with those who have invincible ignorance, then no sin would exist in either the will or the apprehensive power. And so it follows that a defect in the apprehensive power that is subject to the will is also counted as a sin.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for the case of efficient causes whose acts pass into an exterior matter and which effect movement in other things and not in themselves. But the opposite is true in the case of the will. Therefore, the argument does not follow.

Article 2

Is the will alone a subject of sin?

It seems that the will alone is a subject of sin:

Objection 1: In *De Duabus Animabus* Augustine says, “One does not sin except by means of the will.” But a sin exists, as in a subject, in the power by means of which one sins. Therefore, the will alone is a subject of sin.

Objection 2: A sin is something bad that is contrary to reason. But *good* and *bad* as they pertain to reason are the objects of the will alone. Therefore, the will alone is a subject of sin.

Objection 3: Every sin is a voluntary act, since, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio*, “A sin is voluntary to such an extent that if something is not voluntary, then it is not a sin.” But acts of the other powers are not voluntary except insofar as those powers are moved by the will. However, this is not sufficient for their being a subject of sin, since if it were sufficient, then even the exterior bodily members, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin—which is clearly false. Therefore, the will alone is a subject of sin.

But contrary to this: Sin is contrary to virtue. But contraries have to do with the same thing and, as was explained above (q. 65, aa. 3-4), other powers besides the will are also the subject of virtues. Therefore, it is not the case that the will alone is a subject of sin.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (a. 1), anything that is a source of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now as was explained above when we were discussing voluntariness (q. 6, a. 4), the acts that are called voluntary include not only those that are *elicited* by the will, but also those that are *commanded* by the will. Hence, it is not just the will that can be a subject of sin, but all the other powers that are moved to their acts by the will or held back from their acts by the will. Moreover, these same powers are the subjects of good or bad moral habits, since the acts and the habits belong to the same subject.

Reply to objection 1: One does not sin except by means of the will as a first mover, and one sins by means of the other powers insofar as those powers are moved by the will.

Reply to objection 2: *Good* and *bad* [in general] belong to the will as its *per se* objects, whereas the other powers have a determinate *good* and *bad* by reason of which virtue or vice or sin can exist in them insofar as they take part in will and reason.

Reply to objection 3: It is not the members of the body, but only the organs (*solum organa*), that are sources of acts (*principia actuum*); and so the members of the body are related to the soul that moves them like a *servant* that is acted upon and does not act. By contrast, as is clear from what is said in *Politics* 1, the interior appetitive powers are related to reason as *free powers*, since they both act in a certain sense and are acted upon.

Furthermore, the acts of the exterior members are actions that pass into an exterior matter, as is clear in the case of someone’s being struck down in the sin of homicide. And for this reason the arguments are not parallel.

Article 3

Can sin exist in the sentient appetite?

It seems that sin cannot exist in the sentient appetite (*in sensualitate non possit esse peccatum*):

Objection 1: Sin is proper to man, who is praised or blamed because of his actions. But the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*) is common to us and brute animals. Therefore, sin cannot exist in the sentient appetite.

Objection 2: As Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio*, “No one sins in what he cannot avoid.” But a man is unable to avoid an act of his sentient appetite being disordered, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “The sentient appetite is continually corrupt (*est sensualitas perpetuae corruptionis*) for as long as we abide in this mortal life, and this is why it is signified by a serpent.” Therefore, disorder in a movement of the sentient appetite is not a sin.

Objection 3: What a man does not do himself is not imputed to him as a sin. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, “We ourselves seem to do only that which we do with reason’s deliberation.” Therefore, a movement of the sentient appetite that occurs without deliberation is not imputed to a man as a sin.

But contrary to this: Romans 7:15 says, “The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do.” Augustine comments that this concerns an evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a certain movement of the sentient appetite. Therefore, sin exists in the sentient appetite.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), sin can be found in any power whose act can be *voluntary* and *disordered*—which is what the character of sin consists in. But it is clear that an act of sensuality can be voluntary insofar as sensuality, i.e., the sentient appetite (*inquantum sensualitas, idest appetitus sensitivus*), is apt to be moved by the will. Hence, it follows that sin can exist in the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 1: Even though some powers of the sentient part of the soul are common to us and brute animals, they nonetheless have in us a certain excellence because they are joined to reason. For instance, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 78, a. 4), we have, beyond the other animals (*prae aliis animalibus*), the cogitative power and the power of reminiscing. And in this way the sentient appetite in us likewise has a certain preeminence over the other animals, viz., because it is apt to obey reason. And on this score, it can be a source of a voluntary act and, consequently, a subject of sin.

Reply to objection 2: The sentient appetite’s “continual corruptness” has to be understood in terms of the stimulant [to sin] (*quantum ad fomitem*), which is never totally excluded in this life. For original sin passes away in its guilt of punishment and remains in its act (*transit enim peccatum originale reatu et remanet actu*). But this sort of corruptness on the part of the stimulant does not prevent a man from being able, by his rational will (*rationabili voluntate*), to fight off each disordered movement of the sentient appetite if he anticipates it, viz., by diverting his thoughts to other things.

However, while a man is diverting his thoughts to something else, there can likewise arise a disordered movement with respect to that other thing; for instance, when someone, wishing to avoid the movements of concupiscence, redirects his thoughts away from the pleasures of the flesh to some scientific speculation, an unpremeditated movement of vanity sometimes arises. And so because of the aforementioned corruptness, a man cannot avoid *all* movements of this sort; however, it is sufficient for the character of a voluntary sin just that he be able to avoid *each* such movement.

Reply to objection 3: What a man does without reason’s deliberation he does not do completely (*perfecte*), since nothing that is central (*principale*) to a man is operating in such a case. Hence, the act in question is not a completely human act (*non est perfecte actus humanus*). And, as a result, it cannot be a completely virtuous act or a completely sinful act (*non potest esse perfecte actus virtutis vel peccati*); instead, it is something incomplete within those genera. Hence, the sort of movement of the sentient

appetite that precedes an act of reason is a venial sin, i.e., something incomplete in the genus *sin*.

Article 4

Can a mortal sin exist in the sentient appetite?

It seems that a mortal sin can exist in the sentient appetite (*in sensualitate*):

Objection 1: An act is known from its object. But one can sin mortally with respect to the objects of the sentient appetite, e.g., with respect to the pleasures of the flesh. Therefore, an act of the sentient appetite can be a mortal sin. And so mortal sin is found in the sentient appetite.

Objection 2: A mortal sin is contrary to a virtue. But it is possible for a virtue to exist in the sentient appetite; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “Temperance and fortitude are virtues of the non-rational parts of the soul.” Therefore, it is possible for a mortal sin to exist in the sentient appetite, since contraries are apt to be effected with respect to the same subject.

Objection 3: A venial sin is a disposition toward a mortal sin. But the disposition and the habit exist in the same subject. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 3), there is venial sin in the sentient appetite, it is likewise the case that there can be mortal sin in that same subject.

But contrary to this: Augustine says in *Retractationes*—and the same thing is found in a Gloss on Romans 7:14—that “a disordered movement of concupiscence,” i.e., a sin belonging to the sentient appetite, “can likewise exist in those who are in the state of grace”—in whom mortal sin is not found. Therefore, a disordered movement of the sentient appetite is not a mortal sin.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 72, a. 5), just as a disorder that corrupts the source of corporeal life causes corporeal death, so too a disorder that corrupts the source of spiritual life, i.e., the ultimate end, causes spiritual death. But it belongs to reason, and not to the sentient appetite, to order something toward its end. Moreover, to throw something into disorder with respect to its end (*inordinatio a fine*) belongs to the same thing whose role it is to order it toward its end. Therefore, mortal sin can exist only in reason and not in the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 1: An act of the sentient appetite can *concur in* a mortal sin, but an act of mortal sin has its character as an act of mortal sin not from the fact that it belongs to the sentient appetite (*ex eo quod est sensualitatis*), but from the fact that it belongs to reason, the role of which is to order a thing toward its end. And this is why mortal sin is attributed only to reason and not to the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 2: An act of virtue is likewise brought to completion (*perficitur*) not by the fact that it belongs only to the sentient appetite, but rather by the fact that it belongs to reason and to the will, whose role it is to choose. For an act of moral virtue does not occur without an act of choosing. Hence, it is always the case that an act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, occurs with an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power. And, as has been explained, the same thing holds for mortal sin.

Reply to objection 3: There are three ways in which a disposition is related to what it disposes something toward:

Sometimes they are the same thing and they exist in the same thing; for instance, inchoative scientific knowledge (*scientia inchoata*) is said to be a disposition toward perfect scientific knowledge.

Sometimes they exist in the same thing but are not themselves the same thing; for instance, heat is a disposition toward the form of fire.

Sometimes they are not the same thing and do not exist in the same thing, as in the case of those things that are ordered to one another in such a way that a thing arrives at the one from the other; for instance, excellence in the power of imagining (*bonitas imaginationis*) is a disposition toward scientific

knowledge, which exists in the intellect. It is in this last way that a venial sin existing in the sentient appetite is a disposition toward a mortal sin, which exists in reason.

Article 5

Can sin exist in reason?

It seems that sin cannot exist in reason (*peccatum non possit esse in ratione*):

Objection 1: A mistake or sin (*peccatum*) in any power is a defect in that power. But a defect in reason is not a sin; instead, it excuses a sin, since someone is excused from sin because of ignorance. Therefore, sin cannot exist in reason.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1), the first subject of sin is the will (*voluntas*). But the act of reason precedes the act of willing, since it directs the act of willing. Therefore, sin cannot exist in reason.

Objection 3: There cannot be a sin or mistake except with respect to what is within our power (*nisi circa ea quae sunt in nobis*). But perfection and defectiveness in reason are not among the things that are within our power. For there are those whose reason is naturally deficient and those whose reason is naturally brilliant (*quidam sunt naturaliter ratione deficientes vel ratione solertes*). Therefore, sin does not exist in reason.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that sin exists both in lower reason and in higher reason.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (aa. 1-3), a mistake or sin (*peccatum*) in any power consists in that power's act. Now reason has two acts: (a) it has one act *in its own right* (*secundum se*), viz., in relation to its proper object, and this is the act of having a cognition of something true; (b) the second act of reason is the act it has insofar as it *directs other powers* (*est directiva aliarum virium*). Thus, sin can exist in reason in each of these ways.

First, there is a mistake or sin (*peccatum*) insofar as reason errs in its cognition of what is true. This is imputed to it as a mistake (*peccatum*) when it has ignorance or error with respect to what it can know and ought to know.

Second, there is a mistake or sin either when (a) reason commands disordered acts of the lower powers or when (b) it does not constrain (*non coercet*) such acts even after deliberation.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through with respect to a defect in reason that has to do with its proper act regarding its proper object, and this when there is a lack of cognition of something that one is unable to have knowledge of. For in such a case this sort of defect in reason is not a sin, but instead excuses one from sin, as is clear in the case of acts that are committed by madmen. However, if the defect in reason has to do with what a man can and should know, then the man is not altogether excused from sin, but instead the defect itself is imputed to him as a sin.

On the other hand, a defect that has to do only with reason's directing the other powers is always imputed to it as a sin, since reason is able to prevent (*occurrere potest*) this sort of defect by its own act.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above when we were discussing acts of reason and will (q. 17, a. 1), there is a way in which an act of willing moves and precedes an act of reason, and there is a way in which an act of reason moves and precedes an act of willing; hence, a movement of the will can be called 'rational' and an act of reason can be called 'voluntary'. Accordingly, sin is found in reason either (a) insofar as there is a voluntary defect in reason or (b) insofar as an act of reason is the source of an act of willing.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is clear from what has already been said.

Article 6

Does the sin of lingering pleasure exist in reason?

It seems that the sin of lingering pleasure (*peccatum morosae delectationis*) does not exist in reason:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), ‘pleasure’ implies a movement of the appetitive power. But the appetitive power is distinct from reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore, lingering pleasure does not exist in reason.

Objection 2: From the objects one can know which power an act belongs to, and it is through the act that a power is ordered toward its object. But sometimes there is lingering pleasure with respect to sensible goods and not goods of reason. Therefore, the sin of lingering pleasure does not exist in reason.

Objection 3: ‘Lingering’ denotes a thing by reason of its temporal duration (*propter diuturnitatem temporis*). But temporal duration is not a reason in virtue of which a given act belongs to a given power. Therefore, lingering pleasure does not belong to reason.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “If the consent to an enticement is limited to just pleasure at the thought of it, then this, I think, would be as if the woman alone had eaten of the forbidden fruit.” But *the woman* here stands for lower reason, as he himself explains in the same place. Therefore, the sin of lingering pleasure exists in reason.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 5), sometimes a sin exists in reason insofar as reason directs human acts. But it is clear that reason directs not only exterior acts but also the interior passions. And so when reason falls short in directing the interior passions, this is called a sin in reason, just as it is also called a sin in reason when reason falls short in directing exterior acts.

Now there are two ways in which reason falls short in directing the interior passions:

First, when it *commands* illicit passions, as when a man, upon deliberation, provokes in himself a movement of anger or of concupiscence.

Second, when it *does not suppress* an illicit movement of passion, as when someone, having concluded upon deliberation that an oncoming movement of passion is disordered, nonetheless delays with respect to it and does not drive it away. And this is the sense in which a sin of lingering pleasure is said to exist in reason.

Reply to objection 1: Pleasure exists in the appetitive power as in its proximate principle but in reason as in its first mover—in accord with what was said above (a. 1), viz., that actions that do not pass into an exterior matter exist in their principles as in a subject.

Reply to objection 2: Reason has a proper illicit act with respect to its proper object, but it has an act of directing with respect to all the objects of the lower powers that can be directed by reason. And it is in this sense that pleasure with respect to sensible objects belongs to reason as well.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure is called ‘lingering’ not because of its temporal duration (*non ex mora temporis*), but because reason, though deliberating about it, nonetheless does not drive it away, “willingly holding on to and dwelling on what should have been cast aside as soon as it entered the mind,” as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 12.

Article 7

Does the sin of consenting to an act exist in higher reason?

It seems that the sin of consenting to an act (*peccatum consensus in actum*) does not exist in higher reason:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 15, a. 1), consenting is an act of the appetitive power. But reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore, the sin of consenting to an act does not exist in higher reason.

Objection 2: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “Higher reason focuses on (*intendit*) contemplating and consulting the eternal conceptions.” But one sometimes consents to an act without consulting the eternal conceptions; for a man is not always thinking about divine things when he consents to an act. Therefore, the sin of consenting to an act does not always exist in higher reason.

Objection 3: Just as a man regulates his exterior acts by reference to the eternal conceptions, so too with his interior pleasures and other passions. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, “It belongs to lower reason to consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfill it with a deed.” Therefore, it is also the case that consenting to a sinful act must sometimes be attributed to lower reason.

Objection 4: Reason exceeds the imaginative power in just the way that higher reason exceeds lower reason. But sometimes a man proceeds into an action through the imaginative power’s apprehension without any deliberation on the part of reason, as when someone moves his hand or foot without premeditation. Therefore, it is likewise the case that sometimes lower reason can consent to a sinful act without higher reason.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “If, in the consent to the evil use of what can be perceived by the bodily senses, any sin is judged to be such that, if possible, it would be brought to completion corporeally, then this should be understood as the woman’s having given the forbidden fruit to the man”—where *the man* signifies higher reason. Therefore, consenting to a sinful act belongs to higher reason.

I respond: ‘Consent’ implies a judgment about what one is consenting to. For just as speculative reason judges and decides (*iudicat et sententiat*) regarding intelligible things, so too practical reason judges and decides about actions.

Now note that in every judgment the final decision belongs to the supreme court (*supremum iudicatorium*); for instance, we see that in speculative matters the final decision about a proposition is given by resolving it into its first principles (*per resolutionem ad prima principia*). For as long as there is a higher principle remaining, what is being inquired into can still be examined by reference to that principle, and so judgment is still being suspended in the sense that a final decision has not yet been handed down.

Now it is clear that human acts can be regulated (a) *by the rule of human reason*, which is taken from the created things that man has cognition of naturally, and, further, (b) *by the rule of divine law*, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 4 and q. 71, a. 6). Hence, since the rule of divine law is higher, it follows that the final decision by which judgment is in the end terminated belongs to higher reason, which focuses on the eternal conceptions.

Now when there are many things to be judged, the final judgment has to do with what occurs last. But in the case of human acts, the last thing to occur is the act itself, whereas what leads up to it (*praeambula*) is the pleasure that induces one toward the act. And so consent to the act properly belongs to higher reason, whereas the judgment that leads up to it and has to do with the pleasure belongs to lower reason, which has the lower judgment—though higher reason can likewise pass judgment concerning the pleasure, since whatever is subject to the judgment of lower reason is also subject to the judgment of higher reason, though not vice versa.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 15, a. 3), consent is an act of the appetitive power not absolutely speaking, but insofar as it follows upon an act of reason that deliberates and judges. For an act of consent terminates in the will’s tending toward what reason has judged. Hence, consent can be attributed both to the will and to reason.

Reply to objection 2: Higher reason is said to consent to human acts by the very fact that it does not direct them in accord with them eternal law and thereby prevent a sinful act—regardless of whether

or not it is thinking about the eternal law. For when it is thinking about God's law, it shows actual contempt for it, whereas when it is not thinking about God's law, it is neglecting it in the manner of an omission. Hence, consent to a sinful deed proceeds from higher reason in every way, since, as Augustine puts it *De Trinitate* 12, "The mind cannot decide to perpetrate a sin effectively, unless that intention by which mind has the highest power to move the bodily members to action or to constrain them from action yields to the bad action or becomes its servant."

Reply to objection 3: Just as higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or constrain the exterior act, so too it can direct or constrain the interior pleasure. And yet before one arrives at higher reason's judgment, and as soon as the sentient appetite proposes the pleasure, lower reason sometimes accepts this sort of pleasure while deliberating with reference to temporal conceptions; and in such a case consent to the pleasure belongs to lower reason. However, if the man perseveres in the same act of consent after eternal conceptions have also been taken into consideration, then consent of this sort will belong to higher reason.

Reply to objection 4: The imaginative power's apprehension is sudden and without deliberation, and so it can cause an act before higher or lower reason even have time to deliberate. By contrast, lower reason's judgment involves deliberation, which requires a temporal interval in which higher reason can also deliberate. Hence, if higher reason does not back away from the sinful act through its own deliberation, then the sinful act is imputed to it.

Article 8

Is the act of consenting to the pleasure a mortal sin?

It seems that the act of consenting to the pleasure (*consensus in delectationem*) is not a mortal sin:

Objection 1: Consenting to the pleasure belongs to lower reason, which does not focus on the eternal conceptions or on divine law and, consequently, is not turned away from the eternal conceptions or from divine law, either. But every mortal sin occurs through one's being turned away from divine law; this is clear from the definition, posited above (q. 71, a. 6), which Augustine gives of a mortal sin. Therefore, the consent to the pleasure is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: It is bad to consent to something only because what is being consented to is bad. But "that because of which something is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such," or at least not less such-and-such. Therefore, what is consented to cannot be less bad than the act of consenting itself. But the pleasure without the deed (*delectatio sine opere*) is only a venial sin and not a mortal sin. Therefore, the consent to the pleasure is not a mortal sin, either.

Objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, pleasures differ in goodness or badness because of differences in the operations. But the interior act of thinking is one operation and the exterior act is another, e.g., an act of fornicating. Therefore, the pleasure that follows upon the interior act of thinking differs in goodness or badness from the pleasure of the act of fornicating to the extent that the interior act of thinking differs from the exterior act. And, as a result, the acts of consenting to each of them differ from one another in the same way. But the interior act of thinking is not a mortal sin; therefore, neither is the act of consenting to the thinking. Therefore, neither is the act of consenting to the pleasure.

Objection 4: An exterior act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin not by reason of the pleasure, which is also found in the matrimonial act, but by reason of the disorderedness of the act itself. But someone who consents to the pleasure does not thereby consent to the act's disorderedness. Therefore, he does not seem to sin mortally.

Objection 5: The sin of homicide is more grave than the sin of simple fornication. But consenting

to the pleasure that follows upon the thought of homicide is not a mortal sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, consenting to the pleasure that follows upon the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 6: As Augustine says, the Lord's prayer is recited for the remission of venial sins. But Augustine teaches that consenting to the pleasure ought to be retarded by the Lord's prayer. For in *De Trinitate* 12 he says, "This is far less of a sin than if one decided to fulfill it in deed; and so we ought to seek forgiveness for such thoughts as well, and we should strike our breasts and say, 'Forgive us our trespasses'." Therefore, the act of consenting to the pleasure is a venial sin.

But contrary to this: A little later Augustine adds, "The whole man is damned unless, through the grace of the Mediator, those things are forgiven which are thought of as sins of thought alone, i.e., where there is no willing to do the deeds, but there is a willing to delight the mind with them." But no one is damned except for a mortal sin. Therefore, the consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin.

I respond: On this matter various thinkers have had diverse opinions. Some have claimed that the consent to the pleasure is only a venial sin and not a mortal sin. By contrast, others have claimed that it is a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and closer to the truth (*communior et versimilior*).

For notice that since, as *Ethics* 10 explains, every instance of pleasure follows upon some operation and, again, since every instance of pleasure has an object, there are two things that every instance of pleasure can be thought of in relation to, viz., (a) the *operation* that it follows upon and (b) the *object* in which one takes pleasure.

Now it happens that certain operations are the object of pleasure in just the way that any other thing is, since an operation can itself be taken as a good and an end. And sometimes the very operation which pleasure follows upon is itself an object of pleasure, viz., insofar as the appetitive power, whose role it is to take pleasure, is turned back toward the operation itself as a certain good—as, for instance, when someone engages in thinking and takes pleasure in the very fact that he is engaged in thinking insofar as his act own act of thinking pleases him.

On the other hand, the pleasure that follows upon an operation, e.g., some act of thinking, has for its object another operation in the sense of the thing that has been thought of, and in such a case the pleasure proceeds not from the appetite's inclination toward the act of thinking, but from its inclination toward the operation that has been thought of.

So, then, there are two ways in which someone who is thinking about fornication can take pleasure: (a) with respect to the act of thinking itself and (b) with respect to the act of fornicating that is being thought of:

Now the pleasure with respect to the act of thinking follows upon an affective inclination toward the act of thinking itself. But this act of thinking is not a mortal sin in its own right (*secundum se*)—in fact, sometimes it is a venial sin, as when someone is engaged in idle thinking (*cum aliquis inutiliter cogitat*), and sometimes it involves no sin at all, as when someone is engaged in purposefully thinking about [fornication] (*utiliter de ea cogitat*), e.g., because he wants to preach about it or to carry on a disputation about it. And so, as a result, the affection and pleasure which one has in this sense from thinking about fornication does not belong to the genus *mortal sin*, but instead is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all. Hence, neither is the consent to such pleasure a mortal sin. And in this sense the first opinion [mentioned above] has truth.

On the other hand, when someone who is thinking about fornication takes pleasure in the very act that is being thought of, this stems from the fact that his affections are inclined toward this act. Hence, someone's consenting to such pleasure is nothing other than his consenting to his affections' being inclined toward an act of fornication; for no one takes pleasure except in what is conformed to his appetite. But it is a mortal sin for someone to deliberately choose (*ex deliberatione eligat*) that his affections should be conformed to what is in its own right a mortal sin. Hence, as the second opinion claims, this sort of consent to the pleasure of a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained (a. 7), consent to the pleasure can belong not only to

lower reason but also to higher reason. And yet lower reason can itself be turned away from the eternal conceptions. For even though it does not focus on them in the sense that it gives rules in accord with them (something that is proper to higher reason), it nonetheless focuses on them in the sense of being regulated by them. And in this sense it is able to sin mortally by turning itself away from them. For the acts of the lower powers and even the acts of the bodily members can be mortal sins insofar as there is a defect in the ordering that belongs to higher reason in its role of regulating those acts in accord with the eternal conceptions.

Reply to objection 2: Consenting to a sin which is venial by its genus is itself a venial sin. And one can accordingly conclude that consenting to the pleasure which comes from a vain thought about fornication is a venial sin.

However, the pleasure that exists in the very act of fornicating is by its genus a mortal sin, and the fact that prior to the act of consenting it is only a venial sin is incidental (*per accidens*), viz., because of the act's incompleteness. And this incompleteness is removed by the later deliberate consent (*per consensum deliberatum supervenientem*). Hence, the fact that it is a mortal sin is traced to its nature.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for the case of pleasure which has the act of thinking for its object.

Reply to objection 4: The pleasure that has an exterior act for its object cannot exist without one's being pleased with the exterior act in its own right—even if one decides not to fulfill it because it is forbidden by something higher. Hence, the act is disordered and, as a result, the pleasure will be disordered.

Reply to objection 5: Likewise, consenting to the pleasure that proceeds from one's being pleased with an act of homicide that one is thinking about is a mortal sin—but not consenting to the pleasure that proceeds from being pleased with an act of thinking about homicide.

Reply to objection 6: The Lord's prayer should be said to counter not only venial sins, but also mortal sins.

Article 9

Can there be a venial sin in higher reason insofar as it directs the lower powers?

It seems that there cannot be a venial sin in higher reason insofar as it directs the lower powers, i.e., insofar as it consent to a sinful act:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that higher reason “focuses on (*inhaeret*) the eternal conceptions.” But sinning mortally involves turning away from the eternal conceptions (*peccare mortaliter est per aversionem a rationibus aeternis*). Therefore, it seems that in higher reason there cannot be any sin except a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Higher reason behaves like a principle in the spiritual life, just as the heart does in corporeal life. But diseases of the heart are mortal. Therefore, the sins of higher reason are mortal sins.

Objection 3: A venial sin becomes mortal if it is done out of contempt [for divine law]. But contempt seems to be involved in someone's deliberately committing even a venial sin (*quod aliquis ex deliberatione peccet etiam venialiter*). Therefore, since higher reason's consent is always accompanied by deliberation about divine law, it seems that there cannot be a sin in higher reason without its being a mortal sin, and this because of a contempt for divine law.

But contrary to this: As has been explained (a. 7), it belongs to higher reason to consent to a sinful act. But consenting to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore, venial sin can exist in higher reason.

I respond: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 12, higher reason “focuses on examining or

consulting the eternal conceptions”—“examining” insofar as it thinks about their truth, and “consulting” insofar as it judges and orders other things by reference to the eternal conceptions. And it is in this latter role that, in deliberating by reference to the eternal conceptions, it consents to or dissents from an act.

Now it can happen that the disorderedness of the act to which it consents is not contrary to the eternal conceptions, since it does not involve a turning away from the last end, but instead lies outside the eternal conceptions in the way that an act of venial sin does (*sed est praeter eas sicut actus peccati venialis*). Hence, when higher reason consents to an act of venial sin, it does not turn itself away from the eternal conceptions. Hence, it sins venially and not mortally.

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 2: There are two sorts of heart disease. One exists in the very substance of the heart and alters its natural condition; and this sort of disease is always mortal. The other sort of heart disease stems from a disorder either in the heart’s movement or in something that is in the vicinity of the heart; and this sort of disease is not always mortal.

Similarly, in higher reason there is always a mortal sin when the ordering of higher reason to its proper object, i.e., eternal conceptions, is destroyed. However, when there is [only] a disorder with respect to this object, then the sin is venial and not mortal.

Reply to objection 3: Deliberate consent to a sin does not always involve contempt for divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to divine law (*solum quando peccatum legi divinae contrariatur*).

Article 10

Can a venial sin exist in higher reason with respect to itself, i.e., insofar as it examines the eternal conceptions?

It seems that a venial sin cannot exist in higher reason with respect to itself (*secundum seipsam*), i.e., insofar as it examines the eternal conceptions (*secundum quod inspicit rationes aeternas*):

Objection 1: A power’s act is not defective except because it is related to its object in a disordered way. But higher reason’s object consists in the eternal conceptions, and disorder regarding the eternal conceptions does not occur without a mortal sin. Therefore, in higher reason there cannot be a venial sin with respect to itself.

Objection 2: Since reason is a deliberative power, reason’s act always involves deliberation (*actus rationis semper est cum deliberatione*). But every disordered movement in matters that pertain to God is such that if it occurs with deliberation, then it is a mortal sin. Therefore, there is never a venial sin in higher reason with respect to itself.

Objection 3: It sometimes happens that a sin that sneaks up on one (*peccatum ex subreptione*) is a venial sin, whereas a sin that proceeds from deliberation (*peccatum ex deliberatione*) is a mortal sin, since when reason deliberates, it has recourse to some greater good which is such that a man sins more gravely when he acts contrary to it. For instance, when reason deliberates about a disordered pleasurable act and concludes that it is contrary to God’s law, then by consenting it sins more gravely than if it had merely taken into consideration that the act is contrary to moral virtue. But higher reason cannot have recourse to anything higher than its own object. Therefore, if a movement that sneaks up on one (*motus ex subreptione*) is not a mortal sin, then not even a subsequent deliberation will make it a mortal sin—which is clearly false. Therefore, a venial sin cannot exist in higher reason with respect to itself.

But contrary to this: A movement of unbelief that sneaks up on one is a venial sin. But it belongs to higher reason with respect to itself. Therefore, a venial sin can exist in higher reason with respect to itself.

I respond: There is one way in which higher reason is directed (*fertur*) toward its own object and

another way in which it is directed toward the objects of the lower powers that are directed by it.

For higher reason is directed toward the objects of the lower powers only insofar as it consults the eternal conceptions about them. Hence, it is directed toward them only in a manner that involves deliberation. But deliberate consent in matters that are mortal by their genus is a mortal sin. And so higher reason always sins mortally if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are themselves mortal sins.

With respect to its own object, higher reason has two acts, viz., (a) simple intuition (*simplex intuitus*) and (b) deliberation (*deliberatio*), insofar as it likewise consults the eternal reasons about its own object.

As regards simple intuition, it can have a disordered movement with respect to divine matters—as, for instance, when someone undergoes a sudden movement of unbelief. Even though unbelief is by its genus a mortal sin, nonetheless, a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. For a sin is not mortal unless it is contrary to God's law, and something that pertains to the Faith can occur to reason unexpectedly under some rubric other [than the Faith] (*sub quadam alia ratione*) before eternal reason, i.e., God's law, is consulted or can be consulted about it—as, for instance, when someone suddenly apprehends that the resurrection of the dead is impossible according to nature, and resists this apprehension as soon as he has it, before he has time to deliberate about the fact that this [article of the Faith] has been handed down to us as something to be accepted on faith according to divine law. On the other hand, if the movement of unbelief persists after this deliberation, then it is a mortal sin.

And so with respect to its own proper object, even if the sin in question is mortal by its genus, higher reason can sin venially in the case of sudden movements—or it can also sin mortally through deliberate consent. On the other hand, in those matters that pertain to the lower powers, it always sins mortally in cases in which the sins are mortal by their genus, though not in cases in which the sins are venial by their genus.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, even if a sin that is contrary to the eternal conceptions is mortal by its genus, it can nonetheless be a venial sin because of the incompleteness of a sudden act (*propter imperfectionem actus subiti*).

Reply to objection 2: In matters of action, reason, to which deliberation belongs, also has simple intuition of those things from which deliberation proceeds—just as, in speculative matters, it belongs to reason both to syllogize and to form propositions. And so even reason can have a sudden movement.

Reply to objection 3: One and the same thing can be subject to different sorts of consideration, one of which is higher than another. For instance, it is possible for God to be thought of insofar as He is knowable by human reason or insofar as He is believed in by divine revelation, which is a higher sort of consideration. And so even though higher reason's object is the highest according to the thing's nature, there is a nonetheless a higher consideration to which it can be brought back. It is for this reason that, as was explained above, what was not a mortal sin in a sudden movement becomes a mortal sin because of a deliberation that has recourse to a higher consideration.

QUESTION 75

The Causes of Sin in General

Next we have to consider the causes of sin: first, in general (question 75) and, second, in particular (questions 76-84).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Does sin have a cause? (2) Does sin have an interior cause? (3) Does sin have an exterior cause? (4) Is sin a cause of sin?

Article 1

Does sin have a cause?

It seems that sin does not have cause:

Objection 1: As has been explained (q. 71, a. 6), sin has the character of an evil. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “Evil does not have a cause.” Therefore, sin does not have a cause.

Objection 2: A cause is “that which something else follows upon by necessity.” But what occurs by necessity does not seem to be a sin, since every sin is voluntary. Therefore, sin does not have a cause.

Objection 3: If sin has a cause, then it has for its cause either something good or something bad. But not something good, since as Matthew 7:18 says, “A good tree cannot bring forth bad fruit.” Similarly, neither can something bad be a cause of sin, since the evil of punishment (*malum poenae*) follows upon sin, whereas the evil of fault (*malum culpae*) is identical with sin. Therefore, sin does not have a cause.

But contrary to this: Everything that comes to exist has a cause, since, as Job 5:6 says, “Nothing on earth occurs without a cause.” But sin occurs, since sin is “a word or deed or thought that is contrary to God’s law.” Therefore, sin has a cause.

I respond: A sin is a disordered act (*actus inordinatus*). Therefore, as regards the *act*, it can have a *per se* cause, just like any other act. On the other hand, as regards the *disorderedness*, it has a cause in the manner in which a negation or privation can have a cause.

Now there are two sorts of causes that can be designated for a negation:

First of all, the lack of a cause (*defectus causae*), i.e., the negation of a cause itself, is in its own right a cause of a negation. For the negation of an effect follows upon the negation of its cause; for instance, the sun’s absence is a cause of darkness.

Second, the cause of the affirmation upon which a negation follows is a *per accidens* cause of the consequent negation. For instance, fire, in causing heat by its principal tendency, causes a privation of coldness as a consequence.

The first of these can suffice for a simple negation. But since the disorderedness of a sin, or of any evil, is not a simple negation but the privation of what a thing is apt to have and ought to have, this sort of disorderedness must have a *per accidens* agent cause. For what is apt to inhere in a thing and ought to inhere in it is never missing except because of some impeding cause. Accordingly, it has been customary to say that evil, which consists in a privation, has a ‘deficient cause’ (*causa deficiente*), i.e. a *per accidens* agent cause.

Now every *per accidens* cause is traced back to a *per se* cause. Therefore, since, as regards its *disorderedness*, a sin has a *per accidens* agent cause and, as regards its *act*, it has a *per se* agent cause, it follows that a sin’s *disorderedness* follows from the very cause of the *act*. So, then, an act of willing which lacks the measure or rule of reason and of divine law (*caret directionem regulae rationis et legis divinae*) and which intends some changeable good is a *per se* cause of the sinful act, whereas it is a cause *per accidens*, and outside that intention, of the act’s disorderedness. For the act’s lack of orderedness stems from the lack of measure in the will (*ex defectu directionis in voluntate*).

Reply to objection 1: ‘Sin’ signifies not only the privation of some good, i.e., the disorderedness, but also the act which underlies this sort of privation and which has the character of something bad. This, as has been explained, is the sense in which sin has a cause.

Reply to objection 2: If the definition of a cause given here is to be true in all cases (*universaliter deberet verificari*), then it must mean something that is both sufficient for causing and unimpeded (*intelligatur de causa sufficienti et non impedita*). For it is possible for something to be sufficient for causing another (*causam sufficientem alterius*) and yet for the effect not to follow of necessity—and this because of some supervening impediment. Otherwise, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 6, it would follow that everything happens by necessity. So, then, even if a sin has a cause, it nonetheless does not follow that the cause is necessary; for the effect can be impeded.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, the cause of a sin is the will without the use of the rule of reason or of God’s law (*voluntas sine adhibitione regulae rationis vel legis divinae*). However, not using the rule of reason or of God’s law does not in its own right have the character of something evil—either an evil of punishment or an evil of fault—before its application to an act. Hence, in this sense the cause of the first sin is not something bad, but rather something good along with the absence of another good.

Article 2

Does sin have an interior cause?

It seems that sin does not have an interior cause:

Objection 1: What is interior to a thing is always present to it. Therefore, if sin has an interior cause, a man will always be sinning; for when the cause is posited, the effect is posited.

Objection 2: One and the same thing is not a cause of itself. But a man’s interior movements just are the sin. Therefore, they are not a cause of the sin.

Objection 3: Whatever is within a man is either natural or voluntary. But what is natural cannot be a cause of sin, since, as Damascene says, sin is “contrary to nature.” On the other hand, if what is voluntary is disordered, then it is already a sin. Therefore, it is not the case that anything intrinsic can be a cause of the first sin.

But contrary to this: Augustine says, “The cause of sin is the will” (*voluntas est causa peccati*).

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), one must take the *per se* cause of a sin from the side of the act itself. Now an interior cause of a human act can be either *mediate* or *immediate*. The *immediate* cause of a human act is reason and will, in accord with which a man has free choice (*secundum quam homo est liber arbitrio*). On the other hand, the *remote* cause is the sentient part’s apprehension, along with the sentient appetite. For just as by reason’s judgment the will is moved toward something in accord with reason, so too by the sensory power’s apprehension the sentient appetite is inclined toward something. As will become clear below (q. 77, a. 1), this inclination sometimes draws the will and reason along with it. So, then, two sorts of interior causes of sin can be designated, one *proximate*, on the part of reason and the will, and the other *remote*, on the part of the imagination or sentient appetite.

But since it was explained above (a. 1) that the cause of a sin is (a) some motivating apparent good (*aliquod bonum apparens motivum*), along with (b) the absence of an appropriate motive (*cum defectu debiti motivi*)—more specifically, the absence of the rule of reason or the rule of God’s law, it follows that the motivating good itself, i.e., the apparent good, belongs to sentient apprehension and appetite, whereas the absence of an appropriate rule belongs to reason, which is supposed to take a rule of this sort into consideration. Still, the *final completion* (*perfectio*) of a sinful voluntary act belongs to the will, in

the sense that, given the things previously mentioned, the act of willing is now a sin.

Reply to objection 1: What is intrinsic as a natural *power* is always present, but what is intrinsic as an interior *act* of the appetitive or apprehensive power is not always present. However, the very power of willing is a cause of sin in potentiality, and this potentiality is brought to actuality by the previous movements, first of all, of the sentient part and then of reason. For given that something is proposed as desirable by the sensory power and that the sentient appetite is inclined toward it, reason sometimes stops taking the appropriate rule into consideration, and so the will produces a sinful act. Therefore, since the preliminary movements are not always being actualized, neither is sin always being actualized (*quia motus praecedentes non semper sunt in actu, neque peccatum semper est in actu*).

Reply to objection 2: Not all the interior movements belong to the substance of a sin, which consists principally in the will's act; instead, some of the interior movements precede the sin itself and some of them follow upon it.

Reply to objection 3: What causes a sin as a *power* producing the act is natural. Likewise, the sentient part's movement, which the sin follows upon, is sometimes natural, as when someone sins because of his desire for food. On the other hand, a sin is made 'unnatural' by the very fact that what is lacking is the natural *rule* that a man, in keeping with his nature, ought to pay attention to.

Article 3

Does sin have an exterior cause?

It seems that sin does not have an exterior cause:

Objection 1: A sin is a voluntary act. But what is voluntary exists within, and so it does not have an exterior cause. Therefore, sin does not have an exterior cause.

Objection 2: Just as nature is an interior principle, so too is the will. But a sin or mistake (*peccatum*) never occurs among natural things except because of some interior cause—in the way, for instance, that monstrosities occur because of the corruption of an interior principle. Therefore, neither can a sin or mistake occur in moral matters except because of an interior cause. Therefore, sin does not have an exterior cause.

Objection 3: When a cause is multiplied, its effects are multiplied. But to the extent that the exterior inducements to sin are more numerous and greater, what someone does in a disordered way is less imputed to him as a sin. Therefore, nothing exterior is a cause of sin.

But contrary to this: Numbers 31:16 says, "Are not these the ones who deceived the children of Israel and made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore, something exterior can be a cause that effects a sin.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), the interior cause of sin is (a) the *will* insofar as it brings the sinful act to completion, (b) *reason*, as regards the absence of an appropriate rule, and (c) the *sentient appetite*, which provides the inclination. So, then, there are three ways in which something extrinsic could be a cause of sin: (a) it might immediately move the will itself, or (b) it might move reason, or (c) it might move the sentient appetite.

Now as was explained above (q. 9, a. 6), only God can move the will interiorly, but, as will be shown below (q. 79, a. 1), He cannot be a cause of sin. Hence, it follows that nothing exterior can be a cause of sin except either (a) insofar as it moves reason, in the way that a man or a demon persuades someone to sin or (b) insofar as it moves the sentient appetite, in the way that certain exterior sensible things move the sentient appetite. However, exterior persuasion in matters of action does not move reason with necessity. Nor do things proposed exteriorly move the sentient appetite with necessity, unless perhaps it is disposed in a certain way; and yet the sentient appetite likewise does not move reason

or the will with necessity.

Hence, something exterior can be a cause that moves one in the direction of sinning, and yet it is not a cause that is sufficient to induce one to sin (*non sufficienter ad peccatum inducens*). Rather, the will alone is a cause that is sufficient to bring a sin to completion (*causa sufficienter complens peccatum est sola voluntas*).

Reply to objection 1: From the fact that exterior moving causes do not induce us to sin with sufficiency and by necessity, it follows that it remains within our power to sin or not to sin.

Reply to objection 2: An exterior cause of sin is not excluded by the fact that an interior cause of sin is posited. For as has been explained, what is exterior is a cause of sin only by the mediation of an interior cause.

Reply to objection 3: When the exterior causes that incline one toward sin are multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because more individuals are inclined toward acts of sin by those causes, and more often as well. And yet the character of a fault is diminished, since this consists in something's being voluntary and within our power.

Article 4

Is sin a cause of sin?

It seems that sin is not a cause of sin:

Objection 1: There are four sorts of causes, none of which fits in with sin's being a cause of sin. For the *end* has the character of something good, but this does not belong to sin, which is bad by its definition (*de sua ratione malum*). And for the same reason sin cannot be an *efficient cause*, either; for evil cannot be an agent cause, but is instead "weak and powerless," as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4. On the other hand, the *material cause* and *formal cause* seem to have a place only in the case of natural bodies that are composed of matter and form. Therefore, sin cannot have a material cause or a formal cause.

Objection 2: As *Meteorologia* 4 says, "To effect what is similar to itself belongs to a thing that is perfect." But sin is by its definition imperfect. Therefore, sin cannot be a cause of sin.

Objection 3: If some other sin is a cause of *this* sin, then for the same reason yet another sin will be a cause of *that* sin, and so there will be an infinite regress—which is absurd. Therefore, sin is not a cause of sin.

But contrary to this: In *Super Ezechiel* Gregory says, "A sin that is not erased quickly through repentance is both a sin and a cause of sin."

I respond: Since sin has a cause as regards its act, one sin can be a cause of another sin in the way that one human act can be a cause of another. Therefore, it is possible for one sin to be a cause of another sin in accord with the four kinds of causes:

First, in the mode of an *efficient* or *moving* cause, both *per se* and *per accidens*: (a) *per accidens*, in the sense that what removes an obstacle (*removens prohibens*) is called a *per accidens* mover, since when through one sinful act a man loses grace or charity or shame or anything else that restrains him from sin, he falls into another sin because of this, and so the first sin is a *per accidens* cause of the second sin; (b) *per se*, as when a man is disposed by one sinful act toward committing another similar act more easily, since acts are causes of dispositions and habits that incline one toward similar acts.

As regards the genus of a *material cause*, one sin is a cause of another insofar as it prepares the matter for it, in the way that avarice (*avaritia*) prepares the matter for strife (*litigium*), which often concerns riches that have been amassed.

And as regards the genus of a *final cause*, one sin is a cause of another insofar as, because someone

has one sin as a goal, he commits another sin—as when some commits simony (*simonia*) because he has ambitious advancement (*ambitio*) as a goal, or as when some commits fornication in order to commit theft (*committit fornicationem propter furtum*).

And since, as was established above (q. 18, a. 6), the end confers the form in moral matters, from this it also follows that one sin is a *formal cause* of another. For in an act of fornicating that is committed for the sake of theft, the act of fornicating is like the matter, whereas the act of stealing is like the form.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as a sin is disordered, it has the character of something bad, but insofar as it is a certain act, it has some good—at least some *apparent* good—as its end. And so as regards its act—though not as regards its disorderedness—one sin can be a final cause or efficient cause of another sin. Moreover, a sin has a matter with-respect-to-which (*materia circa quam*), though not a matter out-of-which (*materia ex qua*). And it has form from its end. And so, as has been explained, sin can be called a cause of sin in accord with the four kinds of cause.

Reply to objection 2: A sin is imperfect with moral imperfection as regards its disorderedness, but it has a perfection of nature as regards its act. And it is because of the latter that it can be a cause of sin.

Reply to objection 3: Not every cause of sin is a sin. Hence, there is no necessity for an infinite regress; instead, one can arrive at some first sin whose cause is not another sin.

QUESTION 76

Ignorance as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the particular causes of sin: first, the interior causes of sin (questions 76-78); second, the exterior causes of sin (questions 79-81); and, third, sins that are a cause of sin (questions 82-84).

Given what has gone before, the first consideration will have three parts: For first of all, we will discuss ignorance, which is a cause of sin on the part of reason (question 76); second, we will discuss weakness or passion, which is a cause of sin on the part of the sentient appetite (question 77); third, we will discuss malice, which is a cause of sin on the part of the will (question 78).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is ignorance a cause of sin? (2) Is ignorance a sin? (3) Does ignorance totally excuse one from sin? (4) Does ignorance diminish a sin?

Article 1

Can ignorance be a cause of sin?

It seems that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin:

Objection 1: What is nothing is such that it is not a cause of anything. But ignorance is a non-being, since it is a certain sort of privation of knowledge. Therefore, ignorance is not a cause of sin.

Objection 2: As is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 1), the causes of sin have to be from the side of the turning-toward (*ex parte conversionis*). But ignorance seems to have to do with the turning-away (*respicere aversionem*). Therefore, it should not be posited as a cause of sin.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 74, a. 1), every sin consists in an act of willing (*consistit in voluntate*). But the will is directed only toward something known, since the will's object is an apprehended good. Therefore, ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.

But contrary to this: In *De Natura et Gratia* Augustine says, "Some sin through ignorance."

I respond: According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8, there are two sorts of moving causes, the one *per se* and the other *per accidens*. A *per se* cause is one that effects movement by its own power; for instance, whatever generates [the bodies] is a cause that effects movement in heavy and lightweight [bodies]. On the other hand, a *per accidens* cause is, for instance, one that removes an obstacle, or else it is the very removal of an obstacle. It is in this second way that ignorance can be a cause of a sinful act. For ignorance is a privation of the knowledge that perfects reason, and reason prevents a sinful act insofar as it directs human acts.

Note, however, that there are two sorts of knowledge in accord with which reason directs human acts, viz., *universal* knowledge and *particular* knowledge. For one who takes counsel about matters of action makes use of a sort of syllogism whose conclusion is an act of judging or either an act of choosing or an operation (*iudicium seu electio vel operatio*). But actions exist among singular things. Hence, the conclusion of a syllogism about actions is a singular [proposition] (*conclusio syllogismi operativi est singularis*). But a singular proposition (*singularis propositio*) is inferred (*concluditur*) from a universal proposition only by the mediation of some singular proposition. For instance, a man is restrained from an act of parricide by the fact that (a) he knows that one should not kill his father and that (b) he knows that *this* is his father. Therefore, ignorance of either of these propositions can be a cause of an act of parricide—more specifically, either ignorance of the *universal principle*, which is a rule of reason, or ignorance of the *singular circumstance*.

Hence, it is clear that it is not just any instance of ignorance on the part of a sinner that is a cause of a sin, but only an ignorance undermining the sort of knowledge that would prevent the sinful act. Thus, if a man's will were so disposed that it would not be restrained from an act of parricide even if the man recognized his father, then ignorance with respect to his father would not be a cause of his sin; instead, it

would be related to the sin as something concomitant with it. And so, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3, such a man would not be sinning *because of his ignorance*, but would instead be sinning *while ignorant*.

Reply to objection 1: A non-being cannot be a *per se* cause of anything, and yet it can be a *per accidens* cause in the sense of removing an obstacle.

Reply to objection 2: Just as the knowledge that the ignorance undermines has to do with a sin on the part of the turning-toward, so too ignorance is a cause of a sin on the part of the turning-toward insofar as it removes an obstacle.

Reply to objection 3: The will cannot be directed toward what is in every respect unknown, but if something is known in some respect and not known in some other respect, then the will can will that thing. And it is in this second way that ignorance is a cause of sin, as when someone knows that this being whom he is killing is a man but does not know that it is his father, or as when someone knows that this act is pleasurable and yet does not know that it is a sin.

Article 2

Is ignorance a sin?

It seems that ignorance is not a sin:

Objection 1: As was established above (q. 71, a. 5), a sin is “a word or deed or desire that is contrary to God’s law.” But ‘ignorance’ does not imply any act, either interior or exterior. Therefore, ignorance is not a sin.

Objection 2: Sin is more directly opposed to grace than it is to knowledge. But the privation of grace is not a sin; instead, it is a sort of punishment that follows upon sin. Therefore, ignorance, which is a privation of knowledge, is not a sin.

Objection 3: If ignorance is a sin, this is only insofar as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin insofar as it is voluntary, then it seems that the sin consists in the very act of the will rather than in the ignorance. Therefore, ignorance will not be a sin; instead, it will be something that follows upon a sin.

Objection 4: Every sin is removed through repentance and, with the sole exception of original sin, no sin that passes from guilt remains in actuality. However, ignorance is not removed by repentance, but still remains actual after all the guilt has been removed through repentance. Therefore, ignorance is not a sin—unless, perhaps, it is the original sin.

Objection 5: If ignorance itself is a sin, then as long as the ignorance remains in a man, he is actually sinning. But ignorance remains continually in the one who is ignorant. Therefore, the one who is ignorant is continually sinning. This is clearly false, since in that case ignorance would be the gravest sin. Therefore, it is not the case that ignorance is a sin.

But contrary to this: Nothing merits punishment except sin. But ignorance merits punishment—this according to 1 Corinthians 14:38 (“If anyone does not know, he will not be known”). Therefore, ignorance is a sin.

I respond: Ignorance (*ignorantia*) differs from a lack of knowledge (*nescientia*) in that ‘lack of knowledge’ implies a *simple negation* of knowledge, and so anyone who does not have knowledge of certain things can be said to ‘lack knowledge of them’ (*nescire illas*). This is the sense in which Dionysius, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, posits a lack of knowledge in the angels.

By contrast, ‘ignorance’ implies a *privation* of knowledge, when someone lacks knowledge of something that he is naturally capable of knowing (*quae aptus natus est scire*). Some of these things he is obligated to know (*scire tenetur*), viz., the things without which he cannot correctly exercise the right act. Hence, everyone is obligated to know in a general way what belongs to the Faith and to the universal

precepts of law, whereas each individual is obligated to know those things that are relevant to his state in life or his job (*quae ad eorum statum vel officium spectant*). On the other hand, there are certain things which are such that if even if someone is able to know them, he is nonetheless not obligated to know them, e.g., geometrical theorems and contingent particulars—except in the case of some individuals.

Now it is clear that anyone who neglects to have or to do what he is obligated to have or to do sins by a sin of omission. Hence, ignorance of those things that one is obligated to know is a sin because of one's negligence.

However, a man is not held to be negligent if he does not know what he is unable to know. Hence, ignorance of such things is called *invincible*, because it cannot be overcome by the man's efforts. And because of this, ignorance of this sort is not a sin; for it is not voluntary, given that it is not within our power to repel it.

From this it is clear that no instance of invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin if it is ignorance of what someone is obligated to know, though not if it is ignorance of what he is not obligated to know.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 71, a. 6), in the phrase “word or deed or desire” one is to understand the opposite negations as well, insofar as their omission has the character of a sin. And so the negligence because of which ignorance is a sin falls under the aforementioned definition of sin, insofar as something is omitted that ought to be said or done or desired in order to acquire the requisite knowledge.

Reply to objection 2: Even if the privation of grace is not a sin in its own right (*secundum se*), it can nonetheless, like ignorance, have the character of a sin by reason of one's negligence in preparing himself for grace. And yet they are dissimilar to the extent that a man can acquire knowledge through his own acts, whereas grace is acquired by God's gift and not by our own acts.

Reply to objection 3: Just as, in the case of a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of willing, but also in the willed act which is commanded by the will, so too in a sin of omission the sin is not just the act of willing but also the omission itself insofar as it is in some way voluntary. And it is in this sense that negligence with respect to knowing, or a failure to take something into consideration (*inconsideratio*), is itself a sin.

Reply to objection 4: Even though, once the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains insofar as it is a privation of knowledge, it nonetheless does not remain an instance of the negligence because of which the ignorance is called a sin.

Reply to objection 5: Just as, in the case of other sins of omission, a man is actually sinning only at the time for which the affirmative precept obligates him, so too with a sin of ignorance. For one who is ignorant is not sinning continually in actuality, but is instead sinning only when it is time to acquire the knowledge that he is obliged to have.

Article 3

Does ignorance excuse one totally from sin?

It seems that ignorance excuses one totally from sin (*ignorantia ex toto excuset a peccato*) :

Objection 1: As Augustine says, every sin is voluntary. But as was established above (q. 6, a. 8), ignorance is a cause of involuntariness. Therefore, ignorance totally excuses a sin.

Objection 2: What someone does outside his intention, he does *per accidens*. But an intention cannot be directed toward what is unknown. Therefore, what a man does through ignorance is *per accidens* in matters of human action. But what is *per accidens* does not confer a species. Therefore, nothing that is done through ignorance ought to be judged either as sinful or virtuous in matters of human

action.

Objection 3: A man is a subject of virtue or sin insofar as he participates in reason. But ignorance excludes knowledge, through which reason is perfected. Therefore, ignorance excuses one totally from sin.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “Some things done through ignorance are correctly reprov’d.” But only those things that are sins or mistakes (*peccata*) are correctly reprov’d. Therefore, some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore, it is not the case that ignorance excuses one totally from sin.

I respond: Ignorance is of itself (*de se*) such that it makes an act that it causes involuntary.

Now it has already been explained (a. 1) that ignorance is said to cause an act when the knowledge opposed to it would prevent that act. And so if the knowledge were present, then such an act would be ‘contrary to the will’, which is what the name ‘involuntary’ conveys.

However, if the knowledge of which one is deprived through ignorance would not prevent the act, and this because of the will’s inclination toward that act, then, as Aristotle says in *Ethics* 3, ignorance of this knowledge makes the man a “non-willing” agent (*non volentem*) but not an involuntary agent. And this sort of ignorance, which, as has been explained (a.1), is not a cause of the sinful act because it does not cause involuntariness, does not excuse one from the sin. And the same line of reasoning holds for any instance of ignorance that does not cause a sinful act, but instead follows upon it or is concomitant with it.

On the other hand, since ignorance that is a cause of an act does cause involuntariness, it is of itself (*de se*) such that it excuses one from that sin, since voluntariness is part of the nature of sin. However, there are two ways in which it can sometimes happen that ignorance does not *totally* excuse one from sin:

In one way, it can happen *on the part of the thing that one is ignorant about*. For ignorance excuses one from sin to the extent that something is not known to be a sin. Now it can happen that (a) an individual is ignorant of some circumstance of a sin which is such that, if he knew about it, he would refrain from sinning, whether or not that circumstance contributes to the act’s sinful nature (*sive illa circumstantia faciat ad rationem peccati sive non*), and yet that (b) there still remains in his knowledge something in virtue of which he knows that the act is a sinful act. For instance, suppose that (a) an individual who is beating someone up knows that he is a man, which is sufficient for the character of sinfulness, but that (b) he does not know that the man is his father, which is a circumstance that makes for a new species of sin. Or perhaps (a) he did not know that the man, in defending himself, would strike back, and (b) if he had known this, he would not have struck him—something that is irrelevant to the character of sinfulness. Hence, even though such a man sins because of ignorance, he is not totally excused from his sin, since he still retains knowledge of the act’s sinfulness.

In a second way, this can happen *on the part of the ignorance itself*, viz., when the ignorance is itself voluntary—either (a) *directly* voluntary, as when someone assiduously desires not to know certain things in order that he might sin more freely, or (b) *indirectly* voluntary, as when, because of work or other occupations, someone neglects to learn something by which he would have been held back from the sin. For such negligence makes the ignorance itself voluntary and a sin, as long as it is ignorance of things that one is obligated to know and is able to know. And so this sort of ignorance does not totally excuse one from sin.

However, if the ignorance is wholly involuntary—whether because it is invincible or because it is ignorance of something that one is not obligated to know—then ignorance of this sort totally excuses one from the sin.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above, not every instance of ignorance is a cause of involuntariness. Hence, not every instance of ignorance excuses one totally from sin.

Reply to objection 2: The intention to sin remains in the individual who is ignorant to the extent that voluntariness remains in him. Accordingly, the sin will not be *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 3: If the ignorance were such that it totally excluded the use of reason, then it would excuse one from sin altogether, as is clear in the case of those who are furious or mindless (*sicut patet in furiosis et amentibus*). However, the ignorance that causes a sin is not always like that. And so ignorance does not always totally excuse one from sin.

Article 4

Does ignorance diminish a sin?

It seems that ignorance does not diminish a sin:

Objection 1: What is common to every sin does not diminish a sin. But ignorance is common to every sin; for in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “Every bad man is ignorant.” Therefore, ignorance does not diminish a sin.

Objection 2: A sin added to a sin makes for a greater sin. But as has been explained (a. 2), ignorance is itself a sin. Therefore, ignorance does not diminish a sin.

Objection 3: It is not the case that the same thing both aggravates sin and diminishes sin. But ignorance aggravates a sin; for Ambrose, in commenting on the passage from the Apostle (Romans 2:4) that goes, “Are you ignorant of the fact that God’s kindness?”, says, “You sin very gravely if you are ignorant.” Therefore, ignorance does not diminish a sin.

Objection 4: If any sort of ignorance diminishes a sin, it would seem especially to be the sort of ignorance that totally undermines the use of reason. But ignorance of this sort does not diminish a sin, but instead increases it; for in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “The drunkard deserves a twofold curse.” Therefore, ignorance does not diminish a sin.

But contrary to this: Any reason for forgiving a sin (*ratio remissionis peccati*) lessens the sin. But ignorance is like this, as is clear from 1 Timothy 1:13 (“I received mercy because I did it in ignorance”). Therefore, ignorance diminishes or lessens a sin.

I respond: Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish a sin to the extent that it diminishes voluntariness, whereas if it does not diminish voluntariness, then it in no way diminishes the sin.

Now it is clear that since the sort of ignorance that totally excuses one from sin totally destroys voluntariness, it does not diminish the sin but instead removes it altogether. On the other hand, the sort of ignorance that is not a cause of the sin but is instead [merely] concomitant with the sin neither diminishes the sin nor increases it. Therefore, the only sort of ignorance that can diminish a sin is ignorance that (a) is a cause of the sin and yet (b) does not totally excuse one from the sin.

Now it sometimes happens that this sort of ignorance is *per se* and directly voluntary, as when someone keeps himself deliberately (*sua sponte*) ignorant of something in order that he might sin more freely. This sort of ignorance seems to increase the voluntariness and the sin, since it is because of the intensity of his act of willing to sin that someone wants to sustain the loss represented by the ignorance—and this in order to have the freedom to sin.

On the other hand, sometimes ignorance that is a cause of a sin is not directly voluntary, but instead indirectly or *per accidens* voluntary—as, for instance, when someone does not will to work hard at his studies, with the result that he is ignorant; or as when someone wills to drink wine to excess (*immoderate*), with the result that he becomes inebriated and lacks discretion. This sort of ignorance diminishes the voluntariness and, consequently, the sin. For when one does not recognize that something is a sin, his will cannot be said to be moved toward a sin directly and *per se*. Instead, it is moved toward the sin *per accidens*; hence, there is less contempt in such a case and, consequently, a lesser sin.

Reply to objection 1: The ignorance in accord with which every bad man is ignorant is not a cause

of a sin, but rather something that follows upon the cause, i.e., upon the passion or habit that inclines one toward the sin.

Reply to objection 2: A sin added to a sin makes for more sins, and yet it does not always make for a greater sin, since they might not converge into the same sin but might instead be more than one sin. And if the first diminishes the second, it can happen that the two of them together are not as grave as the one would have been by itself. For instance, homicide is a graver sin when it is committed by a sober man than if it is committed by a drunk man, even though [drunkenness and homicide] are two sins. For the drunkenness diminishes the sinful character of the subsequent sin to a degree that is greater than its own graveness.

Objection 3: The quotation from Ambrose can be taken to refer to ignorance that is merely feigned (*simpliciter affectata*).

An alternative reply is that Ambrose can be understood to be talking about a certain type of sin of ingratitude, in which the highest level of ingratitude is that a man should not even recognize the benefits that he has been given (*etiam beneficia non recognoscat*).

Another alternative reply is that the quotation can be taken to refer to the ignorance of infidelity, which subverts the foundation of one's spiritual edifice.

Objection 4: The drunk man merits two curses because of the two sins that he commits, viz., drunkenness and the other sin that follows upon the drunkenness. Yet the drunkenness, by reason of its being joined to ignorance, diminishes the sin that follows upon it; and, as has been explained, it might diminish it to a greater degree than the graveness had by the drunkenness itself.

An alternative reply is that this passage is induced by the ordinance of a certain legislator named Pittacus, who ordered that drunkards should be punished more severely if they struck someone—thus focusing not on the leniency that drunkards should have more of, but instead on the public welfare (*sed ad utilitatem*), since more drunk men do injury than sober men. This is clear from the Philosopher in *Politics* 2.

QUESTION 77

The Sentient Appetite as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the sentient appetite as a cause of sin (*considerandum est de causa peccati ex parte sensitivi appetitus*), i.e., whether the passions of the soul are causes of sin.

On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Can a passion of the soul move or incline the will? (2) Can a passion overcome reason against its own knowledge? (3) Is a sin that stems from a passion a sin of weakness (*utrum peccatum quod ex passione provenit sit peccatum ex infirmitate*)? (4) Is the passion which is love for oneself a cause of every sin? (5) What of the three causes of sin that are posited in 1 John 2:16, viz., “concupiscence of the eyes, concupiscence of the flesh, and pride of life”? (6) Does a passion that is a cause of a sin diminish that sin? (7) Does it totally excuse one from the sin? (8) Can a sin of passion be a mortal sin?

Article 1

Is the will moved by a passion of the sentient appetite?

It seems that the will is not moved by a passion of the sentient appetite:

Objection 1: No passive power is moved except by its own object. But the will is a power that is at the same time both passive and active, since, as the Philosopher says in general about the appetitive power in *De Anima* 3, “it both effects movement and is moved.” Therefore, since the will’s object is the good of reason rather than a passion of the sentient appetite, it seems that a passion of the sentient does not move the will.

Objection 2: A higher mover is not moved by a lower mover; for instance, the soul is not moved by the body. But the will, which is reason’s appetite, is related to the sentient appetite as a higher mover to a lower mover; for in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “Reason’s appetite moves the sentient appetite in the way that one sphere moves another in the case of the celestial bodies.” Therefore, the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Nothing immaterial can be moved by anything material. But the will is an immaterial power; for it does not make use of a corporeal organ, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, it exists in reason. But the sentient appetite is a material power insofar as it is grounded in a corporeal organ (*utpote fundata in organo corporali*). Therefore, a passion of the sentient appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.

But contrary to this: Daniel 13:56 says, “Concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) has perverted your heart.”

I respond: A passion of the sentient appetite cannot *directly* draw or move the will, but it can do this *indirectly*—and this in two ways:

First, by way of *distraction* (*secundum quandam abstractionem*). For since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the single essence of the soul, when one power is intensified in its act, another has to become less intensified in its act or even totally impeded. This is because (a) every power that is dispersed toward several things is weakened (*fit minor*), and so, conversely, when it is intensified with respect to a single thing, it is less able to be dispersed toward other things; and also because (b) the soul’s works require a certain level of attention such that when the soul is strongly applied to one thing, it cannot be strongly attentive to something else. Accordingly, when the sentient appetite’s movement is strengthened in accord with a given passion, then through a certain sort of distraction the proper movement of the rational appetite, i.e., the will, is lessened or totally impeded.

The second way is *on the part of the will’s object*, i.e., the good that is apprehended by reason. For as is clear in those who have lost their minds, reason’s judgment and apprehension, along with the estimative power’s judgment, are impeded by vehement and disorderly apprehensions on the part of the

imagination. But it is clear that the imagination's apprehension, along with the estimative power's judgment, follow the passions of the sentient appetite, just as the judgment of the sense of taste follows the tongue's disposition. Hence, we see that men who are in a passion do not easily turn away from the things by which they are being affected. Hence, as a result, reason's judgment very often follows a passion of the sentient appetite. And as a result of this, so does the movement of the will, which is apt to follow reason's judgment.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, because of the sentient appetite's passion a change occurs in the judgment about the will's object—even though the sentient appetite's passion is not directly the will's object.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, what is higher is not moved directly by something lower than it, but it can be moved by it indirectly in a certain way.

Reply to objection 3: The same thing should be said in reply to the third objection.

Article 2

Can reason be overcome by a passion against its own knowledge?

It seems that reason cannot be overcome by a passion against its own knowledge (*non possit superari a passione contra suam scientiam*):

Objection 1: What is stronger is not overcome by what is weaker. But because of its certitude, knowledge is the strongest thing that exists within us. Therefore, it cannot be overcome by passion, which is weak and quickly passes.

Objection 2: An act of willing is directed only at a good or at an apparent good. But when a passion draws the will toward what is truly good, then it does not incline reason against its own knowledge. On the other hand, when it draws the will toward what is an apparent and non-existent good, then it draws it toward what seems to reason to be the case; but the fact that something seems to it to be the case falls within reason's knowledge. Therefore, a passion never inclines reason against its own knowledge.

Objection 3: If someone replies that passion draws reason, which knows something in general, to make a contrary judgment in the particular case, then against this:

If a universal proposition and a particular proposition are opposed to one another, then they are opposed as contradictories, in the way that 'Every man is such-and-such' and 'Not every man is such-and-such' are contradictories. But as *De Interpretatione* 2 says, two opinions that fall under contradictories are contraries (*duae opinionones quae sunt contradictoriarum sunt contrariae*). Therefore, if anyone who knew something in general made an opposed judgment in the singular case, then it would follow that he has contrary opinions at the same time—which is impossible.

Objection 4: Whoever knows a universal likewise knows a particular that he realizes is contained under that universal. For instance, whoever knows that every mule is sterile knows that *this animal* is sterile, as long as he knows that this animal is a mule; this is clear from what is said in *Posterior Analytics* 1. But one who knows something in general, e.g., that one should not commit any act of fornication, knows that *this particular* is contained under the universal, e.g., that *this* is an act of fornication. Therefore, it seems that he also knows in particular [that he should not commit this act].

Objection 5: According to the Philosopher, "Spoken expressions (*ea quae sunt in voce*) are signs of what the soul understands intellectually (*signa intellectus animae*). But a man in the throes of a passion (*homo in passione existens*) often admits that that what he is choosing is bad even in the particular case. Therefore, he has knowledge even of the particular. So, then, it seems that the passions cannot draw reason against its universal knowledge, since it cannot be the case that it has the universal

knowledge and thinks the opposite in the particular case.

But contrary to this: In Romans 7:23 the Apostle says, “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin.” But the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had previously spoken. Therefore, since concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws reason even against what it knows.

I respond: As the Philosopher reports in *Ethics* 7, Socrates was of the opinion that knowledge can never be overcome by a passion. Hence, he claimed that all the virtues are types of knowledge, and that all sins are types of ignorance (*omnes virtutes esse scientias et omnia peccata esse ignorantias*).

To be sure, there is a sense in which his reasoning was correct in this matter. For since an act of willing is directed toward the good or toward an apparent good, the will is never directed toward what is bad unless what is not good appears to reason to be good in some way. And because of this, the will never tends toward what is bad except when there is some sort of ignorance or error on the part of reason (*nisi cum aliqua ignorantia vel errore rationis*). Hence, Proverbs 14:22 says, “They are ignorant who do evil.”

However, because it is clear from experience that many individuals act against what they have knowledge of—and this is confirmed as well by divine authority in Luke 12:47 (“The servant who knew his master’s will and did not do it will be beaten with many stripes”) and in James 4:17 (“To him who knows to do good and does not do it, it is to him sin”)—what Socrates said is not true absolutely speaking. Instead, we have to draw a distinction, as the Philosopher teaches in *Ethics* 7. For there are two sorts of knowledge by which a man is directed toward acting uprightly, viz., *universal* knowledge and *particular* knowledge, and, as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1), a defect in either of them is sufficient to block the rectitude of a deed and the rectitude of an act of willing (*sufficit ad hoc quod impediatur rectitudo operis et voluntatis*).

Thus, it can happen that someone has an instance of general knowledge, e.g., that one should not commit any act of fornication, and yet he does not recognize in particular that he should not commit *this* act, which is an act of fornication (*sed tamen non cognoscat in particulari hunc actum qui est fornicatio non esse faciendum*). And this is sufficient for the will’s not following reason’s general knowledge.

Again, notice that nothing prevents something from being known habitually and yet not actually being taken into account. Therefore, it is possible for someone to have correct *singular* knowledge—and not just correct *universal* knowledge—and yet not actually take it into account. And in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act outside of what he does not actually take into account.

Now the fact that in a particular case a man does not take into account what he knows habitually sometimes occurs only because of a *lack of the relevant intention*—as, for instance, when a man who knows geometry does not intend to consider the conclusions of geometry, which he can promptly consider at any moment. On the other hand, sometimes it is because of *some supervening obstacle* that a man does not take account of what he knows habitually—as, for instance, because of some extraneous occupation or because of some bodily sickness. And it is in this latter way that someone who is experiencing a passion (*in passione constitutus*) does not take into account in a particular case what he knows in general, and this because the passion impedes his taking it into account.

Now there are three ways in which a passion does this:

First, *by distracting one’s attention* (*per quandam distractionem*), as was explained above (a. 1).

Second, *by contrariety*, in the sense that a passion often inclines one toward the contrary of what the general knowledge dictates (*inclinat ad contrarium huius quod scientia universalis habet*).

Third, *through some sort of bodily change* by which reason is in some sense kept from freely going into action (*ex qua ratio quodammodo ligatur ne libere in actum exeat*)—in the same way that sleep or inebriation likewise prevent the use of reason (*sicut etiam somnus vel ebrietas ligant usum rationis*) by effecting certain bodily changes. The fact that this occurs in the case of the passions is clear from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are intense, a man totally loses the use of reason; for there are

many who go mad (*in insaniam conversi*) because of excessive love or anger. And in this way a passion draws reason into making a judgment in a particular case that runs contrary to the general knowledge it has.

Reply to objection 1: General or universal knowledge, which has the most certitude, does not occupy the principal place in operations; rather, particular knowledge does, because operations have to do with singulars. Hence, it is not surprising if, in the case of actions, a passion runs contrary to general or universal knowledge in the absence of the consideration of the particular.

Reply to objection 2: The very fact that in a particular case something appears good which is not good stems from a passion. And yet the particular judgment is contrary to reason's general or universal knowledge.

Reply to objection 3: To be sure, it could not happen that someone has at the same time both (a) an *actual* instance of knowledge or true opinion with respect to a universal affirmative proposition and (b) an *actual* instance of false opinion with respect to a corresponding particular negative proposition, or vice versa. However, it can indeed happen that someone has both (a) *habitual* true knowledge with respect to a universal affirmative proposition and (b) an *actual* false opinion with respect to a corresponding particular negative proposition. For an act is directly contrary to an act and not to a habit.

Reply to objection 4: Someone who has general or universal knowledge is impeded by a passion from being able to subsume something under that universal and arrive at the conclusion. Instead, he subsumes it under *another* universal that the inclination of the passion has suggested to him, and he draws the conclusion under this latter universal. Hence, as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 7, an incontinent man's syllogism involves four propositions, two of which are universal: one of them comes from reason, e.g., *One should not commit any act of fornication*, and the other comes from the passion, e.g., *One should pursue pleasure*. Thus, the passion binds reason so that it does not subsume and reach a conclusion under the *first* universal proposition. Hence, for as long as the passion persists, reason subsumes and reaches a conclusion under the *second* universal proposition.

Reply to objection 5: An inebriated man is sometimes able to speak words that signify profound sentiments, which he nonetheless cannot pass judgment on with his mind because his drunkenness prevents this. In the same way, as *Ethics* 7 explains, even if someone in the grip of a passion pronounces with his mouth, "I should not do this," he is nonetheless thinking interiorly in his mind that he *should* do it.

Article 3

Should a sin of passion be called a sin of weakness?

It seems that a sin of passion should not be called a sin of weakness (*peccatum quod est ex passione non debeat dici ex infirmitate*):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), a passion is a sort of vehement movement on the part of the sentient appetite. But a movement's vehemence attests more to strength than to weakness. Therefore, a sin of passion should not be called a sin of weakness.

Objection 2: A man's weakness especially involves that which is more fragile within him. But this is his flesh (*caro*); hence, Psalm 77:39 says, "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore, one should say that a sin of weakness is a sin that stems from some bodily defect rather than a sin that stems from a passion of the soul.

Objection 3: A man does not seem to be weak with respect to what is subject to his will. But it is subject to a man's will to do or not to do what a passion inclines him toward—this according to Genesis 4:7 ("Your appetite shall be subject to you, and you shall have dominion over it"). Therefore, a sin of

passion is not a sin of weakness.

But contrary to this: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully calls the passions “sicknesses of the soul.” But ‘sickness’ is another name for ‘weakness’. Therefore, a sin of passion should be called a sin of weakness.

I respond: The proper cause of a sin belongs to the part of the soul in which the sin mainly exists. Now weakness in the soul can be thought of by comparison to weakness in the body. A man’s body is said to be weak when it is weakened or impeded in the execution of its proper operation because of some disorder in the parts of the body, so that a man’s humors and bodily members are not subject to the power that rules and moves the body. Hence, a member is likewise said to be weak if it cannot perform the operation of the member when healthy—e.g., as Aristotle says in *De Historiis Animalium*, an eye is said to be weak when it cannot see clearly.

Hence, weakness is likewise said to belong to the soul when the soul is impeded in its proper operation because of a disorder in its parts. Now just as bodily parts are said to be disordered when they do not follow the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be disordered when they are not subordinated to the order of reason. For reason is the ruling power for the parts of the soul. So, then, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by some passion in a way contrary to the order of reason (*extra ordinem rationis*), and when, because of this obstacle, it stands in opposition—in the way explained above (a. 2)—to an action required of a man, then the sin is called a sin of weakness. Hence, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher compares the incontinent man to someone with palsy, whose bodily parts move in opposition to what he himself intends.

Reply to objection 1: Just as, in the case of the body, the stronger the movement that is opposed to reason, the greater the weakness, so, too, the stronger the movement of a passion in opposition to the order of reason, the greater the soul’s weakness.

Reply to objection 2: Sin consists principally in the act of a will that is not impeded by a bodily weakness. For as was explained above (a. 1), someone who is weak in body can have a will that is prone toward doing something and yet be impeded by a passion. Hence, when a sin is called a sin of weakness, this should be taken to refer to a weakness of the soul rather than to a weakness of the body.

Still, a weakness of the soul can itself be called a ‘weakness of the flesh’, since it is from the condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us; for the sentient appetite is a power that makes use of a corporeal organ.

Reply to objection 3: It is within the will’s power to assent or not to assent to what a passion inclines us toward, and to that extent our appetite is said to be subject to us. However, the will’s assent or dissent is itself impeded by a passion in the way explained above.

Article 4

Is love of self a source of every sin?

It seems that love of self is not a source of every sin (*amor sui non sit principium omnis peccati*):

Objection 1: What is good and right in itself is not a proper cause of sin. But love of self is in itself good and right; this is why man is commanded in Leviticus 19:18 to love his neighbor as himself. Therefore, love of self cannot be a proper cause of sin.

Objection 2: In Romans 7:8 the Apostle says, “Through the commandment sin wrought in me all manner of concupiscence,” where a Gloss says, “The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils.” It says this because concupiscence is a cause of every sin. But as was shown above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 30, a. 2), desire is a passion that is different from love. Therefore, love of self is not a cause of every sin.

Objection 3: In commenting on Psalm 39:17 (“Things set on fire and burned through”), Augustine says, “Every sin stems either from a love that inflames one in a bad way or from a fear that abases one in a bad way.” Therefore, love of self is not by itself a cause of every sin.

Objection 4: Just as man sometimes sins because of a disordered love of self, so too he sometimes sins because of a disordered love of his neighbor. Therefore, love of self is not a cause of every sin.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Love of self that leads to contempt for God builds up the city of Babylon.” But a man belongs to the city of Babylon by any sort of sin. Therefore, love of self is a cause of every sin.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 75, a. 1), the proper and *per se* cause of a sin has to be taken from the side of one’s turning toward a changeable good, and from this side that every sinful act proceeds from a disordered desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that someone desires a temporal good in a disordered way stems from his loving himself in a disordered way; for to love someone is to will some good for him. Hence, it is clear that disordered love of self is a cause of every sin.

Reply to objection 1: Well-ordered love of self is right and natural (*amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis*), in the sense that one wills himself a good that is fitting. By contrast, Augustine is claiming that disordered love of self, which leads to contempt for God, is a cause of sin.

Reply to objection 2: As has already been explained, the concupiscence by which one desires a good for himself is traced back to love of self as its cause.

Reply to objection 3: An individual is said to love both (a) the good that he wants for himself and (b) himself, for whom he wants the good. Therefore, love in the sense in which love is said to be directed at what is wanted—in the way that someone is said to love wine or money—is susceptible to fear as a cause that has to do with drawing back from what is bad. For every sin stems either from a disordered desire for something good or from a disordered drawing back from something bad. But both of these are traced back to love of self. For it is because he loves himself that a man desires good things and draws back from bad things.

Reply to objection 4: A friend is, as it were, another self (*est alter ipse*). And in this way a sin that is committed out of love for a friend is seen to be committed out of love for oneself.

Article 5

Are ‘concupiscence of the flesh’, ‘concupiscence of the eyes’, and ‘pride of life’ appropriately posited as causes of sins?

It seems that ‘concupiscence of the flesh’, ‘concupiscence of the eyes’, and ‘pride of life’ (1 John 2:16) are not appropriately posited as causes of sins:

Objection 1: According to the Apostle in 1 Timothy 6:10, “The avid desire for money is the root of every bad thing.” But pride of life is not contained under the avid desire for money. Therefore, it should not be posited among the causes of sins.

Objection 2: Concupiscence of the flesh is especially excited by the eye’s act of seeing—this according to Daniel 13:56 (“Beauty (*species*) has deceived you”). Therefore, concupiscence of the eyes should not be divided off on the same level from concupiscence of the flesh (*non debet concupiscentia oculorum contra concupiscentiam carnis*).

Objection 3: As was established above (q. 30, a. 2), concupiscence is the desire for what is pleasurable. But pleasures occur not only because of vision, but also because of the other senses. Therefore, concupiscence of hearing and of the other senses should also be posited.

Objection 4: As has been explained (a. 4), just as a man is induced to sin by a disordered desire

for something good, so too he is induced to sin by a disordered aversion to something bad. But there is nothing enumerated here that has to do with the avoidance of what is bad. Therefore, the causes of sin are not sufficiently touched upon.

But contrary to this: 1 John 2:16 says, “All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or concupiscence of the flesh, or pride of life.” Now something is said to be “in the world” because of sin; this is why it says in the same place, “The whole world is set in sin (*in maligno positus est*).” Therefore, the three things under discussion are causes of sins.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 4), disordered love of self is a cause of every sin. Now [disordered] love of self includes a disordered desire for something good, since each individual desires some good for whomever he loves. Hence, it is clear that a disordered desire for a good is a cause of every sin.

Now as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), there are two ways in which a good is an object of the sentient appetite—which is where the passions of the soul, which are a cause of sin, exist—viz., (a) *absolutely speaking*, insofar as it is an object of the *concupiscible* power, and (b) *under the concept of the arduous*, insofar as it is an object of the *irascible* power.

Now as was established above (q. 30, a. 3), there are two sorts of concupiscence or concupiscible desire (*duplex concupiscentia*):

The first is *natural concupiscence*, which is directed toward things by which our corporeal nature is sustained, either with respect to the conservation of the individual, e.g., food and drink and other things of this sort, or with respect to the conservation of the species, as in the case of sexual pleasure. And a disordered desire for such things is called *concupiscence of the flesh*.

The second is *concupiscence belonging to a soul* or *spiritual concupiscence* (*concupiscentia animalis*), which is directed not at things that afford sustenance or pleasure through the senses of the flesh, but instead at things that are pleasing to the apprehension of the imagination or of some such sort of perception, e.g., money, ornate clothes, etc. This spiritual concupiscence is called *concupiscence of the eyes*, regardless of whether (a) this is understood as a desire that belongs to the eyes, i.e., a desire for the very act of seeing that occurs through the eyes, so that it refers to *curiosity*, in the way that Augustine explains it in *Confessiones* 10, or whether (b) it has to do with a desire for things that are proposed from the outside to the eyes, so that it refers to *avid desire* (*cupiditas*), in the way that others explain it.

On the other hand, it is a disordered desire for an arduous good that pertains to *pride of life*. For as will be explained below (*ST* 2-2, q. 162, a. 1), pride is a disordered desire for excellence.

And so it is clear that all the passions that are a cause of sin can be traced back to the three things under discussion. For all the passions of the concupiscible power are traced back to the first two, while all the passions of the irascible part are traced back to the third. The reason why the third one is not divided into two is that all the passions of the irascible part fit in with spiritual concupiscence.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) implies a desire for any good in general, even pride of life is contained under *avid desire*.

On the other hand, it will be explained below (q. 84, a. 1) how avid desire as a specific vice, which is called ‘avarice’, is a root of all sins.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Concupiscence of the eyes’ as used here does not mean a desire for everything that can be seen with the eyes, but only a desire for those things in which what is sought is not carnal pleasure, which occurs through the sense of touch, but rather the pleasure of the eye, i.e., the pleasure of an apprehensive power.

Reply to objection 3: As *Metaphysics* 1 explains, the sense of sight (*sensus visus*) is the most excellent of the senses and extends to the most things. And so, as Augustine explains in *De Verbis Domini*, the name of the sense of sight is transferred to all the other senses and even to all interior apprehensions.

Reply to objection 4: As was explained above (q. 25, a. 2 and q. 29, a. 2), an aversion to what is

bad is caused by a desire for the good. And so only the passions that incline one toward something good are posited here, given that they are causes of the things that effect a disordered aversion to what is bad.

Article 6

Is a sin lessened by passion?

It seems that a sin is not lessened by passion (*peccatum non alleviatur propter passionem*):

Objection 1: An increase in the cause increases the effect; for instance, if something hot dissolves a given thing, then what is hotter will dissolve it to a greater degree. But as has been established, passion is a cause of sin. Therefore, the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore, passion increases the sin and does not diminish it.

Objection 2: A bad passion is related to sin in the same way that a good passion is related to merit. But a good passion increases merit, since the greater the mercy with which someone aids a poor man, the more he seems to merit. Therefore, a bad passion likewise aggravates a sin rather than lessening it.

Objection 3: The more intense the act of willing by which someone commits a sin, the more grave the sin seems to be. But when a passion impels the will, it makes it to be directed more strongly toward the sinful act in question. Therefore, passion aggravates the sin.

But contrary to this: The very passion of concupiscence is called a ‘temptation of the flesh’. But as is clear from Augustine, the greater the temptation that someone is subverted by, the less of a sin he commits. Therefore, passion diminishes a sin.

I respond: A sin consists essentially in an act of free choice, which is a power of the will and reason. A passion, on the other hand, is a movement of the sentient appetite.

Now the sentient appetite can be related to free choice both (a) antecedently and (b) consequently:

It is related to it *antecedently* insofar as a passion of the sentient appetite draws or inclines reason and the will; this was explained above (q. 9, a. 1 and q. 10, a. 3). On the other hand, it is related to it *consequently* insofar as the movements of the higher powers, if they are strong, flow over into the lower powers. For the will cannot be moved intensely toward something without some passion being excited in the sentient appetite.

Therefore, if a passion is being thought of insofar as it *precedes* the sinful act, then it must be the case that it diminishes the sin. For an act is a sin to the extent that it is voluntary and is within our power (*in nobis*), where something is said to be ‘within our power’ because of reason and will. Hence, to the extent that reason and will do something of themselves (*ex se*) and not because of the impulse of passion, that thing is more voluntary and more within our power. And a passion diminishes a sin to the extent that it diminishes voluntariness.

On the other hand, a *consequent* passion does not diminish a sin but instead increases it—or, better, it is a sign of its magnitude insofar as it exhibits the will’s intensity with respect to the sinful act. And in this sense it is true that the more eagerness or concupiscence someone sins with (*maiori libidine vel concupiscentia peccat*), the greater the degree to which he sins (*magis peccat*).

Reply to objection 1: A passion is a sin on the side of the turning-toward (*ex parte conversione*). By contrast, the gravity of the sin has more to do with the turning-away (*magis attenditur ex parte aversione*), which follows upon the turning-toward *per accidens*, i.e., outside of the sinner’s intention. But *per accidens* causes do not increase their effects when they themselves are increased; it is only *per se* causes that do this.

Reply to objection 2: A good passion that follows upon reason’s judgment increases merit. By contrast, if it precedes reason’s judgment—so that, namely, the man is moved to act well more by the passion than by reason’s judgment—then this sort of passion diminishes the act’s goodness and

praiseworthiness.

Reply to objection 3: Even if the will's movement is more intense when it is incited by a passion, this movement is nonetheless not proper to the will in the way that it would be if the will were being moved by reason alone.

Article 7

Does passion totally excuse one from sin?

It seems that passion totally excuses one from sin (*totaliter excuset a peccato*):

Objection 1: Whatever causes involuntariness excuses one totally from a sin. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, is a cause of involuntariness—this according to Galatians 5:17 (“The flesh lusts against the spirit so that you do not do the things that you want to do”). Therefore, passion totally excuses one from sin.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 2), passion is a cause of a certain sort of ignorance with respect to a particular case. But as was established above (q. 19, a. 6), ignorance of the particular totally excuses one from sin. Therefore, passion totally excuses one from sin.

Objection 3: Weakness of soul is worse than weakness of body. But weakness of body totally excuses one from sin, as is clear in the case of those who are insane. Therefore, *a fortiori*, passion, which is a weakness of soul, excuses one from sin.

But contrary to this: In Romans 7:5 the Apostle speaks of the “passions of sins,” and for no reason other than that they are causes of sins. But this would not be the case if they totally excused one from sin. Therefore, passions do not totally excuse one from sin.

I respond: An act that is bad by its genus is totally excused from sin only by being rendered totally involuntary. Hence, if a passion is such that it renders the act that follows upon it totally involuntary, then it totally excuses one from sin; otherwise, it does not totally excuse one.

On this score, there are two things that have to be taken into account:

The first is that something can be voluntary either (a) *in its own right* (*secundum se*), as when the will is moved directly toward it, or (b) *in its cause* (*secundum suam causam*), as when the will is moved toward its cause and not toward its effect; this is clear in the case of one who becomes voluntarily inebriated, since voluntariness is imputed to what he does because of his drunkenness.

The second thing to be taken into account is that something is called ‘voluntary’ either (a) *directly* or (b) *indirectly*—*directly*, as in the case of what the will is directly moved toward, and *indirectly*, as in the case of what the will is able to prevent but does not prevent.

Accordingly, then, one must draw distinctions:

A passion is sometimes such that it totally removes the use of reason, as is clear in the case of those who go insane because love or anger. In such a case, if the passion was voluntary from the start, then the act is imputed as a sin, since it is voluntary in its cause—as was explained above concerning drunkenness. On the other hand, if the cause was natural and not voluntary—as, for instance, when because of sickness or some other cause of this sort someone falls into a passion that totally removes the use of reason—then the act is rendered completely involuntary and, as a result, the individual is totally excused from sin.

However, a passion is sometimes such that it does not totally interrupt the use of reason. And in such a case reason is able either (a) to exclude the passion by diverting itself to other thoughts or (b) to keep its effect from following upon it; for as was explained above (q. 17, a. 9), the bodily members are applied to a deed only through reason's consent. Hence, a passion of this sort does not totally excuse one from sin.

Reply to objection 1: The phrase “so that you do not do the things that you want to do” should be taken to refer not to what is done through the exterior act, but instead to the interior movement of concupiscence. For a man will never to desire what is bad. This is also the way to interpret Romans 7:15 (“The evil which I will not, that I do”).

An alternative reply is that these words can be taken to refer to an act of will that precedes the passion, as is clear in the case of those continent individuals who because of their concupiscence act contrary to what they intend.

Reply to objection 2: The sort of ‘particular ignorance’ that totally excuses one from a sin is ignorance of a circumstance which one cannot know even when due diligence is taken. By contrast, a passion causes ignorance of the law in a particular case by impeding the application of one’s general knowledge to a particular act. As has been explained, this sort passion is such that reason is able to repel it.

Reply to objection 3: Weakness of body is involuntary. However, there would be a parallel if it were voluntary, as has been explained for the case of drunkenness, which is a sort of bodily weakness.

Article 8

Can a sin of passion be mortal?

It seems that a sin of passion cannot be mortal (*peccatum quod ex passione non possit esse mortale*):

Objection 1: Venial sin is divided off against mortal sin. But a sin of weakness is venial (*peccatum quod est ex infirmitate est veniale*), since it has within itself a reason for leniency. Therefore, since a sin of passion arises from weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal

Objection 2: A cause is not more powerful than its effect. But a passion cannot be a mortal sin, since, as was explained above (q. 74, a. 4), there is no mortal sin in the sentient appetite. Therefore, a sin of passion cannot be mortal.

Objection 3: As is clear from what has been said (aa. 1-2), a passion leads one away from reason. But it is the role of reason either to be turned toward God or to turn away from Him, and it is turning away from God that the nature of a mortal sin consists in. Therefore, a sin of passion cannot be mortal.

But contrary to this: In Romans 7:5 the Apostle says, “The passions of the sins work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.” But it is proper to a mortal sin “to bring forth fruit unto death” (*quod fructificet morti*). Therefore, a sin of passion can be a mortal.

I respond: As has been explained (q. 72, a. 5), a mortal sin consists in turning away from the ultimate end, which is God. This turning-away pertains to deliberative reason (*ratio deliberans*), the role of which is precisely to order one toward his end. Therefore, the only way in which it can happen that an inclination in the soul that is contrary to the ultimate end is not a mortal sin is that deliberative reason cannot occur—and this happens in the case of sudden movements.

Now when someone proceeds from passion into an act of sin or into deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly. Hence, deliberative reason can occur in such a case; for, as has been explained (a. 7), it can exclude, or at least impede, a passion. Hence, if deliberative reason does not occur, then there is a mortal sin, just as we see that many instances of homicide and adultery are committed through passion.

Reply to objection 1: There are three senses ‘venial’:

In one sense, something is venial *because of its cause (ex causa)*, i.e., because it has a cause of leniency that diminishes the sin. And this is the sense in which a sin of weakness or of ignorance is called ‘venial’.

In the second sense, something is venial *because of its outcome* (*ex eventu*). In this sense through repentance every sin becomes venial; that is, it attains forgiveness (*venial consecutum*).

In the third sense, something is called 'venial' *by its genus* (*ex genere*), in the way that engaging in an idle conversation (*verbum otiosum*) is a venial sin.

This last sense is the only sense in which 'venial' is opposed to 'mortal', whereas the objection has to do with the first sense.

Reply to objection 2: A passion is a cause of a sin on the part of the turning-toward (*ex parte conversionis*). By contrast, the fact that a sin is mortal stems from the side of the turning-away (*ex parte aversionis*), which, as has been explained (a. 6), follows *per accidens* upon the turning-toward. Hence, the argument does not go through.

Reply to objection 3: Reason is not always totally impeded in its act by a passion. Hence, free choice remains in it, so that it is able to turn away from God or to turn toward God. On the other hand, if the use of reason were totally removed, then there would no longer be either a mortal sin nor a venial sin.

QUESTION 78

Malice as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, and this is called ‘malice’ (*malitia*).

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Can someone sin from fixed malice or purposefully (*ex certa malitia seu industria*)? (2) Does everyone who sins from a habit sin from fixed malice? (3) Does everyone who sins from fixed malice sin from a habit? (4) Does someone who sins from fixed malice sin more gravely than someone who sins from passion?

Article 1

Does anyone sin purposefully or from fixed malice?

It seems that no one sins purposefully or from fixed malice (*nullus peccet ex industria sive ex certa malitia*):

Objection 1: Ignorance is opposed to purposefulness or fixed malice. But according to the Philosopher, everyone who is bad is ignorant. And Proverbs 14:22 says, “They are mistaken who do what is bad.” Therefore, no one sins from fixed malice.

Objection 2: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “No one acts intending what is bad.” But intending what is bad in sinning seems to be the same as sinning from fixed malice. For what lies outside of one’s intention is, as it were, *per accidens*, and it does not give an act its name. Therefore, no one sins from malice.

Objection 3: Malice is itself a sin. Therefore, if malice is a cause of sin, it will follow that a sin is a cause of a sin *ad infinitum*—which is absurd. Therefore, no one sins from malice.

But contrary to this: Job 34:27 says, “They have purposefully withdrawn from God and wanted not to understand His ways.” But to withdraw from God is to sin. Therefore, some individuals sin purposefully or from fixed malice.

I respond: Just like every other entity, man naturally has an appetite for the good. Hence, the fact that his appetite falls into evil stems from a certain corruption or disorder in one of man’s principles, since this is how sins or mistakes occur in the actions of natural things.

Now the principles of human acts are the intellect and the appetites, both the rational appetite, which is called ‘the will’, and the sentient appetite. Therefore, just as, in human acts, sin sometimes occurs because of a defect in the *intellect*, as when someone sins out of ignorance, and sometimes occurs because of a defect in the *sentient appetite*, as when someone sins from passion, so too sin sometimes occurs because of a defect in the will, i.e., because of a disorder of the will.

Now the will is disordered when it loves a lesser good more. The result is that someone chooses to suffer a loss in a good that is loved less in order to enjoy the good that is loved more, as when someone wills to suffer—even knowingly—the amputation of a limb in order to conserve his life, which he loves more. And in this same way, when a disordered will loves some temporal good—say, riches or sensual pleasure—more than the order of reason or the order of divine law or the order of charity with respect to God or something else of this sort, it follows that he wills to suffer a loss in certain spiritual goods in order to enjoy some temporal good.

Now something bad is nothing other than the privation of something good. Accordingly, someone knowingly wills a bad spiritual thing, which is evil absolutely speaking and by which he is deprived of some spiritual good, in order to enjoy a temporal good. Hence, he is said to sin ‘from fixed malice’ or ‘purposefully’ in the sense that he knowingly chooses what is bad.

Reply to objection 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the knowledge by which someone knows *absolutely speaking* that *this act* that he is doing is bad (*simpliciter scit hoc esse malum quod agitur*), and

in such a case he is said to sin out of *ignorance*.

On the other hand, the ignorance sometimes excludes that knowledge by which a man knows that *this act is here and now bad* (*scit hoc nunc esse malum*), as when he sins from *passion*.

By contrast, sometimes the ignorance excludes the knowledge by which someone knows that *this bad act* is not to be endured for the sake of pursuing *that good*, and yet he knows *absolutely speaking* that *this act* is bad (*scit tamen simpliciter hoc esse malum*). This is the sense in which someone who sins from fixed malice is said to be ignorant.

Reply to objection 2: What is bad cannot be intended by someone as such (*secundum se*), but, as has been explained, it can be intended in order to avoid something bad or in order to pursue some good. And in such a case the individual chooses to pursue a good that is intended *per se* and to do it without suffering the loss of the other good (*eligeret consequi bonum per se intentum absque hoc quod pateretur detrimentum alterius boni*). For instance, a lascivious individual might will to enjoy pleasure and to do it without offending God (*lascivus vellet frui delectatione absque offensa Dei*), but of these two intended things, he wills to incur an offense against God more than he wills to be deprived of the pleasure.

Reply to objection 3: The malice from which someone is said to sin can be understood as *habitual malice* (*malitia habitualis*) insofar as the Philosopher calls a bad habit ‘malice’ (*malitia*) in the same way that he calls a good habit ‘virtue’. Accordingly, someone is said to sin from malice by reason of the fact that he sins because of the inclination of a habit.

It can also be understood as an *act of malice* (*malitia actualis*), regardless of whether (a) it is the very choosing of something bad that is being called ‘malice’, in which case someone is said to sin from malice insofar as he sins by choosing what is bad, or (b) what is being called ‘malice’ is some previous sin from which a subsequent sin arises, as when someone impugns his brother’s kindness out of envy. And in this latter instance it is not the case that the same thing that is a cause of itself; instead, the interior act is a cause of the exterior act. And one sin is a cause of the other, but not *ad infinitum*, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 4), it is possible to go back to some first sin that is not caused by any previous sin.

Article 2

Does everyone who sins from a habit sin from fixed malice?

It seems that not everyone who sins from a habit sins from fixed malice:

Objection 1: A sin of fixed malice seems to be especially grave. But sometimes a man commits some minor sin (*leve peccatum*) from habit, as when he engages in an idle conversation (*cum dicit verbum otiosum*). Therefore, not every sin that stems from a habit is a sin of fixed malice.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 2 says, “The acts that proceed from a habit are similar to the acts by which the habit is generated.” But the acts that precede a habit are not vicious because of fixed malice. Therefore, the sins that stem from a habit are likewise not from fixed malice.

Objection 3: In those acts that someone commits from fixed malice, he takes delight after having committed them—this according to Proverbs 2:14 (“They are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things”). This is because it is pleasurable to any given individual when what he intended is attained and when he acts in accord with a habit that is in some sense connatural to him. But those who sin from habit are sorrowful after the sin has been committed; for as *Ethics* 9 says, “Bad men,” i.e., those who have a vicious habit, “are filled with remorse.” Therefore, sins that stem from a habit are not sins of fixed malice.

But contrary to this: A sin of fixed malice is said to be a sin from the choice of what is bad. But each individual is such that what can be chosen by him is what he is inclined to by a proper habit, as

Ethics 6 says of a virtuous habit. Therefore, a sin that stems from a habit is a sin of fixed malice.

I respond: Sinning *while having* a habit is not the same as sinning *from* a habit. For it is not necessary to make use of a habit; instead, this is subject to the will of the one who has the habit. Hence, a habit is by definition “that which someone makes use of when he wills to.” And so just as it can happen that someone who has a vicious habit erupts into an act of virtue, given that reason is not totally corrupted by a bad habit and that something of it remains intact, with the result that the sinner does some things that are good in genus, so too it can likewise happen that someone who has a habit sometimes acts not from the habit but from an aroused passion or even from ignorance. However, whenever he makes use of the vicious habit, it has to be the case that he sins from fixed malice. For what is *per se* lovable to one who has a habit is what is fitting for him according to his own habit; for this has become in a certain way connatural to him, in the sense that custom and habit are converted into his nature. But what is fitting to someone according to a vicious habit is what excludes a spiritual good. From this it follows that the man chooses something spiritually bad in order to acquire a good that is fitting for him according to the habit. And this is to sin from fixed malice. Hence, it is clear that if anyone sins from a habit, then he sins from fixed malice.

Reply to objection 1: Venial sins do not exclude the spiritual good, i.e., God’s grace or charity. Hence, they are called bad in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking. Because of this, a habit with respect to venial sins can be called bad only in a certain respect and not bad absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 2: The acts that proceed from habits are similar in species to the acts by which the habits are generated, and yet they differ from them in the way what is complete differs from what is incomplete. And this is how a sin that is committed from fixed malice differs from a sin that is committed from a passion.

Reply to objection 3: It is always the case that someone who sins from a habit takes delight, for as long as he is making use of the habit, in the fact that he is acting from the habit. But because (a) he is able not to make use of the habit and because (b) he is able through his reason, which has not been totally corrupted, to think about something else, it can happen that when he is not making use of the habit, he is sorrowful about what he has done through the habit. Yet most of the time such individuals repent of the sin not because the sin displeases them in its own right, but because of some other disadvantage that they incur because of the sin.

Article 3

Does everyone who sins from fixed malice sin from a habit?

It seems that everyone who sins from fixed malice sins from a habit:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that it is not just anyone who does unjust deeds in the way that the unjust man does them, viz., by an act of choosing, but only someone who has the habit. But as has been explained (a. 1) to sin from fixed malice is to sin by an act of choosing what is bad. Therefore, it is only someone who has a habit that sins from fixed malice.

Objection 2: In *Peri Archon* 1 Origen says, “It is not all at once that one is ruined or falls away, but instead he has to fall away gradually little by little (*paulatim per partes*).” But the greatest fall seems to be that one should sin from fixed malice. Therefore, it is not immediately at the beginning, but instead through much habituation, from which a habit can be generated, that someone devolves to the point of sinning from fixed malice.

Objection 3: Whenever an individual sins from fixed malice, his will must of itself (*de se*) be inclined toward the bad thing that it chooses. But by the nature of the power [of will] a man is inclined toward what is good rather than toward what is bad. Therefore, if he chooses what is bad, it must be the

case that this comes from something that is added [to the will], viz., a passion or a habit. But as was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), when someone sins from passion, he sins from weakness and not from fixed malice. Therefore, whenever someone sins from fixed malice, he must sin from a habit.

But contrary to this: A bad habit is related to the act of choosing what is bad in the same way that a good habit is related to an act of choosing what is good. But sometimes an individual who does not have the habit of a virtue chooses what is good in keeping with that virtue. Therefore, it can likewise be the case that sometimes an individual who does not have a vicious habit chooses what is bad—which is what it is to sin from fixed malice.

I respond: The will is related in one way to what is good and in another way to what is bad. For by the nature of its power it is inclined toward the good of reason as its proper object; this is why every sin is said to be “contrary to nature” (cf. q. 71, a. 2). Therefore, the fact that the will is inclined toward something bad in its act of choosing stems from elsewhere. Sometimes it happens because of a defect in reason, as when someone sins from ignorance, and sometimes it happens because of an impulse on the part of the sentient appetite, as when someone sins from passion.

However, neither of these is the same as sinning from fixed malice; rather, someone sins from fixed malice only when the will on its own (*ex seipsa*) is moved toward something bad. There are two ways in which this can happen:

In the first way, it happens through a man’s having a corrupt disposition that inclines him toward what is bad, so that because of this disposition something bad becomes, as it were, ‘agreeable’ to him and ‘similar’ to him; and in this way, the will tends toward it, by reason of its agreeableness, as if it were something good. For each thing tends on its own toward what is agreeable to it. Now this sort of corrupt disposition is either (a) a habit that is acquired by habituation and turns into part of one’s nature or else (b) a diseased condition on the part of the body, as in the case of someone who has certain natural inclinations toward given sorts of sins because of the corruption of nature within him.

In the second way, it happens that the will tends *per se* toward something bad because of the removal of some obstacle. For instance, suppose that someone is prevented from sinning not because the sin displeases him in its own right but because of his hope for eternal life or because of his fear of hell; then if his hope is removed by despair or his fear is removed by presumption, the result is that he sins from fixed malice without, as it were, any resistance.

So, then, it is clear that a sin of fixed malice always presupposes some disorderedness in a man and yet this disorderedness is not always a habit. Hence, it does not have to be the case that everyone who sins from fixed malice sins from a habit.

Reply to objection 1: To act in the way in which the unjust man acts is not only to do unjust deeds from fixed malice but also to do them with delight and without serious resistance on the part of reason. This belongs only to someone who has the habit.

Reply to objection 2: One does not immediately fall into sinning from fixed malice; rather, something is presupposed. However, as has been explained, this something is not always a habit.

Reply to objection 3: That in virtue of which the will is inclined toward what is bad is not always a habit or a passion, but is sometimes certain other things, as has been explained.

Reply to argument for the contrary: The line of reasoning that applies to choosing what is good is not parallel to the line of reasoning that applies to choosing what is bad. For what is bad never exists without some goodness of nature, whereas what is good can exist perfectly without any fault.

Article 4

Does one who sins from fixed malice sin more gravely than one who sins from passion?

It seems that one who sins from fixed malice does not sin more gravely than one who sins from passion:

Objection 1: Ignorance excuses a sin either in whole or in part. But there is greater ignorance in someone who sins by fixed malice than there is in someone who sins from passion. For one who sins from fixed malice suffers from ignorance with respect to a *principle*—which, as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 7, is the greatest sort of ignorance. For he has bad judgment about the end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore, someone who sins from fixed malice is excused to a greater degree than is someone who sins from passion.

Objection 2: The greater the impulse one has with respect to sinning, the lesser the degree to which he sins; this is clear in the case of someone who falls into sin with a greater impulse of passion. But one who sins from fixed malice is impelled by a habit, the impulse of which is greater than that of a passion. Therefore, one who sins from a habit sins to a lesser degree than does one who sins from passion.

Objection 3: To sin from fixed malice is to sin from an act of choosing what is bad. But someone who sins from passion likewise chooses what is bad. Therefore, the latter sins to no less a degree than the one who sins from fixed malice.

But contrary to this: A sin that is committed purposefully (*ex industria*) merits by that very fact a graver punishment—this according to Job 34:26-27 (“He has struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, have revolted from Him on purpose”). But the punishment is increased only because of the gravity of the sin. Therefore, a sin is aggravated by being purposeful, i.e., by being a sin of fixed malice.

I respond: A sin of fixed malice is more grave than a sin of passion, and this for three reasons:

First, since a sin consists mainly in an act of willing, a sin is more grave, all other things being equal, to the extent that the sinful movement belongs to the will itself to a greater degree (*quanto motus peccati est magis proprius voluntati*). But when one sins from fixed malice, the sinful movement belongs more to the will itself, which is moved in its own right toward what is bad, than when one sins from passion, i.e., from an extrinsic impulse toward sinning. Hence, a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is a sin of malice; and the stronger the malice is, the more grave the sin. By contrast, a sin is diminished by the fact that it is a sin of passion; and the stronger the passion is, the more the sin is diminished.

Second, a passion that inclines the will toward sinning passes quickly, and so the man quickly returns to a good intention, repenting of his sin. But the habit by which a man sins from malice is a permanent quality, and so someone who sins from malice remains in sin for a longer time (*peccat diuturnius*). This is why, in *Ethics* 7, the Philosopher compares the intemperate man who sins from malice to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease (*continue laborat*), whereas he compares the incontinent man who sins from passion to the man who is sick intermittently (*laborat interpolate*).

Third, someone who sins from fixed malice is badly disposed with respect to the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action. And so his defect is more dangerous than that of the one who sins from passion, whose intention tends toward a good end, even though this intention is interrupted for a while (*ad horam*) because of the passion. But a defect with respect to the principle is the worst sort of defect.

Hence, it is clear that a sin of malice is more grave than a sin of passion is.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 76, aa. 3-4) ignorance in choosing (*ignorantia electionis*), which is what the objection is concerned with, neither excuses a sin nor diminishes it. Hence, neither does a greater ignorance of this sort make for a lesser sin.

Reply to objection 2: The impulse that comes from a passion is, as it were, from the ‘outside’ as

far as the will is concerned, whereas the will is inclined from the 'inside', as it were, by a habit. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: It is one thing for someone *to sin while he is choosing* (*peccare eligentem*) and another thing *to sin by choice* (*peccare ex electione*). Someone who sins from a passion sins, to be sure, while he is choosing, but he does not sin by choice. For in his case the act of choosing is not the first source of the sin. Instead, he is induced by a passion to choose what he would not choose if he were without the passion. By contrast, one who sins by fixed malice chooses on his own (*secundum se*) what is bad, in the way explained above (a. 1). And in his case the act of choosing is the source of the sin, and because of this he is said to sin by choice.

QUESTION 79

God as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the exterior causes of sin (questions 79-81): first, on the part of God (question 79); second, on the part of the devil (question 80); and, third, on the part of man (question 81).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is God a cause of sin? (2) Is the act of sinning (*actus peccati*) from God? (3) Is God a cause of spiritual blindness and of hardness of heart (*causa excaecationis et obdurationis*)? (4) Are spiritual blindness and hardness of heart ordered toward the salvation of those who are spiritually blinded or whose hearts are hardened?

Article 1

Is God a cause of sin?

It seems that God is a cause of sin:

Objection 1: In Romans 1:28 the Apostle says of certain people, “God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do things that are not right.” And a Gloss on this passage says that God works in the hearts of men, inclining their wills toward whatever He wills, be it good or evil. But it is a sin to do what is not right and to have one’s will inclined toward evil. Therefore, God is a cause of sin for men.

Objection 2: Wisdom 14:11 says, “God’s creatures were made into an abomination (*in odium factae sunt*) and a temptation to the souls of men.” But ‘temptation’ usually means a provocation toward sinning. Therefore, since, as was established in the First Part (ST 1, q. 44, a. 1), creatures were made only by God, it seems that God is a cause of sin who provokes men toward sinning.

Objection 3: Whatever is a cause of a cause is a cause of its effect. But God is a cause of free choice, which is a cause of sin. Therefore, God is a cause of sin.

Objection 4: Every evil is opposed to some good. But it is not incompatible with God’s goodness that He is a cause of the evil of punishment (*causa mali poenae*); for of this evil Isaiah 45:7 says that God creates evil and Amos 3:6 asks, “Is there evil in the city that God has not brought about?” Therefore, it is likewise not incompatible with God’s goodness that He should be a cause of sin (*causa culpae*).

But contrary to this: Wisdom 11:25 says, “You hate nothing that you have made.” But God hates sin—this according to Wisdom 14:9 (“To God the wicked man and his wickedness are hateful”). Therefore, God is not a cause of sin.

I respond: There are two ways in which a man is a cause of sin, either his own sin or the sin of another:

(a) in one way, *directly*, viz., by inclining his own will or the will of another toward sinning;

(b) in a second way, *indirectly*, viz., by not drawing someone back from sin; hence, in Ezekiel 3:18 the watchman is told, “If you do not tell the wicked man, ‘You will die the death’, then I will require his blood at your hands.”

Now God cannot be a cause of sin *directly*, either of His own sin or the sin of another. For every sin involves a withdrawal from the ordering that is directed toward Himself as an end. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, God inclines and turns all things toward Himself as their ultimate end. Hence, it is impossible that He should be a cause, for Himself or others, of a departure from the ordering that is directed toward at Himself. Hence, He cannot be a cause of sin directly.

Similarly, He is also unable to be a cause of sin *indirectly*. To be sure, it is possible for God not to offer certain individuals assistance for avoiding sin—assistance which is such that if He were to give it, they would not sin. But He does all of this in accord with the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice. Hence, the fact that someone else sins is not imputed to Him as a cause of sin, just as the helmsman is not called a cause of the sinking of the ship by virtue of the fact that he is not steering the ship, except in a case in which he stops steering the ship when he is able to and obliged

to steer it (*nisi quando subtrahit gubernationem potens et debens gubernare*).

And so it is clear that God is in no way a cause of sin.

Reply to objection 1: As far as the Apostle's words are concerned, the reply is clear from the text itself. For if God "delivers them up to a reprobate sense," then they already have a reprobate sense for doing things that are not befitting. Therefore, He is said to hand them over to a reprobate sense insofar as He does not prevent them from following their reprobate sense, in the same way that we are said to leave exposed those whom we do not keep safe.

Now as for what Augustine says in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* (and this is where the Gloss in question is taken from), viz., that "God inclines men's wills toward good and evil," this should be taken to mean, as has been explained, that God inclines men's wills directly toward the good, whereas He 'inclines' them toward evil insofar as He does not prevent it—and yet this likewise happens as something that is deserved because of previous sin (*hoc etiam contingit ex merito praecedentis peccati*).

Reply to objection 2: When it says, "God's creatures were made into an abomination and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition 'into' is being used consecutively and not causally. For God did not make His creatures to be bad for men; rather, this followed because of men's foolishness. This is why it is added "... and a snare to the feet of the foolish," viz., of those who through their foolishness use creatures for something other than that for which they were made.

Reply to objection 3: When a mediate cause's effect proceeds from it insofar as it is subordinated to the order of the first cause, then the effect is likewise traced back to the first cause. By contrast, if a mediate cause's effect proceeds from it insofar as it departs from the order of the first cause, then the effect is not traced back to the first cause. For instance, if a servant does something contrary to his master's command, then this thing is not traced back to his master as its cause. Similarly, a sin that free choice commits against God's precept is not traced back to God as its cause.

Reply to objection 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the one who is punished, since he is deprived of some good or other. But sin is opposed to the ordering that is directed toward God, and hence it is directly opposed to the divine good. Because of this, the lines of reasoning concerning sin and punishment are not parallel (*non est similis ratio de culpa et poena*).

Article 2

Is the act of sinning from God?

It seems that the act of sinning (*actus peccati*) is not from God:

Objection 1: In *De Perfectione Iustitiae* Augustine says, "The act is sinning is not an entity (*non est res aliqua*).” But everything that is from God is an entity (*res aliqua*). Therefore, the act of sinning is not from God.

Objection 2: A man is said to be a cause of sinning only because the man is a cause of the act of sinning (*causa actus peccat*); for as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "No one acts by intending what is bad (*nullus intendens ad malum operatur*).” But as has been explained (a. 1), God is not a cause of sin. Therefore, God is not a cause of the act of sinning.

Objection 3: As is clear from what was said above (q. 18, aa. 2 and 8), it is by their species that some acts are bad and are sins. But whatever is a cause of something is a cause of whatever belongs to that thing by its species. Therefore, if God were a cause of the act of sinning, it would follow that He is a cause of sin. But as has been shown (a. 1), this is not true. Therefore, God is not a cause of the act of sinning.

But contrary to this: An act of sinning is a certain movement of free choice. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, "God's will is a cause of every motion.” Therefore, God's will is a cause of the

act of sinning.

I respond: The act of sinning is both a *being* and an *act* (*actus peccati et est ens et est actus*), and in both these respects it is from God. For as is clear from Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, every being, in whatever way it exists, must be derived from the first being. And every action (*actio*) is caused by something that exists in act, since nothing acts except insofar as it is actual (*est actu*). But everything that exists in act (*omne ens in actu*) is traced back to the first act as its cause, viz., God, who is actual through His essence (*est per suam essentiam actus*). Hence, it follows that God is a cause of every action insofar as it is an action.

However, 'sin' names a being and an action *along with a certain defect*. But the defect is from a created cause, viz., free choice, insofar as it falls away from the order of the first agent, viz., God. Hence, this defect is not traced back to God as a cause; instead, it is traced back to free choice. In the same way, the defect of limping is traced back to the crooked leg as its cause and not to the power of effecting movement (*virtus motiva*), and yet the power of effecting movement is a cause of whatever motion is involved in the limping. Accordingly, God is a cause of the act of sinning but He is not a cause of the sin, since He is not a cause of the fact that the act exists with a defect.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is using the name 'entity' (*res*) here for that which is an entity absolutely speaking, viz., a substance. In this sense, the act of sinning is not an entity.

Reply to objection 2: What is traced back to the man as a cause is not only the act but also the defect itself; for the act is not subordinated to the one to whom it should be subordinated, even though the man himself does not principally intend this. And for this reason the man is a cause of the sin.

By contrast, God is a cause of the act in such a way that He is in no way a cause of the defect that accompanies the act. And for this reason He is not a cause of the sin.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 72, a. 1), acts and habits receive their species not from a privation, in which the character of evil consists, but instead from an object to which a privation of this sort is conjoined. And so the defect itself, which is said not to be from God, is not like a specific difference (*non quasi differentia specifica*) but instead belongs to the species of the act as something that is posterior to it (*petinet ad speciem actus consequenter*).

Article 3

Is God a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?

It seems that God is not a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart (*causa excaecationis et indurationis*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says that God is not a cause of a man's being worse (*Deus non est causa eius quod homo est deterior*). But a man becomes worse through spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore, God is not a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Objection 2: Fulgentius says, "God is not the punisher of what He is the author of." But God is the punisher of a hardened heart—this according to Ecclesiasticus 3:27 ("A hard heart will do badly in the end"). Therefore, God is not a cause of hardness of heart.

Objection 3: It is not the case that the same effect is attributed to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be (a) a man's badness—this according to Wisdom 2:21 ("For their badness blinded them")—and also (b) the devil—this according to 2 Corinthians 4:4 ("The god of this world has blinded the minds of non-believers"). But these causes are contrary to God. Therefore, God is not a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

But contrary to this: Isaiah 6:10 says, "Make blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy." And Romans 9:18 says, "He has mercy on those whom He wishes; and those whom He wishes,

He hardens.”

I respond: Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart signify two things:

One of them is a *movement of the human soul* when it adheres to evil and is turned away from God’s light. And in this respect God *is not* a cause of spiritual blindness and of hardness of heart.

However, the other one is the *withholding of grace* (*subtractio gratiae*), from which it follows that the mind is not divinely illuminated in order to live in an upright way and that the man’s heart is not softened in order to live in an upright way. And in this respect God *is* a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Now notice that God is a universal cause of the illumination of souls—this according to John 1:9 (“This was the true light, which illumines every man who comes into this world”)—just as the sun is a universal cause of the illumination of bodily entities. Yet the two cases are different, since the sun effects its illumination by a necessity of nature, whereas God does it voluntarily through the order of His wisdom. Now even though the sun, as regards itself, illuminates all bodies, still, if there is in a given body some impediment, the sun leaves that body in the shadows (*reliquit illud tenebrosum*), as in clear in the case of a house whose windows are shuttered. But the sun is in no way a cause of the house’s being darkened, since it is not by the sun’s own judgment that it does not emit light to the interior of the house; instead, the cause of this is just the one who shuttered the windows. By contrast, it is by His own judgment that God does not emit the light of grace to those in whom there is an obstacle to it. Hence, it is not only the one who posits the obstacle to grace who is a cause of the withholding of grace, but also God, who by His own judgment does not posit the grace (*qui suo iudicio gratiam non apponit*).

It is in this way that God is a cause of spiritual blindness, of heaviness of the ears, and of hardness of heart. These three are distinguished in a way that corresponds to the effects of grace. For grace perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And given that two of the senses serve the intellect’s cognition most of all, viz., sight and hearing, one of which, viz., sight, assists in discovery and the other of which, viz., hearing, assists in learning, so spiritual blindness is posited with respect to seeing, heaviness of the ears is posited with respect to hearing, and hardening is posited with respect to the affections.

Reply to objection 1: Since as regards the withholding of grace, spiritual blindness and hardness of heart are punishments of a sort, on this score a man is not made worse by them; rather, having been made worse through sin, he incurs them, just as in the case of other punishments.

Reply to objection 2: This objection has to do with hardness of heart insofar as it is a sin.

Reply to objection 3: Badness is the meritorious cause of spiritual blindness in the way that a sin is the cause of a punishment. And it is likewise in this way that the devil is said to make someone spiritually blind, insofar as he leads him into sin.

Article 4

Are spiritual blindness and hardness of heart always ordered toward the salvation of the one who is blinded or whose heart is hardened?

It seems that spiritual blindness and hardness of heart are always ordered toward the salvation of the one who is blinded or whose heart is hardened (*ad salutem eius qui excaecatur et obduratur*):

Objection 1: In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “Since God is supremely good, He would in no way permit something bad to occur unless He were able to elicit good from any evil.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, He orders toward the good the sort of evil of which He Himself is a cause. But as has been explained (a. 3), God is a cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore, these conditions are ordered toward the salvation of the one who is blinded and whose heart is hardened.

Objection 2: Wisdom 1:13 says, “God takes no pleasure in the destruction of the wicked.” But He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction if He did not turn their spiritual blindness to their own good—just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in afflicting a sick man if he did not order the bitter medicine that he prescribes for him toward his health. Therefore, God turns spiritual blindness toward the good of those who are blinded.

Objection 3: As Acts 10:34 says, “God is not a respecter of persons.” But He orders the spiritual blindness of some persons toward their salvation, e.g., certain Jews who had been blinded, so that they did not believe in Christ and killed Him while they were non-believers, but afterwards were converted, having been overcome with compunction—as we read in Acts 2 about some of them and as is clear from Augustine in *De Quaestionibus Evangeliorum*. Therefore, God turns the blindness of all of them to their salvation.

But contrary to this: As Romans 3:8 says, evil is not to be done in order that good might come of it. But spiritual blindness is an evil. Therefore, God does not blind individuals for their own good.

I respond: Spiritual blindness is a certain precursor to sin (*praeambulum ad peccatum*).

Now there are two things toward which sin is ordered, one toward which it is ordered *per se*, viz., damnation, and the other of which stems from God’s merciful providence, viz., spiritual health, insofar as God allows some to fall into sin so that, acknowledging their own sin, they might become humble and be converted, as Augustine says in *De Natura et Gratia*.

So spiritual blindness is likewise by its very nature ordered toward the damnation of the one who is blinded, and because of this it is also posited as an effect of reprobation. But because of God’s mercy, spiritual blindness is for the time being (*ad tempus*) ordered as a sort of medicine toward the salvation of those who are blinded (*ad tempus ordinatur medicinaliter ad salutem eorum qui excaecantur*). However, as Romans 8:28 makes clear, this mercy is not offered to all of those who are blind, but only to the predestined, for whom “all things work together for the good.”

Hence, as Augustine says in *De Quaestionibus Evangeliorum*, for some individuals spiritual blindness is ordered toward health, whereas for others it is ordered toward damnation.

Reply to objection 1: All the evils that God either brings about or permits are ordered toward some good, and yet they are not always ordered toward the good of the one in whom the evil exists, but are sometimes ordered toward the good of someone else or even of the whole universe. For instance, God ordered the sin of the tyrants toward the good of the martyrs, and He orders the punishment of the damned toward the glory of His own justice.

Reply to objection 2: God does not take pleasure in the destruction of men as regards the destruction itself, but He does take pleasure in it by reason of His justice or because of the good which follows from it.

Reply to objection 3: It belongs to God’s mercy that He orders the spiritual blindness of some individuals toward their salvation, and it belongs to His justice that the spiritual blindness of other individuals is ordered toward their damnation. And as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 23, a. 5), the fact that He metes out mercy to some but not to all does not indicate any “respect for persons” in God.

Reply to the argument for the contrary: It is the evil of sin that is not to be done in order that good might come of it; by contrast, the evil of punishment is to be inflicted for the sake of the good.

QUESTION 80

The Devil as a Cause of Sin

Next we have to consider the devil as a cause of sin.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is the devil a direct cause of sin (*sit directe causa peccati*)? (2) Does the devil induce one to sin by persuading him interiorly? (3) Can the devil impose a necessity for sinning (*possit necessitatem peccandi inducere*)? (4) Do all sins come at the devil's suggestion?

Article 1

Is the devil a direct cause of a man's sinning?

It seems that the devil is a direct cause of a man's sinning (*sit homini directe causa peccandi*):

Objection 1: Sin consists directly in an affection. But in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, "The devil inflames his associates with evil affections." And in *Super Acta* Bede says, "The devil draws the soul toward an affection for badness." And in *De Summo Bono* Isidore says, "The devil fills men's hearts with hidden lusts." Therefore, the devil is a direct cause of sin.

Objection 2: Jerome says, "Just as God perfects the good, so the devil perfects the bad." But God is a direct cause of our good deeds. Therefore, the devil is a direct cause of our sins.

Objection 3: In one of the chapters of *Eudemian Ethics* the Philosopher shows that "there must be some extrinsic principle of human deliberation." But human deliberation (*consilium humanum*) is not only about good things, but about bad things as well. Therefore, just as God moves a man toward good deliberation and is thereby a direct cause of good, so the devil moves a man toward bad deliberation. And it thereby follows that the devil is a direct cause of sin.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 and 3 Augustine shows that a man's mind becomes the slave of lust (*serva libidinis*) by nothing other than the man's own will. But a man becomes a slave of lust only through sin. Therefore, only possible cause of sin is one's own will and not the devil (*causa peccati non potest esse diabolus sed sola propria voluntas*).

I respond: A sin is a certain sort of act. Hence, something can be a direct cause of a sin in the way that someone is a direct cause of an act. But the latter happens only by means of one's moving a proper principle of that act toward acting. Now the proper principle of a sinful act is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Hence, nothing can be a direct cause of a sin unless it is able to move the will toward acting.

Now as was explained above (q. 10, aa. 1 and 2), there are two things by which the will can be moved, viz., (a) by *an object*, in the way that something desirable that is apprehended moves an appetite, and (b) by *what inclines the will interiorly toward willing*:

Now as was shown above (q. 9, a. 3), the latter is none other than either the will itself or God. But as was explained above (q. 79, a. 1), God cannot be a cause of sin. Therefore, it follows that in this respect only a man's will is a direct cause of his sin.

On the other hand, as regards the object, there are three ways in which something can be understood to move the will:

In one way, the proposed object itself moves the will, as when we say that food excites a man's desire to eat.

In a second way, it is the one who proposes or offers this sort of object who moves the will.

In a third way, the one who makes the argument (*persuadet*) that the proposed object has the character of the good moves the will, because in some way he, too, proposes to the will a proper object that is a real or apparent good of reason.

Thus, it is in the first way that sensible things which appear exteriorly move a man's will toward

sin, whereas in the second and third ways the devil—or likewise a man—is able to incite a man to sin, either by offering something that is desirable to the sensory power or by persuading the man’s reason.

However, in none of these three ways can anything be a *direct* cause of sin, since, as was explained above (q. 10, aa. 1 and 2), the will is not moved with necessity by any object other than the ultimate end. Hence, neither the object offered exteriorly, nor the one who proposes the object, nor the one who makes a persuasive argument for it is a sufficient cause of the sin. Hence, it follows that the devil is not a direct and sufficient cause of sin; instead, he is a cause of sin only in the manner of one who makes a persuasive argument for a desirable object or in the manner of one who proposes such an object.

Reply to objection 1: All of these passages, along with any similar ones that might be found, should be taken to be referring to the fact that the devil leading men into a sinful affection by suggesting or proposing desirable objects.

Reply to objection 2: There is a similarity in the devil’s being in some sense a cause of our sins, just as God is in some way a cause of our good acts. Yet there is no similarity with respect to the mode of causing. For God is a cause of good acts through His moving the will interiorly—a mode of causing that cannot belong to the devil.

Reply to objection 3: God is a general principle (*universale principium*) of every human interior movement, whereas the fact that a human will is directed toward an evil deliberation comes (a) *directly* from the human will and (b) from the devil by way of his *persuasion* or of his *proposing* desirable objects.

Article 2

Can the devil induce a man to sin by instigating him interiorly?

It seems that the devil cannot induce a man to sin by instigating him interiorly (*non possit inducere ad peccandum interius instigando*):

Objection 1: The interior movements of the soul are certain vital works (*opera vitae*). But a vital work can come only from an intrinsic principle—even a work of the vegetative soul, which is the lowest among the vital works. Therefore, the devil cannot instigate a man toward evil with respect to his interior movements.

Objection 2: According to the order of nature, all interior movements arise from the exterior sensory powers. But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 110, a. 4), it belongs to God alone to do something outside the order of nature. Therefore, the devil cannot do anything within a man’s interior movements except by means of things that are apparent to the exterior sensory powers (*nisi secundum ea quae exterioribus sensibus apparent*).

Objection 3: Understanding and imagining are interior acts of the soul. But the devil cannot do anything with respect to either of them. For as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 111, a. 2), the devil does not imprint anything on the human intellect. It also seems that he cannot imprint anything on the imagination, since imagined forms, given that they are rather spiritual, have a higher dignity than the forms that exist in sensible matter. Yet, as is clear from what was said in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 110, a. 2), the devil cannot imprint the forms that exist in sensible matter. Therefore, the devil cannot induce a man to sin by means of the man’s interior movements (*secundum interiorem motus*).

But contrary to this: According to the objections, the devil would never tempt a man except by appearing to him visibly. But this is obviously false.

I respond: The interior part of the soul consists of the intellectual part and the sentient part.

Now the intellectual part contains the intellect and the will. As regards the will, it has already been explained (a. 1) how the devil is related to it. The intellect, on the other hand, is moved *per se* by what

illuminates it for the cognition of truth. The devil does not want this for a man, but wants instead to darken a man's intellect so that he might consent to sin. This sort of darkening comes from the imagination and the sentient appetite.

Hence, the entirety of the devil's interior operation seems to focus on the imagination and sentient appetite. By moving the two of them, he is able to induce a man to sin, since he can operate in such a way as to present certain imagined forms to the imagination, and he can likewise bring it about that the sentient appetite is excited with some passion. For it was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 110, a. 3) that a corporeal nature naturally obeys a spiritual nature with respect to local motion. Hence, the devil, too, is able to cause everything that can arise from the local motion of lower bodies, unless he is held back by God's power. Now the fact that forms are represented to the imagination follows sometimes from local motion. For in *De Somno et Vigilia* the Philosopher says, "When an animal sleeps and the blood descends to the sentient principle in a large quantity, the movements or impressions that are left by sensible motions and that are conserved in the sensible species descend at the same time and move the apprehensive principle in such a way that the impressions appear in the way they would if the sentient principle were at that time being affected by the exterior things themselves." Hence, this sort of local motion on the part of the humors or [animal] spirits can be procured by demons whether the man in question is asleep or awake, and in this way it follows that the man imagines certain things. Similarly, the sentient appetite is likewise excited toward certain passions in accord with certain determinate movements of the heart and [animal] spirits; hence, the devil can likewise operate to effect this. And from the fact that certain passions are excited in the sentient appetite, it follows that the man perceives more acutely the sensible movement or tendency that is traced back, in the way just explained, to the apprehensive principle; for as the Philosopher says in the same book, "Lovers are moved to the apprehension of the beloved even by a slight similarity." Again, because the passion is excited, it happens that what is proposed to the imagination is judged to be something that should be pursued; for someone who is in the grips of a passion (*ei qui a passione detinetur*) is such that what he is inclined toward by the passion seems good to him. And it is in this way that the devil induces a man interiorly to sin.

Reply to objection 1: Even if vital works are always from an intrinsic principle, it is nonetheless the case that some exterior agent can contribute to them, just as exterior heat contributes to the works of the vegetative soul in order that food might be digested more easily.

Reply to objection 2: This sort of apparition of imaginable forms does not lie altogether outside the order of nature. And, as has been explained, it occurs through local motion and not just at someone's command.

Reply to objection 3: This makes clear the reply to the third objection. For the forms in question are in the first instance (*primorialiter*) taken from the sensory powers.

Article 3

Can the devil impose a necessity for sinning?

It seems that the devil can impose a necessity for sinning (*possit necessitatem inferre ad peccandum*):

Objection 1: A greater power can impose necessity on a lesser power. But Job 41:24 says of the devil that "there is no power on earth that can compare to him." Therefore, he can impose a necessity for sinning on an earthly man.

Objection 2: Man's reason can be moved only with respect to things that are proposed by the exterior senses and represented by the imagination, since, as it says in *De Anima*, "All our cognition has

its origin in the sensory powers and we have no intellectual understanding without phantasms.” But the devil can effect movement in a man’s imagination, as has been explained (a. 2), and even in his exterior sensory powers; for in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “This evil,” i.e., the evil that is from the devil, “creeps gradually through all the sensory openings, giving itself shapes and accommodating itself to colors and mingling with sounds and infusing itself into smells.” Therefore, he is able to incline a man’s reason to sin by necessity.

Objection 3: According to Augustine, “there are sins in which the flesh lusts against the spirit.” But the devil can be a cause of the concupiscence of the flesh, just as he can be a cause of the other passions, in the way explained above (a. 2). Therefore, he can induce a man to sin by necessity.

But contrary to this: 1 Peter 5:8 says, “Your adversary the devil roams around like a roaring lion, seeking whom he might devour. Resist him strong in the faith.” But such a warning would be useless if a man succumbed to the devil by necessity. Therefore, it is not the case that the devil can impose a necessity for sinning on a man.

I respond: Unless he is restrained by God, the devil can by his own power lead someone to do by necessity an act which is a sin by its genus, but he cannot impose a necessity for sinning.

This is clear from the fact that a man resists a movement toward sinning only through his reason, the use of which the devil can totally impede by effecting movements in the imagination and sentient appetite, as is obvious in the case of those who are possessed (*sicut in arreptitiis*). But in such a case, since reason is bound in this way, nothing that the man does is imputed to him as a sin. On the other hand, if his reason is not totally bound, then, as was explained above (q. 77, a. 7), to the extent that he is free, he is able to resist sinning.

Hence, it is clear that the devil can in no way impose a necessity for sinning on a man.

Reply to objection 1: Not just any power greater than a man can move a man’s will; rather, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 6), only God can.

Reply to objection 2: What is apprehended through the sensory power or the imagination does not move the will with necessity, as long as the man has the use of reason. Nor does an apprehension of the sort in question always bind his reason.

Reply to objection 3: When reason is actively resisting it (*quando ratio ei actu aliter resisti*), the lust of the flesh against the spirit (*concupiscentia carnis contra spiritum*) is not a sin, but is instead the stuff of an exercise of virtue (*materia exercendae virtutis*). On the other hand, reason’s not resisting it is not something that is in the devil’s power. And so the devil is unable to impose a necessity for sinning.

Article 4

Do all of men’s sins come at the devil’s suggestion?

It seems that all of men’s sins come at the devil’s suggestion (*omnia peccata hominum sint ex suggestionibus diabolicis*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The multitude of demons is a cause of all evils, both for themselves and for others.”

Objection 2: Anyone who sins mortally becomes a slave of the devil—this according to John 8:34 (“Whoever sins is a slave of sin”). But as 2 Peter 2:19 says, “One is led into the service of the one by whom he has been conquered.” Therefore, whoever sins has been conquered by the devil.

Objection 3: Gregory says that the devil’s sin is irreparable because he did not fall at anyone else’s suggestion. Therefore, if there were men who sinned through free choice at no one’s suggestion, then their sin would be irremediable—which is clearly false. Therefore, all human sins are suggested by the devil.

But contrary to this: *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “Not all of our bad thoughts are instigated by the devil; rather, at times they emerge from the movement of our own free choice.”

I respond: The devil is an occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, insofar as he induced the first man to sin and insofar as, because of the first man’s sin, human nature has been vitiated to such an extent that we are all inclined toward sinning. In the same way, one might say that he who dries the wood is a cause of the wood’s burning, since his action resulted in the wood’s being more easily set on fire (*ex quo sequeretur quod ligna facile incenderentur*).

However, the devil is not a direct cause of all human sins in the sense of inducing each sin. Origen proves this from the fact that even if there were no devil, men would still have a desire for food and sexual pleasure and other such things, and this desire would still be able to be disordered if it were not directed by reason—something that is subject to free choice.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the multitude of demons is a cause of all our sins with respect to their first origin.

Reply to objection 2: It is not just the one who is conquered by someone who becomes his slave, but also the one who voluntarily subjects himself to him. And it is in this latter way that someone who sins by his own proper movement becomes the devil’s slave.

Reply to objection 3: The devil’s sin was irremediable because he neither sinned at anyone else’s suggestion nor had any tendency to sin that was caused by a previous suggestion. The same cannot be said of any human sin.

QUESTION 81

Man as a Cause of Sin: The Transmission of Original Sin

Next we have to consider the cause of sin on the part of man. Even though a man, just like the devil, is a cause of sin for another man by way of exterior suggestion, man also has a special way of causing sin in another *by way of origin*. Hence, we must talk about *original sin* (questions 81-83). On this topic there are three things that have to be considered: first, the transmission of original sin (question 81); second, the essence of original sin (question 82); and, third, the subject of original sin (question 83).

On the first topic there are five questions: (1) Is [the first] man's first sin transmitted by way of origin (*direvetur per originem*) to his descendants? (2) Are all the other sins of the first parent, or even of other parents, transmitted by way of origin to their descendants? (3) Is original sin transmitted to all those who are generated from Adam through by way of his semen? (4) Would it be transmitted to someone who was formed miraculously from some part of the human body? (5) If the [first] woman had sinned without the [first] man sinning, would original sin have been passed down?

Article 1

Is the first sin of the first parent transmitted to the others by way of origin?

It seems that the first sin of the first parent is not transmitted to the others by way of origin (*primum peccatum primi parentis non traducatur ad alios per originem*):

Objection 1: Ezekiel 18:20 says, "The son will not bear the iniquity of the father." However, he would be bearing the iniquity of his father if he contracted it from him (*si ab eo iniquitatem traheret*). Therefore, no one contracts any sin from any parent by way of origin.

Objection 2: An accident is not transmitted by way of origin unless its subject is likewise transmitted, since an accident does not pass from one subject to another. But as was shown in the First Part (ST 1, q. 118, a. 2), the rational soul, which is the subject of sin (*subiectum culpae*), is not transmitted by way of origin. Therefore, neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.

Objection 3: Everything that is transmitted by way of human origin is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot be a cause of sin, since it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore, no sin can be transmitted by way of origin.

Objection 4: What is more perfect in nature is more powerful in acting. But perfected flesh cannot infect the soul united to it; otherwise, the soul would not be able to be washed clean of original sin while it was united to the flesh. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the semen cannot infect the soul.

Objection 5: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "No one blames those who are ugly by nature, but instead blames those who are ugly because of slothfulness and negligence." Therefore, nothing that comes by way of origin is blameworthy or a sin (*nihil quod est per originem est increpabile neque peccatum*).

But contrary to this: In Romans 5:12 the Apostle says, "Through one man sin entered into this world." This cannot be understood to be by way of imitation, because of what is said in Wisdom 2:24, "By the devil's envy death entered into the world." Therefore, it follows that it is by way of origin from the first man that sin entered into the world.

I respond: According to the Catholic Faith it must be held that the first sin of the first man passes by way of origin to his descendants (*primum peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros*). This is why even children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, so as to be cleansed of the infection of sin. And as is clear from Augustine in several of his books, the contrary view is the heresy of Pelagius.

However, in investigating how it is that the sin of the first parent can pass by way of origin to his

descendants, different authors have proceeded in different ways.

Some, taking into account that the subject of sin is the rational soul, claimed that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that in this way souls that are infected seem to be derived from an infected soul.

By contrast, others, repudiating this view as erroneous, tried to show how, even if the soul is not transmitted, the guilt of the parent's soul is transmitted to the child by the fact that bodily defects are transmitted by the parent to the child, in the way that a leper generates a leper and someone with gout generates someone with gout—and this because of certain corruptions of the semen, even though the semen's corruption is not itself called leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportioned to the soul, and since the defects of the soul likewise run over into the body, and vice versa, in a similar way they claim that the soul's culpable defect (*culpabilis defectus animae*) flows by transmission into the child, even though the semen is not itself the subject of sin or guilt.

However, these ways of responding are all inadequate. For granted that, because of the body's defective condition, certain corporeal defects—and, as a result, even some defects of the soul—pass from parent to child by way of origin, in the way that the mentally slow are sometimes generated by the mentally slow (*sicut interdum ex fatuis fatui generantur*), still, the very nature of having a defect by way of origin seems to exclude the character of sin or guilt, which is voluntary by its nature (*hoc ipsum quod est ex origine aliquem defectum habere videtur excludere rationem culpae, de cuius ratione est quod sit voluntaria*). Hence, even if one claimed that the rational soul is transmitted [with the semen], by the very fact that the infection of the child's soul would not be in his will, it would lose the character of guilt deserving of punishment. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, “No one reproaches a man born blind; one instead takes pity on him.”

And so we have to proceed in a different way, by claiming that all men who are born of Adam can be thought of as a single man (*possunt considerari ut unus homo*) insofar as they agree in the nature that they receive from the first parent—in the way that, in civil matters, all those who belong to a single community are thought of as a single body and the whole community is thought of as a single man. Porphyry likewise says, “By participation in the species, many men are one man.” So, then, the many men descended from Adam are, as it were, many members of one body. But the act of one corporeal member—for example, the hand—is voluntary not by the will of the hand itself, but by the soul's will, which moves the members in the first place. Hence, a homicide committed by the hand is not imputed to as a sin to the hand if the hand is thought of in its own right as divided off from the body; rather, it is imputed to the hand insofar as the hand is something belonging to the man which is moved by the man's first moving principle. So, then, the disorder that exists in *this* man, who has been generated from Adam, is voluntary not by his own will, but by the will of the first parent, who moves, by a motion of generation, all those who are derived by origin from him (*qui ex eius origine derivantur*), in the way that the soul's will moves all the members to their acts.

This is why the sin that is transmitted from the first parent to his descendants is called *original sin*, just as the sin that is transmitted from the soul to the members of the body is called *actual sin*. And just as an actual sin that is committed by means of a bodily member is a sin of that member only insofar as that member is something which belongs to the man himself and because of which the sin is called *human*, so, too, original sin is a sin of *this* person only insofar as *this* person receives his nature from the first parent; hence, it is called a *sin of the nature*—this according to Ephesians 2:3 (“We were by nature children of wrath”).

Reply to objection 1: The son is said not to bear his father's sin, since he is not punished for the father's sin unless he shares in the guilt (*nisi sit particeps culpae*). And this is the way it is in the case under discussion. For the guilt is transmitted *by way of origin* (*per originem*) from the father to the son, just as actual sin is transmitted *by way of imitation* (*per imitationem*).

Reply to objection 2: Even though the soul is not transmitted, given that the semen's power is

unable to cause a rational soul, the semen nonetheless effects a disposition toward the soul (*movet tamen ad ipsam dispositive*). Hence, the human nature—and, along with the nature, the nature's infection—is transmitted from the parent to the child through the semen's power. For the one who is born comes to share in the guilt of the first parent (*fit iste qui nascitur consors culpae primi parentis*) by virtue of the fact that he receives the nature from him through a certain generative motion.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the guilt does not exist in actuality in the semen, the human nature, which is concomitant with this guilt, exists virtually in the semen.

Reply to objection 4: The semen is a principle of the act of generating, which is an act that is proper to *the nature* and serves to propagate it (*est proprius actus naturae eius propagationi deserviens*). And so the soul is infected more by the semen than by already perfected flesh, which is already determined to *the person*.

Reply to objection 5: What exists by way of origin is not blameworthy if the one who is born is considered in his own right. However, if he is considered as being related to some principle, then he can be blameworthy, just as someone who is born suffers the ignominy of a family caused by the sin of one of his ancestors.

Article 2

Are other sins of the first parent himself or of close ancestors likewise transmitted to their descendants?

It seems that other sins of the first parent himself or of close ancestors are likewise transmitted to their descendants (*videtur quod etiam alia peccata vel ipsius primi parentis vel proximorum parentum traducantur in posteros*):

Objection 1: Punishment is never due except for sin. But some are punished by God's judgment for the sin of their close ancestors—this according to Exodus 20:5 (“I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers on the sons, unto the third and fourth generation”). Even with human judgment, in the case of the crime of treason (*in crimine laesae maiestatis*), the children are disinherited for the sin of their parents. Therefore, the sin of close ancestors passes to their descendants.

Objection 2: A thing is better able to transmit to another what it has from itself than what it has from another; for instance, fire is better able to effect heat than is heated water. But a man transmits to his child by way of origin the sin that he has from Adam. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he is able to transmit by way of origin a sin that he himself has committed.

Objection 3: We contract original sin from the first parent because we existed in him as in a principle of our nature, which he has corrupted. But we likewise existed in our close ancestors as in certain principles of our nature, which, even if it has been corrupted, is able to be corrupted still more by sin—this according to Apocalypse 22:11 (“Let him who is sordid become yet more sordid”). Therefore, the children contract the sins of their close ancestors by way of origin, just like the sins of the first parent.

But contrary to this: Good is more diffusive of itself than evil is. But the merits of our close ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the sins are not, either.

I respond: Augustine poses this question in *Enchiridion* and leaves it unresolved. But if one thinks carefully about the matter, it is impossible that any of the sins of close ancestors, or even the sins of the first parent besides the first sin, should be transmitted by way of origin.

The reason for this is that a man generates what is the same *in species* as himself, but not what is the same *individual* as himself. And so things that pertain directly to the individual, such as his personal acts and what belongs to them, are not passed on by parents to their children. For instance, a grammarian does not pass on to his son the science of grammar, which he has acquired by his own study. On the

other hand, what belongs to the nature of the species *is* passed on from the parents to their children, unless it is a defect of nature. For instance, someone with sight generates someone with sight, unless the nature is defective. And if the nature is strong, then even some of the individual accidents that pertain to the nature's disposition—for instance, bodily swiftness, mental acuteness, and other traits of this sort (*velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia huiusmodi*)—are propagated in the children, though not in any way, as has been explained, those accidents that are purely personal (*nullo autem modo ea quae sunt pure personalia*).

Now just as some things belong to a *person* in his own right (*per seipsam*) and some things from the gift of grace (*ex dono gratiae*), so, too, some things can belong to the *nature* in its own right, viz., what is caused by its the nature's own principles, and some things from the gift of grace. And in this sense, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 100, a. 1), original justice was a certain gift of grace given by God to the whole of human nature in the first parent. It was precisely this gift that the first man lost through the first sin. Hence, just as this original justice would have been transmitted to the first parent's descendants along with the nature, so the same thing holds for the opposite disorder. By contrast, other actual sins, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature with respect to what belongs to the *nature*; rather, they corrupt the nature only with respect to what belongs to the *person*, i.e., his proneness to act. Hence, the other sins are not handed down.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine explains in *Epistola ad Avitum*, the children are never punished with *spiritual* punishments in place of their parents if they do not share in their guilt, either by way of origin or by way of imitation, since, as Ezekiel 18:4 says, every soul belongs immediately to God. On the other hand, by divine or human judgment the children are sometimes punished with bodily punishments in place of their parents, insofar as the child is something belonging to the father with respect to his body.

Reply to objection 2: What someone has from himself he is better able to pass down, as long as it is able to be passed down. But the actual sins of one's close ancestors are not able to be passed down; for, as has been explained, they are purely personal.

Reply to objection 3: The first sin corrupts human nature by a corruption that belongs to the *nature*, whereas other sins corrupt it by a corruption that belongs to the *person alone*.

Article 3

Does the sin of the first parent pass by way of origin to all men?

It seems that the sin of the first parent does not pass by way of origin to all men:

Objection 1: Death is a punishment that follows from original sin. But not all those who proceed from Adam by way of his semen die; for instance, those who will be found alive at the Lord's coming will not die, as is evident from what is said in 1 Thessalonians 4:14 ("We who are alive will not take precedence at the Lord's coming over those who have fallen asleep"). Therefore, these men do not contract original sin.

Objection 2: No one gives to another what he himself does not have. But a baptized man does not have original sin. Therefore, he does not pass it on to his offspring.

Objection 3: As the Apostle says in Romans 5:15, Christ's gift is greater than Adam's sin. But Christ's gift does not pass into all men. Therefore, neither does Adam's sin.

But contrary to this: In Romans 5:12, "Death passed into all men; in him all have sinned."

I respond: According to the Catholic Faith one must steadfastly hold that all men who are derived from Adam, which the sole exception of Christ, contract original sin. Otherwise, not all would need the redemption that comes through Christ—which is erroneous.

The reason for this can be taken from what was explained above (a. 1), viz., that original sin is passed down from the sin of the first parent to his posterity in the same way that actual sin is passed down from the soul's will, by way of its moving the members (*per motionem membrorum*), to the members of the body. But it is clear that actual sin can be passed down to all the members that are naturally moved by the will. Thus, original sin is likewise passed down to all those who are moved by Adam by way of the motion of generation.

Reply to objection 1: It is more commonly held, and with more probability, that all those who will found alive at the Lord's coming will die and then rise after a short time; this will be explained more fully in the Third Part.

However, if what others claim is true, viz., that they will never die (in accord with Jerome's narration of the opinions of different writers in a letter to Minerius on the resurrection of the flesh), then the reply to the objection should be that (a) even if the men in question do not die, they still deserve to die (*est tamen in eis reatus mortis*), but that (b) this punishment is remitted by God, who is likewise able to remit the punishments for actual sins.

Reply to objection 2: Original sin is remitted, with respect to its deserved punishment, through baptism (*peccatum originale per baptismum aufertur reatu*), insofar as the soul recovers grace with respect to its mind. However, original sin remains actual with respect to the stimulant to sin (*quantum ad fomitem*), which is a disorder on the part of the lower powers of the soul and of the body itself; and it is in accord with these that a man generates, and not in accord with the mind. And it is for this reason that those who are baptized hand down original sin; for they generate not insofar as they have been renewed through baptism, but rather insofar as they still retain something of the oldness of the first sin (*inquantum retinent adhuc aliquid de vetustate primi peccati*).

Reply to objection 3: Just as Adam's sin is passed down to all who are generated corporeally from Adam, so Christ's grace is passed down to all are generated spiritually from Him through faith and baptism—not only with respect to removing the sin of the first parent, but also with respect to removing actual sins and with respect to being led to glory.

Article 4

Would someone who was miraculously formed out of human flesh contract original sin?

It seems that someone who was miraculously formed out of human flesh would contract original sin:

Objection 1: A Gloss on Genesis 4:1 says, "Adam's whole posterity was corrupted in his loins, because it was separated from him not beforehand in the place of life, but afterwards in the place of exile." But if a man were formed in the way under discussion, then his flesh would be separated from Adam in the place of exile. Therefore, he would contract original sin.

Objection 2: Original sin is caused in us insofar as the soul is infected by the flesh. But the totality of a man's flesh has been infected. Therefore, no matter which part of the flesh a man might be formed from, his soul would be infected by the infection of original sin.

Objection 3: Original sin comes to everyone from the first parent insofar as everyone has sinned in him. But those who were to be formed from human flesh would have existed in Adam. Therefore, they would contract original sin.

But contrary to this: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 10, such men would not have existed in Adam "with respect to his seminal nature" (*secundum seminalem rationem*), which is alone a cause of the transmission of original sin.

I respond: As has already been explained (aa. 1 and 3), original sin passes from the first parent to

his descendants insofar as they are moved by him through generation, in the way that the members are moved by the soul through actual sin. However, there is no motion with respect to generation except through the active power in generation. Hence, the only ones who contract original sin are those who descend from Adam through the active power in generation that is derived originally from Adam. For the ‘seminal nature’ (*ratio seminalis*) is nothing other than the active power in generation.

Now if someone is formed by God’s power from human flesh, then it is clear that the active power is not derived from Adam. Hence, that man would not contract original sin, just as the act of the hand would not belong to a human sin if the hand were moved by some extrinsic mover and not by the man’s will.

Reply to objection 1: Adam lived in the place of exile only after the sin. Hence, it is not because of the place of exile, but rather because of the sin that original sin is passed down to those whom his active generation reaches.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, the flesh infects the soul only insofar as it an active principle in generation.

Reply to objection 3: One who was formed from human flesh would have existed in Adam with respect to his corpulent substance, but not, as has been explained, with respect to the seminal nature. And so he would not contract original sin.

Article 5

If Adam had not sinned after Eve sinned, would their children have contracted original sin?

It seems that if Adam had not sinned after Eve sinned, their children would have contracted original sin:

Objection 1: We contract original sin from our parents insofar as we existed in them—this according to the Apostle in Romans 5:12 (“In him all have sinned”). But just as a man pre-exists in his father, so too he pre-exists in his mother. Therefore, a man would contract original sin by his mother’s sin as well as by his father’s sin.

Objection 2: If Eve had sinned without Adam sinning, passible and mortal children would have been born, since, as the Philosopher explains in *De Generatione Animalium* 2, the mother contributes the matter in generation. Now death, along with every sort of passibility, comes from a necessity on the part of the matter. But passibility and the necessity of dying are the punishment for original sin. Therefore, if Eve had sinned without Adam sinning, the children would have contracted original sin.

Objection 3: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “The Holy Spirit came upon the virgin,” of whom Christ was to be born without original sin, “and cleansed her.” But this cleansing would not have been necessary if the infection of original sin were not going to be contracted from His mother. Therefore, the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother. And so because Eve sinned, her children were going to contract original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.

But contrary to this: In Romans 5:12 the Apostle says, “Through one man sin entered into this world.” If the woman were going to transmit original sin to her offspring, he should rather have said, “Through the two of them sin entered into the world, since both sinned,” or even, “Through the mother sin entered the world, since she sinned first.” Therefore, original sin is transmitted to the children by the father and not by the mother.

I respond: The resolution of this difficulty is clear from what has already been said. For it was explained above (a. 1) that original sin is passed down by the first parent insofar as he himself contributes to the generation of those who are born (*inquantum ipse movet ad generationem natorum*); thus, it was

claimed (a. 4) that if someone were generated merely materially from human flesh, then he would not contract original sin.

Now it is clear that according to the teaching of the philosophers, the active principle in generation is from the father, whereas the mother contributes the matter (*materiam autem mater ministrat*). Hence, original sin is contracted from the father and not from the mother. Accordingly, if Eve had sinned without Adam sinning, then the children would not have contracted original sin. But the opposite would have held if Adam had sinned without Eve sinning.

Reply to objection 1: The child pre-exists in the father as in an active principle, whereas he pre-exists in the mother as in a material and passive principle. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

Reply to objection 2: It has seemed to some that if Adam had not sinned after Eve sinned, then the children would have been immune from sin but would nonetheless have been susceptible to the necessity of dying, along with the other types of passibility stemming from the necessity of the matter, which the mother provides—so that they would have been susceptible to these things not by way of punishment but as certain natural defects (*non sub ratione poenae sed sicut quosdam naturales defectus*).

However, this does not seem plausible. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 97, a. 1), the immortality and impassibility of the original state did not stem from the condition of the matter; instead, they stemmed from original justice, through which the body was subject to the soul as long as the soul was subject to God. But the lack of original justice is original sin. Therefore, if, given that Adam had not sinned, original sin would not be transmitted to his descendants because of Eve's sin, it is clear that the children would not have a lack of original justice. Hence, they would not have passibility or the necessity of dying.

Reply to objection 3: The cleansing that occurred antecedently in the Blessed Virgin was required not in order to prevent the transmission of original sin (*non ad auferendum transfusionem originalis peccati*), but because it was necessary for the mother of God to shine with the greatest purity. For nothing is a worthy receptacle for God unless it is clean—this according to Psalm 92:5 (“Holiness is fitting for your house, O Lord”).

QUESTION 82

The Essence of Original Sin

Next we have to consider original sin with respect to its essence.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is original sin a habit (*habitus*)? (2) Is original sin just a single thing in an individual man (*unum tantum in uno homine*)? (3) Is original sin concupiscence (*utrum sit concupiscentia*)? (4) Does original sin exist equally in everyone?

Article 1

Is original sin a habit?

It seems that original sin is not a habit (*non sit habitus*):

Objection 1: As Anselm says in *De Conceptu Virginali*, original sin is a lack of original justice, and so original sin is a certain privation. But *privation* is opposed to *habit*. Therefore, original sin is not a habit.

Objection 2: Actual sin has more of the character of guilt (*plus de ratione culpae*) than does original sin, insofar as it has more of the character of voluntariness. But the habit of an actual sin does not have the character of guilt. Otherwise, it would follow that a sleeping man would be culpably sinning. Therefore, no original habit has the character of guilt.

Objection 3: In the case of what is bad, the act always precedes the habit, since every bad habit is acquired and no bad habit is infused. But no act precedes original sin. Therefore, original sin is not a habit.

But contrary to this: In *De Baptismo Puerorum* Augustine says that because of original sin, children have an aptitude for concupiscence, even though they are not actually desiring anything in a disordered way (*sunt concupiscibiles etsi non sint actu concupiscentes*). But ‘aptitude’ (*habilitas*) is predicated because of some habit. Therefore, original sin is a habit.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 49, a. 4 and q. 50, a. 1), there are two sorts of habits.

One sort of habit is that by which a power is inclined toward acting—in the way that the virtues and the types of scientific knowledge are called habits. And in this sense original sin is not a habit.

The second sort of habit is a disposition of a nature composed of many parts, in accord with which one is disposed to something either well or badly—especially when the disposition in question has become something like a nature, as is clear in the case of sickness and health. And this is the sense in which original sin is a habit.

For there is a certain disordered disposition that results from the dissolution of the harmony that the nature of original justice consisted in, just as bodily sickness is likewise a certain disordered bodily disposition which dissolves the equilibrium that the nature of health consists in (*solvitur aequalitas in qua consistit ratio sanitatis*). This is why original sin is called a feebleness on the part of the nature (*languor naturae*).

Reply to objection 1: Just as bodily sickness has (a) something of the character of a *privation*, insofar as the equilibrium of health is taken away, and (b) something *positive*, viz., the humors themselves that are disposed in a disordered way, so, too, original sin has (a) the privation of original justice and (b), along with it, a disordered disposition of the parts of the soul. Hence, it is not a pure privation, but is instead a certain corrupt habit.

Reply to objection 2: An actual sin is a certain disordered *act*, whereas original sin, since it is a sin of the nature, is a certain disordered *disposition* of the nature itself that has the character of guilt insofar as it is derived from the first parent; this was explained above (q. 81, a. 1). Now this sort of disordered disposition on the part of the nature has the character of a habit, whereas a disordered disposition on the part of an act does not have the character of a habit. Because of this, original sin, but

not actual sin, is able to be a habit.

Reply to objection 3: This objection goes through for the case of a habit by which a power is inclined toward acting. But original sin is not this sort of habit.

Moreover, even though an inclination toward a disordered act follows from original sin, it follows *indirectly* and not directly, viz., through the removal of something that had prevented it, i.e., original justice, which had prevented the disordered movements—in the same way that an inclination toward disordered bodily movements follows indirectly from sickness.

Nor does one have to claim that original sin is an infused habit or that it is a habit acquired through an act (unless the act belongs to the first parent and not to *this* person). Instead, one should claim that it is a habit that is innate because of a corrupted origin.

Article 2

Are there many original sins in a single man?

It seems that there are many original sins in a single man (*in uno homine sint multa originalia peccata*):

Objection 1: Psalm 1:7 says, “Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother conceived me.” But a sin in which a man is conceived is an original sin. Therefore, there are many original sins in a single man.

Objection 2: One and the same habit does not give an inclination toward contraries, since a habit gives an inclination in the manner of a nature, which tends toward a single thing. But original sin, even in a single man, gives an inclination toward diverse and contrary sins. Therefore, original sin is many habits and not just a single habit.

Objection 3: Original sin infects all the parts of the soul. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 74), the diverse parts of the soul are diverse subjects of sin. Therefore, since a single sin cannot exist in diverse subjects, it seems that original sin is many sins and not just one sin.

But contrary to this: John 1:29 says, “Behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world.” As a Gloss on this passage explains, ‘sin’ is expressed in the singular because the sin of the world, which is original sin, is a single sin.

I respond: In a single man there is a single original sin. The reason for this can be taken from two sources:

First, on the part of the *cause* of original sin. For it was explained above (q. 81, a. 2) that only the first sin of the first parent is passed down to his descendants. Hence, in a single man original sin is numerically one sin, and in all men it is relationally one (*unum proportionem*), viz., with respect to the first principle.

In the second way, the reason can be taken from the very *essence* of original sin. For in the case of every disordered disposition, oneness species is taken from the cause, whereas numerical oneness is taken from the subject. This is clear in the case of bodily illness. For illnesses are diverse in species when they proceed from diverse causes, for instance, from an excess of heat or of cold, or from a lesion in the lung or in the liver; however, a sickness that is one in species exists in a single man only as numerically one sickness. Now there is only a single cause of the corrupt disposition which is called original sin, viz., the privation of original justice that removes the human mind’s subjection to God. And so original sin is one in species. And in a single man it can only be numerically one, whereas in different men it is one in species and relationally one, but numerically diverse.

Reply to objection 1: The plural is used to talk about sins in keeping with the custom of divine Scripture, in which the grammatical plural is frequently used for the singular, as in Matthew 2 (“They are

dead who sought the life of the child”).

An alternative reply is that the plural is used because all actual sins virtually pre-exist in original sin as in a sort of principle that is manifold in its power.

Alternatively, the plural is used because in the sin of the first parent that is handed down by way of origin there were many deformities, viz., pride, disobedience, gluttony, and others of this sort.

Alternatively, the plural is used because many parts of the soul are infected by original sin.

Reply to objection 2: A single habit cannot give an inclination to contraries *per se* and directly, i.e., through its own form.

However, nothing prevents it from giving an inclination to contraries indirectly and *per accidens*, viz., through the removal of an obstacle. For instance, when the equilibrium (*harmonia*) of a mixed body is dissolved, the elements tend toward contrary places. Similarly, when the equilibrium of original justice is dissolved, the diverse powers of the soul are moved in different directions (*diversa animae potentiae in diversa feruntur*).

Reply to objection 3: Original sin infects the diverse parts of the soul insofar as they are parts of a single whole, just as original justice holds all the parts of the soul together as a single whole. And this is why original sin is a just a single sin. In the same way, there is a single fever in a single man, even though diverse parts of the body are burdened.

Article 3

Is original sin concupiscence or disordered desire?

It seems that original sin is not concupiscence or disordered desire (*peccatum originale non sit concupiscentia*):

Objection 1: As Damascene says in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, every sin is contrary to nature. But concupiscence is in accord with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible power (*proprius actus virtutis concupiscibilis*), which is a natural power (*potentia naturalis*). Therefore, original sin is not concupiscence.

Objection 2: Because of original sin “the passions of the sins” exist in us, as is clear from the Apostle in Romans 7:5. But as was established above (q. 23, a. 4), there are many passions besides concupiscence. Therefore, it is not the case that original sin is concupiscence more than any other passion.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 2), all the parts of the soul are disordered because of original sin. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, the intellect is the highest among the parts of the soul. Therefore, original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.

But contrary to this: In *Retractationes* Augustine says, “Concupiscence is the guilt that belongs to original sin (*est reatus originalis peccati*).”

I respond: Each thing has its species from its form. Now it was explained above (a. 2) that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Hence, it must be the case that what is formal in original sin is taken from the cause of original sin. But opposites are causes of opposites. Thus, the cause of original sin must be inferred from the cause of original justice, which is opposed to original sin.

Now the entire order of original justice stems from the fact that man’s will was subject to God. This subjection was primarily and mainly through the will, the role of which, as was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), is to move all the other parts toward their end. Hence, what followed from the turning of the will away from God was disorder in all the other powers of the soul. So, then, the privation of original justice, through which the will had been subject to God, is what is *formal* in original sin, whereas all the other disorders in the powers of the soul are, as it were, what is *material* in original sin.

Now the disorder in the other powers of the soul consists mainly in their being turned in a disordered way toward changeable goods, and this disorder can be called by the general name ‘concupiscence’. And so, materially speaking, original sin is indeed concupiscence, but, formally speaking, it is the lack of original justice.

Reply to objection 1: Since the concupiscible power in man is naturally ruled by reason, man’s desires are natural to the extent that they are in accord with the order of reason (*intantum concupiscere est homini naturale inquantum est secundum rationis ordinem*).

However, concupiscence that transgresses the limits of reason is contrary to nature for man. And this is the sort of concupiscence that belongs to original sin.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), all the passions of the irascible power are traced back to passions of the concupiscible power as to the more principal passions. And as was established above (q. 25, a. 2), among the passions of the concupiscible power, concupiscence or desire effects movements that are stronger and more felt. And so [original sin] is attributed to concupiscence as the more principal passion and the one in which all the other passions are in some sense included.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 77, aa. 1 and 2, and q. 80, a. 2), in good things the intellect and reason have primacy (*principalitatem habent*), whereas, conversely, in evil things the lower part of the soul, which clouds and seduces reason, is the more principal. Because of this, original sin is said to be concupiscence rather than ignorance, even though ignorance is likewise contained among the material defects of original sin.

Article 4

Does original sin exist equally in everyone?

It seems that original sin does not exist equally in everyone:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 3), original sin is disordered desire (*concupiscentia inordinata*). But it is not the case that everyone is equally prone to desire in a disordered way. Therefore, original sin does not exist equally in everyone.

Objection 2: Original sin is a certain disordered disposition on the part of the soul, in the same way that sickness is a certain disordered disposition on the part of the body. But sickness admits of more and less. Therefore, original sin admits of more and less.

Objection 3: In *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* Augustine says, “Disordered sexual desire (*libido*) transmits original sin to the child.” But one individual can have a more disordered sexual desire than another does in an act of generation. Therefore, original sin can be greater in one individual than in another.

But contrary to this: As has been explained (q. 81, a. 1), original sin is a sin of the nature. But the nature exists equally in everyone. Therefore, so does original sin.

I respond: There are two aspects of original sin, one of which is the lack of original justice and the other of which is the relation of this defect to the sin of the first parent, from whom it is transmitted through a corrupted origin.

As for the first, original sin does not admit of more and less, since the whole gift of original justice has been taken away, and privations which take away something in its entirety, e.g., death and utter darkness (*tenebrae*), do not admit of more and less. This was explained above (q. 73, a. 2).

The second aspect likewise does not admit of more and less, since everyone is related equally to the first principle of the corrupted origin, from which original sin receives the character of guilt. For relations do not admit of more and less.

Hence, it is clear that original sin cannot exist more in one individual than in another.

Reply to objection 1: The bond of original justice held all the powers of the soul together under itself in a certain order. Once this bond was broken, each of the powers of the soul tended toward its own proper movement, and the stronger the power, the more vehement the movement. Now it is possible for some of the powers of the soul to be stronger in one individual than in another, because of their different bodily compositions (*propter diversas corporis complexiones*). Therefore, the fact that one man is more prone to disordered desire than another does not stem from original sin, since in everyone the bond of original justice is equally broken and in everyone the lower parts of the soul are equally left to themselves. Rather, as has been explained, this occurs because of the diverse dispositions of the powers.

Reply to objection 2: Bodily sickness does not have an equal cause in everyone, even if the sicknesses are of the same species; for instance, if there is a fever because of corrupted bile (*ex cholera putrefacta*), the corruption can be greater or lesser, and it can be closer to or further removed from the principle of life. But the cause of original sin is equal in everyone. Hence, the cases are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: The disordered sexual desire (*libido*) that transmits original sin to the child is not *actual* disordered sexual desire, since even if by God's power it were granted to someone that he should feel no disordered desire in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin to his child.

Rather, the disordered sexual desire in question should be understood to be *habitual* in the sense that the sentient appetite is not now tied to reason by the bond of original justice. And disordered sexual desire in this sense is equal in everyone.

QUESTION 83

The Subject of Original Sin

Next we have to consider the subject of original sin.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the subject of original sin the flesh or the soul in the first place? (2) If the soul, then is the soul the subject of original sin through its essence or through its powers? (3) Is the will the subject of original sin prior to the other powers? (4) Are certain powers of the soul especially infected, viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch?

Article 1

Does original sin exist more in the flesh than in the soul?

It seems that original sin exists more in the flesh than in the soul:

Objection 1: The flesh's resistance to the mind stems from the corruption of original sin. But the root of this resistance lies in the flesh; for in Romans 7:23 the Apostle says, "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore, original sin lies principally in the flesh (*in carne principaliter consistit*).

Objection 2: Each thing exists more in its cause than in its effect; for instance, heat exists more in the fire that gives warmth than in the water that has been heated. But it is through the carnal semen that the soul is infected with the infection of original sin. Therefore, original sin exists more in the flesh than in the soul.

Objection 3: We contract original sin from our first parent insofar as we existed in him as a seminal nature (*prout in eo fuimus secundum rationem seminalem*). But it was only the flesh that existed in him in this way and not the soul. Therefore, original sin exists not in the soul, but in the flesh.

Objection 4: The created rational soul is infused into the body by God. Therefore, if the soul were infected by original sin, it would follow that it was defiled at its creation or infusion. And so God, who is the agent of its creation and infusion, would be a cause of sin.

Objection 5: No wise man would pour a precious liquid into a vessel by which he knew that the liquid itself would be infected. But the rational soul is more precious than any liquid. Therefore, if the soul could be infected with original sin by its union with the body, then He who is Wisdom itself would never infuse the soul into such a body. However, He does indeed infuse it. Therefore, the soul is not defiled by the flesh. Therefore, original sin exists not in the soul, but in the flesh.

But contrary to this: The same thing is the subject both of virtue and of vice or sin, which is contrary to virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue; for in Romans 7:18 the Apostle says, "I know that good does not dwell in me, i.e., in my flesh." Therefore, only the soul, and not the flesh, can be the subject of original sin.

I respond: There are two ways in which one thing can exist in another: (a) *as in a cause*, whether a principal or an instrumental cause, and (b) *as in a subject*.

Thus, the original sin of every man existed in Adam himself as in its first *principal cause*—this according to the Apostle in Romans 5:12 ("In him all have sinned"). On the other hand, original sin exists in bodily semen as in an *instrumental cause*, because it is through the semen's active power that original sin is passed down to the offspring along with human nature.

However, original sin can exist only in the soul as in a *subject* and cannot in any way exist in the flesh as in a *subject*. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (q. 81, a. 1), original sin is passed down from the will of the first parent to his descendants through a certain generative motion, in the same way that an actual sin flows from the motion of a man's will to his other parts. One can see in this latter sort of derivation that whatever proceeds from the motion of willing a sin to any part of the man that can in any way participate in the sin—either in the manner of a subject or in the manner of an

instrument—has the character of guilt. For instance, because of an act of willing gluttony, a desire for food comes to the concupiscible power, and the eating of the food comes to the hands and the mouth, which are instruments of the sin insofar as they are moved by the will toward the sin. By contrast, the further fact that it comes down to the nutritive power and the interior members of the body, which are not apt to be moved by the will, does not have the character of guilt.

So, then, since the soul is able to be the subject of guilt, whereas the flesh is not of itself (*de se*) the subject of guilt, it follows that whatever corruption from the first sin comes to the soul has the character of guilt, whereas whatever comes to the flesh has the character of punishment rather than the character of guilt. So, then, it is the soul, and not the flesh, that is the subject of original sin.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine claims in *Retractationes*, in the passage in question the Apostle is talking about the man who has already been redeemed and who is freed from guilt but subject to punishment. And it is by reason of this punishment that sin is said to dwell in the flesh. Hence, what follows from this is only that the flesh is the subject of punishment and not that it is the subject of guilt.

Reply to objection 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as an instrumental cause. But it does not have to be the case that something exists more principally in its *instrumental* cause than in its effect; rather, it exists more principally only in its *principal* cause. And in this sense original sin existed more principally in Adam (*potiori modo fuit in Adam*), in whom it existed with the character of an actual sin.

Reply to objection 3: The soul of *this* man existed as a seminal nature in the sinner Adam not as in its *effective* principle, but as in its *disposing* principle. For the bodily semen that is handed down from Adam does not by its power effect the rational soul, but instead effects a disposition for it (*disponit ad eam*).

Reply to objection 4: The infection of original sin is caused solely by the sin of the first parent via carnal generation and is in no way caused by God. And so, since creation implies a relation of the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is defiled at its creation (*ex sua creatione inquinetur*).

By contrast, infusion implies a relation (a) to God as the one who infuses it and (b) to the flesh into which the soul is infused. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the soul is defiled because of its relation to God as the one who infuses it; rather, it is defiled only because of its relation to the body into which it is infused.

Reply to objection 5: The common good is preferred to a singular good. Hence, God in His wisdom does not set aside the universal order of things, viz., that such-and-such a soul should be infused into such-and-such a body, in order to avoid the singular infection of *this* soul—especially given that the nature of the soul is such that it begins to exist only in a body, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 118, a. 3). Moreover, it is better for the soul to exist in this way in accord with its nature rather than not to exist in any way at all—especially because it is able to escape damnation through grace.

Article 2

Does original sin exist in the soul's essence prior to existing in its powers?

It seems that original sin does not exist in the soul's essence prior to existing in its powers:

Objection 1: The soul is apt to be the subject of sin to the extent that it can be moved by the will. But the soul is moved by the will only with respect to the soul's powers and not with respect to its essence. Therefore, original sin exists in the soul only with respect to its powers and not with respect to its essence.

Objection 2: Original sin is opposed to original justice. But original justice existed in some power of the soul, i.e., in a subject of virtue (*erat in aliqua potentia animae, quae est subiectum virtutis*). Therefore, original sin likewise exists in the powers of the soul more than in its essence.

Objection 3: Just as original sin flows from the flesh to the soul, so too it flows from the essence of the soul to its powers. But original sin exists more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore, it likewise exists in the powers of the soul more than in its essence.

Objection 4: As has been explained (q. 82, a. 3), original sin is said to be concupiscence or sense desire (*concupiscentia*). But concupiscence exists in the powers of the soul. Therefore, so does original sin.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (q. 81, a. 1), original sin is said to be a sin of the nature. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 76, a. 6), it is with respect to its essence—and not with respect to its powers—that the soul is the form and nature of the body. Therefore, it is mainly with respect to its essence that the soul is the subject of original sin.

I respond: The principal subject of a sin is that aspect of the soul (*illud animae*) that the moving cause of the sin pertains to; for instance, if the cause that moves one to sin is sensory pleasure, which pertains to the concupiscible power as its proper object, then it follows that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin.

Now it is clear that original sin is caused by way of origin. Hence, the aspect of the soul (*illud animae*) which is first attained to by a man's origin is the primary subject (*primum subiectum*) of original sin. But the origin attains to the soul as the terminus of generation, insofar as it is the form of the body. And as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 76, a. 6), this belongs to the soul with respect to its own essence. Hence, it is with respect to its essence that the soul is the primary subject of original sin.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, just as the motion of one's own act of willing (*motio voluntatis alicuius propriae*) reaches the powers of the soul but not the soul's essence, so the motion of the first parent's will (*motio voluntatis primi generantis*) primarily reaches, by way of generation, the essence of the soul.

Reply to objection 2: Original justice likewise belonged in the first place to the essence of the soul, since it was a gift that was given by God to *human nature*, which the essence of the soul is related to prior to its powers. For the powers seem to pertain more to the *person*, insofar as they are the principles of one's personal acts. Hence, they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are personal sins.

Reply to objection 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to form, where the form is prior in the order of perfection and nature even though it is posterior in the order of generation. On the other hand, the soul's essence is related to the soul's powers as a subject to its proper accidents, where the proper accidents are posterior both in the order of generation and also in the order of perfection. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

Reply to objection 4: As was explained above (q. 82, a. 3), concupiscence is related to original sin as its matter and consequence (*se habet materialiter et ex consequenti in peccato originali*).

Article 3

Does original sin infect the will prior to infecting the other powers?

It seems that original sin does not infect the will prior to infecting the other powers:

Objection 1: Each sin belongs principally to the power by whose act it is caused. But original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore, it seems to belong more to the generative power among all the powers of the soul (*inter ceteras potentias animae*).

Objection 2: Original sin is handed down through the carnal semen (*per semen carnale*). But other powers of the soul are closer to the flesh (*propinquiores sunt carni*) than the will is; this is clear in the case of all the sentient powers, which make use of bodily organs. Therefore, original sin exists in

those powers more than in the will.

Objection 3: The intellect is prior to the will, since there is no act of willing except with respect to a good that is understood intellectually (*non est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto*). Therefore, if original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it first infects the intellect as something prior.

But contrary to this: Original justice is related in the first place to the will, since, as Anselm says in *De Conceptu Virginali*, original justice “is rectitude of the will.” Hence, it does not have to be the case that the generative power is the first subject of original sin.

I respond: There are two things to consider with regard to the infection of original sin:

The first is the infection’s *inherence in a subject*, and on this score, as has been explained (a. 2), the infection is related first to the soul’s essence.

Next, we have to consider the infection’s *inclination toward acting*, and on this score it is related to the powers of the soul. Therefore, it must be the case that it is first related to that power which has the first inclination toward sinning. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 74, aa. 1 and 2), this is the will. Hence, original sin is in the first instance related to the will.

Reply to objection 1: Original sin is caused in a man not by the *child’s* generative power, but by an act of the *parent’s* generative power. Hence, it need not be the case that the child’s own generative power is the first subject of original sin.

Reply to objection 2: Original sin has a twofold progression, one from the flesh to the soul and the other from the soul’s essence to its powers. The first progression follows the order of generation, whereas the second follows the order of perfection. And even though other powers—viz., the sentient powers—are closer to the flesh, still, because the will is closer to the soul’s essence as a higher power, the infection of original sin comes to it first.

Reply to objection 3: The intellect is prior to the will in the sense that it proposes the will’s object to it. But in another sense the will is prior to the intellect, viz., according to the ordering of the motion toward an act; and it is this motion that pertains to sin.

Article 4

Are the powers mentioned in the introduction, [viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch], more infected than the other powers?

It seems that the powers mentioned in the introduction, [viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch] are not more infected than the other powers:

Objection 1: The infection of original sin seems to belong more to the part of the soul that can in the first place be the subject of sin. But this is the rational part of the soul, and especially the will. Therefore, it is the will that is more infected by original sin.

Objection 2: No power of the soul is infected by guilt except insofar as it is able to obey reason. But as *Ethics* 2 says, the generative power is not able to obey reason. Therefore, the generative power is not especially infected by original sin.

Objection 3: Among all the sensory powers it is the power of sight that is more spiritual and closer to reason, since, as *Metaphysics* 1 points out, it exhibits more of the differences among things. But the infection of guilt exists in the first instance in reason. Therefore, the sense of sight is more infected than is the sense of touch.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that the infection of original sin is especially apparent in the movement of the genitals, a movement that is not subject to reason. But genitals serve the generative power in sexual intercourse (*deserviunt generativae virtuti in commixtione sexuum*), in which the pleasure of touch exists, and this pleasure moves sensory desire to the highest

degree (*maxime concupiscentiam movet*). Therefore, the infection of original sin belongs especially to these three powers, viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch.

I respond: The corruption under discussion is customarily called an infection, and an infection is apt to be handed on to another; thus, contagious diseases such as leprosy and scabies are called infections.

Now as was explained above (q. 81, a. 1), the corruption of original sin is handed down through the act of generation. Hence, the powers that come together for this act are especially said to be infected. But an act of this sort serves the *generative power*, insofar as it is ordered toward generation, and has within itself the pleasure of *the sense of touch*, and this pleasure is the most powerful object (*maximum obiectum*) of the *concupiscible power*. Therefore, the infection of original sin belongs especially to these three powers, viz., the generative power, the concupiscible power, and the sense of touch.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained (a. 3), to the extent that original sin effects an inclination toward actual sins, it belongs especially to the will. But to the extent that it is passed down to offspring, it is proximately connected with the three powers in question and remotely connected with the will.

Reply to objection 2: The infection of actual sin (*infectio actualis culpae*) belongs only to the powers that are moved by a sinning will. But the infection of original sin flows not from the will of the one who contracts original sin, but through his nature's origin, which the generative power serves. And it is in this sense that the infection of original sin exists in the generative power.

Reply to objection 3: The sense of sight belongs to the act of generation only through a remote disposition, viz., insofar as the concupiscible species is apparent through the sense of sight. But the pleasure is brought to completion in the sense of touch. And this is why the infection is attributed more to the sense of touch than to the sense of sight.

QUESTION 84

One Sin as a Cause of Another Sin

The next thing we have to consider about the cause of sin is that one sin is a cause of another.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is avid desire or covetousness (*cupiditas*) the root of all sins? (2) Is pride (*superbia*) the beginning of every sin? (3) Besides pride and avarice (*praeter superbiam et avaritiam*), should any special sins be called capital vices? (4) How many capital vices are there, and what are they?

Article 1

Is avid desire or covetousness the root of all sins?

It seems that avid desire or covetousness (*cupiditas*) is not the root of all sins:

Objection 1: Avid desire, which is an immoderate desire for riches, is opposed to the virtue of generosity (*opponitur virtuti liberalitatis*). But generosity is not the root of all virtues. Therefore, avid desire is not the root of all sins.

Objection 2: The desire (*appetitus*) for the means to an end proceeds from a desire for the end. But as *Ethics* 1 points out, riches, the desire for which is avid desire, are desired only as useful for some end. Therefore, avid desire is not the root of every sin, but instead proceeds from some other prior root.

Objection 3: It is often the case that avarice, which is a name for avid desire, arises from other sins—as, for instance, when someone desires money for the sake of ambition or in order to satisfy his gluttony. Therefore, it is not the root of all sins.

But contrary to this: In 1 Timothy 6:10 the Apostle says, “Avid desire [for money] is the root of all evils.”

I respond: According to some, ‘avid desire’ (*cupiditas*) is said in many ways:

In one sense, it is a *disordered desire for riches*. And in this sense it is a special sin.

In another sense, ‘avid desire’ signifies a *disordered desire for any temporal good whatsoever*. And, as has been explained (q. 72, a. 2), in this sense it is a genus of every sin, since in every sin there is a disordered turning-toward a changeable good.

In a third sense, it is taken to signify a certain *inclination* on the part of a corrupted nature toward desiring corruptible goods in a disordered way. And they claim that in this sense avid desire is the root of all sins, by analogy with the root of a tree, because the root *draws nourishment from the earth*. For this is the way in which every sin proceeds from the love of temporal goods.

Now even though, to be sure, these points are true, they do not seem to conform to the Apostle’s intention when he said that avid desire is the root of all sins. For in that passage he is clearly speaking in opposition to those who, since they desire to become rich, fall into the devil’s temptations and snares, because “avid desire is the root of all evils.” Hence, it is clear that he is speaking of avid desire insofar as it is a disordered desire for riches.

Accordingly, one should respond that it is as a *special* sin that avid desire is called the root of all evils, and this by analogy with the root of a tree, because the root *provides nourishment for the whole tree*. For we see that through riches a man acquires the ability to commit every sin and to fulfill his desire for every sin, since money can help a man to have every sort of temporal good—this according to Ecclesiastes 10:19 (“All things obey money”). Accordingly, it is clear that the avid desire for riches is the root of all sins.

Reply to objection 1: Virtue and sin do not arise from the same thing. For sin arises from the desire for changeable goods, and so the desire for that particular good which helps one to acquire all temporal goods is called the root of sin. By contrast, virtue arises from a desire for an unchangeable good, and so charity, i.e., the love of God, is posited as the root of virtue—this according to Ephesians

3:17 (“... rooted and grounded in charity”).

Reply to objection 2: The desire for money is called the root of sins not because the riches are sought for their own sake as an ultimate end, but because they are much sought after as useful with respect to every temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than any particular good, riches move the appetite more than singular goods, which can be had along with many other goods by means of money.

Reply to objection 3: Just as, in the case of natural things, one looks not for what always occurs but instead for what occurs in most cases, since the nature of corruptible things can be impeded so that they do not always operate in the same way, so, too, in the case of moral matters, one considers what occurs in most cases and not what occurs in all cases, since the will does not operate by necessity. Therefore, avarice is not called the root of every evil in a sense that rules out some other evil’s sometimes being the root of avarice; rather, avarice is called the root of every evil because it more frequently happens that other evils arise from it in the way explained above.

Article 2

Is pride the beginning of every sin?

It seems that pride (*superbia*) is not the beginning of every sin (*initium omnis peccati*):

Objection 1: The root is a certain principle or source (*principium*) of a tree, and so the root of a sin seems to be the same thing as the beginning of a sin. But as has been explained (a. 1), avid desire (*cupiditas*) is the root of every sin. Therefore, avid desire—and not pride—is likewise the beginning of every sin.

Objection 2: Ecclesiasticus 10:14 says, “The beginning of the pride of man is to apostatize from God.” But apostatizing from God is a sin. Therefore, there is a sin that is the beginning of pride and pride itself is not the beginning of every sin.

Objection 3: It is what effects every sin that seems to be the beginning of every sin. But this is disordered self-love (*inordinatus amor sui*), which “builds up the city of Babylon,” as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 14. Therefore, self-love—and not pride—is the beginning of every sin.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 10:15 says, “The beginning of every sin is pride.”

I respond: Some claim that ‘pride’ is said in three ways:

In one sense, ‘pride’ signifies a *disordered desire for one’s own excellence* (*inordinatum appetitum propriae excellentiae*). And in this sense it is a special sin.

In a second sense, it implies a certain *actual contempt for God*, with respect to the effect of not being subject to His command. And in this sense, they claim, pride is a general sin.

In the third sense, it implies a certain *inclination* toward contempt of this sort, stemming from the corruption of the nature. And in this sense, they claim, pride is the beginning of every sin. Moreover, pride differs from avid desire (*cupiditas*). For avid desire has to do with sin as a turning-toward some changeable good, and is that by which a sin is in some sense nourished and fostered; and it is because of this that avid desire is called the root. Pride, on the other hand, has to do with sin as a turning-away from God, whose command man refuses to submit to; and so it is called the beginning, because the character of evil begins with a turning-away from God.

Now even though, to be sure, these points are true, they nonetheless do not conform to the intention of the wise man who said, “The beginning of every sin is pride” (Ecclesiasticus 10:15). For he is clearly talking about pride as the disordered desire for one’s own excellence, as is obvious from the fact that he adds, “God has overturned the thrones of the proud leaders.” And he talks about this matter in almost the whole of relevant chapter.

Accordingly, one should respond that it is pride even as a special sin that is the beginning of every sin. For notice that, in the case of voluntary acts—which is what sins are—one finds two orderings: an order of *intention* and an order of *execution*.

In the first order, as has been explained many times above (cf. q. 18, a. 7), the end has the character of a principle or beginning (*habet rationem principii finis*). But in the acquisition of all temporal goods, the end is that the man should have, through those goods, a certain sort of perfection and excellence. And so on this score, pride, which is a desire for excellence, is posited as the beginning of every sin.

On the other hand, as far as execution is concerned, what is first is that which offers an opportunity for fulfilling all the desires involved in the sin, and this has the character of a root, viz., riches. And on this score, as has been explained (a. 2), avarice (*avaritia*) is the root of all evils.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: To apostatize from God is said to be the beginning of pride as far as the turning-away is concerned, because from the fact that a man wills not to submit to God, it follows that in temporal matters he wills his own excellence in a disordered way. And so ‘apostatize from God’ is being taken here not in the sense of a special sin, but rather as a certain general condition of every sin, viz., the turning-away from an unchangeable good.

An alternative reply is that to apostatize from God is the beginning of pride in the sense that it is the first species of pride. For it belongs to pride not to want to be subject to any superior and especially not to God. And from this it follows, with respect to the other species of pride, that the man is exalted in an unfitting way beyond himself.

Reply to objection 3: A man loves himself by desiring his own excellence. For to love oneself is the same as willing the good for oneself. Hence, whether one posits pride or self-love as the beginning of every sin, it amounts to the same thing.

Article 3

Besides pride and avarice, are there any other sins that might be called capital sins?

It seems that besides pride and avarice (*praeter superbiam et avaritiam*), there are no other sins that might be called capital sins (*peccata capitalia*):

Objection 1: As *De Anima* 2 says, the head (*caput*) seems to be related to animals in the way that the root is related to plants, since roots are similar to a mouth. Therefore, if avid desire is called the root of all evils, then it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.

Objection 2: The head has a certain ordering to the other members of the body, insofar as sensation and movement (*sensus et motus*) are in some sense diffused from the head. But something is called a sin because of the privation of order. Therefore, a sin does not have the character of a head. And so no capital sins should be posited.

Objection 3: Capital crimes are those that are punished with capital punishment (*quae capite plectuntur*). But there are sins in every genus that are punished with this sort of punishment. Therefore, the capital vices are not determinate in species.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 31 Gregory lists certain special vices that he claims to be capital vices.

I respond: The term ‘capital’ (*capitale*) is taken from ‘head’ (*caput*). But the head is properly speaking that member of an animal which is a principle and which directs the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a ‘head’, and men who direct and govern others are likewise called the heads of the others.

Therefore, a capital vice is in one sense taken from the head properly speaking, and in this sense a

capital sin is a sin that is punished by capital punishment (*peccatum quod capitis poena punitur*).

However, this is not the sense in which we now mean to be speaking about capital sins. Instead, we mean to be speaking in accord with the other way in which a capital sin is taken from ‘head’, viz., insofar as ‘head’ metaphorically signifies a principle or something that directs others. And in this sense a vice is called capital because other vices originate from it—and especially with respect to the origin of the final cause, which, as was explained (q. 72, a. 6) above, is the formal origin.

And so a capital vice is not only the principle of other vices but is also such that it directs and in some sense guides the others; for a craft or habit, to which the end belongs, always initiates and commands the means to the end. This is why, in *Moralia* 31, Gregory compares the capital vices to the leaders of an army.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Capital’ is taken denominatively from ‘head’, and this is through a certain derivation from or participation in ‘head’, in the sense of having some property of a head and not in the sense of a head absolutely speaking. And so the vices that are called ‘capital’ are not just those which have the character of a *first* origin—such as avarice, which is called ‘the root’, and pride, which is called ‘the beginning’—but also those which have the character of a *nearby* origin with respect to many sins (*quae habent rationem originis propinquae respect plurium peccatorum*).

Reply to objection 2: A sin lacks order as far as its being a turning-away is concerned, since it is on this score that it has the character of evil—and evil, according to Augustine in *De Natura Boni*, is “the privation of mode, species, and order.” However, as far as the turning-toward is concerned, sin has to do with some good. And so it is on this score that sin can have an order.

Reply to objection 3: This objection has to do with ‘capital sin’ insofar as it expresses the punishment deserved. And we are not talking about it in this sense here.

Article 4

Should one claim that there are seven capital vices, viz., vainglory, envy, anger, sadness, avarice, gluttony, and lust?

It seems that one should not claim that there are seven capital vices, viz., vainglory (*inanis gloria*), envy (*invidia*), anger (*ira*), sadness (*tristitia*), avarice (*avaritia*), gluttony (*gula*), and lust (*luxuria*):

Objection 1: Sins are opposed to virtues. But as has been explained (q. 61, a. 2), there are four principal virtues. Therefore, there are likewise just four principal or capital vices.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 77), the passions of the soul are causes of sin. Among the sins listed above there is no mention of two of these passions, viz., hope and fear. By contrast, there are some vices listed that pleasure and sadness belong to. For pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, whereas sadness (*tristitia*) belongs to sloth (*acedia*) and envy. Therefore, the principal sins are not appropriately enumerated.

Objection 3: Anger is not a principal passion. Therefore, it should not be posited among the principal vices.

Objection 4: As was explained above (aa. 1 and 2), just as avid desire (*cupiditas*), i.e., avarice, is the root of sin, so pride (*superbia*) is the beginning of sin. But avarice is posited as one of the seven capital vices. Therefore, pride should have been listed among the capital vices.

Objection 5: There are sins committed which cannot be caused by any of these, as when someone errs out of ignorance, or as when someone commits a sin with a good intention—for instance, when someone steals in order to give alms. Therefore, this list of capital sins is insufficient.

But contrary to this is the authority of Gregory, who enumerates them in this way in *Moralia* 31.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), the capital vices are those from which others arise,

especially with respect to the nature of the final cause. Now an origin of this sort can be thought of in two ways:

(a) *in accord with the condition of the sinner*, who is disposed in such a way that he is especially fixated on a single end, from which he usually proceeds into other sins. However, this mode of origin cannot fall under systematic study (*sub arte cadere non potest*), since there are infinitely many dispositions belonging to men; or

(b) *in accord with the natural relation of the ends themselves to one another*, and, in this regard, one vice arises from another in many cases. Hence, this mode of origin can fall under systematic study. Therefore, in accord with this, the vices that are called capital vices are those whose ends involve certain primary reasons for moving the appetite (*quorum fines habent quasdam primarias rationes movendi appetitum*), and the capital vices are distinguished in a way that corresponds to the distinctions among these reasons.

Now there are two ways in which something moves the appetite: *directly and per se*, and in this way what is good moves the appetite to pursue it, whereas what is bad, for the same reason, moves the appetite to flee from it; and *indirectly and, as it were, because of something else (per aliud)*, in the way that someone pursues something bad because of something good connected with it, or in the way that someone flees from something good because of something bad connected with it.

Now there are three types of good for a man:

The first is a *good of the soul*, which has the character of desirability solely because of someone's apprehension, viz., the excellence of praise or honor, and it is *vainglory* that pursues this good in a disordered way.

The second is a *good of the body*, and this pertains either to the *conservation of the individual*, as with food and drink, and *gluttony* pursues this good in a disordered way, or to the *conservation of the species*, as with sexual intercourse (*sicut coitus*), and *lust* is ordered toward this.

The third type of good is an *exterior good*, viz., riches, and *avarice* is ordered toward this.

And these same four vices flee from the contrary evils.

(Alternatively, a good moves the appetite mainly by the fact that it participates in some way in a property of happiness, which all things naturally desire. Now in the first place, part of the nature of happiness is excellence or renown, and this is what *pride (superbia)* or *vainglory* seeks. Second, part of the nature of happiness is sufficiency, and this is what *avarice* seeks in the riches that promise sufficiency. Third, when happiness is established, there is pleasure, without which happiness cannot exist, and this is what *gluttony* and *lust* seek.)

Now there are two ways in which it happens that someone flees from what is good because of something bad connected with it. For either this occurs with respect to *one's own good*, and this is *sloth (acedia)*, which is saddened by a spiritual good because of the bodily labor connected with it; or it occurs with respect to *someone else's good*, and if it occurs without one's rising up against the other (*sine insurrectione*), then it belongs to *envy*, which is saddened by the good of another insofar as that good poses an obstacle to one's own excellence, whereas if it occurs with some sort of rising up against the other for the purpose of vindication, then it belongs to *anger*.

And the pursuit of the contrary evils pertains to these same vices.

Reply to objection 1: The virtues and the vices do not have the same type of origin. For the virtues are caused by an ordering of desire to reason or even an ordering of desire to the unchangeable good, which is God, whereas the vices arise from a desire for a changeable good. Hence, it does not have to be the case that the principal vices are opposed to the principal virtues.

Reply to objection 2: Fear and hope are passions of the irascible power. But all the passions of the irascible power arise from the passions of the concupiscible power, all of which are ordered in some way toward pleasure and sadness. And so pleasure and sadness are numbered with the capital sins, since, as was established above (q. 25, a. 4), they are the most important passions.

Reply to objection 3: Even though anger is not a principal passion, still, because it involves a special type of appetitive movement, insofar as one attacks the other's good as something that it is upright to do for just vindication, it is distinguished from the other capital vices.

Reply to objection 4: As was explained above (a. 2), pride (*superbia*) is the beginning of every sin because of the nature of its end. And importance of the capital vices is taken from this same nature. And so pride, as a universal vice, is not listed, but is rather posited as "the queen of all vices," as Gregory puts it. Avarice, by contrast, is said to be the root of all sins for another reason, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 2).

Reply to objection 5: The vices in question are called capital vices because other vices very often arise from them. Hence, nothing prevents some sins from sometimes arising from other causes.

Still, one can reply that all the sins that proceed from ignorance can be traced back to sloth, since sloth involves the negligence by which someone is unwilling to acquire spiritual goods because of the labor. For as has been explained (q. 76, a. 2), the ignorance that can be a cause of sin stems from negligence.

Moreover, the fact that someone commits a sin with a good intention seems to pertain to ignorance, viz., insofar as he is ignorant that evil is not to be done in order that good might come from it.

QUESTION 85

The Corruption of the Good of the Nature as an Effect of Sin

Next we have to consider the effects of sin: first, the corruption of the good of the nature (*de corruptione boni naturae*) (question 85); second, the stain of sin (*de macula peccati*) (question 86), and third, the debt or deservingness of punishment (*de reatu poenae*) (question 87).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Is the good of the nature diminished by sin? (2) Can the good of the nature be totally destroyed by sin? (3) What of the four wounds, posited by Bede, by which human nature has been wounded because of sin? (4) Is the privation of mode, species, and order an effect of sin? (5) Are death and other bodily defects the effects of sin? (6) Are death and other bodily defects in some way natural to man?

Article 1

Does sin diminish the good of the nature?

It seems that sin does not diminish the good of the nature:

Objection 1: A man's sin is not more grievous than a demon's sin. But as Dionysius claims in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, natural goods remain untouched (*manet integra*) in the demons after sin. Therefore, sin likewise does not diminish the good of human nature.

Objection 2: Even if what is posterior changes, what is prior does not change; for instance, the substance remains the same even when the accidents change. But the nature exists prior to any voluntary action. Therefore, even after a disorder is effected in voluntary action because of sin, the nature is not thereby changed in such a way that the good of the nature is diminished.

Objection 3: A sin is a certain act, whereas diminution involves being acted upon (*diminutio autem passio*). But no agent is acted upon by its very acting (*nullum agens ex hoc ipso quod agit patitur*), though it can happen that it acts on one thing and is acted upon by something else. Therefore, one who sins does not diminish the good of his nature by his sin.

Objection 4: No accident acts on its own subject, since what is acted upon is a being in potentiality (*quia quod patitur est potentia ens*), whereas the subject of an accident is already a being in actuality with respect to that accident (*quod subiicitur accidenti iam est actu ens secundum accidens illud*). But a sin exists in the good of the nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore, a sin does not diminish the good of the nature, since to diminish something is a certain sort of acting.

But contrary to this: Luke 10:30 says. "A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho ..." —that is, as Bede expounds the passage, the man was going down into the defect of sin, and he was stripped of his gifts and wounded in his nature. Therefore, sin diminishes the good of the nature.

I respond: There are three possible ways to understand the good of human nature:

First, *the very principles of the nature*, by which the nature is constituted, along with the properties caused by these principles, such as the powers of the soul and other such things.

Second, since, as was explained above (q. 60, a. 1 and q. 63, a. 1), man has by his nature an *inclination toward virtue*, this inclination toward virtue is itself a certain good of the nature.

Third, one can call the *gift of original justice* a certain good of the nature that was given to the whole of human nature in the first man.

Thus, the first good of the nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of the nature, on the other hand, was completely taken away because of the sin of the first parent. By contrast, the second good of the nature, viz., the natural inclination toward virtue, is diminished by sin. For as was established above (q. 50, a. 1), human acts effect a certain inclination toward similar acts (*per actus humanos fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes actus*). But by the fact that something is inclined toward one of two contraries, it must be the case that its inclination toward the other contrary is diminished. Hence,

since sin is contrary to virtue, by the very fact that a man sins, the good of his nature, i.e., his inclination toward virtue, is diminished.

Reply to objection 1: As is clear to one who reads Dionysius's words carefully, he is talking about the *first* good of the nature, i.e., existing, living, and understanding (*esse, vivere et intelligere*).

Reply to objection 2: Even though the nature is prior to voluntary action, it nonetheless has an inclination to a certain sort of voluntary action. Hence, the nature, taken by itself, does not vary because of the variation of voluntary action, but the inclination itself varies as regards its being ordered to a terminus.

Reply to objection 3: Voluntary action proceeds from diverse powers, some of which are active and others of which are passive. And as is clear from what was said above when we were talking about the generation of a habit (q. 51, a. 2), the result is that by voluntary actions something is either caused in, or taken away from, a man who acts in such-and-such a way.

Reply to objection 4: An accident does not act as an efficient cause (*non agit effective*) on its subject, and yet it does act on it as a formal cause (*agit formaliter*), in the manner of speaking according to which one says. "Whiteness makes a thing white."

And so nothing prevents a sin from diminishing the good of the nature, yet in the sense that the sin is itself the very diminution of the good of the nature insofar as the diminution belongs to the *act's* disorder.

On the other hand, as far as the *agent's* disorder is concerned, one must claim that this sort of disorder is caused by the fact that in the acts of the soul there is something active and something passive; for instance, as was explained above (q. 77, aa. 1 and 2), the sensible object moves the sentient appetite, and the sentient appetite inclines reason and the will. And that is how the disorder is caused—not, to be sure, in such a way that an accident acts on its proper subject, but rather in such a way that the object acts on a power, and the one power acts on another and disorders it.

Article 2

Can the whole of the good of human nature be destroyed by sin?

It seems that the whole of the good of human nature can be destroyed by sin:

Objection 1: The good of human nature is finite, since human nature is itself likewise finite. But everything finite is totally destroyed (*consumitur*) if it is continuously subtracted from (*facta continua ablatione*). Therefore, since the good of the nature can be continuously diminished by sin, it seems that at some point it can be totally destroyed.

Objection 2: Things that have a uniform nature (*quae sunt unius naturae*) are such that the definition of the whole is similar to the definition of the parts (*similis est ratio de toto et de partibus*), as is clear in the case of air and water and flesh, and of all corporeal things composed of similar parts. But the good of the nature is totally uniform (*totaliter uniforme*). Therefore, since a part of that good can be destroyed by sin, it seems that the whole of it can likewise be destroyed by sin.

Objection 3: The good of the nature that can be diminished by sin is the aptitude for virtue. But in certain individuals this aptitude is completely destroyed because of sin, as is clear in the case of the damned, who cannot be restored to virtue, just as a blind man cannot be restored to sight. Therefore, sin can totally destroy the good of the nature.

But contrary to this: In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "Evil does not exist except in something good." But the evil of sin cannot exist in the good of virtue or of grace, since it is contrary to it. Therefore, it must exist in the good of the nature. Therefore, sin does not totally destroy that good.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the good of the nature that is diminished by sin is the

natural inclination toward virtue. This belongs to a man by the very fact that he is rational, since by virtue of being rational he is such that he operates in accord with reason, which is what it is to act in accord with virtue. But sin cannot totally remove from a man the fact that he is rational, since he would not longer be capable of sin. Hence, it is impossible that the good of the nature just alluded to should be totally destroyed.

Now given that a good of this sort might be continuously diminished by sin, some authors, in order to illustrate this fact, have used a certain example in which something finite is diminished *ad infinitum* and yet is never totally destroyed. For in *Physics* 3 the Philosopher points out that if something of the same quantity is continuously taken away from a finite magnitude, then in the end that magnitude will be totally consumed—as, for instance, if from some finite quantity I will always have subtracted the measure of the palm of a hand. By contrast, if the subtraction always involves the same ratio and not the same quantity, then the subtraction will be able to go on *ad infinitum*—as, for instance, if a quantity is divided into two [equal] parts, and then a half is subtracted from that half, one will be able so to proceed *ad infinitum*, and yet in such a way that what is subtracted later will always be less than what was subtracted earlier.

However, this example has no place in the matter under discussion. For it is not the case that a later sin diminishes the good of the nature less than an earlier sin; it might diminish it more, if it is a more grievous sin.

And so one has to reply in an alternative way that the inclination in question is to be understood as something in the middle between two things, since it is grounded in the rational nature as in a root, and it tends toward the good of the nature as its terminus and end. Therefore, there are two ways to understand its being diminished: in one way, on the part of the *root*; and in the other way, on the part of the *terminus*.

In the first way, the inclination is not diminished by sin, since, as was explained above (a. 1), sin does not diminish the nature itself. But the inclination is diminished in the second way, viz., insofar as an obstacle is posed to its reaching its terminus.

Now if it were diminished in the first way, then it would in some cases (*quandoque*) have to be totally destroyed when the rational nature was destroyed. But because it is diminished by an obstacle which is posed in order that it not reach its terminus, it is clear that it can be diminished *ad infinitum*, since obstacles can be posed *ad infinitum* insofar as a man is able to add sin upon sin *ad infinitum*; and yet it would not be totally destroyed, since the root of this inclination always remains.

Something similar is clear in the case of a diaphanous body. It has an inclination toward receiving light by the fact that it is diaphanous, but this inclination or aptitude is diminished because of intervening clouds (*diminuitur haec inclinatio vel habilitas ex parte nebularum supervenientium*), even though the inclination always remains in the root of the nature.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through when the diminution occurs through subtraction. But the diminution in question is effected by the posing of an obstacle, which, as has been explained, neither destroys nor diminishes the root of the inclination.

Reply to objection 2: A natural inclination is, to be sure, a uniform whole, but it nonetheless has a relation both to its source and also to its terminus (*habet respectum et ad principium et ad terminum*), and because of this it is diminished in one respect and not diminished in another respect (*quodammodo diminuitur et quodammodo non diminuitur*).

Reply to objection 3: The natural inclination toward virtue remains even in the damned; otherwise, remorse of conscience would not exist in them. But the fact that this inclination is not actualized (*non reducatur in actum*) occurs, in accord with God's justice, because of a lack of grace. In the same way, the aptitude for seeing remains in a blind man in the root of his nature itself, but it is not actualized because it lacks a cause that can actualize it by fashioning the organ that is required in order to have sight.

Article 3

Is it appropriate to claim that there are wounds of the nature that follow from sin, viz., weakness, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence?

It seems that it is inappropriate to claim that there are wounds of the nature that follow from sin, viz., weakness, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence:

Objection 1: The effect of a thing is not the same as the cause of that same thing. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 76, a. 1 and q. 77, aa. 3 and 5, and q. 78, a. 1), the four things mentioned are causes of sins. Therefore, they should not be posited as effects of sin.

Objection 2: ‘Malice’ names a certain sin. Therefore, it should not be posited among the effects of sin.

Objection 3: Concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But what is natural should not be posited as a wound of the nature. Therefore, concupiscence should not be posited as a wound of the nature.

Objection 4: It has been explained (q. 77, a. 3) that sinning from weakness is the same thing as sinning from passion. But concupiscence is a certain passion. Therefore, it should not be divided off against weakness.

Objection 5: In *De Natura et Gratia* Augustine posits that there are “two penalties for the soul that sins, viz., ignorance (*ignorantia*) and difficulty (*difficultas*),” which are the sources of “error (*error*) and anguish (*cruciatus*).” But these four things do not seem to harmonize with the four things in questions. Therefore, it seems that one or the other of these lists is posited inappropriately.

But contrary to this is the authority of Bede.

I respond: Through original justice reason perfectly restrained the lower powers of the soul, and reason itself was perfected by God and subject to Him. But as has already been explained (q. 81, a. 2), this original justice was taken away because of the sin of the first parent. And so all the powers of the soul remain in some way deprived of the proper ordering by which they are naturally ordered toward virtue, and this deprivation is itself called a wounding of the nature.

Now as was explained above (q. 61, a. 2), there are four powers of the soul that can be the subject of virtue, viz., (a) *reason*, in which *prudence* exists, (b) the *will*, in which *justice* exists, (c) the *irascible power*, in which *fortitude* exists, and (d) the *concupiscible power*, in which *temperance* exists.

Thus, insofar as *reason* is deprived of its ordering toward the truth, there is the wound of *ignorance*; insofar as the *will* is deprived of its ordering toward the good, there is the wound of *malice*; insofar as the *irascible power* is deprived of its ordering toward the arduous, there is the wound of *weakness*; and insofar as *concupiscence* is deprived of its ordering toward the pleasurable as moderated by reason, there is the wound of *concupiscence*. So, then, there are four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature by *the sin of the first parent*.

However, since, as is clear from what has been said (aa. 1 and 2), the inclination toward virtue in each individual is diminished by *actual* sin, these are also the four wounds that result from other sins, insofar as through sin reason is clouded, especially in matters of action; the will becomes hardened with respect to the good; more difficulty accrues to acting well; and concupiscence becomes more feverish.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents that which is an effect of one sin from being a cause of another sin. For given that the soul has been disordered by a previous sin, it is more easily inclined toward sinning.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Malice’ is being taken here not for a sin but instead for a certain proneness of the will toward evil—this according to Genesis 8:21 (“Man’s senses are prone toward evil from his youth”).

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 82, a. 3), concupiscence is natural to a man to the extent that it is subject to reason. On the other hand, it is contrary to nature in a man for concupiscence to exceed the limits of reason.

Reply to objection 4: Every passion in general is called a weakness insofar as it weakens the soul's strength and impedes reason. But Bede is taking 'weakness' in the strict sense insofar as it is opposed to fortitude, which belongs to the irascible power.

Reply to objection 5: The 'difficulty' posited in Augustine's book includes the three things that belong to the appetitive powers, viz., malice, weakness, and concupiscence; for because of these three things it happens that one does not easily tend toward the good. On the other hand, error and sorrow are subsequent wounds (*vulnera consequentia*); for someone is sorrowful because he is weakened with respect to those things that he desires.

Article 4

Is the privation of mode, species, and order an effect of sin?

It seems that the privation of mode, species, and order is not an effect of sin:

Objection 1: In *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, "Where these three things are great, goodness is great; where they are small, goodness is small; and where they are missing (*nulla*), goodness is missing." But sin does not destroy the good of the nature. Therefore, it does not deprive the nature of mode, species, and order.

Objection 2: Nothing is a cause of its very self. But as Augustine says in *De Natura Boni*, sin is itself "a privation of mode, species, and order." Therefore, the privation of mode, species, and order is not an effect of sin.

Objection 3: Diverse sins have diverse effects. But since mode, species, and order are diverse, they seem to involve diverse privations. Therefore, it is through diverse sins that these privations arise (*per diversa peccata privantur*). Therefore, the privation of mode, species, and order is not the effect of every sin.

But contrary to this: Sin exists in the soul in the same way that weakness exists in the body—this according to Psalm 6:3 ("Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak"). But weakness deprives the body itself of mode, species, and order. Therefore, sin deprives the soul of mode, species, and order.

I respond: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 5, a. 5), mode, species, and order follow upon each created good insofar as it is a created good and even insofar as it is a created being.

For every sort of *esse* and goodness is thought of through some form, from which its *species* is taken. And the form of each thing—no matter what sort of form it is, a substantial form or an accidental form—exists in accord with some measure; this is why *Metaphysics* 8 says that the forms of things are like numbers. And because of this, each thing has a certain *mode*, which has to do with measure. Moreover, each thing is *ordered* by its form toward something else. So, then, corresponding to the diverse grades of goods, there are diverse grades of mode, species, and order.

Therefore, there is a certain good that belongs to the very *substance of the nature*, which has its own mode, species, and order; and this is neither negated (*privatur*) nor diminished by sin.

There is also the good of *the natural inclination*, and this likewise has its own mode, species, and order. And this good, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 2), is diminished by sin but not totally destroyed by it.

And there is also the good of *virtue and grace*, which likewise has its own mode, species, and order, and this is totally destroyed by mortal sin.

There is also the good which is the *well-ordered act itself* and which likewise has its own mode,

species, and order; and the privation of this good is sin itself in its essence (*est essentialiter ipsum peccatum*).

And so it is clear both (a) how sin is a privation of mode, species, and order, and (b) how sin negates or diminishes mode, species and order.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: From this the reply to the first two objections is clear.

Reply to objection 3: As is clear from what has been said, the mode, the species, and the order follow from one another. Thus, they are all negated or diminished together.

Article 5

Are death and other bodily defects the effects of sin?

It seems that death and other bodily defects are not the effects of sin:

Objection 1: If the cause is equal, the effect will be equal. But defects of the sort in question are not equal in everyone; instead, there are those in whom such defects are more abundant. Yet as was explained above (q. 82, a. 4), original sin is equal in everyone, and defects of this sort seem to be the effects especially of original sin. Therefore, death and defects of the sort in question are not the effects of sin.

Objection 2: When a cause is taken away, its effect is taken away. But when every sin is taken away through Baptism or Penance, defects of the sort in question are not taken away. Therefore, they are not the effects of sin.

Objection 3: Actual sin has more of the nature of guilt than original sin does. But actual sin does not change the nature of a body with respect to any defect. Therefore, *a fortiori*, original sin does not do so. Therefore, it is not the case that death and other bodily defects are the effects of sin.

But contrary to this: In Romans 5:12 the Apostle says, “Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death.”

I respond: There are two ways in which one thing is a cause of another, viz., (a) *per se* and (b) *per accidens*.

One thing is a *per se* cause of another when it produces the effect by the power of its own nature or form, and so it follows that the effect is intended *per se* by the cause. Hence, since death and defects of this sort lie outside of the sinner’s intention, it is clear that sin is not a *per se* cause of these defects.

On the other hand, one thing is a *per accidens* cause of another if it is a cause by virtue of its removing an obstacle; for instance, *Physics* 8 says, “One who displaces a column moves *per accidens* a stone that has been placed on the top of the column.” And it is in this way that the sin of the first parent is a cause of death and of all the defects under discussion in human nature, viz., insofar as through the sin of the first parent original justice was lost. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 97, a. 1), through original justice it was the case not only that the lower powers of the soul were held together by reason without any disorder (*continebantur sub ratione absque omni deorindatione*), but also that the whole of the body was held together by the soul without any defects. And so, once this original justice was removed by the sin of the first parent, human nature was rendered corruptible by disorder within the body itself, in the same way that, as was explained above (a. 3), human nature was wounded in the soul by the disorder among its powers.

Now the removal of original justice has the character of a punishment, just as the removal of grace does. Hence, death and all the accompanying bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And even though these defects were not intended by the sinner, they were nonetheless ordained by the justice of God as a punisher.

Reply to objection 1: Equality of the *per se* cause is a cause of equal effects, since when a *per se*

cause is increased or decreased, the effect is increased or decreased. But equality of the sort of cause that removes an obstacle does not entail an equality of effects. For instance, if someone displaces two columns with equal force, it does not follow that the stones placed on top of those columns will move in equal ways; instead, the one that is heavier will move more swiftly in accord with the property of its own nature, since it is left to its own nature when the obstacle is removed.

So, then, when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself. As a result, in accord with the diversity of natural dispositions, the bodies of some individuals will be subject to more defects and the bodies of others to fewer defects, even though original sin is equal in both.

Reply to objection 2: Original sin and actual sin are removed by the same cause by which defects of the sort in question are also removed—this according to the Apostle in Romans 8:11 (“He shall give life to your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit who dwells within you”). But these two effects take place at fitting times according to the order of God’s wisdom. For we must arrive at the immortality and impassibility of the state of glory, which was begun in Christ and which is acquired for us through Christ, after having been previously conformed to His sufferings (*conformati prius passionibus eius*). Hence, passibility must remain in our bodies for a time in order that we might merit the impassibility of glory in conformity with Christ.

Reply to objection 3: In the case of an actual sin, there are two things to take into consideration, viz., (a) the very substance of the act and (b) its character as a sin (*rationem culpae*). As for the substance of the act, an actual sin can cause a bodily defect; for instance, there are those who become ill and die because of an excess of food. But as for the act’s character as a sin, a sin deprives one of grace, which is given to a man in order to rectify the acts of his soul, though not in order to ward off bodily defects, in the way that original justice did.

Article 6

Are death and bodily defects natural to man?

It seems that death and bodily defects are natural to man:

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “The corruptible and the incorruptible differ in species.” But man belongs to same genus as other animals, and the other animals are naturally corruptible. Therefore, man is naturally corruptible.

Objection 2: Everything that is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, having within itself, as it were, the cause of its own corruption. But the human body is like this. Therefore, the human body is naturally corruptible.

Objection 3: The hot naturally consumes the moist. But a man’s life is conserved through the hot and the moist. Since, therefore, as *De Anima* 2 says, the vital operations are brought to completion through the act of natural heat, it seems that death and bodily defects are natural to man.

But contrary to this:

1. Whatever is natural to man is such that God made it in man. But as Wisdom 1:13 says, “God did not make death.” Therefore, death is not natural to man.

2. What accords with nature cannot be called a punishment or an evil, since each thing is such that what is natural to it is appropriate for it. But as was explained above (a. 5), death and bodily defects are a punishment for original sin. Therefore, they are not natural to man.

3. Matter is proportioned to form, and each thing is proportioned to its end. But as was explained above (q. 2, a. 7 and q. 5, a. 3), man’s end is everlasting beatitude. Also, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 6), the form of the human body is the rational soul, which is incorruptible. Therefore, the human body is naturally incorruptible.

I respond: There are two ways in which we can talk about a given corruptible thing: (a) with respect to its universal nature (*secundum naturam universalem*) and (b) with respect to its particular nature (*secundum naturam particularem*).

The *particular nature* is each thing's proper active and conserving power (*est propria virtus activa et conservativa uniuscuiusque rei*). And on this score, as *De Caelo* 2 says, every corruption and defect is contrary to the nature, since power of this sort intends the *esse* and conservation of what it belongs to.

By contrast, the *universal nature* is the active power in some universal principle of nature—for instance, the active power in some celestial bodies or the active power that belongs to some higher substance, in accord with which even God is called the 'Nature that makes nature' (*natura naturans*) by some authors. This power intends the good and the conservation of the whole universe, and this requires alternating generation and corruption among things. And in this sense, the corruptions and defects of things are natural—not, to be sure, because of the inclination of their forms, which are principles of *esse* and perfection, but because of the inclination of their matter, which is assigned proportionately to such-and-such forms according to the universal agent's distribution. And even though every form intends perpetual *esse* to the extent that it can, still, no corruptible entity's form can attain perpetuity for itself—except for the rational soul, because it itself is not completely subject to corporeal matter in the way that the other forms are. To the contrary, the rational soul has its own proper immaterial operation, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 2). Hence, as far as his form is concerned, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. However, because that form has a matter that is composed of contraries, corruptibility in the whole composite follows from the inclination of the matter. Accordingly, man is naturally corruptible with respect to the nature of his matter left to itself, but not with respect to the nature of his form.

The first three of the above arguments have to do with the matter, whereas the other three arguments have to do with the form. Hence, in order to reply to these arguments, notice that man's form, i.e., the rational soul, is, because of its incorruptibility, proportionate to its end, which is everlasting beatitude.

By contrast, the human body, which is corruptible considered in its own nature, is in one sense proportionate to its form and in another sense not. For with respect to any sort of matter there are two circumstances (*conditiones*) that can be considered, viz., (a) what the agent chooses and (b) other things that are not chosen by the agent but exist because of the natural condition of the matter. For instance, in order to make a knife a craftsman chooses hard and flexible matter that can be sharpened so as to be capable of cutting. But the fact that the iron is breakable and subject to rust follows from iron's natural disposition, and the craftsman does not choose this for the iron, but would reject it if he could. Hence, this disposition of the matter is not proportionate to the craftsman's intention or to the intention of his craft. Similarly, the human body is matter chosen by nature for its temperate constitution, in order for the organ of touch and the organs of the other sentient and moving powers to be as suitable as possible. But the fact that the human body is corruptible stems from the matter's condition and is not chosen by nature—just the opposite, nature would choose incorruptible matter if it could.

Now God, to whom every nature is subject, made up for the defect of the matter in the very creation of man; and, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 97, a. 1), by the gift of original justice He gave a sort of incorruptibility to the human body. And this is why it is said that God did not make death and that death is a punishment for sin.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 86

The Stain of Sin as an Effect of Sin

Next we have to consider the stain of sin (*macula peccati*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Is the staining of the soul an effect of sin? (2) Does the stain of sin remain in the soul after the sinful act?

Article 1

Does sin cause a stain in the soul?

It seems that sin does not cause any stain in the soul:

Objection 1: A higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature; this is why, as Augustine remarks in *Contra Quinque Haereses*, a solar ray is not defiled by being touched by fetid bodies. But the human soul is of a much higher nature than the changeable things to which it turns in sinning. Therefore, it does not contract a stain from them when it sins.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 74, aa. 1 and 2), sin exists mainly in the will. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the will exists in reason. But reason, or intellect, is perfected rather than stained by its consideration of any entity whatsoever. Therefore, neither is the will stained by sin.

Objection 3: If sin causes a stain, then that stain is either something positive or a pure privation. If it is something positive, it can only be a disposition or habit, since nothing else seems to be caused by an act. But the stain is not a disposition or habit, since it is possible for it still to remain even after the disposition or habit has been removed; this is clear in the case of someone who committed a mortal sin of prodigality and afterwards changed to the opposite vice by committing a mortal sin. Therefore, 'stain' does not posit anything in the soul. Similarly, it is not a pure privation. For all sins agree as regards the turning-away and the privation of grace. Therefore, it would follow that there is a single stain for all sins. Therefore, it is not the case that sin effects a stain (*macula non est effectus peccati*).

But contrary to this: In Ecclesiasticus 47:22 Solomon is told, "You have made a stain in your glory." And Ephesians 5:27 says, "... so that He might present to Himself a glorious Church without stain or wrinkle." And in both cases what is being talked about is the stain of sin. Therefore, the stain is an effect of sin.

I respond: 'Stain' is used properly in the case of corporeal things, when a shiny body like a garment or gold or silver loses its luster (*perdit suum nitorem*) because of contact with another body, whereas in the case of spiritual things 'stain' has to be used by analogy with this (*ad similitudinem huius oportet maculam dici*).

The soul has two sorts of luster: (a) a luster from the refulgence of the light of natural reason, through which it is directed in its acts, and (b) a luster from the refulgence of the divine light, viz., wisdom and grace, through which a man is likewise perfected in acting suitably and well.

Now the soul has, as it were, a sort of contact when it adheres to certain things through love. But, as is clear from what was explained above (q. 71, a. 6), when the soul sins, it adheres to these things in a way that is contrary to the light of reason and divine law. Hence, the loss of luster that results from such contact is metaphorically called a stain in the soul.

Reply to objection 1: The lower things do not defile the soul by their power, as if they acted on the soul. To the contrary, the soul instead defiles itself by its own action when it adheres to them in a disordered way that is contrary to the light of reason and divine law.

Reply to objection 2: The intellect's action is perfected because intelligible things exist in the intellect in the mode of the intellect itself, and so the intellect is perfected rather than infected by them. By contrast, the will's act consists in a movement toward the things themselves, so that the love glues the soul to the thing that is loved. And it is because of this that the soul is stained when it adheres to things

in a disordered way—this according to Hosea 9:10 (“They have become abominable, just like the things they loved”).

Reply to objection 3: The stain is not anything positive in the soul, but neither does ‘stain’ signify just a privation. Instead, it signifies a privation of luster in the soul *in relation to its cause*, viz., the sin. And, for this reason, diverse sins induce diverse stains. The stain is like a shadow, which is a privation of light stemming from an interposed body (*ex obiecto alicuius corporis*), and the shadows are diversified by the diversity of the interposed bodies.

Article 2

Does the stain remain in the soul after the sinful act?

It seems that the stain does not remain in the soul after the sinful act:

Objection 1: Nothing remains in the soul after an act except a habit or a disposition. But as was established above (a. 1), the stain is not a habit or a disposition. Therefore, the stain does not remain in the soul after the sinful act.

Objection 2: As was explained above (a. 1), the stain is related to a sin in the way that a shadow is related to a body. But when the body passes, the shadow does not remain. Therefore, when the sinful act passes, the stain does not remain.

Objection 3: Every effect depends on its cause. But the cause of the stain is the sinful act. Therefore, when the sinful act is removed, the stain does not remain in the soul.

But contrary to this: Joshua 22:17 says, “Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and that the stain of that crime remains in you to this day?”

I respond: The stain of sin remains in the soul even after the sinful act passes. The reason for this is that, as has been explained (a. 1), the stain implies a certain lack of luster because of a withdrawal from the light of reason or the light of divine law. And so as long a man remains outside of this sort of light, the stain of sin remains in him, whereas after he returns to the divine light and the light of reason—something that occurs through grace—the stain goes away.

Now even if the sinful act by which the man had withdrawn from the light of reason or divine law ceases, nonetheless, the man does not immediately return to the state he was previously in; instead, what is required is some movement of the will contrary to the first movement. In the same way, if someone is distant from another because of some movement, he does not immediately come to be close to him when the movement ceases. Rather, he must approach him by returning through a contrary movement.

Reply to objection 1: After the sinful act nothing positive remains (*nihil positive remanet*) in the soul except a disposition or habit, but something ‘privative’ does remain (*remanet aliquid privative*), viz., the privation of being conjoined to the divine light.

Reply to objection 2: When the body blocking the light passes (*transeunte obstaculo corporis*), the diaphanous body remains equally close to the illuminating body and equally related to it, and so the shadow immediately passes away. By contrast, when the sinful act is removed, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: A sinful act creates a distance from God, and the loss of luster follows upon this distance, just as a local movement creates a distance in place. Hence, just as the distance in place is not removed when the movement ceases, so neither is the stain removed when the sinful act ceases.

QUESTION 87

Being Deserving of Punishment as an Effect of Sin

Next we have to consider the state of being deserving of punishment (*de reatu poenae*): first, the state itself of being deserving of punishment (question 87); and, second, mortal and venial sin, which are distinguished from one another by the punishment deserved for them (*quae distinguuntur secundum reatum*) (questions 88-89).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is it an effect of sin to be deserving of punishment? (2) Can one sin be the punishment for another sin? (3) Does any sin make one deserving of an eternal punishment? (4) Does any sin make one deserving of a punishment that is infinite with respect to quantity? (5) Does every sin make one deserving of an eternal and infinite punishment? (6) Can the state of being deserving of punishment remain after the sin? (7) Is every punishment imposed for some sin? (8) Is one individual deserving of punishment for someone else's sin?

Article 1

Is it an effect of sin to be deserving of punishment?

It seems that it is not an effect of sin to be deserving of punishment (*reatus poenae non sit effectus peccati*):

Objection 1: What a thing is related to *per accidens* does not seem to be a proper effect of it. But to be deserving of punishment is related *per accidens* to a sin, since it lies outside of the sinner's intention. Therefore, it is not an effect of sin to be deserving of punishment.

Objection 2: Evil is not a cause of good. But punishment is a good, because it is just and because it is from God. Therefore, punishment is not an effect of sin, which is evil.

Objection 3: In *Confessiones* 1 Augustine says, "Every disordered affection (*inordinatus animus*) is its own punishment." But a punishment is not a cause of one's being deserving of another punishment, since if that were the case, then there would be an infinite regress (*sic iretur in infinitum*). Therefore, sin does not cause one to be deserving of punishment.

But contrary to this: Romans 2:9 says, "[He will render] tribulation and anguish to every soul that does evil." Therefore, sin incurs punishment, which is here designated by the names 'tribulation' and 'anguish'.

I respond: From the case of natural things it devolves to human affairs that what rises up against a thing suffers some loss (*detrimentum*) from that thing. For instance, we see in the case of natural things that one of two contraries acts more strongly when the other contrary is present; this is why, as *Meteorologia* 1 points out, heated water cools more quickly. Hence, among men one finds that by a natural inclination each one presses back anyone who rises up against him (*deprimat eum qui contra ipsum insurgit*).

Now it is clear that the things contained within any given order are in some sense unified in their relation to the principle of that order. Hence, the result is that whatever rises up against a given order is pressed back by that order or by the principle of that order. But since a sin is a disordered act, it is clear that anyone who sins is acting against some order. And so the result is that he is pressed back by that order. And this pressing back is punishment (*quae depressio poena est*).

Thus, there are three sorts of punishment by which a man can be punished, corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. For, first of all, human nature is subject to the *order of its own reason*; second, it is subject to the *order of other men*, who govern it either spiritually or temporally, whether politically or in a household; and, third, it is subject to the *universal order of God's rule*. Hence, each of these orders is perverted by sin, while the one who sins acts contrary to reason, contrary to human law, and contrary to God's law. Hence, he incurs three sorts of punishment: one from

himself, viz., remorse of conscience; a second from man; and a third from God.

Reply to objection 1: Punishment follows upon sin insofar as sin is evil by reason of its disorder. Hence, just as evil is *per accidens* in the sinner's act, falling outside of his intention, so too with his being deserving of punishment.

Reply to objection 2: Punishment can be just both when it is inflicted by God and when it is inflicted by man, and so *the punishment itself* is only a dispositive effect of sin and not a direct effect (*non est effectus directe sed solum dispositive*).

However, sin makes a man to be *deserving of punishment*, and this is something bad. For in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "To be punished is not an evil, but to become deserving of punishment is an evil." Hence, to be deserving of punishment is posited as a direct effect of sin (*reatus poenae directe ponitur effectus peccati*).

Reply to objection 3: This particular punishment for disordered affection is due for a sin because the sin perverts the *order of reason*. But there are other punishments one comes to be deserving of for perverting the *order of divine law* or the *order of human law*.

Article 2

Can a sin be the punishment for a sin?

It seems that a sin cannot be the punishment for a sin.:

Objection 1: As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, punishments are inflicted so that through them men might be led back to the good of virtue. But a man is not led to the good of virtue by a sin; instead, he is led to just the opposite. Therefore, a sin is not a punishment for a sin.

Objection 2: As is clear from Augustine in *83 Quaestiones*, just punishments are from God. But a sin is unjust and not from God. Therefore, a sin cannot be the punishment for a sin.

Objection 3: It is part of the nature of punishment that it be contrary to the will. But as clear from what was said above (q. 74, aa. 1 and 2), sin comes from the will. Therefore, a sin cannot be the punishment for a sin.

But contrary to this: In *Super Ezechiel* Gregory says that some sins are a punishment for sin.

I respond: There are two ways in which we can speak about sin, *per se* and *per accidens*.

Per se, there is no way in which a sin can be the punishment for sin. For sin is thought of *per se* insofar as it comes from the will. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, a. 5), it is part of the nature of punishment that it is contrary to the will. Hence, it is clear that, speaking *per se*, there is no way in which a sin can be the punishment for a sin.

But *per accidens*, there are three ways in which a sin can be the punishment for a sin:

First, *on the part of a cause which is the removal of an obstacle*. For there are causes that incline one toward sin, such as the passions, the devil's temptations, and others of this sort. These causes are impeded by the assistance of God's grace, which is taken away through sin. Hence, since, as was explained above (q. 79, a. 3), the removal of grace is itself a certain punishment and from God, it follows that, *per accidens*, even the sin which follows from the removal of grace is itself called a punishment. And this is the sense in which Apostle is speaking in Romans 1:24 when he says, "Because of this, God handed them over to the desires of their heart," i.e., to the passions of the soul, because when men are deserted by the assistance of God's grace, they are conquered by their passions. And in this sense it is always the case that a sin is called a punishment for a preceding sin.

Second, *on the part of the substance of the act*, when it involves an affliction, whether this affliction is an interior act, as is clear in the case of anger and envy, or an exterior act, as is clear when individuals are burden themselves with great trouble and loss in order to complete their sinful act—this

according to Wisdom 5:7 (“We tired ourselves out along the way of iniquity”).

Third, *on the part of the effect*, so that some sins are called punishments because of the effects that follow from them.

And in these last two ways, one sin is not only a punishment for a preceding sin, but even a punishment for itself.

Reply to objection 1: Even the fact that some are being punished by God when he permits them to fall into sin is ordered to the good of virtue—sometimes even for the good of virtue for those who are sinning, viz., because after their sin they rise up more humble and more cautious, but always for the correction of others who, seeing some individuals tumble from one sin to another, come to fear sin more greatly.

Now in the other two ways in which a sin can be the punishment for sin, it is clear that the punishment is ordered correction, since the very fact that a man undergoes trouble and loss in his sinning is apt to draw men back from sin.

Reply to objection 2: The argument proceeds from sin taken in its own right (*secundum se*).

Reply to objection 3: The same thing should be said in reply to the third argument.

Article 3

Does any sin make one deserving of an eternal punishment?

It seems that no sin makes one deserving of an eternal punishment (*nullum peccatum inducat reatum aeternae poenae*):

Objection 1: A just punishment is equal to the sin, since justice is equality; hence, Isaiah 27:8 says, “In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, You will judge it.” But a sin is temporal. Therefore, no sin makes one deserving of an eternal punishment.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 2 says, “Punishments are certain medicines.” But no medicine should be infinite, since a medicine is ordered toward an end and, as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, what is ordered toward an end is not infinite. Therefore, no punishment should be infinite.

Objection 3: If anyone is always doing something, it is only because he delights in it for its own sake. But as Wisdom 1:13 says, “God does not delight in the destruction of men.” Therefore, He will not punish men with an everlasting punishment.

Objection 4: Nothing which is *per accidens* is infinite. But punishment is *per accidens*, since it is not in accord with the nature of the one who is punished. Therefore, it cannot last for an infinitely long time (*non potest in infinitum durare*).

But contrary to this: Matthew 25:46 says, “These shall go into everlasting punishment.” And Mark 3:29 says, “He who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit shall not have forgiveness unto eternity, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), sin makes one deserving of punishment because it perverts some order. But as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. Hence, as long as the perversion of the order remains, one must remain deserving of punishment.

Now someone perverts an order at times in a way that is repairable and at times in a way that is irreparable. For a defect by which the principle is taken away is always irreparable, whereas if the principle is preserved, the defects can be repaired by its power. For instance, if the visual principle is corrupted, then vision cannot be restored except by God’s power alone, but as long as the visual principle is preserved, then if impediments to vision come along, they can be repaired either by nature or by art.

Now every order has a principle through which an individual comes to participate in that order. And so if, through sin, there is a corruption of the principle by which a man’s will is subject to God, then

the disorder, taken in its own right (*quantum est de se*), is irreparable, even though it can be repaired by God's power. But the principle of this order is the ultimate end, to which a man adheres through charity. And so if there are sins that involve a turning away from God and remove charity, then, taken in their own right, they make one deserving of an eternal punishment.

Reply to objection 1: The punishment is proportioned to the sin *with respect to its severity*, both in God's judgment and in human judgments. But as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 21, in no judgment is it required that the punishment be equal to the sin *with respect to its duration*. For instance, it is not the case that because adultery or homicide is committed in a moment, it is therefore punished by a momentary punishment; indeed, sometimes it is punished by perpetual incarceration or exile—and sometimes even by death, where what is taken into consideration is not the temporal duration of the execution (*occisionis mora*), but rather the fact that the individual is being permanently excluded from the society of the living, and so the punishment represents in its own way the eternity of the punishment inflicted by God.

Now it is just, according to Gregory, that someone who in his own eternity has sinned against God should be punished in God's eternity (*in aeterno Dei*), where someone is said to have sinned in his own eternity not only because of the continuation of an act that endures for all of a man's life, but because by the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has a willingness to sin forever (*voluntatem habet in aeternum peccandi*). This is why, in *Moralia* 34, Gregory says, "The wicked want to live without end, so that they might be able to remain in their wickedness without end."

Reply to objection 2: Even a punishment inflicted in accord with human laws is not always medicinal for the one who is being punished, but medicinal only for the others—as, for instance, when a robber is hanged not in order that he might change, but for the sake of the others, viz., in order that they might refrain from sinning at least out of fear of punishment—this according to Proverbs 19:25 ("When the wicked man is scourged, the fool will become wiser").

So, then, the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate are medicinal for those who abstain from sins because they are thinking about the punishments—this according to Psalm 59:6 ("You have given to those who fear you a sign, that they may flee from before the bow, that those You love might be delivered").

Reply to objection 3: God does not delight in the punishments for their own sake, but instead delights in the order of His justice, which requires these punishments.

Reply to objection 4: Even though a punishment is ordered *per accidens* with respect to one's nature, it is nonetheless ordered *per se* with respect to the privation of order and with respect to God's justice. And so the punishment will always endure as long as the disorder endures.

Article 4

Should the punishment for sin be infinite with respect to quantity?

It seems that the punishment for sin should be infinite with respect to quantity:

Objection 1: Jeremiah 10:24 says, "Correct me, O Lord, but yet in Your judgment and not in Your fury, lest You reduce me to nothingness." But the words 'God's anger' or 'God's fury' metaphorically signify the retribution belonging to God's justice, whereas being reduced to nothingness is an infinite punishment, just as to make something *ex nihilo* belongs to an infinite power. Therefore, in accord with God's retribution (*secundum vindictam divinam*), a sin is punished by a punishment that is infinite with respect to quantity.

Objection 2: The quantity of the punishment corresponds to the quantity of the guilt—this according to Deuteronomy 25:2 ("According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the

stripes be”). But a sin that is committed against God is infinite, since the greater the person against whom one sins, the greater the sin; for instance, it is a graver sin to strike a prince than to strike a private man. But God has infinite greatness. Therefore, an infinite punishment is fitting for a sin that is committed against God.

Objection 3: There are two sorts of infinity, infinity of duration and infinity of quantity. But the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore, it is infinite in quantity as well.

But contrary to this: If this were so, then there would be equal punishments for every mortal sin, since it is not the case that one infinity is greater than another.

I respond: The punishment is proportioned to the sin. But there are two things in a sin. The first is the turning away from an unchangeable good that is infinite, and so on this score the sin is infinite. The other thing in a sin is the disordered turning toward a changeable good. And on this score the sin is finite, both because the changeable good is itself finite, and also because the turning-toward is finite, since a creature’s acts cannot be infinite.

Therefore, as far as the turning-away is concerned, what corresponds to the sin is the *punishment of loss* (*poena damni*), which is likewise infinite, since it is the loss of an infinite good, viz., God (*est amissio infiniti boni, scilicet Dei*). But as far as the disordered turning-toward is concerned, what corresponds to it is the punishment of the sensory power (*poena sensus*), which is finite.

Reply to objection 1: It is not part of God’s justice to reduce the one who sins to nothingness, since this is incompatible with the everlasting punishment that, as has been explained (a. 3), is in accord with God’s justice. Instead, it is the one who is deprived of spiritual goods that is being said to be ‘reduced to nothingness’—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:22 (“If I do not have charity, I am nothing”).

Reply to objection 2: This argument is talking about sin as regards the turning-away, since it is in this sense that a man sins against God.

Reply to objection 3: The *duration* of the punishment corresponds to the duration of the guilt—not on the part of the *act*, but on the part of the *stain*, which is such that as long as it remains, one is deserving of punishment (*ex parte maculae, qua durante manet reatus poenae*).

On the other hand, the *severity* of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault (*acerbitas poenae respondet gravitati culpae*). Now a fault that is irreparable is of itself such that it endures forever, and so it deserves an eternal punishment. However, it is not infinite as regards the turning-toward, and so on this score it does not deserve a punishment that is infinite with respect to quantity.

Article 5

Does every sin make one deserving of an eternal punishment?

It seems that every sin makes one deserving of an eternal punishment (*omne peccatum inducat reatum poenae aeternae*):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 4), the punishment is proportioned to the guilt. But an eternal punishment differs infinitely (*differt in infinitum*) from a temporal punishment. And yet no sin seems to differ infinitely from any other sin, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 3), some sins deserve an eternal punishment, it seems that no sin deserves just a temporal punishment (*nulli peccato debeatur poena temporalis tantum*).

Objection 2: Original sin is the least among sins; this is why, in *Enchiridion*, Augustine says, “The mildest punishment belongs to those who are punished solely for original sin.” But original sin deserves an everlasting punishment, since children who have died in original sin without Baptism never

see the kingdom of God, as is clear from what our Lord says in John 3:3 (“Unless a man is born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God”). Therefore, *a fortiori*, there will be an eternal punishment for every other sin.

Objection 3: A sin does not deserve a greater punishment from the fact that it is joined to another sin, since each sin has its own punishment attached to it in accord with God’s justice. But a venial sin deserves an eternal punishment if it exists with a mortal sin in someone who is damned, since in Hell there cannot be any forgiveness. Therefore, a venial sin deserves an eternal punishment absolutely speaking. Therefore, no sin deserves a temporal punishment.

But contrary to this: In *Dialogi* 4, Gregory says that certain less serious sins (*quaedam leviores culpa*e) are forgiven after this life. Therefore, not every sin is punished by an eternal punishment.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), sin causes one to be deserving of an eternal punishment insofar as it irreparably attacks the order of divine justice, viz., by being contrary to the very principle of that order, which is the ultimate end. Now it is clear that in some sins there is, to be sure, a disorder, and yet this disorder comes about through an opposition not to the ultimate end, but only to the means to that end, insofar as the means are intended more than they should be or less than they should be (*inquantum plus vel minus debite eis intenditur*), while the ordering with respect to the ultimate end is still preserved—as, for instance, when a man, even though he is too attached to some temporal end, nonetheless would not will to offend God for the sake of that end by doing something contrary to God’s precept. Hence, sins of this sort deserve a temporal punishment and not an eternal punishment.

Reply to objection 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another as regards the turning toward a changeable good, which is what the substance of the act consists in; however, they do differ infinitely from one another as regards the turning-away. For some sins are committed through a turning away from the ultimate end, whereas other sins are committed through a disorder with respect to the means to the end. And the ultimate end differs infinitely from the means to the end.

Reply to objection 2: Original sin deserves an eternal punishment not by reason of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of its subject, viz., a man who is without grace; for it is only through grace that a remission of punishment is effected.

Reply to objection 3: A similar reply should be given to the third objection, which concerns venial sin. For as was explained above (a. 3), the fact that a punishment is eternal corresponds not to the quantity of the sin, but to the fact that the sin is not forgivable (*aeternitas poenae non respondet quantitati culpa*e, sed irremissibilitati ipsius).

Article 6

Does one’s being deserving of punishment remain after the sin?

It seems that one’s being deserving of punishment does not remain after the sin (*reatus poenae non remaneat post peccatum*):

Objection 1: When the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But sin is the cause of one’s being deserving of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, one ceases to be deserving of punishment.

Objection 2: A sin is removed by the man’s returning to virtue. But a virtuous man deserves a reward and not a punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, one does not remain deserving of punishment.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 3 says, punishments are medicines. But after someone has already been cured of an ailment, he is not given medicine. Therefore, once the sin is removed, one does not remain deserving of punishment.

But contrary to this: 2 Kings 12:13-14 says, “David said to Nathan, ‘I have sinned against the Lord.’ And Nathan said to David, ‘The Lord also has taken away your sin. You shall not die. Nevertheless, because you have given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, the child that is born to you shall die.’” Therefore, someone is being punished by God even after his sin is forgiven. And so one’s being deserving of punishment remains after the sin has been removed.

I respond: There are two things that can be considered in a sin: (a) the act of sinning (*actus culpae*) and (b) the ensuing stain.

Now it is clear that in the case of all actual sins, one’s deserving to be punished remains after the *act of sinning* has ceased. For the act of sinning renders a man deserving of punishment insofar as he is transgressing the order of God’s justice, and he does not return to that order except through some sort of compensatory punishment (*nisi per quandam recompensationem poenae*), which leads him back to the equality of justice. More specifically, someone who has indulged his own will more than he should, acting contrary to God’s commandment, must, in accord with the order of God’s justice, undergo, whether willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he wills. We likewise observe in the case of injuries inflicted on men that the equality of justice is reestablished by compensatory punishment. Hence, it is clear that even after the sinful act has ceased or after the injury has been inflicted, the debt of punishment remains.

However, if we are talking about the removal of the *stain of sin* (*si loquamur de ablatione peccati quantum ad maculam*), then it is likewise clear that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul except by the soul’s being joined to God; for it is because of the the soul’s distance from God that it incurred the loss of its proper luster, where, as was explained above (q. 86, a. 1), this loss of luster is the stain of sin. Now a man is joined to God through his will. Hence, the stain of sin cannot be removed from a man unless the man’s will accepts the order of God’s justice, so that either (a) he willingly undertakes a punishment for himself in compensation for his past sin or (b) he patiently undergoes a punishment inflicted on him by God. For in both these ways the punishment has the character of *satisfaction*. Now a punishment that is *satisfactory* in this way loses something of the character of punishment. For it is part of the nature of punishment to be contrary to the will. But satisfactory punishment, even if it is contrary to the will when considered just by itself (*secundum absolutam considerationem*), is nonetheless voluntary at *this* time and for *this* purpose. Hence, it is voluntary absolutely speaking and involuntary in a certain respect (*simpliciter est voluntaria, secundum quid autem involuntaria*), as is clear from what was said above about the voluntary and the involuntary (q. 6, a. 6). Therefore, one should reply that even when the stain of sin has been removed, one can still remain deserving of punishment—not punishment absolutely speaking, but satisfactory punishment.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 86, a. 2), the stain of sin remains even after the sinful act has ceased, and so the state of one’s deserving punishment can likewise remain. But as was just explained, when the stain has ceased to exist, then one does not remain deserving of punishment in exactly the same sense (*non remanet reatus secundum eandem rationem*).

Reply to objection 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment absolutely speaking, and yet punishment can be appropriate for him as satisfactory punishment. For a man’s making satisfaction for acts in which he has offended God or man is itself something that belongs to virtue.

Reply to objection 3: When the stain of sin has been removed, then the wound of sin has been healed with respect to the will. But punishment is still required for cleansing the other powers of the soul that have been disordered by the previous sin, in order that they might be cured through contrary movements. Punishment is also required in order to restore the equality of justice and to remove the scandal of others, in order that they who were scandalized by the sin might be edified by the punishment. This is clear from the example adduced about David.

Article 7

Is every punishment because of some sin?

It seems that not every punishment is because of some sin:

Objection 1: John 9:2-3 says of the man born blind, “Neither did this man sin, nor his parents, that he should be born blind.” Similarly, we see that many children, even baptized children, suffer grave punishments—for instance, fevers and demonic disturbances (*daemonum oppressiones*) and many other things of this sort—even though no sin exists in them after they have been baptized. And before they were baptized, there was no more sin in them than in other children who do not suffer from these things. Therefore, not every punishment is for some sin.

Objection 2: Sinners prospering seems to be the same sort of thing as innocent men being punished. But we find both happening frequently in human affairs; for Psalm 72:5 says of the wicked, “They are not in the labor of men; neither shall they be scourged like other men.” And Job 21:7 says, “The wicked live, are consoled, and are strengthened with riches.” And Habakuk 1:13 says, “Why do You look upon the contemptuous and hold Your peace while the wicked man oppresses the man that is more just than himself?” Therefore, not every punishment is inflicted for some sin.

Objection 3: 1 Peter 2:22 says of Christ, “He did not sin, nor was guile found in His mouth.” And yet in the same place it says that He suffered for us. Therefore, it is not the case that punishments are always dispensed by God for some sin.

But contrary to this: Job 4:7 says, “Who was ever innocent when he perished? And when have the upright been destroyed? Nay rather, I have seen those who work iniquity perishing by the blast of God.” And in *Retractationes* 1 Augustine says, “Every punishment is just, and it is inflicted for some sin.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 6), there are two ways in which punishment can be thought of: (a) *absolutely speaking* and (b) insofar as it is *satisfactory*.

Satisfactory punishment is in some sense voluntary. And since it is possible for those who differ in deserving punishment to be one in their wills by a union of love, it is sometimes the case that someone who has not sinned undergoes punishment voluntarily in place of someone else (*poenam voluntarius pro alio portat*)—in the same way that, in human affairs, we likewise see one individual transferring someone else’s financial debt to himself.

However, if we are talking about *punishment absolutely speaking* insofar as it has the character of punishment, then it is always ordered to one’s own sin. Sometimes it is ordered to one’s own *actual sin*, when someone is punished by God or by man for a sin that he has committed. And sometimes it is ordered to *original sin*, either *principally* or *as a consequence*. The punishment for original sin is *principally* that human nature is left to itself, having lost the assistance of original justice, whereas the *consequences* of this are all the penalties that stem from the defectiveness of the nature in men.

However, notice that sometimes something seems to be a punishment which nonetheless does not have the character of punishment absolutely speaking. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, a. 5), punishment is a species of evil. But evil is the privation of a good. And since there are many goods that belong to man, viz., goods of the soul, goods of the body, and goods consisting in exterior things, it sometimes happens that a man suffers a loss in some lesser good in order to gain an increase in some greater good—as when someone suffers the loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or suffers the loss of both money and bodily health for the sake of the salvation of his soul and the glory of God. In cases like this, the relevant loss is bad for the man in a certain respect, but not absolutely speaking. Hence, it has the character of a *medicine* and not the character of *punishment absolutely speaking*; for physicians likewise prescribe bitter potions for the sick in order to bring them to health. And because these losses do not properly have the character of punishment, they are not traced back to sin as their

cause, except in the sense that the very fact that human nature has to use painful medicines stems from the corruption of the nature, which is the punishment for original sin. For in the state of innocence it would not have been necessary for anyone to make progress in virtue through painful exercises (*per poenalia exercitia*). Hence, the very fact that there is pain in such cases is traced back to original sin as its cause.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the defects that belong to those who are born with them or to children are the effects of, and punishments for, original sin. And they likewise remain after Baptism, for the reason explained above (q. 85, a. 5). And, as was also explained above (q. 85, a. 5), the fact that these effects and punishments are not equal in everyone stems from the diversity of the nature when the nature is left to itself.

Still, in accord with God's providence, defects of this sort are ordered toward (a) the salvation of men, either the salvation of those who suffer from them or the salvation of the others who are forewarned by the punishments, and also toward (b) the glory of God.

Reply to objection 2: Temporal and corporeal goods are, to be sure, human goods, but they are small ones, whereas spiritual goods are great goods for a man. Therefore, it belongs to God's justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous and, as regards temporal goods and evils, to give them as much as suffices for virtue. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 8, "God's justice does not weaken the fortitude of the best men with material gifts." In the case of others, by contrast, the very fact that they are given temporal goods turns out badly as far as spiritual goods are concerned (*in malum spiritualium cedit*). Hence, Psalm 72:6 concludes with, "Therefore pride has held them fast."

Reply to objection 3: Christ sustained satisfactory punishments not for His own sins, but for our sins.

Article 8

Is anyone punished for someone else's sin?

It seems that there are some who are punished for someone else's sin:

Objection 1: Exodus 20:5 says, "I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of those who hate me." And Matthew 23:35 says, "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."

Objection 2: Man's justice is derived from God's justice. But according to man's justice, sometimes the children are punished for their parents, as is clear in the case of high treason. Therefore, it is likewise the case according to God's justice that one is punished for someone else's sin.

Objection 3: Someone might reply that the child is punished not for the father's sin, but for his own sin, insofar as he imitates his father's wickedness. But in that case [Sacred Scripture] would not talk about the children more than about strangers, who are punished by a punishment similar to the punishment of those whose sins they imitate. Therefore, it seems that the children are punished not for their own sins, but for the sins of their parents.

But contrary to this: Ezekiel 18:20 says, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 7), if we are speaking about *satisfactory punishment*, then it is possible for one individual to take someone else's punishment upon himself insofar as they are united (*inquantum sunt quodammodo unum*).

However, if we are speaking about a punishment, inflicted for a sin, *insofar as it has the character of punishment*, then each one is punished only for his own sin, since a sinful act is something personal.

On the other hand, if we are speaking about the sort of punishment that has the character of *medicine*, then it is possible for one individual to be punished for the sin of another. For it has been

explained (a. 7) that losses of corporeal things, or even of the body itself, are penal medicines ordered toward the health of the soul. Hence, nothing prevents someone from being punished with such punishments, either by God or by man, for someone else's sins—for instance, children on behalf of their fathers or servants on behalf of their masters, insofar as they in some sense belong to their fathers or masters. Yet this occurs in such a way that if the child or servant participates in the sin, then the relevant penal loss (*huiusmodi poenalis defectus*) has the character of punishment with respect to both parties, viz., the one who is being punished and the one for whom he is being punished. However, if the child or servant does not participate in the sin, then the penal loss has the character of punishment with respect to the one on whose behalf the child or servant is being punished, whereas with respect to the one who is being punished it has the character only of medicine (except *per accidens*, if the child or servant consented to the other's sin). For the loss is ordered toward the good of his soul if he suffers it patiently.

On the other hand, spiritual punishments are not just medicinal, since a good of the soul is not ordered toward any better good. Hence, in the case of goods of the soul, no one suffers a loss without his own proper guilt. And because of this it is likewise the case, as Augustine points out in *Epistola ad Avitum*, that one is not punished by this sort of punishment on behalf of another; for with respect to his soul, the child is not something that belongs to his father. Hence, the Lord, in giving the reason for this, says in Ezekiel 18:4, "All souls are mine."

Reply to objection 1: Both passages must, it seems, be referring to temporal or corporeal punishments, insofar as the children are something that in a sense belongs to the parents, and insofar as successors belong to their predecessors.

Alternatively, if what is being referred to are spiritual punishments, then this is said because of the imitation of the sin. This is why the passage in Exodus adds, "... to those who hate me," and why the passage in Matthew adds, "... fill up the measure of your fathers." For He says that the sins of the fathers are punished in the sons, because the sons, nourished by the sins of their parents, are more inclined to sin, both out of habit and also because of example, following, as it were, the authority of their fathers. The children deserve an even greater punishment if, seeing the sins of their fathers, they do not correct themselves. This is why He adds, "... to the third and fourth generation." For men are accustomed to living long enough to see the third and fourth generation, and so they are mutually able to see one another: The children are able to see the sins of their fathers so as to imitate them, and the fathers are able to see the punishments of their children so as to grieve over them.

Reply to objection 2: The punishments that human justice inflicts on one individual for someone else's sin are corporeal and temporal punishments. And they are remedies or medicines against subsequent sins, in order that either the very ones who are punished or others might be held back from similar sins.

Reply to objection 3: Close relatives, rather than strangers, are said to be punished for the sins of others both because (a) as has been explained, the punishments of close relatives in some sense redound upon those who have sinned, insofar as the child is something that belongs to the father, and also because (b) domestic examples and domestic punishments are more moving. Hence, when someone has been nurtured by the sins of his parents, he seems to follow them with more vigor, and if he has not been deterred by their punishments, he seems to become more obstinate and, hence, deserving of a greater punishment.

QUESTION 88

Mortal Sin and Venial Sin

Next we have to consider mortal and venial sin, since they are distinguished from one another by the punishments they deserve (*distinguuntur secundum reatum*). We must consider, first, venial sin in relation to mortal sin (question 88) and, second, venial sin in its own right (question 89).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Is it appropriate to divide venial sin off against mortal sin? (2) Are mortal sin and venial sin distinct in genus? (3) Is a venial sin a disposition toward a mortal sin? (4) Can a venial sin become mortal? (5) Can an aggravating circumstance surrounding a venial sin make it a mortal sin? (6) Can a mortal sin become a venial sin?

Article 1

Is it appropriate for venial sin to be divided off against mortal sin?

It seems inappropriate for venial sin to be divided off against mortal sin:

Objection 1: In *Contra Faustum* 22 Augustine says, “Sin is a word or deed or desire contrary to the eternal law.” But being contrary to the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal (*dat peccato quod sit mortale*). Therefore, every sin is mortal. Therefore, it is not the case that venial sin is divided off against mortal sin.

Objection 2: In 1 Corinthians 10: 31 the Apostle says, “Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do, do all for the glory of God.” But anyone who sins acts against this precept, since a sin is not done for the glory of God. Therefore, since doing something contrary to a precept is a mortal sin, it seems that anyone who sins commits a mortal sin (*quicumque peccat mortaliter peccat*).

Objection 3: As is clear from Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, if someone clings to an entity by love, he clings to it either by *enjoying* it or by *using* it. But no one who is sinning clings to a changeable good in the sense of using it, since he is not relating it to the good that gives us beatitude—which is what it is, properly speaking, to use something. Therefore, if someone is sinning, then he is enjoying a changeable good. But as Augustine says in 83 *Quaestiones*, “It is human perversity to enjoy things that we should [merely] be using.” Therefore, since ‘perversity’ is a name for mortal sin, it seems that if anyone sins, he commits a mortal sin.

Objection 4: Whoever approaches one terminus by that very fact recedes from the other terminus. But if anyone sins, he approaches a changeable good. Therefore, he recedes from the unchangeable good. Therefore, he commits a mortal sin. Therefore, it is inappropriate for venial sin to be divided off from mortal sin.

But contrary to this: In *Homilia 41 Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “A crime (*crimen*) is what merits damnation, whereas what is venial does not merit damnation.” But ‘crime’ is a name for mortal sin. Therefore, it is appropriate for venial sin to be divided off against mortal sin.

I respond: There are some names which, if they are taken properly, do not seem to be opposites, but which, if they are taken metaphorically, are found to be opposed to one another. For instance, *smile* is not opposed to *dry*. But if *smile* is said metaphorically of a meadow because it is flowering and turning green, then what is smiling is opposed to what is dry.

Similarly, if *mortal* is taken properly, insofar as it is referred to bodily death, then it does not seem to have any opposition to *venial*, or even to belong to the same genus. But if *mortal* is taken metaphorically, as it is in the case of sins, then what is mortal is opposed to what is venial.

For since, as was established above (q. 71, a. 1 and q. 72, a. 5 and q. 74, a. 9), a sin is a sort of sickness of the soul (*quaedam infirmitas animae*), a sin is called mortal by way of similarity to a disease that is called mortal because, as has been explained (q. 72, a. 5), it causes an irreparable defect through the loss of some principle. But as was explained above (q. 87, a. 3), the principle of the spiritual life, i.e.,

life in accord with virtue, is the ordering toward the ultimate end. If this is lost, then, as was explained above (q. 87, a. 3), the defect cannot be repaired by means of any intrinsic principle; instead, it can be repaired only by God's power. For disorders with respect to the means to the end are repaired by the end, in the way that an error with respect to the conclusions is corrected by the truth of the principles. Therefore, a defect in the ordering to the ultimate end cannot be repaired by anything that is more principal than the ultimate end, just like an error with respect to the principles. And so sins of this sort are called *mortal* in the sense of being irreparable.

On the other hand, sins that involve a disorder with respect to the means to the end are reparable as long as the ordering to the ultimate end is preserved. And these sins are called *venial*, since the sin has remission (*peccatum veniam habet*) when one is no longer deserving of punishment (*quando reatus poenae tollitur*), and this ceases when the sin ceases, as has been explained (q. 87, a. 6).

Accordingly, then, mortal sin and venial sin are opposed as the irreparable and the reparable. And I mean reparable or irreparable *by an interior principle*, though not in relation to God's power, which can repair every disease, be it corporeal or spiritual. And it is for this reason that venial sin is appropriately divided off against mortal sin.

Reply to objection 1: The division of venial sin from mortal sin is not the division of a genus into species that participate equally in the nature of the genus; instead, it is the division of an analogous term (*divisio analogi*) into things of which it is predicated with respect to *prior* and *posterior*. And so the complete definition of sin, which Augustine is positing here, belongs to mortal sin. By contrast, a sin is called 'venial' in accord with an incomplete nature (*secundum rationem imperfectam*) and in relation to mortal sin, in the way that a being is called an 'accident' in relation to substance and in accord with an incomplete nature of *being*. For a venial sin is not contrary to the law, since one who commits a venial sin (*venialiter peccans*) does not do what the law prohibits, nor does he fail to what the law obliges him to do by a precept. Instead, he acts outside the law (*facit praeter legem*), because he does not observe the mode of reason that the law intends.

Reply to objection 2: The Apostle's precept is an affirmative precept and hence does not impose an obligation for all times (*non obligat ad semper*). And so anyone who does not *actually* refer everything he does to the glory of God is not acting contrary to this precept. Therefore, it is sufficient that he *habitually* refer himself and all that belongs to him to God in order that he not always be committing a mortal sin, even if there is some act that he does not *actually* refer to God's glory.

Now venial sin is incompatible only with an *actual ordering* of the act to God's glory and not with a *habitual ordering*. For a venial sin does not exclude charity, which habitually orders one toward God. Hence, it does not follow that one who commits a venial sin thereby commits a mortal sin.

Reply to objection 3: One who commits a venial sin clings to a temporal good not in the sense of *enjoying* it, since he does not fix his end in that thing, but in the sense of *using*. For he refers it to God not by an *act* but by a *habit*.

Reply to objection 4: A changeable good is taken as a terminus opposed to an unchangeable good only when one's end is fixed in a changeable good. For the means to an end do not have the character of a terminus.

Article 2

Do venial sin and mortal sin differ in genus in the sense that some sins are mortal by their genus and some sins are venial by their genus?

It seems that venial sin and mortal sin do not differ in genus in the sense that some sins are mortal by their genus and some sins are venial by their genus:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 18, a. 2), in the case of human acts, *good by its genus* and *bad by its genus* are said in relation to the the matter or object of the act. But with respect to any object or matter, it is possible to commit a mortal sin and also possible to commit a venial sin. For a man can love a changeable good either less than God, which is what it is to commit a venial sin, or more than God, which is what it is to commit a mortal sin. Therefore, venial sin and mortal sin do not differ in genus.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 87, a. 3), a sin is called mortal because it is irreparable, whereas a sin is called venial because it is reparable. But to be irreparable belongs to a sin which is committed out of malice and which according to some is called unforgivable, whereas to be reparable belongs to a sin which is committed out of weakness or ignorance and which is called forgivable. Therefore, mortal sin and venial sin differ as a sin committed out of malice and a sin committed out of weakness and ignorance. But as was explained above (q. 77, a. 8), this is for the sins to differ in their *cause* and not in their *genus*. Therefore, venial sin and mortal sin do not differ in genus.

Objection 3: It was explained above (q. 74, aa. 3 and 10) that sudden movements of either sensuality or reason are venial sins. But sudden movements are found in every genus of sin. Therefore, there are no sins that are venial by their genus (*non sunt aliqua peccata venialia ex genere*).

But contrary to this: In his sermon *De Purgatorio* Augustine enumerates some genera of venial sins and some genera of mortal sins.

I respond: The name ‘venial sin’ (*peccatum veniale*) is derived from ‘pardon’ (*venia*).

Therefore, in one sense a sin can be called venial because it receives pardon, and it is in this sense that Ambrose says, “Every sin becomes venial through repentance.” This is called *being venial by outcome* (*veniale ex eventu*).

In another sense, a sin is called venial because it does not have within itself anything that would keep it from receiving pardon, either totally or in part:

(a) *in part*, as when the sin has within itself diminished guilt because, for instance, it is committed out of weakness or ignorance, and this is called *being venial by cause* (*veniale ex causa*); and

(b) *totally*, because it does not destroy the ordering to the ultimate end, and so merits a temporal punishment and not an eternal punishment. And this is the sense of *venial sin* that we have in mind in the present context.

As regards the first two senses, it is clear that they do not have any determinate genus. But *venial sin* in the third sense can have a determinate genus, so that some sins are called *venial by their genus* and some are called *mortal by their genus* insofar as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object.

For when the will carries itself toward something that is incompatible with charity, through which a man is ordered toward his ultimate end, then the sin is mortal by its object (*peccatum ex suo obiecto habet quod sit mortale*). Hence, it is *mortal by its genus*, either because (a) it is contrary to love of God, as in the case of blasphemy, perjury, and other sins of this sort, or because (b) it is contrary to love of neighbor, as with homicide, adultery, and similar sins. Hence, sins of this sort are mortal by their genus.

By contrast, the will sometimes is directed toward (*fertur in*) what contains some disorder within itself but is not contrary to love of God and neighbor—as, for instance, engaging in an idle conversation or superfluous laughter or other things of this sort. And such sins are *venial by their genus*.

However, because, as was established above (q. 18, aa. 4 and 6), moral acts receive their character of goodness and badness not only from their objects but also from the agent’s disposition, it sometimes happens that a sin that is venial by its genus in virtue of its object becomes *mortal on the part of the agent*—either because the agent fixes his ultimate end in the act or because he orders it toward something that is a mortal sin by its genus—as, for instance, when someone orders an idle conversation toward committing adultery. Similarly, it can happen on the part of the agent that a sin that is mortal by its genus becomes venial, viz., *because the act is imperfect*, i.e., not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle of a bad act. This was explained above (q. 74, a. 10) for the case of sudden movements

of unbelief (*de subitis motibus infidelitatis*).

Reply to objection 1: The very fact that someone chooses what is incompatible with divine charity shows that he prefers that thing to divine charity and, as a result, that he loves that thing more than he loves God. And so some sins that are of themselves (*de se*) incompatible with divine charity are such that by their genus something is being loved more than God. And so they are mortal sins by their genus.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for a sin that is venial by its cause.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for a sin that is venial because of the imperfection of the act.

Article 3

Is a venial sin a disposition toward a mortal sin?

It seems that a venial sin is not a disposition toward a mortal sin:

Objection 1: One opposite does not effect a disposition toward the other opposite. But as has been explained (a. 2), venial sin and mortal sin are divided off against one another as opposites. Therefore, a venial sin is not a disposition toward a mortal sin.

Objection 2: An act disposes one toward something similar in species to itself; hence, *Ethics 2* says that similar dispositions and habits are generated from similar acts. But as has been explained (a. 2), mortal sin and venial sin differ in genus or species. Therefore, a venial sin does not dispose one toward a mortal sin.

Objection 3: If a sin is called venial because it disposes one toward a mortal sin, then it will have to be the case that any acts that dispose one toward a mortal sin are venial sins. But good works dispose one toward a mortal sin, since as Augustine says in *De Regula*, “Pride lies in wait for good works, in order that it might destroy them.” Therefore, even good works will count as venial sins—which is absurd.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 19:1 says, “He who spurns little things will fall little by little.” But he who commits venial sins seems to spurn little things. Therefore, he is little by little disposed toward falling totally through mortal sin.

I respond: That which effects a disposition is in some sense a cause (*disponens est quodammodo causa*). Hence, there are two modes of a disposition, corresponding to the two modes of a cause. For there is a certain sort of cause that effects a movement toward the effect *directly*, in the way that what is hot effects heat (*sicut calidum calefacit*). And there is also a sort of cause that effects a movement to the effect *indirectly* by removing an obstacle, in the way that one who removes a column is said to remove the rock that sits on top of it.

Accordingly, there are two ways in which a sinful act (*actus peccati*) effects a disposition toward something:

In one way, *directly*, and in such a case it disposes one toward an act similar in species. And in this first sense, when the two acts in question differ in species, a sin that is venial by its genus does not primarily and *per se* dispose one toward a sin that is *mortal by its genus*. However, a venial sin is in this sense able to dispose one, as a sort of consequence, toward a sin that is *mortal on the part of the agent* (cf. a. 2). For when a disposition or habit is strengthened (*augmentata*) through acts of venial sin, the avid desire to sin grows to such an extent that the one who sins will fix his own end in the venial sin. For anyone who has a habit is such that, insofar as he has the habit, his end is to operate in accord with the habit. And so by committing many venial sins, he will be disposed toward a mortal sin.

In the second way, a human acts disposes one toward something *by removing an obstacle*. And in this sense a sin that is venial by its genus can dispose one toward a sin that is mortal by its genus. For

one who commits a sin that is venial by its genus overlooks some ordering, and by the fact that he becomes accustomed to not submitting his will to the appropriate ordering in smaller matters, he is disposed toward likewise not submitting his will to the ordering that belongs to the ultimate end—and this by choosing a sin that is mortal by its genus.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), venial sin and mortal sin are not divided off from one another as two species of a single genus; rather, they are divided off against one another in the way that *accident* is divided off against *substance*. Hence, just as an accident can be a disposition toward some substantial form, so, too, a venial sin can be a disposition toward some mortal sin.

Reply to objection 2: A venial sin is not similar to a mortal sin in species, and yet it is indeed similar to a mortal sin in genus, in the sense that both of them involve a defect with respect to some due ordering—though in different ways, as has been explained.

Reply to objection 3: A good work is not *per se* a disposition toward a mortal sin, and yet it can *per accidens* be the matter or occasion of a mortal sin. By contrast, as has been explained, a venial sin disposes one *per se* toward a mortal sin.

Article 4

Can a venial sin become a mortal sin?

It seems that a venial sin can become a mortal sin:

Objection 1: In his exposition of John 3:36 (“He who does not believe the Son shall not see life”), Augustine says, “The smallest sins [read: venial sins] will kill if they are neglected.” But a sin is called mortal from the fact that it kills the soul spiritually. Therefore, a venial sin can become a mortal sin.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 74, a. 8), a movement of sensuality that precedes reason’s consent is a venial sin, whereas a movement of sensuality that comes after reason’s consent is a mortal sin. Therefore, a venial sin can become a mortal sin.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), venial sin and mortal sin differ from one another as a curable disease and an incurable disease. But a curable disease can become incurable. Therefore, a venial sin can become a mortal sin.

Objection 4: A disposition can become a habit. But as has been explained (a. 3), a venial sin is a disposition toward a mortal sin. Therefore, a venial sin can become a mortal sin.

But contrary to this: Things that are infinitely different from one another are not transformed into one another. But as is clear from what has been said (q. 87, a. 5), mortal sin and venial sin are infinitely different from one another. Therefore, a venial sin cannot become a mortal sin.

I respond: There are three possible ways to understand the claim that a venial sin becomes a mortal sin:

In one way, numerically the same act is first a venial sin and later on a mortal sin. And this is impossible. For a sin consists principally in an act of the will, just as every moral act does. Hence, an act is not called one *morally speaking* (*moraliter*) if the will changes, even if the action is continuous *naturally speaking* (*secundum naturam*). On the other hand, if the will does not change, then it is impossible for a mortal sin to come to be from a venial sin.

In the second possible way to understand the claim, what is a venial by its genus becomes mortal. And this is indeed possible, insofar as the end is fixed in the sin, or insofar as the venial sin has the mortal sin as its end (*inquantum refertur ad mortale peccatum sicut ad finem*). This was explained above (a. 2).

In the third possible way to understand the claim, many venial sins constitute one mortal sin:

Now if this means that a single mortal sin is constituted *as an integral whole* (*integraliter*) from

many venial sins, then it is false. For all the venial sins in the world cannot deserve as much punishment as a single mortal sin does (*non omnia peccata venialia de mundo possunt habere tantum de reatu quantum unum peccatum mortale*). This is clear as regards the *duration* of the punishment, since, as has been explained (q. 87, aa. 3 and 5), a mortal sin is deserving of an eternal punishment, whereas a venial sin is deserving of a temporal punishment. It is likewise clear as regards the *punishment of loss* (*ex parte poenae damni*), since a mortal sin merits the absence of the vision of God, which, as Chrysostom says, no other punishment can be compared to. It is also clear as regards the *punishment of the senses* (*ex parte poenae sensus*), at least as far as the worm of conscience is concerned—though perhaps as regards the punishment of fire, the punishments are not disproportionate.

On the other hand, if it means that many venial sins make one mortal sin *as a disposition* (*dispositive*), then, as was shown above (a. 3), this is true, in accord with the two modes of disposition in which a venial sin disposes one toward a mortal sin.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is speaking here in that sense according to which many venial sins cause a mortal sin as a disposition.

Reply to objection 2: It will never be the same movement of sensuality that preceded reason's consent that becomes a mortal sin; rather, what is a mortal sin is the very act of reason giving its consent.

Reply to objection 3: A bodily disease is not an act but a sort of long-lasting disposition; hence, since it is the same disposition, it can change. By contrast, a venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be resumed. And on this score there is no similarity between the two.

Reply to objection 4: A disposition that becomes a habit is something imperfect within the same species; for instance, when imperfect scientific knowledge is perfected, it becomes a habit. But a venial sin is a disposition of a different species, like an accident in relation to a substantial form, into which it will never change.

Article 5

Can some circumstance surrounding a venial sin make it a mortal sin?

It seems that a circumstance surrounding a venial sin can make it a mortal sin:

Objection 1: In his sermon *De Purgatorio* Augustine says, "If the anger is held on to for a long time, and if the drunkenness is continual, they pass into the company of mortal sins." But anger and drunkenness are by their genus venial sins and not mortal sins; otherwise, they would always be mortal sins. Therefore, a circumstance makes a venial sin to be a mortal sin.

Objection 2: In 2 *Sentences*, dist. 24 the Master says that taking pleasure [in evil], if it lingers, is a mortal sin (*delectatio si sit morosa est peccatum mortale*), whereas if it does not linger, it is a venial sin. But whether something lingers is a certain circumstance. Therefore, a circumstance makes a mortal sin out of venial sin.

Objection 3: Good and evil differ more from one another than do venial sin and mortal sin, both of which are in the genus of the evil. But a circumstance makes a bad act out of a good act, as is clear when someone gives alms for the sake of vainglory. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a circumstance can make a mortal sin out of a venial sin.

But contrary to this: Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed the quantity of the act itself, which the act has by its genus; for a subject is always more eminent than its accident. Therefore, if an act is a venial sin by its genus, then it will not be able to become a mortal sin, since, as is clear from what has been said (q. 87, a. 5), a mortal sin in some sense infinitely exceeds the quantity of a venial sin.

I respond: As was explained above when we were talking about circumstances (q. 7, a. 1 and

q. 18, aa. 5 and 10 and 11), a circumstance is, *as such*, an accident of a moral act. However, it is possible for a circumstance to be taken as the *specific difference* of a moral act, in which case it loses its character of being a circumstance and constitutes the species of the moral act. In the case of sins, this occurs when the circumstance adds some deformity of a different genus.

For instance, when a man has sexual intercourse with someone who is not his wife (*cum aliquis accedat ad non suam*), the act is deformed by a deformity opposed to *chastity*. But if he has sexual intercourse with someone who is not his wife and who is instead the wife of another, a deformity is added that is opposed to *justice*, since it is contrary to justice to take what belongs to another. Accordingly, this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin, which is called adultery.

However, it is impossible for a circumstance to make a mortal sin out of a venial sin unless it brings to bear a deformity of some other genus. For it has been explained (a. 1) that a venial sin has a deformity by the fact that it involves a disorder with respect to the means to an end, whereas a mortal sin has a deformity by the fact that it involves a disorder with respect to the ultimate end. Hence, it is clear that a circumstance cannot make a mortal sin out of a venial sin as long as it remains a circumstance; rather, it can do this only when it transfers the sin to another species and becomes in some sense the specific difference of the moral act.

Reply to objection 1: Long-lastingness is not a circumstance that draws an act into another species, and neither are frequency or continuity—except perhaps *per accidens* because of something that supervenes. Nor does anything acquire a new species from the fact that it is multiplied or prolonged—unless perhaps something supervenes in the prolonged or multiplied act that varies the species, e.g., disobedience or contempt or something of the sort.

Therefore, one should reply that since anger is a movement of the mind toward harming one's neighbor, if the harm toward which the movement of anger is tending is itself a *mortal sin by its genus*, e.g., homicide or theft, then anger of this sort is a mortal sin by its genus. And if this movement is a venial sin, it is because of the act's imperfection in the sense of its being a sudden movement of sensuality. However, if the movement is long-lasting, then it returns to the nature of its own genus by the consent of reason.

By contrast, if the harm toward which the movement of anger is tending would itself be a *venial sin by its genus*, as when someone who becomes angry with another wills to say some trifling and joking word to him that will mildly upset him; this anger will not be a mortal sin, no matter how long it lasts—except, perhaps, *per accidens*, if, say, a grave scandal or some other such thing should come from it.

As regards drunkenness, one should reply that by its own nature drunkenness is a mortal sin. For it is openly contrary to virtue that a man should, without necessity and solely from his lust for wine, render himself unable to make use of reason, by which a man is ordered toward God and avoids many sins that lie in wait (*multa peccata occurrentia vitat*). And if drunkenness is a venial sin, this is because of some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a man does not know the power of wine or his own susceptibility, and so does not realize that he is getting inebriated. For in such a case it is only the excessive drinking, and not the drunkenness, that is imputed to him as a sin. However, when he gets drunk frequently, this sort of ignorance cannot be used as an excuse for that fact that his will seemingly chooses to undergo drunkenness rather than to abstain from an excess of wine. Hence, the sin returns to its nature [as a mortal sin].

Reply to objection 2: The lingering enjoyment [of evil] (*delectatio morosa*) is not called a mortal sin except in those matters that are mortal sins by their genus. In such matters, if the enjoyment does not linger, the sin is venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, as was explained above in the case of anger. For it is because of the approval of deliberative reason that the anger is said to be long-lasting and the enjoyment is said to linger.

Reply to objection 3: As was likewise established above (q. 18, a. 5), a circumstance does not

make a bad act out of a good act unless it constitutes the species of the sin.

Article 6

Can a mortal sin become a venial sin?

It seems that a mortal sin can become a venial sin:

Objection 1: The distance of a venial sin from a mortal sin is equal to the opposite distance of a mortal sin from a venial sin (*aequaliter distat peccatum veniale a mortali et e contrario*). But as has been explained (a. 5), a venial sin becomes a mortal sin. Therefore, a mortal sin can likewise become a venial sin.

Objection 2: Venial sin and mortal sin are claimed to differ from one another by the fact that one who commits a mortal sin loves a creature more than he loves God, whereas one who commits a venial sin loves the creature less than he loves God. But it is possible for someone who commits an act that is a mortal sin by its genus to love the creature less than he loves God—for instance, if someone, not knowing that simple fornication is a mortal sin and something contrary to the love of God, were to commit fornication, yet in such a way that he would have been prepared, out of love of God, to forego the act of fornicating if he had known that by fornicating he was acting contrary to the love of God. Therefore, he will be committing a venial sin. And in this way a mortal sin can become a venial sin.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 5), good differs from evil more than a venial sin differs from a mortal sin. But an act that is of itself evil (*de se malum*) can become good; for instance, homicide can become an act of justice, as is clear in the case of a judge who has a robber executed (*sicut patet in iudice qui occidit latronem*). Therefore, a mortal sin can become a venial sin.

But contrary to this: What is eternal can never become temporal. But mortal sin merits an eternal punishment, whereas venial sin merits a temporal punishment. Therefore, a mortal sin can never become a venial sin.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), mortal sin and venial sin differ from one another as the perfect and the imperfect in the genus *sin*. Now what is imperfect can come to perfection through something added to it. Hence, venial sin, too, is made mortal by having added to it a deformity that belongs to the genus *mortal sin*, as when someone engages in idle conversation with an eye toward committing fornication.

By contrast, what is perfect cannot be made imperfect by any addition. And so a mortal sin cannot become a venial sin by having added to it a deformity that belongs to the genus *venial sin*. For instance, the sin of someone who commits fornication is not diminished by his engaging in idle conversation, but is instead aggravated by the added deformity.

Still, it is possible for what is a mortal sin by its genus to be a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act, in the sense that it does not perfectly fulfill the definition of a moral act—and this because, as is clear from what was said above (a. 2), it is sudden and not deliberated. This occurs through a sort of subtraction, viz., the subtraction of deliberative reason. And since a moral act has its species from deliberative reason, it follows that the species of the act is corrupted (*solvitur*) by such a subtraction.

Reply to objection 1: Venial sin differs from mortal sin as the imperfect from the perfect, in the way that a child differs from a man. Now a man comes from a child, but not vice versa. Hence, the argument is not cogent.

Reply to objection 2: If the ignorance is such that it excuses one from sin altogether, as is the case with someone who is furious or insane, then someone who commits fornication out of that kind of ignorance commits neither a mortal sin nor a venial sin. On the other hand, if the ignorance is not

invincible, then the ignorance is itself a sin and contains within itself a lack of love for God insofar as the man neglects to learn that by which he can keep himself in the love of God.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in his book *Contra Mendacium*, “What is bad in its own right (*secundum se*) cannot be done well for any end.” But homicide is the killing of the innocent, and this can in no way be done well. By contrast, as Augustine points out in *De Libero Arbitrio*, a judge who has a robber executed, or a soldier who kills an enemy of the republic, is not called homicidal (*non appellantur homicidae*).

QUESTION 89

Venial Sin in its own Right

Next we have to consider venial sin in its own right (*secundum se*). And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Does a venial sin cause a stain in the soul (*maculam in anima*)? (2) Are venial sins distinguished figuratively by “wood, hay, and straw” (1 Corinthians 3:12)? (3) Was man in the state of innocence able to commit a venial sin? (4) Is a good or bad angel able to commit a venial sin? (5) Are the first movements of non-believers venial sins? (6) Can venial sin exist in someone together with just original sin?

Article 1

Does a venial sin cause a stain in the soul?

It seems that venial sin causes a stain in the soul:

Objection 1: In *De Poenitentia* Augustine says that if venial sins are multiplied, they destroy our beauty (*decorem nostrum exterminant*) to such a degree that they separate us from the embraces of our heavenly Spouse. But the stain is nothing other than a loss of beauty (*detrimentum decoris*). Therefore, venial sins cause a stain in the soul.

Objection 2: A mortal sin causes a stain in the soul because of the disorder in the act and in the affections of the sinner himself. But in venial sin there is a certain sort of disorder in the act and in the affections. Therefore, a venial sin causes a stain in the soul.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 86, a. 1), the stain in the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing through love. But in a venial sin the soul touches a temporal thing with a disordered love. Therefore, a venial sin introduces a stain in the soul.

But contrary to this: Ephesians 5:27 says, “... so that He might present to Himself a glorious Church without stain or wrinkle,” and a Gloss comments, “That is, without any criminal offense (*peccatum criminale*).” Therefore, it seems proper to a mortal sin that it should cause a stain in the soul.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 86, a. 1), ‘stain’ implies a loss of luster because some sort of contact. This is clear in the case of corporeal things, and the name ‘stain’ is transferred by way of similarity from corporeal things to the soul. Now just as there are two sorts of luster in a body, (a) one from the intrinsic disposition of the parts of the body and of the colors and (b) the other from an exterior supervening brightness, so, too, there are two sorts of luster in the soul, (a) one a *habitual* and, as it were, intrinsic luster (*nitor habitualis quasi intrinsicus*) and (b) the other an *actual* and, as it were, exterior splendor (*actualis quasi exterior fulgor*).

Now a venial sin poses an obstacle to the *actual* luster but not to the *habitual* luster, since it does not diminish the *habit* of charity and the other virtues, but instead, as will be explained below (*ST* 2-2, q. 24, a. 10), impedes only their *act*.

‘Stain’, on the other hand, implies something that remains in the stained thing, and so it seems to be more relevant to the *habitual luster* than to the *actual luster*. Hence, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. And if it is claimed anywhere that venial sin does cause a stain, this is so relatively speaking (*hoc est secundum quid*), insofar as venial sin impedes the luster that comes from the *acts* of the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking here about a case in which many venial sins cause a disposition toward a mortal sin (*dispositive inducunt ad mortale*). For otherwise they would not separate one from the embrace of the heavenly Spouse.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of a mortal sin, but not in the case of a venial sin, the disorder in the act corrupts the habit of a virtue.

Reply to objection 3: In the case of a mortal sin the soul, through love, touches a temporal thing

as an end, and this totally blocks the flow of the splendor of the grace that enters into those who adhere to God as their ultimate end through charity. By contrast, in the case of a venial sin a man does not adhere to a creature as his ultimate end. Hence, there is no parallel between the two cases.

Article 2

Are venial sins appropriately designated as “wood, hay, and straw”?

It seems that venial sins are not appropriately designated as “wood, hay, and straw” (*lignum, faenum, stipula*) (1 Corinthians 3:12):

Objection 1: Wood, hay, and straw are said to be built upon the spiritual foundation (*superaedificari spirituali fundamento*). But venial sins lie outside of the spiritual edifice, in the same way that false opinions likewise lie outside of scientific knowledge. Therefore, venial sins are not appropriately designated as wood, hay, and straw.

Objection 2: He who builds with wood, hay, and straw “will be saved as if by fire” (1 Corinthians 3:15). But sometimes the one who commits venial sins will not be saved even by fire—as when the venial sins are found in someone who has died with mortal sin. Therefore, venial sins are not appropriately designated by wood, hay, and straw.

Objection 3: According to the Apostle, there are (a) some who build with gold, silver, and precious stones, i.e., with the love of God and neighbor and with good works, and (b) others who build with wood, hay, and straw (1 Corinthians 3:12-15). But even those who love God and neighbor commit venial sins; for 1 John 1:8 says, “If we say that we have no sin, we are deceiving ourselves.” Therefore, it is inappropriate to designate venial sins by the three things in question.

Objection 4: Venial sins have many more specific differences, and many more grades, than just three. Therefore, it is inappropriate for all venial sins to be included under these three designations.

But contrary to this: The Apostle is saying of someone who builds upon the foundation with wood, hay, and straw that “he will be saved as if by fire” and so suffer some punishment, though not an eternal punishment. But as has been explained (q. 87, a. 5), it belongs properly to venial sin to be deserving of a temporal punishment. Therefore, venial sins are being designated by these three names.

I respond: Some have understood the relevant passage (1 Corinthians 3:12-15) to mean that the foundation is faith informed [by charity], and that upon this foundation some build with good works, which are signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, whereas others build with sins, including mortal sins, which are signified by wood, hay, and straw.

However, Augustine disproves this interpretation (*hanc expositionem disprobat*) in *De Fide et Operibus*. For as the Apostle says in Galatians 5:21, he who does works of the flesh “will not attain the kingdom of God,” which is what it is to be saved, whereas the Apostle says here that he who builds with wood, hay, and straw “will be saved as if by fire.” Hence, wood, hay, and straw cannot be understood to be designating mortal sins.

By contrast, others claim that wood, hay, and straw signify good works that are built on the spiritual edifice, but that venial sins mix themselves in with them. For instance, when someone is charged with taking care of his family (*quando aliquis habet curam rei familiaris*), which is a good thing, excessive love for his wife or children or possessions might mix itself in, yet in a way subordinated to God, so that the man does not will to do anything contrary to God for their sake.

But, once again, it does not seem correct to say this. For it is clear that all good works are referred back to the love of God and neighbor (*ad caritatem Dei et proximi*), and so they pertain to “gold, silver, and precious stones”—and therefore not to “wood, hay, and straw.”

And so one should reply that what is signified by wood, hay, and straw are the venial sins

themselves which mix themselves in with those who are charged with the care of earthly things. For just as these items pile up in a house but do not belong to the substance of the edifice and can be burned off while the edifice remains, so, too, venial sins are multiplied in a man while his spiritual edifice remains, and for them he suffers either the fire of temporal tribulation in this life or the fire of Purgatory after this life, and yet attains eternal salvation.

Reply to objection 1: Venial sins are said to build upon (*superaedificari*) the spiritual foundation not in the sense that are placed upon it directly, but rather in the sense that are placed next to it—just as it says in that place (Psalm 136:1), “Upon (*super*) the waters of Babylon ...,” meaning “next to the waters.” For as has been explained, venial sins do not destroy the spiritual edifice.

Reply to objection 2: It is not said of everyone who builds with wood, hay, and straw that “he will be saved as if by fire.” Instead, this is said only of one who builds upon the foundation. The foundation is not, as some think, unformed faith, but instead faith informed by charity—this according to Ephesians 3:17 (“Rooted and founded in charity”). Therefore, someone who dies with mortal sin and venial sins does, to be sure, have wood, hay, and straw, but they have not been built upon a spiritual foundation. And so he will not “be saved as if by fire.”

Reply to objection 3: Those who are free of caring for temporal things, even if they sometimes commit venial sins, nonetheless commit less serious venial sins and are frequently purified by the fervor of charity. Hence, such people do not build with venial sins, since the sins remain moderate in them. By contrast, the venial sins of those who are occupied with earthly affairs remain for a longer time, since they are not able to return frequently to erasing such sins through the fervor of charity.

Reply to objection 4: As the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 1, “All things are contained under three, viz., the beginning, the middle, and the end.” In accord with this, all the grades of venial sins are traced back to three, viz., (a) wood, which remains in the fire for a longer time; (b) straw, which is consumed the quickest; and (c) hay, which is in the middle between them. For venial sins are more quickly or less quickly purged by fire according to whether they involve greater or lesser adherence or seriousness.

Article 3

Was man in the state of innocence able to commit a venial sin?

It seems that man in the state of innocence was able to commit a venial sin:

Objection 1: A Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:14 (“Adam was not seduced”), says, “Having had no experience of God’s severity, he could have mistakenly believed that he had committed a venial sin.” But he would not have believed this if he had not been able to commit a venial sin. Therefore, he was able to commit a venial sin without committing a mortal sin.

Objection 2: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says, “One should not think that the tempter would have overcome the man if the man had not first had in his soul a sort of excitement (*elatio*) which should have been held in check.” But the excitement that preceded his downfall, which was itself effected by a mortal sin, could only have been a venial sin.

Similarly, in the same book Augustine says, “The man was allured by a desire to experiment, once he saw that the woman was not dead after having eaten the forbidden fruit.” In the case of Eve, there seems also to have been a movement of unbelief, since she doubted the Lord’s words, as is clear from the fact that she said, “Lest *perhaps* we die,” as Genesis 3:3 has it. But these seem to be venial sins. Therefore, man was able to commit a venial sin before committing a mortal sin.

Objection 3: A mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state (*magis opponitur integritati primi status*) than a venial sin is. But the man was able to commit a mortal sin despite the

integrity of the original state. Therefore, he was likewise able to commit a venial sin.

But contrary to this: For each sin some punishment is due. But as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, there could not have been any punishment in the state of innocence (*nihil poenale esse potuit in statu innocentiae*). Therefore, man could not have sinned by any sin that would not result in his being ejected from the state of integrity. But a venial sin does not change man's state. Therefore, he was not able to commit a venial sin.

I respond: It is commonly claimed that man in the state of innocence was unable to commit a venial sin.

This should not be understood to mean that a sin which is venial for us is such that if he had committed it, it would have been a mortal sin because of the loftiness of his status. For the dignity of the person is a circumstance which, while it aggravates a sin, nonetheless does not transform it into another species—except perhaps because of some supervening deformity involving disobedience or a vow or something of that sort, which cannot be claimed in the present case. Hence, what is of itself a venial sin (*id quod est de se veniale*) could not have been transformed into a mortal sin because of the dignity of the original state.

Therefore, the claim in question should be understood to mean that he was unable to commit a venial sin in the sense that before he lost the integrity of the original state by committing a mortal sin, he was not able to commit a sin that was of itself venial. The reason for this is that venial sin occurs in our case either (a) because of the *imperfection of the act*, as with sudden movements in the genus of mortal sin, or (b) because of a *disorder that exists with respect to the means to the end* while the due ordering to the end is preserved.

Both of these happen because of some lack of order stemming from what is lower not being held firmly in check by what is higher. For instance, the fact that a sudden movement of the sentient appetite (*subitus motus sensualitatis*) rises up in us stems from the fact that the sentient appetite is not altogether subject to reason. On the other hand, the fact that a sudden movement arises in reason itself stems in our case from the fact, explained above (q. 74, a. 10), that the execution of reason's act is not subject to a deliberation based on a higher good. And the human mind's being disordered with respect to the means to the end, even while the due ordering to the end is preserved, stems from the fact that the means to the end are not infallibly subordinated to the end (*non ordinantur infallibiliter sub fine*), which, as has been explained (q. 10, aa. 1 and 2), holds the highest place in the sense of being the principle among desirable things.

However, as was established in the First Part (ST 1, q. 95, a. 1), in the state of innocence there was an infallible firmness of order, so that the lower was always subordinated to the higher (*continetur sub superiori*) as long as man's highest good was subordinated to God—as Augustine likewise points out in *De Civitate Dei* 14. And so it had to be the case that there would be no disorder in man unless it began with man's highest good not being subject to God; but this is effected by a mortal sin. From this it is clear that a man in the state of innocence could not have committed a venial sin before he had committed a mortal sin.

Reply to objection 1: 'Venial sin' is being taken here not in the sense in which we are presently speaking of venial sin, but in the sense according to which a sin is called venial because it is easily forgivable.

Reply to objection 2: The excitement that preceded in the man's mind was the man's first mortal sin, and it is said to have preceded his fall into an exterior sin. What followed the excitement was an avid desire to experiment in the man and doubt in the woman. She erupted into this excitement solely upon hearing the serpent mention the precept, as if she were willing not to be held in check by the precept (*quasi nollet sub praecepto contineri*).

Reply to objection 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state to such a degree that it corrupts that state—something that venial sin is unable to do. And since no disorder at all can

exist together with the integrity of the original state, it follows that the first man was unable to commit a venial sin before he had committed a mortal sin.

Article 4

Can a good angel or bad angel commit a venial sin?

It seems that a good angel or bad angel can commit a venial sin:

Objection 1: Man agrees with the angels in the higher part of the soul, which is called the mind—this according to Gregory in *Homilia* (“Man understands with the angels”). But man can commit a venial sin with the higher part of the soul. Therefore, so can an angel.

Objection 2: If anyone is able to do more, then he is able to do less as well. But an angel was able to love a created good more than he loves God—which he did by committing a mortal sin. Therefore, he was likewise able to love a created good less than God but in a disordered way, thereby committing a venial sin.

Objection 3: The bad angels seem to do some things that are by their genus venial sins, viz., provoke men to laughter and other less serious things of this sort. But as has been explained (a. 3), the circumstance of who the person is (*circumstantia personae*) does not make a mortal sin out of a venial sin, unless some special prohibition is added—which does not occur in the case under discussion. Therefore, an angel is able to commit a venial sin.

But contrary to this: An angel’s perfection is greater than man’s perfection in the original state. But man in the original state was not able to commit a venial sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, neither is an angel able to commit a venial sin.

I respond: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 58, a. 3 and q. 79, a. 8), an angel’s understanding is not discursive in the sense of proceeding from principles to conclusions and understanding both principles and conclusions separately from one another, as occurs with us. Hence, it must be the case that whenever an angel considers the conclusions, he considers them insofar as they exist in the principles. Now as has been explained many times above (q. 8, a. 2 and q. 10, a. 1 and q. 72, a. 5), among desirable things the ends are like principles and the means to the end are like conclusions. Hence, an angel’s mind is directed toward the means to an end only insofar as the means correspond to the order of the end (*constant sub ordine finis*). Because of this, an angel is by his nature such that there cannot be a disorder in him with respect to the means to the end without there being simultaneously a disorder with respect to the end itself—a disorder that exists through mortal sin.

Now the good angels are not moved toward the means to an end except in relation to a fitting end, which is God. And because of this all their acts are acts of charity. And so venial sin cannot exist in them.

The bad angels, on the other hand, are moved to nothing except in relation to the end of their sin of pride. And so they commit mortal sins in all things whatsoever that they do *by their own will*. However, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 63, a. 4 and q. 64, a. 2), things stand otherwise with respect to the *natural desire for the good* that exists in them.

Reply to objection 1: A man agrees with the angels in mind or intellect, but, as has been explained, differs from them in the manner in which he understands.

Reply to objection 2: For the reason already explained, an angel is unable to love a creature less than he loves God unless either (a) he simultaneously refers the creature to God as to his ultimate end or (b) he simultaneously refers the creature to a disordered end.

Reply to objection 3: The demons exercise care for all the things that seem to be venial in order that they might draw men into becoming accustomed to them (*ad sui familiaritatem*) and so lead them

into mortal sin. Hence, in all such matters the devils commit mortal sin because of the end that they intend (*propter intentionem finis*).

Article 5

Are the first movements of the sentient appetite in non-believers mortal sins?

It seems that the first movements of the sentient appetite in non-believers are mortal sins:

Objection 1: In Romans 8:1 the Apostle says, “There is no condemnation for those are in Christ Jesus, who do not walk according to the flesh,” and he is speaking here of the desires of the sentient appetite (*de concupiscentia sensualitatis*), as is clear from the preceding verses. Therefore, the reason why sense desire is not damnable in those who do not walk according to the flesh, i.e., those who do not consent to sense desire, is that they “are in Christ Jesus.” But non-believers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore, in non-believers sense desire is damnable. Therefore, its first movements in non-believers are mortal sins.

Objection 2: In *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* Anselm says, “When those who are not in Christ sense the flesh, they are pursuing damnation, even if they do not walk not according to the flesh.” But damnation is due only for mortal sin. Therefore, since a man “senses the flesh” because of the first movement of sense desire (*secundum primum motum concupiscentiae*), it seems that the first movement of concupiscence in non-believers is a mortal sin.

Objection 3: In the same book Anselm says, “Man was made in such a way that he had a duty not to feel sense desire (*concupiscentiam sentire non deberet*).” But this duty seems to be remitted through baptismal grace, which non-believers do not have. Therefore, whenever a non-believer experiences sense desire (*concupiscit*), even if he does not consent, he commits a mortal sin because he is doing something contrary to his duty.

But contrary to this: Acts 10:34 says, “God is not a respecter of persons.” Therefore, what He does not impute to one for condemnation, he does not impute to another for condemnation. But He does not impute the first movements [of the sentient appetite] to believers for condemnation. Therefore, neither does He impute them to non-believers for condemnation.

I respond: It is unreasonable to claim that the first movements [of the sentient appetite] in non-believers are mortal sins if they are not consented to. There are two reasons why this is clear.

First of all, as was established above (q. 74, a. 4), the sentient appetite cannot itself be the subject of a mortal sin. But the same nature of sentient appetite exists in both non-believers and believers. Hence, it cannot be the case that only the movement of the sentient appetite in non-believers is a mortal sin.

Second, it is clear from the status of the sinner himself. For it is never the case that the dignity of the person diminishes the sin; instead, it increases the sin, as is clear from what was said above (q. 73, a. 10). Hence, neither is it the case that the sin is lesser in a believer than in a non-believer; instead, it is much greater in the believer. For the sins of non-believers deserve more leniency, because of their ignorance—this according to 1 Timothy 1:13 (“I obtained God’s mercy, because I acted ignorantly in my unbelief”)—whereas the sins of believers are aggravated because of the sacraments of grace—this according to Hebrews 10:29 (“How much more, do you think, he deserves worse punishments who has considered unclean the blood of the covenant by which he was sanctified”).

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is talking about the condemnation due for original sin, which is taken away through the grace of Jesus Christ, even though the stimulant to sense desire remains (*quamvis maneat concupiscentiae fomes*). Hence, the fact that believers have sense desire is not in them a sign of the damnation of original sin, as it is in the case of non-believers.

Reply to objection 2: This is likewise the way in which the passage from Anselm should be understood. Hence, the reply to the second objection is clear.

Reply to objection 3: The duty not to have sense desire came with original justice. Hence, what is opposed to this duty is relevant to original sin and not to actual sin.

Article 6

Can venial sin exist in someone who has original sin alone?

It seems that venial sin can exist in someone who has original sin alone [and is without mortal sin]:

Objection 1: The disposition precedes the habit. But as was explained above (q. 88, a. 3), a venial sin is a disposition toward a mortal sin. Therefore, in a non-believer, for whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin is found before mortal sin. And so in some cases non-believers have venial sins along with original sin, but without mortal sins.

Objection 2: A venial sin has less connection with and agreement with a mortal sin than one mortal sin has with another mortal sin. But a non-believer subject to original sin is able to commit one mortal sin and not another. Therefore, he is likewise able to commit a venial sin and not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: One can determine a time at which a child is first able to be the agent of an actual sin. When he comes to that time, he is able to persist for at least a brief interval without committing a mortal sin, since this is possible even in the case of the worst criminals. But in that interval, no matter how brief it is, he is able to commit a venial sin. Therefore, venial sin is able to exist in someone who has original sin, but is without mortal sin.

But contrary to this: As will be explained below (*Supplement*, q. 69, a. 6), men are punished for original sin in the limbo of children, where there is no pain of the senses (*ubi non est poena sensus*). But men are thrust into hell solely for mortal sin. Therefore, there will not be a place in which to punish someone who has venial sin along with just original sin.

I respond: It is impossible that venial sin should exist in someone who has original sin but is without mortal sin.

The reason for this is that before an individual comes to the age of discretion (*antequam ad annos discretionis perveniat*), his young age, which prevents the use of reason, excuses him from mortal sin and hence all the more excuses him from venial sin if he does something that is by its genus a venial sin.

However, when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not altogether excused from venial sin or from mortal sin. But the first thing that occurs to a man to think about at that time is to deliberate about himself. And if he orders himself to his fitting end, he will receive the remission of original sin through grace. On the other hand, if he does not order himself to his fitting end, then to the extent that he is capable of discretion at that age, he will commit a mortal sin because he fails to do what he is capable of doing (*non faciens quod in se est*). And from then on venial sin will not exist in him without mortal sin, unless at some later time all his sins are remitted through grace.

Reply to objection 1: A venial sin is a disposition that precedes a mortal sin not by necessity but contingently—in the way that hard work sometimes disposes one for a fever, but not in the way that heat disposes a thing for the form of fire.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, it is because of the absence of the use of reason that venial sin is prevented from existing together with just original sin, and not because of venial sin's distance from or agreement with [mortal sin].

Reply to objection 3: A child who is starting to have the use of reason can abstain from other mortal sins for some time, but he is not free from the sin of omission explained above—unless he turns himself toward God as quickly as he can. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion is

that he think, with respect to himself, what end he should order other things toward. For the end is prior in intention. And so this is the time for which he is obligated by the affirmative precept of God by which the Lord says, “Turn toward me, and I will turn toward you” (Zachariah 1:3).

QUESTION 90

The Essence of Law

We next have to consider the exterior principles of acts. Now the exterior principle that inclines us toward evil is the devil, whose temptations were discussed in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 114). On the other hand, the exterior principle that moves us toward the good is God, who both instructs us with law and assists us with grace. Hence, we must first discuss law (questions 90-108) and then grace (questions 109-114).

On the topic of law, we must first consider law itself in general (questions 90-92) and then the parts of law (questions 93-108).

Now there are three things to consider about law in general: first, the essence of law (question 90); second, the different kinds of law (question 91); and, third, the effects of law (question 92).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is law something that belongs to reason? (2) What is the end or purpose (*finis*) of law? (3) What is the cause of law? (4) What about the promulgation of law?

Article 1

Is law something that belongs to reason?

It seems that law is not something that belongs to reason (*non sit aliquid rationis*):

Objection 1: In Romans 7:23 the Apostle says, “I see another law in my members” But in those members [of the body] there is nothing that belongs to reason, since reason does not use a corporeal organ. Therefore, law is not something that belongs to reason.

Objection 2: Nothing exists in reason which is not either a power, a habit, or an act. But law is not the very *power* of reason itself. Likewise, law is not a *habit* of reason, since the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues that were discussed above (q. 57). Nor, again, is law an *act* of reason, since if it were, then law would cease to exist when reason ceased to act, e.g., in those who are asleep. Therefore, law is not something that belongs to reason.

Objection 3: Law moves those who are subject to the law to act in an upright way (*ad recte agendum*). But as is clear from what was said above (q. 9, a. 1), it is properly speaking the role of the will to move one to act. Therefore, law has to do not with reason but rather with the will, in keeping with what [Justinian] the Legal Expert says [in *Digestum Vetus* 1]: “Whatever pleases the ruler (*princeps*) has the force of law.”

But contrary to this: It is law’s function to command and forbid. But as was established above (q. 17, a. 1), commanding belongs to reason. Therefore, law is something that belongs to reason.

I respond: Law is a certain rule and measure of acts in accord with which one is either induced to act or restrained from acting. For ‘law’ (*lex*) is derived from ‘to bind’ (*ligare*), since law obligates (*obligare*) one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is reason, which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 1, a. 1), is the first principle of human acts. For it belongs to reason to order things to their end—where, according to the Philosopher, the end is the first principle in matters of action (*in agendis*). But in every genus, that which is the principle is the measure and rule of that genus. For instance, *one* is the measure in the genus *number*, and the first movement is the measure in the genus *movement*. Hence, it follows that law is something that belongs to reason.

Reply to objection 1: Since law is a rule and measure, there are two ways in which it is said to exist in something.

First, law exists in that which measures and regulates. And since this is proper to reason, law taken in this sense exists in reason alone.

Second, law exists in that which is regulated and measured. And this is how law exists in all the things that are inclined in any way by any kind of law. As a result, any inclination that stems from any kind of law can itself be called a law—not by its essence but, as it were, by participation. And it is in this sense that the very inclination of the members [of the body] toward sensual desire is called ‘the law of the members’.

Reply to objection 2: Just as in the case of exterior acts one must consider both the action (*operatio*) and the thing that is done (*operatum*)—e.g., the act of building and the thing built—so too in the works of reason one must consider (a) the very acts of reason, i.e., the act of understanding and the act of discursive reasoning, and (b) what is constituted by acts of this sort. In the case of speculative reason, the constituted things are, first, the definition; second, the proposition (*enunciatio*); and, third, the syllogism or argument.

Now, as was explained above (q. 76, a.1) in keeping with what the Philosopher teaches in *Ethics* 7, practical reason likewise uses a certain type of syllogism with respect to things that can be done (*operabilia*). Hence, in the case of practical reason there is something that is related to the actions (*operationes*) in the same way that the proposition is related to the conclusions in the case of speculative reason. These universal propositions of practical reason, which are ordered toward actions, have the character of law. At certain times these propositions are actually being considered, and at other times reason possesses them as habits.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 17, a. 1), it is from the will that reason has its power to effect movement. For it is because someone wills the end that his reason issues commands regarding what is ordered toward the end. However, for an act of will about what is commanded to have the character of law, it must be regulated in some way by reason (*aliqua ratione regulata*). And this is how to understand the claim that the ruler’s will has the force of law; otherwise, the ruler’s will would constitute wickedness (*esset iniquitas*) rather than law.

Article 2

Is law always ordered toward the common good as its end?

It seems that law is not always ordered toward the common good (*bonum commune*) as its end:

Objection 1: It is law’s function to command and forbid. But precepts are ordered toward certain individual goods (*singularia bona*). Therefore, law does not always have the common good as its end.

Objection 2: Law directs a man toward acting. But human acts have to do with particular matters. Therefore, law is likewise ordered toward a certain particular good (*particulare bonum*).

Objection 3: In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “If law is founded upon reason, then law will consist of everything that is founded upon reason.” But it is not just what is ordered toward the common good that is founded upon reason, but also what is ordered toward one’s private good (*bonum privatum*). Therefore, law is ordered not only toward the common good, but also toward one’s private good.

But contrary to this: In *Etymologia* 5 Isidore says, “Law is formulated not for any private advantage, but for the common benefit of the citizens.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), by virtue of the fact that law is a rule and measure, it has to do with the principle of human acts. Now just as reason is the principle of human acts, so too within reason itself there is something which is the principle with respect to everything else. Hence, this must be what law is chiefly and especially concerned with.

Now in actions, which practical reason is concerned with, the first principle is the ultimate end.

But, as was established above (q. 2, a. 7), the ultimate end of human life is happiness or beatitude. Hence, law must have to do mainly with an ordering that leads to beatitude.

Again, since (a) every part is ordered toward its whole in the way that what is incomplete (*imperfectum*) is ordered toward what is complete (*perfectum*), and since (b) a man is part of a complete community, law must properly be concerned with the ordering that leads to communal happiness (*ad felicitatem communem*). Hence, in the definition of legal affairs alluded to above, the Philosopher makes mention of both happiness and political communion. For in *Ethics* 5 he says, “The laws (*legalia*) we call ‘just’ are those that effect and conserve happiness and its elements within the political community.” For as *Politics* 1 puts it, a city is a complete community.

Now in every genus, the genus is especially predicated of the thing that serves as the principle of the others, and the genus is predicated of the others because of their relation to that thing. For instance, fire, which is maximally hot, is a cause of the heat in mixed bodies, which are called ‘hot’ to the extent that they participate in fire. Hence, since ‘law’ is predicated especially in relation to the common good, it must be the case that any other precept about a particular act has the character of law only to the extent that it is ordered toward the common good. And so every law is ordered toward the common good.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Precept’ implies the application of law to the things that are regulated by the law. But an ordering toward the common good, which law is concerned with, is applicable to individual ends. Accordingly, precepts are likewise handed down with respect to certain particular matters.

Reply to objection 2: Actions are, to be sure, concerned with particular matters. However, those particular matters can be referred back to the common good—not, indeed, because they share with it a common genus or species, but rather because they share with it a common final cause. This is why the common good is called a common end.

Reply to objection 3: Just as nothing is firmly established through speculative reason except by being traced back to first indemonstrable principles, so too nothing is firmly established through practical reason except by being ordered to the ultimate end, which is the common good. But what is founded upon reason in this way has the character of law.

Article 3

Whose reason is it that makes law?

It seems that everyone’s reason makes law:

Objection 1: In Romans 2:14 the Apostle says, “When the Gentiles, who do not have the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law, they, not having the Law, are a law unto themselves.” But he says this in general about everyone. Therefore, everyone is able to make law for himself.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, the lawmaker’s intent is to lead men to virtue. But every man is capable of leading another to virtue. Therefore, every man’s reason can make law.

Objection 3: Just as the ruler (*princeps*) of a city is the one who governs (*gubernator*) the city, so too every father of a family (*paterfamilias*) is the one who governs the household. But the ruler of a city is able to make law in the city. Therefore, every father of a family is able to make law in his own household.

But contrary to this: In the *Etymologia* Isidore says (and *Decretals*, dist. 2 repeats this), “A law is an ordinance (*constitutio*) of the people, by which the elders (*maiores*), along with the common people (*plebes*), have sanctioned something.” Therefore, it is not just anyone’s role to make law.

I respond: Law has to do properly, primarily, and principally with an ordering toward the common good. Now to order something toward the common good is the role either of the whole multitude or of someone who is acting in place of the whole multitude. Therefore, establishing a law is something that belongs either to the whole multitude or to a public personage who is in charge of (*habet curam*) the whole multitude. For in all other cases as well, ordering something to an end is the role of someone for whom that end is his own.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 1), when law exists in something, it exists not only in that which regulates, but also, by participation, in that which is regulated. And everyone is a law unto himself in the sense that he participates in the order established by that which does the regulating. This is why the Apostle adds immediately in the same place, "... who show the work of the law that is written in their hearts."

Reply to objection 2: A private person cannot efficaciously lead anyone to virtue. For he can only issue a warning, and if his warning is not heeded, he does not have the sort of coercive power (*vim coactivam*) which, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, law must have in order to lead someone efficaciously to virtue. Now, as will be explained below (q. 92, a. 2), this coercive power is had by the multitude or by a public personage whose role it is to inflict punishments. Only someone like this is in a position to make laws.

Reply to objection 3: Just as a man is part of a household, so a household is part of a city and, as *Politics* 1 puts it, a city is a complete community (*communitas perfecta*). And so just as the good of a single man is not the ultimate end, but is instead ordered toward the ultimate end, so too the good of a single household is ordered toward the good of a single city, which is a complete community. Hence, the one who governs a family can, to be sure, make certain precepts and statutes, but these do not, properly speaking, have the character of law.

Article 4

Is promulgation part of the nature of law?

It seems that promulgation is not part of the nature of law:

Objection 1: Natural law especially has the nature of law. But natural law does not require promulgation. Therefore, it is not part of the nature of law that it be promulgated.

Objection 2: Properly speaking, law plays the role of obligating someone to do or not to do something. But it is not just those to whom a law is promulgated who are obligated to fulfill the law; the others are obligated as well. Therefore, promulgation is not part of the nature of law.

Objection 3: The obligatory force of law extends even into the future, since, as jurists say, laws impose necessity on future transactions. But promulgation is made [only] to those who exist at present. Therefore, law does not require promulgation.

But contrary to this: *Decretals*, dist. 4, says, "Laws are instituted when they are promulgated."

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), law is imposed on others in the manner of a rule and measure. But a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to the things that are ruled and measured. Hence, in order for a law to acquire the power to obligate, which is proper to law, it must be applied to the men who are supposed to be regulated by it. Now this sort of application is accomplished by the law's being brought to their knowledge through its promulgation. Hence, promulgation is necessary in order for law to have its power.

And so from the four traits that have been mentioned, we can put together a definition of law: Law

is (a) an ordering (*ordinatio*) by reason, (b) directed toward the common good, (c) made by one who is in charge of the community, and (d) promulgated.

Reply to objection 1: The promulgation of the law of nature consists in God's having instilled it in the minds of men in order that they might know it naturally.

Reply to objection 2: Those who are such that the law is not promulgated in their presence are obligated to follow the law insofar as it is or can be brought to their knowledge through others, once the promulgation has been made.

Reply to objection 3: A present promulgation extends into the future by reason of the permanence of writing, which in some sense continually promulgates the law. Hence, in *Etymologia* 2 Isidore says, "'Law' (*lex*) is derived from reading (*legendo*), because it is written."

QUESTION 91

The Different Kinds of Law

We next have to consider the different kinds of law. On this topic there are six questions: (1) Is there such a thing as eternal law? (2) Is there such a thing as natural law? (3) Is there such a thing as human law? (4) Is there such a thing as divine law? (5) Is there just a single [divine] law, or more than one? (6) Is there such a thing as ‘the law of sin’?

Article 1

Is there such a thing as eternal law?

It seems that there is no such thing as eternal law:

Objection 1: Every law is imposed on someone. But there was no one on whom law could have been imposed from eternity, since God alone existed from eternity. Therefore, there is no such thing as eternal law.

Objection 2: Promulgation is part of the nature of law. But there could not have been a promulgation from eternity, since nothing existed from eternity to which the law might have been promulgated. Therefore, there cannot be any such thing as eternal law.

Objection 3: Law implies an ordering to an end. But there is nothing eternal that might be ordered to an end, since the ultimate end alone is eternal. Therefore, there is no such thing as eternal law.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “The law that is called the ‘highest ideal plan’ (*summa ratio*) cannot but seem unchangeable and eternal to anyone who understands it.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), law is nothing other than a certain dictate (*dictamen*) of practical reason on the part of a ruler who governs some complete community. But once we assume, as was established in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 22, a. 1), that the world is governed by divine providence, it is obvious that the entire community of the universe is governed by divine reason. Therefore, the very nature of the governance of things that exists in God as the ruler of the universe has the character of law. And since, as Proverbs 8:23 puts it, God’s reason does not conceive of anything temporally but instead has an eternal conception, it follows that a law of this kind must be called eternal law.

Reply to objection 1: Those things that do not exist in themselves exist in God’s presence (*apud Deum*) insofar as they are foreknown and preordained by Him—this according to Romans 4:17 (“He calls the things that are not in the same way as those that are”). So, then, the eternal conception of God’s law has the character of an eternal law, since it is ordered by God toward the governance of the things foreknown by Him.

Reply to objection 2: Promulgation is accomplished by both the spoken word (*verbum*) and the written word (*scriptum*), and the eternal law has both sorts of promulgation on the part of God who promulgates it. For God’s Word is eternal (see *ST* 1, q. 34), and the writing in the book of life is eternal (see *ST* 1, q. 24).

On the other hand, as far as the creature who hears or reads is concerned, the promulgation cannot be eternal.

Reply to objection 3: Law implies an ordering to an end in the *active* sense—viz., in the sense that certain things are ordered to the end through law.

However, law does not imply an ordering to an end in the *passive* sense, i.e., in the sense that the law itself is ordered to an end—except, incidentally, in the case of a governor whose end lies outside himself and is such that his law, too, must be ordered to it. By contrast, the end of divine governance is

God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Hence, the eternal law is not ordered toward any further end.

Article 2

Is there any such thing as natural law in us?

It seems that there is no such thing as natural law in us:

Objection 1: Man is sufficiently governed by eternal law, since, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, “Eternal law is the law by which it is just that all things should be well ordered.” But nature does not abound in what is superfluous, just as it is not deficient in what is necessary. Therefore, there is no such thing as natural law for man.

Objection 2: As was established above (q. 90, a.1), it is through law that man is ordered to the end in his acts. But the ordering of human acts to their end does not stem from nature in the way that this occurs in non-rational creatures, which act for the sake of an end by natural appetite alone; instead, man acts for the sake of an end through his reason and will. Therefore, there is no law that is natural to man.

Objection 3: The more free someone is, the less subject he is to law. But man is more free than all the [other] animals because of the power of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), which he has in contrast to all the other animals. Therefore, since the other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to any natural law.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Romans 2:14 (“For when the Gentiles, who do not have the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law”) says, “Even if they do not have the written Law, they nonetheless have the natural law, by which everyone understands and knows within himself what is good and what is evil.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), since law is a rule and a measure, there are two senses in which it can exist in something: first, in the sense of existing in that which regulates and measures and, second, in the sense of existing in that which is regulated and measured. For a thing is measured and regulated to the extent that it has some participation in the rule and measure. So since, as is clear from what was said above (a. 1), all the things subject to divine providence are regulated and measured by eternal law, it is clear that all things in some way participate in eternal law. More precisely, because eternal law is imprinted on them, they have inclinations toward their own proper acts and ends.

Now among all creatures, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent manner, because he himself participates in providence, providing for himself and for others. Hence, in him, too, there is a participation in eternal reason through which he has a natural inclination to his due act and end. And the rational creature’s mode of participation in the eternal law is called natural law.

Hence, after the Psalmist (Psalm 4:6) has said, “Offer up the sacrifice of justice,” he adds, as if someone were asking what the works of justice are, “Many say, ‘Who is there to show us good works?’” In reply to this question he says, “The light of Your countenance, Lord, is imprinted on us”—as if to say, the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what is evil. This has to do with natural law, which is nothing other than the imprint of God’s light within us.

Hence, it is clear that natural law is nothing other than a participation in eternal law on the part of a rational creature.

Reply to objection 1: This argument assumes that natural law is something different from eternal law. However, as has been explained, natural law is nothing other than a certain kind of participation in eternal law.

Reply to objection 2: As was established above (q. 10, a. 1), every operation of reason and will in us is derived from what is in accord with nature. For every instance of discursive reasoning stems from principles that are naturally known to us, and every desire for things that are ordered to an end stems from a natural desire for the ultimate end. And so, likewise, the initial ordering of our acts to their end (*prima directio actuum nostrorum ad finem*) must be brought about through natural law.

Reply to objection 3: Non-rational animals participate in the eternal law in their own way, just as rational creatures do. However, since a rational creature participates in natural law in an intellectual and rational way, a rational creature's participation in the eternal law is itself properly called a law. For as was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), law belongs to reason. By contrast, a non-rational creature does not participate in the eternal law in a rational way, and so its participation cannot be called law except by way of a likeness (*per similitudinem*).

Article 3

Is there any such thing as human law?

It seems that there is no such thing as human law:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 2), natural law is a participation in eternal law. But as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, all things are completely ordered through eternal law. Therefore, natural law is sufficient for ordering all human affairs. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be any such thing as human law.

Objection 2: As has been explained (q. 90, a. 1), law has the character of a measure. But human reason is not the measure of things; just the opposite, as *Metaphysics* 10 insists. Therefore, there cannot be a law that proceeds from human reason.

Objection 3: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, a measure should be absolutely fixed (*certissima*). But human reason's dictates about things to be done are not fixed, since according to Wisdom 9:14, "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain." Therefore, there cannot be a law that proceeds from human reason.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine posits two kinds of law, one eternal and the other temporal, and the latter he calls 'human law'.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), law is a dictate of practical reason. Now practical reason and speculative reason proceed in similar ways, since, as was established above (q. 90, a. 1), both proceed from given principles to given conclusions. Accordingly, then, just as, in the case of speculative reason, conclusions in the diverse sciences, which are not naturally known to us but are instead discovered by the activity of reason, are brought forth from naturally known indemonstrable principles, so too from the precepts of natural law, which are, as it were, common and indemonstrable principles, human reason must proceed to determine certain matters in a more particular way. And these particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws—assuming the preservation of all the other conditions, described above (q. 90, a. 4), that are relevant to the nature of law.

Thus, in his *Rhetorica* Tully says, "The beginnings of justice came from nature; next, certain things came to be customs because of their advantageous nature; afterwards, fear and reverence sanctioned both what had come from nature and what had been approved by custom."

Reply to objection 1: Human reason is incapable of participating fully in the dictates of divine reason (*non potest participare plenum dictamen rationis divinae*); rather, it participates in its own way and incompletely. And so just as, in the case of speculative reason, there exists in us, through our natural

participation in God's wisdom, a cognition of certain common principles, but not a proper cognition of every truth as there is in God's wisdom, so too, in the case of practical reason, man naturally participates in eternal law with respect to certain general principles, but not with respect to the particular determination of singular acts, even though the latter are contained within the eternal law. This is why it is necessary for human reason to proceed further to the particular sanctions contained in laws.

Reply to objection 2: Human reason is not in its own right (*secundum se*) a rule with respect to things; instead, it is the principles naturally instilled in human reason that are general rules and measures of all the things which are to be done by man and with respect to which natural reason is the rule and measure—even though it is not a measure of what stems from nature.

Reply to objection 3: Practical reason is concerned with actions (*operabilia*), which are singular and contingent, and not with necessary things like those which speculative reason is concerned with. And so human laws cannot have the sort of infallibility that the demonstrated conclusions of the sciences do. Nor is it necessary that every measure should be in every way infallible and fixed; rather, it should be as fixed as is possible within its own genus.

Article 4

Was it necessary for there to be such a thing as divine law?

It seems to have been unnecessary for there to be such a thing as divine law:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 2), natural law is within us a kind of participation in eternal law. But as has been said (a. 1), eternal law is a divine law. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be a divine law in addition to natural law and the human laws that stem from it.

Objection 2: Ecclesiasticus 15:14 says, "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." But as was established above (q. 14, a. 1), counsel is an act of reason. Therefore, man was left to the governance provided by his own reason. But as has been explained (a. 3), a dictate of human reason is human law. Therefore, it is unnecessary for man to be governed by some other divine law.

Objection 3: Human nature is more self-sufficient than non-rational creatures. But a non-rational creature does not have any divine law in addition to the natural inclination that has been instilled in it. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a rational creature should not have any divine law in addition to natural law.

But contrary to this: David asked God for a law to be imposed on him, saying, "Set before me for a law the way of Your justifications, O Lord" (Psalm 118:33).

I respond: In addition to natural law and human law, it was necessary for us to have divine law in order to direct human life—and this for four reasons:

First, through law man is directed to his own proper acts in relation to the ultimate end. And if man were ordered just to an end that is not disproportionate to man's natural power, then it would not be necessary for man to have any directive from reason in addition to natural law and the humanly posited law that stems from it. However, since, as was established above (q. 5, a. 5), man is ordered to the end of eternal beatitude, which is disproportionate to natural human power, it was necessary that, in addition to natural law and human law, he should also be directed to his end by a law that is divinely given.

Second, due to the uncertainty of human judgment, especially about contingent and particular matters, different people can make diverse judgments about human acts, and these diverse judgments lead to diverse and contrary laws. Therefore, in order that man might be able to know without any hesitation what he should do and what he should avoid doing, it was necessary that he be directed in his proper acts by a law that is divinely given and is clearly such that it cannot be mistaken.

Third, man is able to make law with respect to those things which he is in a position to make judgments about. However, human judgments cannot encompass interior movements, which are hidden, but can encompass only exterior acts, which are observable. Yet for the perfection of virtue it is required that a man be upright with respect to both sorts of acts. So human law could not adequately restrain and order interior acts, and divine law had to be added for this purpose.

Fourth, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, human law is incapable of prohibiting or punishing all evil deeds. For if it tried to do away with all evils, many goods would also be destroyed as a result, and the promotion of the common good, which is necessary for human living, would be impeded. Therefore, in order that no evil remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary that there should be, in addition, a divine law by which all sins are prohibited.

These four reasons are touched on in Psalm 18:8, where it says, “The law of the Lord is unspotted,” i.e., does not permit any foulness of sin; “..... converting souls,” since it directs not just exterior acts, but interior acts as well; “..... the testimony of the Lord is faithful,” because of the certitude of what is true and upright; “..... giving wisdom to the little ones,” because it orders man to his supernatural and divine end.

Reply to objection 1: Natural law participates in eternal law in a way proportioned to the power of human nature. But man has to be directed in a deeper way to his ultimate supernatural end. And so there is, in addition, a divinely given law, through which eternal law is participated in more deeply.

Reply to objection 2: Counsel is a certain sort of inquiry, and so it must proceed from given principles. But it is not enough that it should proceed from naturally instilled principles, i.e., from the precepts of the natural law—and this for the [four] reasons explained above. Rather, certain other principles must be added, viz., the precepts of divine law.

Reply to objection 3: Non-rational creatures are not ordered to an end higher than the end that is proportioned to their natural power. And so the arguments are not parallel.

Article 5

Is there just a single divine law?

It seems that there is just a single divine law:

Objection 1: A single king in a single kingdom has a single law. But the whole human race is related to God as to a single king—this according to Psalm 46:8 (“God is king of all the earth”). Therefore, there is just a single divine law.

Objection 2: Every law is ordered toward the end that the lawmaker intends in those for whom he makes the law. But what God intends in all men is one and the same thing—this according to 1 Timothy 2:4 (“He wills that all men be saved and come to knowledge of the truth”). Therefore, there is just a single divine law.

Objection 3: To the extent that the revelation of grace is higher than natural cognition, divine law seems to be closer to eternal law, which is a single law, than is natural law. But natural law is a single law for all men. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so is divine law.

But contrary to this: In Hebrews 7:12 the Apostle says, “For the priesthood having been changed, it is necessary for the law to be changed.” But as is explained in the same place, there are two kinds of priesthood, the Levitical priesthood and Christ’s priesthood. Therefore, there are two laws, viz., the Old Law and the New Law.

I respond: As was explained in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 30, a. 3), distinction is a cause of number.

Now there are two ways in which things can be distinct from one another. First, they are distinct in the sense of being altogether diverse in species, e.g., a horse and an ox. Second, they are distinct in the sense that the one is perfect and the other imperfect within the same species, e.g., a man and a boy. It is in this latter sense that the divine law is divided into the Old Law and the New Law. Hence, in Galatians 3:24-25, the Apostle compares the status of the Old Law to the status of a child under the tutelage of a pedagogue, while he compares the status of the New Law to a full-grown man who is no longer under the tutelage of a pedagogue.

Now perfection and imperfection apply to these laws relative to three of those elements pertaining to law that were noted above.

First, as was noted above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good as its end. But there are two kinds of common good. The first is a *sensible and earthly good* (*bonum sensibile et terrenum*), and it is to this sort of good that the Old Law directly ordered [the people]; hence, in Exodus 3:8-17, at the very initiation of the Old Law, the people are invited into the earthly kingdom of the Canaanites. The second is an *intelligible and heavenly good* (*bonum intelligibile et caeleste*), and it is to this sort of good that the New Law orders [the people]; hence, at the very beginning of His teaching Christ issued an invitation to the kingdom of heaven, saying, “Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Matthew 4:17). Thus, in *Contra Faustum* 4 Augustine says, “Promises of temporal things were contained in the Old Testament, and this is why it is called ‘Old’; by contrast, the New Testament has to do with the promise of eternal life.”

Second, law has to do with directing human acts in accord with the order of justice. On this score, too, the New Law outstrips the Old Law by ordering the interior acts of the soul—this according to Matthew 5:20, “Unless your justice exceeds that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” For this reason it is said that the Old Law restrains the hand, whereas the New Law restrains the mind.

Third, law has the role of inducing men to obey the commandments. The Old Law did this through the fear of punishment, whereas the New Law does it through the love that is infused into our hearts by Christ’s grace, which is conferred under the New Law but was prefigured under the Old Law. This is why in *Contra Adimantum Manichaei Discipulum* Augustine says, “In brief, the difference between the Law and the Gospel is this: fear and love.”

Reply to objection 1: Just as the father of a household issues different commands to children and to adults, so too the one king God, within His single kingdom, gives one law to men who are still imperfect and another more perfect law to those who have already been led by the hand through the prior law to a greater capacity for divine things.

Reply to objection 2: The salvation of men was impossible except through Christ—this according to Acts 4:12 (“There is no other name given to men, whereby we must be saved”). And so a law that leads all men perfectly to salvation could not have been given prior to Christ’s coming. Before that, the people from whom Christ was to be born had to be given a preparatory law for receiving Christ, and in this law certain rudiments of salvific justice were contained.

Reply to objection 3: The natural law directs man in accord with certain general precepts which are shared by both perfect and imperfect men, and this is why there is a single natural law for everyone. In addition, however, the divine law directs man in certain particulars with respect to which the perfect and the imperfect are not similarly positioned. And as has already been explained, this is why it was necessary for there to be two divine laws.

Article 6

Is there such a thing as a ‘law of the stimulant [to sin]’?

It seems that there is no such thing as a ‘law of the stimulant [to sin]’ (*lex fomitis [peccati]*):

Objection 1: In *Etymologia* 5 Isidore says, “The law is founded upon reason.” But the stimulant to sin does not consist in reason; instead, it deviates from reason. Therefore, the stimulant to sin does not have the character of law.

Objection 2: Every law is obligatory in the sense that anyone who does not keep it is called a transgressor. But the stimulant to sin does not render anyone a transgressor by virtue of his not following it; to the contrary, he is rendered a transgressor if he does follow it. Therefore, the stimulus to sin does not have the character of law.

Objection 3: As was established above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good. But the stimulant to sin inclines one not toward the common good, but instead toward his own private good. Therefore, the stimulant to sin does not have the character of law.

But contrary to this: In Romans 7:23 the Apostle says, “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), law exists in an essential way in that which rules and measures, whereas it exists by way of participation in that which is measured and ruled—so that, as is clear from what was said above, every inclination or ordering that is found in things subject to the law is itself called ‘law’ by way of participation.

Now there are two ways in which an inclination stemming from the lawmaker can be found in things that are subject to the law: (a) in one way, insofar as such an inclination *directly* inclines what is subject to it toward something, and sometimes diverse subjects to diverse acts, in the way that military law (*lex militum*) can be said to be different from business law (*lex mercatorum*); (b) in another way, *indirectly*, viz., insofar as the fact that the lawmaker takes away some office (*dignitas*) from one who is subject to him results in the latter’s passing into another order and, as it were, into another law. For instance, if a soldier is discharged from the army, then he will pass into rural law (*lex rusticorum*) or business law.

So, then, under God the Lawmaker different creatures have different natural inclinations, with the result that what is in some way law for one is contrary to what is law for another. For instance, *being fierce* is in a certain sense the law for a dog, whereas it is contrary to the law for a sheep or some other gentle animal.

Thus, the law for man, which is given by divine ordination according to man’s proper condition, is that he should act in accord with reason. This law was, to be sure, so strong in man’s initial state that nothing either beyond reason or contrary to reason could take man unawares (*posset subrepere hominem*). But once man turned away from God, he fell into being carried away by the impetus of sensuality; and this happens in a particular way to each man the more he recedes from reason, so that he becomes in a certain sense like the beasts, which are carried away by the impetus of sensuality—this according to Psalm 48:21 (“Man, when he existed in honor, did not understand: he has been put on the same footing as senseless beasts and been made similar to them”).

So, then, this inclination toward sensuality, which is called the ‘stimulant’ (*fomes*), has the character of law absolutely speaking in the case of the other animals—yet in the manner in which it can be called ‘law’ in such animals, viz., as a direct inclination. In men, by contrast, the stimulant does not have the character of law in this way, but is rather a deviation from the law of reason. Yet insofar as man was stripped of original justice and of vigorous reason through God’s justice, this impetus to sensuality

which leads him on has the character of law in the sense that it is a punishment and follows from God's law, which strips man of his proper dignity (*hominem destituente propria dignitate*).

Reply to objection 1: This argument proceeds from the stimulant considered by itself, insofar as it inclines one to evil. For, as has been explained, it does not in this sense have the character of law. Instead, it has the character of law insofar as it follows from the justice of God's law—in the way that one might call it a law that a nobleman should, because of some sin, be subjected to the work of a servant.

Reply to objection 2: This objection proceeds on the assumption that the stimulant is a law in the sense of a rule and measure; for those who deviate from the law in this sense are rendered transgressors. However, the stimulant is not a law in this sense, but is instead a law by participation of a certain sort, in the way explained above.

Reply to objection 3: This argument proceeds from the stimulant's proper inclination and not from its origin. Yet if the inclination toward sensuality is considered as it exists in other animals, then it is indeed ordered to the common good, i.e., to the conservation of nature in the species and in the individual. And this is also true in the case of man, to the extent that sensuality is subject to reason. However, the name 'stimulant' is used for it insofar as it departs from the order of reason.

QUESTION 92

The Effects of Law

We next have to consider the effects of law. On this topic there are two questions: (1) Is it an effect of law to make men good? (2) Are the effects of law, as the Jurist [Gratian] claims, to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish?

Article 1

Is it the role of law to make men good?

It seems that it is not the role of law to make men good:

Objection 1: Men are good through virtue, since as *Ethics* 2 puts it, “Virtue is what makes the one who has it good.” But virtue comes to man only from God, since He “works it in us without us,” as was explained when we defined virtue (q. 55, a. 4). Therefore, it is not the role of law to make men good.

Objection 2: Law does a man no good unless he obeys the law. But the very fact that a man obeys the law stems from his goodness. Therefore, a man’s goodness is presupposed in relation to law. Therefore, it is not law that makes men good.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good. But there are some men who act well in matters pertaining to the common good and yet do not act well in their own proper affairs. Therefore, it is not the role of law to make men good.

Objection 4: As the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 3, some laws are tyrannical. But a tyrant aims only at his own advantage and not at the goodness of his subjects. Therefore, it is not the role of law to make men good.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “Every lawmaker intends to make the citizens good.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), law is nothing other than a dictate of reason which exists in the one who is in charge (*in praesidente*) and by which his subjects are governed. Now, in general, the virtue of what is subordinate lies in its being subordinated in the right way to that by which it is governed; for instance, we see that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible [parts of the soul] consists in their being obedient in the right way to reason. Similarly, as the Philosopher puts it in *Politics* 1, “The virtue of any subject lies in his being subjected to his ruler in the right way (*ut bene subiiciatur principanti*).”

Now each law is ordered toward being obeyed by those subject to it. Hence, it is clear that it is a property of law that it should lead its subjects toward their own proper virtue. Therefore, since virtue is what makes the one who has it good, it follows that a proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given good, either *absolutely speaking* or *relatively speaking*.

For if the lawmaker’s intention is directed toward the true good, i.e., the common good regulated in accord with divine justice, then it follows that through his law men become good *absolutely speaking*.

On the other hand, if the lawmaker’s intention is not directed toward the good absolutely speaking, but is instead directed toward a good which is advantageous or pleasant for himself or which is incompatible with divine justice, then his law makes men good not absolutely speaking, but only *relatively speaking*, viz., in relation to that sort of regime. This is the sense in which the good exists even in things that are *per se* evil, as when someone is said to be a good thief because he operates in a way that is appropriate for his end.

Reply to objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (q. 63, a. 2), there are two kinds of virtue, viz., *acquired* virtue and *infused* virtue. The regularity (*assuetudo*) of the actions plays a role in

both kinds of virtue, but in different ways. For this regularity is in fact a *cause* of acquired virtue, whereas it [merely] *disposes* one for infused virtue and then conserves and promotes that virtue once it is already possessed. Since law is given in order to direct human acts, law makes men good to the extent that human acts contribute to virtue. Hence, the Philosopher likewise says in *Politics* 2, “Lawmakers make men good by habituating them.”

Reply to objection 2: It is not always the case that someone obeys the law because of his perfect goodness in virtue. Rather, he sometimes obeys because of his fear of punishment, and at other times simply because of the dictate of reason, which, as was explained above (q. 63, a. 1), is in some sense the principle of virtue.

Reply to objection 3: The goodness of a part is seen in relation to its whole. Hence, as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 3, “Any part that does not fit in with its whole is bad (*turpis*).” Therefore, since every man is part of a political community (*pars civitatis*), it is impossible that any man should be good without being related in the right way to the common good; nor can the whole consist appropriately of anything except parts that are proportioned to it.

Hence, it is impossible for the common good of the political community to fare well unless at least the citizens who are the rulers are virtuous. However, as far as the good of the community is concerned, it is enough that the other citizens be virtuous to the extent that they obey the commands of the rulers. This is why in *Politics* 3 the Philosopher says, “The virtue of a ruler is the same as the virtue of a good man, whereas the virtue of a common citizen is not the same as the virtue of a good man.”

Reply to objection 4: Since a tyrannical law is not in accord with reason, it is not a law absolutely speaking, but is instead a kind of perversion of law. And yet to the extent that it retains something of the character of law, it aims at the citizens’ being good. For it has nothing of the character of law except to the extent that (a) it is a dictate of someone who is in charge of the subjects and that (b) it intends that the subjects obey the law in the right way, i.e., that they be good—not absolutely speaking, but in relation to that regime.

Article 2

Are the acts of law correctly enumerated when one says that the acts of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish?

It seems that the acts of law are not correctly enumerated when one says that the acts of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish:

Objection 1: As the Jurist [Gratian] says [in *Decretum* 3], law consists in all of the general precepts. But to command is the same as to issue a precept. Therefore, the other three acts are superfluous.

Objection 2: As was explained above (a. 1), the effect of law is to lead its subjects to the good. But a counsel concerns a better good than a precept does. Therefore, law has more to do with giving counsel than with issuing precepts.

Objection 3: Just as a man is spurred on toward the good by punishments, so too he is spurred on toward the good by rewards. Therefore, just as punishing is counted as an effect of law, so rewarding should be counted as well.

Objection 4: As was explained above (a. 1), the lawmaker’s intention is to make men good. But one who obeys the law solely out of fear of punishment is not a good man; for as Augustine says, “Even if one does something *good* out of servile fear, i.e., the fear of punishment, he still has not done anything

well.” Therefore, to punish does not seem to be a property of law.

But contrary to this: In *Etymologia* 5 Isidore says, “Every law either *permits* something (e.g., that a brave man may seek a reward), or it *prohibits* something (e.g., that no one is permitted to seek marriage with a consecrated virgin), or it *punishes* something (e.g., someone who has committed murder shall be put to death).”

I respond: Just as a spoken proposition (*enunciatio*) is a dictate of reason in the mode of *asserting* (*enuntiandi*), so too a law is a dictate of reason in the mode of *issuing a precept* (*praecipiendi*).

Now it is proper to reason to go from one thing to another. Hence, in the case of the demonstrative sciences, reason induces assent to the conclusion by means of certain principles; in the same way, it induces assent to a precept of the law by means of something. Now as was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), the precepts of the law concern human acts, which the law directs, and there are three different kinds of human acts:

As was explained above (q. 18, a. 8), some acts, viz., the acts of the virtues, are *good by their genus* (*boni ex genere*), and the act of law that is posited with respect to such acts is *to command* or *to issue a precept*. For as *Ethics* 5 says, law commands all the acts of the virtues.

By contrast, some acts, such as the acts of the vices, are *evil by their genus* (*mali ex genere*), and it is characteristic of law *to forbid* these acts.

On the other hand, some acts are *indifferent by their genus* (*indifferentes ex genere*), and it is characteristic of law *to permit* these acts. In addition, all acts that have either just a little goodness or just a little badness can likewise be called indifferent.

Finally, it is through *fear of punishment* that the law induces obedience to itself, and in this regard *to punish* is counted as an effect of law.

Reply to objection 1: Just as ceasing to do evil has a certain type of goodness, so too a prohibition is a certain type of precept. Accordingly, if ‘precept’ is taken broadly, a law may in general be called a ‘precept’.

Reply to objection 2: To give counsel is not an act proper to law, but can also be the act of a private person who does not have the role of making law. Thus it is that in 1 Corinthians 7:12, when he is giving counsel on a certain matter, the Apostle says, “It is I speaking, and not the Lord.” This is why giving counsel is not posited among the effects of law.

Reply to objection 3: Once again, to reward can be the role of anyone, whereas to punish pertains only to a minister of the law, by whose authority the punishment is inflicted. And this is why only punishing, and not rewarding, is counted as an act of law.

Reply to objection 4: Given that someone begins to be accustomed to avoiding evil and doing good because of his fear of punishment, he is sometimes led to enjoy doing good and to do it of his own will. Accordingly, it is also by punishing that the law leads to men being good.

QUESTION 93

The Eternal Law

We next have to consider each type of law individually. We will consider, first, the eternal law (question 93); second, the natural law (question 94); third, human law (questions 95-97); fourth, the Old Law (questions 98-105); and, fifth, the New Law, i.e., the Law of the Gospel (questions 106-108). As for the law of the stimulant to sin (*lex fomitis*), enough was said above during the discussion of Original Sin (questions 81-83).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) What is the eternal law? (2) Is the eternal law known to everyone? (3) Does every law flow from the eternal law? (4) Are necessary things subject to the eternal law? (5) Are natural contingent things subject to the eternal law? (6) Are all human affairs subject to the eternal law?

Article 1

Is the eternal law the highest conception or plan existing in God?

It seems that the eternal law is not the highest conception or plan (*ratio summa*) existing in God:

Objection 1: The eternal law is a single law only. But there are many conceptions (*rationes*) in God's mind, since in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "God made individual things by means of conceptions that are proper to each of them." Therefore, the eternal law does not seem to be the same as a conception existing in God's mind.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), it is part of the nature of law that it be promulgated by a spoken word (*verbum*). But as was established in the first part (ST 1, q. 34, a. 1), 'Word' (*verbum*) is predicated of a person in God, whereas 'conception' (*ratio*) is predicated of the divine essence. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as God's conception.

Objection 3: In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, "It is clear that above our mind there is a law, which is called truth." But the law that exists above our mind is the eternal law. Therefore, the eternal law is truth. But the nature of truth is not the same as the nature of a conception. Therefore, the eternal law is not the same as the highest conception.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, "The eternal law is the highest conception, which must always be conformed to."

I respond: Just as a conception (*ratio*) of the things made through his craft exists beforehand in a craftsman's mind, so too in anyone who governs there must exist beforehand a conception of the ordering of the things to be done by those who are subject to the governor's rule. And just as the conception of the things to be made through a craft is called an *artistic conception* (*ars*) or *exemplar* (*exemplar*) of the artifacts, so too the conception had by one who governs the acts of his subjects takes on the character of *law*, given the presence of all the other elements we described above as belonging to the nature of law (q. 90).

Now as was established in the first part (ST 1, q. 14, a. 8), it is through His wisdom that God is the *creator* of the totality of things, and He is related to those things in the way a craftsman is related to his artifacts. As was likewise established in the first part (ST 1, q. 22, a. 2 and q. 103, a. 5), God is also the *governor* of all the acts and motions found in each creature. Hence, just as the divine wisdom's conception has the character of an *artistic conception* or *exemplar* because all things are created through it, so too the divine wisdom's conception has the character of *law* insofar as it moves all things to their appropriate ends. Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing other than the divine wisdom's conception insofar as it directs all acts and movements.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is speaking here about the ideal conceptions (*rationes ideales*) that relate to the proper natures of singular things, and so, as was established in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 15, a. 2), among these conceptions there is distinction and plurality corresponding to their diverse relations to the things.

However, as was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), law directs acts in relation to the common good. But things that are diverse in themselves are counted as one insofar as that they are ordered to something common. And this is why there is a single eternal law, which is the conception of this ordering.

Reply to objection 2: There are two things that can be considered with respect to any word, viz., (a) the word itself and (b) what is expressed by the word. For a spoken word is a certain sound emanating from a man's mouth, and this word expresses the things that are signified by human words. The same holds for a man's mental word (*de verbo hominis mentali*), which is none other than something which is conceived by the mind and by which a man mentally expresses the things he is thinking about.

In God, then, the Word, which is the conception of the Father's intellect, is predicated of a person, but, as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 15, this Word expresses each thing that is contained in the Father's knowledge—regardless of whether it has to do with the divine persons, the divine essence, or even the works of God. And among the other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is also expressed by this Word. Nor does it follow from this that 'eternal law' is predicated of a person in God. However, it is appropriated to the Son because of the consonance between a conception and a word (see *ST* 1, q. 39, a. 7-8).

Reply to objection 3: God's intellectual conception is related to things in a way different from the way in which the human intellect's conception is.

For human understanding is *measured by* the things, so that a man's conception is not true by virtue of itself, but is instead called 'true' by virtue of the fact that it fits (*consonat*) the things. For a belief (*opinio*) is true or false by virtue of the fact that the thing is or is not such-and-such.

By contrast, God's understanding is *the measure of* the things, since, as was explained in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 16, a. 1), each thing is true insofar as it is like (*imitatur*) God's understanding of it. And so God's understanding is true by virtue of itself, and thus His conception is truth itself.

Article 2

Is the eternal law known to everyone?

It seems that the eternal law is not known to everyone:

Objection 1: As the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 2:11, "So the things also that are of God, no man knows, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a certain conception existing in God's mind. Therefore, it is not known to anyone except God alone.

Objection 2: In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, "The eternal law is that by which it is fitting for all things to be very well ordered." But not everyone knows the way in which all things are very well ordered. Therefore, not everyone knows the eternal law.

Objection 3: In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, "The eternal law is something upon which men cannot pass judgment." But as *Ethics* 1 says, "Each one judges best the things that he knows." Therefore, the eternal law is not known to us.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, "Knowledge of the eternal law has been imprinted upon us."

I respond: There are two ways in which a thing can be known. First, it can be known in itself.

Second, it can be known in its effect, where some likeness of the thing is found; for instance, someone who does not see the sun in its substance knows it in what radiates from it (*in irradiatione*).

So, then, no one except the blessed in heaven, who see God through His essence, can know the eternal law as it is in itself. However, every rational creature knows the eternal law with respect to more or less of what radiates from it. For any cognition of the truth is a sort of radiation from and participation in the eternal law, which is unchangeable truth, as Augustine says in *De Vera Religione*. But everyone knows the truth in some sense, at least with respect to the common principles of the natural law. As for other matters, some participate to a greater degree and some to a lesser degree in the cognition of the truth and, accordingly, they know more or less of the eternal law.

Reply to objection 1: The “things that are of God” cannot be known by us in themselves, but they are nonetheless made manifest to us in their effects—this according to Romans 1:20 (“The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made.”)

Reply to objection 2: Even if everyone knew the eternal law to the limit of his capacity in the way explained above, no one would be able to comprehend it, since it cannot be made totally manifest through its effects. And so one who knows the eternal law in the way explained above need not know the entire order by which all things are very well ordered.

Reply to objection 3: There are two possible ways to understand what it is to pass judgment upon something.

In the first way, a cognitive power makes a judgment about its own proper object—this in accord with Job 12:11 (“Does not the ear judge words, and the palate of him who eats, the taste?”). And it is about this mode of judgment that the Philosopher says, “Each one judges best the things he knows,” viz., by judging whether what is proposed to him is true.

In the second way, through a certain kind of practical judgment someone higher judges, with respect to something lower, whether or not it ought to be such-and-such. This is the sense in which no one can pass judgment upon the eternal law.

Article 3

Does every law flow from the eternal law?

It seems that not every law flows from (*derivatur*) the eternal law:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 91, a. 6), there is a certain law of the stimulant to sin (*lex fomitis*). But this law does not flow from God’s law, i.e., the eternal law, since it involves the “prudence of the flesh,” about which the Apostle says in Romans 8:7 that “it is not subject to the law of God.” Therefore, not every law flows from the eternal law.

Objection 2: Nothing wicked can proceed from the eternal law, since, as has been explained (a. 2), “the eternal law is that by which it is fitting for all things to be very well ordered.” But some laws are wicked—this according to Isaiah 10:1 (“Woe to those who make wicked laws”). Therefore, not every law proceeds (*procedit*) from the eternal law.

Objection 3: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “Law written in order to rule the people correctly permits many things that are avenged through God’s providence.” But as has been explained (a. 1), the plan (*ratio*) of divine providence is the eternal law. Therefore, not even all the upright laws proceed from the eternal law.

But contrary to this: In Proverbs 8:15 God’s wisdom says, “By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.” But as has been explained (a. 1), the plan of God’s wisdom is the eternal law.

Therefore, all laws proceed from the eternal law.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1-2), ‘law’ implies a certain plan that directs acts to their end. Now in every case involving ordered movers, the power of a secondary mover flows from the power of the first mover, since a secondary mover moves only insofar as it is moved by the first mover. Hence, we see the same thing in the case of all those who govern as well, viz., that the plan of governance flows from the first governor to the secondary governors. For instance, the plan of things to be done in a city flows by way of command (*per praeceptum*) from the king to the lower administrators. In the case of artifacts, too, the plan for the acts involved in making the artifacts flows from the architect to the lower craftsmen who work by hand.

Therefore, since the eternal law is the plan of governance that exists in the highest governor, all the plans of governance found in the lower governors must flow from the eternal law. Now these plans of the lower governors consist in all the kinds of law besides eternal law. Hence, all laws flow from the eternal law to the extent that they participate in right reason. This is why Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, “There is nothing just or legitimate in temporal law except what men have drawn from the eternal law.”

Reply to objection 1: The stimulant to sin (*fomes*) has the character of law in man to the extent that it is a punishment that follows upon God’s justice, and on this score it clearly flows from the eternal law. However, as is clear from what was said above (q. 91, a. 6), to the extent that the stimulant inclines one toward sin, it is contrary to God’s law and does not have the character of law.

Reply to objection 2: Human law has the character of law to the extent that it is in accord with right reason and, so understood, it clearly flows from the eternal law.

However, to the extent that human law departs from reason, it is called ‘unjust law’ (*lex iniqua*) and has the character not of law but of a certain sort of violence. Yet to the extent that some likeness to law is preserved in this unjust law because it is ordained by the power of a lawmaker, in this respect it, too, flows from the eternal law. For as Romans 13:1 says, “All power is from the Lord God.”

Reply to objection 3: Human law is said to permit certain things not in the sense that it approves of them, but rather in the sense that it is incapable of directing them. However, there are many things directed by God’s law that cannot be directed by human law, since there are more things subject to a higher cause than to a lower cause. Hence, the very fact that human law does not intrude into matters that it cannot direct flows from the order of the eternal law. (It would be different if human law were to approve of things that the eternal law condemns.) Thus, it does not follow from this that human law does not flow from the eternal law; rather, all that follows is that human law does not perfectly measure up to the eternal law.

Article 4

Are necessary and eternal things subject to the eternal law?

It seems that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law:

Objection 1: Everything reasonable (*rationabile*) is subject to a plan (*subditur ratione*). But God’s will is reasonable, since it is just. Therefore, it is subject to a plan. But the eternal law is God’s plan. Therefore, God’s will is subject to the eternal law. But God’s will is something eternal. Therefore, even eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

Objection 2: Whatever is subject to the king is subject to the king’s law. But as 1 Corinthians 15:24 and 28 says, “the Son will be subject to God and the Father when He has handed over the

kingdom to Him.” Therefore, the Son, who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.

Objection 3: The eternal law is the plan of divine providence. But many necessary things, e.g., the permanence of incorporeal substances and of the celestial bodies, are subject to divine providence. Therefore, even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

But contrary to this: Things that are necessary are such that it is impossible for them to be otherwise, and so they do not need to be restrained. By contrast, as is clear from what was said above (q. 92, a. 2), law is imposed on men in order to restrain them from evil. Therefore, necessary things are not subject to law.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), the eternal law is the plan of divine governance. Therefore, whatever is subject to divine governance is likewise subject to the eternal law, and whatever is not subject to eternal governance is likewise not subject to the eternal law.

Now the distinction between these two sorts of things can be understood on the basis of what we are familiar with. For things that *can be done by men* are subject to human governance, whereas things that *belong to man’s nature*—e.g., that a man has a soul or hands or feet—are not subject to human governance. So, then, whatever exists in the things created by God—whether it be contingent or necessary—is subject to the eternal law, whereas whatever pertains to God’s own nature or essence is not subject to the eternal law, but is in reality the eternal law itself.

Reply to objection 1: We can speak of God’s will in two ways.

First, we can speak of the *will itself*, and if we are speaking in this way, then since God’s will is His very essence, it is not subject either to divine governance or to the eternal law; instead, it is just the same as the eternal law.

Second, we can speak of the divine will *in relation to what God wills concerning creatures*. The things He wills concerning creatures are subject to the eternal law insofar as a plan for them exists in God’s wisdom. It is in relation to these things that God’s will is called reasonable. On the other hand, in virtue of its very self, God’s will should instead be called the plan itself.

Reply to objection 2: The Son of God is not made by God, but is instead naturally generated by Him. And so He is not subject to divine providence or to the eternal law, but, as is clear from *De Vera Religione*, is rather Himself the eternal law through a certain appropriation (cf. *ST* 1, q. 39, a. 7-8). However, He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in accord with which the Father is also said to be greater than He is.

Reply to objection 3: We concede the third objection, since it has to do with necessary things that are created.

Reply to argument for the contrary: As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 5, certain necessary things have a cause of their necessity, and so they depend on another for the very fact that it is impossible for them to be otherwise. And this in itself is a certain kind of efficacious restraint. For things that are restrained are said to be restrained to the extent that they are unable to act differently from the way in which they are determined to act (*aliter facere quam de eis disponatur*).

Article 5

Are natural contingent things subject to the eternal law?

It seems that natural contingent things are not subject to the eternal law:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), promulgation is part of the nature of law. But promulgation can be made only to rational creatures, to whom a pronouncement can be made. Therefore,

only rational creatures are subject to the eternal law. Therefore, natural contingent things are not subject to it.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 1 says, “Things that obey reason somehow participate in reason.” But as was explained above (a. 1), the eternal law is the highest conception or plan. Therefore, since natural contingent things do not in any way participate in reason but are instead completely non-rational (*penitus irrationabilia*), it seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.

Objection 3: The eternal law is absolutely efficacious. But defects occur among natural contingent things. Therefore, they are not subject to the eternal law.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 8:29 says, “When He set the border around the sea and gave a law to the waters, lest they pass their limits”

I respond: What we say about the eternal law, i.e., the law of God, has to differ from what we say about the law of man. For the law of man reaches only the rational creatures who are subject to man. The reason for this is that law directs the acts of those who are subject to someone’s governance, and so no one, properly speaking, imposes a law on his own acts. Now whatever is done by way of using the non-rational things that are subject to man is done through the act of man himself moving things of this sort; for as was explained above (q. 1, a. 2), these non-rational creatures do not move themselves (*non agunt seipsas*) but are instead acted upon by others. And so man cannot impose law on non-rational creatures, no matter how much they are subject to him. By contrast, he can impose law on the rational beings who are subject to him, because by his command or by some other pronouncement he imprints upon their mind a rule that serves as a principle of acting.

Now just as, by means of a pronouncement, one man imprints (*imprimit*) an interior principle of acting on another man who is subject to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature principles with respect to their proper acts. It is in this sense that God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Psalm 148:6 (“He has commanded and His command will not pass away”). And this is also the sense in which all the movements and acts of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law.

Hence, non-rational creatures are subject to the eternal law in a way different from rational creatures, viz., insofar as they are moved by divine providence, and not, as with rational creatures, through an understanding of God’s precept.

Reply to objection 1: The imprinting of an active intrinsic principle plays the same role with respect to natural things that the promulgation of the law plays with respect to men. For as has been explained, a principle that directs human acts is imprinted on men through the promulgation of law.

Reply to objection 2: Non-rational creatures do not participate in or obey *human* reason, but they do participate in *divine* reason in the mode of obedience. For the power of God’s plan extends to more things than does the power of human reason. And just as the members of the human body are moved at the command of reason and yet do not participate in reason (for they do not have any apprehension related to reason), so also non-rational creatures are moved by God and yet are not thereby rational.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the defects that occur in natural things lie outside the order of particular causes, they do not lie outside the order of universal causes or, especially, outside the order of the first cause, viz., God, whose providence nothing can undermine. This was explained in the first part (ST 1, q. 22, a. 2). And since, as has been explained (a. 1), the eternal law is the plan of divine providence, it follows that the defects in natural things are subject to the eternal law.

Article 6

Are all human affairs subject to the eternal law?

It seems that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law:

Objection 1: In Galatians 5:18 the Apostle says, “If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law.” But according to Romans 8:14 (“Those who are acted on by the Spirit of God are the sons of God”), the just, who are sons of God by adoption, are acted on by the Spirit of God. Therefore, not all men are under the eternal law.

Objection 2: In Romans 8:7 the Apostle says, “Prudence of the flesh is the enemy of God, since it is not subject to the law of God.” But there are many men in whom prudence of the flesh is dominant. Therefore, not all men are subject to the eternal law.

Objection 3: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “It is the eternal law by which the wicked merit unhappiness and the good merit the life of beatitude.” But men who are either already beatified or already damned are not in a position to merit. Therefore, they are not subject to the eternal law.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “Nothing in any way evades the laws of the most high creator and governor by whom the peace of the universe is administered.”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (a. 5), there are two ways for a thing to be subject to the eternal law: first, insofar as eternal law is participated in through the mode of cognition; and second, through the mode of acting and being acted upon, insofar as eternal law is participated in as a moving principle. As has been explained (a. 5), it is in this second way that non-rational creatures are subject to the eternal law.

However, since rational nature, in addition to what it shares in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself because it is rational, it is subject to the eternal law in both ways. For as was explained above (a. 2), in one way or another a rational nature has knowledge of the eternal law and, in addition, each rational creature has within itself a natural inclination toward what is consonant with the eternal law. For as *Ethics* 2 says, “We are naturally prone toward having the virtues.”

Yet both these modes are imperfect and in some sense corrupted in bad people, in whom (a) the natural inclination toward virtue is perverted by vice (*per habitum vitiosum*) and (b) the natural cognition of the good is darkened by passions and sinful habits. By contrast, in good people both of the modes are more perfect, since (a) in addition to the natural cognition of the good, they also have the cognition provided by faith and wisdom, and (b) in addition to the natural inclination toward the good, they also have the interior movement of grace and virtue.

So, then, good people are perfectly subject to the eternal law to the extent that they always act in accord with it. By contrast, bad people are, though subject to the eternal law, imperfectly subject to it in their actions, since they have imperfect knowledge and are imperfectly inclined toward the good; however, what is lacking in their actions is compensated for by how they are acted upon. For they suffer what the eternal law dictates for them to the degree that they fail to do what is consonant with the eternal law. Hence in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “I believe that the just act under the eternal law.” And in *De Catechizandis Rudibus* he says, “By means of His most fitting laws, God knew how to adorn the lower regions of His creation with the merited unhappiness of the souls who would desert Him.”

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible ways to interpret this passage from the Apostle.

On the first interpretation, by ‘is under the law’ he means someone who unwillingly submits to the obligation imposed by the law as if it were a burden. Hence, a Gloss on the same passage says, “Someone who is ‘under the law’ abstains from evil deeds not because of his love for justice, but rather because of his fear of the punishment that the law threatens.” Spiritual men are not under the law in this

sense, since through their charity, which the Holy Spirit infuses into their hearts, they willingly fulfill the demands of the law.

On the other interpretation, the works of a man who is acted upon by the Holy Spirit are said to be the works of the Holy Spirit more than the works of the man himself. Hence, since, as was said above (a. 5), neither the Holy Spirit nor the Son is under the law, it follows that works of this sort, insofar as they belong to the Holy Spirit, are not under the law. And this is supported by what the Apostle says at 2 Corinthians 3:17 (“Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom”).

Reply to objection 2: Prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to God’s law as far as *acting* is concerned, since it inclines one to actions that are contrary to God’s law. However, it is subject to God’s law as far as *being acted upon* is concerned, since it merits the suffering of punishment in accord with the law of divine justice. Still, there is no man in whom prudence of the flesh dominates to such an extent that the whole good of his nature is corrupted. And so there remains in such a man an inclination to fulfill the demands of the eternal law. For it was established above (q. 85, a. 2) that sin does not destroy the whole good of nature.

Reply to objection 3: An entity is preserved in its end through the same thing through which it is moved toward its end. For instance, a heavy body is at rest in a lower place through its heaviness (*gravitas*), which is also that through which it is moved to that very place.

Accordingly, one should say that just as it is in accord with the eternal law that some men merit beatitude and some merit unhappiness, so it is through that same law that they are preserved in beatitude or in unhappiness. And in this sense both the blessed and the damned are subject to the eternal law.

QUESTION 94

The Natural Law

We next have to consider the natural law. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) What is the natural law? (2) Which precepts belong to the natural law? (3) Are all the acts of the virtues part of the natural law? (4) Is there a single natural law for everyone? (5) Is the natural law changeable? (6) Can the natural law be erased from the human mind (*possit a mente hominis deleri*)?

Article 1

Is the natural law a habit?

It seems that the natural law is a habit:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 2, “There are three sorts of things in the soul: powers, habits, and passions.” But as is clear from going through each of these one by one, the natural law is not one of the powers of the soul or one of the passions. Therefore, the natural law is a habit.

Objection 2: Basil says, “Conscience (*conscientia*) or synderesis (*synderesis*) is our intellect’s law”—and by this he cannot mean anything other than the natural law. But as was established in the first part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 12), synderesis is a certain habit. Therefore, the natural law is a habit.

Objection 3: As will be shown below (a. 6), the natural law remains within a man always. But a man’s reason, which is what the law has to do with, is not always actually thinking about the natural law. Therefore, the natural law is a habit and not an act.

But contrary to this: In *De Bono Coniugali* Augustine says, “A habit is that by means of which something is done when there is need.” But the natural law is not like this, since it exists even in children and in the damned, who cannot act through it. Therefore, the natural law is not a habit.

I respond: There are two senses in which something can be called a habit.

In the first sense, something is called a habit *properly and essentially*, and in this sense the natural law is not a habit. For it was explained above (q. 90, a. 1) that the natural law is something constituted by reason, in the same way that a proposition is a work of reason. But *what* someone does or makes is not the same as *that by means of which* he does it or makes it. For instance, it is by means of the habit of grammar that someone makes a coherent utterance. Therefore, since a habit is *that by means of which* one acts, no sort of law can be a habit properly and essentially.

In the second sense, *that which is had* by means of a habit can itself be called the habit—in the way that the Faith is that which is held by means of faith. And since the precepts of the natural law are such that even though at times they are actually being considered by reason, at other times they exist only habitually in reason, one can say in this sense that the natural law is a habit. In the same way, the indemonstrable principles in speculative matters are not the habit itself with respect to those principles; rather, they are principles with respect to which there is a habit.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage the Philosopher means to be looking for the genus of *virtue*, and since it is clear that a virtue is a principle of acts, he proposes only the sorts of things that serve as the principles of human acts, viz., powers, habits, and passions. However, besides these three, there are other sorts of things that exist in the soul. For instance, certain kinds of acts exist in the soul, e.g., an act of willing exists in one who wills; (b) again, things that are known exist in the one who knows them; and (c) the natural properties of the soul exist in the soul, e.g., immortality and others of this sort.

Reply to objection 2: Synderesis is called our intellect’s law because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are first principles of human works.

Reply to objection 3: The conclusion of this argument is that the natural law is had in a habitual

manner. This we concede.

Reply to argument for the contrary: By the very fact that something exists habitually in a man, it follows that he is sometimes unable to make use of it because of an impediment. For instance, a man who is sleeping cannot make use of his habit of knowing conclusions (*habitus scientiae*). In the same way, because he is not of the right age, a young child cannot make use of the habit of grasping first principles (*intellectus*); nor, again, can he make use of the natural law, which exists in him habitually.

Article 2

Does the natural law contain many precepts or just one precept?

It seems that the natural law contains just one precept and not many precepts:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 92, a. 2), law is contained under the genus *precept*. Therefore, if the natural law contained many precepts, it would follow that there are likewise many natural laws.

Objection 2: The natural law follows upon the nature of man. But human nature is one taken as a whole, even though it has multiple parts. Therefore, either (a) there is just one precept of the law of nature because of the oneness of the whole or (b) there are many precepts because of the multiplicity of the parts of human nature, in which case even what stems from the inclination of the concupiscible [part of the soul] will belong to the natural law.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), law is something that belongs to reason. But there is just a single faculty of reason in a man. Therefore, the natural law contains just one precept.

But contrary to this: The precepts of the natural law play the same role in a man with respect to matters of action that first principles play with respect to matters of demonstration. But there are many indemonstrable first principles. Therefore, there are likewise many precepts of the natural law.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), the precepts of the law of nature bear the same relation to practical reason that the first principles of demonstration bear to speculative reason. For in both cases they are principles that are known *per se* (*per se nota*).

Now there are two senses in which something is said to be known *per se*: (a) in its own right (*secundum se*) and (b) as regards us (*quoad nos*). Every proposition (*propositio*) said to be known *per se* in its own right is such that its predicate is part of the notion of its subject (*de ratione subiecti*); and yet it happens that such a proposition will not be known *per se* to someone who does not know the definition of the subject. For instance, the proposition ‘A man is rational’ is known *per se* given its own nature, since anyone who expresses *man* expresses *rational*; and yet this proposition is not known *per se* to someone who does not know the real definition (*quid sit*) of man. This is why, as Boethius points out in *De Hebdomadibus*, certain fundamental truths (*dignitates*) and propositions (*propositiones*) are known *per se* in general to everyone—and these are the ones whose terms are known to everyone, e.g., ‘Every whole is greater than its part’ and ‘Things equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other’—whereas other propositions are known *per se* only to the wise, who understand what the terms of the proposition signify. For instance, to someone who understands that an angel is not a body it is known *per se* that an angel does not exist circumscriptively in a place; however, this is not obvious to unsophisticated people, who do not grasp the point in question.

Now there is a certain ordering among those things that fall within everyone’s apprehension. The first thing to fall within apprehension is *being*, a grasp of which is included in everything that anyone apprehends. So the first indemonstrable principle, founded upon the notions *being* and *non-being*, is

‘One is not to affirm and deny [the same thing] at the same time’. And, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, all the other principles are founded upon this one.

Now just as *being* is the first thing to fall within apprehension absolutely speaking, so *good* is the first thing to fall within the apprehension of practical reason, which is ordered toward action. For every agent acts for the sake of an end, which has the character of a good. And so the first principle in practical reasoning is what is founded on the notion *good*, which is the notion (*quod fundatur supra rationem boni quae est*): *The good is what all things desire*. Therefore, the first precept of law is that good ought to be done and pursued and that evil ought to be avoided. And all the other precepts of the law of nature are founded upon this principle—so that, namely, all the things to be done or avoided that practical reason naturally apprehends as human goods are such that they belong to the precepts of the law of nature. For since what is good has the character of an end and what is bad has the character of the contrary of an end, it follows that all the things man has a natural inclination toward are such that (a) reason naturally apprehends them as goods and thus as things that ought to be pursued by action and (b) reason naturally apprehends their contraries as evils and thus things that ought to be avoided.

Therefore, there is an ordering of the precepts of the natural law that corresponds to the ordering of the natural inclinations.

First, man has an inclination toward the good with respect to the nature he shares in common with all substances, viz., insofar as every substance strives for the conservation of its own *esse* in accord with its own nature. And what belongs to the natural law in light of this inclination is everything through which man’s life is conserved or through which what is contrary to the preservation of his life is thwarted.

Second, man has an inclination toward certain more specific [goods] with respect to the nature that he shares in common with the other animals. Accordingly, those things are said to belong to the natural law which nature teaches all the animals, i.e., the union of male and female, the education of offspring, etc.

Third, man has an inclination toward the good with respect to the rational nature that is proper to him; for instance, man has a natural inclination toward knowing the truth about God and toward living in society. Accordingly, those things that are related to this sort of inclination belong to the natural law, e.g., that a man avoid ignorance, that he not offend the others with whom he has to live in community, and other such things related to this inclination.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as all these precepts of the law of nature are traced back to a single first principle, they have the character of a single natural law.

Reply to objection 2: All the inclinations of any of the parts of human nature, e.g., the concupiscible part and the irascible part, are relevant to the natural law insofar as they are regulated by reason, and, as has been explained, they are traced back to a single first precept. Accordingly, even though the precepts of the law of nature are many in themselves, they nonetheless share a single root.

Reply to objection 3: Even if reason is in itself one, it nonetheless orders all the things relating to men. Accordingly, the law of reason contains everything that can be regulated by reason.

Article 3

Do all the acts of the virtues belong to the law of nature?

It seems that not all the acts of the virtues belong to the law of nature:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), it is part of the notion of law that it is ordered toward the common good. But as is especially clear in the case of acts of temperance, some acts of the

virtues are ordered toward an individual's private good. Therefore, not all the acts of the virtues fall under the natural law.

Objection 2: All sins are opposed to some virtuous act or other. Therefore, if all the acts of the virtues belonged to the law of nature, then, as a result, all sins would seem to be contrary to nature. But this is said specifically [only] of certain sins.

Objection 3: All share in those things that are in accord with nature. But it is not the case that all share in acts of the virtues, since something that is virtuous for one person is vicious for another. Therefore, not all the acts of the virtues belong to the law of nature.

But contrary to this: In [*De Fide Orthodoxa*] 3 Damascene says, "The virtues are natural." Therefore, virtuous acts likewise fall under the law of nature.

I respond: We can speak of virtuous acts in two ways: (a) first, insofar as they are virtuous and (b) second, insofar as they are acts of certain kinds considered in their own proper species.

Thus, if we are speaking of the acts of the virtues insofar as they are virtuous, then in this sense all the acts of the virtues belong to the law of nature. For it was explained above (a. 2) that everything toward which man is inclined in accord with his nature belongs to the law of nature. But every entity is naturally inclined toward action that is appropriate for it in light of its form, in the way that fire is naturally inclined to give warmth. Hence, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, every man has a natural inclination toward acting in accord with reason—which is just to act in accord with virtue. Hence, in this sense all the acts of the virtues belong to the natural law, since the faculty of reason proper to each man dictates by nature that he act virtuously.

By contrast, if we are speaking of virtuous acts in their own right, i.e., insofar as they are considered in their own proper species, then in this sense not all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For many things done in accord with virtue are such that nature does not incline one toward them in the primary sense; rather, it is through reasoned inquiry that men have discovered these things to be, as it were, advantageous to living well.

Reply to objection 1: Temperance has to do with sensory desires for food and drink and sexual pleasure, all of which are ordered toward the common good of nature, just as other matters pertaining to the law are likewise ordered toward the common moral good.

Reply to objection 2: By 'nature of man' one can mean either (a) those things that are proper to man, and in this sense all sins, since they are contrary to reason, are likewise contrary to nature, as is clear from Damascene [in *De Fide Orthodoxa*] 2; or (b) those things that are common to man and the other animals, and in this sense certain specific sins are said to be contrary to nature. For instance, sexual intercourse between males is contrary to the sexual union between male and female, which is natural to all animals, and is in a special sense called a vice contrary to nature.

Reply to objection 3: This argument has to do with acts considered in their own right. For it happens in this way that, because of the diverse conditions men find themselves in, some acts are virtuous for some people, in the sense of being proportioned to and suitable for them, but are nonetheless vicious for others in the sense of not being proportioned to them.

Article 4

Is there a single law of nature for everyone?

It seems that it is not the case that there is a single law of nature for everyone:

Objection 1: *Decretum*, dist. 1, says, "Natural law (*ius naturale*) includes what is contained in the

Law and what is contained in the Gospel.” But this is not common to everyone, since as Romans 10:16 says, “Not everyone is obedient to the Gospel.” Therefore, there is not a single natural law for everyone.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 5 says, “Things that are in accord with the law are called just.” But the same book says that nothing is just for everyone to such an extent that it is not different for some. Therefore, it is likewise not the case that the natural law is the same for everyone.

Objection 3: As was explained above (a. 2-3), the law of nature has to do with what man is inclined toward in accord with his nature. But different men are naturally inclined toward different things; for instance, some are inclined toward a desire for pleasures, others toward a desire for honors, and others toward other things. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a single natural law for everyone.

But contrary to this: In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “The natural law (*ius naturale*) is common to all nations.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2-3), those things to which man is naturally inclined belong to the law of nature—and, among other things, it is proper to man that he be inclined to act in accord with reason.

Now as is clear from *Physics* 1, it belongs to reason to proceed from what is universal (*ex communibus*) to what is particular (*ad propria*). However, speculative reason and practical reason behave differently on this score. For since speculative reason deals principally with necessary things, which are such that it is impossible for them to be otherwise, truth is found without exception (*absque aliquo defectu*) in the particular conclusions in just the way it is found in the universal principles. By contrast, practical reason deals with contingent things, which include human actions, and so even if there is some sort of necessity in the universal principles, nonetheless, the further down one descends to particulars, the more exceptions there are. So, then, in speculative matters there is the same truth for everyone both in the principles and in the conclusions, even though the truth is known to everyone only in the principles, which are called common conceptions (*communes conceptiones*), and not in the conclusions. By contrast, in practical matters, there is the same practical truth or correctness (*rectitudo*) for everyone only with respect to the universal principles and not with respect to the particulars. Further, in the case of those for whom there is the same correctness in the particulars, it is not equally well known to all of them.

So, then, it is clear that *with respect to the universal principles of either speculative reason or practical reason*, there is the same truth or correctness for everyone and it is equally well known to everyone.

Again, *with respect to the particular conclusions of speculative reason*, there is the same truth for everyone, though it is not equally known to all of them. For instance, it is true for everyone that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but this is not known to everyone.

However, *with respect to the particular conclusions of practical reason*, there is not the same truth, i.e., correctness, for everyone, and even in the case of those for whom it is the same, it is not equally well known to everyone. For instance, it is right and true for everyone that one ought to act in accord with reason, and from this principle it follows as a sort of particular conclusion that what has been entrusted to one for safe-keeping ought to be returned. To be sure, this is true in the greater number of cases (*ut in pluribus*). Yet, in a given case, to return what has been entrusted to you may be injurious and thus unreasonable (*irrationale*)—for instance, if someone were seeking to harm your country. And the further down one descends to particulars, the more often [the original rule] fails—as, for instance, when someone says that entrusted things ought to be returned with such-and-such precautions or in such-and-such a manner. For to the extent that more and more particular conditions are added, there are more ways in which [the original rule] can fail and thus be incorrect about returning or not returning what has been entrusted.

Therefore, one should claim that with respect to its first universal principles, the law of nature is the same for everyone both with respect to correctness and with respect to knowledge. On the other hand, with respect to various particular [rules], which are, as it were, the conclusions of those universal principles, the law of nature is the same for everyone in the greater number of cases (*ut in pluribus*) both with respect to correctness and with respect to knowledge, and yet there can be exceptions in a fewer number of cases (*ut in paucioribus*) both (a) with respect to *correctness*, and this because of certain impediments (just as the generable and corruptible natures are defective in a fewer number of cases because of impediments), and also (b) with respect to *knowledge*, and this because the faculty of reason has been perverted in some people by passion or by bad habits or by a bad natural condition. For instance, as Julius Caesar reports in *De Bello Gallico*, at one time among the Germans theft was not considered bad, even though it is clearly contrary to the law of nature.

Reply to objection 1: This passage should not be understood to mean that all the things contained in the Law and the Gospel belong to the law of nature. For many things set forth in the Law and the Gospel go beyond nature. Rather, the passage means that what belongs to the law of nature is found more fully in the Law and the Gospel.

This is why, after Gratian had claimed that the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel, he immediately added, by way of example, "... by which everyone is commanded to do to another what he wishes to be done to himself."

Reply to objection 2: This passage from the Philosopher should be understood to be talking about rules that are naturally just not in the manner of universal principles, but rather in the manner of conclusions stemming from those principles. Such conclusions are correct in the greater number of cases and fail in a fewer number of cases (*quae ut in pluribus rectitudinem habent et ut in paucioribus deficiunt*).

Reply to objection 3: Just as man's reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers should be ordered in accord with reason. Hence, it is universally right for everyone that all the inclinations of men should be directed in accord with reason.

Article 5

Can the law of nature be changed?

It seems that the law of nature can be changed:

Objection 1: A Gloss on Ecclesiasticus 17:9 ("He gave them instructions, and the law of life") says, "He wanted the 'law of the letter' to be written in order to correct the natural law." But what is corrected is changed. Therefore, the natural law can be changed.

Objection 2: The killing of the innocent is contrary to the natural law, as are adultery and theft as well. But these have been changed by God, viz., (a) when God commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, according to Genesis 22:2; (b) when He commanded the Jews to steal the vases they had borrowed from the Egyptians, according to Exodus 12:35; and (c) when He commanded Hosea to take an adulterer as his wife, according to Hosea 1:2. Therefore, the natural law can be changed.

Objection 3: In *Etymologia* Isidore says, "The communal possession of all things and equal liberty belong to natural law." But we see that these have been changed through human laws. Therefore, it seems that the natural law is changeable.

But contrary to this: *Decretum*, dist. 5, says, "The natural law dates from the very beginnings of the rational creature. Neither does it change over time, but remains immutable."

I respond: There are two ways to understand what it is for the natural law to be changed.

First, it is changed by something's being added to it. In this sense nothing prevents the natural law from being changed. For many things useful to human life have been added to the natural law, both by the divine law and also by human laws.

Second, the natural law might be thought of as being changed by way of subtraction—so that, namely, something that was previously in accord with the natural law ceases to belong to the natural law. Given this sense of change, the law of nature is altogether unchangeable with respect to its first principles. On the other hand, with respect to its secondary precepts—which we have claimed to be, as it were, particular conclusions in the neighborhood of the first principles (*proprias conclusiones propinquas primis principiis*)—the natural law is not changed in such a way as to prevent the natural law from consistently being correct in the greater number of the particular cases (*quin ut in pluribus rectum sit semper quod lex naturalis habet*). However, as was explained above (a. 4), in a fewer number of cases it can be changed in some particular because of special causes that obstruct the observance of the secondary precepts.

Reply to objection 1: The written law is said to have been given in order to correct the law of nature either because (a) what the natural law lacks was supplied by the written law, or because (b) the law of nature had in certain respects been corrupted in the hearts of some people to such an extent that they took what was naturally bad to be good—and this sort of corruption required correction.

Reply to objection 2: Everyone in general, whether innocent or guilty, dies a natural death, and according to 1 Kings 2:6 (“The Lord gives death and gives life”), natural death is imposed by God’s power because of Original Sin. And so by God’s command death can be inflicted without any injustice on any man, guilty or innocent.

Similarly, adultery is sexual intercourse with someone else’s wife, where it is by a divinely given law that she is sworn to that other man. Hence, for someone to be intimate with any woman by God’s command is neither adultery nor fornication.

The same holds for theft, which is the taking of what belongs to another. For whatever someone takes at the command of God, who is the owner (*dominus*) of the universe, is such that he is not taking it against the owner’s will—which is what theft is.

And not only is it the case that whatever is commanded by God in human affairs is by that very fact just, but also, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 105, a. 6), whatever is done by God among natural things is in some sense natural.

Reply to objection 3: There are two ways in which something is said to belong to the natural law (*esse de iure naturali*).

First, something is said to belong to the natural law because nature inclines one toward it, e.g., that one should not harm another.

Second, something is said to belong to the natural law because nature has not induced the contrary. For instance, we could say that it belongs to the natural law that man is unclothed, since nature does not give him clothes, but instead human art invented them.

It is in the second sense that a communal possession of all goods and equal liberty for all are said to belong to the natural law—since, namely, servitude and the distinctions among possessions are induced not by nature but by men’s reason because of their usefulness to human life. And so on this score the law of nature has not been changed except by addition.

Article 6

Can the natural law be wiped out of a man's heart?

It seems that the natural law can be wiped out of a man's heart (*possit aboleri a corde hominis*):

Objection 1: A Gloss on Romans 2:14 ("When the Gentiles, who do not have the Law, etc.") says, "The law of justice, which sin had erased, is written in the inner man who is made new through grace." But the law of justice is the same as the law of nature. Therefore, the law of nature can be erased (*potest deleri*).

Objection 2: The law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is erased through sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the law of nature can be erased.

Objection 3: What is established by the law is proposed as being just. But there are many things established by men contrary to the law of nature. Therefore, the law of nature can be wiped out of the hearts of men.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 2 Augustine says, "Your law was written in the hearts of men, and no sort of wickedness erases it." But the law written in the hearts of men is the natural law. Therefore, the natural law cannot be erased.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 4-5), the natural law contains in the first place certain very general precepts that are known to everyone, but it also contains certain secondary, and more particular, precepts that are like conclusions lying in the neighborhood of the principles.

Thus, as far as the universal principles are concerned, the natural law cannot in any way be erased entirely from the hearts of men. However, it is erased with respect to particular actions insofar as reason is impeded from applying a universal principle to a particular action because of sensual desire or some other passion, as was explained above (q. 77, a. 2).

However, as far as the other, i.e., secondary, precepts are concerned, the natural law can be erased from the hearts of men, either (a) because of bad arguments, in the same way that errors occur in speculative matters with respect to necessary conclusions, or (b) because of depraved customs and corrupt habits—in the way that, as the Apostle points out in Romans 1:24ff., theft or even vices contrary to nature are not thought of as sins by some people.

Reply to objection 1: Sin erases the law of nature in particular cases, but not in general, except perhaps with respect to the secondary precepts of the law of nature in the way that has been explained.

Reply to objection 2: Even if grace is more efficacious than nature, nature nonetheless has more to do with man's essence (*essentialior est homini*) and is thus more permanent.

Reply to objection 3: This argument has to do with the secondary precepts of the law of nature. Some lawmakers have made statutes opposed to these precepts, and such statutes are wicked.

QUESTION 95

Human Law

We next have to consider human law: first, human law in itself (question 95); second, its force (question 96); and, third, its mutability (question 97).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is human law useful? (2) What are its origins? (3) What are the characteristics of human law? (4) How is human law divided?

Article 1

Was it useful for laws to be made by men?

It seems not to have been useful for laws to be made by men:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 92, a. 1), the intention behind every law is that men should become good through it. But men are better led toward the good willingly through admonitions than by being coerced through laws. Therefore, it was unnecessary to make laws.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, men have recourse to a judge as one who embodies ‘living justice’ (*justum animatum*). But living justice is better than the non-living justice contained in laws. Therefore, it would have been better to entrust the administration of justice to the decisions of judges rather than to issue laws over and beyond this.

Objection 3: As is clear from what was said above (q. 90, a. 1-2), every law directs human acts. But since human acts comprise individual cases that are infinite in number, not everything that is relevant to directing human acts can be adequately taken into account except by some wise man who investigates the individual cases. Therefore, it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the decisions of wise men rather than by any law that might be made. Therefore, it was unnecessary to make human laws.

But contrary to this: In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “Laws have been made in order that human boldness might be held in check by fear of them, and in order that the innocent might be safe among the wicked, and in order that the ability of the wicked themselves to do harm might be curbed by their fear of punishment.” But these things are especially necessary for the human race. Therefore, it was necessary to make human laws.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 63, a. 1 and q. 94, a. 3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue. It is through discipline, however, that he arrives at the *perfection* of virtue—just as we likewise see that it is man’s industriousness that helps him acquire his necessities, e.g., food and clothing, with respect to which nature gives him certain initial resources, viz., his faculty of reason and his hands, but not full satisfaction—unlike the other animals, to whom nature has given adequate food and outer protection. But it is not easy for a man to be self-sufficient with respect to the discipline required for virtue. For perfecting a virtue is mainly a matter of restraining a man from inappropriate pleasures of the sort to which men are especially drawn—and, above all, young people, with whom discipline is more effective. And so men have to receive from others the sort of training through which virtue is acquired.

Now, to be sure, paternal discipline, which makes use of admonitions, is sufficient for those young people who are inclined toward acts of virtue by a good natural temperament, or by upbringing (*consuetudo*), or, better, by a gift of God. However, because there are some who are impudent and prone to the vices and who cannot be easily moved by words, it was necessary to restrain them from evil through force and fear, so that (a) ceasing to do evil, they might at least leave others to a peaceful life, and so that (b) in the end they might be led by this sort of habituation to the point of doing willingly what

they were previously doing out of fear and so becoming virtuous.

Now the sort of discipline in question, which coerces by the fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Hence, it was for the sake of virtue and of peace among men that laws had to be established. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, “Just as man, if he is perfected in virtue, is the best of the animals, so, too, if he is cut off from the law and from justice, he is the worst of all animals.” For unlike the other animals, man has the weapons of reason to satisfy his lustful desires and his taste for savage violence.

Reply to objection 1: Well-disposed men are best led to virtue by willingly heeded admonitions rather than by coercion, but ill-disposed men are not led to virtue unless they are coerced.

Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “It is better for all things to be regulated by law than left to the decision of judges.” There are three reasons for this:

First, a few wise men—which is all it takes to make good laws—are easier to find than a large number of wise men—which is what it would take to judge cases correctly one by one.

Second, lawmakers spend a long time considering what should be imposed by law, whereas judgments about individual cases are made quickly as the cases arise. Moreover, a man can more easily see what is right if he considers many instances than if he considers just a single instance.

Third, lawmakers make judgments that apply to all cases (*in universali*) and are future-oriented, whereas the men who render judgments are judging about present matters, concerning which they are affected by love or hate or some kind of excessive desire, and in this way their judgments become perverted.

Therefore, since there are not many cases of a judge’s ‘living justice’, and since such justice can be skewed (*est flexibile*), it was necessary for the law to determine which judgments should be made in as many cases as possible and to leave very few cases to the decisions of men.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in the same place, certain particular matters that cannot be included in a law—e.g., “those concerning what has or has not been done” and other things of this sort—“must be entrusted to judges.”

Article 2

Does every humanly made law stem from the natural law?

It seems that not every humanly made law stems from the natural law (*a lege naturali derivetur*):

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “What is legally just is such that at the beginning it did not matter whether it was done this way or some other way.” But in things that arise from the natural law it does matter whether they are done this way or some other way. Therefore, not everything established by human laws stems from the law of nature.

Objection 2: As is clear both from Isidore in *Etymologia* and from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, positive law (*ius positivum*) is opposed to natural law (*ius naturale*). But as was explained above (q. 94, a. 4), what stems in the manner of a conclusion from the principles of the law of nature belongs to the law of nature. Therefore, what belongs to human law does not stem from the law of nature.

Objection 3: The law of nature is the same for everyone; for the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, “What is naturally just is such that it has the same force everywhere.” Therefore, if human laws stemmed from the natural law, it would follow that these human laws are likewise the same for everyone. But this is clearly false.

Objection 4: A reason can be given for things that stem from the natural law. But as the Legal Expert points out, it is not the case that a reason can be given for everything that those in charge

(*maiores*) have established as law. Therefore, not every human law stems from the natural law.

But contrary to this: In his *Rhetorica* Tully says, “Fear and reverence sanctioned both what had come from nature and what had been approved by custom.”

I respond: As Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1, “A law that is not just does not seem to be a law at all.” Hence, something has the force of law to the extent that it shares in justice.

Now in human affairs something is called just by virtue of its being right (*rectum*) according to the rule of reason. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 91, a. 2), the first rule of reason is the law of nature. Hence, every humanly made law has the character of law to the extent that it stems from the law of nature. On the other hand, if a humanly made law conflicts with the natural law, then it is no longer a law, but a corruption of law.

Note, however, that there are two possible modes in which things can stem from (*derivari*) the natural law: first, as *conclusions* from principles, and, second, (b) as *specifications* (*determinationes*) of what is general. The first mode is similar to the way in which demonstrative conclusions are produced from principles in the sciences. By contrast, in the second mode there is a similarity to the way in which general forms are narrowed down to something more specific in the arts—for instance, a craftsman must narrow down the general form *house* to this or that specific shape for a house.

Thus, some things stem from the universal principles of the law of nature in the manner of a *conclusion*; for instance, *One should not kill* can be derived as a conclusion from *One should not do evil to anyone*. On the other hand, some things are derived in the manner of a *specification*; for instance, the law of nature says *Let him who does evil be punished*, but it is a specification of the law of nature that an evildoer should be punished by *this specific* punishment.

Thus, both sorts of things are found posited in human law. However, what stems from the natural law in the first mode is not contained in human law in such a way that it is posited by that law alone; rather, it also has some of its force from the natural law. By contrast, what stems from the natural law in the second mode has its force from human law alone.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage the Philosopher is talking about what is posited by the law through a determination or specification of the precepts of the law of nature.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for the case of those things that stem from the law of nature as conclusions.

Reply to objection 3: Because of the great variety in human affairs, the general principles of the law of nature cannot be applied in the same way to everyone. This is the source of the diversity of positive law for different people.

Reply to objection 4: This passage from the Legal Expert should be understood as applying to what is introduced by those in charge concerning particular specifications of the natural law. The judgment of men who are experienced and prudent bears the same relation to these specifications as it does to the principles—viz., that they directly see just which particular specifications are appropriate. Hence, the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6 that in such matters “one should give no less respect to the indemonstrable pronouncements and opinions of experienced and older and prudent men than to demonstrations.”

Article 3

Does Isidore appropriately describe the characteristics of positive law?

It seems that Isidore does not appropriately describe the characteristics (*qualitatem*) of positive law

when he says, “The law will be (a) morally upright (*honesta*), (b) just (*justa*), (c) possible according to nature, (d) in keeping with the customs of the country, (e) appropriate for the time and place, (f) necessary, (g) useful, (h) clear as well, lest it contain anything deceptive because of its obscurity, (i) written for no one’s private advantage, but for the common advantage of the citizens.”

Objection 1: He had previously explained the characteristics of law by listing [only] three conditions: “The law will be everything that builds upon reason, as long as it (a) agrees with religion, (b) contributes to discipline, and (c) promotes welfare (*salus*).” Therefore, it was unnecessary for him to multiply the conditions later on.

Objection 2: As Tully explains in *De Officiis*, justice (*iustitia*) is a part of moral uprightness (*honestas*). Therefore, once Isidore had said “morally upright,” it was unnecessary to add “just.”

Objection 3: According to Isidore, the written law is opposed to custom. Therefore, he should not have put “in keeping with the customs of the country” into the definition of law.

Objection 4: There are two types of necessary things. The first is what is necessary absolutely speaking, i.e., such that it is impossible for it to be otherwise; this type of necessary thing is not subject to human judgment and so this sort of necessity is irrelevant to human law. Something can also be necessary for the sake of an end, and this sort of necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore, it is superfluous to posit both “necessary” and “useful.”

But contrary to this is the authority of Isidore himself.

I respond: As *Physics 2* makes clear, everything that exists for the sake of an end must be such that its form is proportioned to that end—in the way that the form of a saw is appropriate for cutting. In addition, everything that is rectified and measured must have a form proportioned to its rule and measure.

Now human law has both these features, since (a) it is something ordered toward an end and (b) it is a rule or measure that is itself ruled or measured by a higher measure—where, as is clear from what was said above (q. 93, a. 3), this higher measure is twofold, viz., divine law and the law of nature. Moreover, the end of human law is its usefulness for men, as the Legal Expert likewise points out.

And this is why, in giving the conditions for law, Isidore first lays down these three: that (a) law agrees with religion, viz., insofar as it is proportioned to the divine law, that (b) it contributes to discipline, insofar as it is proportioned to the law of nature, and that (c) it promotes welfare, insofar as it is proportioned to human usefulness. All the other characteristics that he posits later on are traced back to these three.

For the law’s being morally upright is traced back to its being in agreement with religion.

And what he then adds—viz., “just, possible according to nature, in keeping with the customs of the country, appropriate for the time and place”—is added because it contributes to discipline. For human discipline is concerned in the first place with the order of reason, which is implied by his saying “just.” Second, it has to do with the ability of the agents, since discipline should be appropriate for each one in accord with what is possible for him, likewise keeping in mind what is possible for nature (for the same discipline imposed on grown men should not be imposed on children), and in accord with human custom, since a man cannot live by himself in society and fail to defer to others. Third, as far as fitting circumstances are concerned, he says, “appropriate to the time and place.”

Now what he then adds, viz., “necessary, useful, etc.,” is traced back to the fact that law expedites human welfare, so that “necessity” refers to the removal of evils, “usefulness” to the pursuit of goods, and “clear” to the prevention of harm that could come from the law itself.

And since, as was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good, this point itself is made clear in the last part of the definition.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3 and objection 4: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Is Isidore's division of human laws appropriate?

It seems that Isidore proposes an inappropriate division of human statutes or human law:

Objection 1: Under human law (*ius*) he includes the law of nations (*ius gentium*), which, as he explains, is so-called because nearly all the nations make use of it. But as he himself says, the natural law is common to all nations. Therefore, the law of nations is contained under natural law rather than under positive human law.

Objection 2: Things that have the same force seem to differ from one another only materially and not formally. But statutes (*leges*), popular ordinances (*plebiscita*), senate decrees (*senatusconsulta*), etc., all seem to have the same force. Therefore, it seems that they differ from one another only materially. But a theory (*ars*) should not bother with this sort of distinction, since it could go on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, it is inappropriate to make this sort of division of human laws.

Objection 3: Just as a city has rulers and priests and soldiers, so too there are other roles men play as well. Therefore, it seems that just as one posits military law (*ius militare*) along with public law (*ius publicum*), which covers priests and magistrates, so too one should posit other types of law that correspond to other roles in the community.

Objection 4: What is incidental (*per accidens*) should be left out of consideration. But it is incidental to law that it is made by this or that man. Therefore, it is inappropriate to posit a division of human laws by reference to the names of lawmakers—as, for example, to call one sort of law Cornelian law and another sort Falcidian law, etc.

But contrary to this: The authority of Isidore is sufficient here.

I respond: Each thing is divisible *per se* on the basis of what is contained in its definition (*ratio*). For instance, *soul*, which is either *rational* or *non-rational*, is contained in the definition of *animal*, and so *animal* is divided properly and *per se* by *rational* and *non-rational*. By contrast, *animal* is not properly and *per se* divided by *white* and *black*, which lie completely outside of the definition of *animal*.

Now there are many elements in the definition of *human law*, and human law can be properly and *per se* divided in accordance with each of them.

First of all, as was explained above (a. 2), it is part of the definition of *human law* that human law stems from the law of nature. Accordingly, *positive law* (*ius positivum*) is divided into the law of nations (*ius gentium*) and civil law (*ius civile*), in keeping with the two modes, explained above (a. 2), in which something stems from the law of nature. For things that belong to the law of nations stem from the law of nature as *conclusions* from principles—e.g., justice in buying and selling, etc., in the absence of which men would be unable to live together with one another. This belongs to the natural law, since as *Politics* 1 shows, man is by nature a social animal. On the other hand, things that stem from the law of nature in the manner of particular *specifications* belong to civil law, according to which each community determines what is fitting for itself.

Second, it is part of the definition of *human law* that human law is ordered toward the common good of the community. Accordingly, human law can be divided by the diversity of roles played by those who work specifically for the common good—e.g., *priests*, who pray to God on behalf of the people; *rulers*, who govern the people; and *soldiers*, who fight for the safety of the people. And so special laws are adapted to these men as such.

Third, as was explained above (q. 90, a. 3), it is part of the definition of *human law* that human law is instituted by one who governs the civil community. Accordingly, human laws are divided by the

diverse forms of civil government (*regimina*). One of these forms, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 3, is the *kingdom* (*regnum*), viz., when the community is governed by one man, and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to the *Princely Constitutions*. Another form of government is *aristocracy*, i.e., rule by the best or by the party of the best (*optimates*), and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to the Counsels of the Wise (*Responsa Prudentum*) and also to the Senate Decrees (*Senatusconsulta*). The next form of government is *oligarchy*, i.e., rule by a few rich and powerful men, and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to the Praetorian Law (*Ius Praetorium*), which is also called the Law of Honor (*Ius Honararium*). Another form of government is government by the people, which goes by the name *democracy*, and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to Popular Ordinances (*plebiscita*). The last form of government is *tyranny*, which is altogether corrupt and hence does not give rise to any sort of law. There is also a mixed form of government—the best form—and, accordingly, this regime gives rise to a type of law which, as Isidore puts it, has been sanctioned by the elders along with the common people.

Fourth, it is part of the definition of *human law* that it directs human acts. Accordingly, laws are divided by the diverse acts about which laws are made. Sometimes these laws are named by their authors — in the way that Julian law concerns acts of adultery, Cornelian law assassination, and so on. They are named in this way not because of their authors, but because of the deeds they are concerned with.

Reply to objection 1: The law of nations is, to be sure, in some sense natural to man insofar as he is rational, since it stems from the natural law in the manner of a conclusion that is not very far removed from its principles. Hence, it was easy for men to agree to a law of this sort. However, the law of nations is nonetheless distinct from the natural law, especially from what is common to all animals.

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3 and objection 4: The replies to the other objections are clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 96

The Force of Human Law

We next have to consider the force (*potestas*) of human law. On this topic there are six questions: (1) Should human law be formulated in a general way? (2) Should human law restrain vices? (3) Should human law prescribe acts of all the virtues? (4) Does human law impose necessity on man with respect to his conscience? (5) Are all men subject to human law? (6) Is it permissible for those subject to the law to go beyond the letter (*praeter verba legis*) of the law in their actions?

Article 1

Should human law be made in a general way or for particular cases instead?

It seems that human law should not be made in a general way (*non debeat poni in communi*), but should instead be made for particular cases (*sed magis in particulari*):

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “Legal justice consists in everything that is posited by law for individual cases, as well as decrees,” which are likewise particular, since decrees are issued for particular actions. Therefore, law is made not only in a general way, but also for particular cases.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1-2), the law directs human acts. But human acts are particulars. Therefore, human laws should not be made in a general way, but should be made for particular cases instead.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1-2), law is a rule and measure of human acts. But as *Metaphysics* 10 puts it, a measure should be fixed with certitude (*certissima*). Therefore, since in human acts there is nothing general that is fixed to such an extent that it does not fail in some particular instances, it seems necessary for laws to be made for particular instances instead of being formulated in a general way.

But contrary to this: The Legal Expert says, “Laws have to be made for situations that come up very frequently, but laws are not made for situations that can come up perhaps only once.”

I respond: If something exists for the sake of an end, then it must be proportioned to that end. Now the end of law is the common good, since, as Isidore says in *Etymologia*, “Law must be written for no one’s private advantage, but for the common advantage of the citizens.” But the common good is built up out of many things. And so the law must take into consideration a multiplicity of persons, actions, and times. For a civil community is composed of many persons, and its good is procured through a multiplicity of actions, and it is instituted not just to endure for a brief time, but to last for all time through a succession of citizens, as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 12.

Reply to objection 1: In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher posits three parts of legal justice, i.e., positive law.

Some laws are made in an absolutely general way, and these are the *general laws* (*leges communes*). It is with respect to laws of this sort that he says that what is legally just is such that at the beginning it does not matter whether it is this way or some other way, but that it does matter once the law is made—e.g., that captives are to be ransomed for such-and-such a mandated price.

On the other hand, there are certain laws that are general in one respect and particular in another respect. Laws of this sort are called *privileges* (*privilegia*)—private laws (*privatae leges*), as it were—since they have to do with particular persons; and yet they are such that their force extends to many actions. It is in this connection that he adds, “..... everything that is posited by law for particular cases.”

Again, certain things are called legal not because they are laws but because they involve the

application of general laws to particular cases—for instance, *decrees* (*sententiae*), which are treated as laws. It is in this connection that he adds, “and also decrees.”

Reply to objection 2: That which directs must direct a plurality of things. This is why in *Metaphysics* 10 the Philosopher says that everything belonging to a given genus is measured by some one thing that is first in that genus. For if there were as many rules and measures as there are things ruled and measured, then rules and measures would cease to be useful, since their usefulness consists in making it possible for many things to be understood on the basis of some one thing. Likewise, a law would not be useful if it did not extend beyond some one particular act. For as was explained above (q. 92, a. 2), it is the particular precepts of *prudent* men that are given for the purpose of directing *particular* acts, whereas a *law* is a *general* precept.

Reply to objection 3: As *Ethics* 1 says, we should not seek the same sort of certitude in all things. Hence, in contingent matters such as natural and human affairs, the certitude that something is true in most cases is sufficient, even if a few exceptions occur now and then.

Article 2

Should human law suppress all vices?

It seems that human law should suppress (*cohibere*) all vices:

Objection 1: In *Etymologia* Isidore says, “Laws have been made in order that boldness might be held in check by fear of them.” But boldness would not be adequately held in check if not every evil were prohibited by the law. Therefore, human law should suppress every evil.

Objection 2: The lawmaker’s intention is to make the citizens virtuous. But no one can be virtuous unless he is held back (*compescatur*) from all vices. Therefore, human law should suppress all vices.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 95, a. 2), human law stems from the natural law. But all vices are opposed to the law of nature. Therefore, human law should suppress all vices.

But contrary to this: *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 says, “It seems to me that the law written for ruling the people rightly permits those things and that God’s providence punishes them.” But God’s providence does not punish anything except vices. Therefore, human law rightly permits certain vices by not suppressing them.

I respond: As has already been explained (q. 90, a. 1-2), law is posited as a certain rule or measure of human acts. Now as *Metaphysics* 10 says, a measure must be homogenous with what it measures, since diverse things are measured by diverse measures. Hence, it must also be the case that laws are imposed on men according to their condition. For as Isidore says, “The law must be possible both according to nature and also according to the customs of the country.”

Now the power or ability to act proceeds from an interior habit or disposition, and it is not the case that the same thing is possible both for someone who is virtuous and for someone who lacks the habit of the virtue, just as it is not the case that the same thing is possible both for a boy and for a grown man. It is for this reason that the law made for children is not the same as the law made for adults; for there are many things permitted to children that are punished by law or even vilified in adults. Similarly, there are many things permitted to men who are not perfected in virtue that would not be tolerable in virtuous men.

Now human law is made for the multitude of men, and the greater part of this multitude consists of men who are not perfected in virtue. And so not all the vices from which virtuous men abstain are prohibited by human law. Instead, the only vices prohibited are the more serious ones, which it is

possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain from—especially those vices which are harmful to others and without the prohibition of which human society could not be conserved. For instance, homicide and theft and other vices of this sort are prohibited by human law.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Boldness’ here has to do, it seems, with attacks against others. Hence, it mainly concerns those sins by which injury is inflicted on one’s neighbors. As has been explained, these are the sins prohibited by human law.

Reply to objection 2: Human law has the intention of leading men to virtue, but of leading them gradually and not all at once. And so it does not immediately impose upon the multitude of imperfect men what is already characteristic of the virtuous, viz., that they abstain from every evil. Otherwise, those who are imperfect, unable to bear precepts of the sort in question, would erupt into worse evils—this according to Proverbs 30:33 (“He who violently blows his nose brings forth blood”) and Matthew 9:17 (“If new wine (*read:* the precepts of the perfect life) is put into old wineskins (*read:* into imperfect men), then the wineskins burst and the wine runs out (*read:* the precepts are despised and out of contempt the men erupt into worse evils).”)

Reply to objection 3: The natural law exists in us as a certain participation in the eternal law, but human law falls short of the eternal law. For in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “This law which is imposed to rule the civil communities allows and leaves unpunished many things that will be punished by God’s providence. Nor is it the case that because this law does not do all things, one should disapprove of what it does do.” Hence, human law likewise cannot prohibit everything that the law of nature prohibits.

Article 3

Does human law command the acts of all the virtues?

It seems that human law does not command the acts of all the virtues:

Objection 1: The acts of the vices are opposed to the acts of the virtues. But as has been explained (a. 2), human law does not prohibit all the vices. Therefore, human law does not command the acts of all the virtues.

Objection 2: An act of a virtue proceeds from that virtue. But virtue is the *end* of law, and so what *proceeds from* a virtue cannot fall under a precept of the law. Therefore, human law does not command the acts of all the virtues.

Objection 3: As has been explained (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good. But certain acts of the virtues are ordered not toward the common good, but instead toward [the agent’s] private good. Therefore, the law does not command the acts of all the virtues.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “The law commands the acts of the brave man and the acts of the temperate man and the acts of the mild-mannered man—and so on for the other virtues and vices, commanding the former and prohibiting the latter.”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 54, a. 2), the species of virtue are distinguished by their objects. But all the objects of the virtues can be traced back either to the private good of an individual or to the common good of a multitude. For instance, one can execute acts of fortitude either for the sake of conserving the community or for the sake of preserving a friend’s rights (*ius amici sui*).

Now as has been explained (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good. And so there is no virtue such that the law cannot command acts of that virtue. However, human law does not issue

commands concerning all the acts of all the virtues; instead, it commands only those acts which can be ordered toward the common good either (a) *immediately*, as when certain acts are done directly because of the common good, or (b) *mediately*, as when the lawmaker commands certain acts pertaining to good discipline through which citizens are formed in such a way that they might conserve the good of justice and peace.

Reply to objection 1: Human law does not prohibit all vicious acts by an obligatory precept, just as it does not command all virtuous acts, either. Yet it prohibits certain acts of individual vices, just as it likewise commands certain acts of individual virtues.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which an act is said to be an act of a virtue:

First, because the man *is doing something virtuous*. For instance, it is an act of justice to do something right and an act of fortitude to do something brave. In this sense the law commands some acts of the virtues.

Second, because the man is doing something virtuous *in the way that a virtuous man does it*. An act of this sort always proceeds from the virtue and never falls under a precept of the law, but is instead the end which the lawmaker intends to lead [the citizens] to.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, there is no virtue whose acts cannot be ordered toward the common good, either mediately or immediately.

Article 4

Does human law impose an obligation in conscience on a man?

It seems that human law does not impose an obligation in conscience on a man (*non imponat homini necessitatem in foro conscientiae*):

Objection 1: A lower authority (*potestas*) cannot impose a law on the judgment of a higher authority. But the authority of a man who makes human law is lower than God's authority. Therefore, human law cannot impose a law with respect to God's judgment, i.e., the judgment of conscience.

Objection 2: The judgment of conscience depends especially on God's commands. But sometimes God's commands are voided by human laws—this according to Matthew 15:6 (“You have made void the commandment of God on behalf of your traditions”). Therefore, human law does not impose an obligation in conscience on a man.

Objection 3: Human laws often inflict fraud and harm on men—this according to Isaiah 10:1-2 (“Woe to them who make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice in order to oppress the poor in judgment, and do violence to the cause of the humble of my people”). But everyone is permitted to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore, human laws do not impose an obligation in conscience on a man.

But contrary to this: 1 Peter 2:19 says, “It is worthy of thanks if, because of his conscience, someone endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully.”

I respond: Laws that are humanly made are either just or unjust.

If they are just, then they have their power to oblige in conscience from the eternal law, from which they stem—this according to Proverbs 8:15 (“By me kings reign, and lawgivers make just decrees”). Now laws are called just on the basis of (a) their *end*, viz., when they ordered toward the common good, and (b) their *author*, viz., when a law that is made does not exceed in its scope the power of the lawmaker, and (c) their *form*, viz., when they impose on those subject to them proportionately equal burdens in relation to the common good. For since a man is part of a multitude, each man is such that

what he is and what he has belongs to the multitude, in the same way that any part is such that what it is belongs to the whole. This is why nature likewise inflicts a loss on a part in order to save the whole. Accordingly, laws of this sort, which impose proportionate burdens, are just, and they bind in conscience, and they are legal laws (*leges legales*).

On the other hand, there are two ways in which laws are unjust.

First, in counterpoint to what was said above, they are unjust when they are contrary to the *human* good either (a) because of their *end*, as when the lawmaker imposes burdens on his subjects that contribute not to the common welfare but to his own greed or glory, or (b) because of their *author*, as when someone makes laws that go beyond the authority entrusted to him, or (c) because of their *form*, as when burdens are distributed unequally over the multitude, even if those burdens are ordered toward the common good. Laws of this sort are outrages (*violentiae*) rather than laws, since, as Augustine puts it in *De Libero Arbitrio*, “What is not just does not seem to be a law.” Hence, laws of this sort do not bind in conscience (*non obligant in foro conscientiae*)—except perhaps for the sake of preventing scandal or social unrest (*turbatio*), in which case a man should cede his right, in accord with Matthew 5:40-41 (“If someone forces you to go one mile, go with him another two and if someone takes away your coat, give him your cloak as well”).

The second way in which laws can be unjust is by being contrary to the *divine* good, as are tyrannical laws that induce men to idolatry or to doing anything else that is contrary to divine law. It is not permissible to obey such laws in any way at all, since as Acts 5:29 says, “We must obey God rather than men.”

Reply to objection 1: As the Apostle says in Romans 13:1-2, “Every human authority is from God, and so whoever resists that authority (*read*: in the things that pertain to the scope of that authority) is resisting God’s ordinance.” And, accordingly, such a man is accused by his conscience (*efficitur reus quantum ad conscientiam*).

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through in the case of human laws that are directed against a command of God’s. The scope of the authority [of human law] does not extend this far. Hence, in such cases one must not obey the human law.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through in the case of a law that imposes an unjust burden on those subject to it. Again, the scope of the authority given by God does not extend this far, and so in such cases a man is not obligated to obey the law if he can resist it without giving scandal or causing some greater damage.

Article 5

Is everyone subject to human law?

It seems that not everyone is subject to human law:

Objection 1: The only ones subject to the law are those for whom the law is made. But in 1 Timothy 1:9 the Apostle says, “The law is not made for the just man.” Therefore, the just are not subject to human law.

Objection 2: Pope Urban says (and one finds the same thing in *Decretals* 19, q. 2), “If someone is led by a private law, then he in no way needs to be bound by a public law.” But all men who are sons of God are led by the private law of the Holy Spirit—this according to Romans 8:14 (“Those who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God”). Therefore, not every man is subject to human law.

Objection 3: The Legal Expert says, “The ruler is exempt from the law (*solutus a lege*).” But one

who is exempt from the law is not subject to the law. Therefore, not everyone is subject to the law.

But contrary to this: In Romans 13:1 the Apostle says, “Let every soul be subject to the higher authorities.” But one who is not subject to a law laid down by a given authority does not seem to be subject to that authority. Therefore, all men have to be subject to human law.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 90, a. 1-3), law by its nature has two characteristics: first, it is a rule with respect to human acts; second, it has coercive force. It follows that there are two senses in which a man can be subject to the law.

In the first sense, he is subject to the law in the way that what is ruled is subject to what is doing the ruling. And everyone who is subject to an authority is in this sense subject to the law which that authority gives.

Now it can happen in two ways that someone is not subject to a given authority: (a) first, *because he is absolutely free of subjection to it*, and, hence, those who belong to one city or kingdom are not subject to the laws of the ruler of some other city or kingdom, just as they are not subject to his dominion; and (b) second, *insofar as he is ruled by a higher law*. For instance, someone subject to a proconsul should be ruled by his command—and yet not in those matters in which he receives a dispensation from the emperor. For with respect to those matters, since he is being directed by the command of someone higher, he is not bound by the command of someone lower. Accordingly, it is possible for someone who is subject to the law absolutely speaking not to be bound by the law in certain matters with respect to which he is under the rule of a higher law.

On the other hand, in the second sense, someone is said to be subject to the law in the way that what is coerced is subject to what is doing the coercing. In this sense it is only bad men, and not virtuous and just men, who are subject to the law. For what is coerced and violent is contrary to one’s will. And the will of good men is consonant with the law, whereas the will of bad men disagrees with the law. Hence, in this respect only bad men, and not good men, are under the law.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the type of subjection that exists in the mode of coercion. For in this sense the law is not given for the just men, since, as the Apostle puts it in Romans 2:14-15, “they are a law unto themselves when they show the work of the law written in their hearts.” Hence, the law does not exercise coercive power over them in the way it does over on the unjust.

Reply to objection 2: The law of the Holy Spirit is higher than any law that is humanly given. And so insofar as spiritual men are led by the law of the Holy Spirit, they are not subject to the law with respect to those things that are incompatible with the guidance of the Holy Spirit. However, part of the Holy Spirit’s guidance is that spiritual men should be subject to human laws—this according to 1 Peter 2:13 (“Be subject to every human creature for the sake of God”).

Reply to objection 3: The ruler is said to be exempt from the law as far as the law’s *coercive force* is concerned, since no one properly coerces himself and the law has its coercive force only from the ruler’s authority. Thus, the ruler is said to be exempt from the law in the sense that no one can bring a judgment of condemnation against him if he acts against the law. Hence, a Gloss on Psalm 50:6 (“Against you alone have I sinned”) says, “There is no man who is the judge of the king’s deeds.”

However, as far as the *directive force* of the law is concerned, the ruler is subject to the law by his own will. Accordingly, *Extra, De Constitutionibus*, chapter beginning “Since everyone”, says, “If anyone establishes a law for another, then he himself should keep that same law.” And the authority of a wise man says, “Obey yourself the law that you have given.” Again, Our Lord rebukes those who “prescribe and do not do it” and who “impose grave burdens on others and do not themselves want to lift a finger to move them” (Matthew 23:3-4). Hence, as far as God’s judgment is concerned, the ruler is not exempt from the directive force of the law, but instead should fulfill the law willingly and not under

coercion.

In addition, the ruler is above the law in the sense that if it is expedient, he can change the law and give dispensations from it for given times and places.

Article 6

Is one who is subject to the law permitted to act outside the letter of the law?

It seems that one who is subject to the law is not permitted to act outside the letter of the law (*praeter verba legis agere*):

Objection 1: In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “In the case of temporal laws, even though men pass judgment on them before they institute them, still, once they have been instituted and confirmed, one is not permitted to pass judgment *on* them, but is permitted [only] to pass judgment *in accordance with* them.” But if someone neglects the letter of the law, claiming that he is preserving the lawmaker’s intention, then he seems to be passing judgment on the law. Therefore, one who is subject to the law is not permitted to neglect the letter of the law in order to preserve the lawmaker’s intention.

Objection 2: Interpreting the laws is the role of the one who makes the laws. But it is not the role of the men who are subject to the law to make the laws. Therefore, it is not their role to interpret the lawmaker’s intention; instead, they should always act in accord with the letter of the law.

Objection 3: Every wise man knows how to explain his own intention in words. But those who have made the laws should be considered wise, since in Proverbs 8:15 God’s wisdom says, “By me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.” Therefore, one should pass judgment about a lawmaker’s intention only by reference to the letter of the law.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “The meaning of what is said should be taken from the reasons for saying it, since the words should be subject to the things and not the things to the words.” Therefore, one should pay more attention to the reasons that move the lawmaker than to the very words of the law.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 4), every law is ordered toward the common welfare of men, and this is how it gets its force and character as law; on the other hand, to the extent that it fails in this, it does not have the power to bind. Hence, the Legal Expert says, “Neither a reason in law nor kind fairness permits us to induce severity by means of a stricter interpretation, contrary to the welfare of men, of what had been beneficially introduced to be useful to them.”

Now it often happens that even though the observance of a certain practice is useful for the common welfare in the greater number of cases, there are nonetheless some cases in which it is especially harmful. Therefore, since a lawmaker cannot foresee all the individual cases, he makes the law with an eye toward what happens in the greater number of cases, while directing his intention to the common advantage. Hence, if a case arises in which the observance of such a law is harmful to the common welfare, it should not be obeyed. For instance, if in a city under siege it is mandated by law that the city gates should remain closed, this is useful to the common welfare in the greater number of cases. However, if a situation arose in which the enemy were pursuing certain citizens who had important roles in preserving the city, then it would be extremely damaging to the city if the gates were not opened to them, and so in such a case the gates should be opened—in opposition to the letter of the law—in order to preserve the common welfare, which is what the lawgiver intends.

Notice, however, that if the observance of the letter of the law does not entail a sudden danger that has to be dealt with immediately, then not just anyone has the role of interpreting what is advantageous

or disadvantageous; rather, this is the role only of the ruler, who has the authority to grant dispensations from the laws in light of cases of the sort in question. On the other hand, if there is a sudden danger that does not permit enough time to have recourse to someone in charge, then the necessity itself has a dispensation attached to it, since necessity is not subject to the law.

Reply to objection 1: Someone who acts outside the letter of the law in a case of necessity is not passing judgment on the law itself, but is rather passing judgment on a particular case, in which he sees that the letter of the law should not be obeyed.

Reply to objection 2: One who follows the lawmaker's intention is not interpreting the law absolutely speaking; rather, he is interpreting the law with respect to a case in which it is obvious, because of the evidentness of the harm, that the lawmaker had intended something else. For if there is a doubt, then he should either act in accord with the letter of the law or consult those in charge.

Reply to objection 3: No man has wisdom to such a degree that he is able to think of all the individual cases, and so no one can adequately express by his words what is in keeping with his intended end. Even if a lawmaker were able to take all the cases into consideration, he should not express them all—and this for the sake of avoiding confusion. Instead, he should issue a law in keeping with what happens in the greater number of cases.

QUESTION 97

Changes in Human Law

We next have to consider changes in human law. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is human law changeable? (2) Should human law always be changed when something better comes along? (3) Is human law abolished by custom, and does custom acquire the force of law? (4) Should the practice of human law be changed by means of dispensations granted by the rulers?

Article 1

Should human law in any way be changed?

It seems that human law should not in any way be changed:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 95, a. 2), human law stems from the natural law. But the natural law persists unchanged. Therefore, human law should likewise remain unchanged.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, a measure must be especially permanent. But as was explained above (q. 90, a. 1-2), human law is a measure of human acts. Therefore, it should remain unchanged.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 95, a. 2), it is part of the nature of law that it is just and right. But what is once right is always right. Therefore, what is once the law should always be the law.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine says, “Even if a temporal law is just, it can nonetheless be justifiably modified as time goes on.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 91, a. 3), human law is a certain type of dictate of reason by which human acts are directed. Accordingly, there are two possible reasons why human law might justifiably be changed, one on the side of *reason* and the other on the side of the *men* whose acts are regulated by the law.

On the side of *reason*, it seems natural to human reason that it should gradually move from what is imperfect toward what is perfect. Hence, we see in the speculative sciences that those who first philosophized handed down what was imperfect and this was later made more perfect by their successors. The same thing holds true in the practical sciences. Those who first intended to discover something useful for the human community, unable to take everything into consideration on their own, instituted certain practices which were deficient in many ways and which their successors changed by instituting other practices that were less prone to fail with respect to the common welfare.

On the side of the *men* whose acts are regulated by the law, law can rightly be changed because of changes in the situations of men, for whom different things are expedient in different situations. In *De Libero Arbitrio* 1 Augustine presents an example: “If the people are mature and serious and diligently guard the common welfare, then it is right to adopt a law by which such people are permitted to appoint for themselves magistrates to administer the republic. However, if the same people, having been depraved little by little, hold a rigged election and entrust the government to dissolute and profligate men, then it is justifiable to deprive such people of the power of conferring public offices and to return to the judgment of a few good men.”

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 91, a. 2), the natural law is a type of participation in the eternal law, and so it persists unchanged—a feature it has from the unchangeability and perfection of God’s reason insofar as it institutes nature. By contrast, human reason is changeable and imperfect, and so its law is changeable.

Moreover, the natural law contains certain general precepts which always remain in force, whereas the law made by man contains certain particular precepts corresponding to the different situations that

arise.

Reply to objection 2: A measure should be as permanent as possible. But among changeable entities there cannot be anything that persists altogether unchangeably. And so human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.

Reply to objection 3: Among corporeal things ‘right’ (*rectum*) is predicated absolutely, and so, as far as it itself is concerned, what is right always remains right. However, rightness (*rectitudo*) is predicated of the law in relation to the common welfare, which, as was explained above, is not such that one and the same thing is always proportioned to it. And so this sort of correctness changes.

Article 2

Should human law always be changed when something better comes along?

It seems that human law should always be changed when something better comes along:

Objection 1: Human laws, like other matters of art, have been arrived at by human reason. But in other matters of art, what was previously embraced is changed if something better comes along. Therefore, the same thing should be done in the case of human laws.

Objection 2: We can provide for the future by drawing on the past. But if human laws had not been changed in light of better discoveries that superseded them, then many anomalies would have followed, because old codes of law contain many elements of ignorance. Therefore, it seems that the laws should be changed as often as something better to institute comes along.

Objection 3: Human laws are established with respect to particular human acts. But the only way we reach complete cognition of particulars is through experience, which takes time, as *Ethics* 2 points out. Therefore, it seems that through the course of time something that is better to institute can come along.

But contrary to this: *Decretals*, dist. 12, says, “It is a ridiculous and wholly abominable disgrace for us to break off the traditions that we have received from our fathers.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), human law is justifiably changed to the extent that such a change in the law is a means of providing for the common welfare. However, the very changing of the law, taken just by itself, does a certain sort of damage to the common welfare. For custom (*consuetudo*) contributes to the observance of a great many laws, to the extent that whatever violates common custom—even if it is of little importance in its own right—is seen as rather serious. Hence, when a law is changed, the constraining force of the law is diminished to the extent that a given custom is nullified.

Therefore, human law should never be changed unless the damage done to the common welfare by the change is wholly compensated for in some other way. This happens either because (a) some very great and obvious advantage comes from the new statute, or because (b) there is some urgent necessity stemming from the fact that the established law either involves a manifest iniquity or is such that its observance is very harmful. Hence, the Legal Expert says, “In order to revoke a law that has been deemed just for a long time, there must be an obvious advantage in the new practices that are going to be instituted.”

Reply to objection 1: Matters of art have their efficacy solely from reason, and so whenever a better reason comes along, what was previously embraced should be changed. By contrast, as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 2, laws acquire an especially great force from custom. And so they are not to be changed so easily.

Reply to objection 2: This argument shows that laws should be changed, but not for the sake of

just any sort of improvement. Instead, as has been explained, they should be changed for the sake of some great advantage or out of some urgent necessity.

Reply to objection 3: The same reply holds for the third objection.

Article 3

Can custom acquire the force of law or nullify a law?

It seems that custom (*consuetudo*) can neither acquire the force of law nor nullify a law:

Objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (q. 93, a. 3 and q. 95, a. 2), human law stems from the natural law and the divine law. But human custom cannot alter the law of nature or the divine law. Therefore, neither can it alter human law.

Objection 2: It is not the case that a good can come from many evils. But the one who first starts to act against the law acts badly. Therefore, it is not the case that something good will be produced by the multiplication of acts similar to that bad act. Now a law is a sort of good, since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore, a law cannot be nullified by custom in such a way that the custom itself acquires the force of law.

Objection 3: Making law is the function of public personages whose role it is to govern the community; hence, private persons cannot make law. But a custom increases in strength through the acts of private persons. Therefore, custom cannot acquire the force of a law by which some other law is nullified.

But contrary to this: In *Epistola ad Casulanum* Augustine says, “The customs of the people of God, as well as what has been instituted by the leaders, should be embraced as law. And like those who transgress divine laws, so too those who show contempt for ecclesiastical customs should be corrected.”

I respond: Every sort of law proceeds from the lawmaker’s reason and will—divine and natural law from God’s rational will, and human law from the human will as regulated by reason. Now just as, in practical matters, a man’s reason and will are made manifest by what he says, so too they are made manifest by what he does. For each man seems to choose as a good what he brings about by his action.

Now it is manifest that the law can be both explained and changed by human words, insofar as those words make manifest human reason’s interior movement and conception. Hence, the law can also be explained and changed through acts which, especially when they are multiplied, engender customs; moreover, these acts can cause something that acquires the force of law, viz., because through repeated exterior acts the will’s interior motion and reason’s designs are effectively clarified. For when something is repeated many times, it seems to proceed from the deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force of law, nullifies law, and serves to interpret law.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, natural law and divine law proceed from the divine will. Hence, they cannot be changed by any custom that proceeds from the human will; instead, they could be changed only by God’s authority. And so no custom contrary to the divine law or natural law can acquire the force of law. For in the *Synonymes* Isidore says, “Let custom cede to authority; let law and reason subdue a depraved custom.”

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 96, a. 6), human laws fail (*deficit*) in some cases, and so it is sometimes possible to act outside the law without the act’s being bad, viz., in a case where the law fails. And when such cases are multiplied because of some change in the men, then it becomes clear through custom that the standing law is not advantageous—in just the way this would likewise become clear if a law were promulgated that was verbally contrary to the standing law.

However, if the reason for which the first law was advantageous still holds, then the law conquers the habit rather than the habit the law—unless, perhaps, the law seems disadvantageous precisely because it is not possible given the customs of the country, which was one of the conditions for law (cf. q. 95, a. 3). For it is difficult to abolish a custom of the people.

Reply to objection 3: The people among whom a custom is introduced can be in one of two conditions:

If it is a free people that can make laws for itself, then the consensus of the whole people to observe the practice that a custom makes manifest counts for more than the authority of the ruler, who does not have the power to make law except insofar as he stands in for the people. Hence, even if particular persons cannot make law, the whole people can nonetheless make law.

On the other hand, if the people does not have free power to make law for itself or to nullify a law made by someone in charge, then a custom that is widespread among such a people acquires the force of law to the extent that it is tolerated by those who have the role of imposing law on the people. For by this very toleration they seem to give their approval to what the custom has introduced.

Article 4

Can the rulers of the people give dispensations from human laws?

It seems that the rulers of the people cannot give dispensations from human laws:

Objection 1: As Isidore puts it, law is established “for the common welfare.” But the common good should not be overridden in favor of any person’s private advantage (*pro privato commodo alicuius personae*), since, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, “The good of the nation is more divine than the good of a single man.” Therefore, it seems that no one should be given a dispensation to act against a general law.

Objection 2: Deuteronomy 1:17 gives this command to those who are placed in charge of others: “You shall hear the little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man’s person, because it is the judgment of God.” But ‘respecting persons’ or favoritism (*acceptio personarum*) seems to consist in conceding to a given individual what is generally denied to everyone. Therefore, the rulers of the people cannot give dispensations of the sort in question, since this is contrary to God’s command.

Objection 3: If human law is to be upright, then it must be consonant with the natural law and with divine law; otherwise, it would neither “agree with religion” nor “contribute to discipline”—which, as Isidore says, are required for law (cf. q. 95, a. 3). But no man can give a dispensation either from divine law or from the natural law. Therefore, neither can any man give a dispensation from human law.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 9:17 the Apostle says, “..... a dispensation is committed to me.”

I respond: ‘Dispensation’ (*dispensatio*) properly implies a measuring out of something common to individuals. Hence, the head of a family is called a ‘dispenser’ (*dispensator*) insofar as he distributes, in due weight and measure, the tasks and necessities of life to each member of the family. So, then, every multitude is such that someone in it is called a dispenser by virtue of the fact that he determines how a general precept is to be implemented by each individual.

Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 96, a. 6), sometimes a precept that is appropriate for the multitude in the greater number of cases is not appropriate for this person or in this case, either because it would prevent something better or because it would lead to some evil. However, as was explained above (q. 96, a. 6), it would be dangerous to leave such matters to the judgment of each

individual, except perhaps in the face of an evident and sudden threat. Thus, the one charged with ruling the people has the power to dispense from a human law that depends on his authority, with the result that when the law fails for given persons or cases, he may permit a precept of the law not to be obeyed. However, if he granted such permission just by his own will alone and without the sort of reason in question, then in granting such a dispensation he would be either unfaithful or imprudent—unfaithful if he did not intend the common good, and imprudent if he knew of no reason for the dispensation. This is why, in Luke 12:42, Our Lord says, “Who do you think is the faithful and prudent steward (*dispensator*), whom his lord sets over his family?”

Reply to objection 1: When someone is dispensed from obeying a general law, this should be done not with a prejudice against the common good, but rather with the intention of promoting the common good.

Reply to objection 2: There is no ‘respecting of persons’ (*acceptio personarum*) if it is not the case that persons who are equal are being treated as unequals. Hence, when a person’s situation requires that, in accord with reason, something be observed in a special way in that situation, then it is not favoritism if some special favor is granted him.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as the natural law contains general precepts that never fail, it cannot admit of dispensations.

On the other hand, with respect to those other precepts, which are like conclusions of the general precepts, men can sometimes give dispensations—for instance, a dispensation according to which a thing left in trust need not be returned to someone who has betrayed his country, or something of this sort.

However, every man is related to divine law in the way that a private person is related to a public law to which he is subject. Hence, just as in the case of human public law, the only one who can give dispensations is the one from whom the law has its authority or someone whom he has commissioned, so too in the case of the precepts of the divine law, which come from God, no one can give a dispensation except God or someone to whom He Himself has given a special commission.

QUESTION 98

The Old Law

We next have to consider the Old Law—first, the Law itself (question 98) and, second, its precepts (questions 99-105).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Was the Old Law good? (2) Was the Old Law from God? (3) Was the Old Law from God through the mediation of angels? (4) Was the Old Law given to everyone? (5) Did the Old Law oblige everyone? (6) Was the Old Law given at an appropriate time?

Article 1

Was the Old Law good?

It seems that the Old Law was not good:

Objection 1: Ezechiel 20:25 says, “I gave them precepts that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live.” But a type of law is called good only because of the goodness of the precepts it contains. Therefore, the Old Law was not good.

Objection 2: As Isidore points out, part of the goodness of a law consists in its promoting the common welfare (*communis salus*). But the Old Law did not bring salvation (*non fuit salutifera ...*) and brought death and harm instead (*sed magis mortifera et novica*). For in Romans 7:8-10 the Apostle says, “Without the Law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the Law. But when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died.” And in Romans 5:20 he says, “The Law entered in that sin might abound.” Therefore, the Old Law was not good.

Objection 3: Part of the goodness of a law is that it is possible to observe it in a way that accords with both nature and human custom. But the Old Law lacked this characteristic; for in Acts 15:10 Peter says, “Why are you trying to impose on the necks of the disciples a yoke that neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?” Therefore, it seems that the Old Law was not good.

But contrary to this: In Romans 7:12 the Apostle says, “And so the Law is indeed holy, and the commandment is holy and just and good.”

I respond: There is no doubt that the Old Law was good. For just as a teaching (*doctrina*) is shown to be true by the fact that it is consonant with right reason, so too a law is shown to be good by the fact that it is consonant with reason. But the Old Law was consonant with reason. For as is clear from the commandment laid down in Exodus 20:15, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s goods,” the Old Law curbed concupiscence, which is opposed to reason. It likewise prohibited all the sins that are contrary to reason. Hence, it is clear that it was good. And in Romans 7:22 the Apostle’s argument (*ratio*) is this: “I am delighted with the Law of God, according to the inward man”; and, again, “I consent to the Law, because it is good.”

However, notice that, as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good admits of different degrees. For some goods are perfect and some are imperfect. In the case of things that are ordered toward an end, perfect goodness consists in a thing’s being such that it is sufficient *per se* to induce the end, whereas an imperfect good is such that it contributes something toward the acquisition of the end but is not sufficient to induce the end. For instance, a perfectly good medicine is one that cures a man, whereas an imperfect medicine is one that helps a man but is unable to cure him.

Now note that the end of human law is distinct from the end of divine law. For the end of human law is temporal peace within the political community (*temporalis tranquillitas civitatis*), and human law achieves this end by curbing exterior acts that involve evils capable of disturbing the peaceful state of the political community. By contrast, the end of divine law is to lead a man to the end of eternal happiness,

and this end is impeded by any sin whatsoever—not just the exterior acts, but the interior acts as well. And so what suffices for the perfection of human law, viz., that it prohibit sins and mete out punishments, does not suffice for the perfection of divine law. Rather, divine law has to make a man totally fit for participation in eternal happiness.

Now this can be brought about only through the grace of the Holy Spirit, by which the charity that fulfills the law is diffused in our hearts. For as Romans 6:23 says, “The grace of God is eternal life.” But the Old Law was unable to confer this grace, since this was reserved to Christ. For as John 1:17 says, “The law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Hence, the Old Law is good, to be sure, but it is an imperfect good—this according to Hebrews 7:19 (“The Law brought nothing to perfection”).

Reply to objection 1: The Lord is speaking here about the ceremonial precepts, which are called “not good” because they did not confer the grace through which men are washed of sin—even though precepts of this sort did show men to be sinners. That is why the verse expressly says, “and judgments in which they shall not live,” i.e., judgments through which they cannot acquire the life of grace, “and I polluted them in their own gifts,” i.e., I showed them to be polluted “when, because of their sins, they offered everything that opened the womb.”

Reply to objection 2: The Law is said to have killed not as an *efficient cause* but as an *occasion*—and this because of its imperfection, viz., insofar as it did not confer the grace through which men would be able to fulfill what it commanded or to avoid what it forbade. And so this occasion was not given, but was instead taken by men. Hence, in the same place the Apostle says, “For sin, taking the occasion, seduced me through the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me.” It is for this same reason that he says, “The law entered in that sin might abound,” where ‘that’ implies succession rather than causality—viz., insofar as men, taking the occasion from the Law, sinned more abundantly, both because their sin was more grave after it had been prohibited by the Law, and also because concupiscence increased, since we desire all the more what is forbidden to us.

Reply to objection 3: The yoke of the Law could not have been obeyed without the help of grace, which the Law did not give. For Romans 9:16 says, “So then it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs”—i.e., to will and to run within God’s precepts—“but of God who shows mercy.” Hence, Psalm 118:32 says, “I have run the way of Your commandments, since You enlarged my heart”—i.e., through the gift of grace and of charity.

Article 2

Was the Old Law from God?

It seems that the Old Law was not from God:

Objection 1: Deuteronomy 32:4 says, “The works of God are perfect.” But as was explained above (a. 1), the Old Law was imperfect. Therefore, the Old Law was not from God.

Objection 2: Ecclesiastes 3:14 says, “I have learned that all the works which God has made persevere forever.” But the Old Law did not persevere forever; for in Hebrews 7:18 the Apostle says, “There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of its weakness and unprofitableness.” Therefore, the Old Law was not from God.

Objection 3: It is a function of the lawmaker’s wisdom to remove not only evils but the occasions of evil. But as was explained above (a. 1), the Old Law was an occasion of sin. Therefore, it was inappropriate that God—who, as Job 36:22 puts it, “is such that none is like Him among the

lawmakers”—should hand down such a law.

Objection 4: 1 Timothy 2:4 says, “God wills all men to be saved.” But as was explained above (a. 1), the Old Law did not suffice for the salvation of men. Therefore, it was inappropriate for God to make such a law. Therefore, the Old Law is not from God.

But contrary to this: In Matthew 15:6 our Lord, in speaking to the Jews, to whom the Old Law had been given, says, “You have made void the commandment of God because of your traditions.” And just before this we find, “Honor your father and your mother,” which is clearly contained in the Old Law (cf. Exodus 20:12 and Deuteronomy 5:16). Therefore, the Old Law is from God.

I respond: The Old Law was given by the good God, who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordered men toward Christ in two ways.

First, it ordered men toward Christ by bearing witness to Christ. Hence, in the last chapter of Luke, verse 44, He Himself says, “All things had to be fulfilled which were written about me in the law of Moses and in the prophets and in the Psalms.” And in John 5:46 He says, “If you believed Moses, you would perhaps believe me also; for he wrote about me.”

Second, the Old Law ordered men toward Christ in the manner of a disposition, since by drawing men back from idolatry, it enveloped them within the worship of the one God by whom the human race was to be saved through Christ. Hence, in Galatians 3:23 the Apostle says, “Before the faith came, we were guarded under the Law, enclosed for that faith which was to be revealed.” But, clearly, the one who disposes things to the end is the same as the one who leads them to the end, and by ‘the same’ I mean either through himself (*per se*) or through those who are subject to him. For the devil would not have given a law by means of which men might be led to Christ, through whom he himself was going to be cast out—this according to Matthew 12:26 (“If Satan casts out Satan, then his kingdom is divided”). And so the Old Law was given by the same God by whom the salvation of men was effected through the grace of Christ.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents a thing from being imperfect absolutely speaking and yet perfect with respect to a given time. For instance, a boy is not said to be perfect absolutely speaking, but is said to be perfect for his age (*secundum temporis conditionem*). So, too, precepts that are given to children are perfect for the condition of those to whom they are given, even if those precepts are not perfect absolutely speaking. The precepts of the Old Law were like this. Hence, in Galatians 3:24 the Apostle says, “The Law was our teacher (*paedagogus*) in Christ.”

Reply to objection 2: The works of God that persevere forever are the ones which God made in such a way that they should persevere forever, and these are the ones that are perfect. By contrast, the Old Law was set aside at the time of the perfection of grace—not as something bad, but as something weak and unprofitable for that time. For as is added [in the cited passage], “The law did not bring anything to perfection.” Hence, in Galatians 3:25 the Apostle says, “Now that faith has come, we are no longer under the teacher.”

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 79, a. 4), God at times allows some men to fall into sin in order that they might thereby be made humble. So, too, He willed to give a Law that men could not fulfill by their own power in order that men, in relying on themselves, might discover themselves to be sinners and, having been humbled, might have recourse to the assistance of grace.

Reply to objection 4: Even though the Old Law did not suffice for the salvation of man, there was nonetheless another sort of assistance which God offered to men along with the Law and by which they were able to be saved, viz., faith in the Mediator—a faith through which the ancient patriarchs were justified in the same way that we ourselves are justified. And so God did not remove Himself from men in the sense of not giving them the means to salvation.

Article 3

Was the Old Law given through the mediation of angels or was it given directly by God?

It seems that the Old Law was given directly (*immediate*) by God and not through the mediation of angels (*per angelos*):

Objection 1: *Angel* means *messenger*, and so the name ‘angel’ implies ministry and not dominion—this according to Psalm 102:20-21 (“Bless the Lord, all you His angels ... His ministers (*ministri*)”). But the Old Law is said to have been given by the Lord; for Exodus 20:1 says, “The Lord spoke these words ...” and later adds, “For I am the Lord your God.” And this same manner of speaking is frequently repeated in Exodus and in the succeeding books of the Law. Therefore, the Law was given directly by God.

Objection 2: As John 1:17 says, “The Law was given by Moses.” But Moses received it directly from God; for Exodus 33:11 says, “The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend.” Therefore, the Old Law was given directly by God.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 3), it is the role of the ruler alone to make law. But God alone is the ruler of the salvation of souls, whereas the angels are “ministering spirits,” as Hebrews 1:14 puts it. Therefore, since the Old Law was ordered toward the salvation of souls, it was inappropriate for it to be given through the mediation of angels.

But contrary to this: In Galatians 3:19 the Apostle says, “The Law was given through the angels at the hand of a Mediator.” Again, in Acts 7:53 Stephen says, “You have received the Law under the direction of angels.”

I respond: The Law was given by God through the mediation of angels. In addition to the general reason that Dionysius gives in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, viz., that “it is appropriate for divine realities to be brought to men by the mediation of angels,” there is a special reason why the Old Law had to be given through the mediation of angels.

For it was explained above (a. 1-2) that the Old Law was imperfect and yet disposed men for the perfect salvation of the human race that was going to come about through Christ. But it is evident in the case of all ordered powers and crafts that the one who ranks higher performs the principal and perfect act by himself, whereas it is through the mediation of his helpers (*per suos ministros*) that he does the things that dispose [the patient] for the ultimate perfection. For instance, a ship-builder puts the ship together by himself, but he prepares the materials through the mediation of his assistant craftsmen.

So it was fitting that the perfect law of the New Covenant should be given directly by God Himself made man, but that the Old Law should be given to men through the mediation of God’s ministers, viz., the angels. And it is in this way that the Apostle, at the beginning of Hebrews, establishes the preeminence of the New Law over the Old Law; for in the New Testament God “has spoken to us in His own Son,” whereas in the Old Testament “His word was given through the angels.”

Reply to objection 1: As Gregory notes at the beginning of *Moralia*, “The angel who is described as having appeared to Moses is variously called ‘the angel’ and ‘the Lord’”. He is called ‘the angel’ by reason of the fact that he served by speaking exteriorly, whereas he is called ‘the Lord’ because, presiding interiorly, he administered the power of speaking.” Hence, the angel was also, as it were, speaking in the person of the Lord.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, Exodus 33:11 says, “The Lord spoke to Moses face to face,” and a little later adds, “Show me Your glory.” Therefore, Moses was sensing what he saw and desiring what he did not see. Therefore, he did not see the very essence of God, and in this sense he was not directly instructed by God.

Therefore, when Scripture says, “He spoke to him “face to face,” it is speaking in accord with the opinion of the people, who thought that Moses and God were speaking with their mouths, because God was speaking to him and appearing to him through creatures subject to Him, i.e., through the angel and through the cloud.

An alternative reply is that “seeing God’s face” refers to a certain preeminent and intimate contemplation that falls short of the vision of God’s essence.

Reply to objection 3: It is the role of the ruler alone to institute law by his own authority, but he sometimes promulgates an instituted law through others. And so God instituted the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated it through the angels.

Article 4

Was it fitting for the Old Law to have been given only to the Jewish people?

It seems that the Old Law should not have been given only to the Jewish people (*solī populo Iudaeorum*):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 2-3), the Old Law disposed men to the salvation that was to come through Christ. But this salvation was going to take place in all the nations (*in omnibus gentibus*) and not just among the Jews—this according to Isaiah 49:6 (“It is a small thing that you should be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob and to convert the dregs of Israel. Behold, I have given you to be the light of the Gentiles, that you may be my salvation even to the farthest part of the earth”). Therefore, the Old Law should have been given to all the nations and not just to one people.

Objection 2: As Acts 10:34 says, “God is not a respecter of persons (*acceptor personarum*), but in every nation, he who fears Him and does works of justice is acceptable to Him.” Therefore, He should not have opened the way of salvation more to one people than to the others.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 3), the Law was given through angels. But God has always granted the ministry of the angels to all the nations and not just to the Jews; for Ecclesiasticus 17:14 says, “Over every nation He set a ruler.” He likewise gave temporal goods to all the nations—and God is less concerned with temporal goods than with spiritual goods. Therefore, He should likewise have given the Law to all the peoples.

But contrary to this: Romans 3:1-2 says, “What advantage then does the Jew have? Much, in every way. First, because the words of God were committed to them.” And Psalm 147:20 says, “He has not done thus for any other nation, and He has not made known His judgments to them.”

I respond: One reason that could be invoked for why the Law was given to the Jewish people rather than to the other peoples is that while the others had fallen into idolatry, the Jewish people alone remained steadfast in the worship of the one God. And so the other peoples were unworthy to receive the Law, lest what is holy should be given to the dogs (cf. Matthew 7:6).

However, this argument seems inappropriate. For the Jewish people fell into idolatry even after the Law had been given—which was a more grievous sin, as is clear from Exodus 32 and from Amos 5:25-26 (“Did you offer victims and sacrifices to me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made for yourselves.”) Again, Deuteronomy 9:6 says explicitly, “Know that it is not because of your acts of justice that the Lord your God gives you this excellent land for your possession; for you are an utterly stiff-necked people.”

Instead, the correct reason is given in the preceding verse: “... in order that the Lord might fulfill

His word, which He promised by an oath to your fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” In Galatians 3:16 the Apostle shows which promise had been made to them, saying, “To Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He does not say, ‘and to your seeds’, as of many, but ‘and to your seed’, as of one, who is the Christ.” Therefore, God gave the Law and other special benefits to that people because of the promise He had made to their fathers that the Christ would be born of them. For it was fitting that the people from whom the Christ would be born should be enriched with a special sanctification—this according to Leviticus 19:2 (“You will be holy, because I am holy”).

Again, it was not because of the merits of Abraham himself that such a promise was made to him; rather, it was because he was gratuitously elected and called (*ex gratuita electione et vocatio*). Hence, Isaiah 41:2 says, “Who has raised up the just one from the East, has called him to follow Him?”

So, then, it is clear that the patriarchs received the promise solely because of a gratuitous election, and that the people that descended from them received the Law—this according to Deuteronomy 4:36-37 (“You heard His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved your fathers, and chose their seed after them”).

However, if one were to ask again why He chose this people in order that the Christ might be born from them, then the response that Augustine gives in *Super Ioannem* is the right one: “Why did he choose this one and not that one? Do not look for an answer, if you do not want to be mistaken.”

Reply to objection 1: Even though the future salvation through the Christ had been prepared for all the nations, it was still necessary for the Christ to be born from one people, who because of this had prerogatives in preference to the others. Accordingly, Romans 9:4-5 says, “... to whom [read: the Jews] belongs the adoption as of children of God, and the testament and the giving of the Law ... to whom belong the fathers and from whom comes the Christ, according to the flesh.”

Reply to objection 2: Respect for persons or favoritism (*acceptio personarum*) is possible in the case of things that are given because they are [in some sense] owed, but there is no question of favoritism in the case of things that are conferred gratuitously. For one is not playing favorites if out of generosity he gives something of his own to one person and not to another. By contrast, if he were responsible for dispensing communal goods (*si esset dispensator bonorum communium*) and did not distribute them equitably according to the merits of the relevant persons, then he would be playing favorites.

Now it is out of His graciousness (*ex sua gratia*) that God confers salvific benefits on the human race. Hence, there is no favoritism if He confers these benefits on some in preference to others. This is why Augustine says in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*: “All those whom God instructs are such that it is by His mercy (*miser cordia*) that He instructs them; and those whom He does not instruct are such that it is by His justice (*iudicium*) that He does not instruct them.” For this stems from the condemnation of the human race because of the sin of the first parent.

Reply to objection 3: The gifts of grace are taken away from man because of sin, but his natural gifts are not taken away. Among the latter is the ministry of the angels, which is required by (a) the very ordering of natures, so that the lowest beings should be governed by middle-level beings, as well as by (b) the corporeal gifts that God grants not only to men but also to beasts—this according to Psalm 35:7 (“Men and beasts You will preserve, O Lord”).

Article 5

Were all men obliged to observe the Old Law?

It seems that all men were obliged (*obligarentur*) to observe the Old Law:

Objection 1: Anyone who is subject to a king must be subject to that king’s law. But the Old Law

was given by God, who is “the king of all the earth,” as Psalm 46:8 puts it. Therefore, all the inhabitants of the earth were obliged (*tenebantur*) to observe the Law.

Objection 2: The Jews were unable to be saved unless they observed the Old Law; for Deuteronomy 27:26 says, “Cursed be he that abides not in the words of this Law, and fulfills them not in his works.” Therefore, if other men were able to have been saved without observing the Old Law, then the Jews’ situation would have been worse than that of other men.

Objection 3: Gentiles were admitted to the Judaic rites and to the observance of the Law; for Exodus 12:48 says, “If any stranger is willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Passover of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it ritually, and he shall be like one that is born in the land.” But it would not have made sense for the foreigners admitted by God’s ordinance to observe the Law if they could have been saved without observing the Law. Therefore, no one was able to be saved unless he observed the Law.

But contrary to this: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 9, Dionysius says that many Gentiles were led to God by the angels. But it is clear that the Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore, some were able to be saved without observing the Law.

I respond: The Old Law made manifest the precepts of the law of nature and added certain precepts of its own.

Therefore, as regards the precepts of the law of nature that were contained in the Old Law, all men were obliged to observe the Old Law—not because these precepts belonged to the Old Law, but because they belonged to the law of nature.

However, as regards what the Old Law added to the law of nature, the only ones obliged to observe the Old Law were the Jewish people. The reason for this is that, as has been explained (a. 4), the Old Law was given to the Jewish people in order that they might acquire a certain privilege of holiness out of reverence for the Christ, who was to be born of that people. But statutes established for the special sanctification of certain people oblige no one but them. For instance, clerics, who are set aside for divine ministry, have certain obligations that lay people do not have; similarly, religious are bound by their profession to certain works of perfection that seculars are not bound to. In the same way, the Jewish people had certain special obligations that other peoples did not have. Hence, Deuteronomy 18:13 says, “You shall be perfect and without stain before the Lord your God.” It is for this reason that they made use of a type of profession, as is clear from Deuteronomy 26:3 (“I profess this day before the Lord your God ...”).

Reply to objection 1: If someone is subject to a king’s rule, then he is obliged to observe the law that the king proposes for everyone in general. But if the king institutes certain laws to be observed by his closest ministers, then the others are not obliged to observe these laws.

Reply to objection 2: The more a man is conjoined to God, the better his situation becomes. And so to the extent that the Jewish people were bound more closely to the worship of God, they were better off than other peoples. Hence, Deuteronomy 4:8 asks, “What other nation is there so renowned that has ceremonies, and just judgments, and the whole of the Law?” Similarly, on this score clerics are in a better situation than lay people, and religious are in a better situation than seculars.

Reply to objection 3: Gentiles attained salvation more completely and more surely under the observances of the Old Law than under the natural law alone, and that is why they were admitted to these observances. So, too, even now lay people pass into the clerical state and seculars pass into the religious state, even though they can be saved without doing this.

Article 6

Was it appropriate for the Old Law to have been given at the time of Moses?

It seems that it was not appropriate for the Old Law to have been given at the time of Moses:

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 2-3), the Old Law disposed man for the salvation that was to come through the Christ. But man needed the remedy of this sort of salvation immediately after his sin. Therefore, the Old Law should have been given immediately after his sin.

Objection 2: The Old Law was given for the salvation of those from whom the Christ was going to be born. But as Genesis 12:7 says, the promise concerning “the seed, i.e., Christ” (cf. Galatians 3:16), was first made to Abraham. Therefore, the Law should have been given right away at the time of Abraham.

Objection 3: Just as Christ was not born of any descendants of Noah other than Abraham, to whom the promise was made, so too He was not born of any sons of Abraham other than David, to whom the promise was renewed—this according to 2 Kings 23:1 (“The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob said ...”). Therefore, the Old Law should have been given after David, just as it was in fact given after Abraham.

But contrary to this: In Galatians 3:19 the Apostle says, “The Law was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come to whom He made the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator”—i.e., “being given in an orderly way,” as a Gloss puts it. Therefore, it was fitting for the Old Law to have been handed down in that particular temporal order.

I respond: It was utterly appropriate for the Old Law to have been given at the time of Moses. We can cite two reasons for this, given that there are two kinds of men on whom any law, whatever it might be, is imposed. For some of those on whom a law is imposed are stubborn and proud, and these men are restrained and subdued by the law; and a law is also imposed on those who are good, and these men, instructed by the law, are aided in fulfilling what they intend.

Therefore, it was fitting for the Old Law to be given at a time appropriate for conquering men’s pride. Man is proud with respect to two things, viz., knowledge and power. He is proud with respect to knowledge in the sense of thinking that natural reason can suffice for his salvation. So in order that man’s pride on this score might be conquered, he was left to the guidance of his own reason without the support of a written law, and man was able to learn that he suffered from deficiencies of reason—and he learned this from experience, in virtue of the fact that by the time of Abraham men had fallen into idolatry and into the most shameful vices. And so it was necessary for the written Law to be given after that time as a remedy for human ignorance; for as Romans 3:20 says, “The knowledge of sin comes through the Law.”

But after man had been instructed through the Law, his pride was conquered in his weakness (*infirmitas*), when he was unable to fulfill the Law which he now knew. And so, as the Apostle concludes in Romans 8:3-4, “What the Law, weakened by the flesh, was powerless to do, this God has done by sending his own Son ... so that the righteous decree of the law might be fulfilled in us.”

On the other hand, as far as the good men are concerned, the Law was given to assist them. This was especially necessary for the people at a time when the Law had begun to be obscured because of the excesses of their sins. However, assistance of this sort had to be given in a certain order, so that they might be led by the hand through what was imperfect to perfection. And so the Old Law had to be given in the time between the law of nature and the law of grace.

Reply to objection 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given immediately after the sin of the first man, both because man, confident in his own power of reason, did not yet recognize his need for

the Law, and also because the dictates of the law of nature had not yet been obscured by habitual sinning.

Reply to objection 2: The Law should be given only to a people, since, as was explained above (q. 96, a. 1), a law is a communal precept (*praeceptum commune*). And so certain of God's familial and, as it were, domestic precepts were given to men at the time of Abraham. But afterwards, when Abraham's posterity had multiplied to such an extent as to constitute a people and had been liberated from slavery, the Law could appropriately be given. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 3, slaves are not part of a people or political community, and it is to a people or political community that law is appropriately given.

Reply to objection 3: Since it was necessary for the Law to be given to a certain people, the Law was received not only by those individuals from whom Christ was born but by the whole people marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham and believed in by him, as the Apostle puts it in Romans 4:11. And so the Law had to be given to this people, now already gathered together, even before David.

QUESTION 99

The Precepts of the Old Law

We next have to consider the precepts of the Old Law—first, the distinction among the precepts (question 99) and, second, each of the distinct types of precepts (questions 100-105).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Does the Old Law contain many precepts or just one precept? (2) Does the Old Law contain any moral precepts? (3) Does the Old Law contain ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts? (4) Does the Old Law contain judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts? (5) Does the Old Law contain any type of precept besides these three? (6) How did the Old Law induce the observance of these precepts?

Article 1

Does the Old Law contain just one precept ?

It seems that the Old Law contains only one precept (*praeceptum*):

Objection 1: As was established above (q. 92, a. 2), a law is nothing other than a precept. But the Old Law is a single law. Therefore, it contains only one precept.

Objection 2: In Romans 13:9 the Apostle says, “If there is any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself’.” But this is a single commandment (*mandatum*). Therefore, the Old Law contains only one commandment.

Objection 3: Matthew 7:12 says, “All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them; for this is the Law and the prophets.” But the whole of the Old Law is contained in the Law and the prophets. Therefore, the whole of the Old Law contains just one precept.

But contrary to this: In Ephesians 2:15 the Apostle says, “... making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees.” And he is talking about the Old Law, as is clear from a Gloss on this same passage. Therefore, the Old Law contains many commandments within itself.

I respond: Since a precept of the law is obligatory, it concerns something that ought to be done. But the fact that something ought to be done stems from its being necessary for some end. Hence, it is clearly part of the notion of a precept that it implies an ordering to an end, insofar as what is commanded is necessary or expedient for that end.

Now it is possible for a single end to be such that many things are necessary or expedient for it. Accordingly, precepts can be given with respect to different things insofar as they are ordered to a single end. Hence, one should claim that (a) all the precepts of the Old Law are one insofar as they are ordered to a single end, and yet that (b) they are many because of the diversity of the things that are ordered to that end.

Reply to objection 1: The Old Law is called a single law because it is ordered to a single end, and yet it contains diverse precepts because of the distinction among the things that are ordered to that end. Similarly, the craft of building is a single craft because of the oneness of its end, since it aims at building a house; and yet it contains diverse precepts because of the diversity of the acts that are ordered to this end.

Reply to objection 2: As the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 1:5, “The goal of the precept is charity.” For every law aims at establishing the friendship either of men with one another or of man with God. And so the whole of the Law is fulfilled in the single commandment, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” taken as the goal of all the commandments. For the love of God is also included in the love of neighbor when the neighbor is loved because of God. Hence, the Apostle used this one precept in place of the two precepts which have to do with the love of God and the love of neighbor and about which our

Lord says in Matthew 22:40, “On these two commandments depend the whole Law and the prophets.”

Reply to objection 3: As *Ethics* 9 puts it, “The friendly acts directed toward another proceed from the friendly acts that a man directs toward himself,” viz., as long as the man is related to the other in the same way that he is related to himself. And so when it says, “All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them,” a certain rule for the love of neighbor, implicitly contained in “You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” is being explicated. Hence, it is a sort of explication of that commandment.

Article 2

Does the Old Law contain moral precepts?

It seems that the Old Law does not contain any moral precepts:

Objection 1: As was established above (q. 91, a. 4-5), the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature. But moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore, they do not belong to the Old Law.

Objection 2: Divine law was supposed to assist men in cases where human reason is deficient; this is clear with those things pertaining to the Faith that lie beyond human reason. But man’s reason seems to be sufficient for moral precepts. Therefore, moral precepts are not part of the Old Law, which is a type of divine law.

Objection 3: The Old Law is called “the letter that kills,” as is clear from 2 Corinthians 3:6. But moral precepts give life and do not kill—this according to Psalm 118:93 (“I will never forget Your precepts (*iustificationes*), because in them You give me life.”) Therefore, no moral precepts belong to the Old Law.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 17:9 says, “He gave them discipline and the law of life for an inheritance.” But ‘discipline’ (*disciplina*) pertains to morals, since a Gloss on Hebrews 12:11 (“Every chastisement (*disciplina*) ...”) says, “Discipline involves the learning of morals through difficulties.” Therefore, the Law given by God contained moral precepts.

I respond: As is clear from Exodus 20:13 and 15 “You shall not kill ... You shall not steal”), the Old Law contained certain moral precepts. And this makes sense. For just as the main intention of human law is to establish the friendship of men with one another, so too the intention of divine law is mainly to establish man’s friendship with God. Now since, according to Ecclesiasticus 13:19 (“Every beast loves its like”), likeness is a reason for love, it is impossible for there to be friendship between man and God, who is absolutely good, unless men are made good. Hence, Leviticus 19:2 says, “You will be holy, for I am holy.” But the goodness of a man is virtue, which makes the one who has it good. And so precepts of the Old Law had by all means to be given concerning the acts of the virtues. And these are the moral precepts of the Law.

Reply to objection 1: The Old Law is distinguished from the law of nature not in the sense of being altogether different from it, but in the sense of adding something to it. For just as grace presupposes nature, so too divine law must presuppose the natural law.

Reply to objection 2: It was appropriate for divine law to provide for man not only in those matters for which reason is insufficient, but also in those matters concerning which man’s reason can be impeded. Now as far as the moral precepts are concerned, man’s reason cannot be mistaken about the universal principle in the case of the most general precepts of the law of nature, but it can nonetheless, because of habitual sinning, be blinded with respect to particular actions. On the other hand, there are many whose reason goes awry with respect to those other moral precepts that are like conclusions

deduced from the most general precepts of the law of nature, with the result that many people are such that their reason judges as permissible things that are evil in themselves (*mala secundum se*). Hence, man had to be given assistance, through the authority of divine law, against both kinds of error.

Similarly, in order to prevent the error of human reason that was occurring with many people, the things proposed to us for acceptance by faith (*credenda*) include not only some that reason cannot attain to, e.g., that God is three, but also some that right reason can attain to, e.g., that there is one God.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine shows in *De Spiritu et Littera*, the letter of the law can be an occasion of ‘killing’ even in the case of the moral precepts, viz., insofar as it commands what is good without offering the assistance of grace to fulfill what it commands.

Article 3

Does the Old Law contain ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts?

It seems that the Old Law does not contain ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts:

Objection 1: Every law that is given to men directs human acts. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 3), human acts are called moral acts. Therefore, it seems that the Old Law given to men should have contained only moral precepts.

Objection 2: Precepts called ‘ceremonial’ seem to pertain to divine worship. But divine worship is an act of one of the virtues, viz., the virtue of religion, which, as Tully says in *Rhetorica*, “offers worship and ceremony to the divine nature.” Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 2), the moral precepts are concerned with the acts of the virtues, it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinguished from the moral precepts.

Objection 3: The precepts that seem to be ceremonial are those which signify something in a figurative way. But as Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 2, “Among men it is words that have attained preeminence in signifying.” Therefore, there was no need for the Law to contain ceremonial precepts concerned with certain figurative actions.

But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 4:13-14 says, “Ten words He wrote in two tables of stone, and He commanded me at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do.” But the ten precepts of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore, besides the moral precepts there are also distinct ceremonial precepts.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 2), divine law is instituted mainly to order men toward God, whereas human law is instituted mainly to order men toward one another.

So human laws have concerned themselves with divine worship only in relation to the common good of men, and for this reason they have also concocted many things about divine matters insofar as this seemed expedient to them for the shaping of human morals; this is clear in the rites of the Gentiles.

By contrast, divine law ordered men toward one another insofar as this was consonant with their being ordered toward God—which is what divine law was mainly concerned with. Now man is ordered toward God not only through interior mental acts, i.e., acts of faith, hope, and love (*credere, sperare et amare*), but also through the exterior acts by which man professes his submission (*servitudo*) to God. And these acts are said to pertain to the worship of God.

According to some, this worship is called ‘ceremony’ (*caeremonia*) from the *munia*, i.e., gifts, of Ceres (*Caeres*), who was called the goddess of fruits, because they first offered oblations to God from their fruits. An alternative explanation is that, as Valerius Maximus claims, the name ‘ceremony’ was introduced to signify divine worship among the Latins because of a certain town near Rome called

‘Caere’; for when Rome was captured by the Gauls, the sacred artifacts of the Romans were taken there and reverently preserved. So, then, the precepts in the Law that are concerned with the worship of God are specifically called *ceremonial* precepts.

Reply to objection 1: Human acts also extend to divine worship, and so the Old Law given to men contains precepts concerning these acts as well.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 91, a. 3), the precepts of the law of nature are general and stand in need of specification. They are specified both by human law and by divine law. And just as the specifications that are made by human law are themselves said to belong not to the law of nature but to positive law instead, so too the specifications of the precepts of the law of nature that are made by divine law are distinguished from the moral precepts that belong to the law of nature.

Therefore, since *worshipping God* is an act of virtue, it has to do with a *moral* precept; however, the *specification* of this precept—viz., that God should be worshiped with such-and-such sacrifices and such-and-such gifts—belongs to the *ceremonial* precepts. And it is in this way that the ceremonial precepts are distinguished from the moral precepts.

Reply to objection 3: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1 Dionysius says that divine realities cannot be made manifest to men except under certain sensible likenesses. But these likenesses move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words but also proffered to the senses. And so divine realities are handed down in Scripture not only through likenesses expressed in words, but also through likenesses of things that are proposed to sight—and this is what the ceremonial precepts are concerned with.

Article 4

Does the Old Law contain judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts?

It seems that the Old Law does not contain any judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts:

Objection 1: In *Contra Faustum* Augustine says that in the Old Law “there are precepts that have to do with living life and precepts that have to do with signifying life.” But the precepts that have to do with living life are the moral precepts, whereas the precepts that have to do with signifying life are the ceremonial precepts. Therefore, one should not posit distinct judicial precepts in the law over and beyond these two types of precepts.

Objection 2: A Gloss on Psalm 118:102 (“I have not turned from your judgments”) says, “That is, I have not turned from what you have set up as a rule for living.” But a rule for living pertains to the moral precepts. Therefore, the judicial precepts should not be distinguished from the moral precepts.

Objection 3: Judgment seems to be an act of justice—this according to Psalm 93:15 (“Until justice is turned into judgment”). But acts of justice, like acts of the other virtues, have to do with the moral precepts. Therefore, the moral precepts include the judicial precepts within themselves and so should not be distinguished from them.

But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 6:1 says, “These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments.” But ‘precepts’ refers antonomastically to the moral precepts. Therefore, in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts there are also judicial precepts.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 2), it is the function of divine law to order men to one another and to God. Both of these functions belong in a general way to the dictates of the law of nature, which the moral precepts are concerned with, but both must be specified by divine law or human law.

For in speculative matters as well as in practical matters (*tam in speculativis quam in activis*) the naturally known principles are general. Therefore, just as the specification of the general precept regarding divine worship is accomplished through the ceremonial precepts, so too the specification of the general precept of justice that must be observed among men is specified through the judicial precepts.

Accordingly, one must posit three types of precepts in the Old Law, viz., (a) the *moral* precepts, which have to do with the dictates of the law of nature, (b) the *ceremonial* precepts, which are specifications of divine worship, and (c) the *judicial* precepts, which are specifications of the justice that is to be observed among men. Hence, in Romans 7:12, after having claimed that “the law is holy,” the Apostle adds, “The commandment is just and holy and good” (*iustum et sanctum et bonum*)—‘just’ with respect to the judicial precepts, ‘holy’ with respect to the ceremonial precepts (for ‘holy’ means what has been dedicated to God), and ‘good’, i.e., ‘upright’ (*honestum*), with respect to the moral precepts.

Reply to objection 1: Both the moral precepts and the judicial precepts have to do with directing human life. And they are both contained under one of the disjuncts Augustine posits, viz., under ‘precepts that have to do with living life’.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Judgment’ signifies the execution of justice, which consists in the application of reason in a determinate way to particular actions. Hence, the judicial precepts share something in common with the moral precepts, viz., being derived from reason, and something in common with the ceremonial precepts, viz., being specifications of general precepts. And this is why the judicial and moral precepts are sometimes included together under ‘judgments’, as in Deuteronomy 5:1 (“Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments ...”), while at other times it is the judicial and ceremonial precepts that are included together under ‘judgments’, as in Leviticus 18:4, “You shall do my judgments, and shall observe my precepts”—where ‘precepts’ refers to the moral precepts and ‘judgments’ refers to the judicial and ceremonial precepts.

Reply to objection 3: An act of justice, taken in general, pertains to the moral precepts, whereas the specification of that act as a particular pertains to the judicial precepts.

Article 5

Are there any precepts contained in the Old Law in addition to the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts?

It seems that there are precepts contained in the Old Law in addition to the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts:

Objection 1: The judicial precepts have to do with the act of justice, which is between man and man, whereas the ceremonial precepts have to do with the act of religion, by which God is worshiped. But as was explained above (q. 60, a. 5), there are many other virtues besides these two, e.g., temperance, fortitude, generosity, and lots of others. Therefore, the Old Law contains many other precepts in addition to those mentioned above.

Objection 2: Deuteronomy 11:1 says, “Love the Lord your God and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and mandates.” But as has been explained (a. 4), ‘precepts’ (*praecepta*) refers here to the moral precepts. Therefore, besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts, there are still other precepts contained in the Law, and these are called ‘mandates’ (*mandata*).

Objection 3: Deuteronomy 6:17 says, “Keep the precepts of the Lord your God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have commanded you.” Therefore, in addition to all the other precepts mentioned above, there are also testimonies (*testimonia*) contained in the Law.

Objection 4: Psalm 118:93 says, “I will never forget Your justifications (*iustificaciones*),” Therefore, the precepts of the Old Law include not only the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts, but justifications as well.

But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 6:1 says: “Here are the precepts, and ceremonies, and judgments which the Lord your God commanded you.” And these three are set forth at the beginning of the Law. Therefore, all the precepts of the Law are included in them.

I respond: Certain things are posited in the Law as precepts, whereas others are posited as ordered toward the fulfillment of the precepts. The precepts concern things that are to be done. For the fulfillment of these precepts man has two inducements, viz., (a) the authority of the one commanding and (b) the advantage associated with the fulfillment, i.e., the acquisition of some useful, pleasurable, or upright good, or the avoidance of some contrary evil.

Therefore, certain things had to be proposed in the Old Law which would indicate the authority of God commanding, e.g., Deuteronomy 6:4 (“Hear, O Israel, the Lord God your God is one”) and Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth”). These are called *testimonies* (*testimonia*).

Again, certain things had to be proposed as rewards for those who observed the law and punishments for those who transgressed it, as is clear from Deuteronomy 28:1 (“If you will listen to the voice of the Lord your God, He will make you higher than all the nations ...”). And these are called *justifications* (*iustificaciones*), insofar as God justly punishes some or rewards others.

Now things that are to be done fall under a precept only insofar as they have something of the character of what is owed. But there are two kinds of debts, one having to do with the rule of reason and the other having to do with the rule of a specifying law—just as the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5 distinguishes two modes of the just, viz., the morally just and the legally just.

There are two kinds of moral debts. For reason dictates that a thing is to be done either (a) as something necessary, without which the order of virtue cannot exist, or (b) as something useful for preserving the order of virtue in a better way. Accordingly, certain things pertaining to what is moral are either precisely commanded or precisely forbidden in the Law—e.g., “You shall not kill” and “You shall not steal.” And these are called *precepts* (*praecepta*) in the proper sense. On the other hand, certain things are commanded or forbidden not as precisely owed, but for the sake of what is better. And these can be called *mandates* (*mandata*), since they contain a certain inducement and persuasiveness—e.g., Exodus 22:26 (“If you take a garment from your neighbor in pledge, you should return it to him before sunset”) and others of this sort. This is why Jerome says that there is justice in the precepts and charity in the mandates.

Now debts arising from a specification of law have to do with the judicial precepts in human matters and with the ceremonial precepts in divine matters—although those having to do with punishments and rewards can also be called testimonies, insofar as they are declarations of divine justice. On the other hand, all the precepts of the Law can be called justifications, insofar as they are executions of legal justice.

In addition, there is an alternative way to distinguish mandates from precepts, viz., what are called precepts are such that God issues them through Himself, whereas mandates are such that He gives them through others, as the name ‘mandate’ seems to suggest.

From all of this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are included among the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts, whereas the other things do not have the character of precepts, but instead, as has been explained, are ordered toward the observance of the precepts.

Reply to objection 1: Justice alone, among the other virtues, implies the notion of what is owed. And so the moral is specifiable by law to the extent that it pertains to justice, a certain part of which is religion, as Tully says. Hence, legal justice cannot include anything except the ceremonial precepts and judicial precepts.

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3 and objection 4: The replies to the other objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 6

Was it right for the Old Law to have induced the observance of its precepts by temporal promises and threats?

It seems that it was not right for the Old Law to have induced observance of its precepts by temporal promises and threats:

Objection 1: The intention behind divine law is that men should submit to God through fear and love; hence, Deuteronomy 10:12 says, “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you, but that you fear the Lord your God, and walk in His ways, and love Him?” But a passionate desire (*cupiditas*) for temporal things leads one away from God; for in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Passionate desire is poison with respect to charity.” Therefore, temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the lawmaker’s intention—and this renders a law worthy of condemnation, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Politics* 2.

Objection 2: Divine law is more excellent than human law. But we see that among the sciences, a given science is higher to the extent that it proceeds by means of higher middle terms. Therefore, since human law tries to induce men by temporal threats and promises, it was not right for divine law to proceed in this way; instead, it should have proceeded by means of something loftier.

Objection 3: What happens indifferently to good men and bad men cannot be the reward for justice or the punishment for sin. But as Ecclesiastes 9:2 says, “All things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offers victims of sacrifice and to him that despises sacrifices.” Therefore, temporal goods or evils are not appropriately used as the rewards or punishments attached to the commandments of divine law.

But contrary to this: Isaiah 1:19-20 says, “If you are willing and listen to me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you are unwilling and provoke me to anger, the sword shall devour you.”

I respond: Just as in the speculative sciences men are induced to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic middle terms, so too in the case of all laws men are induced to observe the precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now we see in the case of the speculative sciences that the middle terms are proposed to the hearer in a way corresponding to his condition. Hence, in the sciences one must proceed in an orderly fashion so that learning might begin with things that are better known. So, too, one who wishes to induce a man to the observance of the precepts must begin to move him by appealing to things he has an affection for; for instance, children are enticed into doing things by childish treats.

Now it was explained above (q. 98, a. 1-3) that the Old Law disposed men for the Christ in the way that something imperfect disposes one for something perfect. Hence, the Old Law was given to a people still imperfect in comparison with the perfection that was to come through the Christ, and so, as is clear from Galatians 3:24, this people was comparable to a child who is under the tutelage of a teacher. Now man’s perfection consists in his adhering to spiritual things while holding temporal things in contempt, as is clear from what the Apostle says in Philippians 1:13 and 15 (“Forgetting the things that are behind and stretching forth myself to those that are before ... Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded.”) And the mark of imperfect men is that they desire temporal things and yet in relation to God, whereas the mark of corrupt men is that they set up temporal goods as their end. Hence, it was fitting

that it should be through temporal things, which imperfect men had an affection for, that the Old Law led men to God.

Reply to objection 1: The passionate desire by which a man sets up temporal goods as his end is poison with respect to charity. But the pursuit of temporal goods that a man desires in relation to God is a sort of path that leads the imperfect to love God—this according to Psalm 48:19 (“He will praise You when You are good to him.”)

Reply to objection 2: Human law induces men by temporal rewards or punishments that are to be delivered by men, whereas divine law induces men by rewards or punishments that are to be given by God. And it is in this way that divine law proceeds through more lofty middle terms.

Reply to objection 3: As is clear to one who reflects on the stories in the Old Testament, the general situation of the people under the Law was always prosperous as long as they observed the law, and as soon as they turned away from the precepts of the Law, they fell into many adversities. But some particular people, even while observing the justice of the Laws, fell into adversities, either because (a) they had already become spiritual, so that through this adversity they were drawn even further away from an affection for temporal things and their virtue was proved, or because (b) while fulfilling the exterior works of the Law, they had fixed their hearts wholly on temporal things and had separated their hearts from God—this according to Isaiah 29:13 (“This people honors me with their lips, but their heart is far from me”).

QUESTION 100

The Moral Precepts of the Old Law

We next have to consider each of the types of precept in the Old Law—first, the moral precepts (question 100); second, the ceremonial precepts (questions 101-103); and third, the judicial precepts (questions 104-105).

On the first topic there are twelve questions: (1) Do all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature? (2) Do the moral precepts of the Old Law have to do with the acts of all the virtues? (3) Are all the moral precepts of the Old Law traced back to the ten precepts of the Decalogue? (4) What about the way in which the precepts of the Decalogue are distinguished? (5) What about the number of precepts? (6) What about their order? (7) What about the way in which they are set down? (8) Is it possible to be dispensed from the precepts of the Decalogue? (9) Does the mode of practicing a virtue fall under a precept? (10) Does the mode of charity fall under a precept? (11) How are the other moral precepts distinguished? (12) Do the moral precepts of the Old Law give justification [before God]?

Article 1

Do all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?

It seems that not all the moral precepts [of the Old Law] belong to the law of nature:

Objection 1: Ecclesiasticus 17:9 says, “He gave them teaching, and the law of life for an inheritance.” But teaching (*doctrina*) is distinct from the law of nature, since the law of nature is not taught, but is instead had by natural instinct (*ex naturali instinctu*). Therefore, not all the moral precepts [of the Old Law] belong to the law of nature.

Objection 2: Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human law adds some things pertaining to good morals to what belongs to the law of nature; this is clear from the fact that the law of nature is the same for everyone, whereas diverse moral practices have been instituted among diverse peoples. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it was fitting for divine law to add some things pertaining to good morals over and beyond the law of nature.

Objection 3: Just as reason induces men to good morals, so too does faith; hence, Galatians 5:6 says, “Faith works through love” (*per dilectionem*). But faith is not included in the law of nature, since what belongs to the Faith lies beyond natural reason. Therefore, not all the moral precepts of divine law belong to the law of nature.

But contrary to this: In Romans 2:14 the Apostle says, “The Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law.” This has to be understood as referring to things that have to do with good morals. Therefore, all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.

I respond: The moral precepts—as opposed to the ceremonial and judicial precepts—concern things that in their own right (*secundum se*) have to do with good morals.

Now since human morals are set apart by their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, morals are called good when they are consonant with reason and bad when they are at variance with reason. And just as every judgment of speculative reason stems from the natural cognition of first principles, so too, as was explained above (q. 94, a. 2), every judgment of practical reason stems from naturally known principles on the basis of which one can proceed to make judgments in various ways about various matters.

For instance, among human acts there are some so clear that they can immediately, with very little consideration, be approved of or disapproved of on the basis of these general first principles.

By contrast, there are others such that judging them requires an extensive consideration of various

circumstances that only the wise, and not just anyone, can carefully investigate—in the way that the role of investigating the particular conclusions of the sciences falls only to the philosophers and not to just anyone.

Lastly, there are some acts such that in order for a man to pass judgment on them, he needs to be assisted by divine teaching. This is the case with the things that have to be taken on faith (*credenda*).

So, then, it is clear that since (a) the moral precepts concern matters that belong to good morals, and (b) these good morals are consonant with reason, and (c) every one of human reason's judgments stems in some way or other from natural reason, it must be the case that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature—though in different ways.

For some precepts are such that every man's natural reason judges immediately and *per se* that such-and-such should be done or should not be done, e.g., "Honor your father and your mother," "You shall not kill," and "You shall not steal" (Exodus 20:12-15). Precepts of this sort belong to the law of nature absolutely speaking.

But other precepts are such that it is the wise who, after a more subtle investigation by reason, judge that they should be observed. And these precepts belong to the law of nature, but in such a way that they require the sort of teaching by which the young are instructed by the wise—e.g., "Stand up in the presence of a hoary head, and honor the elderly person" (Leviticus 19:32), and others of this sort.

Finally, there are other precepts such that in order to make a judgment about them, human reason needs divine instruction, through which we learn about divine things, e.g., "You shall not make for yourself a graven image, nor any likeness ... nor shall you take the name of your God in vain" (Exodus 20:4,7).

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from has been said.

Article 2

Do the moral precepts of the Law have to do with all the acts of the virtues?

It seems that the precepts of the Law do not have to do with all the acts of the virtues:

Objection 1: The observance of the precepts of the Old Law is called 'justification'—this according to Psalm 118:8 ("I will keep Your justifications"). But a justification is an execution of justice. Therefore, the moral precepts have to do only with acts of justice.

Objection 2: Whatever falls under a precept has the character of something owed (*debitum*). But the character of what is owed belongs not to the other virtues but only to justice, whose proper act is to render to each person what is owed to him. Therefore, the moral precepts of the Law have to do only with acts of justice and not with acts of the other virtues.

Objection 3: As Isidore says, every law is made for the common good. But as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 5, among the virtues it is only justice that has to do with the common good. Therefore, the moral precepts have to do only with acts of justice.

But contrary to this: Ambrose says, "Sin is a transgression of divine law and disobedience against the heavenly commandments." But all the acts of the virtues are such that sins are opposed to them. Therefore, divine law has to give directives about the acts of all the virtues.

I respond: Since, as has been established (q. 90, a. 2), the precepts of the Law are ordered toward the common good, the precepts of the Law must be distinguished in a way corresponding to the different types of communities. Hence, in his *Politics* the Philosopher teaches that in a city ruled by a king it is

necessary to establish laws different from those established in a city ruled by the people or by certain people who are in charge of the city.

Now the type of community to which human law is ordered is different from that toward which divine law is ordered. For human law is ordered toward the civil community (*ad communitatem civilem*), which is a community of men with respect to each other. Now men are ordered toward one another through the exterior acts by which men share a common life (*communicant*) with one another, and it is a common life of this sort that is relevant to the nature of justice, which properly directs the human community. And so human law proposes precepts having to do only with acts of justice; and, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, if human law commands acts of the other virtues, this is so only to the extent that those acts take on the character of justice.

By contrast, the community directed by divine law is the community of men with God, whether in the present life or in the future life. And so divine law sets forth precepts having to do with all the things through which men are well-ordered toward their common life with God (*ad communicationem cum Deo*). Now man is joined to God by his reason (*ratio*), or mind (*mens*), in which the image of God resides. And so divine law sets forth precepts having to do with all the things through which man's reason is well-ordered. But this ordering occurs through the acts of all the virtues; for the intellectual virtues render acts of reason well-ordered in themselves, whereas the moral virtues render the acts of reason well-ordered with respect to interior passions and exterior operations. And so it is clearly fitting for divine law to set forth precepts having to do with the acts of all the virtues—yet in such a way that those acts without which the order of virtue (i.e., the order of reason) cannot be maintained fall under the obligation of a *precept*, whereas others that have to do with the flourishing of perfect virtue (*bene esse virtutis perfectae*) fall under the admonition of a *counsel*.

Reply to objection 1: The fulfillment of the commandments of the Law, even of those commandments having to do with the acts of the other virtues, has the character of justification insofar as it is just that man should obey God—or, alternatively, insofar as it is just that everything having to do with man should be subject to reason.

Reply to objection 2: Justice, properly speaking, has to do with what one man owes to another (*debitum unius hominis ad alium*), whereas with all the other virtues there is a 'debt' (*debitum*) that the lower powers owe to reason. And corresponding to the notion of this latter sort of debt, the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5 speaks of a sort of metaphorical justice.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.

Article 3

Are all the moral precepts of the Old Law traced back to the ten precepts of the Decalogue?

It seems that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are traced back to (*reducantur*) the ten precepts of the Decalogue:

Objection 1: As Matthew 22:37,39 puts it, the first and principal precepts of the Law are "You shall love the Lord your God" and "You shall love your neighbor." But these two precepts are not contained in the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue.

Objection 2: The moral precepts are not traced back to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of the Decalogue there is one ceremonial precept, viz., "Remember to

keep holy the Sabbath day” (Exodus 20:8). Therefore, the moral precepts are not traced back to all the precepts of the Decalogue.

Objection 3: The moral precepts have to do with all the acts of the virtues. But only precepts having to do with acts of justice are found among the precepts of the Decalogue—as is clear from running through them one by one. Therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue do not contain all the moral precepts.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Matthew 5:11 (“Blessed are you when they shall revile you ...”) says, “After Moses had proposed the ten precepts, he afterwards explained them through their parts (*per partes*).” Therefore, all the precepts of the Law are, as it were, parts of the precepts of the Decalogue.

I respond: The precepts of the Decalogue differ from the other precepts of the Law in the fact that the precepts of the Decalogue are such that God Himself (*Deus per seipsum*) is said to have presented them to the people, whereas He presented the other precepts to the people through Moses. Therefore, the precepts belonging to the Decalogue are those that man has knowledge of from God Himself. But these precepts include (a) the ones that can be known immediately, with very little reflection, on the basis of first general principles and, again, (b) the ones that are known immediately on the basis of divinely infused faith.

Therefore, there are two kinds of precepts that are not counted among the precepts of the Decalogue, viz., (a) precepts which are first general principles and which do not need to be made known (*editio*) in any way other than by being written in natural reason as something known *per se*, e.g., ‘A man should not do evil to anyone’ and others of this sort, and, again, (b) precepts that are found to be consonant with reason through the diligent inquiry of the wise, since these precepts come to the people from God through the teaching of the wise. Still, both of these sorts of precepts are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue, though in different ways. For the ones that are first general principles are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue in the way that principles are contained in their proximate conclusions, whereas, conversely, the ones that are known through the wise are contained in the precepts of the Decalogue in the way that conclusions are contained in their principles.

Reply to objection 1: The two precepts in question are first general precepts of the law of nature, and they are known *per se* to human reason, either by nature or by faith. And so all the precepts of the Decalogue are traced back to these two precepts in the way that conclusions are traced back to their general principles.

Reply to objection 2: The precept about the observance of the Sabbath is a moral precept in a certain respect, viz., insofar as it commands man to free up some time (*aliquo tempore vacet*) for divine matters—this according to Psalm 45:11 (“Be still (*vacate*) and see that I am God”). It is in this sense that it is counted among the precepts of the Decalogue.

However, it is not a moral precept as far as the exact specification of the time is concerned (*quantum ad taxationem temporis*), since in this respect it is a ceremonial precept.

Reply to objection 3: The character of something’s being owed (*ratio debiti*) is less noticeable (*magis latens*) in the case of the other virtues than it is in the case of justice. And so the precepts having to do with the other virtues are not as well known to the people as the precepts about the acts of justice are. It is for this reason that acts of justice fall specifically under the precepts of the Decalogue, which are the first elements of the Law.

Article 4

Are the precepts of the Decalogue correctly distinguished from one another?

It seems that the precepts of the Decalogue are not correctly distinguished from one another [in Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5:7-22]:

Objection 1: Worship (*latria*) is a virtue different from faith (*fides*), and the precepts are given with respect to acts of the virtues. But what it says at the beginning of the Decalogue, viz., “You shall not have strange gods before me,” has to do with faith, whereas what is then added, viz., “You shall not make graven images,” has to do with worship. Therefore, as Augustine says, these are two precepts and not just one.

Objection 2: The affirmative precepts contained in the Law, e.g., “Honor your father and your mother,” are distinct from the negative precepts, e.g., “You shall not kill.” But “I am the Lord your God” is affirmative, whereas what is added, “You shall not have strange gods before me,” is negative. Therefore, as Augustine claims, they are two precepts and are not contained under a single precept.

Objection 3: In Romans 7:7 the Apostle says, “I would not have known concupiscence if the Law had not said, ‘You shall not covet’.” So it seems that the precept “You shall not covet” is a single precept. Therefore, it should not be split into two precepts.

But contrary to this is the authority of Augustine in *Glossa super Exodum*, where he says that there are three precepts having to do with God and seven having to do with our neighbor.

I respond: The precepts of the Decalogue are divided up in different ways by different authors.

For example, Hesychius, in commenting on Leviticus 26:26 (“... so that ten women are baking bread in one oven”), says that the observance of the Sabbath does not belong to the ten precepts, because it is not the case that the letter of this precept must be observed for all times. Yet he distinguishes four precepts that have to do with God:

(a) The first is: “I am the Lord your God.”

(b) The second is: “You shall not have strange gods before me.” (In like manner, Jerome also distinguishes these two in commenting on Hosea 10:10 (“... because of their two iniquities”).)

(c) The third precept, he claims, is: “You shall not make graven images for yourselves.”

(d) The fourth is: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.”

On the other hand, he claims that there are six precepts that have to do with our neighbor:

(a) The first is: “Honor your father and your mother.”

(b) The second is: “You shall not kill.”

(c) The third is: “You shall not commit adultery.”

(d) The fourth is: “You shall not steal.”

(e) The fifth is: “You shall not bear false witness.”

(d) The sixth is: “You shall not covet.”

First of all, however, it seems wrong for the precept having to do with the observance of the Sabbath to be placed among the precepts of the Decalogue if it has nothing at all to do with the Decalogue.

Second, since Matthew 6:24 says, “No man can serve two masters,” it would seem that “I am the Lord your God” and “You shall not have strange gods” have the same import (*eiusdem rationis esse*) and fall under the same precept. This is why Origen, who also distinguishes four precepts ordered toward God, takes these two as one precept, while positing (a) “You shall not make graven images” as the second precept, (b) “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain” as the third precept, and (c) “Remember to keep holy the Sabbath” as the fourth precept. The other six precepts he posits in the

same way that Hesychius does.

However, since making graven images or likenesses is prohibited only insofar as they are not worshiped as gods (for as Exodus 25:18-20 says, God commanded that an image of the Seraphim be made for the tabernacle itself), Augustine more correctly places “You shall not have strange gods” and “You shall not make graven images” under a single precept.

Similarly, coveting (*concupiscentia*) another’s wife for sexual intercourse has to do with concupiscence of the flesh (*concupiscentia carnis*), whereas coveting other things that are desired as possessions has to do with concupiscence of the eyes (*concupiscentia oculorum*). Hence, Augustine posits two precepts here, one against coveting another’s goods and one against coveting another’s wife. And so Augustine posits three precepts in relation to God and seven in relation to one’s neighbor. And this is better.

Reply to objection 1: Worship is nothing other than a certain declaration (*protestatio*) of faith, and so it is not the case that one precept should be given about worship and another about faith. Instead, a precept should be given about worship rather than about faith, since the precept of faith (*praeceptum fidei*) is presupposed by the Decalogue in the same way that the precept of love (*praeceptum dilectionis*) is. For just as the first general precepts of the law of nature are known *per se* to anyone who has natural reason and so do not need to be promulgated, so too the precept that one ought to believe in God (*credere in Deum*) is a first precept and is known *per se* to anyone who has faith. For as Hebrews 11:6 says, “He who comes to God must believe that He exists.” And so this precept needs no promulgation other than the infusion of faith.

Reply to objection 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative precepts when the one is not included in the other. For instance, the precept that no man should be killed is not included in the precept about honoring one’s parents, or vice versa.

By contrast, when the affirmative precept is included in the negative one, or vice versa, then it is not the case that there are different precepts about the matter in question. For instance, the precept “You shall not steal” is not a different precept from “Take care of another’s property” or “Return another’s property to him.” And for the same reason, the precept about believing in God and the precept about not believing in strange gods are not diverse precepts.

Reply to objection 3: All types of coveting (*concupiscentia*) share a general definition, and this is why the Apostle speaks in the singular about the commandment concerning coveting. Yet the reason why Augustine distinguishes different precepts about not coveting is that the types of coveting differ from one another in species. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, the types of desire (*concupiscentia*) differ from one another in species according to the differences among the actions or among the things desired.

Article 5

Is there an appropriate number of precepts in the Decalogue?

It seems that there is an inappropriate number of precepts in the Decalogue:

Objection 1: As Ambrose says, “Sin is a transgression of divine law and disobedience against the heavenly commandments.” But sins are distinguished from one another by whether a man sins against God, against his neighbor, or against himself. Therefore, since among the precepts of the Decalogue there are none that order a man toward himself, but only ones that order him toward God and toward his neighbor, it seems that there is an insufficient number of precepts in the Decalogue.

Objection 2: Just as the observance of the Sabbath had to do with the worship of God, so also did the observance of the other solemn feasts (*solemnitates*) and the immolation of sacrifices. But among the precepts of the Decalogue there is a single precept having to do with the observance of the Sabbath. Therefore, there should also be some precepts having to do with the other solemn feasts and with the rite of sacrifices.

Objection 3: Just as one can sin against God by perjuring himself, so too he can sin against God by blasphemy or by various deceptions that are opposed to divine teaching. But there is a single precept forbidding perjury, when it says, “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.” Therefore, the sins of blasphemy and false teaching should be prohibited by some precept of the Decalogue.

Objection 4: Just as a man has a natural love for his parents, so too he has a natural love for his children; indeed, the commandment of charity extends to all one’s neighbors. But the precepts of the Decalogue are ordered toward charity—this according to 1 Timothy 1:5, “The end of the commandment is charity.” Therefore, just as there is a precept having to do with one’s parents, so also there should have been precepts having to do with one’s children and other neighbors.

Objection 5: In every genus of sin it is possible to sin with one’s heart and to sin with one’s deeds. But within certain genera of sin, viz., in the case of theft and adultery, sinning by deed is prohibited in one place—viz., when it says, “You shall not commit adultery” and “You shall not steal”—and sinning with the heart is prohibited in a separate place—viz., when it says, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s goods” and “You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife.” Therefore, the same thing should have been done with the sin of homicide and the sin of false witness.

Objection 6: Just as a sin can stem from a disorder of the concupiscible appetite, so too a sin can stem from a disorder of the irascible appetite. But there are certain precepts prohibiting disordered desire, when it says, “Do not covet ...” Therefore, the Decalogue should also have contained some precepts prohibiting a disordered irascible appetite. Therefore, it does not seem that there is an appropriate number of precepts in the Decalogue.

But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 4:13 says, “He showed you His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in the two tables of stone.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), just as the precepts of human law order a man toward the human community, so the precepts of divine law order a man toward a sort of community or republic of men under God. Now in order for someone to live a good life in a community, two things are required. The first is that he behave well toward the one who presides over the community, and the second is that the man behave well toward the others who are his companions and co-participants in the community. Therefore, divine law must first lay down some precepts ordering a man toward God and, second, it must lay down other precepts ordering a man toward those others who are living together with him as his neighbors under God.

Now there are three things a man owes to the ruler of his community: (a) fidelity, (b) reverence, and (c) service (*famulatus*). Fidelity to one’s lord consists in not conferring on someone else the honor of preeminence; and on this score there is the first precept, when it says, “You shall not have strange gods.” Reverence to one’s lord requires that nothing injurious be done to him; and on this score there is the second precept, i.e., “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.” Service is owed to a lord in repayment for the benefits his subjects receive from him; and here the relevant precept is the third, which has to do with the sanctification of the Sabbath in remembrance of the creation of things.

On the other hand, someone behaves well toward his neighbor both in a specific way and in a general way:

He behaves well in a specific way to the extent that he renders what he owes to those he is indebted to. And on this score there is the precept that has to do with honoring one’s parents.

He behaves well in a general way, i.e., with respect to everyone, in that he inflicts no harm on anyone either by his deeds or with his mouth or with his heart.

As for deeds, in some cases harm is inflicted on one's neighbor in his very person, i.e., with respect to his existence as a person; and this is prohibited when it says, "You shall not kill." Again, in some cases the harm is inflicted in a person joined to him in the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited when it says, "You shall not commit adultery." And in some cases the harm is inflicted in his possessions, which are ordered both to him and to those conjoined to him, and this is prohibited by saying, "You shall not steal."

On the other hand, harm caused with the mouth is prohibited when it says, "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor."

And harm caused with the heart is prohibited when it says, "You shall not covet."

Moreover, the three precepts ordered toward God could also be distinguished in accord with the specific differences *by deed*, *with the mouth*, and *with the heart*. The first of these three precepts has to do with deeds, and thus it says there, "You shall not make graven images." The second precept has to do with the mouth, and thus it says, "You shall not take the name of your God in vain." The third precept has to do with the heart, since in the sanctification of the Sabbath, insofar as this is a moral precept, the stillness of the heart is directed toward God.

Alternatively, according to Augustine, through the first precept we revere the unity of the First Principle, through the second precept we revere God's truth, and through the third precept we revere His goodness, by which we are sanctified and in which, as our end, we come to rest.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible replies to this objection.

First, the precepts of the Decalogue are traced back to the precept of love. Now a precept had to be given to man concerning the love of God and neighbor, since in this regard the natural law had been obscured because of sin. By contrast, this was not the case with respect to the love of self, because (a) in this regard the natural law was still alive—or, alternatively, because (b) the love of self is also included in the love of God and neighbor, since it is in ordering himself to God that a man has genuine love for himself. And this is why the precepts of the Decalogue contains only precepts having to do one's neighbor and with God.

The second possible reply is that the precepts of the Decalogue are the ones that the people received directly from God. Hence, Deuteronomy 10:4 says, "He wrote in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Thus, the precepts of the Decalogue had to be such that they could be immediately understood by the people. Now a precept has the character of something that is owed, and the fact that a man necessarily owes something to God or to his neighbor is easily grasped by a man—and especially by a man of faith (*fidelis*). However, it is not so readily apparent that a man is necessarily owed something in those matters that pertain to himself and not to another. For at first glance it seems that everyone is free in matters that pertain to himself. And so the precepts that prohibit a man's disorders with respect to himself come to the people later on through the instruction of the wise. This is why they do not belong to the Decalogue.

Reply to objection 2: All the solemn feasts of the Old Testament were instituted in commemoration of some divine favor, either a past favor remembered or a future favor prefigured; and, likewise, it was for this reason that all the sacrifices were offered. Now among all of God's favors, the first and foremost is the favor of creation, which is commemorated in the sanctification of the Sabbath. Hence, Exodus 20:11 gives the following as the reason for this precept: "For in six days God made heaven and earth, etc." Moreover, among all the future favors that had to be prefigured, the principal and final one was rest in the mind of God, either in the present life through grace or in the future life through glory. This was likewise prefigured by the Sabbath observance. Hence, Isaiah 58:13 says, "If you turn away your foot from the Sabbath, from doing your own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath

delightful, and the holy of the Lord glorious ...” For these are the favors that are first and foremost in the minds of men, especially men of faith.

By contrast, the other solemn feasts are celebrated because of certain particular favors that were temporally transitory. Take, for instance, the celebration of the Passover because of the favor of the past liberation from Egypt and because of the future passion of Christ. These events have passed in time, leading us into the rest of the spiritual Sabbath. That is why, among the precepts of the Decalogue, mention was made only of the Sabbath, while all the other solemn feasts and sacrifices were left out.

Reply to objection 3: As the Apostle says in Hebrews 6:16, “Men swear by one greater than themselves, and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy.” And so since oaths are common to everyone, the prohibition of disordered oaths is specifically made in a precept of the Decalogue.

By contrast, the sin of false teaching is relevant only to a few people, and hence it did not have to be mentioned among the precepts of the Decalogue. (Still, according to one interpretation, the precept “You shall not take the name of your God in vain” does prohibit false teaching; for instance, there is a Gloss that expounds it as follows: “You shall not claim that Christ is a creature.”)

Reply to objection 4: Natural reason directly dictates to a man that he should not inflict injury on anyone, and so the precept prohibiting harm extends to everyone. However, natural reason does not directly dictate that a man should do something for another’s benefit, except in the case of someone to whom the man is indebted. Now the debt a child owes to his father is so obvious that it cannot be denied by any sort of evasion. For the father is a principle of generation and of *esse* and, afterwards, of upbringing and teaching. And this is why it does not fall under a precept of the Decalogue that support or obedience should be given to anyone other than one’s parents.

On the other hand, parents do not seem to be indebted to their children because of any favors received from them; rather, just the opposite is the case. Likewise, as the Philosopher puts it in *Ethics* 8, a child is a part of his father, and fathers love their children as a part of themselves. Hence, the reason why there are no precepts in the Decalogue with regard to love of one’s children is the same as the reason why there are likewise no precepts that order a man toward himself.

Reply to objection 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of riches are desirable for their own sake, insofar as they have the character of a pleasurable good or a useful good. For this reason, what had to be prohibited in their case was not just the deed, but the desire (*concupiscentia*) as well.

By contrast, homicide (*homicidium*) and falsehood are horrific in their own right; for we naturally love our neighbor and love the truth, and they are not desired for the sake of anything else. And so as far as the sins of homicide and false witness were concerned, it was unnecessary to prohibit the sin of the heart, but necessary only to prohibit the deed.

Reply to objection 6: As was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), all of the irascible passions stem from the concupiscible passions. And so in the precepts of the Decalogue, which are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, mention had to be made only of the concupiscible passions and not of the irascible passions.

Article 6

Are the precepts of the Decalogue correctly ordered?

It seems that the precepts of the Decalogue (see Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5:7-22) are not correctly ordered:

Objection 1: Love of neighbor seems to be prior to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is—this according to 1 John 4:20 (“If one does not love his brother whom he sees, how can he love God whom he sees not?”). But the first three precepts have to do with love of God, whereas the other seven have to do with love of neighbor. Therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue are incorrectly ordered.

Objection 2: Acts of the virtues are commanded by the affirmative precepts, whereas acts of the vices are prohibited by the negative precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the *Categories*, the vices must first be rooted out before the virtues are planted. Therefore, among the precepts having to do with our neighbor, the negative precepts, rather than the affirmative precepts, should have come first.

Objection 3: The precepts of the Law are given with respect to human acts. But the act of the heart comes before the act of the mouth or the exterior deed. Therefore, it is incorrect for the precepts to be ordered in such a way that the ones having to do with not coveting, which pertain to the heart, come last.

But contrary to this: In Romans 13:1 the Apostle says, “The things that are from God are orderly (*ordinata*).” But as has been explained (a. 3), the precepts of the Decalogue are directly from God. Therefore, they are in the correct order.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 5, ad 1), the precepts of the Decalogue are given with respect to those things that the human mind grasps immediately and quickly. But it is clear that something is better grasped by reason to the extent that its contrary has a greater and more serious (*gravius*) opposition to reason.

Now it is clear that since reason’s ordering takes its inception from the end, it is maximally opposed to reason that a man should find himself disordered with respect to his end. But the end of human life and society is God. And so man had to be ordered by the precepts of the Decalogue in the first place toward God, since the contrary of this is the most serious of all contraries—just as in an army, which is ordered toward the general as an end, the soldier first of all submits himself to the general, the contrary of this being the most serious of all, whereas, second, he is coordinated with the other soldiers.

Now among the steps by which we are ordered toward God, the first is that a man faithfully submit himself to God and that he have no commerce (*habens nullam participationem*) with God’s rivals. The second step is that he exhibit reverence for Him, whereas the third is that he offer Him his service. In an army, it is a greater sin if a soldier, acting unfaithfully, makes a pact with the enemy than if he does something disrespectful to the general, and the latter is more serious than if he is found deficient in some matter of obedience (*obsequium*).

On the other hand, among the precepts ordering one toward his neighbor, it is clear that it is more repugnant to reason, and a graver sin, if a man does not observe the due ordering to those persons whom he is more indebted to. And so among the precepts that order one toward his neighbor, the first to be posited is the precept having to do with one’s parents. Among the other precepts there is likewise an ordering that corresponds to the gravity of the sins. For it is more grave, and more repugnant to reason, to sin by a deed than to sin with one’s mouth, and it is more grave to sin with one’s mouth than in one’s heart. Furthermore, among the sins that involve deeds, homicide, by which an already existing man’s life is taken, is graver than adultery, which undermines certitude about the offspring who are to be born (*per quod impeditur certitudo prolis nasciturae*); and adultery is graver than theft, which has to do with external goods.

Reply to objection 1: Even though our neighbor is better known to us than God according to the way of the senses, love of God is nonetheless the reason for love of neighbor. This will be explained below (*ST* 2-2, q. 25, a. 1). And so the precepts ordering one toward God had to be placed ahead of the

others.

Reply to objection 2: Just as God is the universal principle of *esse* for all things, so too the father is a sort of principle of *esse* for his child (*principium quoddam essendi filio*). And so it is appropriate that after the precepts having to do with God, there should be a precept having to do with one's parents.

Now the argument [contained in objection 2] goes through when the affirmative and negative precepts in question have to do with the same genus of action—although even then the argument does not have complete efficacy. For even if, in the order of execution, vices must be uprooted before virtues are planted—this according to Psalm 33:15 (“Turn away from evil and do good”) and Isaiah 1:16-17 (“Cease to act perversely, learn to act well”)—still, virtue is cognitively prior to sin, since, as *De Anima* 1 says, it is through what is straight that one comes to know what is crooked. As Romans 3:20 puts it, “By the Law is knowledge of sin.”

According to this line of reasoning, it was right for the affirmative precept to have come first. Still, this is not the reason for the ordering [we have]; rather, the reason is the one set forth [at the beginning of this reply]. For in the precepts having to do with God, which are on the first tablet, the affirmative precept comes last, since transgressing it produces a less grievous sin (*inducit minorem reatum*).

Reply to objection 3: Even if the sin of the heart is prior in execution, nonetheless, the prohibition of it comes later conceptually (*in ratione*).

Article 7

Are the precepts of the Decalogue set down in an appropriate way?

It seems that the precepts of the Decalogue are not set down (*tradantur*) in an appropriate way:

Objection 1: The affirmative precepts order one toward acts of the virtues, whereas the negative precepts draw one back from acts of the vices. But with respect to any subject matter whatsoever, there are virtues and vices opposed to one another. Therefore, in any subject matter about which a precept of the Decalogue gives direction, there should have been both an affirmative precept and a negative precept. Therefore, it is inappropriate for there to be affirmative precepts for some subject matters and negative precepts for others.

Objection 2: Isidore says that every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the Decalogue belong to divine law. Therefore, a reason should have been given for each of the precepts, and not just for the first and third.

Objection 3: Through the observance of the precepts one merits rewards from God. But God's promises have to do with the rewards attached to the precepts. Therefore, a promise should have been made in each of the precepts, and not just in the first and the fourth.

Objection 4: The Old Law is called the ‘law of fear’, because it was through threats of punishment that it induced men to observe the precepts. But all the precepts of the Decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore, a threat of punishment should have been made in each of the precepts, and not just in the first and the second.

Objection 5: All the precepts of God should be retained in memory; for Proverbs 3:3 says, “Write them on the tablets of your heart.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for a mention of memory to be made in just the third precept. And so it seems that the precepts of the Decalogue were inappropriately set down.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 11:21 says, “You have ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, He has preserved an appropriate mode of setting down the precepts of

His law.

I respond: The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of divine law; hence, Deuteronomy 4:6 says, “This is your wisdom, and understanding in the sight of the nations.” But it is the role of wisdom to dispose all things in a fitting manner and order. And so it ought to be clear that the precepts of the Law have been set down in an appropriate way.

Reply to objection 1: The negation of one of two opposites always follows from the affirmation of the other, but it is not always the case that the affirmation of one of two opposites follows from the negation of the other. For instance, ‘If something is white, then it is not black’ is valid, but ‘If something is not black, then it is white’ is not valid. For the negation extends to more things than the affirmation does. Hence, it is likewise the case that ‘One should not do harm’, which is a negative precept, extends to more persons (*personas*) as a primary dictate of reason than does ‘One ought to give obedience (or benefits) to someone’.

However, it is a dictate of reason in the first instance that one ought to give obedience (or benefits) to those from whom he has received benefits, as long as he has not yet repaid them. But, as *Ethics* 8 says, there are two beings in return for whose benefits no one can make sufficient repayment, viz., God and his father. And this is why there are only two affirmative precepts, one having to do with honoring one’s parents and the other having to do with the celebration of the Sabbath in commemoration of God’s favors.

Reply to objection 2: The precepts that are purely moral have an obvious reason behind them, and so there was no need for a reason to be added to them.

However, some precepts are such that either a ceremonial precept or the specification of a moral precept is added to them. For instance, in the first precept there is the addition of “You shall not make graven images,” and in the third precept the day of the Sabbath is specified. And this is why a reason had to be given in these two cases.

Reply to objection 3: Men order their acts for the most part toward some sort of usefulness. And so the promise of a reward had to be attached to those precepts from which no usefulness seemed to follow or by which some sort of usefulness was impeded. Now since parents are already in their receding years, no usefulness is expected from them. And so a promise is attached to the precept about honoring one’s parents. The same holds for the precept that prohibits idolatry. For this precept seems to impede the apparent usefulness which men believe they can attain by entering into a pact with the demons.

Reply to objection 4: As *Ethics* 10 says, punishments are especially necessary for those who are prone to evil. And so a threat of punishment is added only to those precepts in which there was a tendency toward evil.

Now men were prone to idolatry because of the general practice of the Gentiles. Similarly, there were also men prone to perjury because of the frequency of oaths. This is why a threat is attached to the first two precepts.

Reply to objection 5: The precept about the Sabbath is posited as a commemoration of a past favor, and this is why it contains a specific mention of memory.

An alternative reply is that the precept about the Sabbath has adjoined to it a specification that does not belong to the law of nature, and that is why this precept requires a special admonition.

Article 8

Can dispensations be granted from the precepts of the Decalogue?

It seems that there can be dispensations from the precepts of the Decalogue:

Objection 1: The precepts of the Decalogue belong to the natural law, and as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, what is naturally just fails in some cases and is mutable, just as human nature is. But as was explained above (q. 96, a. 6 and q. 97, a. 4), the failure of the law in some particular cases is the reason for granting a dispensation. Therefore, a dispensation can be granted from the precepts of the Decalogue.

Objection 2: God is related to divinely given law in the same way that man is related to human law. But man is able to grant dispensations from those precepts of the law that are man-made. Therefore, since the precepts of the Decalogue were established by God, it seems that God is able to grant dispensations from them. But prelates function on earth in the place of God; for in 2 Corinthians 2:10 the Apostle says, “If I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.” Therefore, prelates, too, can grant dispensations from the precepts of the Decalogue.

Objection 3: The prohibition of homicide is included among the precepts of the Decalogue. But it seems that men grant dispensations from this precept, e.g., when, in accord with the precepts of human law, certain men, viz., evildoers and enemies, are lawfully killed. Therefore, dispensations can be granted from the precepts of the Decalogue.

Objection 4: The observance of the Sabbath is included among the precepts of the Decalogue. But a dispensation was granted from this precept; for 1 Maccabees 2:41 says, “And they determined in that day, saying, ‘Whoever shall come up against us to fight on the Sabbath day, we will fight against him’.” Therefore, dispensations can be granted from the precepts of the Decalogue.

But contrary to this: In Isaiah 24:5 certain people are rebuked because “they have changed the Law, they have broken the everlasting covenant”—which must, it seems, refer especially to the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue cannot be altered by a dispensation.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 96, a. 6 and q. 97, a. 4), a dispensation should be granted from a precept when some particular case occurs in which the observance of the letter of the law is contrary to the lawmaker’s intention. Now the intention of every lawmaker is ordered first and principally toward the common good and, second, toward the order of justice and virtue, in accord with which the common good is attained and preserved.

Therefore, if there are any precepts which embody the very conservation of the common good or the very order of justice and virtue, then precepts of this sort preserve the lawmaker’s intention and so are such that dispensations cannot be granted from them. For instance, if a community were to establish the precept ‘No one may destroy the republic or betray the city-state to the enemy’, or the precept ‘No one may do anything in an evil or unjust way’, then there could not be dispensations from precepts of this sort.

By contrast, if there were other precepts which were ordered to the [primary] precepts and which specified certain particular modes for them, then a dispensation could be granted from such precepts to the extent that their being overridden (*per omissionem huiusmodi praeceptorum*) in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the primary precepts that embody the lawmaker’s intention. For instance, if, in order to save the republic, it were decreed in a city that certain men should take turns keeping guard over the city when it is under siege, then some men could be dispensed from this precept for the sake of some greater advantage.

Now the precepts of the Decalogue embody the intention of the lawmaker, viz., God. For the precepts of the first tablet, which are ordered toward God, embody the very ordering toward the common

and final good, which is God. On the other hand, the precepts of the second tablet embody the very order of justice to be observed among men, so that, namely, nothing undue is done to anyone and what is due is rendered to each one; for the precepts of the Decalogue should be understood according to this rationale. And so there cannot be any dispensations at all from the precepts of the Decalogue.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is not speaking here of the naturally just, which embodies the very order of justice; for the precept ‘Justice is to be preserved’ never fails. Rather, he is speaking about specific modes of observing justice, and in some cases these modes fail.

Reply to objection 2: As the Apostle says in 2 Timothy 2:13, “God remains faithful; He cannot deny Himself.” But He would be denying Himself if He destroyed the very order of His justice, since He is Justice Itself. And so God cannot grant a dispensation that would permit a man either (a) to behave in a disordered way toward God or (b) not to submit to the order of His justice, even in those matters in which men are ordered toward one another.

Reply to objection 3: The killing of a man is prohibited in the Decalogue insofar as it has the character of something undue; for this is the sense in which a precept embodies the very nature of justice.

Now human law cannot permit that a man should be killed both lawfully and in an undue way. But it is not undue for an evildoer, or for the enemies of the republic, to be killed. Hence, this is not contrary to the precept of the Decalogue; nor is such a killing (*occisio*) a homicide (*homicidium*)—which is what the precept prohibits, as Augustine says in *De Libero Arbitrio* 1. Similarly, if what belongs to someone is taken from him, then if it is due that he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery, which is what the precept of the Decalogue prohibits.

And so when, by God’s command, the children of Israel took the spoils from the Egyptians (Exodus 12:35), this was not theft, since these spoils were owed to them by God’s decree. Similarly, when Abraham consented to kill his son (Genesis 22), he did not consent to homicide, since by the command of God, who is the Lord of life and death, it had been made due that his son should be killed. For it is God who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both the just and the unjust, because of the sin of our first parent; and if a man executes this sentence by God’s authority, then he will not be committing homicide (*non erit homicida*), just as God does not commit homicide. Similarly, when Hosea takes to himself a “wife of fornications,” i.e., an adulterous woman (Hosea 1), he is not an adulterer or a fornicator; for he took a woman who belonged to him according to the command of God, the author of the institution of matrimony.

So, then, the precepts of the Decalogue are immutable with respect to the character of justice that they embody. However, regarding the specification of the precepts as applied to singular acts—that is, as regards whether this or that act is or is not homicide or theft or adultery—there is indeed mutability, sometimes by God’s authority alone, viz., in those things that have been instituted by God alone (e.g., matrimony and other things of this sort), and sometimes also by human authority, as in those matters that have been entrusted to the jurisdiction of men. With respect to those matters, but not with respect to all matters, men act in the place of God.

Reply to objection 4: The thought expressed here was more of an interpretation of the precept than a dispensation. For someone who does what is necessary for human welfare is not thought of as violating the Sabbath, as the Lord shows in Matthew 12:1-15.

Article 9

Does the mode of virtue fall under a precept of the Law?

It seems that the mode of virtue falls under a precept of the Law:

Objection 1: The mode of virtue involves one's doing just things in a just way, and courageous things in a courageous way, and so on for the other virtues. But Deuteronomy 16:20 commands, "You shall do justly that which is just." Therefore, the mode of virtue falls under a precept.

Objection 2: It is what the lawmaker intends that principally (*maxime*) falls under a precept. But as *Ethics* 2 says, the lawmaker's intention is mainly to make men virtuous, and virtuous men are those who act in a virtuous manner. Therefore, the mode of virtue falls under a precept.

Objection 3: The mode of virtue, properly speaking, seems to involve one's acting willingly (*voluntarie*) and with delight (*delectabiliter*). But this falls under a precept of divine law. For Psalm 99:2 says, "Serve the Lord in gladness," and 2 Corinthians 9:7 says, "... not with sadness or out of necessity; for God loves a cheerful giver," and a Gloss on this second passage says, "Whatever good you do, do it with cheerfulness, and then you will do well; but if you do it with sadness, though it comes from you, you are not doing it." Therefore, the mode of virtue falls under a precept of the Law.

But contrary to this: As is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2 and 4, no one can act in the way a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of the virtue. But anyone who transgresses a precept of the Law merits punishment. Therefore, it would follow that one who does not have the habit of a virtue is such that whatever he does merits punishment. But this is contrary to the intention of the Law, which intends to lead man to virtue by making him accustomed to good works. Therefore, it is not the case that the mode of virtue falls under a precept.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 3), a precept of the law has coercive force. Therefore, what directly falls under a precept of the law is that toward which the law coerces one. But as *Ethics* 10 says, the law's coercive force comes from the fear of punishment, since what properly falls under a precept of the law is such that the law's punishment is inflicted in light of it.

Now divine law and human law go about instituting punishments in different ways. For the law's punishment is inflicted only for those things over which the lawmaker exercises judgment, since the law punishes in light of this judgment. But man, who makes human law, is able to pass judgment only about exterior acts, since, as 1 Kings 16:7 puts it, "Men see things that appear to be the case." By contrast, only God, who makes divine law, can judge the interior movements of wills—this according to Psalm 7:10 ("The searcher of hearts and affections (*corda et renes*) is God"). Accordingly, then, one should claim that there is one respect in which the mode of virtue is relevant to both human law and divine law, and a second respect in which it is relevant to divine law but not human law, and a third respect in which it is relevant to neither divine law nor human law.

Now according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2, the mode of virtue consists of three elements:

The first is that the agent acts *knowingly* (*sciens*). This falls under the judgment of both divine law and human law. For what someone does in ignorance, he does *per accidens*. Hence, as far as punishment and pardon are concerned, some matters are judged by reference to ignorance—and this according to both divine law and human law.

The second is that the agent acts *willingly* (*volens*), i.e., "by choosing [the act] and choosing it for its own sake." This involves two interior movements, viz., an act of willing (*voluntas*) and an act of intending (*intentio*), which were explained above (q. 8 and q. 12). Only divine law, and not human law, passes judgment on these two acts. For human law does not punish someone who wills to kill and yet does not kill, whereas divine law does punish him—this according to Matthew 5:22 ("Whoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment").

The third element is that the agent *has, and acts from, a firm and unchangeable character* (*ut firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur*). This firmness properly involves a habit, so that he is acting from a rooted habit (*ex habitu radicato*). As far as this element is concerned, the mode of virtue does not fall under a precept of either divine law or human law. For even if someone who gives the honor due to his

parents does not have the habit of piety, he is not punished by man or by God as a transgressor of the precept.

Reply to objection 1: In the performance of an act of justice, the mode that falls under the precept is not that something be done from the habit of justice, but that it be done according to the order of uprightness (*secundum ordinem iuris*).

Reply to objection 2: The lawmaker's intention involves two things. The first is what he intends to lead his subjects toward by means of the precepts of the law, and this is *virtue*. The second is what he intends to make his precept about, and this is what leads or disposes them toward virtue, viz., *acts of virtue*. For the end of the precept is not the same as what the precept is about—just as, in other matters, the end is not the same as what is ordered toward the end.

Reply to objection 3: Performing an act of a virtue without sadness (*sine tristitia*) does fall under a precept of divine law, since anyone who acts with sadness is acting reluctantly (*non volens*).

On the other hand, acting with delight (*delectabiliter*)—whether with joy (*cum laetitia*) or with cheerfulness (*cum hilaritate*)—falls under a precept in one sense, viz., to the extent that the delight follows from the love of God and neighbor, which itself falls under a precept. For love is a cause of delight. However, there is a sense in which acting with delight does not fall under a precept, since, as *Ethics* 2 says, “Delight in the act is a sign of a habit that has already been generated.” For an act can be delightful either because of its end or because of the agreeableness of its habit.

Article 10

Does the mode of charity fall under a precept of divine law?

It seems that the mode of charity falls under a precept of divine law:

Objection 1: Matthew 19:17 says, “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments,” and from this it is apparent that the observance of the commandments is sufficient for entering into life. But good works are not sufficient for entering into life unless they are done out of charity; for 1 Corinthians 13:3 says, “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, but have not charity, it profits me nothing.” Therefore, the mode of charity is contained in a precept.

Objection 2: The mode of charity properly concerns doing all things for the sake of God. But this falls under a precept; for in 1 Corinthians 10:31 the Apostle says, “Do everything for the glory of God.” Therefore, the mode of charity falls under a precept.

Objection 3: If the mode of charity does not fall under a precept, then someone can fulfill the precepts of the law without having charity. But what can be done without charity can be done without grace, which is always joined to charity. Therefore, someone can fulfill the precepts of the Law without grace. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Haeresibus*, this is the error of Pelagius. Therefore, the mode of charity is contained in a precept.

But contrary to this: Whoever does not observe a precept commits a mortal sin. Therefore, if the mode of charity fell under a precept, it would follow that if someone did something without acting out of charity, he would commit a mortal sin. But anyone who does not have charity is such that he acts without acting out of charity. Therefore, it follows that anyone who does not have charity commits a mortal sin in every act that he does, no matter how good it is. But this is absurd.

I respond: There have been contrary opinions on this matter.

Some have claimed that, absolutely speaking, the mode of charity falls under a precept. Nor is it

impossible for someone lacking charity to observe this precept, since he can dispose himself to having charity infused in him by God. Moreover, it is not the case that whenever someone lacking charity does something good, he commits a mortal sin. For the precept ‘Act out of charity’ is an affirmative precept and imposes an obligation not for all times, but only for those times at which someone has charity.

By contrast, others have claimed that the mode of charity does not fall under a precept in any way at all.

Both sides have asserted the truth in a certain respect. For there are two possible ways to think of the act of charity:

In the first way, one is thinking of it as a certain act in its own right (*quidam actus per se*). And in this sense it falls under the precept of the Law that is proposed specifically about this act, viz., “You shall love the Lord your God, and you shall love your neighbor.” And on this score, the first opinion has asserted the truth, since it is not impossible to observe this precept, which has to do with the act of charity. For a man can dispose himself to have charity, and then, when he has it, he can make use of it.

In a second way, the act of charity can be thought of insofar as it is a mode of the acts of the other virtues, i.e., insofar as the acts of the other virtues are ordered toward charity, which is, as 1 Timothy 1:5 says, the end of the precept. For as was explained above (q. 12, a. 1), the intending of an end is a sort of formal mode of an act ordered to that end. And in this sense, what the second opinion asserted is true, viz., that the mode of charity does not fall under a precept. That is to say, the precept “Honor your father, etc.” includes only honoring one’s father and not honoring one’s father out of charity. Hence, even if someone who is honoring his father does not have charity, he is not transgressing this precept—and this is so even if he is transgressing the precept that has to do with the act of charity and so merits punishment because of this transgression.

Reply to objection 1: Our Lord did not say, “If you wish to enter into life, keep one commandment.” Rather, He said, “Keep all the commandments”—among which is the commandment about love of God and neighbor.

Reply to objection 2: The commandment of charity includes loving God with one’s whole heart, which involves referring all things to God. And so a man cannot fulfill the precept of charity without referring all things to God. So, then, one who honors his parents is obligated to honor them out of charity, but this obligation comes from the force of the precept “You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart” and not from the force of the precept “Honor your parents.” Moreover, since these two affirmative precepts do not impose an obligation for all times, they can impose obligations for diverse times. And so it is possible for someone to fulfill the precept about honoring one’s parents at a time when the precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity is not being transgressed.

Reply to objection 3: A man cannot observe all the precepts of the Law unless he fulfills the precept of charity, which cannot be done without grace. And so what Pelagius claimed is impossible, viz., that a man fulfills the Law without grace.

Article 11

Is it correct to mark out moral precepts of the Law in addition to the Decalogue?

It seems incorrect to mark out (*distinguere*) moral precepts of the Law other than the Decalogue:

Objection 1: As our Lord says in Matthew 22:40, “On these two precepts [of charity] depends the whole Law and the prophets.” But these two precepts are explicated by the ten precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be other moral precepts.

Objection 2: As has been explained (q. 99, a. 3), the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and ceremonial precepts. But specifications of the general moral precepts are contained in the judicial and ceremonial precepts, whereas, as has been explained (a. 3), the general moral precepts themselves are contained in the ten precepts of the Decalogue—or are at least presupposed by the Decalogue. Therefore, it is inappropriate for other moral precepts to be handed down in addition to the Decalogue.

Objection 3: As was explained above (a. 2), the moral precepts are about the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, just as, in addition to the Decalogue, the Law contains moral precepts that deal with worship, generosity, mercy, and chastity, so too there should be precepts dealing with the other virtues, e.g., fortitude, sobriety, and others of this sort. But such precepts are not to be found. Therefore, it is inappropriate for other moral precepts that go beyond the Decalogue to be marked out in the Law.

But contrary to this: Psalm 18:8 says, “The law of the Lord is pure, converting souls.” But there are other moral precepts, in addition to the Decalogue, through which a man is preserved without the stain of sin and through which his soul is converted. Therefore, it was the Law’s function to hand down other moral precepts as well.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 99, a. 3-4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts have force solely by virtue of their being instituted, since before they were instituted, there was no apparent difference between things being done one way or another. By contrast, the moral precepts would have had efficacy on the basis of the dictates of natural reason even if they had never been codified in the Law.

Now there are three levels (*gradus*) of moral precept:

(a) Some moral precepts are absolutely certain and so evident that they do not need to be made known publicly (*editione non indigent*). For as was explained above (a. 3), the commandments about love of God and neighbor and others of this sort are, as it were, the ends of the precepts (*fines praeceptorum*) and so such that no one can make a mistaken judgment of reason about them.

(b) Other moral precepts are more specific (*determinata*) and such that anyone, even an ordinary man, can grasp the reason behind them easily and immediately. However, since human judgment about these precepts can be perverted in a fewer number of cases, precepts of this sort need to be made known publicly (*indigent editione*). These precepts are the precepts of the Decalogue.

(c) Still other moral precepts are such that the reason behind them is not evident to everyone; instead, it is evident only to the wise. These precepts are the ones that were added to the Decalogue and given to the people by God through the mediation of Moses and Aaron.

Now since things that are evident are the basis for knowing things that are not evident, these other moral precepts that were added to the Decalogue are traced back to the precepts of the Decalogue in the sense that they are a sort of addition to them.

For instance, the first precept of the Decalogue prohibits the worship of strange gods, and to this are added other precepts that prohibit things that are ordered toward the worship of idols—as, e.g., in Deuteronomy 18:10-11: “Do not let there be found among you anyone that shall purify his son or daughter by making them to pass through the fire ... Neither let there be any evil magician or enchanter, or anyone who consults prophetic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or who seeks truth from the dead.”

The second precept of the Decalogue prohibits perjury, and to this are added the prohibition of blasphemy in Leviticus 24:15 and the prohibition of false teaching in Deuteronomy 13.

To the third precept are added all the ceremonial precepts.

To the fourth precept, the one about honoring one’s parents, is added a precept about honoring the elderly—this according to Leviticus 19:32 (“Stand up in the presence of a hoary head, and honor the elderly person”)—and, more generally, all the precepts that induce one to show respect for one’s betters or to give benefits to one’s equals or inferiors.

To the fifth precept, which prohibits homicide, are added the prohibition of hatred or any sort of

injury (*violatio*) against one's neighbor, as in Leviticus 19:16 ("You shall not stand against the blood of your neighbor"), and the prohibition of hatred of one's brother, as in Leviticus 19:17 ("You shall not hate your brother in your heart").

To the sixth precept, which prohibits adultery, is added the prohibition against prostitution (*meretricium*)—this according to Deuteronomy 23:17 ("There shall be no prostitutes among the daughters of Israel, nor fornicators among the sons of Israel"). Again, also added is the prohibition of the vice against nature—this according to Leviticus 28:22-23 ("You shall not have sex with a male ... You shall not copulate with any beast").

To the seventh precept, which prohibits theft (*furtum*), are added the precept prohibiting usury (*usura*)—this according to Deuteronomy 23:19 ("You shalt not lend your brother money to usury")—and the prohibition of fraud (*fraus*)—this according to Deuteronomy 25:13 ("You shall not have diverse weights in your bag")—and, more generally, everything having to do with the prohibition of cheating (*calumnia*) and plundering (*rapina*).

To the eighth precept, which prohibits false witness, are added the prohibition of false judgment—this according to Exodus 23:2 ("You shall not acquiesce in judgment to the opinion of the majority, so as to stray from the truth")—and the prohibition against lying, which is added in the same place ("You shall avoid lying"), and the prohibition against detraction—this according to Leviticus 19:16 ("You shall not be a detractor (*criminator*) or a whisperer among the people").

However, no other precepts are added to the last two precepts of the Decalogue, since these precepts prohibit all evil desires in general.

Reply to objection 1: The precepts of the Decalogue are ordered toward the love of God and neighbor with the evident rationale of what is owed (*secundum manifestam rationem debiti*) to God and to neighbor. By contrast, the ordering of the other precepts toward the love of God and neighbor has a more hidden reason behind it.

Reply to objection 2: The ceremonial and judicial precepts specify the precepts of the Decalogue by instituting something and not, as with the additional moral precepts, by the force of a natural inclination (*ex vi naturalis instinctus*).

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 2), the precepts of law are ordered toward the common good. And it is because the virtues that order us toward other people are directly relevant to the common good—and, likewise, chastity, insofar as the act of generation subserves the common good—that both the precepts of the Decalogue and the additional precepts are given directly about these virtues.

By contrast, as far as the act of fortitude is concerned, the relevant precept has to be proposed by leaders giving exhortations in a war undertaken for the common good—as is clear from Deuteronomy 20:3, where the priest is commanded [to say], "Do not be afraid! Do not yield!"

Similarly, the prohibition of the act of gluttony is entrusted to paternal warnings, since gluttony is contrary to the good of the household (*bonum domesticum*). Hence, Deuteronomy 21:20 says in the personage of the parents, "He hates listening to our admonitions; he is idle with his reveling and debauchery and socializing."

Article 12

Did the moral precepts of the Old Law give justification [before God]?

It seems that the moral precepts of the Old Law gave justification [before God] (*iustificatio*):

Objection 1: In Romans 2:13 the Apostle says, "For it is not the hearers of the Law who are

justified before God; rather, it is the doers of the Law who shall be justified.” But the ones who are called doers of the Law are those who fulfill the precepts of the Law. Therefore, when the precepts of the Law were fulfilled, they gave justification.

Objection 2: Leviticus 18:5 says, “Abide by my laws and judgments; the man who fulfills them will have life in them.” But a man’s spiritual life comes through justice. Therefore, when the precepts of the Law were fulfilled, they gave justification.

Objection 3: Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law gives justification, since there is a kind of justice in the fulfillment of the precepts of the law. Therefore, the precepts of the Law gave justification.

But contrary to this: In 2 Corinthians 3:6 the Apostle says, “The letter kills ...” According to Augustine in *De Spiritu et Littera*, the Apostle is referring here even to the moral precepts. Therefore, the moral precepts did not give justification.

I respond: Just as ‘healthy’ is said first and primarily of that which has health, whereas it is said secondarily of that which is a sign of health or of that which preserves health, so too ‘justification’ is said first and primarily of the very effecting of justice, whereas ‘justification’ can be said secondarily—and, as it were, improperly—of a sign of justice or of a disposition toward justice.

There are two ways in which the precepts of the Law clearly gave justification, viz., (a) insofar as they disposed men toward the justifying grace of Christ and (b) insofar as they also signified that grace. For as Augustine says in *Contra Faustum*, “Even the life of that people was prophetic and a figure of Christ.”

However, if we are talking about justification properly speaking, then note that ‘justice’ can be understood either as it exists in a habit or as it exists in an act, and so ‘justification’ is predicated in two ways: (a) first, insofar as a man becomes just by acquiring the habit of justice and (b) second, insofar as he performs the works of justice, in which case justification is nothing other than the execution of justice.

Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 63, a. 4), justice, like the other virtues, can be understood either as acquired justice or as infused justice. Acquired justice is caused by actions. By contrast, infused justice is caused by God Himself through His grace; and this is the true justice about which we are now talking and in light of which someone is said to be just before God—this according to Romans 4:2 (“If Abraham was justified by the works of the Law, then he has glory, but not before God”). Therefore, this sort of justice could not have been caused by the moral precepts, which have to do with human actions. Accordingly, the moral precepts could not have given justification by effecting justice.

On the other hand, if ‘justification’ is understood as the execution of justice, then all the precepts of the Law gave justification, though in different ways.

For the ceremonial precepts contained justice in its own right in a general way (*justitia secundum se in generali*) insofar as they had to do with the worship of God. However, they did not contain justice in its own right in a specific way, but were just solely because of the determination of divine law. And so these precepts are said to have given justification only because of the devotion and obedience of those who observed them.

By contrast, the moral and judicial precepts contained what was just in its own right, either in a general way or in a specific way. The moral precepts contained what is just in itself by *general justice*, which, as *Ethics* 5 explains, involves “every virtue,” whereas the judicial precepts involved *special justice*, which has to do with the contractual interchanges (*contractus*) of human life that take place among men in their dealings with one another.

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is using ‘justification’ here to refer to the execution of justice.

Reply to objection 2: A man who observes the precepts of the Law is said “to have life in them” in the sense that he does not incur the punishment of death that the law inflicts on those who transgress it.

This is the Apostle's meaning in Galatians 3:12.

Reply to objection 3: The precepts of human law give justification by means of acquired justice, which we are not discussing at present; rather, we are talking only about that justice which is justice before God.

QUESTION 101

The Ceremonial Precepts of the Old Law in Themselves

We next have to consider the ceremonial precepts. First, we have to consider them in themselves (question 101); second, we have to consider the reasons for them (question 102); and, third, we have to consider their duration (question 103).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) What is the reason for the ceremonial precepts? (2) Are the ceremonial precepts figurative (*figuralia*)? (3) Was it right for there to have been a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts? (4) How are the ceremonial precepts distinguished from one another?

Article 1

Does the reason for the ceremonial precepts lie in their having to do with the worship of God?

It seems that the reason for the ceremonial precepts does not lie in their having to do with the worship of God:

Objection 1: As is clear from Leviticus 11, precepts about abstaining from certain foods are given to the Jews in the Old Law; and as is clear from Leviticus 19:19 (“You shall not wear a garment that is woven from two [kinds of thread]”) and, again, from the command given at Numbers 15:38 (“Tell them to make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments”), there are also precepts about avoiding certain kinds of clothing. But precepts of this sort are not moral precepts, since they do not remain in the New Law; nor are they judicial precepts, since they do not have to do with making judgments among men. Therefore, they are ceremonial precepts. But they seem to have nothing to do with the worship of God. Therefore, it is not the case that the reason for the ceremonial precepts is that they have to do with the worship of God.

Objection 2: Some claim that the ceremonial precepts are the ones having to do with the solemn feasts (*solemnitates*), and that the name ‘ceremonial’ is taken from the word for wax candles (*cerei*), which are lit on the feast days. But there are many other things besides the solemn feasts that have to do with the worship of God. Therefore, it does not seem that the reason why these precepts are called ‘ceremonial’ is that they have to do with the worship of God.

Objection 3: According to some, the precepts in question are called ‘ceremonial’ because they are norms or rules for salvation (*regulae salutis*), where ‘*χαίρε*’ in Greek is the same as the Latin ‘*salve*’. But all the precepts of the Law—and not just those having to do with the worship of God—are rules for salvation. Therefore, it is not the case that the only precepts called ‘ceremonial’ are those that have to do with the worship of God.

Objection 4: Rabbi Moses claims that the precepts called ‘ceremonial’ are such that the reason behind them is not obvious. But many things that have to do with the worship of God have an obvious reason behind them, e.g., the observance of the Sabbath, the celebration of the Passover (*Phase*), and the celebration of the Feast of Tabernacles (*Secopegia*). Therefore, it is not the case that the ceremonial precepts are the ones that have to do with the worship of God.

But contrary to this: Exodus 18:19-20 says, “Be present to the people in those things that pertain to God to show the people the ceremonies and the rite of worship.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 99, a. 4), the ceremonial precepts specify the moral precepts with respect to God, whereas the judicial precepts specify the moral precepts with respect to one’s neighbor. But man is ordered to God through the worship that is owed to Him, and so the precepts that have to do with the worship of God are properly called ‘ceremonial precepts’.

Moreover, the explanation of the name ‘ceremonial’ was given above (q. 99, a. 3) when the

ceremonial precepts were distinguished from the other precepts.

Reply to objection 1: Sacrifices and other such things that seem to be immediately ordered to God are not the only things having to do with the worship of God. In addition, those who worship God have to be duly prepared for worshipping Him—just as, in other subject matters, whatever serves as a preparation for the end falls under the science that deals with the end.

Now precepts of the sort that are given in the Law about the clothing and food of those who worship God, along with other such things, have to do with the preparation of the ministers themselves, in order that they might be fit for worshipping God—in just the way that some of those who minister to a king engage in special observances. Hence, these precepts are likewise contained among the ceremonial precepts.

Reply to objection 2: This explanation of the name ‘ceremonial’ does not seem very plausible, especially in light of the fact that there is little in the Law about wax candles being lit on the solemn feasts; instead, as is clear from Leviticus 24:2, even the lamps of the Candlestick itself were prepared with olive oil.

Still, one could claim that on the solemn feasts everything that had to do with the worship of God was observed more carefully and that, accordingly, all the ceremonial precepts are included in the observance of the solemn feasts.

Reply to objection 3: This explanation of the name ‘ceremonial’ does not seem very plausible, either. For the name ‘ceremony’ (*ceremonia*) comes from the Latin rather than the Greek.

Still, one could claim that since man’s salvation (*salus*) is from God, it is the precepts that order man toward God which seem to be the rules of salvation, and that it is for this reason that the precepts pertaining to the worship of God are called ceremonial.

Reply to objection 4: This explanation of the nature of the ceremonial precepts is in a certain sense plausible—not that these precepts are called ‘ceremonial’ because the reason behind them is not obvious, but rather that this is a certain consequence of their being ceremonial. For, as will be explained below (a. 2), the precepts having to do with the worship of God must necessarily be figurative, and so in this regard the reason behind them is not very obvious.

Article 2

Are the ceremonial precepts figurative?

It seems that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative (*figurativa*):

Objection 1: As Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 4, every teacher (*doctor*) has the responsibility of speaking in such a way that he can be easily understood—and this seems especially necessary in the giving of law, since the precepts of the law are being proposed to ordinary people (*populus*). Hence, as Isidore puts it, law ought to be evident. Therefore, if the ceremonial precepts were given as figures of something else, then Moses, in not explaining what they were figures of, seems to have handed down precepts of this kind in the wrong way.

Objection 2: What is done in the worship of God ought to have the highest integrity (*maxime debent habere honestatem*). But performing certain actions in order to represent other actions seems theatrical or poetical; for in the theater it used to be that certain actions of others were represented by the things enacted there. Therefore, it seems that actions of this sort ought not to be performed in the worship of God. But as has been explained, (a. 1), the ceremonial precepts are ordered toward the worship of God. Therefore, the ceremonial precepts ought not to be figurative (*figuralia*).

Objection 3: In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “God is especially worshiped by faith, hope, and charity.” But the precepts given about faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore, the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative.

Objection 4: In John 4:24 our Lord says, “God is a spirit, and those who adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth.” But a figure is not the truth itself—in fact, *figure* and *truth* are divided off from one another as contraries. Therefore, the ceremonial precepts, which have to do with the worship of God, should not be figurative.

But contrary to this: In Colossians 2:16-17 the Apostle says, “Let no man therefore judge you in meat or in drink or with respect to a feast day or a new moon or the Sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), the precepts called ‘ceremonial’ are the ones that are ordered toward the worship of God. Now there are two types of worship of God, interior and exterior. For since man is composed of body and soul, both must be applied to the worship of God—so that, namely, the soul worships with interior worship and the body worships with exterior worship. This is why Psalm 83:3 says, “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” And just as the body is ordered toward God through the soul, so too exterior worship is ordered toward interior worship.

Now interior worship consists in the soul’s being joined to God through understanding and affection (*per intellectum et affectum*). And so insofar as there are different modes in which the understanding and affection of the worshiper of God are correctly joined to God, there are correspondingly different ways in which a man’s exterior acts are applied to worshipping God.

For instance, in the state of future beatitude the human intellect will see the divine Truth in itself, and so exterior worship will consist not in any sort of figures but solely in the praise of God that proceeds from interior cognition and affection—this according to Isaiah 51:3 (“Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving, and the voice of praise”).

On the other hand, in the state of the present life, we are unable to see the divine Truth in itself; instead, as Dionysius puts it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, the ray of divine truth must illumine us under certain sensible figures—though in diverse ways corresponding to the diverse states of human cognition.

For instance, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 9:8, in the Old Law it was not the case either that the divine truth was evident in itself or even that the way to attain it was made known. And so it was necessary for exterior worship under the Old Law not only to prefigure the future truth that is going to be made manifest in heaven, but also to prefigure Christ, who is the Way leading men to that truth in heaven.

By contrast, in the state of the New Law this Way has already been revealed. Hence, the Way does not have to be prefigured as something future, but instead has to be brought to mind as something past or present—and the only thing that needs to be prefigured is the truth of the glory that has not yet been revealed.

And so it is that the Apostle says in Hebrews 10:1, “The Law has the shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things.” For a shadow is something less than an image, and so ‘image’ has to do with the New Law and ‘shadow’ with the Old Law.

Reply to objection 1: What is divine must be revealed to men only in a way corresponding to their capacity for understanding; otherwise, there would be an occasion for their downfall, since they might scorn what they cannot understand. And thus it was more advantageous for the divine mysteries to be handed down to an unsophisticated people under the veil of figures, so that they might have at least an implicit cognition of the mysteries as long as they used the figures to honor God.

Reply to objection 2: Just as poetical things fail to be understood by human reason because of the

imperfect nature of the truth contained in them, so human reason cannot perfectly understand divine things because of their excess of truth. And so in both cases what is needed is a representation by means of sensible figures.

Reply to objection 3: In this passage Augustine is talking about interior worship. Still, as has been explained, exterior worship must be ordered toward interior worship.

Reply to objection 4: The same reply holds for the fourth objection, since it is through Christ that men are introduced more fully to the spiritual worship of God.

Article 3

Was it right for there to be a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts?

It seems that it was not right for there to be a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts:

Objection 1: Things that are ordered toward an end should be proportioned to that end. But as has been explained (a. 1-2), the ceremonial precepts are ordered toward the worship of God and toward being a figure of Christ. But as 1 Corinthians 8:6 says, “There is but one God, from whom are all things and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things.” Therefore, the ceremonial precepts should not have been multiplied.

Objection 2: The multitude of ceremonial precepts was an occasion of sin (*occasio transgressionis*)—this according to Peter in Acts 15:10 (“Why do you tempt God by putting a yoke upon the necks of the disciples which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?”) But the transgression of divine precepts is contrary to human salvation. Therefore, since, as Isidore says, every law should be consistent with human salvation, it seems that a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts should not have been given.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 2), the ceremonial precepts have to do with the exterior and corporeal worship of God. But the law ought to have put less emphasis on (*diminuere*) this sort of corporeal worship, since it was ordered toward Christ, who taught men to worship God “in spirit and in truth,” as John 2:23-24 says. Therefore, it was not right for a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts to be given.

But contrary to this: Hosea 8:12 says, “I shall write within them my many laws.” And Job 11:6 says, “..... that He might show you the secrets of wisdom, and that His law is manifold.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 96, a. 1), every law is given to a particular people, and every people contains two kinds of men. Some men are prone to evil, and they have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as was noted above (q. 95, a. 1); other men have an inclination toward the good—either by nature or by habit (or, better, by grace)—and they have to be instructed by the precepts of the law and moved to become better.

It was with respect to both kinds of men that it was advantageous for the ceremonial precepts to be multiplied in the Old Law.

For among this people there were some prone to idolatry, and so they had to be recalled from idolatrous worship to the worship of God by means of the ceremonial precepts. And since there were many ways in which men devoted themselves to idolatry, a multiplicity of contrary precepts had to be instituted in order to repress each of those ways. Again, a multiplicity of precepts had to be imposed on such men, so that burdened, as it were, by things that had to do with the worship of God, they would not have the free time to devote themselves to idolatry.

On the other hand, as far as those who were inclined toward the good are concerned, the

multiplication of ceremonial precepts was likewise necessary, both because in this way their minds were recalled to God in diverse ways and more assiduously, and also because the mystery of Christ, which was prefigured through these ceremonial precepts, brought a multiplicity of benefits to the world, and there were many things to consider about this mystery that needed to be prefigured through diverse ceremonial precepts.

Reply to objection 1: When what is ordered to an end is sufficient for attaining that end, then a single such thing is sufficient for a single end. For instance, if a single medicine is efficacious, then it is sometimes sufficient for inducing health, and in such a case there is no need for the medicines to be multiplied.

On the other hand, if there is a lack of power or perfection on the part of what is ordered to the end, then it has to be multiplied, in the way that many remedies are applied to someone who is sick when a single remedy is not sufficient to cure him.

Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and imperfect both in representing the mystery of Christ, which is surpassing, and in subjecting the minds of men to God. Hence, in Hebrews 7:18-19 the Apostle says, "There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof. For the law brought nothing to perfection." And that is why ceremonies of this sort had to be multiplied.

Reply to objection 2: A wise lawgiver permits lesser sins in order that greater sins might be avoided. And so in order that the sin of idolatry might be avoided, along with the sin of pride, which would be nurtured in the hearts of the Jews if they were to fulfill all the precepts of the Law, God did not refrain from handing down a multiplicity of ceremonial precepts simply because the Jews might easily take this as an occasion for sinning.

Reply to objection 3: In many ways the Old Law put less emphasis on corporeal worship. It was for this reason that the Law decreed that sacrifices were not to be offered in every place or by just anyone. And it established a multiplicity of precepts of this sort in order to put less emphasis on exterior worship, as Rabbi Moses of Egypt likewise points out. Yet it was necessary not to attenuate the corporeal worship of God to such an extent that men would fall into the worship of demons.

Article 4

Are the ceremonies of the Old Law correctly divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?

It seems that the ceremonies of the Old Law are not correctly divided into sacrifices (*sacrificia*), sacred things (*sacra*), sacraments (*sacramenta*), and observances (*observantiae*):

Objection 1: The ceremonies of the Old Law prefigured Christ. But this was done solely through the sacrifices, which prefigured the sacrifice by which Christ offered Himself, in the words of Ephesians 5:2, "as an oblation and a sacrifice to God." Therefore, only the sacrifices were ceremonial.

Objection 2: The Old Law was ordered toward the New Law. But in the New Law the sacrifice is itself the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore, in the Old Law sacrifices should not have been distinguished from sacraments.

Objection 3: A thing called 'sacred' is one that has been dedicated to God, in the sense in which a tabernacle and its vessels were said to be 'made sacred' (*sacrificari*). But as has been explained (a. 1), all the ceremonial precepts were ordered toward the worship of God. Therefore, all the ceremonial precepts were sacred things. Therefore, it is incorrect for just one part of the ceremonial precepts to be

named ‘sacred things’.

Objection 4: Observances (*observantiae*) are so-called from ‘observing’ (*ab observando*). But all the precepts of the Law were supposed to be observed; for Deuteronomy 8:11 says, “Take heed, and beware lest at any time you forget the Lord your God, and neglect His commandments and judgments and ceremonies.” Therefore, observances should not be posited as just one part of the ceremonies.

Objection 5: The solemn feasts (*solemnitates*) are counted among the ceremonies, since they are a foreshadowing of what is to come, as is clear from Colossians 2:16-17; the same holds for oblations (*oblaciones*) and gifts (*munera*), as is clear from the Apostle in Hebrews 9:9. But none of these seems to be contained under any of the above divisions. Therefore, the division of the ceremonies set forth above is incorrect.

But contrary to this: In the Old Law each of the divisions set forth above is called a ceremony. For *sacrifices* are called ceremonies in Numbers 15:24 (“The multitude shall offer a calf and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies require”). Again, Leviticus 7:35 says of the *sacrament* of Orders, “This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies.” Likewise, Exodus 38:21 says of the *sacred things*, “These are the instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony in the ceremonies of the Levites.” And 3 Kings 9:6 says of the *observances*, “If you shall turn away from following me and will not observe my ceremonies which I have set before you”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), the ceremonial precepts are ordered toward the worship of God. In this worship we can consider (a) the worship itself, (b) the worshipers, and (c) the instruments of worship.

The worship itself consists specifically in the *sacrifices* that are offered in reverence for God.

The instruments of worship are the *sacred things*, e.g., the tabernacle, the vessels, and other things of this sort.

As for the worshipers, there are two things to consider:

The first is their being ordained for divine worship (*institutio ad cultum divinum*), which takes place through a consecration of the people or of the ministers; and this is what the *sacraments* have to do with.

The second is their unique way of life (*singularis conversatio*), through which they are distinguished from those who do not worship God; and this is what the *observances* concerning food, clothing, and other such things have to do with.

Reply to objection 1: Sacrifices had to be offered in certain places by certain men, and all of this pertains to the worship of God. Hence, just as the immolated Christ is signified through their sacrifices, so too the sacraments and sacred things of the New Law were prefigured through their sacraments and sacred things. What’s more, the way of life of the people of the New Law was prefigured through their observances. And all these things have to do with Christ.

Reply to objection 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, i.e., the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, who is the author of sanctification; for as Hebrews 13:12 says, “He sanctified the people by His own blood.” And that is why this sacrifice is also a sacrament.

By contrast, the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ but instead prefigured Him, and so they are not called sacraments. Instead, in order to signify this separately, there were certain sacraments in the Old Law that were figures of the future consecration—even though it was also the case that sacrifices were adjoined to some of the consecrations.

Reply to objection 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were also ‘sacred things’. However, there were certain things which were called ‘sacred’ because they had been dedicated to the worship of God and yet which were neither sacrifices nor sacraments. And so these things retained for themselves the general name ‘sacred things’.

Reply to objection 4: Those things that had to do with the way of life of the people worshiping God retained for themselves the general name ‘observances’ insofar as they did not fall under the previously mentioned divisions. For instance, they were not called ‘sacred things’, since they did not have an immediate relation to the worship of God in the way that the tabernacle and its vessels did. Instead, they were ceremonial through a certain entailment, viz., insofar as they had to do with the fitness of the people worshiping God.

Reply to objection 5: Just as sacrifices were offered in a determinate place, so too they were offered at determinate times. Hence, the solemn feasts seem to be numbered among the sacred things.

On the other hand, oblations and gifts are counted with the sacrifices, since they were offered to God. Thus in Hebrews 5:1 the Apostle says, “Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things that pertain to God, that he might offer up gifts and sacrifices.”

QUESTION 102

The Reasons for the Ceremonial Precepts

We next have to consider the reasons (*causae*) for the ceremonial precepts. On this topic there are six questions: (1) Are there reasons for the ceremonial precepts? (2) Do the ceremonial precepts have literal reasons or just figurative reasons? (3) What are the reasons for the sacrifices? (4) What are the reasons for the sacred things? (5) What are the reasons for the sacraments? (6) What are the reasons for the observances?

Article 1

Are there reasons for the ceremonial precepts?

It seems that there are no reasons for the ceremonial precepts (*non habeant causam*):

Objection 1: A Gloss on Ephesians 2:15 (“..... making void the Law of the commandments by the decrees”) says, “That is, making the Law void with respect to bodily observances, by means of the decrees, i.e., by means of the Gospel precepts, which are based on reasons (*ex ratione*).” But if the observances of the Old Law had been based on reasons, then there would not have been no point to making them void by means of the reasoned decrees (*per rationabilia decreta*) of the New Law. Therefore, there were no reasons for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.

Objection 2: The Old Law is the successor of the law of nature. But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 about the prohibition regarding the tree of life, the law of nature contained a precept that had no reason behind it except to test man’s obedience. Therefore, in the Old Law some precepts likewise had to be given by which man’s obedience would be tested and which had no intrinsic reason behind them (*de se nullam rationem haberent*).

Objection 3: A man’s deeds are called moral insofar as they proceed from reason. Therefore, if there were reasons for the ceremonial precepts, then the ceremonial precepts would not differ from the moral precepts. Therefore, it seems that the ceremonial precepts have no causes, since the reason for a precept is taken from some cause.

But contrary to this: Psalm 18:9 says, “The precept of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eye.” But the ceremonial precepts are God’s precepts. Therefore, they are clear. But they would not be clear unless they had a reasoned cause (*nisi haberent rationabilem causam*). Therefore, the ceremonial precepts have a reasoned cause.

I respond: Since, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 1, “one who is wise has the role of giving order,” what proceeds from God’s wisdom must be well-ordered, as the Apostle says in Romans 13:1.

Now for things to be well-ordered, there are two requirements:

The first is that they be ordered toward a fitting end, since the end is the principle of all order in things to be done. For if things occur by chance without tending toward an end (*praeter intentionem finis*), or if they are done playfully and not in earnest, we say that they are unordered (*inordinata*).

Second, what is ordered toward an end must be proportioned to the end. From this it follows that the reasons for things that are ordered toward an end are themselves taken from the end—in the way that, as *Physics* 2 points out, the reason for the configuration of a saw is taken from the act of cutting.

Now it is clear that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law, were instituted by God’s wisdom; hence, Deuteronomy 4:6 says, “This is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations.” Thus, one must assert that the ceremonial precepts are ordered toward an end and that their reasoned causes can be gathered (*assignari*) from that end.

Reply to objection 1: The observances of the Old Law can be described as being ‘without reason’ (*sine ratione*) in the sense that the deeds themselves did not have an explanation (*ratio*) in terms of their own nature—for instance, that a garment should not be made from wool and linen. However, they were able to be reasoned observances because of their relation to something else, viz., either because they were a figure of something or because they prevented something.

By contrast, the decrees of the New Law, which consist principally in having faith in God and in loving God, take their reason from the very nature of the act.

Reply to objection 2: The prohibition regarding the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was not made because the tree was evil by its nature; instead, this prohibition had a reason that was taken from its relation to something else, viz., insofar as it was a figure of something. In the same way, the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law have their reason in their relation to something else.

Reply to objection 3: It is by their very nature that moral precepts such as ‘You shall not kill’ and ‘You shall not steal’ have reasoned causes. By contrast, as has been explained, the ceremonial precepts have their reasoned causes from their relation to something else.

Article 2

Do the ceremonial precepts have literal reasons or only figurative reasons?

It seems that the ceremonial precepts have only figurative reasons (*causa figuralis*) and not literal reasons (*causa litteralis*):

Objection 1: The main ceremonial precepts were circumcision and the immolation of the Paschal lamb. But each of these had only a figurative reason, since each was given as a sign. For Genesis 17:11 says, “You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between me and you.” And regarding the celebration of the Passover, Exodus 13:9 says, “It shall be as a sign in your hand, and as a memorial before your eyes.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, the other ceremonial precepts have only figurative reasons.

Objection 2: An effect is proportioned to its cause. But as was explained above (q. 101, a. 2), all the ceremonial precepts are figurative. Therefore, they have only a figurative reason.

Objection 3: If something is of itself indifferent with respect to its being done this way or that way, then it does not seem to have a literal reason. But there are some ceremonial precepts that do not seem to determine whether things should be done this way or that way—for instance, with respect to the number of animals that are to be offered or with respect to other particular circumstances of this sort. Therefore, the [ceremonial] precepts of the Old Law do not have literal reasons.

But contrary to this: Just as the ceremonial precepts were figures of Christ, so too was the history (*historia*) of the Old Testament; for 1 Corinthians 10:11 says, “All these things happened to them in figure.” But in the historical events of the Old Testament there is, besides a mystical or figurative meaning (*intellectus mysticus seu figuralem*), a literal meaning as well. Therefore, the ceremonial precepts likewise had literal reasons in addition to their figurative reasons.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), the reason behind what is ordered toward an end must be taken from that end. Now the ceremonial precepts have two ends, since they were ordered (a) toward the worship of God for that time and (b) toward being figures of Christ—in the same way that, as Jerome points out in his commentary on Hosea, the words of the prophets were related to the present time in such a way that they were spoken to prefigure the future as well.

So, then, there are two ways to think of the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law.

In the first way, the reasons are derived from the worship of God that was to be observed for that time. These are the *literal* reasons, which have to do (a) with preventing idolatrous worship, or (b) with commemorating certain favors bestowed by God, or (c) with intimating God's excellence, or (d) with making clear the mental disposition required for that time in those who were worshiping God.

In the second way, the reasons are derived from the fact that the precepts are ordered toward being figures of Christ. And in this way the precepts have *figurative* and *mystical* reasons—whether these reasons are taken (a) from Christ Himself and the Church (and this pertains to the *allegorical sense*), or (b) from the practice of the Christian people (and this pertains to the *moral sense*), or (c) from the state of future glory insofar as we are led to it by Christ (and this pertains to the *anagogical sense*).

Reply to objection 1: Just as the interpretation of a metaphorical locution in Scripture is literal, given that the words were used in order to signify metaphorically, so too the signification of those ceremonies of the Law that commemorate God's favors and have been instituted because of those favors does not go beyond the order of literal reasons. Hence, the fact that the reason for the celebration of the Passover is taken from its being a sign of the liberation from Egypt, or the fact that circumcision is a sign of the covenant (*pactum*) God had with Abraham, pertains to a literal reason.

Reply to objection 2: This objection would go through if the ceremonial precepts had been given solely in order to prefigure the future and not in order to worship God in the present.

Reply to objection 3: It was explained above (q. 96, a. 6) that there are general reasons for human laws, but not reasons for their particular conditions; rather, the particular conditions stem from the judgment of those who institute the laws. So, too, many of the particular determinations found in the ceremonies of the Old Law have only a figurative reason and not a [specific] literal reason, even though they do have a general literal reason.

Article 3

Can appropriate reasons be assigned for the ceremonies that involve sacrifices?

It seems that appropriate reasons cannot be assigned for the ceremonies that involve sacrifices:

Objection 1: What was offered in sacrifice were things necessary for sustaining human life, e.g., certain animals and breads. But God does not need such sustenance—this according to Psalm 49:13 (“Will I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or will I drink the blood of goats?”). Therefore, it was inappropriate for sacrifices of this sort to be offered to God.

Objection 2: The only animals offered in divine sacrifice were (a) three kinds of quadrupeds, viz., oxen, sheep, and goats, and (b), among the birds, the turtledove and the dove generally speaking, while the sparrow was sacrificed in the specific case of the cleansing of a leper. But there are many other animals more noble than these. Therefore, since whatever is best ought to be given to God, it seems that it should not have been just these things that had to be offered to God as sacrifices.

Objection 3: Just as man has dominion from God over the birds and the beasts, so too he has dominion over the fish. Therefore, it was inappropriate for fish to be excluded from the divine sacrifices.

Objection 4: It is commanded indifferently that doves and turtledoves be offered. Therefore, just as it is commanded that the young of the doves be offered, so too it should be commanded that the young of the turtledoves be offered.

Objection 5: As is clear from what is said in Genesis 1, God is the author of the life not only of men but also of the animals. But death is opposed to life. Therefore, what should have been offered to God were living animals instead of animals that had been killed—especially because in Romans 12:1 the

Apostle likewise admonishes that we should present our bodies “as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God.”

Objection 6: If animals were offered to God in sacrifice only after they had been killed, then it does not seem to make any difference how they were killed. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the manner of immolation to be set down—especially in the case of birds, as in Leviticus 1:15-16.

Objection 7: Every defect in an animal is a path to corruption and death. Therefore, if animals that had already been killed were being offered to God, then it was inappropriate to prohibit the sacrifice of a defective animal, e.g., a lame or blind or otherwise unclean animal.

Objection 8: Those who offer victims to God ought to partake of those victims—this according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 10:18 (“Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?”). Therefore, it was inappropriate for certain parts of the victims—viz., the blood, the fat, the breastbone, and the right shoulder—to be withheld from those who were offering the sacrifice.

Objection 9: Just as holocausts were offered in honor of God, so too were peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female animal was offered to God in a holocaust, even though holocausts were made with both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore, it was inappropriate for female animals to be offered as peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and yet for birds not to be offered as peace-offerings.

Objection 10: All peace-offerings seem to be of the same type. Therefore, no distinction should have been drawn among them, as Leviticus 7:15-16 does in mandating that the flesh of some peace-offerings cannot be eaten a day later, whereas the flesh of others can be.

Objection 11: All sins alike involve a turning away from God. Therefore, a single type of sacrifice should have been offered for all sins in order to be reconciled with God.

Objection 12: All the animals that were offered in sacrifice were offered in a single way, viz., after having been killed. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate that offerings of things that grow in the earth should have been made in diverse ways. For instance, sometimes an offering was made of grain, sometimes of flour, and sometimes of bread, where the bread was sometimes cooked in an oven, sometimes in a pan, and sometimes on a grill.

Objection 13: All things that we have use of are such that we should acknowledge them as coming from God. Therefore, it was unfitting that, besides animals, the only things offered to God were bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt.

Objection 14: Bodily sacrifices express the heart’s interior sacrifice, by which a man offers his own spirit to God. But in an interior sacrifice there is more of sweetness, which is represented by honey, than of sharpness, which is represented by salt; for Ecclesiasticus 24:27 says, “My spirit is sweet beyond honey.” Therefore, it was inappropriate to prohibit in sacrifices the use of honey and leaven, which make bread tasty, and to prescribe instead the use of salt, which is sharp, and incense, which has a bitter taste.

Therefore, it seems that the things having to do with the ceremonies of the sacrifices do not have a reasoned cause.

But contrary to this: Leviticus 1:13 says, “The priest shall offer all the gifts and burn them upon the altar for a holocaust and a most sweet savor to the Lord.” But according to Wisdom 7:28, “God loves no one except he who dwells with wisdom,” from which one can infer that whatever is acceptable to God is imbued with wisdom. Therefore, the ceremonies of the sacrifices were imbued with wisdom, i.e., they had reasoned causes.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), there are two kinds of reasons for the ceremonies of the Old Law, viz., (a) *literal* reasons, given that the ceremonies are ordered toward the worship of God, and (b) *figurative* or *mystical* reasons, given that the ceremonies are ordered toward prefiguring Christ. The ceremonies having to do with sacrifices can be appropriately assigned reasons of both kinds.

Insofar as the sacrifices are ordered to the worship of God, there are two reasons that can be

specified for them:

The first reason is that the sacrifices represent that ordering of the mind toward God which the one offering the sacrifice is incited to. Now the correct ordering of the mind to God involves (a) a man's acknowledging that all the things he has are from God as their first principle and (b) his ordering all those things to God as their ultimate end. This was represented in the oblations and sacrifices by the fact that a man offered some of his own things to honor God, as if acknowledging that he had them from God. Accordingly, in 1 Paralipomenon 39:14 David said, "All things are yours, and we have given you what we received from your hand." So in offering sacrifices man was professing that God is the first principle of the creation of things and the ultimate end to whom all things should be directed.

Now because the correct ordering of the mind to God involves the human mind's (a) not recognizing any first author of things other than God alone and (b) not setting up any other being as its own last end, the Law prohibits offering sacrifices to any being other than God—this according to Exodus 22:20 ("Anyone who sacrifices to gods besides the Lord alone shall be put to death"). And so the second reason that can be specified for the ceremonies involving sacrifice is that through ceremonies of this sort men were restrained from offering sacrifices to idols. Moreover, this is why the precepts concerning the sacrifices were given to the Jewish people only after they had fallen into idolatry by worshiping the molten calf; it was as if these sacrifices were instituted in order that a people eager to offer sacrifices should offer such sacrifices to God rather than to idols. Hence, Jeremiah 7:22 says, "For I spoke not to your fathers, and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt offerings and sacrifices."

Now among all the gifts that God gave to the human race once it had already fallen through sin, the principal one was that He gave His own Son. Hence, John 3:16 says, "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, so that whoever believes in Him may not perish, but may have eternal life." And so the most powerful sacrifice is the one by which Christ "offered Himself to God for an odor of sweetness," as Ephesians 5:22 puts it. Because of this, all the other sacrifices were offered in the Old Law in order that they might be figures of this one singular and principal sacrifice, in the way that the imperfect is a figure of the perfect. Hence, in Hebrews 10:11 the Apostle says that a priest of the Old Law "offered many times the same sacrifices, which are never able to take away sins," whereas Christ "offered one sacrifice for sins" for all times. And since the reason for a figure is taken from what it is a figure of, it follows that the reasons for the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law are to be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ.

Reply to objection 1: God did not want sacrifices of this sort for the sake of the things themselves that were offered, as if He stood in need of them; hence, Isaiah 1:11 says, "I did not want holocausts of rams, and the fat of fatlings, and the blood of calves and lambs and goats." Rather, as has been explained, He wanted them offered to Himself (a) in order to prevent idolatry, (b) in order to signify the appropriate ordering of the human mind toward God, and (c) in order to be a figure of the mystery of human redemption accomplished by Christ.

Reply to objection 2: In all the respects just mentioned, there was an appropriate reason why the animals in question—and not others—were offered to God in sacrifice.

First, in order to prevent idolatry. For the idolaters offered all the other animals to their gods or used them for their sorceries (*maleficia*), whereas among the Egyptians, with whom they had lived, it was an abomination to kill the animals in question, and so the Egyptians did not offer them in sacrifice to their own gods. Hence, Exodus 8:26 says, "We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our God." For the Egyptians worshiped sheep and venerated goats, since demons appeared in the shape of these animals, whereas they used oxen for agriculture, which they held to be something sacred.

Second, this was appropriate in two ways for the ordering of the mind toward God:

(a) First, because animals of the sort in question are especially the ones that human life is sustained

by and, along with this, they are the cleanest animals and eat the cleanest food. By contrast, other animals are such that they either live in the wild and are not commonly thought of as useful to men or, if domesticated, then, like the pig and the goose, eat unclean food. But only what is pure should be offered to God. On the other hand, the birds in question were specifically offered to God because they were found in abundance in the promised land.

(b) Second, because purity of mind is signified by the immolation of animals of the sort in question. For as a Gloss on Leviticus 1 says, “We offer a calf when we conquer the pride of the flesh; we offer a lamb when we correct our irrational movements; we offer a goat when we conquer our lasciviousness; we offer a turtledove when we preserve our chastity; we offer unleavened bread when we eat the unleavened bread of sincerity.” Moreover, the turtledove clearly signifies charity and simplicity of mind.

Third, these animals were appropriately offered as figures of Christ. For a Gloss on the same passage says, “Christ is offered in the calf as a figure of the power of the cross; He is offered in the lamb as a figure of His innocence; He is offered in the ram as a figure of His sovereignty; He is offered in the goat as a figure of the sinful flesh. What is shown in the turtledove and the dove is the conjoining of the two natures”—or, alternatively, the turtledove signifies chastity and the dove signifies charity—“and the flour is a figure of the sprinkling of believers with the water of Baptism.”

Reply to objection 3: Since they live in the water, fish are more distant from man than are the other animals, which live in the air, as man does. Again, when fish are taken from the water, they immediately die, and so they could not be offered in the temple in the way the other animals were.

Reply to objection 4: Among the turtledoves, the older ones are better than the younger, whereas it is just the opposite in the case of the doves. And so, as Rabbi Moses puts it, they were told to offer turtledoves and the young of the doves, because everything that is the best should be given to God.

Reply to objection 5: The animals offered in sacrifice were killed because animals that have been killed are useful to man, insofar as God has given them to man for food. And so they were consumed by fire, because it was through fire that, having been cooked, they were apt for human use. Again, the killing of the animals signified the destruction of sins, and also signified that men deserved to be killed for their sins—as if the animals were being killed in place of the men in order to signify the expiation of sins.

Moreover, the killing of these animals signified the killing of Christ.

Reply to objection 6: The Law set down a specific way of killing the immolated animals in order to exclude the other ways by which idolaters sacrificed animals to their idols.

Alternatively, as Rabbi Moses puts it, “The Law chose a type of killing by which the animals being killed would suffer the least.” This excluded (a) cruelty (*immisericordia*) on the part of those offering the sacrifice and (b) the mangling (*deterioratio*) of the animals killed.

Reply to objection 7: Defective animals are normally held in contempt by men, and so it was forbidden that they be offered in sacrifice to God. Because of this, it was also forbidden “to offer the price of a prostitute or the price of a dog in the house of God” (Deuteronomy 23:18). And for this same reason they did not offer animals that were not yet seven days old; for such animals were, so to speak, abortive—not as yet fully firmed up because of their tender age.

Reply to objection 8: There were three kinds of sacrifice:

One kind was totally consumed by fire, and this was called a *holocaust* (*holocaustum*). For a sacrifice of this sort was offered to God specifically to show reverence to His majesty and love for His goodness, and it corresponded to *the state of perfection in fulfilling His counsels*. And so the sacrifice was totally consumed by fire, in order that just as the entire animal, reduced to smoke, ascended upward, so this might signify that the whole man and all that belonged to him were subject to the Lord God and were to be offered to Him.

The second kind of sacrifice was a *sin-offering* (*sacrificium pro peccatis*), which was offered to God because of the need for the forgiveness of sins and which corresponded to *the state of those doing penance as satisfaction for their sins*. The offering was divided into two parts: one part of it was consumed by fire, and the other part went for the use of the priests in order to signify that the expiation of sins is accomplished by God through the ministry of the priests. The only exception occurred when the sacrifice was being offered for the sins of all the people or specifically for the sins of the priests. On such occasions the whole offering was consumed by fire. For it would have been unfitting for the priests to have use of what had been offered for their sins in such a way that nothing sinful should remain in them. For this would not have been satisfaction for their sins. After all, if the offering were handed over for the use of those whose sins it had been offered for, this would seem to be equivalent to their not having made an offering at all.

The third kind of sacrifice was called a *peace-offering* (*hostia pacifica*), which was offered to God either as a thanksgiving (*pro gratiarum actione*) or for the well-being (*salus*) and prosperity of those making the offering, in return for a favor already received or to be received in the future, and which corresponds to *the state of those proficient in the fulfillment of the commandments*. These offerings were divided into three parts: (a) one part was burned in honor of God, (b) another part went for the use of the priests, and (c) the third part went for the use of those making the offering. This was in order to signify that (a) man's well-being proceeds from God, (b) under the direction of God's ministers, and (c) with the cooperation of the very men who are being saved.

Now it was a general rule that the blood and fat did not go either for the use of the priests or for the use of those making the offering; instead, the blood was poured out at the foot of the altar in honor of God, while the fat was burned up in the fire.

One reason for this was to prevent idolatry, since idolaters drank the blood of sacrificial victims and ate their fat—this according to Deuteronomy 32:38 (“Of the victims [of the idols] they ate the fat, and drank the wine of their drink offerings”).

A second reason was to give shape to a humane way of life. For the use of the blood was forbidden to them in order that they might abhor the shedding of human blood; hence, Genesis 9:4-5 says, “Flesh with blood you shall not eat; for I will require the blood of your lives.” And the use of the fat was forbidden to them in order to stave off licentiousness; hence, Ezekiel 34:3 says, “You killed that which was fat.”

A third reason was to show reverence for God. For blood is especially necessary for life and, because of this, the soul is said to exist in the blood (see Leviticus 17:11). Fat, on the other hand, points to an abundance of food. And so in order to show that life and every adequate supply of goods come to us from God, the blood was poured out and the fat burned in honor of God.

A fourth reason is that it prefigured the shedding of Christ's blood and the abundance of charity with which He offered Himself to God on our behalf.

The priests were given the breast and right shoulder from the peace-offerings in order to prevent the type of divination that is called spatulamancy (*spatulamantia*), since divinations were made in the shoulder-blades (*in spatulis*) of sacrificed animals, as well as in their breastbones. And so these things were taken away from those who made the offerings. This practice also signified that the priest needed (a) ‘wisdom of the heart’ (*sapientia cordis*) in order to instruct the people, and this is signified by the breast, which covers the heart, as well as (b) the fortitude to endure their defects, and this is signified by the right shoulder.

Reply to objection 9: Since the holocaust was the most perfect among the sacrifices, only the male was offered in a holocaust. For the female is an imperfect animal.

Now turtledoves and doves were offered because of the poverty of those making the offering; for they were unable to offer the bigger animals. Moreover, since the peace-offerings were offered

spontaneously and no one was forced to offer them unwillingly, birds of this sort were offered not in the peace-offerings, but rather in the holocausts and sin-offerings, which had to be offered at certain times. In addition, these birds fit in with the perfection of the holocausts because they fly high in the sky, and they fit in with the sin-offerings because of their sad singing.

Reply to objection 10: The holocaust was the chief among the sacrifices, since the entire offering was consumed by fire in honor of God, and none of it was eaten. The second place in holiness was held by the sin-offering, which was eaten only in the court, by the priests, and on the very day of the sacrifice. The third place was held by the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in Jerusalem. And the fourth place was had by peace-offerings made with a private vow (*ex voto*); the meat from these sacrifices could be eaten on the next day as well.

The reason for this ordering is that man is obligated to God (a) most of all because of His majesty; (b) second, because of the offenses committed against Him; (c) third, because of favors already received; and (d) fourth, because of favors hoped for.

Reply to objection 11: As was explained above (q. 73, a. 10), sins are made more serious by the status of the sinner. And so the offerings mandated for the sins of a priest or a ruler are different from those mandated for the sins of a private person.

But notice that, as Rabbi Moses points out, “the graver the sin was, the lower the species of animal offered for it. Hence, the goat, which is a very low animal, was offered for idolatry, which is the gravest sin, whereas a calf was offered for a sin of ignorance on the part of a priest, and a ram was offered for a sin of negligence on the part of a ruler.”

Reply to objection 12: In the case of sacrifices, the Law wished to take into account the poverty of those making the offering, so that someone who could not afford a four-footed animal might at least offer a bird, and someone who could not afford a bird might at least offer bread, and someone who could not afford bread might at least offer flour or grain.

The figurative reason for this is that the bread signifies Christ, who is the living bread, as John 6:41 says. Under the law of nature Christ was like grain in the faith of the patriarchs; and then He was like flour in the teaching of the Law of the prophets; and then He was like formed bread-dough after He assumed His human nature; and then He was cooked by a fire, i.e., He was formed by the Holy Spirit in the oven of the virgin’s womb, and He was also cooked in a baking pan through the hardships (*labores*) He endured in the world; and on the cross He was, as it were, consumed by fire on a grill.

Reply to objection 13: Among the things that grow from the earth, those that are useful to man are either (a) for eating, and from these bread was offered, or (b) for drinking, and from these wine was offered, or (c) for seasoning, and from these oil and salt were offered, or (d) for healing, and from these incense, which is aromatic and gives strength, was offered.

Now the bread is a figure of Christ’s flesh; the wine is a figure of His blood, through which we have been redeemed; the oil is a figure of Christ’s grace; the salt is a figure of His knowledge; and the incense is a figure of His prayer.

Reply to objection 14: The reason why honey was not offered in sacrifices to God was that it used to be offered in sacrifices to idols, and also in order to prevent any sort of carnal delight or pleasure in those who intended to make sacrifice to God.

The reason why leaven was not offered was to prevent spoiling. And perhaps it, too, used to be offered in sacrifices to idols.

On the other hand, salt was offered because it prevents spoiling, and sacrifices to God ought to be unspoiled. Also, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom as well as the mortification of the flesh.

Incense was offered in order to signify the devotion of mind required in those making the offering, and also to signify the odor of a good reputation. For incense is rich and fragrant. Moreover, since the

‘sacrifice of jealousy’ (*sacrificium zelotypiae*) proceeded not from devotion but instead from suspicion, incense was not offered in this sort of sacrifice (see Numbers 5:15).

Article 4

Can appropriate reasons be assigned for the ceremonies that involve the sacred things?

It seems that appropriate reasons cannot be assigned for the ceremonies that involve the sacred things:

Objection 1: In Acts 17:24 Paul says, “God, who made the world, and all things therein; He, being Lord of heaven and earth, dwells not in temples made with hands.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for the tabernacle or temple to be instituted under the Old Law for the worship of God.

Objection 2: The status of the Old Law was altered only by Christ. But the tabernacle signified the status of the Old Law. Therefore, it should not have been altered by the building of a temple.

Objection 3: The divine law should be principally concerned with inducing men to worship God. But as is clear in the New Law, the making of many altars and many temples contributes to an increase in the worship of God. Therefore, it seems that even in the Old Law there should have been many temples or tabernacles, and not just a single temple or single tabernacle.

Objection 4: The tabernacle or temple was ordered toward the worship of God. But it is especially God’s oneness and simplicity that should be venerated. Therefore, it does not seem to have been appropriate for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by veils.

Objection 5: The power of the first mover, who is God, is first apparent in the East (*in parte orientis*), where the first motion begins. But the tabernacle was instituted for the adoration of God. Therefore, it should have faced toward the East rather than the West.

Objection 6: In Exodus 20:4 the Lord commanded that they should “not make a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything.” Therefore, it was improper for there to have been graven images of the Cherubim in the tabernacle or temple. Similarly, there seems to have been no appropriate reason for the ark or the propitiatory or the candelabra or the table or the two altars to be there.

Objection 7: In Exodus 20:24 the Lord commanded, “You shall make an altar of earth unto me,” and again, “You shall not go up by steps unto my altar.” Therefore, it was inappropriate to command later on that the altar be made of wood covered with gold or bronze and of such a height that it could not be ascended except by means of steps. For Exodus 27:1-2 says, “You shall make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long and as many wide and three cubits high and you shall cover it with brass.” And Exodus 30:1,3 says, “You shall make an altar to burn incense of setim wood and you shall overlay it with the purest gold.”

Objection 8: There should be nothing superfluous in the works of God, since there is nothing superfluous in the works of nature. But a single covering (*operimentum*) is sufficient for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was inappropriate for the tabernacle to have many coverings, viz., curtains, blankets made of the hair of goats, ram skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins (see Exodus 26).

Objection 9: Exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, whose subject is the soul. Therefore, since the tabernacle and its vessels were inanimate corporeal things, it was inappropriate for them to be consecrated.

Objection 10: Psalm 33:2 says, “I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise will always be in my mouth.” But the solemn feasts (*solemnitates*) were instituted in order to praise God. Therefore, it was inappropriate for certain set days to be instituted for celebrating the feasts.

So, then, it seems that there were no appropriate reasons for the ceremonies involving the sacred things.

But contrary to this: In Hebrews 8:4 the Apostle says, “Those who offer gifts according to the law serve as an example and shadow of heavenly things. As Moses was told when he was finishing the tabernacle: ‘See to it that you make all things according to the pattern which was shown to you on the mountain.’”

I respond: The whole of the exterior worship of God was principally ordered toward men’s holding God in reverence. However, human affection is such that things that are common and not distinctive in relation to other things are less revered, whereas things that have some mark of excellence in distinction from other things are more revered and admired. Because of this, it has been the custom among men that kings and princes, who should be held in reverence by their subjects, dress in more expensive clothes and have bigger and more beautiful houses to live in.

For this reason, it was necessary that special times and special places and special vessels and special ministries should be ordered toward the worship of God, so that men’s minds might thereby be led to a greater reverence for God.

Similarly, as has been explained (a. 2), the status of the Old Law was instituted in order that it might be a figure of the mystery of Christ. But that which is a figure of another must itself be something determinate in order to represent a likeness of that other. And so, again, it was necessary for special things to be observed in those matters that involve the worship of God.

Reply to objection 1: The worship of God involves two things, viz., the God who is being worshiped and the men who are doing the worshiping. The God who is being worshiped is not Himself confined to any corporeal place, and hence it is not because of Him that a tabernacle or temple must be fashioned. By contrast, the men worshiping Him are corporeal, and it is because of them that a special tabernacle or temple must be instituted for the worship of God—and this for two reasons.

First, when they come together at such a place with the thought that the place has been set aside for the worship of God, they come with greater reverence.

Second, the arrangement of the tabernacle or temple signifies certain things that bear upon the excellence of the divine nature or of the humanity of Christ.

Thus, in 3 Kings 8:27 Solomon says, “If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain You, how much less this house which I have built for You?” And after this he adds, “Let Your eyes be open upon this house of which You said, ‘My name shall be there’, ... so that You may hear the prayer of Your servant and of Your people Israel.” From this it is clear that the house of the sanctuary was instituted not in order to capture God, as if He might live there as in a place, but rather in order that (a) the name of God might dwell there, i.e., in order that the knowledge of God might be made manifest in that place through the things that were said and done there, and in order that (b) out of reverence for the place, the prayers made there would be heard more readily because of the devotion of those praying.

Reply to objection 2: In the time before Christ the status of the Old Law was not altered with respect to the fulfillment of the Law, which was accomplished only through Christ. However, it was altered with respect to the condition of the people who were living under the Law.

For at first the people were living in the desert and had no fixed dwelling place. After that, they waged various wars against the neighboring Gentiles. Finally, at the time of David and Solomon the people lived in a very peaceful state. And it was at that time that the temple was first built on the site that Abraham, instructed by God, had designated for sacrifice. For Genesis 22:2 says that Lord commanded Abraham to offer his son “for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show you.” And afterwards it says that he named this place ‘The Lord Sees’—as if it were in accord with God’s foreknowledge that this place had been chosen for divine worship. It is for this reason that Deuteronomy 12:5-6 says, “You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall choose and you shall offer

..... your holocausts and victims.”

However, before the time of David and Solomon it would have been inappropriate to designate a place for building the temple, and this for the three reasons Rabbi Moses puts forth: first, so that the Gentiles would not appropriate that place for themselves; second, so that the Gentiles would not destroy that place; and, third, so that the tribes would not all want to have that place in their own territory, with quarrels and disputes arising as a result. And so the temple was not built until the people had a king who could stop the quarreling.

Before that time, a tabernacle that could be carried to different places had been ordained for the worship of God—as if there was not yet a determinate place for divine worship. And this is literal reason for the difference between the tabernacle and the temple.

Now one possible figurative reason is that this signified our twofold status. For the tabernacle, which is mutable, signifies the state of our present mutable life, whereas the temple, which is fixed and stable, signifies the state of the future life, which is completely unchangeable. And because of this it is said that when the temple was being built, no sound of hammers or saws was heard, and this to signify that all disturbances will be far removed from the future state.

An alternative reason is that the tabernacle signifies the status of the Old Law, whereas the temple constructed by Solomon signifies the status of the New Law. Hence, only Jews worked on the construction of the tabernacle, whereas even Gentiles from Tyre and Sidon cooperated in the building of the temple.

Reply to objection 3: Both a literal and a figurative reason can be given for the fact that there is just one temple or tabernacle.

The literal reason is to prevent idolatry. For the Gentiles used to build different temples to different gods, and so in order to strengthen in the minds of men a faith in God’s oneness, God willed that sacrifices to Himself should be offered in just one place. Again, He did this in order to show that it was not because of itself that bodily worship was acceptable to Him. And so they were kept from offering sacrifices at just any time or place. By contrast, worship under the New Law, whose sacrifice contains spiritual grace, is acceptable to God in its own right, and this is why the multiplication of altars and temples is accepted under the New Law.

However, as regards those things that had to do with the spiritual worship of God and consisted in the teaching of the Law and the prophets, even under the Old Law there were different places set aside where they would come together to praise God. These were called ‘synagogues’, just as now there are places called ‘churches’ where the Christian people congregate to praise God. And so among us the church has taken the place of both the temple and the synagogue, since the very sacrifice of the Church is spiritual, and so there is no distinction among us between the place of sacrifice and the place of teaching.

A possible figurative reason is that the oneness of the temple signifies the oneness of the Church, whether the Church militant or the Church triumphant.

Reply to objection 4: Just as the oneness of God or the oneness of the Church is represented by the oneness of the tabernacle or temple, so the distinctions within the tabernacle or temple represent the distinctions among the things which are subject to God and out of which we rise up to venerate God.

Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts. The one part was called the ‘Holy of Holies’ and was situated to the West, and the other was called ‘The Holy Place’ and was situated to the East. Again, in front of the tabernacle there was a court.

There are two reasons for this division.

The first reason is that the tabernacle is ordered toward the worship of God. For the divisions within the tabernacle are a figure of the different parts of the world. The part called the ‘Holy of Holies’ was a figure of the higher world, i.e., the world of spiritual substances, whereas the part called the ‘Holy Place’ represented the corporeal world. And this is why the Holy Place was divided off from the Holy of

Holies by a veil divided into four colors designating the four elements, viz., (a) flaxen (*byssum*), signifying *earth*, since linen, i.e., flax, grows from the earth; (b) purple (*purpura*), signifying *water*, since the purple tint was made from a certain shellfish found in the sea; (c) violet (*hyacinthus*), signifying *air*, since it has the color of the atmosphere; and (d) twice-dyed scarlet (*coccus bis tinctus*), signifying *fire*. The reason for this is that the matter composed of the four elements is a barrier by which the incorporeal substances are veiled from us. And so only the high priest entered the inner tabernacle, i.e., the Holy of Holies, and this just once a year, in order to signify that man's final perfection is to enter into that higher world. By contrast, the priests entered the outer part, i.e., the Holy Place, every day—though not the people, who went only as far as the court. For while the people can perceive corporeal things, only the wise are able, by their study, to grasp the inner natures (*rationes*) of those things.

As for the figurative reasons, the outer tabernacle, called the Holy Place, signifies the status of the Old Law, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 9:6-7. For the priests always entered the outer tabernacle in carrying out the duties associated with the sacrifices.

By contrast, the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, signifies either heavenly glory or the spiritual status of the New Law, which is a sort of beginning of future glory. Christ led us into this status, and a figure of this was the fact that the high priest entered into the Holy of Holies by himself.

Now the veil was a figure of the hiddenness of the spiritual sacrifices within the old sacrifices. And as for the fact that the veil was decorated with four colors, the flaxen signified the purification of the flesh (*carnis puritatem*), the purple signified the sufferings that the saints have endured for the sake of God, the twice-dyed scarlet signified the twofold love of God and neighbor, and the violet signified heavenly contemplation (*caelestis meditatio*).

Now the people and the priests were related in different ways to the status of the Old Law. For the people concentrated on the corporeal sacrifices that were offered in the court. The priests, on the other hand, took into account the reasons behind the sacrifices and had a more explicit faith concerning the mysteries of the Christ. And so they entered the outer tabernacle, which was divided off from the court by a veil, because certain things about the mystery of the Christ which were veiled from the people were made known to the priests. However, as Ephesians 3:5 says, these things were not revealed to them in full, as they would later be revealed in the New Testament.

Reply to objection 5: Adoration toward the West was introduced in the Law in order to prevent idolatry. For all the Gentiles worshiped toward the East out of reverence for the sun. Hence, Ezekiel 8:16 says, "Some had their backs toward the temple of the Lord, and their faces to the East, and they adored in the direction of the sun's rising." Hence, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle had the Holy of Holies situated to the West, so that they worshiped toward the West.

This can also serve as a figurative reason, since the whole status of the prior tabernacle was ordered toward being a figure of the death of Christ, which is signified by the West—this according to Psalm 67:5 ("He ascends unto the West, the Lord is His name.")

Reply to objection 6: Both literal and figurative reasons can be given for the things that were contained in the tabernacle.

The literal reasons, of course, have to do with their relation to the worship of God.

Since, as was explained above, the *inner tabernacle*, called the 'Holy of Holies', signified the higher world of spiritual substances, there were three things contained in that inner tabernacle. One was the ark of the covenant (*arca testamenti*), in which there was a golden vase containing manna, the rod of Aaron that had flowered, and the tablets on which the ten precepts of the Law had been written. This ark was situated between the two Cherubim, who were looking at each other. And above the ark there was a sort of table, called the 'propitiatory', which was located over the wings of the Cherubim and was being held up, as it were, by the Cherubim themselves—as if one were to imagine that this table was the seat of God. The reason the table was called the 'propitiatory' is that the people received propitiation when the

high priest prayed. And it was held up by the Cherubim, who were bowing down to God, whereas the ark of the covenant served as the footstool, as it were, of the One sitting on the propitiatory.

These three things signify three things that exist in that higher world.

First there is *God*, who exists above all things and is incomprehensible to every creature. And in order to represent His invisibility, no likeness of Him was placed there. Instead, a representation of His seat was placed there, because a creature's being subject to God is comprehensible, just like a seat's being subject to the one sitting on it. Again, there are *spiritual substances* called 'angels' in that higher world, and they are signified by the two Cherubim. They are looking at each other in order to signify their concord with one another—this according to Job 25:2 ("He makes concord in high places"). And the reason why there was not just one Cherub was to signify the multitude of heavenly spirits and to prevent their being worshiped by those who were commanded to worship the one God alone. Again, *conceptions (rationes)* of all the things that are brought to completion in our world are contained in some sense in that intelligible world—in the way that conceptions of effects are contained in their causes and that conceptions of his artifacts are contained in a craftsman. And this was signified by the ark, which, by the three things it contained, represented the three most powerful things in human affairs, viz., wisdom, which was represented by the tablets of the covenant; political power (*potestas regiminis*), which was represented by Aaron's rod; and life, which was represented by the manna that sustained life. An alternative explanation is that these three items represented three of God's attributes, viz., wisdom, in the tablets; power, in the rod; and goodness, in the manna, both because of its sweetness and because it was given to the people out of God's mercy and so was conserved in memory of God's mercy.

Figures of these three things are likewise found in Isaiah's vision (see Isaiah 6). For he saw the Lord exalted and elevated on His throne, and he saw the Seraphim attending Him, and the house was filled with the glory of God. And so the Seraphim proclaimed, "All the earth is full of the glory of God." And thus, as has been explained, the likenesses of the Seraphim were placed there not to be worshiped—something forbidden by the first precept of the Law—but instead, as has been explained, as a sign of their ministry.

On the other hand, the *outer tabernacle*, which signifies the present world, likewise contained three things, viz., the *altar of incense (altare thymiamatis)*, which was directly across from the ark; the *table of proposition (mensa propositionis)*, with the twelve loaves of bread on it, which was positioned toward the North; and the *candelabra*, which was positioned toward the South. These three items seem to correspond to the three things contained in the ark, but they represented them in a more evident way. For the conceptions of things have to be given a more evident manifestation than their existence in the minds of God and the angels in order for wise men to be able to grasp them, where the wise men are signified by the priests entering the tabernacle. The candelabra signified, as a visible sign, the wisdom that was expressed in intelligible words on the tablets. The altar of incense signified the role of the priests in leading the people back to God, and this was likewise signified by the rod. For the sweet-smelling incense, which signified the holiness of a people acceptable to God, was lit on that altar; as Apocalypse 8:3-4 puts it, the smoke of aromatic herbs signifies the "prayers of the saints" (*iustificationes sanctorum*). The dignity of the priests was appropriately signified in the ark by the rod and in the inner tabernacle by the altar of incense, because the priest is a mediator between God and the people, ruling over the people by God's power, which is signified by the rod. And he offers, as it were, the fruit of his rule, viz., the holiness of the people, on the altar of incense. Now the table signifies the nourishment of life, just as the manna does—though the former is a more common and coarse sort of nourishment, while the latter is sweeter and more subtle. The candelabra was appropriately positioned toward the South and the table toward the North, since, as *De Caelo et Mundo* 2 says, the South is the right-hand part of the world, whereas the North is the left-hand part. And wisdom pertains to the right, as do other spiritual goods, whereas temporal nourishment pertains to the left—this according to Proverbs 3:16 ("In her left hand are

riches and glory”). Moreover, the power of the priesthood occupies a middle place between temporal things and spiritual wisdom, since both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed through this power.

Now these things can be assigned another and more literal reason.

The ark contained the tablets of the Law in order to prevent the Law from being forgotten; hence, Exodus 24 says, “I will give you two stone tablets, and the Law and commandments which I have written, that you might teach them to the children of Israel.” Aaron’s rod was placed there in order to suppress the dissension of the people against Aaron’s priesthood; hence, Numbers 17:10 says, “Carry back the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a token of the rebellious children of Israel.” The manna was preserved in the ark as a reminder of the favors God had bestowed on the children of Israel in the desert; hence, Exodus 16:32 says, “Fill an omer with it, and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread, wherewith I fed you in the wilderness.” The candelabra was set up to give honor to the tabernacle, since a house’s magnificence includes its being well lit. For the candelabra had seven arms to signify, as Josephus says, the seven planets by which the whole world is illumined, and the reason why the candelabra was positioned toward the South was that the course of the planets is from our South. The altar of incense was set up so that the tabernacle would continually have sweet-smelling smoke (*fumus boni odoris*)—both because of the veneration due the tabernacle and also as a remedy for the stench that necessarily arose from the outflow of blood and the killing of the animals. For things that smell bad are despised as vile, whereas things with a good odor are more highly valued by men. The table was set up to signify that the priests who served the temple were supposed to have their food in the temple; hence, as Matthew 12:4 says, only the priests were allowed to eat the twelve loaves of bread that were placed on the table as a memorial of the twelve tribes. Now the table was not placed exactly in the middle in front of the propitiatory. This was in order to prevent an idolatrous rite, since on the feasts of the moon the Gentiles put a table in front of the idol of the moon; hence, Jeremiah 7:18 says, “The women knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven.”

In the *court outside the tabernacle* there was an altar of holocausts, on which sacrifices were offered to God from among the things possessed by the people. And so the people who offered sacrifices by the hand of the priests could be present in the court. But only the priests, whose role was to offer the people to God, could go up to the inner altar, on which the very devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. The altar of holocausts was placed in the court outside the tabernacle in order to prevent idolatrous worship, since the Gentiles set up altars within their temples to offer sacrifices to their idols.

Now figurative reasons can be assigned for all these things on the basis of the tabernacle’s relation to Christ, of whom it is a figure. Note that in order to signify the imperfection of the figures in the Law, diverse figures were set up in the temple to signify Christ.

For He is signified by the propitiatory, since, as 1 John 2:2 puts it, He Himself is “a propitiation for our sins.” And it was appropriate for the propitiatory to be held up by the Cherubim, since it is written of Him that all the angels of God adore Him, as Hebrews 1:6 says. He is likewise signified by the ark, since just as the ark was made of setim wood, so Christ’s body consists of the purest members. The ark was overlaid with gold, since Christ was full of wisdom and charity, which are signified by gold. Inside the ark there was a golden urn, i.e., a holy soul, containing manna, i.e., all the plenitude of divinity. Inside the ark there was also the rod, i.e., priestly power, since He was made a priest forever. The tablets of the covenant were also there, in order to signify that Christ Himself is the lawgiver. Christ Himself is also signified by the candelabra, since He says, “I am the light of the world,” and the seven lights signify the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. He is spiritual food—this according to John 6:41 (“I am the living bread”), while the twelve loaves signify the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Alternatively, the candelabra and the table can signify the teaching and faith of the Church, which likewise gives light and spiritual

renewal. Christ is also signified by the two altars, the altar of holocausts and the altar of incense. For it is through Him that we must offer to God all the works of the virtues, or all the things by which we afflict our flesh and which are offered, as it were, on the altar of holocausts, along with those things which, with a greater perfection of mind and through the spiritual desires of the perfect, are offered to God in Christ as on the altar of incense—this according to Hebrews 13:15 (“By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God”).

Reply to objection 7: The Lord commanded that the altar be constructed in order to offer gifts and sacrifices both in honor of God and for the sustenance of the ministers who served in the tabernacle. Now there are two commands given by the Lord concerning the construction of the altar.

The first occurs at the beginning of the Law in Exodus 20, where the Lord commanded that the altar be made of earth or at least of uncut stones and, again, that they not make the altar so high that it would be necessary to ascend it by means of steps. This was out of hatred for idolatrous worship, since the Gentiles constructed ornate and towering altars to their idols, and they believed there to be something holy and divine in their altars. It was for the same reason that the Lord commanded in Deuteronomy 16:21, “You shall plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of the Lord your God.” For the idolaters used to offer sacrifices under trees because it was pleasant and shady there.

There was also a figurative reason for these precepts. For in Christ, who is our altar, we should confess the true nature of flesh with respect to His humanity, and this corresponds to making an altar of earth. And with respect to His divinity, we should confess His equality with the Father, and this corresponds to not ascending the altar by means of steps. Nor should we allow near to Christ the Gentile teaching which leads to licentiousness.

However, once the tabernacle had been fashioned in honor of God, then there was no reason to fear such occasions of idolatry. And so the Lord commanded that the altar of holocausts, which would be visible to all the people, should be made out of bronze, and that the altar of incense, which only the priests would see, should be made out of gold. Nor was bronze so precious that the people would be moved to idolatry because of it.

However, since Exodus 20:26 adds—as a reason for the precept ‘You shall not ascend my altar by steps’—“..... lest your nakedness be revealed,” one has to think that this precept was likewise instituted to prevent idolatry. For on the feasts of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their genitals before the people. But later on the priests were ordered to use loincloths to cover their genitals, and so there was no danger in building an altar so high that at the hour of sacrifice the priests offering the sacrifices would ascend the altar by wooden steps—not permanent steps but portable ones.

Reply to objection 8: The main body of the tabernacle consisted of boards standing on end, which were covered on the inside by curtains of four different colors, viz., twisted flaxen, violet, purple, and twice-dyed scarlet. But these curtains covered only the sides of the tabernacle, whereas the roof of the tabernacle was one covering of violet-colored skins and, over that, another covering of red ram-skins, and, over that, a third covering of goat-skin blankets that not only covered the roof of the tabernacle but came down all the way to the ground and covered the outside of the boards of the tabernacle.

The general literal reason behind these coverings was to decorate and protect the tabernacle, in order that it might be treated with reverence. As for specific reasons, according to some the curtains signified the starry heaven, which is dotted with the different stars; and the blankets signified the waters that are above the firmament; and the red-colored skins signified the empyrean heaven, where the angels reside; and the violet-colored skins signified the heaven of the Holy Trinity.

On the other hand, the figurative reasons for these things are as follows: The boards out of which the tabernacle was built signify Christ’s faithful ones, out of whom the Church is built. The walls are covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors because the faithful are decorated interiorly with four virtues: for as a Gloss puts it, “The twisted flax signifies the flesh striving after chastity, the

violet signifies the mind desiring heavenly things, the purple signifies the flesh subject to the passions, and the twice-dyed scarlet signifies the mind shining forth from among the passions with the love of God and neighbor. As for the coverings on the roof, the violet-colored skins signify the prelates and doctors, in whom the celestial way of life should shine forth; the red-colored skins signify a readiness for martyrdom; and the goat-skin blankets—which, as a Gloss says, were exposed to the wind and the rain—signify austerity of life and perseverance against enemies.

Reply to objection 9: The sanctification of the tabernacle and its vessels had as its literal reason that they might be treated with great reverence, given that through this consecration they were being assigned to the worship of God.

On the other hand, the figurative reason is that this sanctification signifies the spiritual sanctification of the living tabernacle, viz., the tabernacle of the faithful from whom the Church of Christ is built.

Reply to objection 10: As can be seen from Numbers 28 and 29, in the Old Law there were seven periodic solemn feasts (*solemnitates temporales*) and one continuous solemn feast.

For there was, as it were, a continuous feast, since a lamb was sacrificed every day in the morning and in the evening, and this continuous feast of continual sacrifice represented the perpetuity of God's happiness.

Now the first of the periodic feasts was the one that was repeated every seventh day, and this was the solemn feast of the Sabbath, which, as explained above (q. 100, a. 5), was celebrated in memory of the creation of things.

The second solemn feast was repeated every month, viz., the feast of the New Moon (*festum Neomeniae*), which was celebrated to commemorate the work of divine governance. For things here below vary mainly according to the moon's motion, and so this feast was celebrated at the time of the new moon—and not at the time of the full moon, in order to prevent the idolatrous worship that offered sacrifices at the time of the full moon.

The other five feasts were celebrated once a year, and they recalled favors that had been specially given to that people. The feast of the Passover (*festum Phase*) was celebrated in the first month, in order to commemorate the favor of the liberation from Egypt, while the feast of Pentecost (*festum Pentecostes*) was celebrated fifty days later, in order to recall the favor of the giving of the Law. The other three feasts were celebrated in the seventh month, the whole of which was solemn among them in the same way that the seventh day was. On the first day of the seventh month was the feast of Trumpets (*festum Tubarum*), in memory of the liberation of Isaac, when Abraham found the ram caught by its horns, which were represented by the horns that they sounded. The feast of Trumpets was, as it were, an invitation to prepare oneself for the next feast, which was celebrated on the tenth day. This was the feast of Atonement (*festum Expiationis*), in memory of that favor by which, at the prayer of Moses, God forgave (*propitiatus est*) the sin of the people worshiping the calf. After this, the feast of Booths (*festum Scenopegiae*), i.e., the feast of Tabernacles, was celebrated for seven days to commemorate the favor of God's protecting them and leading them through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence, on that feast they had to have the fruit of the most beautiful tree, i.e., the citron, and a tree of dense foliage, i.e., the myrtle, which is fragrant, and the branches of palm trees, and the willows of the brook, which keep their greenness for a long time. All of these are found in the promised land (*terra promissionis*), and signify that God had led them through the arid terrain of the desert into a delightful land. On the eighth day another feast was celebrated, viz., the feast of Assembly and Collection (*festum Coetus atque Collectae*), in which the necessary expenses for divine worship were collected from the people. This signified the union of the people and the peace bestowed on them in the promised land.

Now the figurative reasons for these feasts are as follows: The continual sacrifice of the lamb is a figure of the perpetuity of Christ, who is the Lamb of God—this according to Hebrews 13:8 ("Jesus

Christ yesterday and today, and the same for ever”). The Sabbath signifies the spiritual rest given to us through Christ, as Hebrews 4 says. The feast of the New Moon, which is the beginning of a new moon, signifies the illumination of the primitive Church by Christ through His preaching and miracles. The feast of Pentecost signifies the descent of the Holy Spirit on the apostles, whereas the feast of Trumpets signifies the preaching of the apostles. The feast of Atonement signifies the washing away of the sins of the Christian people, whereas the feast of Tabernacles signifies their journey in this world, in which they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of Assembly and Collection signifies the congregation of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven, and that is why this feast was called “most holy.” And these last three feasts were continuous with one another because, as Psalm 83 says, it is necessary for those whose vices have been forgiven to make progress in virtue until they arrive at the vision of God.

Article 5

Can appropriate reasons be assigned for the sacraments of the Old Law?

It seems that appropriate reasons cannot be assigned for the sacraments of the Old Law:

Objection 1: What is done in divine worship should not be similar to the observances of the idolaters; for Deuteronomy 12:31 says, “You shall not do in like manner to the Lord your God. For they have done to their gods all the abominations which the Lord abhors.” But in their worship, the worshipers of idols used to cut themselves to the point of drawing blood; for 3 Kings 18:28 says, “They cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, until they were all covered with blood.” For this reason the Lord commanded in Deuteronomy 14:1, “You shall not cut yourselves, nor shave your heads over the dead.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for circumcision to have been instituted in the Law.

Objection 2: What is done in divine worship should be upright and serious—this according to Psalm 34:18 (“I will praise You in a serious people”). But it seems to smack of a certain levity that men should eat in haste. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Exodus 12 to command that they should eat the paschal lamb in haste. In addition, other rules that were instituted concerning the eating of the lamb seem to have no reason at all behind them.

Objection 3: The sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. But the paschal lamb signifies the sacrament of the Eucharist—this according to 1 Corinthians 5:7 (“Christ our Pasch is sacrificed”). Therefore, there should also have been sacraments in the Law that prefigured the other sacraments of the New Law such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, Matrimony, and the others.

Objection 4: One can be purified only of impurities. But in God’s eyes, nothing corporeal is considered unclean; for every corporeal entity is a creature of God and, as 1 Timothy 4:4 says, “Every creature of God is good, and nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for them to have to be purified because of contact with a human corpse or with a similar kind of bodily infection.

Objection 5: Ecclesiasticus 34:4 asks, “What can be made clean by the unclean?” But the ashes of a burnt red heifer (see Hebrews 9:13) were unclean; for Numbers 19:7ff. says that the priest who killed the red heifer was rendered impure until evening, and likewise the one who burned it and the one who collected its ashes. Therefore, it was inappropriate for there to have been a precept in the Law according to which the unclean were purified by the sprinkling of these ashes.

Objection 6: Sins are not anything corporeal that can be moved from one place to another; nor can

a man be cleansed of his sins by anything unclean. Therefore, it was inappropriate that, in order to expiate the sins of the people, the priest would confess the sins of the children of Israel over a goat which would then carry them into the desert, whereas through another goat, which the priests used for purification and which they burned along with a calf outside the camp, they were rendered unclean, so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies with water.

Objection 7: That which has already been made clean does not need to be made clean again. Therefore, it was inappropriate that after a man's leprosy, or even his house, had been made clean, another purification should be made, as Leviticus 16 has it.

Objection 8: Spiritual uncleanness cannot be washed away by corporeal water or by shaving. Therefore, it seems that there is no reason for the Lord to have commanded in Exodus 30:18-20 that a brass washbasin with its own base be fashioned for the washing of the hands and feet of the priests who were about to enter the tabernacle, or for Him to have commanded in Numbers 8:7 that the Levites be sprinkled with the water of purification and shave all the hair off their bodies.

Objection 9: What is greater should not be sanctified by what is lesser. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the consecration of the higher and lower priests (Leviticus 8) and of the Levites (Numbers 8) to be done with bodily ointment and corporeal sacrifices and corporeal oblations.

Objection 10: 1 Kings 16:7 says, "Men see those things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart." But the things that appear outwardly in a man are his bodily disposition and his clothes. Therefore, it was inappropriate for special vestments to be assigned to the higher and lower priests (Exodus 28). And there seems to be no reason why anyone should be excluded from the priesthood because of bodily defects, in the way stated in Leviticus 21:17-18: "Whoever of your seed throughout their families has a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God; neither shall he approach to minister to Him if he is blind or lame."

Therefore, it seems that there were no reasons behind the sacraments of the Old Law.

But contrary to this: Leviticus 20:8 says, "I am the Lord your God, who sanctifies you." But nothing comes from God without a reason; for Psalm 103:24 says, "You have made all things with wisdom." Therefore, in the sacraments of the Old Law, which were ordered toward the sanctification of men, there was nothing that did not have a reasoned cause behind it.

I respond: What are properly called sacraments are things that were done to the worshipers of God by way of a consecration through which they were in some sense set off (*deputabantur*) for the worship of God. Now the worship of God pertained in a general way to the whole people and in a specific way to the priests and Levites, who were the ministers of divine worship. And so among the sacraments of the Old Law, some pertained in general to all the people, whereas others pertained specifically to the ministers.

With respect to both groups, there were three requirements:

The first is being initiated (*institutio*) into the state of worshiping God. This general initiation with respect to everyone was accomplished through *circumcision*, without which no one was admitted to anything having to do with the Law. With respect to the priests, on the other hand, the initiation was accomplished through the *consecration of the priests*.

The second requirement was the exercise (*usus*) of what pertained to divine worship. With respect to the people, this consisted in the eating of the Paschal meal, which, as is clear from Exodus 12:43-45, no one uncircumcised was admitted to. With respect to the priests, it consisted in the offering of sacrifices (*oblatio victimarum*) and in the eating of the loaves of proposition and other items set aside for the use of the priests.

The third requirement was the removal of whatever might impede someone from divine worship, viz., impurities. And so with respect to the people, certain purifications from exterior impurities were

instituted, along with rites for the atonement for sins; and with respect to the priests, the washing of the hands and feet was instituted, along with the shaving of the hair.

For all these sacraments there were both (a) literal reasons, insofar as the sacraments were ordered toward the worship of God for that time period, and (b) figurative reasons, insofar as they were ordered toward being figures of Christ. This will become clear as we go through them one by one.

Reply to objection 1: The main literal reason behind circumcision was to give witness to faith in the one God. For since Abraham was the first to separate himself from the non-believers (*infideles*), leaving his home and his relatives, he was the first to receive circumcision. The reason for this is set forth by the Apostle in Romans 4:9-11: “He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith that he had while still uncircumcised.” More specifically, we read, “Abraham’s faith was reputed to justice” because “he believed in hope against hope”—i.e., he believed in the hope of grace against the hope of nature—“that he would become the father of many nations,” even though he was old and his wife was an old woman and barren. And in order that this witness, along with the imitation of Abraham’s faith, should be strengthened in the hearts of the Jews, they received a sign in their flesh which they could not forget about. Hence, Genesis 17:13 says, “My covenant (*pactum*) shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant (*foedus*).”

Now the reason why it was done on the eighth day was that before then a boy is very delicate and could suffer gravely from it and is not yet considered strong enough (*solidatum*). Hence, even animals were not offered before their eighth day. On the other hand, the reason why it was not delayed longer was that some boys might refuse the sign of circumcision because of the pain, and also that some parents, given that their love for their sons would increase after constant contact with them and after the boys had grown, would prevent them from being circumcised.

A second possible reason was to reduce concupiscence in the bodily member in question.

A third reason was to give affront to the sacred rites of Venus and Priapus, in which that bodily part was honored.

Moreover, the Lord prohibited only the sort of slashing that took place in the worship of idols, and circumcision was not similar to that.

On the other hand, the figurative reason for circumcision was that it was a figure of the removal of corruption which was to be brought about by Christ and which will be perfectly completed on the eighth day, i.e., the time of resurrection. And it was because all the corruption of sin and punishment came to us through our carnal origin from the sin of our first parent that this circumcision was done to the body’s generative member. Hence, the Apostle says in Colossians 2:11, “You are circumcised with a circumcision not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

Reply to objection 2: The literal reason for the Paschal meal was to commemorate the favor by which God led them out of Egypt. Hence, through the celebration of this meal they professed that they belonged to that people whom God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were liberated from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb’s blood on the threshold of their houses, as if proclaiming that they rejected the rites of the Egyptians, who worshiped the ram. Hence, by sprinkling or rubbing the lamb’s blood on their door-posts, they were freed from the danger of being exterminated that threatened the Egyptians.

Now in their flight from Egypt there were two elements of note, viz., (a) their haste in going, since the Egyptians implored them to leave quickly, according to Exodus 12:33, and (b) the fact that those who did not hurry to leave with the crowd were threatened with the danger of being killed by the Egyptians if they remained behind.

Their haste was signified in two ways:

First, it was signified by *what* they ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a

sign of the fact that the bread “could not rise with the Egyptians pressing them to leave” (Exodus 12:39). And they were commanded to eat meat that had been roasted over a fire, since that was a quicker way to prepare it, and they were commanded not to separate the bone from the meat, since someone in a hurry does not have time to break the bones off.

Second, it was signified by *how* they ate. For Exodus 12:11 says, “You shall gird your loins, and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding your staffs in your hands; and you shall eat quickly.” This obviously signifies men who are ready to go on a journey. The same point is involved in this command that is given to them: “In one house shall you eat, and you shall not carry any of its meat outside” (Exodus 12:46). That is, because of their haste they do not have time to send out portions to one another. Again, the hardship that they had suffered in Egypt was signified by the bitter herbs (*lactuae agrestes*).

Now the figurative reasons behind the Paschal meal are clear. The sacrifice of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ—this according to 1 Corinthians 5:7 (“Christ our paschal lamb has been sacrificed.”) The lamb’s blood, which freed them from the destroyer (*exterminator*) when it was sprinkled on the door-posts of their houses, signifies the faith in Christ’s passion which is found in the hearts and minds of the faithful and through which they are freed from sin and death—this according to 1 Peter 1:18 (“You were redeemed by the precious blood of the unspotted lamb”). They ate the meat to signify the eating of the body of Christ in the sacrament. The meat was roasted over a fire to signify the passion, or perhaps Christ’s charity. They ate it with unleavened bread to signify the pure way of life that belongs to the faithful who receive the body of Christ—this according to 1 Corinthians 5:8 (“Let us feast with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth”). The bitter herbs were added as a sign of the repentance of sinners that is required of those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins had to be girded by the cincture of chastity, whereas the shoes on their feet signify the example given by our dead ancestors (*patres*). The staffs held in their hands signify pastoral care. Moreover, they are commanded to eat the paschal lamb in one house, i.e., in the Catholic Church, and not in gatherings of heretics.

Reply to objection 3: Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding sacraments in the Old Law that were figures of them.

For example, Baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, corresponds to circumcision; hence, Colossians 2:11-12 says, “You have been circumcised in the circumcision of our Lord Jesus Christ and buried with Him in Baptism.” The Eucharist in the New Law corresponds to the meal of the paschal lamb, while the sacrament of Penance corresponds to all the purifications under the Old Law. Again, the sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration of the high-priests and priests.

On the other hand, the sacrament of Confirmation, which is a sacrament of the fullness of grace, cannot have any corresponding sacrament in the Old Law; for the time of fullness had not yet arrived, because “the Law brought no one to perfection” (Hebrews 7:19). The same holds for Extreme Unction, which is an immediate preparation for one’s entrance into glory, whereas the way to glory was not yet open under the Old Law, because the price for it had not yet been paid.

Matrimony did, to be sure, exist in the Old Law as a natural institution (*officium naturae*), but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ and the Church, since the Church had not yet come into existence. Hence, a decree of divorce (*libellus repudii*) was granted under the Old Law—which is contrary to the nature of the sacrament.

Reply to objection 4: As has been explained, the purifications under the Old Law were ordered toward removing impediments to divine worship. There are two kinds of worship, viz., *spiritual worship*, which consists in devoting one’s mind to God, and *corporeal worship*, which consists in sacrifices, offerings, and other things of this sort.

Men are impeded in spiritual worship through the sins by which men were said to be polluted, e.g., idolatry, homicide, adultery, and incest. Men were purified of this sort of pollution by certain sacrifices or offerings made either communally on behalf of the whole multitude or for the sins of individuals.

These carnal sacrifices did not in their own right have the power to expiate sins; rather, they signified the future expiation of sins through Christ. For the ancients, too, participated in Christ by professing their faith in a redeemer through the figures of their sacrifices.

On the other hand, men were impeded in their exterior worship through certain corporeal impurities that were thought of as first existing in the men and then also in other animals and in their clothes and houses and vessels. In men the uncleanness was thought of as stemming in part from the men themselves and in part from their contact with unclean things. As for men themselves, what was considered unclean was anything that already had some sort of corruption or had been exposed to corruption. And so since death is a kind of corruption, a man's corpse was considered unclean. Similarly, since leprosy occurs because of a corruption of bodily fluids (*humores*) that erupt externally and infect others, lepers were also considered unclean. The same held for women who were having a flow of blood—either through illness or else through nature, whether during their menstrual periods or at the time of conception. For the same reason, men were considered unclean when having an emission of seminal fluid—whether through sickness or nocturnal emission or sexual intercourse. For every bodily fluid flowing from a man or a woman in one of these ways has a certain unclean taint. Again, one was also unclean from having contact with anything unclean.

There were both literal and figurative reasons for these types of uncleanness.

The literal reason was to promote reverence for what had to do with divine worship, because when men are unclean, they do not normally touch precious objects, and also because sacred things are more venerated when access to them is rare. For since one could only rarely avoid all impurities of the sort in question, it happened that men could only rarely approach to touch those things that had to do with divine worship; and so when they did approach, they did so with more reverence and humility of mind.

In some of these cases the literal reason was so that men would not stay away from divine worship in order to avoid contact with lepers or other sick people whose diseases were loathsome and contagious. Again, in some cases the reason was to prevent idolatry, since in their rites the Gentiles sometimes used human blood and seminal fluid.

Now all types of corporeal uncleanness were purified either through the mere sprinkling of water or, in the case of more serious impurities, through some sacrifice to expiate the sin from which the indispositions (*infirmities*) arose.

On the other hand, the figurative reason for these impurities was that the forms of exterior uncleanness were figures of different types of sin. For instance, the uncleanness of a corpse signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy signifies the uncleanness of heretical doctrine, because heretical doctrine is contagious, just as leprosy is, and also because there is no false doctrine that does not mix truths with falsehoods, just as on the surface of a leprous body there is a distinction between unclean parts of the flesh and healthy parts. The uncleanness of a woman with a flow of blood signifies the uncleanness of idolatry, because of the stream of blood from immolated victims [in idolatrous rites]. The uncleanness of a man's loss of seminal fluid signifies the uncleanness of fruitless speech (*vana locutio*), since "the seed (*semen*) is the word of God" (Luke 8:11). The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of a woman giving birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of a menstruating woman signifies the uncleanness of a mind weakened by sensual pleasure.

In general, uncleanness contracted by touching an unclean thing signifies the uncleanness of consenting to the sin of another—this according to 2 Corinthians 6:17 ("Exit from among them and be separate, and do not touch what is unclean"). This type of uncleanness by touching also extended to non-living things, since whatever someone who was unclean touched in any way was itself unclean. In this respect, the Law attenuated the superstition of the Gentiles, who claimed that uncleanness is contracted not only by touching someone unclean, but also by speaking with him or looking at him—as

Rabbi Moses reports about a menstruating woman. This signified in a mystical way what Wisdom 14:9 says, “To God, the wicked and his wickedness are alike hateful.”

Now there was also a certain kind of uncleanness that non-living things had in their own right, in the way that the uncleanness of leprosy existed in a house or in clothes. For just as the disease of leprosy occurs in men because of corrupted fluids that putrefy and corrupt the flesh, so too because of corruption and because of excessive moistness or dryness, corrosion sometimes occurs in the stones of a house or even in clothing. And so the Law called this sort of corruption ‘leprosy’, and on the basis of it a house or piece of clothing would be judged unclean—because, as has been explained, every sort of corruption is relevant to uncleanness, and also because the Gentiles worshiped household gods in order to combat this sort of corruption. And so the Law commanded that houses in which persistent corruption of this sort existed should be destroyed and that clothes of this sort should be burned, in order to remove an occasion for idolatry.

There were also certain kinds of uncleanness with respect to vessels, spoken of in Numbers 19:15: “The vessel that has no cover or binding over it shall be unclean.” The reason for this uncleanness is that something unclean could easily fall into such vessels and they could in that way be made unclean. This precept, too, was meant to discourage idolatry. For the idolaters believed that if mice or lizards or something of this sort that they sacrificed to their idols suddenly fell into a vessel or into water, they would become more pleasing to their gods. Even now some girls leave vessels uncovered in honor of the nocturnal spirits called the *Janae*.

The figurative reasons for these impurities are as follows: A leprous house signifies the assembly of heretics. A leprous piece of linen clothing signifies the perversity of the habits arising from a bitterness of mind, whereas a leprous piece of wool clothing signifies the perversity of flatterers. A leprous warp signifies vices of the soul, whereas a leprous woof signifies carnal sins; for the soul is in the body as the warp is in the woof. The vase that has no cover or binding signifies a man who has no covering of taciturnity and who is not constrained by any strictness of discipline.

Reply to objection 5: As was explained above, there were two kinds of uncleanness under the Law. The one kind involved a corruption of mind or body, and this was the more serious kind of uncleanness. The other kind merely involved touching something unclean, and this was less serious and expiated by a more simple rite. The first kind of uncleanness was expiated by a sacrifice for sins, since every type of corruption proceeds from sin and signifies sin, whereas the second kind of uncleanness was expiated simply by the sprinkling of a certain sort of water. Numbers 19 talks of this water of expiation. For in that place the Lord commands them to take a red heifer in memory of the sin they committed when they adored the calf. And it says a heifer rather than a calf because that is what the Lord used to call the assembly (*synagoga*)—this according to Hosea 4:16 (“Israel has gone astray like a wanton heifer”). Perhaps this was because they worshiped heifers in the manner of the Egyptians—this according to Hosea 10:5 (“They worshiped the heifers of Beth-aven”). Out of detestation for the sin of idolatry, the heifer was sacrificed outside the camp, and whenever a sacrifice was made for the expiation of the sins of the multitude, it was burned as a whole outside the camp. And in order to signify that through this sacrifice the people were cleansed from the totality of their sins, the priest dipped his finger into the heifer’s blood and sprinkled it “over against the entrance of the tabernacle seven times” (Numbers 19:4) because the number *seven* signifies a totality. The sprinkling itself also had to do with the renunciation of idolatrous rites in which the blood was not poured out but instead collected, and the men gathered around it to have a meal in honor of the idols. Then the blood was burned in the fire. This was either because God had appeared to Moses in a fire and the Law had been given in the midst of fire, or because the burning of the blood signified that idolatry had to be completely rooted out, along with everything having to do with idolatry, just as the heifer was cremated “with her skin and her flesh, her blood and dung being delivered to the flames” (Numbers 19:5).

Also, “cedar wood, hyssop, and twice-dyed scarlet” (Numbers 19:6) were added to the fire to signify that just as cedar wood does not easily putrefy, and twice-dyed scarlet does not lose its color, and hyssop retains its smell even after it has been dried out, so too this sacrifice was for the preservation of the people itself and of its uprightness and devotion. Hence, the ashes of the heifer are said to be “reserved for the multitude of the children of Israel” (Numbers 19:9). Alternatively, according to Josephus, they signified the four elements: the cedar was added to the fire in order to signify earth, because of its earthiness; hyssop signified air, because of its smell; and scarlet signified water for the reason that purple did, because of the tints that are derived from the water—and this was meant to express that the sacrifice was being offered to the creator of the four elements.

And because this sort of sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, and in detestation of idolatry, the one who did the burning and the one who collected the ashes and the one who sprinkled the water with which the ashes had been mixed were all considered unclean, in order to show that anything that had to do in any way with idolatry was to be rejected as unclean. Now the three of them were purified of this uncleanness merely by the washing of their clothes, and they did not need to be sprinkled with water because of this sort of uncleanness, since this would have involved an infinite regress. For the one who sprinkled the water became unclean, and so if he sprinkled himself, he would remain unclean; but if someone else sprinkled him, then that one would remain unclean, and, again, the one who sprinkled that one would remain unclean, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Now the figurative reason for this sacrifice is that the red heifer signifies Christ with respect to the weakness He has taken on (*secundum infirmitatem assumptam*), which the feminine gender designates. The color of the heifer signifies the blood of His passion. The red heifer was of full age, because every operation of Christ’s is perfect. There was no blemish in the heifer and it did not carry a yoke, because Christ did not carry the yoke of sin. It is commanded that the heifer be led to Moses, because they imputed to it the transgression of the Mosaic Law in the violation of the Sabbath. It was commanded that it be handed over to Eleazar the priest, because Christ was handed over to the hands of the priests to be killed. It was sacrificed outside the camp, because Christ suffered outside the gates. The priest dipped his finger into the heifer’s blood because the mystery of Christ’s passion is to be meditated on and imitated with prudence, which the finger signifies. The blood was sprinkled against the tabernacle, through which the assembly is signified, either in order to condemn non-believing Jews or to purify the believing Jews. And it was sprinkled seven times either because of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit or because of the seven days, in which the whole of time is understood.

Then there are all the things to be burned by the fire, i.e., to be understood spiritually, that have to do with Christ’s Incarnation. The skin and flesh signify Christ’s exterior action. The blood signifies the subtle interior virtue that gives life to His exterior actions. The dung signifies His weariness, His thirst, and every thing else related to His weakness. Of the three added things, the cedar wood signifies the height of hope or of contemplation, the hyssop signifies humility or faith, and the twice-dyed scarlet signifies the twofold charity—for it is through these things that we should adhere to the suffering Christ. The ashes of the fire are collected by “a man that is clean,” because the relics of Christ’s passion found their way to Gentiles who were not culpable in the death of Christ. The ashes were placed in water for the expiation because by virtue of Christ’s passion Baptism has the power to wash away sins. The priest who performed the sacrifice and burned the heifer, along with the priest who burned it and collected the ashes and the priest who sprinkled the water, were all unclean, either because (a) the Jews became unclean from the killing of Christ, through whom our sins are forgiven, and this right up to evening, i.e., until the end of the world, when the remnant of Israel will be converted, or because (b), as Gregory explains in *Pastoralis*, those who deal with holy things in order to cleanse others contract certain impurities themselves, and this right up to evening, i.e., to the end of this life.

Reply to objection 6: As has been explained, the sort of uncleanness that stemmed from the

corruption of mind or body was expiated through sacrifices made for sin. Now special sacrifices were made for the sins of individuals, but because some were negligent with regard to the expiation of such sins and impurities, or even failed to offer expiation out of ignorance, it was decreed that once a year, on the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for the whole people.

Since, as the Apostle points out in Hebrews 7:28, “the law makes men who have infirmity priests,” it was necessary that the priest first offer a calf on his own behalf for his own sins, in memory of the sin Aaron committed in the production of the golden calf, along with a ram in a holocaust in order to signify that the priest’s preeminence (*praelatio*), which the ram signifies as the leader of the flock, was ordered toward honoring God.

Then he offered two goats for the people.

One of the goats was sacrificed for the sins of the multitude. For the goat is a foul-smelling animal, and the clothes made from its skin have a pungent smell, and this signified the stench and impurity and pangs of sin. Now the blood of this sacrificial goat, along with the blood of the calf, was carried into the Holy of Holies and sprinkled over the whole sanctuary in order to signify that the tabernacle was being washed clean of the impurities of the children of Israel. But the corpses of the goat and the calf which had been sacrificed for sin had to be burned in order to signify the destruction (*consumptio*) of sin. However, this burning did not take place on the altar, since only the holocausts were totally consumed by fire on the altar. This is why it was commanded that the corpses of the goat and the calf be burned outside the camp in detestation of sin. This is what was done whenever a sacrifice was offered for some particular grave sin or for a multitude of sins.

However, the other goat was sent off into the desert, not to be offered to the demons whom the Gentiles used to worship in desert places, since [the children of Israel] were not allowed to make sacrifices to the demons, but rather to signify the effect of the immolated sacrifice. And so the priest imposed his hand on the goat’s head while confessing the sins of the children of Israel, as if the goat were carrying those sins off into the desert where he would be eaten by beasts—bearing, as it were, the punishment for the sins of the people. The goat was said to be carrying the sins of the people either because its being sent out signified the forgiveness of the sins of the people or because a piece of paper on which the sins had been written was tied to its head.

The figurative reason for these things were as follows: The calf signifies Christ because of His power (*propter virtutem*), the ram signifies Him because He is the leader of the faithful, and the goat signifies Him because of “the likeness of sinful flesh” (Romans 8:3). And Christ Himself was sacrificed for the sins of both the priests and the people, since through His passion both the great and the small (*maiores et minores*) were washed of their sins. Now the blood of the calf and the goat was carried into the sanctuary by the high priest because through the blood of Christ’s passion the entrance into the kingdom of heaven is opened up to us. Their corpses were burned outside the camp, because “Christ suffered outside the gates,” as the Apostle puts it in Hebrews 13:12. On the other hand, the goat that was sent out can signify either (a) Christ’s divine nature itself (*ipsa divinitas*), which goes off into solitude when Christ the man undergoes His suffering—not changing its place, but having its power restrained—or (b) evil desire, which we should cast off from ourselves while offering our virtuous actions (*virtuosos motus*) to the Lord.

As for the uncleanness of those who burned these sacrifices, the figurative reason is the same one given above in the case of the sacrifice of the red heifer.

Reply to objection 7: The rite of the Law did not cleanse a leper from the stain of leprosy, but rather declared him to be cleansed. This is shown in Leviticus 14:3-4, where it says of the priest, “When he finds that the leprosy has been cleansed, he shall command him to be purified.” Therefore, the leprosy had already been cleansed, whereas he was said to be purified insofar as he was restored by the priest’s decree to the fellowship of men and to divine worship. (However, it sometimes happened that when the

priest was mistaken in this judgment, the bodily leprosy was cleansed by a divine miracle through the rite of the Law.)

Now there were two purifications for the leper. First, he was judged to be clean, and, second, as clean, he was restored after seven days to the fellowship of men and to divine worship.

In the first purification, the leper who was to be cleansed offered on his own behalf “two living sparrows cedar wood, and scarlet, and hyssop” (Leviticus 14:4), in such a way that the one sparrow and the hyssop were tied to the cedar wood with a scarlet thread, so that the cedar wood was like the handle of a sprinkler, while the hyssop and sparrow were the part of the sprinkler that was dipped into the blood of the other sparrow, which had been “immolated over living waters” (Leviticus 14:5). He offered these four things to counter the four defects of leprosy. The cedar wood, which is a tree not subject to putrefaction, was offered to counter the putrefaction; the hyssop, which is a fragrant plant, was offered to counter the stench; the live sparrow was offered to counter the numbness; and the scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered to counter the lurid color of leprosy. The live sparrow was sent off flying into the plain because the leper was being restored to his original freedom.

On the eighth day the leper was admitted to the divine worship and restored to the fellowship of men—though he first shaved the hair off his whole body and washed his clothes, since leprosy rots one’s hair and infects one’s clothes and makes them smell bad. Afterwards, a sacrifice was offered for his sins, since leprosy was often inflicted because of sin. Some blood from the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the one who was being cleansed “and on the thumb of his right hand and on the big toe of his right foot” (Leviticus 14:14), because it is in these parts of the body that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. Three liquids were used in this rite, viz., blood, to counter the corruption of the blood; oil, to signify the healing of the disease; and living water, to wash away the filth.

The figurative reasons were as follows: The two sparrows signify Christ’s divinity and humanity. One of them, viz., the humanity, is immolated in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the waters of Baptism are consecrated by the passion of Christ. The other sparrow, viz., the impassible divinity, remained alive, because the divinity cannot die; and it flew away, because it could not be bound by the passion. Now as noted above, this living sparrow—along with the cedar wood and scarlet (or cochineal) and hyssop, i.e., faith, hope, and charity—was dipped into the water for sprinkling, since we are baptized in faith in the God-man (*in fide Dei et hominis*). Through the water of Baptism, or the water of tears, the man washes his clothes, i.e., his deeds, and all his strands of hair, i.e., his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the one who is being cleansed is tinged with the blood and the oil in order to guard his hearing against corrupting words, whereas his right thumb and big toe are tinged in order that his action might be holy.

There is nothing special to be said about any of the other things involved in this purification, or in the purification of other kinds of uncleanness, over and beyond what has been said about the other sacrifices for sins or for crimes.

Reply to objections 8 and 9: Just as the people were initiated (*instituebatur*) for divine worship through circumcision, so the ministers were initiated for divine worship through a special purification or consecration. In this way they were perceived as being separated off from the others in the sense of being set aside specially, in preference to the others, for the ministry of divine worship. Everything that was done to them in their consecration or initiation had to do with showing that they had a certain prerogative of cleanness and power and dignity. And so three things were done in the initiation of the ministers: first, they were purified; second, they were vested (*ornabantur*) and consecrated; and third, they were assigned (*applicabantur*) to the exercise of the ministry.

As Leviticus 8 [and Numbers 8] have it, all of them were purified in general through a washing with water and through certain sacrifices, while the Levites (*Levitae*) in particular shaved all the hair off their bodies.

The consecration of the high priests (*pontifices*) and priests (*sacerdotes*) was done in the following order: First, after they had been washed, they were clothed with certain special vestments to signify their dignity. The high priest in particular was anointed on the head with the oil of unction in order to signify that the power of consecrating flowed from him to the others, just as the oil flowed from his head to the lower parts of his body—this according to Psalm 132:2 (“Like the precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron”).

The Levites, on the other hand, did not have a consecration other than being offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of the high priest, who prayed for them.

As for the lower priests (*sacerdotes minores*), only their hands, which were to be used for the sacrifices, were consecrated. In addition, the tip of their right ear, the big toe of their right foot, and the thumb of their right hand were tinged with the blood of an immolated animal. This was done in order that (a) they would be obedient to the Law of God in the offering of sacrifices (this was signified by the intinction of the right ear), and in order that (b) they would be solicitous and prompt in carrying out the sacrifices (this was signified by the intinction of the big toe of the right foot and the thumb of the right hand). They, along with their vestments, were sprinkled with the blood of an immolated animal, in memory of the blood of the lamb through which they had been liberated from Egypt. Moreover, in their consecration the following sacrifices were offered: (a) a calf for sin, in memory of the remission of the sin of Aaron in the fashioning of the [golden] calf; (b) a ram for a holocaust, in memory of the offering of Abraham, whose obedience the high priest was expected to imitate; (c) a ram of consecration, which was, as it were, a peace-offering in memory of the liberation from Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and (d) a basket of loaves of bread, in memory of the manna bestowed upon the people.

As for the assignment to the ministry, the fat of the ram and its right shoulder and a piece of bread twisted off from one of the loaves were placed in their hands, in order to show that they accepted the power of making offerings to the Lord. The Levites, on the other hand, were assigned to their ministry by being sent into the tabernacle of the covenant in order to take care of the vessels of the sanctuary.

The figurative meaning of these things was as follows: Those who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ must first be purified by the water of Baptism and the water of tears of faith in Christ’s passion, which is an expiatory and cleansing sacrifice. And they should shave all the hairs off their bodies, i.e., they should shave off all evil thoughts. They should also be vested with the virtues and consecrated by the oil of the Holy Spirit and by being sprinkled with the blood of Christ. And they should in this way be ordered toward exercising their spiritual ministries.

Reply to objection 10: As has been explained, the intention of the Law was to induce reverence for divine worship, and this in two ways: first, by excluding from divine worship anything that could have been contemptible; second, by affixing to divine worship everything that seemed relevant to giving honor. And if this norm was observed in the case of the tabernacle and the vessels and the animals to be sacrificed, it had to be observed all the more in the case of the ministers themselves.

And so to remove any contempt for the ministers, it was commanded that they not have any bodily blemish or defect, since men of this sort are apt to be held in contempt by others. Because of this, it was also prescribed that those to be assigned to the ministry of God would come not in a haphazard way from just any family (*genus*), but would instead come by a succession of generation from a particular stock, so that in this way they might be thought of as more distinctive and more noble.

To ensure that they would be held in reverence, special ornate vestments and a special consecration were likewise provided for them—this is the general reason for their ornate vestments. As for specific reasons, note that the high priest had eight ornate vestments:

First, he had a linen tunic (*vestis lineae*).

Second, he had a violet tunic (*tunica hyacinthia*), at whose bottom edges there was a circle of little bells and “pomegranates of violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed” (Exodus 39:23).

Third, he had a humeral veil (*superhumorale*) that covered his shoulders and the front part of his body down to waist. The humeral veil was composed of gold, violet, purple, twice-dyed scarlet, and twisted linen, and on the shoulders it had two onyx-stones on which were inscribed the names of the sons of Israel.

Fourth, he had a breastpiece (*rationale*) made of the same material. It was square and positioned on the breast, and it was fastened to the humeral veil. On this breastpiece there were twelve precious stones separated into four rows, and the names of the sons of Israel were likewise inscribed on these stones. This was to signify that (a) the high priest was to bear the burden of the whole people, given that he was carrying their names on his shoulders, and that (b) he should constantly be thinking about their well-being, given that he was carrying them on his breast—having them, as it were, in his heart. The Lord also commanded that doctrine and truth (*doctrinam et veritatem*) be put on the breastpiece. For certain points concerning the truth of justice and the truth of doctrine were written on the breastpiece. (The Jews, however, imagine that there was a stone on the breastpiece that changed colors according to the different things that were going to happen to the sons of Israel, and they call this stone ‘Truth and Doctrine’.)

Fifth, there was the belt (*balteus*), i.e., girdle (*cingulus*), of the four colors mentioned above.

Sixth, there was the tiara (*tiara*), i.e., miter (*mitra*), made of linen.

Seventh, hanging on his forehead there was a thin piece of gold metal (*lamina aurea*) that had the name of the Lord on it.

Eighth, there were “the linen loincloths (*femoralia linea*) to cover the flesh of their nakedness” (Exodus 28:42) when they climbed up to the sanctuary or climbed up to the altar.

Of these eight ornate vestments, the lower priests had four, viz., the linen tunic, the loincloth, the belt, and the tiara.

Some give literal reasons for these ornate vestments, claiming that the arrangement of the world is signified in them, as if the high priest were declaring that he is the minister of the creator of the world. Hence Wisdom 18:24 says, “The world was described on the vestments of Aaron.” For the loincloth was a figure of the earth, in which linen grows. The circularity of the belt signified the ocean that surrounds the earth. The color of the purple tunic signified the atmosphere, its little bells signified claps of thunder, and the pomegranates signified flashes of lightning. The humeral veil signified by its variety the stars of the heavens, and the two onyx-stones signified the two hemispheres or, alternatively, the sun and the moon. The twelve gems on the breast, which were positioned on the breastpiece, signify the twelve signs of the zodiac, since the heavens contain explanations of earthly things—this according to Job 38:33 (“Do you know the order of heaven, and can you set down the reason thereof on the earth”). The miter or tiara signified the empyrean heaven, and the piece of gold metal signified God presiding over all things.

The figurative reasons are obvious. The blemishes or defects from which the priests should be immune signify the different vices and sins which they ought to lack. For a priest is not permitted to be blind, i.e., ignorant. Nor is he allowed to be lame, i.e., unstable and tending in many different directions. Nor is he allowed to have a nose that is too small or too big or crooked, i.e., he should not through a lack of discretion do too much or too little or engage in depraved acts; for the nose signifies discretion, because it distinguishes smells. Nor is he allowed to have a broken foot or hand, i.e., he is not allowed to lose the habit of acting well or of progressing toward virtue. He is also rejected if he has a large belly or is hunch-backed, since these signify a love of earthly things. If he is bleary-eyed, then his mind is darkened by carnal desire; for bleary eyes stem from a flow of the humors. He is likewise rejected if he has a pearl-like white spot in his eye, i.e., if in his own mind he presumes that he has the brightness of moral uprightness. He is also rejected if he has a chronic scab, i.e., lustfulness of the flesh (*petulantia carnis*). And he is also rejected if he has a skin disease (*impetigo*) that covers his body without pain and destroys the beauty of his body; this signifies avarice. Also, he is rejected if he has a rupture or is

overweight, since this gives rise to a heaviness of evil in his heart, even if he does not express it in his deeds.

The ornate vestments signify the virtues of the ministers of God. Now there are four virtues that are necessary for all ministers, viz., chastity, which is signified by the loincloth; purity of life, which is signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of discretion, which is signified by the girdle; and rectitude of intention, which is signified by the tiara covering the head.

But before all these, the high priests should have four things. First, they should have the constant remembrance of God in their contemplation, and this is signified by the thin piece of gold metal on their forehead with the name of God on it. Second, they should bear the weaknesses of the people, and this is signified by the humeral veil. Third, they should have the people in their hearts and in their breasts through the solicitude of charity, and this is signified by the breastpiece. Fourth, they should have a heavenly way of life through works of perfection, and this is signified by the violet tunic. That is also why the violet tunic has the golden bells at its edges, signifying the teaching of divine things that must be joined to the high priest's heavenly way of life. The adjoined pomegranates signify unity of faith and agreement in good morals, since his teaching ought to be interconnected in such a way that the unity of faith and peace is not ruptured by it.

Article 6

Are there reasoned causes for the ceremonial observances?

It seems that there are no reasoned causes for the ceremonial observances:

Objection 1: As the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 4:4: "Every creature of God is good, and nothing received with thanksgiving is to be rejected." Therefore, it was inappropriate to prohibit, as Leviticus 11 and Deuteronomy 14 do, the eating of certain foods regarded as unclean.

Objection 2: Just as animals are given as food for man, so too are plants; hence, Genesis 9:3 says, "..... even as I have given you the green plants, so I have given all meat to you." But the Law did not single out any plants as unclean, even though some of them were especially harmful, e.g., the poisonous ones. Therefore, it seems that no animals should have been prohibited as unclean, either.

Objection 3: If the matter from which something is generated is unclean, then by parity of reasoning that which is generated from it should be unclean. But meat is generated from blood. Therefore, since not all meats were prohibited as unclean, then by parity of reasoning neither should blood—or fat, which is generated from blood—have been prohibited as unclean.

Objection 4: In Matthew 10:28 and Luke 12:4 the Lord says, "Do not fear those who kill the body since after death there is nothing else for them to do"—which would not be true if a man were harmed by something that came from his corpse. *A fortiori*, it does not matter how one cooks the meat of an animal that has already been killed. Therefore, it seems unreasonable for Exodus 23:19 to say, "You shall not cook a kid in the milk of his mother."

Objection 5: Among men and animals, it is the ones that come forth first (*primitiva*) that are mandated to be offered to the Lord, since they are more perfect. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Leviticus 10:23 to command, "When you shall have come into the land and shall have planted fruit trees in it, you shall take away their foreskins (*praeputia*) [*read*: their first fruits], and they shall be unclean for you, and you shall not eat of them."

Objection 6: A man's clothing is something separate from his body. Therefore, it should not have been the case that certain specific types of clothing were forbidden to the Jews—for instance, Leviticus

19:19 says, “You shall not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts of cloth,” and Deuteronomy 22:5 says, “A woman shall not be clothed with men’s apparel, neither shall a man use women’s apparel,” and later on in verse 11, “You shall not wear a garment that is woven of wool and linen together.”

Objection 7: Being mindful of God’s commandments has to do not with the body, but with the heart. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 6 to command, “You shall tie the precepts of God as a sign on your hand and they shall be written on the threshold of your doors.” And it was inappropriate for Numbers 15:38-39 to command, “They shall make themselves fringes in the corners of their garments, on which they will put violet ribbons to remind them of the commandments of God.”

Objection 8: In 1 Corinthians 9:9 the Apostle says, “God is not concerned about oxen,” and, as a consequence, neither is He concerned about other non-rational animals. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 22:6 to command, “If you are walking along and you find a bird’s nest, you shall not take the mother with her young.” And it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 25:4 to command, “You shall not muzzle the ox that is threshing.” And it was inappropriate for Leviticus 19:19 to command, “You shall not make your cattle mate with beasts of any other kind.”

Objection 9: The Law made no distinction between clean plants and unclean plants. Therefore, *a fortiori*, there should have been no distinctions made with respect to the cultivation of plants. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Leviticus 19:19 to command, “You shall not sow your field with different kinds of seeds.” And it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 22:9-10 to command, “You shall not sow your vineyard with different kinds of seeds You shall not plow with an ox and an ass together.”

Objection 10: We notice that inanimate things are especially subject to the power of men. Therefore, it was inappropriate to restrict a man, as the precept of the Law found in Deuteronomy 7:25-26 does, from taking the silver and gold from which idols had been made, or from taking the other things found in the temples of the idols. Likewise, the command in Deuteronomy 23:13, “Digging a hole in the earth, they shall cover their excrement with dirt,” seems ridiculous.

Objection 11: Piety is especially required in the priests. But piety seems to involve one’s being concerned with the burial of one’s friends; hence, Tobias is praised for this, as Tobias 1:20-25 attests. Similarly, piety sometimes also involves a man’s taking a prostitute for his wife, since in this way he frees her from sin and from a bad reputation. Therefore, it seems inappropriate that these things should be forbidden to the priests in Leviticus 21.

But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 18:14 says, “But you are otherwise instructed by the Lord your God.” From this one can gather that observances of the sort in question were instituted by God as the special prerogative of this people. Therefore, these observances are not unreasonable or without due cause.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 5), the Jewish people were set aside in a special way for divine worship; and, among the people, the priests were set aside in a special way. And just as the other things assigned to divine worship ought to have some sort of special character that involves the honored status (*honorificentia*) of divine worship, so too in the way of life of the people, and especially of the priests, there ought to be certain special elements, whether spiritual or corporeal, that are congruent with divine worship.

Now worship under the Law was a figure of the mystery of Christ, and so all their actions were a figure of things having to do with Christ—this according to 1 Corinthians 10:11 (“All these things happened to them in figure”). And so the reasons for the observances in question can be assigned in two ways: first, according to their fittingness for divine worship; and, second, insofar as they prefigured something in the life of Christians.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 5), there were two kinds of pollution or uncleanness observed under the Law, viz., (a) the uncleanness of sin, through which the soul is polluted,

and (b) the uncleanness of any sort of corruption through which the body is in some way defiled.

If we are talking about the first kind of uncleanness, then no types of food are unclean, or able to defile a man, according to their nature; hence, Matthew 15:11 says, “It is not what goes into his mouth that defiles a man, but rather it is what comes out of his mouth that defiles a man,” and this is understood as talking about sins. However, certain foods are incidentally able to defile a man, viz., insofar as they are eaten out of disobedience or contrary to a vow or from excessive sensual desire, or insofar as they promote lust, for which reason some men abstain from wine and meat.

Now as regards corporeal uncleanness, i.e., the uncleanness of corruption, the meat of certain animals is unclean either because (a) the animals feed on unclean things, as the pig does, or because (b) they live in an unclean way, as do animals that live underground, such as moles and mice and others of this sort, and hence have a foul smell, or because (c) their meat generates corrupted humors in human bodies because of its moistness or dryness. And so the people were forbidden to eat the meat of animals having soles, i.e., uncloven hoofs, because of their earthiness. Similarly, they were forbidden to eat the meat of animals that have many clefts in their feet, since these are fierce and sun-scorched, e.g., lion meat and others of this sort. And for the same reason, they were forbidden to eat certain birds of prey, which have excessive dryness, along with certain water fowls, because of their excessive moistness. The same held for certain fish that do not have fins and scales, e.g., eels and others, and this because of their excessive moistness. On the other hand, they were permitted to eat animals that ruminate and have a cloven hoof, since these animals have well-digested humors and a balanced composition; for they are not too moist, which is signified by their hoofs, or too earthy, given that they have a cloven and not a continuous hoof. Among the fish, they were allowed to eat the fish that are drier, which is signified by the fact that they have scales and fins, since it is in this way that the moist composition of fish is tempered. Among the birds, they were permitted to eat the more temperate ones, such as hens, partridges, and others of this sort.

A second reason [for the prohibitions] was the detestation of idolatry. For the Gentiles, and especially the Egyptians, among whom they had been brought up, sacrificed these forbidden animals to their idols or used them for sorcery (*ad maleficia*). On the other hand, they did not eat the animals that the Jews were permitted to eat; instead, they worshiped those animals as gods or abstained from them for other reasons, as was explained above (a. 3, ad 2).

A third reason was to prevent excessive concern about food. This is why they were permitted to eat animals that could be easily and promptly obtained. However, they were generally forbidden to eat the blood and fat of any animal. The prohibition of blood was meant (a) to prevent cruelty, in order that they might hate the shedding of human blood, as was explained above (a. 3, ad 8), and (b) to prevent idolatrous rites, since the custom of the idolaters was to come together around the collected blood in order to have a meal in honor of the idols to whom they thought the blood was especially acceptable. This is why the Lord commanded that the blood be poured out and covered with dust. For this reason they were also forbidden to eat suffocated or strangled animals, because their blood was not separated from their flesh, or because the animals suffered greatly in that kind of death and the Lord wanted to prohibit cruelty even with respect to brute animals, so that having shown kindness (*exercitium pietatis*) even to beasts, the people might withdraw further from cruelty to men. They were forbidden to eat fat, because (a) the idolaters ate it in honor of their gods, and because (b) it was burned in honor of God, and because (c) blood and fat do not make for good nutrition—this is the explanation Rabbi Moses gives. Now the reason for the prohibition of the eating of sinews is expressed in Genesis 32:32, where it says, “The children of Israel, unto this day, eat not the sinew, because Jacob touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank.”

The figurative reason for these prohibitions is that particular sins are signified by all the prohibited animals, and it is as a figure of those sins that the animals are prohibited. Hence, in *Contra Faustum*

Augustine says, “If someone asks about the pig and the lamb, both are clean by nature, since every creature of God’s is good; however, by signification the lamb is clean and the pig is unclean. It is as if one were to say that both of the words ‘foolish’ and ‘wise’ are clean with respect to the nature of the sounds and letters and syllables out of which they are composed, and yet by signification the one is clean and the other is unclean.” For the animal that ruminates and has a cloven hoof is clean by signification, since the cleft in the hoof signifies the distinction between the two Testaments, or between the Father and the Son, or between the two natures in Christ, or the distinction between good and evil—whereas the rumination signifies meditation on the Scriptures and the sound interpretation of the Scriptures, where anyone who lacks either of these things is spiritually unclean.

The same holds in the case of fish. The ones that have scales and fins are clean by signification, since the fins signify the sublime life, i.e., contemplation, whereas the scales signify the difficult life—and each of these is necessary for spiritual cleanness.

In the case of birds, certain kinds are specifically prohibited. For in the eagle (*aquila*), which flies high, pride is prohibited, and in the griffin (*gryps*), which is inimical to horses and men, the cruelty of the powerful is prohibited. The seahawk (*haliaeetos*), which feeds on small birds, signifies those who prey upon the poor, whereas the kite (*milvus*), which makes special use of deception, signifies fraudulent men. The vulture (*vultur*), which follows an army with the expectation of eating the corpses of the dead, signifies those who desire men to die or to have conflicts with one another, so that they can thereby profit. Raven-like animals (*animalia corvini generis*) signify those who are sullied by sensual desire or who are devoid of good affections, since the raven, once it had been sent off from the ark, did not return. The ostrich (*struthiocamelus*), which cannot fly even though it is a bird, but is always close to the ground, signifies those who, fighting for God, entangle themselves in worldly affairs. The night-raven (*nycticorax*), which sees well at night but cannot see in the daytime, signifies those who are astute in temporal matters but dull in spiritual matters. The seagull (*larus*), which both flies in the air and swims in the sea, signifies those who revere both circumcision and Baptism or, alternatively, those who wish to fly through contemplation and yet to live in the waters of sensual desire. The hawk (*accipiter*), which helps men in catching prey, signifies those who serve the powerful in preying upon the poor. The owl (*bubo*), which seeks its food at night and hides during the day, signifies the lustful, who seek to remain hidden in the night-time works they do. The sea-dove (*mergulus*), which by nature stays under water for long periods of time, signifies the gluttonous, who immerse themselves in the waters of delicacies. The ibis (*ibis*) is an African bird with a long beak which feeds on snakes and is perhaps the same as the stork (*ciconia*); it signifies the envious, who feed upon the ills of others as upon snakes. The swan (*cygnus*) is dazzling white in color and with its long neck extracts its food from the depths of the earth or water; and it can signify men who seek earthly profit with an external veneer of virtue. The pelican (*onocrotalus*) is a bird of the Orient with a long beak, whose jaws have sacks in which it first stores its food, and after an hour sends it to its belly; it signifies the greedy, who collect the necessities of life with excessive solicitude. The purple swamphen (*porphyrio*), beyond the manner of other birds, has one wide foot for swimming and one cloven foot for walking, since in the water it swims like a duck (*anas*), and on dry ground it walks like a partridge (*perdix*); it drinks only when it chews, since it moistens its food with water, and it signifies those who do not want to do anything at another’s bidding but want to do only what has been moistened with the water of their own will. The herodion (*herodio*), commonly called the falcon (*falco*), signifies those whose feet are “quick to the shedding of blood” (Psalm 13:3). The plover (*charadrius*), which is a garrulous bird, signifies the loquacious, whereas the hoopoe (*upupa*), which nests in dung and eats stinking excrement and simulates a moan in its song, signifies the sadness of the world, which works death in unclean men. The bat (*vespertilio*), which flies close to the ground, signifies those who, gifted in worldly knowledge, are wise only about worldly things.

In the case of the fowls and quadrupeds, the only permitted ones are those that have longer back

legs, so that they are able to leap. By contrast, the others, which stay closer to the ground, are prohibited, because those who misuse the doctrine of the four Evangelists and are not uplifted by it are considered unclean.

In the case of the blood and the fat and the nerves, what is being understood as prohibited are cruelty and voluptuousness and a bravado for sinning (*fortitudo ad peccandum*).

Reply to objection 2: Men ate plants and other things growing from the earth even before the flood, but the eating of meat seems to have been introduced after the flood. For Genesis 9:3 says, “I have given you all the meat, even as I have given you the green plants.” This is because the eating of things that grow in the earth bespeaks a certain simplicity of life, whereas the eating of meat bespeaks certain pleasures and cares in living. For the earth generates plants spontaneously, and things growing in the earth are procured in great volume with a modicum of effort, whereas a great effort is necessary for eating animals or even for catching them. And so the Lord, wishing to lead His people to a more simple way of life, forbade them to eat many things in the genus of animals, but not in the genus of things growing in the earth.

An alternative reason is that animals were sacrificed to idols, whereas things growing in the earth were not.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is obvious from what has been said.

Reply to objection 4: Even if the kid that has been killed does not know how its own flesh is being cooked, there still seems to be a certain cruelty in the mind of the cook if the mother’s milk, which was given to the kid for nutrition, is used in the consumption of its meat.

Alternatively, one can point out that in the feasts of their idols the Gentiles cooked the meat of the kid in this way in order either to sacrifice it or to eat it. This is why Exodus 23, after it has previously talked about the celebration of the solemn feasts in the Law, adds, “You shall not cook a kid in the milk of his mother.”

The figurative reason for this prohibition is that it prefigured the fact that Christ, who is a kid because of the “likeness of sinful flesh” (Romans 8:3), was not to be cooked, i.e., killed, by the Jews in His mother’s milk, i.e., at the time of His infancy.

An alternative reply is that it signifies that the kid, i.e., the sinner, is not to be cooked in his mother’s milk, i.e., he is not to be soothed with blandishments.

Reply to objection 5: The Gentiles offered first fruits, which they considered lucky, to the gods, or even burned them in order to do certain forms of magic. And so the precept is that the people should consider the fruits of the first three years to be unclean. For in a period of three years almost all the trees of that land produce fruit from either seeding or grafting or planting. However, it rarely happens that the stones inside the tree fruits or the hidden seeds are planted; for these take more time to produce fruit, whereas the Law had an eye toward what happened for the most part. Now the fruits of the fourth year were offered to God as the first of the clean fruits, whereas the fruits from the fifth year and beyond were eaten.

The figurative reason was that this prefigured the fact that after the three stages of the Law—one of which lasted from Abraham to David, the second from David to the Babylonian exile, and the third from the Babylonian exile to Christ—Christ, who is the fruit of the Law, was to be offered to God.

An alternative figurative reason is that we should put the first of our own works under suspicion, because of our imperfection.

Reply to objection 6: As Ecclesiasticus 19:27 says, “A man’s clothing shows what he is.” And so the Lord wanted His people to be distinguished from other peoples not only by the sign of circumcision, but also by a distinctive way of dressing (*habitus*).

There were two reasons why they were forbidden to wear a garment sewn together from wool and

linen, and why the women were forbidden to wear men's clothes, and vice versa.

First, to prevent idolatrous worship. For in the worship of their gods the Gentiles used various vestments made of diverse materials. Moreover, in the worship of Mars the women put on men's armor, while, conversely, in the worship of Venus men used women's clothing.

The second reason is to fend off lust. For all kinds of disordered sexual intercourse are excluded [by the prohibition of] various mixtures of clothing. A woman dressing in men's clothing, or vice versa, is an incentive to sensual desire and provides an occasion for lust.

The figurative reason is that what is forbidden in the case of a garment sewn together from wool and linen is the combination of the simplicity of innocence, of which the wool is a figure, with the subtlety of malice, of which the linen is a figure. It is also prohibited that a woman should take upon herself the office of teaching or any of the other functions of a man, or that a man should descend to the softness of women.

Reply to objection 7: As Jerome says in *Super Matthaeum*, "The Lord commanded that they make violet fringes in the four corners of their garments in order to mark the people of Israel off from other peoples." Hence, in this way they professed that they were Jews, and so by looking at this sign they were induced to be mindful of their Law.

Now the words "You shall tie them on your hand, and they will be always before your eyes" were misinterpreted by the Pharisees when they wrote the Decalogue of Moses on scrolls and tied it on their foreheads like a crown, so that it would move before their eyes. The Lord's intention, however, was that the precepts should be tied to their hand, i.e., to their actions, and that the precepts should be before their eyes, i.e., in meditation. Also, in the case of the violet strips which were inserted inside their cloaks, what is signified is the heavenly intention that ought to be joined to all our works.

Still, one could claim that since these people were carnal and stiff-necked, they had to be stirred to the observance of the Law through sensible things of this sort.

Reply to objection 8: There are two kinds of human affect, the one involving reason and the other involving the passions.

With respect to the affect of reason, it does not matter what a man does with brute animals, since all of them have been subjected to his power by God—this according to Psalm 8:8 ("You have subjected all things under his feet"). In this regard, the Apostle says that God is not concerned about oxen because God does not require of man what he does to the oxen or other animals.

However, with respect to the affect of passion, human affect is moved even with respect to the other animals. For since the passion of pity (*misericordia*) arises from the sufferings of others, and since brute animals are also able to sense pain, the affect of pity can arise in a man even with respect to the sufferings of animals. It follows that one who is able to feel the affect of pity with respect to animals is thereby more disposed toward the affect of pity with respect to men; hence, Proverbs 12:10 says, "The just man has regard for the lives of his beasts, but the innards of the wicked are cruel." And so the Lord, in order that He might call the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, back to pity, wished them to be moved to pity even for brute animals and prohibited them from doing to animals certain things that seem to involve cruelty. Thus, He forbade them to cook a kid in its mother's milk, or to muzzle an ox threshing grain, or to kill a mother with her children.

Still, one could also claim that it was out of a detestation of idolatry that they were forbidden to do these things. For the Egyptians considered it evil for oxen that were threshing to eat any of the grain. Again, certain magicians used an incubating mother together with her captured young ones for securing fertility and good fortune in the nurturing of children; also, among the fortune-tellers it was considered good fortune to find a mother incubating young ones.

As for the [prohibition against] mixing animals of differing species, there were three possible literal reasons:

First, detestation of the idolatry of the Egyptians, who used differing mixtures in the service of the planets, which according to their different conjunctions have diverse effects on diverse kinds of things.

The second reason was to prevent sexual intercourse that is contrary to nature.

The third reason is the general one of removing occasions for sensual desire. For animals of different species do not easily mate with one another unless this is procured by men, and the movement of sensual desire is excited in men when they witness animals having sexual intercourse. Hence, as Rabbi Moses reports, among the Jewish traditions there is a precept according to which men should avert their eyes from animals that are having sexual intercourse.

The figurative reasons for these things are as follows: The necessities of life should not be taken from the ox who is threshing, i.e., from the preacher who bears the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle puts it in 1 Corinthians 9:10. Again, we should not hold fast the mother along with her young, since in certain matters the spiritual meaning, i.e., the young, should be held on to while the literal observance, i.e., the mother, is overridden. Again, as beasts of burden, i.e., ordinary people, we are forbidden to have sexual intercourse, i.e., to have close connections, with living things of a different kind, i.e., with Gentiles or Jews.

Reply to objection 9: As far as the literal reason is concerned, all these agricultural mixtures were prohibited in renunciation of idolatry. For in their veneration of the stars, the Egyptians concocted different mixtures of seeds and animals and clothes, representing the different conjunctions of the stars.

An alternative reply is that all mixtures of the sort in question were prohibited in renunciation of sexual intercourse that is contrary to nature.

Still, these prohibitions have a figurative reason behind them. For the passage “You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse seeds” is to be understood spiritually to mean that strange doctrine is not to be sown within the Church, which is a spiritual vine. And similarly, the field, i.e., the Church, is not to be sown with diverse seeds, i.e., with both Catholic doctrine and heretical doctrine. Nor is to be plowed simultaneously with an ox and a donkey, since he who is foolish is not to join with him who is wise in preaching; for the one impedes the other.

Reply to objection 10: *[There is no reply in the manuscripts to objection 10.]*

Reply to objection 11: In their rites the magicians and priests of the idols used the bones or flesh of dead men. And so, in order to root out idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the lower priests, who ministered in the sanctuary for fixed periods, should not be defiled with death, except for the deaths of those close to them, viz., their father or mother or persons related to them in like manner.

The high priest, however, had always to be prepared for the ministry of the sanctuary, and so he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, no matter how closely related they were.

Again, the priests were also commanded to take a virgin as a wife, and not to marry a prostitute or divorced woman. This was meant to induce reverence for the priests, whose dignity might seem to be diminished by such a marriage, and also because of the sons, for whom the mother’s shame would be a source of ignominy—something to be especially avoided insofar as the dignity of the priesthood would be conferred on them according to familial succession.

In order to prevent idolatrous rites, they were also forbidden to shave their heads or beards or to make incisions in their flesh. For the priests of the Gentiles shaved their heads and beards; hence, Baruch 6:30 says, “The priests sit with their garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven.” Also, in the worship of their idols “they cut themselves with knives and lances,” as 3 Kings 18:28 reports. Hence, the contraries of these things were mandated for the priests of the Old Law.

The spiritual reasons behind these precepts are as follows: The priests had to be entirely immune from dead works, i.e., the works of sin. And they should also not shave, i.e., put off wisdom, or rid themselves of their beards, i.e., rid themselves of wisdom, or tear their vestments or cut their flesh, i.e., incur the vice of schism.

QUESTION 103

The Duration of the Ceremonial Precepts

The next thing to consider is the duration of the ceremonial precepts. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Were there ceremonial precepts before the Law? (2) Did the Law have the power to give justification? (3) Did the ceremonial precepts cease to apply after Christ came? (4) Is it a mortal sin to observe the ceremonial precepts in the time after Christ?

Article 1

Did the ceremonies of the Law exist before the Law existed?

It seems that the ceremonies of the Law existed before the Law did:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 102, a. 3), sacrifices and holocausts have to do with the ceremonies of the Old Law. But there were sacrifices and holocausts before the Law; for Genesis 4:3-4 says, “Cain offered gifts to the Lord from the fruits of the earth, whereas Abel offered gifts from the first-born of his flock and from their fat.” Again, Noah offered holocausts to the Lord, as Genesis 18:20 states; and Abraham did so, too, as Genesis 22:13 reports. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law existed before the Law existed.

Objection 2: The construction and anointing (*injunctio*) of an altar have to do with the ceremonies relating to the sacred things. But these things existed before the Law did; for Genesis 13:18 says, “Abraham built an altar to the Lord,” and Genesis 28:18 says of Jacob, “He took the stone and set it up as a monument (*vitulus*), pouring oil over it.” Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law existed before the Law existed.

Objection 3: Among the sacraments of the Law the primary one (*primum*) seems to have been circumcision. But as is clear from Genesis 17:10ff., circumcision existed before the Law did. Likewise, the priesthood existed before the Law did; for Genesis 14:18 says, “Melchisedech was a priest of the most high God.” Therefore, the ceremonies of the sacraments existed before the Law existed.

Objection 4: As was explained above (q. 102, a. 6), the distinction between clean and unclean animals has to do with the ceremonies of the observances. But this distinction existed before the Law did; for Genesis 7:2-3 says, “Take seven and seven of all the clean animals, but two and two of the unclean animals.” Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law existed before the Law existed.

But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 6:1 says, “These are the precepts and ceremonies that the Lord your God has commanded that I should teach you.” But they would not have needed to be taught about them if these ceremonies had already existed. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law did not exist before the Law existed.

I respond: As is clear from what has been said (q. 102, a. 2), the ceremonies of the Law were ordered toward two things, viz., worshiping God and being figures of Christ.

Now whoever worships God must worship Him in specific ways that bear upon exterior worship. But this specification (*determinatio*) of divine worship involves ceremonies in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 99, a.4), the specification of how we are ordered to our neighbor involves judicial precepts. And so just as it was common among men for there to be judicial precepts that were not instituted by God’s authority but were instead ordained by human reason, so too there were certain ceremonies that were specified not by the authority of any law but rather solely by the will and devotion of the men who were worshiping God.

However, since even before the Law existed there were certain outstanding men empowered with a prophetic spirit, it is plausible to believe that they were led by a divine instinct—by a private law, as it were—to a certain set way (*ad aliquem certum modum*) of worshiping God which was appropriate for

interior worship and which was also fit to signify the mysteries of Christ that other actions of theirs were also figures of—this according to 1 Corinthians 10:11 (“All things happened to them in figure”).

Therefore, there were ceremonies before the Law existed, but they were not the ceremonies of the Law, since they were not instituted through any legislation.

Reply to objection 1: Before the Law existed, the ancients offered oblations and sacrifices and holocausts out of the devotion of their own will, insofar as it seemed fitting to them that in those things which they had received from God and which they offered out of reverence for God, they should give witness (*protestarentur*) to the fact that they were worshiping God, who is the source and end of all things.

Reply to objection 2: They likewise instituted certain sacred things because it seemed fitting to them that there should be some places that were set off from others and tied to divine worship.

Reply to objection 3: The sacrament of circumcision was established by God’s command before the Law existed. Hence, circumcision can be called a sacrament of the Law only in the sense that it was observed under the Law and not in the sense that it was instituted by the Law. This is why our Lord says in John 7:22, “Circumcision is not from Moses, but from his fathers.”

Likewise, among those who worshiped God the priesthood existed according to a human specification before the Law existed, since they gave this dignity to the first-born.

Reply to objection 4: Before the Law existed, the distinction between clean and unclean animals did not exist as far as eating was concerned, since Genesis 9:3 says, “Everything that moves and lives will be food for you.” Rather, the distinction existed only with respect to the offering of sacrifices, since they offered certain specific animals as sacrifices.

However, if there was any distinction among animals that pertained to eating, this was not because the eating of the animals was illegal—for it was not forbidden by any law—but rather because of abhorrence or custom, just as even now we see that certain foods that are eaten in some lands are abhorred in others.

Article 2

Did the ceremonies of the Old Law have the power to confer justification at the time of the Law?

It seems that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to confer justification (*habuerint virtutem justificandi*) at the time of the Law:

Objection 1: Expiation from sin and the consecration of a man have to do with justification. But Exodus 29:21 says that the priests and their vestments were consecrated through the sprinkling of blood and anointing with oil, while Leviticus 16:16 says that through the sprinkling of the blood of the heifer the priest expiated the sanctuary from the impurities of the children of Israel and from their deceits and sins. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to confer justification.

Objection 2: That by which a man is pleasing to God pertains to justification—this according to Psalm 10:8 (“The Lord is just, and He loved just acts”). But some men were pleasing to God because of the ceremonies—this according to Leviticus 10:19 (“How could I have been pleasing to the Lord in the ceremonies with the mind of a sad man?”) Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to confer justification.

Objection 3: What belongs to the worship of God involves the soul as well as the body—this according to Psalm 18:8 (“The Law of the Lord is pure, converting souls”). But as Leviticus 14 points out, lepers were cleansed by the ceremonies of the Old Law. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the ceremonies of the

Old Law were capable of cleansing the soul by conferring justification on it.

But contrary to this: In Galatians 2:21 the Apostle says, “If a law had been given that was capable of conferring justification, then Christ would have died for nothing (*gratis*),” i.e., for no reason. But this is absurd. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law did not confer justification.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 102, a. 5), there were two kinds of uncleanness under the Old Law. The one kind was spiritual, and this is the uncleanness of sin (*immunditia culpae*). The other kind, by contrast, was corporeal (*immunditia corporalis*) and took away one’s fitness for divine worship; this is the sense in which a leper was unclean, or one who touched something associated with death. Uncleanness of this kind was nothing other than a certain irregularity (*irregularitas*).

The ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to cleanse this second kind of uncleanness, since these ceremonies were remedies applied by legal ordinance to remove those sorts of uncleanness, like the ones mentioned above, which had been induced by a statute of the Law. This is why in Hebrews 9:13 the Apostle says, “The blood of goats and bulls and the sprinkled ashes of a heifer sanctify those who are defiled as far as the cleansing of the flesh is concerned.” And just as the uncleanness that was washed away by these ceremonies was an uncleanness of the flesh rather than of the mind, so shortly before the cited passage (Hebrews 9:10) the Apostle calls these ceremonies ‘justifications of the flesh’ (*iustitiae carnis*). “They are justifications of the flesh,” he says, “imposed during the time of correction.”

However, these ceremonies did not have the power to expiate uncleanness of the mind, i.e., the uncleanness of sin. This is because the expiation from sins could never have been brought about except through Christ, who “takes away the sins of the world,” as John 1:29 says; and since the mystery of Christ’s incarnation and passion had not yet been accomplished in reality, the ceremonies of the Old Law were unable in their own right to have a real power that flowed from the incarnate and suffering Christ in the way that the sacraments of the New Law do. And so these ceremonies were unable to wash away sin. As the Apostle puts it in Hebrews 10:4, “It was impossible for sins to be removed by the blood of bulls and goats.” This is what in Galatians 4:9 the Apostle calls “those empty and weak elements”—weak because they cannot wash away sin, whereas the weakness arises from the fact that they are empty, i.e., from the fact that they do not contain grace in their own right.

Still, at the time of the Law the mind of the faithful ones was able, through faith, to be joined to Christ incarnate and suffering, and so the faithful were justified by their faith in Christ. The observance of the ceremonies in question was a kind of profession of this faith, insofar as the ceremonies were figures of Christ. And the reason that sacrifices were offered for sins in the Old Law was not that the sacrifices themselves washed away sin, but rather that they were a kind of profession of that faith which did wash away sin. The Law itself lends support to this claim by its mode of speaking; for Leviticus 4-5 says that in the offering of sacrifices for sin the priest “will pray for him and his sin will be forgiven”—as if to say that the sin is forgiven not by the power of the sacrifices, but rather because of the faith and devotion of those offering the sacrifices. Note, however, that the fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law expiated corporeal impurities was itself a figure of the expiation of sins that is made through Christ.

So, then, it is clear that the ceremonies under the status of the Old Law did not themselves have the power to confer justification.

Reply to objection 1: The sanctification of the priests and their sons and of their vestments, or of any other things, through the sprinkling of blood was nothing other than a deputation for divine worship and a removal of impediments to the purity of the flesh, as the Apostle puts it. This was done as a prefigurement of the sanctification by which Jesus sanctified the people by His own blood.

Similarly, the expiation in question should be thought of as removing corporeal impurities and not sins. Hence, the sanctuary, which was not capable of sinning (*culpae subiectum esse non poterat*), is likewise said to be expiated.

Reply to objection 2: In the ceremonies the priests were pleasing to God because of their

obedience and devotion and because of their faith in the reality prefigured by the ceremonies—and not because of the ceremonies themselves considered in their own right.

Reply to objection 3: The ceremonies that had been instituted for the cleansing of a leper were not ordered toward removing the uncleanness of the disease of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were applied only to someone who was already cleansed of the disease; hence, Leviticus 14:3-4 says, “When the priest, upon leaving the camp, finds that the leprosy has been cleansed, he will command that the one *who is purified* should offer, etc.”—and not “*who is about to be purified*.” From this it is clear that the priest was set up as the judge of an already cleansed leper and not of a leper who was about to be cleansed.

Ceremonies of this sort were used to remove an uncleanness of irregularity. However, they say that sometimes, if the priest happened to make a mistake in his judgment, the leper was miraculously cleansed by God through His divine power—and not through the power of the sacrifices. In the same way, as Numbers 5:27 reports, the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted when she drank the water upon which the priest had “heaped curses.”

Article 3

Did the ceremonies of the Old Law cease with the coming of Christ?

It seems that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease with the coming of Christ:

Objection 1: Baruch 4:1 says, “This is the book of God’s commandments and the law which lasts forever.” But the ceremonies of the Law are part of the Law. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law were to last forever.

Objection 2: A cleansed leper’s offering belongs to the ceremonies of the Law. But even in the Gospel a cleansed leper is ordered to make offerings of this sort. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease when Christ came.

Objection 3: As long as a cause remains, its effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasoned causes insofar as they were ordered toward divine worship, even beyond the fact that they were ordered toward being figures of Christ. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Old Law were not supposed to cease.

Objection 4: As was explained above (q. 102, a. 4), circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham’s faith, and the observance of the Sabbath was instituted to recall the favor of creation, and the other solemn feasts of the Law were instituted to recall others of God’s favors. But Abraham’s faith should be imitated even by us; and the favor of creation, along with God’s other favors, should always be recalled. Therefore, it is even less the case that circumcision and the solemn feasts of the Law should cease.

But contrary to this: In Colossians 2:16-17 the Apostle says, “Let no man judge you in meat or in drink, or with respect to a feast day or the new moon or the Sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come.” And Hebrews 8:13 says, “In saying ‘a new [covenant]’, He has made the former [covenant] old, and that which decays and grows old is near its end.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 102, a. 1 and 2), all the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordered toward the worship of God. Now exterior worship should be proportioned to interior worship, which consists in faith, hope, and charity. Hence, exterior worship should be diversified in a way corresponding to the diversity of interior worship.

Now one can distinguish three states (*status*) of interior worship:

The first state is that in which faith and hope are had both (a) with respect to heavenly goods and also (b) with respect to the means by which we are led to those heavenly goods, where both of these are seen as something future. This is the state of faith and hope under the Old Law.

The second state of interior worship is that in which faith and hope are had (a) with respect to heavenly goods as something future, but (b) with respect to the means by which we are led to those goods as something present or past. This is the state of the New Law.

The third state is that in which both things are had as something present, and nothing is believed in or hoped for as something absent. This is the state of the blessed in heaven (*status beatorum*). Thus, in the state of the blessed nothing that has to do with divine worship is figurative; instead, there is only the act of thanksgiving and the voicing of praise. Thus, Apocalypse 21:22 says of the city of the blessed, “I saw no temple in it, for the Lord, the almighty God, is its temple, and the Lamb.”

Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it was fitting that the ceremonies of the first state, which were figures of the second and third states, should cease when the second state arrived, and that other ceremonies should be introduced which corresponded to the state of divine worship for that later time, in which the heavenly goods are something future, but the divine favors by which we are led to the heavenly goods are something present.

Reply to objection 1: The Old Law is said to be eternal in an absolute and unqualified way with respect to its moral precepts. On the other hand, as far as its ceremonial precepts are concerned, it is eternal with respect to the truth that the ceremonies are figures of.

Reply to objection 2: The mystery of the redemption of the human race was completed in Christ’s passion; hence, in John 19:30 our Lord says, “It is consummated” (*consummatum est*). As a sign of this, we read that during Christ’s passion the veil of the temple was rent (Matthew 27:51).

And so before Christ’s passion, when Christ was preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were running side by side, since the mystery of Christ had already begun but had not yet been consummated. And it was for this reason that our Lord ordered the leper to observe the ceremonies of the Law.

Reply to objection 3: The literal reasons given above (q. 102) for the ceremonies have to do with divine worship, which was worship with faith in something yet to come. And so when He who was to come had already come, the first state of worship ceased and all the reasons were ordered toward the second state of worship.

Reply to objection 4: Abraham’s faith was commended because he trusted God’s promise about his future seed, in which all nations were to be blessed. And so as long as this was still something future, Abraham’s faith had to be professed in circumcision. However, after it had already been accomplished, the same reality was declared by another sign, viz., Baptism, which was in this regard the successor to circumcision—this according to the Apostle in Colossians 2:11-12 (“You have been circumcised with a circumcision made not by hand in the despoiling of the body’s flesh, but rather with the circumcision of our Lord Jesus Christ, buried with Him in Baptism.”)

Moreover, the Sabbath, which signified the first creation, is changed to Sunday (*dies dominicus*), on which the new creature, begun in the Christ’s resurrection, is commemorated.

Likewise, the other solemn feasts of the Old Law are succeeded by the new solemn feasts, since the favors granted to that people signify the favors granted to us through Christ. Hence, the feast of the Passover is succeeded by the feast of the passion and resurrection of Christ. The feast of Pentecost on which the Old Law was given is succeeded by the feast of Pentecost on which the Law of the Spirit of life was given. The feast of the New Moon is succeeded by the feast of the Blessed Virgin on which the illumination of the sun, i.e., Christ, first appeared through the outpouring of grace. The feast of Trumpets is succeeded by the feasts of the apostles. The feast of the Atonement is succeeded by the feasts of the martyrs and confessors. The feast of Tabernacles is succeeded by the feast of the

consecration of a church. The feast of the Assembly and Collection is succeeded by the feast of the angels, or also by the feast of All Saints.

Article 4

Can the ceremonial precepts be observed without mortal sin after Christ's passion?

It seems that the ceremonial precepts can be observed without mortal sin after Christ's passion:

Objection 1: It is unbelievable that the apostles committed mortal sin after having received the Holy Spirit. For as Luke 24:29 says, by His fullness "they were endowed with power from on high." But after the coming of the Holy Spirit the apostles observed the Law. For Acts 16:3 says that Paul circumcised Timothy, and Acts 21:26 says that Paul, acting on the advice of James, "took the men and, having been purified with them, entered the temple, announcing the fulfillment of the day of purification while an offering was being made for each of them." Therefore, the ceremonial precepts can be observed without mortal sin after Christ's passion.

Objection 2: The ceremonial precepts include avoiding contact with Gentiles. But the first shepherd (*pastor*) of the Church observed this precept; for Galatians 2:12 says that when certain men came to Antioch, Peter withdrew from the Gentiles and separated himself from them. Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law can be observed without mortal sin after Christ's passion.

Objection 3: The commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin. But by a decree of the apostles it was decided that the Gentiles should observe certain of the ceremonial precepts (*quaedam de ceremoniis*) of the Law; for Acts 15:28-29 says, "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain from what has been sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Therefore, the ceremonies of the Law can be observed without sin after Christ's passion.

But contrary to this: In Galatians 5:2 the Apostle says, "If you are circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." But nothing rules out Christ's fruit except mortal sin. Therefore, being circumcised, along with observing the other ceremonies of the Law, is a mortal sin after Christ's passion.

I respond: All the ceremonies were a sort of profession of that faith which the interior worship of God consists in. A man can profess this interior faith by deeds as well as by words, and in both sorts of profession, a man commits a mortal sin if he professes something false.

Now even though the faith we have in Christ is the same faith that the ancient fathers had, nonetheless, because they came before Christ whereas we come after Christ, this same faith is signified with different words by us and by them. For they say, "Behold, a virgin will conceive and bring forth a son," where the verbs are future-tense, whereas we represent this same thing with past-tense verbs by saying, "She conceived and brought forth a son."

Similarly, the ceremonies of the Old Law signified the Christ as someone who would be born and would suffer, whereas our sacraments signify Him as someone who has been born and has suffered. Therefore, just as someone would commit a mortal sin if he now, in professing his faith, claimed that the Christ will be born—something that the ancients said in a pious and faith-filled manner—so too someone would commit a mortal sin if he now observed those ceremonies which the ancients observed in their pious and faith-filled manner. This is what Augustine says in *Contra Faustum*: "'Will be born', 'will suffer', and 'will rise'—which those [old] sacraments in a sense resounded with—are no longer permitted. Instead, it is proclaimed that He has been born, that He has suffered, and that He has risen—which the sacraments performed by Christians now resound with."

Reply to objection 1: Jerome and Augustine seem to have had differing views on this matter.

Jerome distinguished two periods of time. The one period occurred before Christ's passion, and in this period the ceremonial precepts of the Law were neither dead (*mortua*), in the sense of not having obligatory or expiatory force in their own way, nor deadly (*mortifera*), because those observing them did not thereby sin. However, immediately after Christ's passion, the ceremonial precepts of the Law began to be not only dead, i.e., lacking in power and obligation, but also deadly, in the sense that if anyone observed them, he was committing a mortal sin. For this reason, Jerome claims that after Christ's passion the apostles never in truth observed the ceremonial precepts of the Law, but instead observed them only by a sort of pious simulation, and this in order not to give scandal to the Jews and thus impede their conversion. The simulation is not to be understood in such a way that they did not in truth perform the relevant actions, but rather is to be understood to mean that they did not perform them in such a way as to observe the ceremonial precepts of the Law—as, for instance, if someone were to cut off the foreskin of the male member for the sake of health and not for the sake of observing the legal ceremony of circumcision.

However, because it seems implausible that the apostles should have hidden, out of concern for scandal, those very things that have to do with the truth of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of a simulation in matters that involve the salvation of the faithful, Augustine more appropriately distinguishes three periods of time. One occurred before Christ's passion, and in this period the ceremonial precepts of the Law were neither dead nor deadly. A second occurs after the time of the spread of the Gospel, and in this period the ceremonial precepts of the Law were both dead and deadly. The third period was the time between the other two, viz., from Christ's passion to the spread of the Gospel, and during this period the ceremonial precepts of the Law were, to be sure, dead, because they did not have power and because no one was obliged to observe them, but they were nonetheless not deadly, because those who had been converted to Christ from among the Jews were able to observe them licitly as long as they did not place their hope in them in such a way that they considered them necessary for salvation, i.e., as long as they did not believe that faith in Christ was unable to justify them in the absence of the ceremonies of the Law. However, there was no reason for those who were converted to Christ from among the Gentiles to observe the ceremonial precepts of the Law.

Accordingly, Paul circumcised Timothy because Timothy had been born of a Jewish mother, whereas he decided not to circumcise Titus, since Titus had been born of Gentiles. However, in order to show the difference between the rites of the Law and the rites of the Gentiles, the Holy Spirit did not want the observance of the ceremonies of the Law to be immediately forbidden for those who had been converted from among the Jews, in the way that the Gentile rites were forbidden for those who had been converted from among the Gentiles. For the rites of the Gentiles were repudiated as altogether illicit and had always been prohibited by God. By contrast, the rites of the Law ceased because they had been fulfilled through Christ's passion; for they had been instituted by God as a figure of the Christ.

Reply to objection 2: According to Jerome, Peter put up the pretense of withdrawing from the Gentiles in order to avoid scandalizing the Jews, of whom he was the Apostle. Hence, in this he did not in any way sin. Paul, on the other hand, likewise put up the pretense of reprehending him in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, of whom he was the Apostle.

Augustine, however, disproves this view by appeal to the fact that in the canonical Scriptures, viz., in Galatians 2:11, in which one cannot believe that there is anything false, Paul says that Peter was reprehensible. Hence, it is true that Peter sinned and that Paul corrected him in reality and did not just pretend to correct him.

Still, Peter did not sin in observing the Law for that time period, since he was permitted to observe the Law as someone converted from among the Jews. Instead, he sinned by being excessively diligent in his observance of the Law in order not to scandalize the Jews, with the result that he scandalized the

Gentiles instead.

Reply to objection 3: Some have claimed that this prohibition by the apostles should be understood not in a literal sense but in a spiritual sense, so that the prohibition of blood stands for the prohibition of homicide, and the prohibition of what is suffocated stands for the prohibition of robbery and violence, and the prohibition of what has been sacrificed stands for the prohibition of idolatry, and the prohibition of fornication stands for the prohibition of what is bad *per se*. This opinion is accepted by certain Glosses, which expound precepts of this sort in a mystical sense.

However, since homicide and robbery were thought of as being against the law even among the Gentiles, it would not have been necessary for a special commandment to be given about this matter to those who had been converted to Christ from paganism.

Hence, others have claimed that the foods were prohibited literally not because of the observances of the Law but in order to suppress gluttony. Hence, in *Super Ezechiel* 44:31 (“The priests shall not eat of anything that is dead”) Jerome says that the passage in question condemns priests who, out of gluttonous desire, do not keep these precepts in the case of thrushes and other things of this sort.

However, since there are foods that are greater delicacies and more conducive to gluttony, there does not seem to be any reason why the particular foods in question were prohibited rather than others.

Therefore, one should reply, in keeping with a third opinion, that the foods in question were prohibited literally not with an eye toward observing the ceremonies of the Law, but rather in order to strengthen the union of Gentiles and Jews who were living together. For as a matter of ancient custom, blood and strangled meat were abominable to the Jews, whereas the eating of things that had been sacrificed to idols could generate among the Jews the suspicion that the Gentiles were relapsing into idolatry. And so these things were forbidden for the period in which it was necessary to bring Gentiles and Jews together for the first time (*de novo*). However, as time went on and the cause ceased to be present, the effect also ceased to be present—once the truth of the Gospel teaching became evident, where our Lord teaches that “nothing that enters through the mouth makes a man unclean” (Matthew 15:11) and 1 Timothy 4:4 says, “Nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving.”

On the other hand, fornication was specifically prohibited because the Gentiles did not consider it a sin.

QUESTION 104

The Judicial Precepts of the Old Law

Next we have to consider the judicial precepts. First we have to consider them in general and, second, we have to consider the reasons for them.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) What are the judicial precepts? (2) Are the judicial precepts figurative? (3) How long do they endure? (4) What are the kinds of judicial precepts?

Article 1

Does the nature of the judicial precepts consist in their directing a man in his relations with his neighbor?

It seems that the nature of the judicial precepts does not consist in their directing a man in his relations with his neighbor (*ordinantia ad proximum*):

Objection 1: The judicial precepts (*praecepta iudicialia*) take their name from judicial proceedings (*iudicium*). But there are many other things by which a man is directed in his relations with his neighbor and which do not involve any judicial proceeding. Therefore, it is not the case that these precepts are called judicial because they direct a man in his relations with his neighbor.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 99, a. 4), the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts. But there are many moral precepts by which a man is directed in his relations with his neighbor, as is clear from the seven precepts of the second tablet. Therefore, it is not the case that precepts are called judicial by reason of the fact that they direct a man in his relations with his neighbor.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 99, a. 4 and q. 101, a. 1), the judicial precepts bear upon our neighbor in the same way that the ceremonial precepts bear upon God. But among the ceremonial precepts there are some that have to do with one's own self, e.g., the observances regarding food and clothing that were discussed above (q. 102, a. 6). Therefore, it is not the case that precepts are called judicial by virtue of the fact that they direct a man in his relations with his neighbor.

But contrary to this: Ezekiel 18:8 lists among the good works of the just man: "... if he judges accurately (*iudicium fecerit verum*) between one man and another." But the judicial precepts take their name from judicial proceedings (*iudicium*). Therefore, it seems that the precepts that are called judicial are those that involve directing men in their relations with one another.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 99, a. 4), certain precepts of the Law have their binding force (*vis obligandi*) from the very dictate of reason—i.e., in virtue of the fact that natural reason dictates that such-and-such is to be done or is to be avoided. Precepts of this sort are called *moral* precepts, because human morals (*mores humani*) come from reason.

By contrast, other precepts do not have their binding force from the very dictate of reason; for, considered in themselves, they do not absolutely speaking have the character of what ought to be done or ought not to be done. Instead, they have their binding force from some statute, either divine or human (*ex aliqua institutione divina vel humana*). Certain specifications (*determinationes*) of the moral precepts are of this sort. Thus, if the moral precepts are given a specification by divine statute in those matters in which man is ordered toward God, then the resulting precepts are called *ceremonial* precepts. On the other hand, if the moral precepts are given a specification in matters that involve the ordering of men to one another, then the resulting precepts are called *judicial* precepts.

Therefore, the nature of the judicial precepts consists in two things, viz., (a) the fact that they have to do with directing men in their relations with one another, and (b) the fact that they have binding force not just from reason, but from statutes.

Reply to objection 1: Judicial proceedings are conducted as the official duty of certain rulers (*principes*) who have the power to pass judgment. Now a ruler has the role of bringing order not only to what comes under litigation, but also to the voluntary contracts made among men and to everything that involves the communal life and governance of the people. Hence, the judicial precepts include not only those matters that involve disputes requiring judicial proceedings but also any matter that involves the ordering of men to one another and that is subject to the determination of the ruler as the supreme judge.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through in the case of those precepts that direct a man in his relations with his neighbor and that have their binding force solely from the dictate of reason.

Reply to objection 3: It is likewise the case that among the precepts that direct one toward God, some are moral, i.e., are dictated by reason itself as informed by faith—e.g., that God is to be loved and worshiped—whereas others are ceremonial, i.e., they have binding force only by divine ordinance.

Now what pertains to God are not just the sacrifices offered to God, but also anything relevant to one's fitness for making offerings and for worshiping God. For men are directed toward God as their end, and so it is relevant to the worship of God, and thus to the ceremonial precepts, that a man should have a certain sort of fitness (*idoneitas*) with respect to divine worship.

By contrast, a man is not directed to his neighbor as his end in such a way that he must be, within his very self, at the disposal of his neighbor (*ut oporteat eum disponi in seipso in ordine ad proximum*). For this is the way in which servants are related to their masters—where, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, “servants, in all that they are, belong to their masters.” And so there are no judicial precepts that direct a man within himself; instead, all precepts of that sort are moral. For reason, which is the principle of the moral precepts, plays the same role within a man—i.e., with respect to the things pertaining to his very self—that a ruler or judge plays within a city.

Still, note that because the relation of a man to his neighbor falls [directly] under reason to a greater degree than does the relation of a man to God, there are more moral precepts by which a man is directed in his relations with his neighbor than there are moral precepts by which he is directed toward God. It is for this reason, too, that in the Law there are more ceremonial precepts than there are judicial precepts.

Article 2

Are the judicial precepts figures of anything?

It seems that the judicial precepts are not figures of anything:

Objection 1: It seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as a figure of something. Therefore, if the judicial precepts were likewise figures of something, then there would be no difference between the judicial precepts and the ceremonial precepts.

Objection 2: Just as the Jewish people were given certain judicial precepts, so other peoples among the Gentiles were given judicial precepts, too. However, the judicial precepts of those other peoples were not figures of anything, but instead laid down what ought to be done. Therefore, the judicial precepts of the Old Law do not seem to have been figures of anything, either.

Objection 3: What pertains to the worship of God had to be handed down by means of figures, since, as was explained above (q. 101, a. 2), the things of God exceed our reason. By contrast, what has to do with our neighbor does not exceed our reason. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the judicial precepts, which direct us in our relations with our neighbor, to be figures of anything.

But contrary to this: In Exodus 21 the precepts are explained by means of both an allegorical sense and a moral sense (*allegorice et moraliter*).

I respond: There are two ways in which a precept can be a figure of something:

In the first way, a precept is a figure primarily and *per se*, i.e., it is instituted mainly in order to be a figure of something. This is the way in which the ceremonial precepts are figurative, since they were instituted in order to be figures of things having to do with the worship of God and the mystery of Christ.

On the other hand, certain precepts are figurative not primarily and *per se*, but in a derivative way (*in consequenti*). This is the way in which the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were instituted not for the purpose of being figures of anything, but rather for the purpose of regulating the condition (*status*) of the Jewish people in accordance with justice and equity. However, the judicial precepts were figures of something in a derivative way, viz., insofar as the overall condition (*totus status*) of the people who were disposed by these precepts was itself figurative—this according to 1 Corinthians 10:11 (“All things happened to them in figure”).

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the ceremonial precepts were figurative in a way different from that in which the judicial precepts were figurative.

Reply to objection 2: The Jewish people had been chosen by God in order that the Christ should be born from them. And so, as Augustine puts it in *Contra Faustum*, the overall condition of that people had to be prophetic and figurative. Because of this, it was also the case that the judicial precepts given to that people were figurative to a greater degree than the judicial precepts given to other peoples. For instance, that people’s wars and deeds are given a mystical interpretation, unlike the wars and deeds of the Assyrians and the Romans—even though the latter are far more famous among men.

Reply to objection 3: If, within that people, the directing of a man in his relations with his neighbor is considered merely by itself, then it is accessible to reason (*pervius rationi*). However, it surpassed reason insofar as it was ordered toward the worship of God. And it is on this score that it was figurative.

Article 3

Do the judicial precepts of the Old Law have perpetual binding force?

It seems that the judicial precepts of the Old Law have perpetual binding force (*perpetuam obligationem habeant*):

Objection 1: The judicial precepts (*praecepta iudicialia*) have to do with the virtue of justice, since a legal judgment (*iudicium*) is an execution of justice. But as Wisdom 1:15 says, justice is “everlasting and undying (*perpetua et immortalis*).” Therefore, the binding force of the judicial precepts is perpetual.

Objection 2: A divine statute (*institutio divina*) is more stable than a human statute. But the judicial precepts of the codes of human law have perpetual binding force. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so do the judicial precepts of divine law.

Objection 3: In Hebrews 7:18 the Apostle says, “The previous Law (*mandatum*) was set aside because of its weakness and unprofitableness.” This is true of the ceremonial Law, which, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 9:9-10, “could not make one perfect in conscience except only with respect to food and drink and various types of ritual washing and rules governing the flesh.” By contrast, the judicial precepts were useful and effective for the purpose to which they were ordered, viz., to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore, the judicial precepts of the Old Law were not set aside, but still have force.

But contrary to this: In Hebrews 7:12 the Apostle says, “Once the priesthood is transferred

(*translatum*), the Law must be transferred as well.” But the priesthood is transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore, the whole of the Law is transferred. Therefore, it is not the case that the judicial precepts still have binding force.

I respond: The judicial precepts did not have perpetual binding force, but were set aside with the coming of Christ—though in manner different from that in which the ceremonial precepts were set aside.

For the ceremonial precepts were set aside in such a way that they are not only dead but also deadly for those observing them after Christ, especially after the spread of the Gospel. By contrast, the judicial precepts are, to be sure, dead, since they do not have binding force, and yet they are not deadly. For if a ruler were to command that these judicial precepts should be observed in his domain, he would not thereby sin—unless, perhaps, the precepts were observed or were to be observed as if they had their binding force from the institution of the Old Law. For this sort of intention in observing them would be deadly.

The explanation for this difference between the ceremonial precepts and the judicial precepts can be gathered from what was said above (a. 2). For it was claimed that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and *per se*, in the sense that they were instituted primarily to be figures of the mysteries of the Christ understood as something future. And so to observe them now is prejudicial to the truth of the Faith, since we now confess that these mysteries have been accomplished. By contrast, the judicial precepts were instituted not in order to be figures, but in order to mold the state of the people that was ordered toward the Christ. And so when the status of that people changed because Christ had already come, the judicial precepts lost their binding force; for as Galatians 3:24 says, the Law was a teacher leading them to the Christ.

Still, since the judicial precepts are ordered not toward being figures of anything, but rather toward something’s being done, the observance of those precepts is not itself, absolutely speaking, prejudicial to the truth of the Faith. However, the intention to observe the judicial precepts because of the binding power of the Law is indeed prejudicial to the truth of the Faith. For it implies that the former people’s state still persists and that the Christ has not yet come.

Reply to objection 1: To be sure, justice must always be observed. But the specification of what is just by human or divine decree must vary with the different states of men.

Reply to objection 2: The judicial precepts instituted by men have perpetual binding force as long as the relevant state of the regime persists. But if a city or nation devolves into another regime, then the laws must change. For instance, as is clear from the Philosopher in his *Politics*, it is not the case that the same laws are appropriate for both a democracy, which is rule by the people (*potestas populi*), and an oligarchy, which is rule by the rich (*potestas divitum*). So, too, once the status of the people in question changed, the judicial precepts had to change.

Reply to objection 3: The judicial precepts disposed the people toward justice and equity in a way appropriate for their status. But after Christ, the status of that people had to change, since now in Christ there would be no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason, the judicial precepts also had to change.

Article 4

Can the judicial precepts be divided into set kinds?

It seems that the judicial precepts cannot be divided into set kinds:

Objection 1: The judicial precepts direct men in their relations with one another. But the things

that need to be directed among men and are part of human practice do not fall under set kinds, since there are infinitely many of them. Therefore, the judicial precepts cannot have set kinds.

Objection 2: The judicial precepts are specifications of the moral precepts. But the moral precepts do not seem to admit of set kinds, except insofar as they are traced back to the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, the judicial precepts do not have set kinds.

Objection 3: Since the ceremonial precepts have set kinds, their division is based on the Law, as when some are called sacrifices and some are called observances. But there is no division of the judicial precepts that is based on the Law. Therefore, it seems that the judicial precepts do not have set kinds.

But contrary to this: Where there is order, there must be distinctions. But the notion of order is especially relevant to the judicial precepts, through which the people in question were ordered. Therefore, the judicial precepts ought especially to have set kinds.

I respond: Since law is, as it were, the craft (*ars*) of instituting or ordering human life, it follows that just as in any craft there is a set distinction among the rules of the craft, so too in any law there must be a set division of the precepts; otherwise, confusion would by itself destroy the law's usefulness. Accordingly, one should claim that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, through which men were ordered in their relations with one another, have divisions corresponding to the divisions of human ordering.

Now within a given people there are four orderings: (a) the ordering of the rulers of the people to their subjects, (b) the ordering of the subjects to one another, (c) the ordering of the people themselves to outsiders (*ad extraneos*), and (d) the ordering of domestic relations, e.g., father to son, wife to husband, master to servant. It is according to these four orderings that the judicial precepts of the Old Law can be divided:

(a) Some precepts are given that have to do with the institution of the rulers and their duties, and with the respect that ought to be shown for them; and this is one part of the judicial precepts.

(b) Again, some precepts are given that have to do with the citizens' relations with one another, e.g., precepts concerning buying and selling, and precepts concerning judgments and penalties. And this is the second part of the judicial precepts.

(c) Again, some precepts are given that have to do with outsiders, e.g., precepts concerning wars against enemies and precepts concerning the manner in which travelers and strangers are to be received. And this is the third part of the judicial precepts.

(d) Again, in the Law some precepts are given that have to do with domestic common life, e.g., precepts concerning servants and wives and children. And this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.

Reply to objection 1: The things that have to do with the ordering of men to one another are, to be sure, infinitely many. However, as has been explained, they can still be reduced to certain set kinds of things according to the differences among human relations.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 100, a. 3), the precepts of the Decalogue are first in the genus of morals, and so the other moral precepts are appropriately divided by reference to them. By contrast, the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different sort of binding force that comes not from natural reason but solely by decree. And so their divisions have a different explanation.

Reply to objection 3: The Law bases the division of the judicial precepts on the very things that are ordered by the judicial precepts in the Law.

QUESTION 105

The Reasons for the Judicial Precepts

Next we have to consider the reasons for the judicial precepts. On this topic there are four questions: (1) What are the reasons for the judicial precepts that have to do with the rulers? (2) What are the reasons for the ones that have to do with the common life of men with one another? (3) What are the reasons for the ones that have to do with outsiders? (4) What are reasons for the ones that have to do with domestic life?

Article 1

Did the Old Law give appropriate direction concerning the rulers?

It seems that the Old Law did not give appropriate direction (*inconvenienter ordinaverit*) concerning the rulers:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 3, “The governance of the people depends principally on the highest ruling office.” But the Law does not say how the highest ruler should be appointed. By contrast, it does say something about the lower rulers in Exodus 18:21-22 (“Provide wise men from among the whole people”), Numbers 11:16-17 (“Gather to me seventy men from among the elders of Israel”), and Deuteronomy 1:13 (“Give me wise and knowledgeable men from among yourselves,” and so on). Therefore, the Old Law did not give sufficient direction concerning the rulers of the people.

Objection 2: As Plato says, “It belongs to the best to do the best.” But the best arrangement for a city or for any people is that it should be governed by a king, since governance (*regimen*) of this sort is the best representation of the divine governance by which God rules the world. Therefore, the Law should have set up a king for the people from the beginning, and it should not have left this up to the choice of the people, as Deuteronomy 27:14-15 does (“When you shall say, ‘I will set a king over me’, then you will set him over you,” and so on).

Objection 3: As Matthew 12:25 says, “Every kingdom divided against itself will be laid waste,” and this became clear from experience in the case of the Jewish people, among whom the division of the kingdom was a cause of devastation. But the Law should principally tend toward what contributes to the common welfare. Therefore, the Law should have forbidden the division of the kingdom between two kings. Nor should this division have been introduced by divine authority, in the way that, according to 3 Kings 11, it was introduced by the Lord’s authority through the prophet Ahijah the Shilonite.

Objection 4: Just as the priests are ordained (*instituantur*) in order to benefit the people in those things that have to do with God, as is clear from Hebrews 5, so too the rulers are constituted in order to benefit the people in human affairs. But certain things on which their livelihood depends—e.g., tithes and first fruits and many other such things—are allotted to the priests and Levites under the Law. Therefore, in the same way, certain things necessary for sustenance should have been directed to the rulers of the people, especially in light of the fact that they were forbidden to accept gifts, as is clear from Exodus 23:8 (“You shall not accept gifts, which make even prudent men blind and subvert the words of the just”).

Objection 5: Just as a monarchy (*regnum*) is the best kind of government (*regimen*), so a tyranny is the worst corruption of government. But in setting up a king, the Lord instituted a tyrannical rule; for 1 Kings 8:11 says, “This will be the right of the king who is to rule over you: that he should take your sons,” and so on. Therefore, the Law did not appropriately provide for the regulation of the rulers.

But contrary to this: In Numbers 24:5 the people of Israel is commended for the elegance of its

order (“How beautiful are your tabernacles, O Jacob, and your tents, O Israel”). But the beauty of a people’s order depends on its rulers being instituted in the right way. Therefore, through the Law this people was set up correctly with respect to its rulers.

I respond: There are two points to notice regarding the fitting institution (*ordinatio*) of the rulers in a city or among a people.

The first is that everyone should have some role in governance (*principatus*), since, as *Politics* 2 points out, the peaceful existence (*pax*) of a people is thereby maintained, and everyone loves and safeguards an arrangement of this sort.

The second point has to do with the type of political arrangement (*species regiminis*), i.e., the manner in which the ruling offices are constituted. Even though, as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 3, there are various types of political arrangements, the preeminent types are monarchy (*regnum*), in which a single ruler governs in accord with virtue (*principatur secundum virtutem*), and aristocracy (*aristocratia*), i.e., rule by the best, in which a small number govern in accord with virtue.

Hence, the best manner of constituting the ruling offices occurs in a city or region in which (a) there is a single person who is placed in authority on the basis of virtue (*secundum virtutem*) and presides over everyone, and in which (b) under him there are certain others who govern in accord with virtue, and yet in which (c) this political arrangement involves everyone (*ad omnes pertinet*), both because the rulers can be chosen *from among* everyone and also because they are chosen *by* everyone. This is the best political arrangement, with a good mixture of (a) *monarchy*, insofar as there is a single preeminent ruler, and (b) *aristocracy*, insofar as many govern in accord with virtue, and (c) *democracy*, i.e., rule by the people, insofar as the rulers can be chosen from among the people and the choice of rulers falls to the people (*ad populum pertinet electio principum*).

This was the arrangement instituted by divine law. For Moses and his successors governed the people as single rulers over all, which is a certain type of monarchy. Moreover, the seventy-two elders were chosen for their virtue; for Deuteronomy 1:15 says, “I took from your tribes men who were wise and honorable, and I made them rulers.” And this was similar to aristocracy. On the other hand, it was democratic in that (a) these rulers were chosen from among all the people (Exodus 18:21: “Provide wise men from among the whole people”) and (b) the people chose them (Deuteronomy 1:13: “Give me wise men from among yourselves,” and so on). Hence, it is clear that the Law established the best arrangement for the rulers.

Reply to objection 1: The people in question were ruled under God’s special care; this is why Deuteronomy 7:6 says, “The Lord your God chose you to be His special people.” And so the Lord reserved to Himself the institution of the highest ruler. And this is just what Moses asked for in Numbers 27:16: “May the Lord, the God of the spirits of all flesh, provide a man to preside over this multitude.” And so Joshua was appointed by God’s command to govern after Moses. And we read, with respect to each of the judges who succeeded Joshua, that “God raised up a savior for the people,” and that “the spirit of the Lord” was in them, as is clear from Judges 3. And so, as is clear from Deuteronomy 17:15 (“You shall appoint him king whom the Lord your God chooses”), the Lord did not hand over to the people the choice of a king, but instead reserved it for Himself.

Reply to objection 2: As long as it is not corrupt, monarchy is the best political arrangement for a people. However, because of the great power that is granted to a king, monarchy easily degenerates into tyranny unless the one who is granted such power is completely virtuous. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, it is only the virtuous who bear good fortune well.

Now complete virtue is found in only a few cases, and the Jews were particularly cruel and prone to greed—vices through which men especially fall into tyranny. And so at the beginning the Lord did not establish for them a king with full power, but instead instituted a judge and a governor to watch over them. Later on, however, at the request of the people, He granted them a king—though indignantly, so to

speak, as is clear from what He said to Samuel in 1 Kings 8:7 (“It is not you they have rejected, but me, lest I rule over them”).

However, as regards the institution of a king, He did make arrangements from the beginning, first of all, for the manner of choosing a king. In this regard, He made two specifications, viz., (a) that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord’s judgment, and (b) that they should not make anyone from another nation king, since such kings have no affective ties to the nation over which they preside and, as a result, do not take care of the people. Second, He prescribed how the kings, once appointed, should behave with respect to themselves, viz., that they should not accumulate chariots or horses or wives or even great wealth, since a strong desire for these things makes rulers fall into tyranny and abandon justice. He also specified how they should behave with respect to God, viz., that they should always be reading and meditating on God’s Law, and that they should always live in the fear of God and in obedience to Him. He also specified how they should behave with respect to their subjects, viz., that they should not hold them in contempt out of pride or oppress them, and also that they should not deviate from justice.

Reply to objection 3: The division of the kingdom and the multiplication of kings was given to the people less as something for their benefit than as a punishment for the many instances of dissension that they directed against David’s just kingdom. Hence, Hosea 13:11 says, “I will give you a king in my anger,” and Hosea 8:4 says, “They themselves ruled, but not because of me; they became rulers, and I did not know it.”

Reply to objection 4: The priests were appointed to sacred affairs through a succession of birth. And the reason was that they would be held in greater reverence if not just anyone from among the people could become a priest; and the honor they received contributed to the reverence for divine worship. And so they had to be granted certain special provisions in the form of tithes and first fruits, as well as oblations and sacrifices, so that they might live off of those things.

By contrast, the rulers, as has been explained, were taken from the people as a whole, and so they had certain possessions of their own that they could live off of. Also, and especially, the Lord forbade the king to have extravagant wealth or showy magnificence, both because (a), given these things, it would difficult for him not to be led into pride and tyranny, and also because (b) if the rulers were not extravagantly rich, and if ruling were arduous and full of anxiety, then ordinary people would not aspire to rule—and in this way one cause of rebellion (*sedition*) was removed.

Reply to objection 5: It is not the case that this right was being given to the king by divine institution; rather, the passage is foretelling the usurpation by the kings, who establish this unjust right as they degenerate into tyranny and plunder their subjects.

This interpretation is clear from what is added at the end—viz., “..... and you will be his servants”—which properly has to do with tyranny, since tyrants rule their subjects as if they were servants. Hence, Samuel uttered these words in order to deter them from asking for a king. For what follows is this: “The people refused to listen to the voice of Samuel.”

Still, it can happen that even a good king, in the absence of tyranny, takes away the sons and makes them tribunes and centurions, and demands many things from his subjects—and this in order to procure the common good.

Article 2

Were appropriate judicial precepts given with respect to the common life of the people?

It seems that appropriate judicial precepts were not given with respect to the common life of the

people:

Objection 1: Men cannot live peacefully with one another if one takes what belongs to another. But this seems to be encouraged in the Law; for Deuteronomy 23:24 says, "Having entered your neighbor's vineyard, eat as many grapes as you please." Therefore, the Old Law did not appropriately provide for peace among men.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 2, a chief reason why many cities and kingdoms are destroyed is that their possessions fall to women. But this very thing was introduced in the Old Law; for Numbers 27:8 says, "When a man dies without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter." Therefore, the Law did not appropriately provide for the welfare of the people.

Objection 3: As *Politics* 1 says, human society is mainly conserved by the fact that men provide one another with the things they need through buying and selling. But as is clear from Leviticus 25:28, the Old Law undermined the effect of commerce (*virtus venditionis*) by commanding that possessions that had been sold should revert to the seller during the fiftieth year, the year of the Jubilee. Therefore, the Law did not appropriately direct the people on this matter.

Objection 4: Human needs are met especially by the fact that men are ready to lend. Yet this readiness is undermined when borrowers do not return what they have taken; hence, Ecclesiasticus 29:10 says, "Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness, but because they were afraid of being defrauded without cause." But the Law encourages just this. For, first of all, Deuteronomy 15:2 commanded, "One to whom something is owed by his friend or neighbor or brother shall not ask for it back, because it is the Lord's year of remission," and, again, Exodus 22:15 says that if a borrowed animal dies while its owner is present, the borrower does not have to make restitution (*reddere*). Second, the security the lender has because of the promised collateral (*pignus*) is undermined; for Deuteronomy 24:10ff. says, "When you demand of your neighbor something that he owes you, you shall not go into his house to take away the promised collateral," and, again, "The promised collateral shall not pass the night with you, but you shall give it back to him immediately." Therefore, the Law did not give sufficient direction in the case of lending.

Objection 5: There is a very great risk of being defrauded of what one has deposited for safekeeping (*depositum*), and so the greatest caution has to be exercised; hence, 2 Maccabees 3:15 says, "The priests called upon Him from heaven who made the law concerning things deposited for safekeeping, that He would preserve them safe for those who had deposited them." But in the precepts of the Old Law little caution is shown in the case of things deposited for safekeeping. For Exodus 22:10-11 says that when something deposited for safekeeping is lost, one should accept the oath of the one with whom the thing was deposited. Therefore, the Law's direction on this matter was inappropriate.

Objection 6: Just as a wage laborer hires out his services, so too some rent out their houses or other possessions. But it is not necessary that a tenant (*conductor*) immediately pay the rent on a house he has rented. Therefore, it was excessively harsh for Leviticus 19:13 to command, "The wages owed to your wage laborer shall not remain in your hands all the way until morning."

Objection 7: Since there is a frequent need for judgments, there should be easy access to a judge. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Law to prescribe in Deuteronomy 17:8-9 that those seeking judgment for their cases should all proceed to a single fixed place.

Objection 8: It is possible not only for two people, but also for three or more, to agree to lie. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 19:15 to say, "Every word that comes from the mouth of two or three witnesses shall stand."

Objection 9: Punishment should be determined according to the measure of the fault (*culpa*); hence, Deuteronomy 25:2 says, "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the lashes be." But the Law established unequal punishments for certain equal faults. For instance, Exodus 22:1

says, “The thief shall restore five oxen for one oxen and four sheep for one sheep.” Also, certain sins that are not very grave are punished by severe punishments—e.g., in Numbers 15 a man was stoned because he had gathered wood on the Sabbath. Again, in Deuteronomy 21 it is commanded that an unruly son should be stoned for small transgressions, viz., for spending his time in revelry and feasting. Therefore, punishments were not appropriately instituted in the Law.

Objection 10: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 21, “Tully writes that there are eight forms of punishment recognized in the laws, viz., fines (*damnum*), incarceration (*vincula*), scourging (*verbera*), retaliation (*talio*), public disgrace (*ignominia*), exile (*exilium*), death (*mors*), and servitude (*servitudo*).”

Some of these were established under the Old Law: fines, as when a thief is fined five times or four times as much as he has stolen; incarceration, as when Numbers 15:34 commands, with respect to someone, that he be incarcerated; scourging, as when Deuteronomy 25:2 says, “If they see that he who has sinned deserves flogging, they shall lay him down, and shall make him to be scourged in their presence.” Likewise, the Law imposed public disgrace on anyone who refused to marry the wife of his deceased brother; she was to “take off his shoe and spit in his face.” Again, the Law imposed death, as is clear from Leviticus 20:9: “If anyone curses his father or mother, let him die the death.” Again, the Law imposed the punishment of retaliation, with Exodus 21:24 saying, “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Law not to impose the other two forms of punishment, viz., exile and servitude.

Objection 11: There ought not to be a punishment unless there is guilt. But brute animals cannot have guilt. Therefore, it is wrong for punishment to be imposed on them, as in Exodus 21:29 (“An ox shall be stoned if it kills a man or a woman”) and Leviticus 20:16 (“If a woman has sexual relations with any beast, she shall be killed along with the beast”). So, then, it seems that things pertaining to the common life of men with one another were inappropriately directed under the Old Law.

Objection 12: In Exodus 21:12 the Lord commanded that homicide should be punished by the death of a man. But the death of a brute animal counts for much less than the death of a man. Therefore, the punishment for homicide cannot be adequately replaced by putting a brute animal to death. Therefore, it was wrong for Deuteronomy 21:1-4 to command that “when the corpse of a slain man is found and no one knows who is guilty of the murder the elders of the nearest city shall take from the herd a heifer that has not drawn a yoke or plowed the ground, and they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley that has never been plowed or sown, and there they shall cut off the head of the heifer.”

But contrary to this: Psalm 147:20 counts it as a special blessing that “He has not done thus for every nation, and He has not made His judgments known to them.”

I respond: In *De Civitate Dei* 2 Augustine cites the following passage from Tully: “A people is a the union of a multitude brought together by consent to the law and by their common welfare.” Hence, it pertains to the notion of a people that the interaction of men with one another should be directed by precepts of law that are just.

Now there are two types of interaction that men have with one another: One type is effected by the authority of the rulers, and the other type is effected voluntarily by private persons. Since everyone’s will is such that it has the capacity to oversee what is subject to its power, it has to be by the authority of the rulers, to whom men are subject, that judgments between men are enacted and that punishments are imposed on evildoers. By contrast, possessions are subject to the power of private persons, and so with respect to these possessions they are able to interact with one another voluntarily, e.g., in buying, selling, making gifts, and other activities of this sort.

Now the Law gave adequate direction with respect to both types of interaction.

For instance, the Law established judges, as is clear from Deuteronomy 16:18 (“You shall appoint judges and magistrates at all its gates, that they might judge the people with just judgment”). Again, the

Law instituted a just order of judgment, as when Deuteronomy 1:16-17 says, “Make a just judgment, regardless of whether the person is a citizen or a stranger; there will be no difference of persons.” Again, as is clear from Exodus 23:8 and Deuteronomy 16:19, the Law removed an occasion for unjust judgment by forbidding judges to accept gifts. Again, as is clear from Deuteronomy 16:6 and 19:15, it fixed the number of witnesses at two or three. Again, as will be described below, the Law established fixed punishments for various crimes.

With respect to possessions, on the other hand, as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 2, it is best for possessions to be divided among the people, and for their use to be partly communal and partly up to the will of those who possess them. These three points were laid out in the Law.

First, the possessions themselves were divided among the individuals. For instance, Numbers 33:53-54 says, “I have given the land for a possession, and you shall divide it among you by lot.” And since, as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 2, many cities are ruined by disparities in possessions, the Law applied a threefold remedy for regulating possessions. First, the Law stipulated that possessions should be divided equally according to the number of men; hence Numbers 33:54 says, “You shall give a larger part to the more and a smaller part to the fewer.” The second remedy is that one’s possessions do not fall to others in perpetuity but revert to their former owners after a fixed period, so that shares of the possessions do not become mixed up with one another. The third remedy, aimed at removing confusion of the sort just mentioned, is that the relatives of those who die succeed them in ownership: in order, first, the son; second, the daughter; third, the brothers; fourth, the father’s brothers; fifth, any other relative. And to preserve shares of the possessions, the Law further stipulated in Numbers 36:6 that women who inherit should marry men of their own tribe.

Second, the Law stipulated to what extent the use of things would be communal. First, with respect to *taking care of things*, Deuteronomy 22:1 says, “You shall not pass by if you see your brother’s ox or his sheep going astray; but you shall bring them back to your brother,” and likewise for other possessions. Second, with respect to *fruits*, it was generally allowed, for instance, that anyone, having entered his friend’s vineyard, could licitly eat of the fruit, as long as he did not take any fruit away with him. Next, with respect to *poor people in particular*, according to Leviticus 19:9 and Deuteronomy 24:19, the leftover sheaves should be left behind for them, as well as the leftover fruit and bunches of grapes; and according to Exodus 23:11 and Leviticus 25:4, anything grown in the seventh year should be given to them.

Third, the Law regulated the transfer of possessions by those who owned them. One sort of transfer was a *pure gift*. Deuteronomy 14:28-29 says, “Every third year you shall separate off another tithe, and the Levite and the stranger and the orphan and the widow shall come, and they shall eat and be filled.” By contrast, the other sort of transfer was a transfer *with advantageous compensation*—as, for instance, through selling and buying, through leasing and hiring, and through loans and safekeeping, and there are fixed rules in the Law about all of these.

Hence, it is clear that the Old Law appropriately directed the common life of the people.

Reply to objection 1: As the Apostle says in Romans 13:8, he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law, since all the precepts of the Law, especially the ones directed toward one’s neighbor, seem to be ordered toward the goal of men loving one another. Now what proceeds from this love is that men share their goods with one another. For as 1 John 3:17 says, “If someone sees his brother suffering from want and closes off his affection from him, then how does the love of God abide in him?” And so the Law intended to make men accustomed to sharing their goods easily with one another, just as the Apostle likewise commands the rich “to give readily and share with others” (1 Timothy 6:18).

Now someone is not quick to share if he does not tolerate his neighbor’s taking something modest from him without any great loss on his part. And so the Law stipulated that someone entering his neighbor’s vineyard is permitted to eat of the fruit there—though he is not permitted to carry any fruit

away, lest this become an occasion for inflicting a large loss on his neighbor and thereby disturbing the peace. Among disciplined people, the taking of a little does not disturb the peace, but rather strengthens friendship and makes men accustomed to being quick to share.

Reply to objection 2: The Law did not stipulate that women should have succession with respect to their father's goods unless there were no male children. In such a case it was necessary that the succession pass to the women in order to console the father, to whom it would have been a grave blow if his inheritance were going to pass in its entirety to outsiders.

However, according to Numbers 26:7-8, the Law did apply a due precaution in this matter, commanding that women who succeeded to their father's inheritance should marry within their own tribes, so that the shares of the tribes would not get mixed up with one another.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 2, the regulation of possessions contributes greatly to the preservation of a city or nation. Hence, as he himself points out, in certain Gentile cities there was a rule that "no one could sell a possession except to compensate for an obvious loss" (*nisi pro manifesto detrimento*). For if possessions were sold indiscriminately, then it could happen that all the possessions would end up with just a few people, making it necessary for the city or region to be emptied of inhabitants. And so in order to remove this danger, the Old Law directed matters in such a way that men's needs might be satisfied by permitting the selling of possessions up to a certain point in time, and yet it removed the danger in question by commanding that at a set point in time the possessions that had been sold should revert to the seller. The Law set things up in this way so that the shares would not get mixed up with one another, but instead there would always be the same determinate division of goods among the tribes.

However, since urban houses were not divided by lot, the Law permitted them to be sold in perpetuity in the same way that mobile goods were. For the number of houses in a city had not been mandated in the same way that the Law had mandated a set measure of possessions which could not be added to. Rather, the number of houses in a city could be increased. By contrast, houses that were not in a city but in a village "that has no walls" (Leviticus 25:31) could not be sold in perpetuity. For houses of this sort are constructed only for purposes related to cultivation and for the safekeeping of possessions. And so the Law appropriately established the same rule for both.

Reply to objection 4: As has been explained, the Law's intention was to make men accustomed through its precepts to assisting one another promptly with necessities, since this is especially conducive to friendship. And it mandated such promptness in assisting not only with respect to those goods that are given away freely and without qualification, but also with respect to those goods that are given as loans, since assistance of this sort is the more frequent and the more necessary for the majority of people.

Now the Law prescribed this promptness of assistance in a number of ways:

First, as Deuteronomy 15 shows, the Law prescribed that they should show themselves willing to lend and that they should not withdraw from this practice when a year of remission was approaching.

Second, the Law prescribed that they should not burden the one to whom they lend either with usurious interest or by taking as collateral something that is altogether necessary for his life, and it prescribed that if such things have been taken, they should immediately be given back. For Deuteronomy 23:19 says, "You shall not lend money to your brother unto usury." And Deuteronomy 24:6 says, "You shall not take the lower or upper millstone as collateral, since he has pledged his life to you." And Exodus 22:26 says, "If you take your neighbor's garment as collateral, you shall give it back to him before sunset."

Third, the Law forbade them to be unmannerly in exacting payment. Hence Exodus 22:25 says, "If you lend money to my poor people who live among you, you shall not be exacting with them like an extortioner." And it is because of this that Deuteronomy 24:10-11 likewise says, "When you demand of your neighbor anything that he owes you, you shall not go into his house to take away the collateral, but

you shall stand outside and he shall bring out to you what he has”—this because one’s home is his safest refuge, and thus it is offensive to a man that his own house should be invaded, and also because the Law does not allow a creditor to take the collateral he wants, but rather allows the debtor to give what he needs the least.

Fourth, the Law prescribed that every seventh year debts would be entirely remitted. For it was probable that those who could easily repay their debts would do so before the seventh year and would not defraud their lender without cause. However, if they were altogether unable to repay, then cancelling the debt was owed to them out of love, for the same reason that it should have been given to them from the beginning because of their need.

As regards borrowed animals, the Law prescribed that if, because of the negligence of the borrower, the animals died or were injured in his absence, then he should be forced to make restitution. On the other hand, if the animals died or were injured while he was present and diligently caring for them, then he was not forced to make restitution—especially if they had been rented out for a fee. For they might likewise have died or been injured in the same way under the lender’s care (*apud mutuantem*), and so as long as the borrower succeeded in preserving the animal, the lender would already be profiting from the loan, and it would not be a gratuitous loan. This rule had to be observed especially in cases where the animals were rented out for a fee, since in such cases the lender received a set fee for the use of the animals. Hence, the lender was not to get anything extra by way of restitution for the animals—unless there was negligence on the part of the one entrusted with the animals. On the other hand, if the animals were not rented out for a fee, then the lender could have a just claim for at least as much compensation as the use of the dead or injured animal could have been rented out for.

Reply to objection 5: The difference between something that is lent (*mutuum*) and something that is deposited for safekeeping (*depositum*) is that what is lent is handed over for the benefit of the one to whom it is lent, whereas what is deposited for safekeeping is handed over for the benefit of the one who deposits it. And so in certain cases one was more constrained to give back what had been lent than to give back what had been deposited for safekeeping.

What was deposited for safekeeping could be lost in two ways.

First, through an *unavoidable* (i.e., natural) cause, as when an animal deposited for safekeeping died or was disabled, or through an *extrinsic* cause, as when an animal deposited for safekeeping was captured by enemy forces or was eaten by a beast. In this last case, however, one was obliged to return the remains of the slain animal to its owner, whereas in the previous cases one was not obliged to return anything, but was obliged only to take an oath in order to clear away any suspicion of fraud.

The second way in which something deposited for safekeeping could be lost was through an *avoidable* cause, viz., theft. In such a case the guardian was obliged to make restitution if the theft occurred because of negligence on his part. However, as has been explained, one who received an animal on loan was obliged to make restitution even if the animal died or was disabled in his absence. For it took a lesser degree of negligence to make a borrower liable than someone holding a thing in safekeeping, who was liable only in the case of theft.

Reply to objection 6: Laborers who sell their services are poor and seek their daily sustenance by their labors. And so the Law was provident in prescribing that a wage laborer should be paid immediately, lest he fall short of food. By contrast, those who rent out other items tend to be well-off, and they do not need the rental fee for their daily sustenance. Thus, the arguments in the two cases are not parallel.

Reply to objection 7: Judges are appointed among men to clear up possible ambiguities concerning justice among men.

Now there are two ways in which a matter can be ambiguous:

First, it can be ambiguous *to ordinary people* (*apud simplices*). And to remove this sort of doubt,

Deuteronomy 16:18 mandates that judges and magistrates should be appointed for each tribe in order to judge the people with just judgments.

In the second way, something can be doubtful *even to the experts* (*apud peritos*). And so to remove this sort of doubt, the Law prescribed that everyone should return to the principal place which had been chosen by God and in which resided both (a) the *high priest*, who was to clear up doubts concerning the ceremonies of divine worship, and (b) the *high judge* of the people, who was to clear up things relevant to judicial matters among men—just as even in our own time cases are sent from lower judges to higher judges because of appeals (*per appellationem*) or for consultation (*per consultationem*). Hence, Deuteronomy 17:8-9 says, “If you notice among you a difficult and ambiguous judgment and you see that the words of the judges within your gates vary among themselves, then go up to the place that the Lord chooses and you will come to the priests of the Levite race and to the one who is judge at that time.” Still, doubtful judicial matters of this sort did not come up very often, and so the people were not burdened because of this.

Reply to objection 8: In human affairs there can be no demonstrative and infallible proofs; rather, what suffices is conjectural probability of the sort that rhetoricians use for persuasion. And so even if it is possible for two or three witnesses to agree in a lie, it is nonetheless not easy for them to conspire in this way or likely that they will do it. And so their testimony is accepted as the truth—especially if they do not vacillate in their testimony or come under suspicion in other ways. Moreover, in order that it might not be easy for witnesses to deviate from the truth, the Law prescribed that witnesses should be examined with extreme care and severely punished when caught in a lie (Deuteronomy 19:16).

However, there was a reason for specifying this number of witness, viz., to signify the infallible truthfulness of the divine persons, who are sometimes numbered as two, with the Holy Spirit as the link between them, and sometimes expressed as three—as Augustine points out in commenting on John 8:17 (“In your Law it is written that the testimony of two men is true”).

Reply to objection 9: Severe punishment is imposed not only because of the seriousness of a fault but for other reasons as well:

First, because of the quantity of the sin, since, all other things being equal, the more quantity a sin has, the more severe is the punishment due for it.

Second, because of the sin’s degree of habituation, since men are not easily drawn away from habitual sins except through severe punishments.

Third, because of a high degree of concupiscence or pleasure associated with the sin, since men are not easily drawn away from such sins except through severe punishments.

Fourth, because of the ease with which the sin was committed and the ease of hiding the sin, since when sins of this sort are made public, they should be more severely punished in order to instill fear in others.

As far as the quantity of a sin is concerned, there are four degrees to be noted, even with respect to one and the same deed:

The first occurs when someone commits a sin *involuntarily*. For in such a case, if he acts altogether involuntarily, he is totally exempt from punishment. For instance, Deuteronomy 22:25 says that a girl who is assaulted in the fields is not liable to death, since “she cried out and no one was there to help her.” On the other hand, if someone commits a sin that is in some sense voluntary but he sins out of weakness—as, for instance, when someone sins from passion—then the sin is lessened and the punishment should be lessened to the degree that this judgment about it is true. A possible exception occurs when, for the sake of the common welfare, the punishment, as explained above, is made more severe in order to deter men from sins of this sort.

The second degree of sin occurred when someone sinned *through ignorance*. In such a case guilt was in some way assigned because of the sinner’s negligence in finding something out. Yet instead of

being punished through the mediation of the judges, the sinner expiated his own sin through sacrifices; hence, Leviticus 4:2 says, “The soul that sins through ignorance”. However, this should be understood to mean ignorance of a fact and not ignorance of a divine precept, which everyone was expected to know.

The third grade of sin occurred when someone sinned *out of pride*, i.e., out of a fixed choice or out of fixed malice. In such a case he was punished in proportion to the quantity of his crime (*delictum*).

The fourth grade of sin occurred when someone sinned *through impudence* (*protervia*) and *obstinance* (*pertinacia*). In such a case, as a rebel and destroyer of the Law’s ordinance, he was to be wholly destroyed (*omnino occidendus erat*).

Accordingly, the reply to the objection is that in punishing theft, the Law took into consideration the frequency with which something could happen. So for the theft of things that could easily be guarded from thieves, the thief was to make twofold restitution. On the other hand, since sheep grazed in the fields, they could not be easily guarded from theft, and so it happened that sheep were very often taken by theft. Hence, the Law imposed a greater punishment, viz., that four sheep were to be given over for every one stolen. Again, oxen are even more difficult to guard, since they are kept in the fields and they do not graze in herds like sheep do. And so the Law imposed a still greater punishment in their case, viz., that five oxen were to be given back for every one stolen. (I mean this except for times when the same animal was found alive with the thief, in which case the restitution was only twofold, as with other thefts; for there could have been a presumption that the thief was thinking about returning the ox and that this is why he had preserved its life.)

An alternative reply, in accord with a Gloss [on Exodus 22:1], is that an ox has five uses—viz., being sacrificed, plowing, being eaten, giving milk, and providing a hide with many uses—and that this is why five oxen were given back for every one stolen. A sheep, on the other hand, has four uses—viz., being sacrificed, being eaten, giving milk, and providing wool.

Now an unruly son was put to death not because he ate and drank, but because of his contumaciousness and rebellious spirit, which were always punished by death, as was explained above.

On the other hand, someone who gathered wood on the Sabbath was stoned as a violator of the Law, which, as was explained above (q. 100, a. 5), prescribed that the Sabbath should be observed in order to call to mind one’s faith in the creation of the world. Thus, he was put to death as one who was unfaithful (*tamquam infidelis*).

Reply to objection 10: The Old Law imposed the death penalty in the case of very serious crimes, viz., sins against God, homicide, kidnapping (*furtum hominum*), disrespect for parents, adultery, and incest. For the theft of other things [besides human beings], the Law imposed fines as punishment. For striking or mutilating someone it imposed the punishment of retaliation, and likewise for the sin of false testimony. In the case of other lesser sins, the Law imposed the punishment of scourging or public disgrace.

Now the Law did impose servitude as a punishment in two cases. The first was when, during the seventh year of remission, someone who was a servant refused to take advantage of the Law in order to depart as a free man. In such a case, the punishment imposed on him was that he would remain a servant in perpetuity. Second, servitude was imposed on a thief when he was unable to make restitution (see Exodus 22:3).

However, the Law did not prescribe absolute exile as a punishment. For it was only among this people that God was worshiped, whereas all the other peoples had been corrupted by idolatry. Hence, if someone were absolutely excluded from this people, it would be an occasion of idolatry for him. And so 1 Kings 26:19 reports that David said to Saul, “They are cursed in the sight of the Lord who have cast me out this day, so that I might not dwell in the inheritance of the Lord, saying: ‘Go, serve strange gods’.”

Still, there was a certain limited exile (*particulare exilium*). For Deuteronomy 19:4 says that if

someone struck down his neighbor unknowingly and was proved to have had no hatred against him, then he was to flee to one of the cities of refuge and remain there until the death of the high priest. He was allowed to return to his home at that time because in the face of a general loss for the whole people, particular grievances were normally put to rest, and so those close to the dead man were less likely to kill the man in question.

Reply to objection 11: It was commanded that brute animals should be killed not because of any fault on their part, but as a punishment for their owners, who had not safeguarded the animals from sins of the sort in question. And so an owner was punished more if his ox had already gored people yesterday and the day before, in which case the present danger could have been obviated, than if the ox gored someone all of a sudden.

An alternative reply is that the animals were killed out of hatred for the sin and in order that men should not be struck with terror upon seeing those animals.

Reply to objection 12: As Rabbi Moses points out, the literal reason for the precept in question was that the killer was often from a neighboring city. Hence, the killing of the heifer was done to investigate the unsolved homicide (*homicidium occultum*). This was accomplished in three ways: (a) first, the elders of the city swore that they would overlook nothing in guarding their highways; (b) second, the owner of the heifer suffered a loss when the animal was killed, and if the murder was cleared up first, then the animal would not be killed; (c) third, the place where the heifer was killed remained uncultivated. And so, in order to avoid losses of both sorts, the men of the city would be quick to make the murderer known if they knew who he was, and it would rarely happen that no talk or opinions were voiced about the matter.

An alternative reply is that this was done to instill terror, out of hatred for homicide. For the killing of a heifer, which is a useful animal and very strong—especially a heifer that had not yet labored under the yoke—signified that (a) even if the one who had committed the murder was himself useful and strong, he should nonetheless be killed, and that (b) he should die a cruel death, which was signified by cutting the animal's head off, and that (c) he should be cut off from human society as someone vile and contemptible, which was signified by the fact that the heifer, once having been killed, was left in a wild and uncultivated place to rot away.

Now the mystical reason is that the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of Christ, which did not bear the yoke, since He never sinned. Nor did the heifer ever plow the ground, i.e., Christ never admitted of the stain of rebellion. Now the fact that the heifer was killed in an uncultivated valley signified the disgraceful death of Christ, through which all sins are washed away and through which the devil is shown to be the author of murder.

Article 3

Were appropriate judicial precepts given with respect to outsiders?

It seems that appropriate judicial precepts were not given with respect to outsiders (*extranei*):

Objection 1: In Acts 10:34-35 Peter says, "In truth I have come to see that God is not a respecter of persons, but, in every nation, whoever fears Him and does justice is acceptable to Him." But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the assembly of God (*ecclesia Dei*). Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 23:3 to command, "The Ammonites and the Moabites, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord forever," while, on the contrary, in the very same place Deuteronomy 23:7 commands with respect to certain of the nations, "You shall not hate the Edomite, because he is your brother, or the Egyptian, because you were an alien in his land."

Objection 2: What is not within our power is not deserving of punishment. But that a man is a eunuch, or that he was born of a prostitute, is not within his power. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 23:1-2 to command, “The eunuch and he who was born of a prostitute shall not enter the assembly of the Lord.”

Objection 3: The Old Law mercifully prescribed that aliens were not to be persecuted; for Exodus 22:21 says, “You shall not molest the alien or persecute him; for you yourselves were likewise aliens in the land of Egypt,” and Exodus 23:9 says, “You shall not make trouble for the alien, for you know the souls of aliens, because you were likewise aliens in the land of Egypt.” Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 23:19 to permit them to lend money to aliens at a usurious rate.

Objection 4: Men are much closer to us than trees are. But the closer something is to us, the more we ought to show it the affection of love and the effects of love—this according to Ecclesiasticus 13:19 (“Every beast loves what is like it; so every man likewise loves what is closest to himself.”) Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Lord to command in Deuteronomy 20:5-7 that they were to slay everyone in the captured enemy cities, and yet were not to cut down the fruit trees.

Objection 5: Everyone should, in accord with virtue, prefer the common good to his own private good. But in a war conducted against enemies, it is the common good that is sought. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 20:5-7 to prescribe that when battle was imminent, certain men were to be left at home—for instance, whoever had just built a new house, whoever had planted vines, and whoever had just betrothed a wife.

Objection 6: No one ought to profit (*commodum reportare*) from his own faults. But it is a man’s own fault that he is fearful and fainthearted, since this is contrary to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the fearful and fainthearted to be excused from the hardships of battle.

But contrary to this: In Proverbs 8:8 Divine Wisdom says, “All my words are just, there is nothing wicked or perverse in them.”

I respond: The relations of men with outsiders can be of two types, viz., *peaceful* and *hostile*. And the Law contained appropriate precepts in directing both types.

There are three ways in which the Jews had occasion to have *peaceful* relations with outsiders:

The first was when outsiders passed through their territory as travelers. The second way was when they came to their land to live as aliens. And with respect to these two ways, Exodus 22:21 says, “You shall not make trouble for the alien,” and Exodus 23:9 says, “You shall not molest the traveler.”

The third way was when outsiders wished to be admitted fully into their fellowship and rites. And a certain order was followed in such cases. For they were not immediately received as citizens—just as, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 3, in certain nations it was prescribed that no one would be counted as a citizen except those whose grandparents or great-grandparents had been citizens. The reason for this is that if outsiders, upon arriving, were immediately admitted into deliberations about matters pertaining to the people, many dangers could arise. For instance, outsiders, not yet having a firm love for the public good, might strive for certain goals in opposition to the people. And so the Law prescribed that those from nations that had some connection with the Jews—viz., the Egyptians, among whom they had been born and raised, and the Edomites, who were the children of Esau, the brother of Jacob—would be received into the fellowship of the people in the third generation. By contrast, others, since they were from nations that had maintained hostile relations with the Jews, e.g., the Ammonites and Moabites, would never be admitted into the fellowship of the people, whereas the Amalekites, who had been even more hostile to them and had no blood relations with them, would be counted as perpetual enemies. For Exodus 17:16 says, “God will war against Amalek from generation to generation.”

As for *hostile* relations with outsiders, the Law likewise handed down appropriate precepts.

First, it established that war should be justly undertaken; for instance, Deuteronomy 20:10

prescribes that when they go out to attack a city, they should first make an offer of peace.

Second, the Law prescribed that they should courageously fight the war once it had been undertaken, putting their trust in God. And to make sure that this precept would be observed in the best way, the Law prescribed that when battle was imminent, a priest should strengthen them by promising them God's help.

Third, the Law commanded that impediments to battle should be removed by leaving at home certain men who could present problems.

Fourth, the Law prescribed that they should moderate the advantage of victory by sparing the women and children and also by not cutting down the fruit trees of the region.

Reply to objection 1: The Law did not exclude the men of any nation from the worship of God and from what pertains to the salvation of the soul. For Exodus 12:48 says, "If an alien wants to dwell with you and to keep the Passover of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then he shall celebrate the rite in the prescribed manner, and he shall be as one born in the land."

However, in temporal matters, not everyone was immediately admitted into the common life of the people, and this for the reason explained above. Rather, some, viz., the Egyptians and the Edomites, were admitted in the third generation, whereas others were permanently excluded out of hatred for their past sins, e.g., the Moabites, Ammonites, and Amalekites. For just as one man is punished for a sin he has committed in order that others who see this might be afraid and refrain from sinning, so too a nation or city can be punished for some sin in order that other nations and cities might refrain from a similar sin.

However, it was possible, in light of some act of virtue, that someone should be admitted by dispensation into the fellowship of the people. For instance, Judith 14:6ff. says that Achior, the leader of the children of Ammon, "was joined to the people of Israel, and all of his descendants." And the same is true of the Moabite Ruth, who was a woman of virtue. (Still, one could reply here that the prohibition in question extended only to men and not to women, who were not citizens absolutely speaking.)

Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 3, there are two ways in which someone is said to be a citizen, viz., (a) absolutely speaking and (b) in a qualified sense.

A citizen absolutely speaking is one who is able to do those things that properly belong to citizens, e.g., to voice his views or make judgments (*dare consilium vel iudicium*) in the assembly of the people.

On the other hand, a citizen in the qualified sense is someone who lives in the city, including lowly people (*viles personae*) and children and the aged, who are not fit to have power in matters pertaining to the common welfare.

Thus, bastards, because of their lowly origin, were excluded from the assembly, i.e., from the tribunal of the people (*collegium populi*), up to the tenth generation.

The same was true of eunuchs, who were unable to have the honor that is owed to fathers—and especially within the people of the Jews, among whom the worship of God was preserved by carnal generation. For as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 2, even among the Gentiles those who had begotten many sons were given special honor. However, as regards the things having to do with God's grace, eunuchs were not separated off from the others—just as, in the way explained above, outsiders were not separated off, either. For Isaiah 56:3 says, "Let not the son of the outsider that adheres to the Lord speak, saying, 'The Lord will divide and separate me from His people.' And let not the eunuch say, 'Behold, I am a dry tree'."

Reply to objection 3: It was not the Law's intention that usurious interest should be taken from outsiders; rather, the Law permitted this, as it were, because of the Jews' inclination toward greed and in order that they might relate more peaceably to the outsiders from whom they were making a profit.

Reply to objection 4: A distinction must be drawn with respect to the citizens of enemy lands.

Some of them lived far away and did not belong to those cities that had been promised to the Jews; and in these cities, once conquered, the men who had fought against the people of God were slain,

whereas the women and children (*infantes*) were spared.

However, in the nearby cities, which had been promised to them, the command was that everyone should be killed because of their prior iniquities, and it was to punish those iniquities that the Lord sent the people of Israel as the executioners of divine justice. For Deuteronomy 9:5 says, “Because they have acted wickedly, they are destroyed at your coming.”

Now it was commanded that the fruit trees be spared because of their usefulness to that people to whose rule the city and its territory were to be subject.

Reply to objection 5: There were two reasons why those who had built new houses, planted new vines, or betrothed a wife were exempted from battle.

The first is that the things a man has just acquired or is just about to acquire are such that he normally loves them more and, as a result, is fearful of losing them. Hence, it was likely that because of this love such men would fear death more and so would fight less courageously.

The second reason is that, as the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2, “It seems to be a misfortune, when one is close to acquiring some good, if he is afterwards prevented from doing so.” And so in order that the close survivors would not be more upset by the death of these men who had not gotten to possess the goods awaiting them, and in order that the people would likewise not be horrified, men of this sort were sequestered from the danger of death by being removed from battle.

Reply to objection 6: The fearful were left at home not in order that they themselves might thereby have an advantage, but in order that the people might not suffer a disadvantage from their presence. For because of their fearfulness and their taking flight others might likewise be incited to become fearful and take flight.

Article 4

Did the Old Law issue appropriate precepts with respect to household members?

It seems that the Old Law did not issue appropriate precepts with respect to household members (*circa domesticas personas*):

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, a servant, in everything he is, belongs to his master. But what belongs to someone is owed to him perpetually. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Exodus 21:2 to command that servants should go free in the seventh year.

Objection 2: Just as an animal, like a donkey or an ox, is a possession of its owner, so too with his servant. But Deuteronomy 22:1-3 prescribes that animals are to be returned to their owners if they are discovered after having gone astray. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Deuteronomy 23:15 to command, “You shall not hand over a servant to his master if he flees to you.”

Objection 3: Divine law ought to move one toward mercy even more than human law does. But under human law someone who treats his male or female servants with excessive harshness is severely punished. Now the harshest treatment seems to be that which results in death. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Exodus 21:20-21 to mandate, “If someone beats his male or female servant with a rod and the servant survives for a day then he shall not be subject to punishment, since the money belongs to him.”

Objection 4: As *Politics* 1 and 3 say, the rule of a master over his servant is different from the rule of a father over his child. But it pertains to the rule of a master over his servant that the master is allowed to sell his male or female servant. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Law to permit someone to sell his daughter as a handmaid or servant.

Objection 5: A father has power over his son. But one who has power over a sinner is in a position to punish him. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 21:19 to prescribe that a father should take his son to the elders of the city to be punished.

Objection 6: In Deuteronomy 7:3 the Lord prohibited them from making marriages with aliens; and as is clear from Esdra 10, He commanded that marriages with aliens that had already been contracted should be dissolved. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 21:10 to permit them to take women captured from alien nations as their wives.

Objection 7: As is clear from Leviticus 18, the Lord commanded that certain degrees of consanguinity and kinship were to be avoided in the making of marriages. Therefore, it was inappropriate for Deuteronomy 25:5 to command that if a man died without children, then his brother should marry his wife.

Objection 8: Just as there ought to be the greatest degree of familiarity between man and wife, so too there should be the firmest trust. But this cannot be if marriage is dissoluble. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the Lord to permit a man to dismiss his wife with a written decree of divorce (*repudium*) and to prescribe further that he could not take her back as his wife again (Deuteronomy 24).

Objection 9: Just as a wife can break trust with her husband, so too a servant can break trust with his master, and a son with his father. But no sacrifice was instituted in the Law as part of the investigation of a servant's harming his master or of a son's harming his father. Therefore, it seems superfluous for the Law to have established, in Numbers 5, a "sacrifice of jealousy" to investigate a wife's adultery.

Therefore, it seems that the Law did not issue appropriate precepts for household members.

But contrary to this: Psalm 18:10 says, "The judgments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves."

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, the relation of household members with one another has to do with daily actions that are ordered toward the necessities of life. Now the life of man is preserved in two ways.

First, it is preserved in the *individual*, viz., insofar as numerically the same man remains alive. In the preservation of life in this sense a man is assisted by exterior goods on the basis of which he has food, clothing, and other things of this sort that are necessary for life. And a man needs servants to administer these goods.

Second, the life of man is preserved in the *species* through generation, and for this a man needs a wife in order that he might generate children from her.

So, then, a domestic community involves three sorts of relations, viz., master to servant, man to wife, and father to children. And the Old Law issued appropriate precepts with respect to all of them.

As regards *servants*, the Law prescribed that they should be treated with moderation, both (a) with respect to their work, so that they were not to be burdened with too much work—and this is why Deuteronomy 5:14 says, "The Lord commanded that on the Sabbath day your male and female servants should rest, even as you do"—and also (b) with respect to the punishments imposed on them, so that the Law prescribed that those who mutilated their servants must let them go free (Exodus 21:26-27). The Law prescribed this same freedom in the case of a female servant whom someone took as his wife. Again, the Law specifically prescribed that servants who themselves were members of the Jewish people should be freed in the seventh year, along with everything they had brought with them, including their clothes (Exodus 21:2). In addition, Deuteronomy 15:13 prescribed that they be given provisions for their journey.

As regards *wives*, the Law contained prescriptions about taking a wife. Specifically, as Numbers 36:6 has it, the Law prescribed that they take wives from their own tribe—and this in order that the

shares of the tribes not be conflated with one another. Again, as Deuteronomy 25:5-6 has it, the Law prescribed that a man was to marry the wife of his brother who had died without children—and this in order that someone who could not have descendants according to carnal origin might at least have descendants by a sort of adoption, so that the memory of the dead man would not be totally erased. Again, the Law prohibited them from marrying certain persons, viz., (a) alien women, because of the danger of their being seduced [by alien ways of life], and (b) women who were close relatives, because of the natural reverence owed to them. The Law also prescribed how wives, once taken in marriage, should be treated. Specifically, as Deuteronomy 22 has it, the Law commanded that anyone who falsely accused his wife of a crime should be punished. Again, as Deuteronomy 21 has it, a child was not to suffer harm because of a husband's hatred for his wife. And, as is clear from Deuteronomy 24, a husband was not to persecute his wife because of his hatred for her, but instead he was to dismiss her with a written decree of divorce. Again, in order that even greater love should draw the spouses closer together from the beginning, the Law prescribed that when someone had recently taken a wife, no publicly necessary task should be enjoined on him, so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife.

As regards *children*, the Law prescribed that fathers should give their children discipline by instructing them in the faith. Hence, Exodus 12 says, "When your children ask you, 'What is this rite?', you are to say, 'It is the Passover of the Lord.'" Likewise, the Law prescribed that they should instruct their children in morals. Hence, according to Deuteronomy 21:20, fathers had to say [to the elders], "He dislikes hearing our warnings; he gives himself over to revelry and debauchery."

Reply to objection 1: Since the children of Israel had been freed by the Lord from servitude and had thereby been assigned to serve God, the Lord did not want them to be servants in perpetuity. Hence, Leviticus 25:39 says, "If your brother, constrained by poverty, sells himself to you, you shall not oppress him with the service of servants, but he shall be like a wage laborer and a migrant worker. For they are my servants, and I brought them out of the land of Egypt. Let them not be sold as servants." And so since they were not servants absolutely speaking, they were to be let free.

Reply to objection 2: This commandment should be understood to be speaking of a servant whose master is seeking to kill him or to enlist his help in some sin.

Reply to objection 3: As far as injuries (*laesiones*) inflicted on servants are concerned, the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether or not it was certain [that the injury had resulted from the beating].

If it was certain, then the Law applied a penalty. More specifically, the prescribed penalty for mutilation was the loss of the servant, who was to be granted his freedom, whereas the prescribed penalty for death was that of a murderer, in cases where the servant died while being beaten at the hand of his master.

On the other hand, if it was not certain but had some appearance of being so (*aliquam apparentiam haberet*), then the Law did not impose a punishment in the case of one's own servant, e.g., when the beaten servant did not die immediately, but after a few days. For in that case it was uncertain whether or not he had died from the beating. For if his master had beaten a free man in such a way that the latter did not die immediately but "walked around again with the help of his staff" (Exodus 21:19), then he would not be guilty of homicide, even if the man died afterwards. Still, the master was obligated to assume the expenses which the beaten servant had paid to the doctors. However, this did not apply in the case of a master's own servant, since whatever the servant had—even the very person of the servant—was, as it were, the master's possession. And the reason given for his not being subject to a fine was that the servant's money belonged to him.

Reply to objection 4: As has been explained, no Jew could possess another Jew as a servant absolutely speaking; rather, he was a servant in a qualified sense—something like a wage laborer—for a certain period of time. And it is in this sense that the Law permitted someone, under the duress of

poverty, to sell his son or his daughter. This is also shown by the very wording of the Law, which says, “If a man sells his daughter as a servant, she shall not go forth as the handmaids are wont to” (Exodus 21:7). In this same way, a man was able to sell not only his child but even himself, more as a wage laborer than as a servant—this according to Leviticus 25:39-40 (“If, compelled by poverty, your brother sells himself to you, you shall not oppress him with the servitude of servants, but he will be like a wage laborer or migrant worker.”)

Reply to objection 5: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, a father’s authority extends only to the power to admonish, and he does not have the sort of coercive power by which someone rebellious and stubborn can be constrained. And so in this case the Law commanded that a stubborn child should be punished by the rulers of the city.

Reply to objection 6: The Lord prohibited them from taking foreign women in marriage because of the danger of seduction, i.e., lest they be led into idolatry. And He prohibited this especially with regard to women from those nations that lived close by, where they would be more likely to retain their own rites.

On the other hand, if the woman was willing to abandon idolatrous worship and to make the transition to worship under the Law, then she could be taken in marriage—as is clear from the case of Ruth, whom Boaz took in marriage. Hence, in Ruth 1:16 she had said to her mother-in-law, “Your people will be my people, and your God my God.” And so it was permitted to take a captive women in marriage only if she first shaved off her hair, cut her nails, cast off the clothes in which she had been captured, and mourned for her father and mother—all of which signified the everlasting rejection of idolatry.

Reply to objection 7: As Chrysostom says in *Super Matthaëum*, “Because death was an unmitigated evil among the Jews, who did everything with a view to the present life, the Law prescribed that children should be born to the dead man through his brother, and this constituted a certain mitigation of death. However, no one other than his brother or a close relative was ordered to marry the wife of the dead man, since otherwise a child who was to be born from this union would not be regarded as the son of the man who had died. Moreover, an outsider would not be obliged, in the way a brother would be, to sustain the household of the man who had died. For it was a just thing for the brother to do this because of his relationship with the dead man.”

From this it is clear that in taking his brother’s wife as his own, he was acting in the place of his dead brother.

Reply to objection 8: The Law permitted divorcing one’s wife not because this was just absolutely speaking, but because of the Jews’ hardness of heart, as our Lord said in Matthew 19:8. We will have to talk about this more fully when we deal with the sacrament of Matrimony.

Reply to objection 9: Wives break the trust of matrimony through adultery, and they do it both easily, because of the pleasure, and covertly, because, as Job 24:15 says, “The eye of the adulterer observes darkness.”

However, it is not the case that a similar explanation holds for the case of a son with respect to his father or a servant with respect to his master. For unfaithfulness of this latter sort proceeds not from a desire for pleasure but rather from malice. Nor can it remain hidden in the way that the infidelity of an adulterous woman does.

QUESTION 106

The Law of the Gospel, Called the New Law, in Itself

Next we have to consider the Law of the Gospel, which is called the New Law. First, we will consider it in itself (question 106). Second, we will consider it in relation to the Old Law (question 107). Third, we will consider the things contained in the New Law (question 108).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) What sort of law is it? More specifically, is it a written law or an infused law? (2) As to its power, does it confer justification? (3) As to its beginning, should it have been given from the beginning of the world? (4) As to its end, will it last until the end, or should another law succeed it?

Article 1

Is the New Law a written law?

It seems that the New Law is a written law:

Objection 1: The New Law is the Gospel itself. But the Gospel has been written down; for John 20:31 says, “These things have been written in order that you might believe.” Therefore, the New Law is a written law.

Objection 2: An instilled law (*lex indita*) is a law of nature—this according to Romans 2:14-15 (“They do by nature what belongs to the law ... They have the work of the law written in their hearts”). Therefore, if the Law of the Gospel were an instilled law, then it would not differ from the law of nature.

Objection 3: The Law of the Gospel belongs only to those who are in the status of the New Covenant. But an instilled law is common both to those in the status of the New Covenant and to those in the status of the Old Covenant; for Wisdom 7:27 says that divine wisdom “conveys herself throughout the nations into holy souls, and she establishes the friends of God and the prophets.” Therefore, the New Law is not an instilled law.

But contrary to this: The New Law is the Law of the New Covenant. But the Law of the New Covenant is instilled in the heart. For in Hebrews 8:8-10 the Apostle, citing the authority of Jeremiah 31:31-33 (“Behold the days shall come, says the Lord, and I will consummate a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah ...”), goes on to explain what this covenant is in the following words: “This is the covenant I will make with the house of Israel by putting my laws in their minds, and I will write my laws in their heart.” Therefore, the New Law is an instilled law.

I respond: As the Philosopher puts it in *Ethics* 9, “Each thing seems to be that which is most prominent in it.” But that which is most prominent in the Law of the New Covenant and in which its power consists is the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is given through faith in Christ. And so the New Law is in the first instance the very grace of the Holy Spirit that is given to those who believe in Christ (*datur Christi fidelibus*).

This is manifestly apparent from the Apostle, who in Romans 3:27 says, “Where, then, is your boasting? It is excluded. By what law? The law of works? No, but by the law of faith.” For he calls the very grace of faith a law. And in Romans 8:2 he says even more clearly, “The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed me from the Law of sin and death.” Thus, in *De Spiritu et Littera* Augustine says, “Just as the Law of works was written on tablets of stone, so the Law of faith has been written in the hearts of the faithful.” And elsewhere in the same book he says, “What else are the laws of God written by God in our hearts than the very presence of the Holy Spirit?”

Still, the New Law contains certain elements that *dispose* us toward the grace of the Holy Spirit and certain elements that have to do with the *use* of that grace. These elements are, as it were, secondary

aspects of the New Law, about which those who believe in Christ have to be instructed, through both the spoken word and the written word, regarding what they ought to believe and what they ought to do. And so one should reply that the New Law is in the first instance an instilled law, but that, secondarily, it is a written law.

Reply to objection 1: The Scriptures of the Gospel contain only things that pertain to the grace of the Holy Spirit, either in the sense that they dispose us toward that grace or in the sense that they direct us in the use of that grace.

In order to dispose our understanding through the faith by which the grace of the Holy Spirit is given, the Gospel contains things that involve the manifestation of either Christ's divinity or His humanity. Again, in order to dispose our affections, the Gospel contains things which involve that hatred of the world through which a man comes to have a capacity for the grace of the Holy Spirit. For as John 14:17 says, "The world [read: lovers of the world] cannot take in (*capere*) the Holy Spirit."

On the other hand, the use of spiritual grace occurs in the works of the virtues, which the Scriptures of the New Testament exhort men to in many ways.

Reply to objection 2: There are two senses in which something is instilled (*inditum*) into a man.

The first sense has to do with human nature, and it is in this sense that the natural law is a law which is instilled in a man.

In the second sense, what is instilled in a man is, as it were, something added to his nature through the gift of grace. And this is the sense in which the New Law is instilled in a man, not only pointing out what is to be done, but also helping him to do it.

Reply to objection 3: No one has ever had the grace of the Holy Spirit except through explicit or implicit faith in Christ. But it is through faith in Christ that a man belongs to the New Covenant. Hence, if anyone has had the Law of grace instilled in him, then he thereby belonged to the New Covenant.

Article 2

Does the New Law confer justification?

It seems that the New Law does not confer justification:

Objection 1: No one is justified unless he obeys God's law—this according to Hebrews 5:9 ("He, viz., Christ, has become to all who obey Him the cause of eternal salvation"). But the Gospel does not always bring it about that men obey it; for Romans 10:16 says, "Not everyone obeys the Gospel." Therefore, the New Law does not confer justification.

Objection 2: In Romans the Apostle proves that the Old Law did not confer justification from the fact that after it came, transgression increased; for Romans 4:15 says, "The Law makes for wrath, since where there is no law, there is no transgression, either." But the New Law increases transgression even more, since one who continues to sin after the New Law has been given is deserving of even more punishment—this according to Hebrews 10:28-29 ("One who invalidates the Law of Moses dies without any mercy at the word of two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, does he who tramples upon the Son of God deserve worse punishments?"). Therefore, the New Law, like the Old Law, fails to confer justification.

Objection 3: Conferring justification is an effect that belongs properly to God—this according to Romans 8:33 ("It is God who confers justification"). But the Old Law was from God, just as the New Law is. Therefore, the New Law does not confer justification any more than the Old Law did.

But contrary to this: In Romans 1:16 the Apostle says, "I am not ashamed of the Gospel, since it

is the power of God for the salvation of all who believe.” But salvation comes only to those on whom justification has been conferred. Therefore, the Law of the Gospel confers justification.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), there are two elements involved in the New Law.

The first, and principal, element is the very grace of the Holy Spirit, which is given inwardly. And on this score, the New Law confers justification. Hence, in *De Spiritu et Littera* Augustine says, “There, viz., under the Old Covenant, a Law is posited outwardly by which the unjust are made fearful, whereas here, viz., in the New Covenant, a Law is given inwardly by which the unjust are justified.”

The other element involves the Law of the Gospel in a secondary way, viz., the documents of the faith and the precepts that direct human affections and human actions. On this score, the New Law does not confer justification. Hence, in 2 Corinthians 3:6 the Apostle says, “The letter kills, but the spirit gives life.” In *De Spiritu et Littera* Augustine explains that by ‘the letter’ is meant any writing that exists exterior to men, even the writing of the moral precepts contained in the Gospel. Hence, even the letter of the Gospel kills unless the healing grace of faith is inwardly present.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through in the case of the New Law not with respect to what is primary in it, but with respect to what is secondary in it, viz., the documents and precepts that are proposed to man exteriorly either by the spoken word or by the written word.

Reply to objection 2: Even if the grace of the New Covenant helps a man not to sin, it nonetheless does not confirm a man in the good, so that he is unable to sin. For this belongs to the state of glory. And so if anyone sins after having received the grace of the New Covenant, he deserves a greater punishment because he is ungrateful for greater blessings and is not using the help that has been given to him. However, the New Law is not said to “work wrath” because of this, since the New Law of itself gives help that is sufficient for not sinning.

Reply to objection 3: The one God gave both the New Law and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law as written on stone tablets, whereas He gave the New Law as written on “the fleshy tablets of the heart,” as the Apostle puts it in 2 Corinthians 3:3. Furthermore, as Augustine says in *De Spiritu et Littera*, “The Apostle calls *that* letter, written outside of man, both a ministration of death and a ministration of damnation. *This* letter, however, viz., the Law of the New Covenant, he calls a ministration of the Spirit and a ministration of justification, since it is through the gift of the Spirit that we work justice and are freed from the damnation of transgression.”

Article 3

Should the New Law have been given from the beginning?

It seems that the New Law should have been given from the beginning:

Objection 1: As Romans 2:11 says, “There is no respecting of persons with God.” But as Romans 3:23 says, “All men have sinned and need the glory of God.” Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that all might have been helped by it.

Objection 2: Just as different men live in different places, so too they live at different times. But God—who, as 1 Timothy 2:4 says, wills all men to be saved—commanded that the Gospel should be preached in all places, as is clear from Matthew 28:19 and Mark 16:15. Therefore, the Law of the Gospel should have been present at all times, with the result that it should have been given from the beginning of the world.

Objection 3: Spiritual salvation, which is eternal, is more necessary for man than is corporeal salvation, which is temporal. But as is clear from Genesis 1, from the beginning of the world God

provided man with those things necessary for corporeal salvation by giving him power over all the things that had been created for the sake of man. Therefore, the New Law, which is especially necessary for spiritual salvation, should have been given to man from the beginning of the world.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 15:46 the Apostle says, “That which is spiritual was not first, but instead that which is animal.” But the New Law is more spiritual than anything else is. Therefore, the New Law should not have been given from the beginning of the world.

I respond: Three reasons can be cited for why the New Law should not have been given from the beginning of the world.

The first is that, as has been explained (a. 1), the New Law is in the first instance the grace of the Holy Spirit, which could not have been given in abundance until the obstacle of sin had been removed from the human race by the consummation of redemption through Christ. Hence, John 7:39 says, “The Spirit had not yet been given, because Jesus had not yet been glorified.” And this is the reason clearly stated by the Apostle in Romans 8, where, after having begun by talking about the “law of the Spirit of life,” he added, “God, in sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for the sake of sin, condemned sin in the flesh in order that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.”

The second reason that can be given is based on the perfection of the New Law. For a thing is not brought to perfection immediately from the beginning; rather, it is brought to perfection with a certain temporal order of succession, in the way that someone is first a boy and later a man. The Apostle cites this reason in Galatians 3:24-25: “The Law was our teacher in Christ, in order that we might be justified by faith. But when faith arrives, we are no longer under the teacher.”

The third reason is based on the fact that the New Law is a law of grace, and so it was first required that man should be left to himself in the state of the Old Law, in order that, falling into sin and seeing his own weakness, he might recognize that he needed grace. It is this reason that the Apostle cites in Romans 5:20, where he says, “The Law entered in so that sin might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did more abound.”

Reply to objection 1: Because of the sin of its first parent, the human race deserved to be deprived of the assistance of grace. And so as Augustine says in *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, “If grace is not given to someone, this is out of justice, whereas if grace is given to someone, this is out of mercy (*ex gratia*).” Hence, the fact that God did not confer the Law of grace on everyone from the beginning of the world does not involve His being a respecter of persons. For as has been explained, grace had to be conferred in due order.

Reply to objection 2: A diversity of locations does not change the status of the human race; rather, this status varies through temporal succession. And so the New Law is proposed to all locations, but not at all times, even though, as was explained above (a. 1, ad 3), at every time there have been some who belong to the New Covenant.

Reply to objection 3: Things having to do with corporeal salvation aid man with respect to his nature, which is not destroyed through sin. By contrast, things having to do with spiritual salvation are ordered toward grace, which is lost through sin. And so the arguments in the two cases are not parallel.

Article 4

Will the New Law last until the end of the world?

It seems that the New Law will not last until the end of the world:

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 13:10 the Apostle says, “When that which is complete (*perfectum*)

has come, then that which is partial will be done away with.” But the New Law is partial (*ex parte*); for in the same place the Apostle says, “We know in part, and we prophesy in part.” Therefore, the New Law will have to be done away with when another, more complete, state succeeds it.

Objection 2: In John 16:13 our Lord promised His disciples that they would know “all truth” at the coming of the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete. But the Church does not yet know all truth within the state of the New Covenant. Therefore, another state is to be expected in which all truth will be manifested through the Holy Spirit.

Objection 3: Just as the Father is other than (*alius a*) than the Son, and the Son is other than the Father, so too the Holy Spirit is other than the Father and the Son. But there was a status corresponding to the person of the Father, viz., the status of the Old Law, in which men tended toward generating children. Similarly, there is likewise a status corresponding to the person of Son, viz., the status of the New Law, in which the leaders are clerics tending toward wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son. Therefore, there will be a third status of the Holy Spirit, in which spiritual men will lead.

Objection 4: In Matthew 24:14 our Lord says, “The Gospel of the kingdom will be preached in the whole world, and then the consummation will come.” But the Gospel of Christ has long since been preached in the whole world, and yet the consummation has not yet come. Therefore, the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom; rather, there will be another Gospel, the Gospel of the Holy Spirit—another Law, as it were.

But contrary to this: In Matthew 24:34 our Lord says, “I tell you that this generation will not pass away until all these things have been accomplished.” Chrysostom explains that this refers to “the generation of those who believe in Christ.” Therefore, the status of those who believe in Christ will remain until the consummation of the world.

I respond: There are two senses in which the status of the world can vary.

One sense corresponds to the differences among the *laws*. And in this sense there will be no other status succeeding the present status of the New Law. For the status of the New Law succeeded the status of the Old Law in the way that the more perfect succeeds the less perfect. But no status of the present life can be more perfect than the status of the New Law. For there can be nothing closer to the ultimate end than that which immediately leads up to the ultimate end. But this is what the New Law does; hence, in Hebrews 10:19-22 the Apostle says, “And so, brothers, having confidence in our entry into the Holy of Holies through the blood of Christ, a new way that He has opened for us ... let us draw near to Him.” Hence, there can be no more perfect state of the present life than the status of the New Law, since the more perfect a given thing is, the closer it is to the ultimate end.

Second, the status of *men* can vary in a way corresponding to the different ways in which men are related to the same law, be it a more perfect or a less perfect law. And in this sense the status of the Old Law changed quite often. For sometimes the laws were kept very well, whereas at other times they were completely ignored. In this sense, the status of the New Law varies as well in a way corresponding to different places and times and persons, insofar as the grace of the Holy Spirit is had in a more perfect or less perfect way by given individuals.

However, one should not expect there to be some future status in which the grace of the Holy Spirit is had in a more perfect way than it has been had up to now—especially by the apostles, who received the first fruits of the Spirit, i.e., who “received them first in time and more abundantly than others,” as a Gloss on Romans 8:23 puts it.

Reply to objection 1: As Dionysius says in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, there are three statuses: first, the status of the Old Law; second, the status of the New Law; the third status comes afterwards, not in this life, but in heaven (*in patria*). But just as the first status is figurative and imperfect with respect to the status of the Gospel, so too the latter status is figurative and imperfect with respect to the status of

heaven. When this last status arrives, the present status will be done away with, just as we read in the same place, “Now we see darkly through a mirror, then we shall see face to face.”

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine reports in *Contra Faustum*, Montanus and Priscilla claimed that our Lord’s promise to give the Holy Spirit was brought to fulfillment not in the apostles, but in themselves. Similarly, the Manicheans claimed that it was brought to fulfillment in Manes, whom they claimed to be the spirit Paraclete. And so in both cases they refused to accept the Acts of the Apostles, in which it is manifestly shown that this promise was brought to fulfillment in the apostles, just as our Lord promised them again in Acts 1:5 (“You shall be baptized in the Holy Spirit, not many days from now”) and which Acts 2 says was fulfilled.

But these falsehoods are ruled out by the fact that John 7:39 says, “The Spirit had not yet been given, because Jesus had not yet been glorified.” From this it is understood that the Holy Spirit was given immediately upon Christ’s being glorified in His resurrection and ascension. This also rules out the empty notions of anyone who claims that another era of the Holy Spirit is to be expected.

Now the Holy Spirit taught the apostles all truth concerning those things that are necessary for salvation (*quae pertinent ad necessitatem salutis*)—more specifically, what is to be believed and what is to be done. However, He did not teach them about all future events, since this was not relevant to them—this according to Acts 1:7 (“It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father has reserved for His own power.”)

Reply to objection 3: The Old Law belonged not only to the Father but also to the Son, since the Old Law was a figure of Christ. Hence, in John 5:46 our Lord says, “If you believed Moses, you would perhaps believe me as well, since he wrote about me.”

Similarly, the New Law belongs not only to Christ but also to the Holy Spirit—this according to Romans 8:2 (“The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,” and so on). Hence, another law which is a law of the Holy Spirit is not to be expected.

Reply to objection 4: Since it was at the very beginning of the preaching of the Gospel that Christ said, “The kingdom of heaven is at hand,” it would be utterly stupid to claim that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom.

However, there are two possible meanings of ‘the preaching of the Gospel of Christ’:

The first sense has to do with spreading the knowledge about Christ, and in this sense, as Chrysostom points out, the Gospel was preached in the whole world even during the time of the apostles. Accordingly, what is then added, viz., “... and then the consummation will come,” should be understood to be speaking about the destruction of Jerusalem, about which He was speaking literally at that time.

In the second possible sense it means the preaching of the Gospel in the whole world with its full effect, with the result that the Church is firmly fixed (*fundetur*) in every nation. And as Augustine points out in his letter to Hesychius, in this sense the Gospel has not yet been preached in the whole world; but once this is done, the consummation of the world will come.

QUESTION 107

The Relation between the Old Law and the New Law

Next we have to consider the relation of the New Law to the Old Law. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the New Law a law different from the Old Law? (2) Does the New Law bring the Old Law to fulfillment? (3) Is the New Law contained within the Old Law? (4) Which is the more burdensome, the New Law or the Old Law?

Article 1

Is the New Law different from the Old Law?

It seems that the New Law is not different from the Old Law:

Objection 1: Both Laws are given to those who have faith in God, since, as Hebrews 11:6 says, “Without faith it is impossible to please God.” But the faith of the ancients is the same as the faith of the moderns, as a Gloss on Matthew 21:9 says. Therefore, the Laws are the same as well.

Objection 2: In *Contra Adimantum Manichaei Discipulum* Augustine says, “Briefly put, the difference between the Law and the Gospel is fear and love.” But the New Law and the Old Law cannot be differentiated with respect to fear and love. For precepts of charity are proposed even in the Old Law. Leviticus 19:18 says, “You shall love your neighbor,” and Deuteronomy 6:5 says, “You shall love the Lord your God.” Similarly, they cannot be differentiated by the other distinction that Augustine proposes in *Contra Faustum*: “The Old Covenant made temporal promises, the New Covenant makes spiritual and eternal promises.” For even in the New Covenant certain temporal things are promised—this according to Mark 10:30 (“You will receive a hundred times as much in this present age, houses and brothers ...”). Moreover, even in the Old Covenant hope was placed in spiritual and eternal promises—this according to Hebrews 11:16, which says of the ancient fathers: “But now they desire a country, i.e., a celestial country.” Therefore, it seems that the New Law is not different from the Old Law.

Objection 3: In Romans 3:27 the Apostle seems to be distinguishing the two Laws, calling the Old Law a ‘law of works’, while calling the New Law a ‘law of faith’. But the Old Law was likewise a law of faith—this according to Hebrews 11:39, which says of the fathers of the Old Covenant: “All were approved by the testimony of faith.” Similarly, the New Law is likewise a law of works; for Matthew 5:44 says, “Do good to those who hate you,” and Luke 22:19 says, “Do this in memory of me.” Therefore, the New Law does not differ from the Old Law.

But contrary to this: In Hebrews 7:12 the Apostle says, “When the priesthood is transformed, it is necessary for a transformation of the Law to be made.” But as the Apostle proves in the same place, the priesthood of the New Law is different from the priesthood of the Old Law. Therefore, the Laws are likewise different.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 91, a. 4), all law directs human interaction in relation to some end. Now there are two ways in which things that are ordered to an end can be differentiated with respect to the notion of an end. First, they can be differentiated by the fact that they are ordered to diverse ends, and this is a difference in species, especially if the end is a proximate one. Second, they can be differentiated by their closeness to or distance from the end itself. For instance, it is clear that two movements differ in species insofar as they are ordered to different termini; on the other hand, to the extent that one part of a given movement is closer to the terminus than another part, there is a difference within the movement with respect to the perfect and the imperfect.

So, then, two laws can be differentiated in two ways.

In one way, they are differentiated in the sense of being wholly diverse, insofar as they are ordered

toward diverse ends. In the case of cities, for instance, a law that was ordered toward rule by the common people (*populus*) would be different in species from a law that was ordered toward rule by the aristocrats (*optimates*) in the city.

In the second way, two laws can be differentiated by the fact that the one of them orders things more closely to the end, while the other orders things more remotely. For instance, in one and the same city, a law imposed on grown men (*virī perfecti*), who are capable of immediately doing what contributes to the common good, is different from a law meant to teach children, who have to be instructed in how to perform the acts of men later in life.

Therefore, one should reply that, according to the first way of differentiating laws, the New Law is not different from the Old Law, since both have the same end, viz., that men should submit to God, and there is just one God for both the New Covenant and the Old Covenant—this according to Romans 3:30 (“There is one God who justifies circumcision on the basis of faith and the lack of circumcision through faith”).

According to the second way of differentiating laws, the New Law is different from the Old Law. For the Old Law is, as it were, a teacher of children, as the Apostle says in Galatians 3:24, whereas the New Law is a law of perfection, since it is a law of charity. On this score, the Apostle says in Colossians 3:14 that the New Law is a “bond of perfection.”

Reply to objection 1: The oneness of faith in both covenants attests to the oneness of the end. For it was explained above (q. 62, a. 2) that the object of the theological virtues, one of which is faith, is the ultimate end. Still, though, faith had one status in the Old Covenant and another in the New Covenant. For they believed in what was to come, we believe in what has been accomplished.

Reply to objection 2: All of the ascribed differences between the New Law and the Old Law are taken in a way corresponding to the perfect and the imperfect. For the precepts of any law are given concerning acts of virtue. But the imperfect, who do not yet have the habit of a virtue, are inclined toward doing the acts of virtue in a way different from those who have been perfected through the habit of the virtue.

Those who do not yet have the habit of a virtue are inclined toward doing the works of the virtue by some extrinsic cause, e.g., the threat of punishment or the promise of some extrinsic reward such as honor or wealth or something of this sort. And so the Old Law, which was given to the imperfect, i.e., to those who had not yet attained spiritual grace, was called a ‘law of fear’ insofar as it induced one to the observance of its precepts by threatening certain punishments. Again, it is said to contain certain temporal promises.

By contrast, those who have a virtue are inclined toward performing acts of that virtue out of love of virtue and not because of any extrinsic punishment or reward. And so the New Law, which consists principally in the spiritual grace poured into our hearts, is called a ‘law of love’. And it is said to contain spiritual and eternal promises, which are the objects of virtue, especially of charity. And thus the perfect are inclined *per se* toward those objects of virtue—not in the sense of being inclined toward something extrinsic, but in the sense of being inclined toward something that is their own.

Moreover, the reason why the Old Law is said to “restrain the hand and not the mind” is that someone who refrains from sinning out of a fear of punishment is such that his will does not abstain from sin absolutely speaking, as does the will of someone who abstains from sin out of a love of righteousness (*amore iustitiae*). And it is for this reason that the New Law, which is a law of love, is said to restrain the mind.

To be sure, there were some individuals in the status of the Old Law who, having charity and the grace of the Holy Spirit, looked toward spiritual and eternal promises. And to that extent, they belonged to the New Law. Similarly, even in the New Covenant there are some carnal men who have not yet attained the perfection of the New Law and who, even in the New Covenant, have to be induced to acts

of virtue through the fear of punishment and through certain temporal promises.

Moreover, even if the Old Law hands down precepts of charity, it is still the case that the Holy Spirit was not given *through* that Law—and, as Romans 5:5 says, it is through the Holy Spirit that “charity is diffused in our hearts.”

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 106, a. 1), the New Law is called a ‘law of faith’ insofar as it principally consists in the very grace which is given inwardly to those who have faith (*credentes*), and hence this grace is called the ‘grace of faith’. To be sure, the New Law secondarily contains certain moral and sacramental deeds, but the principal aspect of the New Law does not consist in these deeds, in the way that the principal aspect of the Old Law did consist in them.

Now someone who was acceptable to God through faith under the Old Covenant belonged in that respect to the New Covenant. For he received justification only through faith in Christ, who is the author of the New Covenant. Hence, in Hebrew 11:26 the Apostle says even of Moses that “he thought of the reproach of the Christ as greater riches than the treasures of the Egyptians.”

Article 2

Does the New Law bring the Old Law to fulfillment?

It seems that the New Law does not bring the Old Law to fulfillment:

Objection 1: *Being fulfilled (impletio)* is a contrary of *being made void (evacuatio)*. But the New Law makes void, or rules out, the observances of the Old Law; for in Galatians 5:2 the Apostle says, “If you get circumcised, Christ will profit you nothing.” Therefore, the New Law is not a fulfillment of the Old Law.

Objection 2: One contrary does not fulfill another. But in the New Law our Lord proposed certain precepts that are contrary to the precepts of the Old Law; for Matthew 5:31-33 says, “You have heard it said to the ancients, ‘Whoever dismisses his wife, let him give her a written decree of divorce.’ But I say to you, whoever divorces his wife makes her commit adultery.” And the same thing is clear with oaths, as well as with the prohibition of retaliation and with the hatred of enemies. Similarly, in Matthew 15:11 (“It is not what enters into the mouth that defiles a man ...”) our Lord also seems to have ruled out those precepts of the Old Law that have to do with the distinction among foods. Therefore, the New Law is not a fulfillment of the Old Law.

Objection 3: If anyone acts contrary to a law, he does not fulfill that law. But in certain cases Christ acted contrary to the Law. For instance, as Matthew 8:3 reports, He touched a leper—which was contrary to the Law. Again, He seems to have violated the Sabbath many times, and this is why the Jews said of Him in John 9:16, “This man is not from God, for He does not keep the Sabbath.” And so the New Law given by Christ is not a fulfillment of the Old Law.

Objection 4: As was explained above (q. 99, a. 4), the Old Law contained moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts. But in Matthew 5, where He brought fulfillment to the Law in certain respects, he seems to make no mention of the judicial or ceremonial precepts. Therefore, it seems that the New Law does not completely fulfill the Old Law.

But contrary to this: In Matthew 5:17 our Lord says, “I have come not to destroy the Law, but to fulfill it.” And later on He adds, “Not one iota or one letter of the Law will pass away until each of them is fulfilled.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the New Law is related to the Old Law as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect supplies what the imperfect lacks. Accordingly, the New Law

brings the Old Law to fulfillment insofar as it supplies what the Old Law lacked.

Now there are two possible things to consider in the Old Law, viz., its *end* and the *precepts* contained in the Law:

As was explained above (q. 92, a. 1), the *end* of any type of law is that men should be made just and virtuous. Hence, the end of the Old Law was likewise men's becoming justified (*iustificatio hominum*). The Law was unable to accomplish this, but it prefigured it in certain ceremonial actions and promised it in words.

In this respect, the New Law brings the Old Law to fulfillment by conferring justification through the power of Christ's passion. This is what the Apostle is talking about in Romans 8:3-4: "What the Law could not do ... God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, has condemned sin in the flesh, in order that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." In this respect, the New Law accomplishes what the Old Law had promised—this according to 2 Corinthians 1:20 ("All the promises of God are in Him," i.e., in Christ).

Again, the New Law likewise brings to completion what the Old Law was a figure of. Hence, Colossians 2:17 says of the ceremonial precepts that "they were shadows of things to come, but the body is Christ's," i.e., the reality (*veritas*) belongs to Christ. Hence, the New Law is called the 'law of reality' (*lex veritatis*), whereas the Old Law is called the 'law of shadows' or 'law of figures'.

On the other hand, Christ fulfilled the *precepts* of the Old Law both by His deeds and by His teaching.

He did this by His deeds in the sense that He willed to be circumcised and to observe all the legal regulations that were supposed to be observed at that time—this according to Galatians 4:4 ("... made under the Law").

Moreover, there were three ways in which He fulfilled the precepts of the Law by His teaching:

First, by expressing the true meaning of the Law. This is clear in the case of homicide and adultery, in the prohibition of which the Scribes and the Pharisees had understood only the prohibited exterior act. Hence, our Lord brought the Law to fulfillment by showing that interior acts of sin also fall under the prohibition.

Second, our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by giving directions about how what the Law had prescribed might be more securely observed. For instance, the Old Law had prescribed that a man should not perjure himself, and this is more securely observed if he abstains from oaths altogether, except in the case of necessity.

Third, our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by adding to them certain counsels of perfection, as is clear from Matthew 19:21, where our Lord, speaking to an individual who claims that he has observed the precepts of the Old Law, says, "One thing you are lacking. If you wish to be perfect, then go and sell all that you have."

Reply to objection 1: As was established above (q. 103, a. 3), the New Law does not make the observance of the Old Law void except with respect to the ceremonial precepts. But those precepts were figures of future realities. Hence, the ceremonial precepts are not to be observed any longer precisely because they have been fulfilled by the perfect things that they were figures of. For if they were observed, then something would still be signified as future and unfulfilled—just as there is no longer room for a promise of a future gift once the promise has already been fulfilled by the giving of the gift. And it is in this sense that the ceremonies of the Law are done away with when they are fulfilled.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine explains in *Contra Faustum*, the cited precepts of our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Law: "For instance, what our Lord prescribed about not divorcing one's wife is not contrary to what the Law prescribed. For the Law does not say, 'If anyone wishes to, he may divorce his wife', the contrary of which would be 'Do not divorce your wife'. To the contrary, the Law did not want a wife to be divorced by her husband and proposed a delay in order that a mind bent on

divorce might desist when confronted with the writing of the bill of divorce. Hence, in order to emphasize that a wife is not to be easily divorced, He makes an exception only where the cause is fornication.”

The same thing should be said about the prohibition of oaths, as has been explained.

Again, the same thing is clear in the case of the prohibition of retaliation. For the Law set a limit to retribution by prescribing that a man should not pursue it to the point of immoderate revenge. But our Lord removed him more perfectly from immoderate revenge by warning him to refrain from retribution altogether.

Again, as regards hatred of one’s enemies, He corrected the inaccurate understanding had by the Pharisees, warning us that it is the sin, and not the person, that should be held in contempt.

And as for the distinctions concerning food, which were ceremonial, our Lord did not prescribe that these distinctions should not be observed at that very time. Rather, as has been explained (q. 102, a. 6), He showed that food is unclean not by its nature, but only figuratively.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 102, a. 5), touching a leper was forbidden under the Law because from it a man incurred a sort of uncleanness of irregularity, as was also the case with touching the dead. But our Lord, who was a cleanser of lepers, could not incur uncleanness.

Now by the things He did on the Sabbath He did not in reality break the Sabbath. The Master Himself showed this in the Gospel, by the fact that (a) He worked miracles by divine power, which is always active in things, and also by the fact that (b) He performed works that contributed to man’s health, given that the Pharisees provided for the health even of animals on the Sabbath day; and also by the fact that (c) by reason of necessity He excused the apostles when they were collecting grain on the Sabbath.

To be sure, He did seem to break the Sabbath according to the superstitious understanding of the Sabbath had by the Pharisees, who believed that one should abstain even from health-giving works on the Sabbath—a belief that was contrary to the intention of the Law.

Reply to objection 4: The ceremonial precepts were not mentioned in Matthew 5 because, as has been explained, the observance of those precepts is entirely ruled out by their fulfillment.

As for the judicial precepts, He did mention the precept of retaliation in order that what was said about this precept should be understood to apply to all the others. In the case of this precept, He taught that the Law’s intention was not that the penalty of retaliation should be sought for the sake of vengeful spite, which He forbade, warning that a man should be ready to suffer even grave injuries. Instead, the Law’s intention was that retaliation should be sought only out of a love for justice—something that still remains under the New Law.

Article 3

Is the New Law contained within the Old Law?

It seems that the New Law is not contained within the Old Law:

Objection 1: The New Law consists principally in faith, and this is why it is called a ‘law of faith’, as is clear from Romans 3:27. But there are many things proposed for belief in the New Law which are not contained in the Old Law. Therefore, the New Law is not contained within the Old Law.

Objection 2: A certain Gloss on Matthew 5:19 (“Whoever breaks one of the least of these commandments ...”) says that the commandments of the Law are lesser, whereas the commandments in the Gospel are greater. But what is greater cannot be contained within what is lesser. Therefore, the New Law is not contained within the Old Law.

Objection 3: Anything that is contained within another is such that it is had when the latter is had. Therefore, if the New Law were contained within the Old Law, then when the Old Law was had, the New Law would be had as well. Therefore, once the Old Law was had, it was redundant for the New Law to be given again. Therefore, it is not the case that the New Law is contained within the Old Law.

But contrary to this: As Ezechiel 1:16 says, “There was a wheel within a wheel”—that is, as Gregory explains, the New Covenant was contained within the Old Covenant.

I respond: There are two ways for one thing to be contained within another. In one way, it is *actually* contained, as in the case of something that is located in a place. In the second way, it is *virtually* contained, in the way that an effect is contained within its cause, or in the way that what is complete is contained within what is incomplete, as a genus contains its species in potentiality or as a whole tree is contained within its seed.

It is in this second way that the New Law is contained within the Old Law. For, as has been explained (a. 1), the New Law is related to the Old Law as the perfect to the imperfect. Hence, Chrysostom, in commenting on Mark 4:28 (“The earth for its part brings forth fruit: first, the blade, and then the ear, and then the full ear of corn”) says, “First, He brings forth the herb in the law of nature; then He brings forth the blade in the Law of Moses; and then He brings forth the full ear of corn in the Gospel.” So, then, the New Law is in the Old Law in the way that the full ear of corn is in the blade.

Reply to objection 1: Everything that is explicitly and openly proposed for belief in the New Covenant is proposed for belief in the Old Covenant, but implicitly through figures. And it is in this sense that the New Law is contained within the Old Law even with respect to what is proposed for belief.

Reply to objection 2: It is with respect to explicit manifestation that the precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than the precepts of the Old Law. But with respect to the very substance of the precepts of the New Covenant, all of them are contained within the Old Covenant. Hence, in *Contra Faustum* Augustine says, “Almost all the things our Lord warned about or commanded when He added the phrase, ‘But I say to you’, are found in those old books as well. But because they understood homicide to be nothing other than the slaying of the human body, our Lord disclosed that every evil impulse toward harming one’s brother is to be assigned to the genus of homicide.”

It is in light of disclosures of this sort that the precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than the precepts of the Old Law. But nothing prevents the greater from being contained virtually within the lesser in the way that a tree is contained within a seed.

Reply to objection 3: That which was given implicitly had to be made explicit. And so after the Old Law was handed down, the New Law likewise had to be given.

Article 4

Is the New Law more burdensome than the Old Law?

It seems that the New Law is more burdensome (*gravior*) than the Old Law:

Objection 1: In commenting on Matthew 5:19 (“Whoever breaks one of the least of these commandments ...”) Chrysostom says, “The commandments of Moses are easy to enact: ‘You shall not kill’, ‘You shall not commit adultery’. By contrast, the commandments of Christ—i.e., ‘You shall not be angry’, ‘You shall not lust’—are very difficult to enact.” Therefore, the New Law is more burdensome than the Old Law.

Objection 2: It is easier to take advantage of earthly prosperity than to endure tribulations. But as

is clear from Deuteronomy 28, in the Old Covenant temporal prosperity followed upon the observance of the Old Law. By contrast, many adversities follow for those who observe the New Law—just as 2 Corinthians 4:6 says: “Let us show ourselves to be God’s ministers in great patience, in tribulations, in necessities, in distresses,” and so on. Therefore, the New Law is more burdensome than the Old Law.

Objection 3: What results from addition to something else seems to be more difficult. But the New Law results from addition to the Old Law. For as is clear from Matthew 5, following Augustine’s commentary, the Old Law prohibited bearing false witness (*periurium*), whereas the New Law prohibited even the taking of oaths; the Old Law prohibited divorcing one’s wife without a written decree of divorce, whereas the New Law prohibited divorce altogether. Therefore, the New Law is more burdensome than the Old Law.

But contrary to this: Matthew 11:28 says, “Come to me all you who labor and are burdened.” In commenting on this passage, Hilary says, “He calls to Himself those who labor under the difficulties of the Law and all who are burdened with the sins of the world.” And later on, concerning the yoke of the Gospel, our Lord adds: “My yoke is easy and my burden is light.” Therefore, the New Law is a lighter burden than the Old Law.

I respond: It is with respect to works of virtue that precepts of law are given, and there are two types of difficulty that can attend works of virtue.

One sort of difficulty involves the *exterior works*, which are in a way difficult and burdensome in their own right. On this score, the Old Law is much more burdensome than the New Law, since the Old Law obligated one to many more exterior actions in the many ceremonies than does the New Law, which in the teaching of Christ and the apostles adds very little beyond the precepts of the law of nature—even though afterwards some additional things were instituted by the holy Fathers. Even with respect to these additions, Augustine says that moderation should be observed in order that the way of life of the faithful not be rendered onerous. For in *Ad Inquisitiones Januarii* he says of certain individuals, “Our religion, which God’s mercy wanted to be free, with very clear and very few sacramental celebrations, these people load up with servile burdens, to such an extent that the situation of the Jews is more tolerable, since they were subject to the sacraments of the Law and not to human presumption.”

The second sort of difficulty involves the works of virtue in *interior acts*, i.e., that one should perform a virtuous work promptly and with pleasure. And in this respect virtue is difficult, since for someone who does not have a virtue it is very difficult; however, it is made easy by the virtue. On this score, the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than the precepts of the Old Law, since in the New Law there are prohibitions against interior movements of the mind that were not explicitly prohibited in the Old Law. (Even if they were prohibited in some cases, there was no penalty attached to what was prohibited.) But this is extremely difficult for one who does not have a virtue; hence, in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says that it is easy to do the things that the just man does, but to do them in the way in which the just man does them, viz., with pleasure and promptly, is difficult for one who is not just. So, too, 1 John 5:3 says, “His commandments are not burdensome”—which Augustine comments on by saying that they are not burdensome for one who has love, but that they are burdensome for one who does not have love.

Reply to objection 1: The passage in question is expressly talking about the difficulty of the New Law with respect to the explicit constraint on interior movements.

Reply to objection 2: The adversities suffered by those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself. However, it is because of love, which the New Law consists in, that they are borne easily. For as Augustine says in *De Verbis Domini*, “Love renders easy and almost null all the things that are harsh and frightful.”

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says, the additions to the precepts of the Old Law are ordered

toward making what the Old Law commanded easier to fulfill. And so the objection shows not that the New Law is more burdensome, but rather that it is easier.

QUESTION 108

The Contents of the New Law

Next we have to consider what is contained in the New Law. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Should the New Law command or prohibit certain exterior works? (2) Does the New Law adequately command or prohibit exterior acts? (3) Does the New Law appropriately direct men with respect to interior acts? (4) Is it appropriate for the New Law to add counsels over and beyond its precepts?

Article 1

Should the New Law command or prohibit any exterior acts?

It seems that the New Law should not command or prohibit any exterior acts:

Objection 1: The New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom—this according to Matthew 24:14 (“This Gospel of the kingdom will be preached in the whole world”). But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior acts, but only in interior acts—this according to Luke 17:21 (“The kingdom of God is within you”) and Romans 14:17 (“The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit”). Therefore, the New Law should not command or prohibit any exterior acts.

Objection 2: As Romans 8:2 says, the New Law is “the Law of the Spirit.” But as 2 Corinthians 3:17 says, “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom.” But there is no freedom where man is obligated to do or to avoid certain exterior works. Therefore, the New Law does not contain any commands or prohibitions with respect to exterior acts.

Objection 3: All exterior acts are thought of as involving the hand, just as interior acts involve the mind. But the difference posited between the New Law and the Old Law is that “the Old Law restrains the hand and the New Law restrains the mind.” Therefore, in the New Law prohibitions and precepts ought to be posited not with respect to exterior acts, but only with respect to interior acts.

But contrary to this: Through the New Law men are made children of the light; hence, John 12:36 says, “Believe in the light, in order that you might be children of the light.” But it is fitting for children of the light to do works of light and to cast aside works of darkness—this according to Ephesians 5:8 (“You were once darkness, but now you are light in the Lord. Walk as children of the light”). Therefore, the New Law should prohibit some exterior works and should command others.

I respond: As has been explained (q. 106, a. 1), the New Law is principally the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is manifested in faith working through love. But men attain this grace through the Son of God made man; for grace filled His humanity in the first instance, and from there it flowed to us. Hence, John 1:14 says, “The Word was made flesh,” and later adds, “He was full of grace and of truth,” and further on, “Of His fullness we have all received, and grace for grace.” Later on, John 1:17 adds, “Grace and truth were made by Christ.”

And so it is appropriate that (a) the grace flowing from the incarnate Word comes down to us through certain exterior and sensible things and that (b) from this interior grace, through which the flesh is made subject to the spirit, certain sensible works are produced.

So, then, there are two possible ways for exterior works to involve grace.

First, they lead us in a some way to grace. These are the works of the sacraments instituted under the New Law, such as Baptism, the Eucharist, and others of this sort.

Second, there are the exterior works produced by the prompting of grace. And among these works there is a distinction to be noted.

For some of them have a necessary agreement with or necessary opposition to the interior grace that

consists in faith working through love. Exterior works of this sort are commanded or prohibited in the New Law. For instance, the confession of one's faith is commanded and the denial of one's faith is prohibited. For Matthew 10:22-23 says, "If anyone acknowledges me before men, I will likewise acknowledge him before my Father. But if anyone denies me before men, I will likewise deny him before my Father."

By contrast, there are other works that do not have a necessary opposition to or agreement with faith operating through love. Such works were not commanded or prohibited in the New Law at the first institution of the Law; instead, the Lawgiver, viz., Christ, has left them up to each individual, to the extent that he is charged with the responsibility. And so with respect to such works, each individual is free to determine what is expedient for him to do or to avoid, and each individual who has responsibility for others (*praesidens*) is free to direct his subordinates with regard to what they should do or avoid in the case of such works. Hence, in this respect the Law of the Gospel is also called a 'law of freedom', since the Old Law determined many things and left few things to be determined by the freedom of men.

Reply to objection 1: The kingdom of God consists principally in interior acts, but, as a result, all the things without which interior acts cannot exist are likewise relevant to the kingdom of God. For instance, if the kingdom of God is interior justice and peace and spiritual joy, then all the exterior acts which are incompatible with justice or peace or spiritual joy must be incompatible with the kingdom of God. And so all such acts have to be forbidden in the kingdom of God.

By contrast, acts that are related neutrally to interior justice and peace and spiritual joy, e.g., eating this or that food, are such that the kingdom of God does not consist in them. And this is why the Apostle prefaces [the reference to justice and peace and joy] by saying, "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink."

Reply to objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 1, "the free is what is a cause of itself." Therefore, someone acts freely when he acts 'from himself' (*ex seipso*). Now when a man does something from a habit that agrees with his nature, he does it from himself, since a habit inclines one in the manner of a nature. By contrast, if the habit ran contrary to his nature, then the man would not act insofar as it is he himself, but instead he would act in accord with a certain corruption that had supervened on him. Therefore, since the grace of the Holy Spirit is like an interior habit infused into us and inclining us toward acting uprightly, it makes us do freely those things that agree with grace and to avoid those things that are contrary to grace.

Thus, there are two senses in which the New Law is called a 'law of freedom':

First, because it does not restrict us in doing or avoiding things except for those that are of themselves (*de se*) either necessary for salvation or incompatible with salvation; these things fall under either a commandment of the Law or a prohibition of the Law.

Second, because it makes us fulfill even these precepts or prohibitions freely, insofar as we fulfill them because of the interior prompting of grace.

It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called a "law of perfect freedom" (James 1:25).

Reply to objection 3: In restraining the mind from disordered movements, the New Law must also restrain the hand from disordered acts, since these acts are the effects of interior movements.

Article 2

Does the New Law give adequate direction to exterior acts?

It seems that the New Law does not give adequate direction to exterior acts:

Objection 1: The New Law seems principally to involve faith working through love—this

according to Galatians 5:6 (“In Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor lack of circumcision counts for anything; rather, it is faith that works through love”). But the New Law made explicit certain beliefs (*credenda*) that were not explicit in the Old Law, e.g., the belief in the Trinity. Therefore, it should likewise have added some exterior moral acts that had not been specified in the Old Law.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 102, a. 4), under the Old Law it was not only sacraments that were instituted, but also sacred things. But under the New Law, even if certain sacraments have been instituted, still, no sacred things seem to have been instituted by our Lord—e.g., things having to do with the sanctification of a temple or of vases, or even things having to do with the celebration of sacred feasts. Therefore, the New Law has not given adequate direction concerning exteriors.

Objection 3: Just as under the Old Law there were certain observances involving ministers of God, so too there were certain observances that involved the people—as was explained above (q. 102, a. 6) when the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were being discussed. But under the New Law certain observances seem to have been handed down to the ministers of God, as is clear from Matthew 10:9 (“Do not take with you gold or silver or money in your wallets,” and so on, along with the other things that follow in that place and other things that are said in Luke 9 and 10). Therefore, there should have also been some observances involving the lay faithful (*populus fidelis*) instituted under the New Law.

Objection 4: In the Old Law there were judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts. But no judicial precepts are handed down in the New Law. Therefore, the New Law did not give adequate direction to exterior works.

But contrary to this: In Matthew 7:24, “Everyone who hears my words and keeps them is like a wise man who built his house on rock.” But the wise builder did not overlook anything that was necessary for his building. Therefore, everything that involves salvation is adequately set down in the sayings of Christ.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), in the case of exterior acts the New Law should command or prohibit only (a) acts through which grace is introduced or (b) acts which necessarily involve the correct use of grace.

Because we are able to obtain grace only through Christ and not on our own, our Lord Himself instituted by Himself the sacraments through which we obtain grace, viz., Baptism, the Eucharist, the Ordination of ministers of the New Law (by appointing the apostles and the seventy-two disciples), Penance, and indissoluble Matrimony. He also promised Confirmation through the mission of the Holy Spirit. In addition, we read that, by His institution, the apostles cured the sick by anointing them with oil (Mark 6:13). These are the sacraments of the New Law.

Now the correct use of grace occurs through works of charity. Insofar as such works have a necessary connection with virtue, they pertain to the moral precepts, which were also handed down in the Old Law. Hence, on this score, it was not appropriate for the New Law to add anything to the Old Law with respect to exterior acts. On the other hand, as was explained above (q. 99. 4), the specification of exterior works in relation to the worship of God pertains to the ceremonial precepts of the Law, whereas the specification of such works in relation to one’s neighbor pertains to the judicial precepts. And so, since these specifications are not in themselves necessarily connected with interior grace, which the New Law consists in, they do not fall under a precept of the New Law, but are instead left up to human discretion. Some of these specifications are left up to the lower ranks and have to do with each individual taken one by one, whereas others are left up to temporal or spiritual authorities (*ad praelatos temporales vel spirituales*) and have to do with the common welfare.

So, then, the only exterior works that the New Law ought to determine by commands and prohibitions are (a) the sacraments and (b) moral precepts that of themselves involve the essence (*ratio*)

of virtue, e.g., ‘Do not kill’, ‘Do not steal’, and others of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: The things that pertain to faith lie beyond human reason; hence, we are unable to arrive at them except through grace. And so when a more abundant grace comes along, more beliefs need to be made clear.

By contrast, we are directed to the works of the virtues by our rational nature, which, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3 and q. 63, a. 2), is a measure (*regula*) of human action. And so in the case of these works there is no need for any precepts to be given beyond the moral precepts of the Law, which come from the dictate of reason.

Reply to objection 2: The grace given in the sacraments of the New Law is from Christ alone, and so the sacraments had to be instituted by Him.

By contrast, no grace is given in the sacred things, e.g., in the consecration of a temple or of an altar or of other things of this sort, or even in the very celebration of solemn feasts. And so because such things do not have a necessary relation to interior grace, our Lord left it up to the faithful to institute them by their own choice.

Reply to objection 3: Our Lord gave the precepts in question to the apostles not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes. There are two possible ways to understand this.

First, according to Augustine in *De Consensu Evangelistarum*, they were given not as precepts, but as permissions (*concessionones*). For instance, he permitted them to undertake the role of preaching without a wallet or a staff or other things of this sort, since they had the authority to receive the necessities of life from those to whom they preached; this is why he added, “For the laborer is deserving of his food.” However, one who has the role of preaching does not sin, but instead goes beyond his duty (*supererogat*), if, as Paul did, he brings along with him what he will live on and does not receive supplies from those to whom he preaches the Gospel.

The second way to understand these precepts, following the explanation of other saints, is that they are temporary statutes given to the apostles for that time during which they were being sent forth to preach in Judea before Christ’s passion. For the disciples, still like little ones under Christ’s care, needed to receive special instructions from Christ, in the way that subordinates need instructions from their superiors—and this mainly because they had to practice little by little at abandoning temporal cares, so that they might thereby become fit for preaching the Gospel throughout the whole world. And given that the status of the Old Law still persisted and that they had not yet attained the perfect freedom of the Spirit, it is not surprising that our Lord instituted certain determinate modes of living. When the passion was imminent, He abrogated these statutes, since the disciples had by that time been adequately trained through them. Hence, at Luke 22:35-36 our Lord said, “When I sent you without a sack or wallet or shoes, were you lacking anything?” And they replied, “No.” And then He said to them, “But now let one who has a sack take it, and the same with a wallet.” For the time of perfect freedom was already imminent, and so they were left entirely to their own judgment in those matters that did not of themselves have a necessary connection with virtue.

Reply to objection 4: Likewise, the judicial precepts, considered in themselves, have a necessary connection with virtue only with respect to the general nature of justice and not with respect to the particular specifications. And so our Lord left it up to those who were going to have spiritual or temporal care of others to specify the judicial precepts. However, as will be noted below (a. 3), He did explain certain of the judicial precepts of the Old Law because of the Pharisees’ defective interpretations of them.

Article 3

Does the New Law give man adequate direction with respect to interior acts?

It seems that the New Law does not give man adequate direction with respect to interior acts:

Objection 1: There are ten precepts of the Decalogue ordering man toward God and neighbor. But our Lord brought only three of them to perfection, viz., the prohibition of homicide, the prohibition of adultery, and the prohibition of bearing false witness (*periurium*). Therefore, it seems that He gave man inadequate direction by failing to bring the other precepts to perfection.

Objection 2: In the Gospel our Lord gave no direction concerning the judicial precepts except for those having to do with divorcing one's wife, the punishment of retaliation, and the persecution of enemies. But as was explained above (q. 105), there were many other judicial precepts in the Old Law. Therefore, in this respect He gave inadequate direction to the lives of men.

Objection 3: In the Old Law there were ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral and judicial precepts. Our Lord gave no direction at all concerning ceremonial precepts. Therefore, it seems that He has given inadequate direction.

Objection 4: Having a good interior disposition of mind involves a man's not doing good works for the sake of temporal ends. But there are many temporal goods other than human respect, and there are likewise many good works other than fasting, almsgiving, and praying. Therefore, it was inappropriate for our Lord to teach, concerning just these three good works, that we ought to avoid the glory of human respect, without mentioning any other earthly goods.

Objection 5: It is naturally instilled in man that he should be solicitous about those things that are necessary for him to live, a solicitude that other animals also share in common with man; hence, Proverbs 6:6-8 says, "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways She prepares her food in the summer and stores up provisions in a harvest." But every precept that is given in opposition to an inclination of nature is evil, since it is contrary to the natural law. Therefore, it seems inappropriate for our Lord to have prohibited solicitude about food and clothing.

Objection 6: No act of virtue should be prohibited. But judgment is an act of justice—this according to Psalm 93:15 ("..... until justice be turned into judgment"). Therefore, it seems inappropriate for our Lord to have prohibited judgment.

And so it seems that the New Law has given inadequate direction with respect to interior acts.

But contrary to this: In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, "Notice that when He said, 'Whoever hears these words of mine', this is a sufficient indication that our Lord's sermon is complete, containing all the precepts by which the Christian life is shaped."

I respond: As is clear from the passage cited from Augustine, our Lord's Sermon on the Mount contains a comprehensive instruction for the Christian life in which the interior movements of man are perfectly directed. For after declaring beatitude to be the end and commending the authority of the apostles, through whom the doctrine of the Gospel was to be promulgated (Luke 6:12-17), He gives directions for the interior movements of man, first with respect to oneself and then with respect to one's neighbor.

As regards oneself, He does this in two ways, corresponding to man's two interior movements with respect to action (*de agendis*), viz., (a) willing the action and (b) intending the end. Hence, he first directs man's willing of an action in accord with the different precepts of the Law. More specifically, He directs that one should abstain not only from exterior works that are evil in themselves (*secundum se mala*), but from evil interior acts of will as well, and also from occasions for evil acts of will. He then directs man's intentions, teaching that in the good acts we do, we should seek neither human glory nor worldly riches, i.e., we should not seek to build up our treasure on earth.

Now after this He directs man's interior movement with respect to his neighbor. More specifically he directs that we should not pass judgment rashly or unjustly or presumptuously; nor, on the other hand, should we be remiss toward our neighbor in such a way that we entrust him with sacred things when he is unworthy.

Lastly, He teaches us the manner in which the Gospel doctrine should be fulfilled, viz., by imploring God's help, by making the effort to enter through the narrow gate of perfect virtue, and by exercising caution in order that we not be corrupted by those who would seduce us (*a seductoribus*). And He teaches us that observing His commandments is necessary for virtue, and that it is not sufficient merely to make a confession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to hear His word.

Reply to objection 1: Our Lord brought to perfection those precepts of the Law which the Scribes and Pharisees had an incorrect understanding of. This occurred mainly with respect to three precepts of the Law. For in the case of the prohibitions against adultery and homicide, they thought that the exterior act alone was prohibited, and not the interior desire. They believed this more with regard to homicide and adultery than with regard to stealing and bearing false witness, because the movement of anger that leads to homicide and the movement of concupiscence that leads to adultery seemed to them to be somehow in us by nature, whereas this was not the case with the desire to steal or to bear false witness.

Still, they had a false understanding of perjury. To be sure, they believed that bearing false witness is a sin, but they believed that taking oaths was desirable in itself and should frequently be done, since it seems to involve reverence for God. And so our Lord showed that the taking of oaths is not to be desired as a good, but that it is better to speak without oaths unless necessity compels one to.

Reply to objection 2: There were two ways in which the Scribes and the Pharisees were mistaken about the judicial precepts.

First, there were certain acts handed down as *permissible* in the Law of Moses which they took to be *righteous* in themselves, viz., divorcing one's wife and taking usurious interest from outsiders. And so our Lord prohibited divorcing one's wife (Matthew 5:32), along with the taking of usurious interest, saying "Lend without expecting something in return" (Luke 6:35).

The second way in which they were mistaken was in believing that certain things that the Old Law had directed to be done for the sake of justice were to be done out of either (a) an appetite for revenge or (b) a desire for temporal things or (c) a hatred of one's enemies. And this involved three precepts.

For they believed that the desire for revenge was licit because of the precept that had been given concerning retaliation as a punishment. However, this precept had been given to preserve justice and not so that a man might seek revenge. And so our Lord, in order to exclude this interpretation, teaches that a man's mind ought to be prepared so that, if necessary, he will be ready to suffer many things.

Again, they considered the movement of sense desire licit because of those judicial precepts in which, as was explained above (q. 105, a. 2, ad 9), the restitution of a thing that had been stolen (*restitutio rei ablatae*) had to be made along with something additional. Now the Law commanded this in order to maintain justice, and not in order to make room for greed (*cupiditas*). And so our Lord teaches that we should not demand what belongs to us out of greed, but that we should be ready, if necessary, to hand over even more.

Again, they believed that the impulse to hatred was licit because of those precepts of the Law that had been given about the killing of enemies. As was explained above (q. 105, a. 3, ad 4), the Law prescribed this in order to fulfill justice and not in order to fully satisfy one's hatred. And so our Lord teaches that we should have love for our enemies and that we should be ready, if necessary, even to do good to them.

As Augustine explains, these precepts are to be taken "as a preparation of the mind."

Reply to objection 3: It was fitting for the moral precepts to remain in their entirety under the New Law, since they involve the essence of virtue in themselves. The judicial precepts, on the other

hand, did not necessarily remain in the manner in which the Law specified; instead, it was left up to the judgment of men whether they should be specified in the same way or some other way. And so our Lord gave us adequate direction concerning these two kinds of precepts.

However, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was completely done away with because of the fulfillment of the reality. And so in His general teaching He did not give any direction with respect to precepts of this sort. However, in other places He shows that the entire corporeal worship which had been specified under the Law had to be changed into spiritual worship. This is clear from John 4:21-23, where He said, “The hour is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem, but true worshippers will worship the Father in spirit and in truth.”

Reply to objection 4: All worldly things fall under three headings, viz., honors, riches, and pleasures. This is in accord with 1 John 2:16, “All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh”—which has to do with pleasures of the flesh—“and concupiscence of the eyes”—which involves riches—“and pride of life”—which pertains to the ambition for fame and honor.

Now the Law did not promise superfluous pleasures of the flesh; rather, it prohibited them. On the other hand, it did promise lofty honor and an abundance of riches; for with respect to the former, Deuteronomy 28:1 says, “If you listen to the voice of the Lord your God, He will exalt you above all the nations,” and with respect to the latter, it adds a little later, “He will make you abound with every kind of good.” The Jews understood these promises perversely (*prave*) to mean that they should serve God for the sake of these things as an end.

And so our Lord excluded this understanding. He taught, first of all, that the works of virtue should not be done for the sake of human glory. And He proposed three such works, which all the others fall under. For all the things that someone does to restrain himself in his sense desires fall under *fasting*; and whatever is done because of love of one’s neighbor falls under *almsgiving*; and all the things done for the sake of worshiping God fall under *prayer*. Now He posits these three works in particular because they are the principal ones and the ones through which men are especially wont to strive for glory.

Second, He taught that we should not set up riches as our end when He said, “Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth” (Matthew 6:19).

Reply to objection 5: Our Lord did not prohibit necessary solicitude, but instead prohibited disordered solicitude. Now there are four types of disordered solicitude concerning temporal goods that should be avoided.

First, we should not take temporal goods as our end, and we should not serve God for the sake of necessary food and clothing. Hence, He says, “Do not store up for yourself treasures”

Second, we should not be solicitous about temporal goods in a way that involves our despairing of God’s help. Hence, our Lord says, “Your Father knows that you need all these things” (Matthew 6:32).

Third, our solicitude should not be presumptuous, as when a man becomes confident that he himself, through his own solicitude, can procure the necessities of life without God’s help. Our Lord rules this out by saying that a man cannot add to his own height (Matthew 6:27).

Fourth, a man anticipates the time of solicitude, so that he is solicitous at the present moment about what pertains to the cares of the future and not to the cares of the present moment. Hence, He says, “Do not be solicitous about tomorrow” (Matthew 6:34).

Reply to objection 6: Our Lord did not prohibit the sort of judgment that belongs to justice, without which what is sacred could not be taken away from those who are unworthy. Rather, He prohibits disordered judgment, as has been explained.

Article 4

Is it appropriate for certain determinate counsels to be proposed in the New Law?

It seems that it is inappropriate for certain determinate counsels (*consilia aliqua determinata*) to be proposed in the New Law:

Objection 1: As was explained above when we talked about counsel (q. 14, a. 2), counsels are given about things that are expedient for an end. But it is not the case that the same things are expedient for everyone. Therefore, certain determinate counsels should not have been proposed for everyone.

Objection 2: Counsels are given with respect to a better good. But there are no determinate grades of better goods. Therefore, determinate counsels ought not to be given.

Objection 3: Counsels have to do with the perfection of a life. But obedience has to do with the perfection of a life. Therefore, it is inappropriate that in the Gospel a counsel is not given for obedience.

Objection 4: Among the precepts there are many that pertain to the perfection of a life, such as our Lord's saying, "Love your enemies," along with the precepts He gave to the apostles in Matthew 10. Therefore, it is inappropriate for counsels to be given in the New Law, both because not all of them are posited, and also because they are not distinct from the precepts.

But contrary to this: The counsels of a wise friend afford great assistance—this according to Proverbs 27:9 ("Ointments and various perfumes delight the heart, and the good counsels of a friend gladden the soul"). But Christ especially is wise and a friend. Therefore, His counsels have the greatest usefulness and are appropriate.

I respond: The difference between a counsel and a precept is that a precept implies necessity, whereas a counsel is left up to the choice of the one to whom it is given. And so it was appropriate that counsels should be added to the precepts in the New Law, which is a law of freedom, but not in the Old Law, which was a law of servitude. Therefore, the precepts of the New Law must be understood to have been given about things that are necessary for attaining the end of eternal beatitude, toward which the New Law directly leads one. By contrast, the counsels have to concern things through which a man is able to attain the end in question in a better and more expeditious manner.

Now man is situated between the things of this world and the spiritual goods in which eternal beatitude consists, so that the more he clings to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and vice versa. Therefore, someone who totally clings to the things of this world, in the sense that he sets them up as his end and takes them as the reasons for and measures of his actions, falls away entirely from spiritual goods. And so it is a disorder of this sort that is excluded by the precepts. However, a man need not totally cast off the things of the world in order to attain the end of eternal beatitude, since a man who makes use of the things of this world can attain eternal beatitude as long as he does not set them up as his end. And it is about this matter that the counsels of the Gospel are given.

Now as is clear from 1 John 2:16, the goods of this world that are involved in the practice of human life are of three types, viz., (a) the riches of exterior goods, which pertain to the concupiscence of the eyes; (b) carnal pleasures, which pertain to the concupiscence of the flesh; and (c) and honors, which pertain to pride of life. The evangelical counsels involve giving up all three of these in their entirety, to the extent that this is possible. Every sort of religious life (*religio*) that professes the state of perfection is based on these three counsels. For wealth is given up through *poverty*, carnal pleasures are given up through *perpetual chastity*, and pride of life is given up through *obedience*.

Now when these three are observed absolutely speaking, then they pertain to the proposed counsels in an unqualified way. On the other hand, the observance of any of them in a special case involves the counsels in a qualified way, viz., in that particular case. For instance, if a man gives alms to someone who is poor when he is not obligated to do so, then he is following the counsel with respect to that deed.

Similarly, when someone abstains from carnal pleasures for a fixed period of time in order to make room for prayer, then he is following the counsel during that time. Similarly, when someone does not follow his own wishes with respect to some action that he could licitly perform, then he is following the counsel in that particular case—if, say, he does good to his enemies when he is not obligated to, or if he forgives an offense for which he could justly demand retribution (*vindicta*).

And in this way all the particular counsels fall under the three general and perfect counsels.

Reply to objection 1: The counsels mentioned above are of themselves expedient for everyone, but because some individuals lack the right disposition, it happens that the counsels are not expedient for a given individual, since his affections are not inclined toward them. And so when our Lord proposes the evangelical counsels, he always mentions the fitness of men for observing the counsels. For instance, when He is giving the counsel of perpetual poverty in Matthew 19:21, He begins by saying, “If you wish to be perfect,” and then He adds, “..... go and sell all that you have.” Similarly, when He was giving the counsel of perpetual chastity, after He had said, “There are eunuchs who have castrated themselves for the sake of the kingdom of heaven,” He immediately added, “Let him who can take it, take it.” Similarly, in 1 Corinthians 7:35 the Apostle, having given the counsel of virginity, says, “I am telling you this for your benefit, and not to set a trap for you.”

Reply to objection 2: It is not determinate just which particular goods are better in each case. But it is determinate which general goods are better simply and absolutely speaking. And, as has been explained, it is these goods that all the particular goods fall under.

Reply to objection 3: Our Lord is understood to have given the counsel of obedience when He said, “..... and let him follow me” (Matthew 16:24). We follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments—this according to John 10:27 (“My sheep listen to my voice and follow me”).

Reply to objection 4: If the things our Lord says about genuine love of enemies and other such things in Matthew 5 and Luke 6 are taken to refer to *the preparation of the mind*, then they are necessary for salvation—viz., that a man be ready to do good to his enemies and to do other things of this sort when necessity requires it. And in this sense they are counted as precepts.

On the other hand, as has been explained, it pertains to the counsels that a man should promptly do good to his enemies in actuality, where there is no special necessity for doing so.

Now as was explained above, the things that are posited in Matthew 10 and Luke 9 and 10 were certain precepts of discipline for that time, or certain permissions. And so they are not taken to be counsels.

QUESTION 109

The Necessity for Grace

Next we have to consider the exterior principle of human acts that comes from God insofar as we are helped by Him to act rightly by His grace. We have to consider, first, God's grace (questions 109-111); second, the cause of grace (question 112); and, third, the effects of grace (questions 113-114).

There are three parts of the first topic. We will consider, first, the necessity for grace (question 109); second, grace itself with respect to its essence (question 110); and, third, the divisions of grace (question 111).

On the first topic there are ten questions: (1) Can a man have cognition of any truth without grace? (2) Can a man do anything good without God's grace? (3) Can a man love God above all things without grace? (4) Can a man keep the commandments of the Law without grace? (5) Can a man merit eternal life without grace? (6) Can a man prepare himself for grace without grace? (7) Can a man recover from sin without grace? (8) Can a man avoid sin without grace? (9) Can a man who has received grace do good and avoid sin without any further divine assistance? (10) Can man persevere in the good on his own (*per seipsum*)?

Article 1

Can a man have cognition of any truth without grace?

It seems that a man cannot have cognition of any truth without grace:

Objection 1: Ambrose's Gloss on 1 Corinthians 12:3 ("No one can say 'Lord Jesus' except in the Holy Spirit") says, "Anything true that is said by anyone is from the Holy Spirit." But the Holy Spirit dwells in us through grace. Therefore, we cannot know the truth without grace.

Objection 2: In *Soliloquium* 1 Augustine says, "The most certain of the disciplines are those that are illuminated by the sun in order that they might be seen. Now it is God Himself who does the illuminating, whereas reason exists in minds in the way that sight (*aspectus*) exists in the eyes, and the mind's eyes are the soul's senses." But no matter how pure a bodily sense is, it cannot see any visible thing without the sun's illumination. Therefore, no matter how perfect a human mind is, it cannot come to know truth through its reasoning without God's illumination. But this involves the assistance of grace.

Objection 3: As is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 14, the human mind cannot understand truth except by thinking. But in 2 Corinthians 3:5 the Apostle says, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything by ourselves, as if it were from us." Therefore, a man cannot have a cognition truth on his own without the assistance of grace.

But contrary to this: In *Retractationes* 1 Augustine says, "I do not approve of my having said in a prayer, 'O God, who willed that only the clean should know what is true.' For one can reply that even many unclean individuals know many truths." But it is through grace that a man is made clean—this according to Psalm 50:12 ("A clean heart create in me, O God, and renew in my innards a steadfast spirit"). Therefore, a man can know the truth by himself without grace.

I respond: Having cognition of the truth is a certain employment of, or act of, the intellectual light (*usus quidam vel actus intellectualis luminis*). For according to the Apostle in Ephesians 5:13, "Everything that is made manifest is light." Now 'employment' or 'use' (*usus*) implies a sort of movement, taking 'movement' in the broad sense according to which acts of intellective understanding and of willing are said to be movements—as is clear from the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3.

Now we see in the case of corporeal things that what is required for movement is not only (a) the very form that is the principle of the movement or action, but also (b) the motion of the first mover (*motio primi moventis*). And the first mover in the order of corporeal things is a celestial body. Hence, no matter how perfect a heat a given instance of fire might have, it does not effect change except through

the motion of a celestial body.

Now it is clear that just as all corporeal movements are traced back to the movement of a celestial body as to a first corporeal mover, so too all movements, both corporeal movements and spiritual movements, are traced back to the first mover absolutely speaking, viz., God. And so no matter how perfect a given corporeal or spiritual nature is claimed to be, it cannot proceed into its own act if it is not moved by God. This movement occurs in accord with the plan of God's providence and not in accord with a necessity of nature, as in the case of the motion of a celestial body. Moreover, it is not just every *movement* that comes from God as from a first cause; rather, every *formal perfection* comes from Him as from a first act. So, then, an action of the intellect, or of any created entity, depends on God in two ways: (a) insofar as it has from God the form by which it acts, and (b) insofar as it is moved by Him to act.

Now each form that has been put into created things by God has causal efficacy with respect to a determinate act that it is capable of in accord with its properties (*habet efficaciam respectu alicuius actus determinati in quem potest secundum suam proprietatem*), but it is incapable of anything beyond that except by the addition of another form; for instance, water cannot make anything hot unless it is itself made hot by fire. So, then, the human intellect has a form, viz., the intelligible light itself, which is by itself sufficient for the cognition of certain intelligible things, viz., those that we are able to come to knowledge of through sensible things. However, the human intellect is unable to have cognition of higher intelligible things unless it is perfected by a stronger light (*nisi fortiori lumine perficiatur*), e.g., the light of faith or the light of prophecy.

So, then, one should reply that in order to have cognition of anything at all, a man needs God's help in order that his intellect might be moved by God to its act. However, in order to have cognition of the truth, he does not in all cases need a new illumination in addition to his natural illumination; instead, he needs a new illumination only in certain cases that exceed his natural cognition.

Yet sometimes through His grace God miraculously instructs some individuals with respect to things that can be known through natural reason, in just the way that He sometimes does miraculously certain things that nature can do.

Reply to objection 1: Any truth that is uttered by anyone is from the Holy Spirit in the sense that it is from the one who pours the natural light [into the intellective soul] and moves a man to have intellective understanding and to speak the truth. However, not every truth is from the Holy Spirit in the sense that it is from the one who dwells [in the soul] through habitual or sanctifying grace (*per gratiam gratum datum*); this is the case with the cognition and utterance only of certain truths—especially those which belong to the Faith and which the Apostle was talking about [in the cited passage].

Reply to objection 2: The corporeal sun illuminates from without, whereas the intelligible sun, viz., God, illuminates from within. Hence, the natural light that is poured into the soul is itself the illumination on God's part by which we are illuminated by Him in order to have cognition of those things that pertain to natural cognition. And a further illumination is not required for this, but is instead required only with respect to things that exceed our natural cognition.

Reply to objection 3: We always need God's help in thinking about anything whatsoever, insofar as He moves our intellect to act. For as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 14, to think is to have an actual intellective understanding of something.

Article 2

Is a man able to will and do good without grace?

It seems that a man is able to will and do good without grace:

Objection 1: What is within a man's power is such that he is the master over it. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 1), a man is the master of his own acts, and especially of the act of willing.

Therefore, a man is able to will and do good on his own (*per seipsum*) without the assistance of grace.

Objection 2: Each thing is more capable of what is in accord with its nature than of what is beyond its nature. But as Damascene explains in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, sin is contrary to nature, while, as was explained above (q. 71, a. 1), virtue is in accord with man's nature. Therefore, since a man is able to sin on his own (*per seipsum*), it seems that, *a fortiori*, he is able to will and to do good on his own.

Objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, the intellect's good is the true. But the intellect is able on its own (*per seipsum*) to have cognition of what is true, just as every other entity is able to perform its natural operation on its own (*per se*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, a man is able to do and will good on his own.

But contrary to this: In Romans 9:16 the Apostle says, "It"—viz., the willing—"does not belong to him who wills; nor does it"—viz., the running—"belong to him who runs, but instead it belongs to God, who has mercy." And in *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine says, "Without grace men accomplish no good at all, either by thinking or by willing and loving or by doing."

I respond: There are two ways in which to consider a man's nature: (a) *in its uncorrupted or integral state (in sui integritate)*, in the way it existed in the first parent before the sin; and (b) *as corrupted in us* after the sin of the first parent.

Now in both these states human nature needs God's assistance as the first mover in order to do or will any good at all; this was explained above (a. 1).

However, in the state of *uncorrupted or integral nature (in statu naturae integrae)* the man was able by his natural powers (*poterat homo per sua naturalia*), as far as the sufficiency of his operative power was concerned, to will and do the good proportioned to his nature, i.e., the good of acquired virtue, but not the good that exceeds his nature, i.e., the good of infused virtue.

On the other hand, in the state of *corrupted nature* a man falls short even of what he is able to do in accord with his nature, so that he is unable to fulfill the whole of this sort of good (*totum huiusmodi bonum*) through his natural power. Yet since human nature has not been totally corrupted by sin in such a way as to be totally deprived of the good of nature, a man is able even in the state of corrupted nature to accomplish some particular goods through the power of his nature, e.g., to build houses and plant vines and other things of this sort, even though he is not able to accomplish the whole of the good that is connatural to him in such a way as to be lacking in nothing—in the same way that a sick man is able to have some movement on his own, but cannot, unless he is assisted by medicine, move perfectly with the movement of a healthy man.

So, then, in the state of integral nature a man needs the power of grace (*virtute gratuita*) in addition to his natural power for just one thing, viz., to do and will the supernatural good. By contrast, in the state of corrupted nature he needs the power of grace for two things, viz., (a) to be healed and, further, (b) to accomplish the good of supernatural virtue, i.e., the meritorious good. What's more, in both states a man needs God's help in order to be moved by Him toward acting well.

Reply to objection 1: A man is the master of his own acts, of both his willing and his not willing, because of reason's deliberation, which can be turned toward one part [of a contradiction] or the other. But if he is likewise the master of whether or not he deliberates, this must be because of a previous deliberation. And since there is no infinite regress here, one must in the end arrive at the point at which the man's free choice is moved by some exterior principle that lies beyond the human mind, viz., God. The Philosopher likewise proves this in *De Bona Fortuna*. Hence, even a healthy man's mind does not have dominion over its own act in the sense that it does not need to be moved by God. And the same holds *a fortiori* after the sin for the sick man's free choice, which is kept from the good by the corruption of nature.

Reply to objection 2: To sin is nothing other than to fall away from a good that is appropriate to a given thing in accord with its nature. But just as each created entity is such that (a) it does not have *esse* except from another and such that (b) it is nothing considered in itself, so too it needs to be conserved by another in the good of its own nature. By contrast, it can fall away from that good on its own, just as it

can likewise fall into non-esse on its own unless it is conserved by God.

Reply to objection 3: In the sense explained above (a. 1), a man cannot without God's assistance even have cognition of what is true. And yet human nature is corrupted by sin more with respect to its desire for the good than with respect to its cognition of the true.

Article 3

Can a man love God above all things by just his natural power and without grace?

It seems that a man cannot love God above all things by just his natural power and without grace (*non possit diligere Deum super omnia ex solis naturalibus sine gratia*):

Objection 1: To love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. But man cannot have charity on his own, since, as Romans 5:5 puts it, "God's charity is diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us." Therefore, a man is unable to love God above all things by just his natural power.

Objection 2: No nature is capable of what lies beyond itself (*nulla natura potest supra seipsam*). But to love something more than oneself is to tend toward something beyond oneself. Therefore, no created nature can love God in a way that lies beyond itself without the assistance of grace (*nulla natura creata potest Deum diligere supra seipsam sine auxilio gratiae*).

Objection 3: Since God is the highest good, He is owed the highest love, viz., that He be loved above all things. But a man is unable without grace to devote to God the highest love that is owed to Him by us; otherwise, it would make no sense for grace to be added. Therefore, without grace a man cannot love God above all things by just his natural power.

But contrary to this: According to some, the first man was constituted with just his natural power. And it is clear that in that state he loved God in some way or other. But he did not love God exactly as much as he loved himself or less than he loved himself (*non dilexit Deum aequaliter sibi vel minus se*), since he would have thereby sinned. Therefore, he loved God more than he loved himself (*dilexit Deum supra se*). Therefore, a man is able to love God more than himself—and so above all things—by just his natural power.

I respond: As was explained above in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 95, a. 1), where diverse opinions were likewise posited about the angels' natural love, man in the state of integral nature (*in statu naturae integrae*) was able by the power of his nature to accomplish that good that is connatural to him without the addition of the gift of grace (*absque superadditione gratuiti doni*)—though not without the assistance of God as mover (*tamen non absque auxilio Dei moventis*).

Now to love God above all things is something connatural to man as well as to every creature—not just rational creatures, but also non-rational and even non-living creatures, each in accord with the mode of love that can belong to it. The reason for this is that it is natural to every creature that it should desire and love something to the extent that this desire and love are naturally fitting (*secundum quod aptum natum est esse*); for as *Physics* 2 says, "Each thing acts in the way that is fitting for it." But it is clear that the good of the part exists for the sake of the good of the whole. Hence, by a natural desire or love each particular entity likewise loves its own proper good for the sake of the *common good of the whole universe*, i.e., for the sake of God. Hence, in *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, "God turns all things toward love for Himself." Thus, in the state of uncorrupted nature man referred his love for himself—and, similarly, his love for all other things—to the love of God as his end. And in this sense He loved God more than himself and loved Him above all things.

By contrast, in the state of corrupted nature a man falls short of this as far as the rational will's desire is concerned, since, because of the corruption of the nature, the rational will pursues *its own private good*—unless it is healed by God's grace.

And so one should reply that a man in the state of integral nature does not need the addition of the gift of grace to his natural goods in order to love God naturally above all things, even though he does need God's assistance in moving him to this act. However, in the state of corrupted nature a man needs the addition of the gift of grace healing his nature in order for him to do even this much.

Reply to objection 1: Charity loves God above all things in a more eminent way than [human] nature does. For the nature loves God above all things insofar as He is the source and end of natural goodness, whereas charity loves God above all things insofar as the man has a certain spiritual fellowship with God (*quandam societatem spiritualem cum Deo*).

Moreover, charity adds to the natural love for God a sort of promptitude and pleasure, in the same way that any virtuous habit adds something to a good act that comes just from the natural reason of a man who did not [previously] have the virtuous habit.

Reply to objection 2: The claim that no nature is capable of what lies beyond itself (*potest supra seipsam*) should not be understood to imply that a nature cannot be directed toward an object which lies beyond it (*in aliquod obiectum quod est supra se*). For it is clear that our intellect is able by its natural cognition to have cognition of things that lie beyond it, as is clear from its natural cognition of God. Rather, the claim should be understood to imply that a nature is incapable of an act that exceeds the measure of the nature's power. But loving God above all things is not an act of this latter sort, since, as has been explained, this act is natural to every created nature.

Reply to objection 3: Love (*amor*) is said to be 'highest' not only with respect to the *degree* of the loving (*quantum ad gradum dilectionis*) but also with respect to the *nature* of the loving and the *mode* of loving (*quantum ad rationem diligendi et dilectionis modum*). Accordingly, as has been explained, the highest degree of love is that by which charity loves God as the beatifier.

Article 4

Can a man without grace fulfill the precepts of the Law by his own natural power?

It seems that a man without grace can fulfill the precepts of the Law by his own natural power (*per sua naturalia possit praecepta legis implere*):

Objection 1: In Romans 2:14 the Apostle says, "The Gentiles, who do not have the Law, do naturally those things that belong to the Law." But what a man does naturally he is able to do on his own (*per seipsum*) without grace. Therefore, a man is able to carry out the precepts of the Law without grace.

Objection 2: In *Expositio Catholicae Fidei* Jerome says, "They are to be cursed who claim that God has commanded something impossible of man." But what a man is unable to fulfill on his own is impossible for him. Therefore, a man can fulfill all the precepts of the Law on his own.

Objection 3: As is clear from Matthew 25:37, the greatest of all the precepts of the Law is, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart." But as was explained above (a. 3), a man can fulfill this commandment through his natural powers by loving God above all things. Therefore, a man can fulfill all the precepts of the law without grace.

But contrary to this: In *De Haeresibus* Augustine says that it belongs to the Pelagian heresy "to believe that a man can carry out all of God's commandments without grace."

I respond: There are two senses of 'fulfill the commandments of the Law'.

One sense has to do with *the substance of the deeds*, viz., insofar as a man does just deeds and brave deeds and deeds of the other virtues. In this sense a man in the state of integral nature was able to fulfill all the commandments of the Law; otherwise, he would not have been able not to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing other than to transgress God's commandments. By contrast, in the state of corrupted nature a man is not able to fulfill all of God's commandments without healing grace.

In the second possible sense, the commandments of the law are fulfilled not only with respect to the

substance of the deed, but also with respect to *the mode of acting*, in the sense that they are done out of charity. And in this sense a man cannot fulfill the commandments of the Law without grace either in the state of integral nature or in the state of corrupted nature. This is why, in *De Correptione et Gratia*, after he had claimed that “without grace men can do no good at all,” Augustine adds, “not only in order that they might know what to do by the light of grace, but also in order that, with the help of grace, they might do with love what they know.”

In addition, as has been explained (a. 2), in both states men need the assistance of God as [first] mover in order to fulfill the commandments.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in *De Spiritu et Littera*, “Let it not disturb you that he said that they are to do naturally what belongs to the Law. For the Spirit of grace does this in order to restore in us the image of God, in which we have been naturally made.”

Reply to objection 2: What we are able to do with God’s assistance is not altogether impossible for us—this according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3 (“What we can do through our friends, we can in some sense do through ourselves”). Hence, in the very same place Jerome likewise concedes that we have free choice in such a way that we may claim that we are always in need of God’s assistance.

Reply to objection 3: As is clear from what was said above (a. 3), a man cannot by his purely natural power fulfill the precept concerning the love of God insofar as it is fulfilled out of charity.

Article 5

Can a man merit eternal life without grace?

It seems that a man can merit eternal life without grace:

Objection 1: In Matthew 19:17 our Lord says, “If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments.” From this it is clear that it is within the power of man’s will (*sit constitutum in hominis voluntate*) to enter into eternal life. But we can do by ourselves what is within our will’s power. Therefore, it seems that a man can merit eternal life on his own (*per seipsum*).

Objection 2: Eternal life is a prize or reward (*praemium vel merces*) that is bestowed by God on men—this according to Matthew 5:12 (“Your reward is great in heaven”). But a reward or prize is bestowed by God on a man because of the man’s works—this according to Psalm 61:12 (“You will render to each one according to his works”). Therefore, since a man is the master of his own works, it seems that it is within his power to attain eternal life.

Objection 3: Eternal life is the ultimate end of human life. But each natural thing can attain its own end through its own natural powers. Therefore, *a fortiori*, man, who has a higher nature, can attain eternal life through his own natural powers and in the absence of any sort of grace (*absque aliqua gratia*).

But contrary to this: In Romans 6:23 the Apostle says, “The grace of God is eternal life.” As a Gloss on the same passage points out, this is said “in order that we might understand that God leads us to eternal life by His mercy.”

I respond: The acts that lead one to eternal life have to be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle. And so we see that, among natural things, no entity can by its own operation bring about an effect that exceeds its active power; instead, it is able through its operation to produce only an effect that is proportioned to its power.

But as is clear from what was explained above (q. 5, a. 5), eternal life is an end that exceeds the proportion of human nature. And so man cannot by his natural powers produce meritorious works that are proportioned to eternal life; instead, this requires a higher power, which is the power of grace. And so without grace a man cannot merit eternal life.

However, as Augustine says in his third reply to the Pelagians, a man is able to do works that attain

to some of the good that is connatural to him, e.g., “work in the field, drink, eat, have friends,” and others of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: It is by his own will that a man does the works that merit eternal life; however, as Augustine explains in the same book, what is required for this is that the man’s will should be prepared by God through grace.

Reply to objection 2: As a Gloss on Romans 6:23 (“The grace of God is eternal life”) says, “It is certain that eternal life will be given for good works, but the very works for which eternal life is rendered belong to God’s grace.” For it was likewise explained above (a. 4) that grace is required in order to fulfill the commandments of the Law in the right manner for their fulfillment to be meritorious.

Reply to objection 3: This objection goes through for the case of an end that is connatural to man. But by the very fact that human nature is more noble, it can, at least by the help of grace, be led to a higher end that lower natures can in no way attain—in the same way that, as the Philosopher points out in *De Caelo* 2, a man who can attain health with the help of certain medicines is better disposed toward health than is a man who cannot in any way attain health.

Article 6

Can a man prepare himself for grace on his own without the exterior assistance of grace?

It seems that a man can prepare himself for grace on his own without the exterior assistance of grace:

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 4), nothing that is impossible for a man is imposed on him. But Zachariah 1:3 says, “Turn toward me, and I will turn toward you,” and preparing oneself for grace is nothing other than turning toward God. Therefore, it seems that man can prepare himself for grace on his own without the assistance of grace.

Objection 2: A man prepares himself for grace by doing something that is within him (*faciendo quod in se est*), since if a man does what is within him, then God does not deny him grace. For Matthew 7:11 says that God gives His good Spirit “to those who ask Him.” But what is ‘within us’ is what is within our power. Therefore, it seems that it is within our power to prepare ourselves for grace.

Objection 3: If a man needs grace in order to prepare himself for grace, then by parity of reasoning he will need grace in order to prepare himself for that first grace, and so there will be an infinite regress—which is absurd. Therefore, it seems that one should stop at the first step—so that, namely, a man without grace can prepare himself for grace.

Objection 4: Proverbs 16:1 says, “It belongs to a man to prepare his mind.” But what is said to belong to a man is that which he can do on his own. Therefore, it seems that a man can on his own prepare himself for grace.

But contrary to this: John 6:44 says, “No one can come to me unless the Father, who sent me, draws him.” But if a man were able to prepare himself for grace, he would not have to be drawn by another. Therefore, a man cannot prepare himself for grace without the assistance of grace.

I respond: There are two sorts of preparation of the human will for the good:

One sort of preparation is that by which the human will is prepared for operating well and enjoying God. And this sort of preparation cannot be accomplished in the absence of the *habitual* gift of grace (*non potest fieri sine habituali gratiae dono*), which, as has been explained (a. 5), is the principle of a meritorious work.

In the second way, the preparation of the human will can be thought of as a preparation for *attaining* the habitual gift itself of grace. Now the preparation itself for the reception of *this* gift would not have to presuppose any other *habitual* gift in the soul, since otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Instead, what has to be presupposed is some assistance of grace (*aliquod auxilium gratuitum*)

whereby God either moves the soul interiorly or inspires a good intention (*interius animam moventis sive inspirantis bonum propositum*). For as was explained above (aa. 2 and 3), it is in these two ways that we need God's assistance.

Now it is clear that for this [second sort of preparation] we need God's assistance in moving us. For since every agent acts for the sake of an end, every cause must turn its effects toward its own end. And so since there is an ordering of ends corresponding to the ordering of agents or movers, a man has to be turned toward his ultimate end by the motion of the first mover, whereas he has to be turned toward a proximate end by certain of the lower movers' effecting the movement (*per motionem alicuius inferiorum moventium*)—just as a soldier's mind is turned toward seeking victory by the army leader's effecting the movement (*ex motione ducis exercitus*), whereas it is moved toward following his company's standard by the company leader's effecting the movement (*ex motione tribuni*). So, then, since God is the first mover absolutely speaking, the effect of His motion is that all things are turned toward Him in accord with the common tendency of the good (*secundum communem intentionem boni*), through which each thing tends toward being similar to God in its own manner. Hence, in *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, "God turns all things toward Himself." But He turns justified men (*homines iustos*) toward Himself as toward a special end that they intend and that they desire to adhere to as their proper good—this according to Psalm 72:28 ("It is good for me to adhere to God"). And so a man's being turned toward God can occur only when God turns him toward Himself. But someone's preparing himself for grace is, as it were, his being turned toward God—in the same way that someone whose eyes are turned away from the sun's light prepares himself to receive the sun's light by turning his eyes toward the sun. Hence, it is clear that a man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except through the assistance of the grace of God, who moves him interiorly (*nisi per auxilium gratuitum Dei interius moventis*).

Reply to objection 1: A man's turning toward God does, to be sure, come about through free choice and, accordingly, the man is commanded to turn himself toward God. But free choice cannot be turned toward God unless God turns it toward Himself—this according to Jeremiah 31:18 ("Turn me toward you and I will be turned, since you are my God") and according to Lamentations 5:21 ("Turn us, O Lord, toward you and we will be turned").

Reply to objection 2: A man can do nothing unless he is moved by God—this according to John 15:5 ("Without me you can do nothing"). And so when it is said that a man does what is 'within him', what is being said is that this is within a man's power insofar as he is moved by God.

Reply to objection 3: This objection goes through for the case of habitual grace, which requires some preparation, since every form requires something that is disposed toward being able to receive it (*requirit susceptibile dispositum*). But a man's being moved by God does not have as a prerequisite any other movement, since God is the first mover. Hence, there need be no infinite regress.

Reply to objection 4: It belongs to a man to prepare his mind, since he does this through free choice, and yet, as has been explained, he does not do this without the assistance of God moving him and attracting him to Himself.

Article 7

Can a man rise up from sin without the assistance of grace?

It seems that a man can rise up from sin without the assistance of grace:

Objection 1: That which is a prerequisite for grace can be effected without grace. But to rise up from sin is a prerequisite for the illumination of grace; for Ephesians 5:14 says, "Rise up from the dead, and Christ will illuminate you." Therefore, a man can rise up from sin without grace.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 71, a. 1), sin is opposed to virtue in the way that sickness

is opposed to health. But by his natural power a man is able to rise up from sickness to health without the aid of any exterior medicine, because there remains within him a life-principle (*principium vitae*) from which natural operations proceed. Therefore, it seems that, for a similar reason, a man can recover on his own by going from a state of sin back to a state of justice (*de statu peccati ad statum iustitiae*) without the assistance of exterior grace.

Objection 3: Each natural thing is able to return to the act that is appropriate for its nature, in the way that hot water returns on its own to its natural coldness, and in the way that a rock that has been thrown returns on its own to its natural movement. But as is clear from Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, a sin is in some sense an act that is contrary to nature. Therefore, it seems that a man is able on his own to go from sin back to a state of justice.

But contrary to this: In Galatians 2:21 the Apostle says, “If a Law was given that was able to confer justification (*potest iustificare*), then Christ died in vain (*gratis*),” i.e., for no reason (*sine causa*). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, if a man has a nature through which justification is able to be conferred, then Christ died in vain, i.e., for no reason. But it is absurd to say this. Therefore, a man is not able to be justified on his own, i.e., to go from a state of sin back to a state of justice.

I respond: A man cannot in any way rise up from sin on his own without the assistance of grace. For since, as was explained above (q. 87, a. 6), a sin that passes away in its act remains in its guilt (*peccatum transiens actu remaneat reatu*), rising up from a sin is not the same thing as ceasing to commit the sin (*cessare ab actu peccati*).

Now as was explained above (q. 85, a. 1 and q. 86, a. 1 and q. 87, a. 1), there are three sorts of damage that a man incurs by sinning, viz., (a) the stain or blemish of sin (*macula*), (b) the corruption of the natural good (*corruptio naturalis boni*), and (c) the debt of punishment (*reatus poenae*). He incurs the stain of sin insofar as he is deprived of the beauty of grace by the deformity of sin. And the good of nature is corrupted insofar as the man’s nature is disordered by a human will that is not subject to God; for when this order is removed, the result is that the sinful man’s whole nature remains disordered. On the other hand, the debt of punishment is that by which a man, in committing a mortal sin (*peccando mortaliter*), merits eternal damnation.

Now it is clear, with respect to all three of these, that they can be repaired only by God. For since the beauty of grace results from being illuminated by God’s light, such beauty cannot be restored unless God once again does the illuminating; hence, what is required is a habitual gift, i.e., the light of grace. Similarly, the order of nature cannot be repaired in such a way that a man’s will is subject to God unless, as has been explained (a. 6), God draws the man’s will toward Himself. Likewise, the debt of eternal punishment can be remitted only by God, against whom the offense was committed and who is the judge of men.

And so the assistance of grace is required in order for a man to rise up from sin, both (a) in the sense of a habitual gift and (b) in the sense of an interior movement from God.

Reply to objection 1: What is being indicated to a man in this passage involves the act of free choice that is required in the man’s rising up from sin. And so when it says, “Rise up ... and Christ will illuminate you,” this should not be taken to mean that the whole of the rising up from sin precedes the illumination of grace. Rather, it means that when a man, through free choice moved by God, tries to rise up from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace.

Reply to objection 2: Natural reason is not a sufficient principle of the health that exists in a man through justifying grace. Instead, the principle of this health is grace, which is destroyed by sin. And so a man is not able to rise up on his own; instead, he needs the light of grace to be poured into him once again, in the same way that a soul would be poured once again into a dead body that was to be resuscitated.

Reply to objection 3: When nature is integral, then it can be restored on its own to what is appropriate for and proportioned to itself. However, it cannot without exterior assistance be restored to what exceeds its own proportion. So, then, as was explained above, since human nature as it goes

downward through sin does not remain integral but is instead corrupted, it cannot be restored through itself either with respect to the good that is connatural to itself or, *a fortiori*, with respect to the good of supernatural justification.

Article 8

Is a man without grace able not to sin?

It seems that a man without grace is able not to sin:

Objection 1: As Augustine points out in *De Duabus Animabus* and in *De Libero Arbitrio*, no one sins in what he cannot avoid. Therefore, if a man who is in mortal sin is not able to avoid sin, then it seems that in sinning he will not sin—which is absurd.

Objection 2: A man is corrected in order that he might not sin. Therefore, if a man who is in mortal sin is not able not to sin, then it seems that it would be useless to give him correction—which is absurd.

Objection 3: Ecclesiasticus 15:18 says, “Before man is life and death, good and evil; what pleases him shall be given to him.” But someone does not cease to be a man by sinning. Therefore, it is still within his power to choose good or choose evil. And so a man can avoid sin without grace.

But contrary to this: In *De Perfecta Iustitia* Augustine says, “If anyone denies that we should pray not to enter into temptation (and someone denies this if he claims that the assistance of God’s grace is not necessary for a man not to sin, but that, once a man merely receives the Law, the human will is sufficient), I have no doubt that this denial should be obliterated from the ears of everyone and condemned by the mouth of everyone.”

I respond: There are two ways in which we can speak about a man: (a) in accord with the state of *integral nature* and (b) in accord with the state of *corrupted nature*.

With respect to the state of *integral nature*, a man was able not to sin—either mortally or venially—even without habitual grace. For sinning is nothing other than withdrawing from what is in accord with nature, and a man in the integrity of his nature is able to avoid this. However, he was not able to do this without the assistance of God’s conserving him in the good [of his nature]; for if this were taken away, then he would fall into nothingness.

By contrast, in the state of *corrupted nature* a man needs habitual grace healing his nature in order to abstain entirely from sin. In the present life this healing occurs first in the mind, even while the carnal appetite is not yet repaired; hence, in Romans 7:25 the Apostle says in the person of a man who has been restored: “I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin.” As was established above (q. 74, a. 5), in this state a man is able to abstain from mortal sins that exist in reason. However, a man is not able to abstain from every venial sin, and this because of the corruption of the lower appetite of sensuality. To be sure, *each* movement of sensuality is such that the man is able to repress it (and for this reason these movements have the character of sins and of voluntary acts), but he is nonetheless not able to repress *all* of them, since (a) while he is trying to resist the one, another is likely to rise up, and also, as was explained above (q. 74, a. 3), since (b) reason is unable to be ever watchful, so as to avoid movements of this sort.

Similarly, even before man’s reason, in which mortal sin exists, is repaired through justifying grace, each mortal sin is such that reason is able to avoid it (*postest singula peccata mortalia vitare*) and for some time, since it is not necessary for reason to be continually sinning in actuality; but it is impossible for reason to remain without mortal sin for a long time. Hence, in *Super Ezechiel* Gregory says, “A sin that is not erased right away through repentance leads by its momentum (*suo pondere*) to other sins.” The reason for this is that, just as the lower appetite should be subject to reason, so too reason should be subject to God and to posit the end or goal of its will in God (*in ipso constituere finem suae voluntatis*).

But all human acts have to be regulated by the end, in the same way that the movements of the lower appetite ought to be regulated by reason's judgment. Therefore, just as, when the lower appetite is not totally subject to reason, it is impossible that disordered movements should not arise in the sentient appetite, so too, when man's reason is not subject to God, the result is that many disorders occur in the very acts of reason. For since the man does not have his heart fixed on God in such a way that he wills not to be separated from Him for the sake of any good to be pursued or evil to be avoided, many things occur which are such that for the sake of pursuing them or avoiding them, the man withdraws from God by disregarding His precepts (*contemnendo praecepta ipsius*). And in this way he commits mortal sin, mainly because, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, in matters that come up suddenly (*in repentinis*) a man acts according to his preconceived ends and preexistent habits—even though the man is able, by reason's antecedent consideration (*ex praemeditatione rationis*), to do something outside the order of his preconceived ends and outside the inclination of his habits. But since a man cannot always have this sort of antecedent consideration, it is impossible that he should remain for a long time without acting in accord with the natural result of a will not ordered toward God (*secundum consequentiam voluntatis deordinatae a Deo*), unless he is quickly restored through grace to the correct ordering.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, each individual act of sinning is such that a man is able to avoid it; but he is not able to avoid all of them together (*non tamen omnes*) except through grace. And yet since a man's not preparing himself to have grace results from his own defect, his sin is not excused by the fact that he is unable to avoid sin without grace.

Reply to objection 2: Correction is useful, as Augustine puts it in *De Correptione et Gratia*, "when a desire for regeneration arises from the pain of the correction. Yet if a son of the promise is corrected, then while the noise of the correction resounds outwardly and lashes out, God is working and willing in him internally by His hidden inspirations."

Therefore, the reason why correction is necessary is that a man's act of will is required in order for him to abstain from sin; and yet the correction is not sufficient without God's assistance. This is why Ecclesiastes 7:14 says, "Consider the works of God, that no man is able to correct someone whom He has despised."

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in *Hypognosticon*, this passage is to be understood of man in the state of integral nature, when he was as yet not a slave of sin and so was able to sin and able not to sin.

In his present state, too, man is given whatever he wills, but the fact that he wills the good comes from the assistance of grace.

Article 9

Is someone who has already received grace able on his own to do good and avoid evil without any further assistance of grace?

It seems that someone who has already received grace is able on his own to do good and avoid evil without any further assistance of grace (*absque alio auxilio gratiae*):

Objection 1: A thing is either useless or imperfect (*frustra aut imperfectum*) if it does not accomplish what it is given for. But grace is given to us in order that we might be able to do good and avoid sin. Therefore, if a man is not able to do this through grace, then it seems that grace is either useless or else imperfect.

Objection 2: Through grace the Holy Spirit Himself dwells within us—this according to 1 Corinthians 3:16 ("Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwells within you?"). But since the Holy Spirit is omnipotent, He is sufficient to induce us to act well and to guard us from sin. Therefore, a man who has received grace is able to do both of the aforementioned

things without any further assistance of grace.

Objection 3: If a man who has received grace still needed a further assistance of grace in order to live well and to abstain from sin, then, by parity of reasoning, if he received that further assistance of grace, he would still need a further assistance [of grace]. Therefore, there would be an infinite regress—which is absurd. Therefore, someone who is in the state of grace does not need any further assistance of grace in order to act well and to abstain from sin.

But contrary to this: In *De Natura et Gratia* Augustine says, “Just as a fully healthy bodily eye cannot see unless it is aided by the clarity of light, so, too, even a most perfectly justified man cannot live correctly unless he is aided divinely by the eternal light of justice.” But justification comes from grace—this according to Romans 3:24 (“... justified gratuitously by His grace”). Therefore, even a man who already has grace needs the further assistance of grace in order to live correctly.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 5), in order to live correctly, a man needs God’s assistance in two ways: In one way, with respect to a *habitual gift*, through which corrupted human nature is healed and, once healed, is elevated to do works that merit eternal life and that exceed the proportion of nature. In the second way, a man needs the assistance of grace in order *to be moved by God to act*.

Therefore, as regards the first type of assistance, a man in the state of grace (*in gratia existens*) does not need any further assistance in the sense of another infused habit.

However, he does need the other type of assistance of grace, in order, namely, to be moved by God to act correctly—and this for two reasons. First, a general reason, viz., that, as was explained above (a. 1), no created entity is able to proceed into any act except by virtue of God’s moving it (*nisi virtute motionis divinae*). Second, a specific reason, viz., because of the condition of the state of human nature, which, even if it has been healed with respect to the mind, is still such that corruption and infection remain in it with respect to the flesh, through which “it serves the law of sin,” as Romans 7:25 puts it. In addition, a certain darkness of ignorance remains in the intellect and, accordingly, as Romans 8:26 likewise says, “We do not know what to pray for as we ought.” For because of the various turns of events, and because we do not know even our very own selves perfectly, we are not able to know in full what is good for us (*quid expediat nobis*)—this according to Wisdom 9:14 (“The thoughts of mortals are timid, and our counsels uncertain”). And so it is necessary for us to be directed and protected by God, who knows all things and can do all things.

This is why it is proper even for those who have been re-born through grace as children of God to say, “And lead us not into temptation,” and “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven,” and the rest of what is contained in the Lord’s prayer that is relevant in this regard.

Reply to objection 1: The gift of habitual grace is not given to us in order that we might not need any further divine assistance, since every creature needs to be conserved by God in the good that it has received from Him. And so if, after having received grace, a man still needs God’s assistance, one cannot infer that it is useless for the grace to have been given, or that the grace is imperfect. For even in the state of glory, when the grace will be altogether perfect, a man will still need God’s assistance.

Still, as has been explained, in our present state (*hic*) the grace is indeed imperfect in the sense that it does not heal a man totally.

Reply to objection 2: The action of the Holy Spirit by which He moves and protects us is not limited to the effect of the habitual gift that He causes within us. To the contrary, along with the Father and the Son, He moves and protects us beyond this effect.

Reply to objection 3: This argument shows that a man does not need any further *habitual* grace.

Article 10

Does a man in the state of grace need the assistance of grace in order to persevere?

It seems that a man in the state of grace (*in gratia constitutus*) does not need the assistance of grace in order to persevere:

Objection 1: Perseverance is something less than virtue, in the same way that, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, continence is something less than virtue. But in order to have the virtues, a man does not need the assistance of grace other than that assistance by which he is justified. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he does not need the [further] assistance of grace in order to have perseverance.

Objection 2: All the virtues are infused together. But perseverance is counted as a virtue. Therefore, it seems that perseverance is given along with the other virtues infused by grace.

Objection 3: As the Apostle says in Romans 5:20, more was restored through Christ's gift than was lost through Adam's sin. But Adam received that by which he was able to persevere. Therefore, *a fortiori*, our ability to persevere is restored to us through Christ's grace. And so a man does not need [any further] grace in order to persevere.

But contrary to this: In *De Perseverantia* Augustine says, "Why is perseverance begged for from God, if it is not given by God? Wouldn't that prayer be laughable, since one is asking from Him something that He is known not to give, but that is within the man's power even though God doesn't give it?" But perseverance is begged for even by those who are sanctified through grace; this is understood when we say, "Hallowed be Thy name"—something that Augustine confirms in the same place by citing Cyprian's words. Therefore, a man—even a man in the state of grace—needs to be given perseverance by God.

I respond: There are three senses of 'perseverance'.

Sometimes 'perseverance' signifies a habit of the mind through which a man stands firm, lest he be drawn away by pressing sorrows (*per tristitias irruentes*) from what accords with virtue. Taken in this sense, perseverance is related to sorrows in the way that, as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 7, continence is related to sensual desires and pleasures.

In a second sense, 'perseverance' implies a certain habit in accord with which a man adopts the plan to persevere in the good right up to the end.

Now in both of these senses, perseverance is infused together with grace, just as continence is and just as the rest of the virtues are.

In yet another sense, 'perseverance' implies a continuation in the good right up until the end of one's life. And as is clear from the preceding article (a. 9), in order to have this sort of perseverance, a man does not, to be sure, need any further *habitual* grace, but he does need God's assistance directing him and protecting him against the pressure of temptations (*contra impulsus tentationum*). And so after a man is justified through grace, he has to ask God for this gift of perseverance, in order that he might be guarded from evil right up until the end of his life. For there are many men to whom grace is given, but to whom perseverance in grace is not given.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through on the first sense of 'perseverance', just as the second objection goes through on the second sense.

Reply to objection 2: For the same reason, the reply to this objection is clear.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine puts it in *De Natura et Gratia*, "Man in his first state received the gift through which he could persevere, but he did not receive it in order to persevere. Now, however, through the grace of Christ many receive the gift of grace by which they are able to persevere, and it is further granted them that they do in fact persevere." And it is in this sense that Christ's gift is greater than Adam's crime.

Yet a man was more easily able to persevere through the gift of grace in the state of innocence, in which there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, than he is now, when the restoration by

Christ's grace, even if it has begun with respect to the mind, is nonetheless not yet finished with respect to the flesh. This will occur in heaven (*in patria*), where a man will not only be able to persevere, but will also be unable to sin.

QUESTION 110

The Essence of God's Grace

Next we have to consider God's grace with respect to its essence. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is grace an entity of some sort in the soul (*utrum gratia ponat aliquid in anima*)? (2) Is grace a quality? (3) Does grace differ from an infused virtue? (4) What is the subject of grace?

Article 1

Is grace an entity of some sort in the soul?

It seems that grace is not an entity of any sort in the soul:

Objection 1: A man is said to have the grace or favor of another man (*habere gratiam hominis*) in the same way that he is said to have the grace or favor of God (*habere gratiam Dei*); hence, Genesis 39:21 says, "The Lord gave to Joseph favor (*gratiam*) in the eyes of the chief keeper of the prison." But the fact that a man is said to have the grace or favor of some other man does not bespeak any sort of entity in the one who has the grace or favor of the other; instead, it bespeaks some kind of act of acceptance (*acceptatio*) in the one whose grace or favor he has. Therefore, the fact that a man is said to have the grace or favor of God does not bespeak any sort of entity in the soul; instead, the only thing it signifies is God's act of acceptance.

Objection 2: Just as the soul gives life to the body, so God gives life to the soul; hence, Deuteronomy 30:20 says, "He is your life." But the soul gives life to the body without mediation. Therefore, there is likewise nothing that falls between God and the soul. Therefore, grace is not a created entity of any sort in the soul.

Objection 3: A Gloss on Romans 1:7 ("Grace to you and peace") says, "Grace, i.e., the remission of sins ..." But the remission of sins is not an entity of any sort in the soul; rather, it exists in God alone by virtue of his not imputing the sin—this according to Psalm 31:2 ("Blessed is the man to whom the Lord has not imputed sin"). Therefore, neither is grace an entity of any sort in the soul.

But contrary to this: Light is an entity of some sort in the thing that is illuminated. But grace is a sort of light of the soul; hence, in *De Natura et Gratia* Augustine says, "Light deservedly deserts the defamer of the law, and the one who is thus deserted becomes blind." Therefore, grace is an entity of some sort in the soul.

I respond: In the common manner of speaking, there are three ways in which 'grace' is ordinarily understood:

(a) In one way, it is taken for someone's love (*pro dilectione*), as when we say, "The soldier has the king's grace or favor" (*miles habet gratiam regis*), i.e., he is in the king's good graces (*rex habet eum gratum*).

(b) In a second way, it is taken for a gift that is given for free (*pro aliquo dono gratis dato*), as when we say, "I bestow this grace or favor on you" (*hanc gratiam facio tibi*).

(c) In a third way, it is taken for acknowledging in gratitude a benefit that has been freely given (*pro recompensatione beneficii gratis dati*), in accord with which we are said to give thanks for, or 'say grace' over, gifts (*secundum quod dicimur agere gratias beneficiorum*).

Of these three, the second depends on the first; for the result of the love by which someone holds another in his favor or in his good graces is that he freely expends something on his behalf (*ex amore quo aliquis alium gratum habet procedit quod aliquid ei gratis impendat*). On the other hand, the third proceeds from the second, since the action of saying grace or giving thanks (*gratiarum actio*) arises from the benefits that have been freely bestowed.

Thus, with respect to the last two, it is clear that grace is an entity in the one who receives the grace—in the case of the former, it is the very gift that has been given for free, and in the case of the

latter, it is the act of recognizing the gift.

On the other hand, as regards the first, there is a difference to be noted between God's grace or favor and a man's grace or favor. For given that a creature's good comes from God's will, it is from the love by which God loves a creature that any good at all flows into the creature. By contrast, a man's will is moved by a good that already preexists in things, and from this it follows that a man's love is not a total cause of the thing's goodness, but instead presupposes that goodness either in part or in whole.

Therefore, it is clear that some good or other, caused in a creature at some time, follows upon any sort of love on God's part—even if not a good that is coeternal with God's eternal love. And God's love for creatures is thought of as differing, depending on the differences among the sorts of goods:

One sort of love is a *general love* in accord with which God "loves all the things that exist," as Wisdom 11:25 puts it, and in accord with which natural *esse* is bestowed on all things.

The other sort of love is a *special love* in accord with which God draws the rational creature beyond the status of his nature to a participation in the divine good. And with this love He is said to love someone absolutely speaking (*dicitur aliquem diligere simpliciter*), since with this love God wills for the creature an eternal good absolutely speaking, viz., Himself. In this sense, then, what is signified by saying that a man has God's grace or favor is a supernatural entity in the man that comes from God (*significatur quiddam supernaturale in homine a Deo proveniens*).

Sometimes, however, 'God's grace' expresses God's eternal love itself, and in this sense it is also called 'the grace of predestination' insofar as God has predestined or elected (*praedestinavit sive elegit*) certain men gratuitously and not on the basis of merits; for Ephesians 1:5ff. says, "He has predestined us for adoption as his children ... unto the praise of the glory of His grace."

Reply to objection 1: Even when someone is said to have the grace or favor of a *man*, it is understood that in him there exists some entity that is held in favor by that man, just as in the case when someone is said to have the grace or favor of *God*—though in different ways. For what is held in favor by one man in another man is *presupposed* by the former's love, whereas, as has been explained, what is held in favor by God in a man is *caused* by God's love.

Reply to objection 2: God is the life of the soul in the manner of an *efficient* cause, whereas the soul is the life of the body in the manner of a *formal* cause. Now there is nothing that lies between a form and its matter, since the form on its own informs its matter or subject. By contrast, an agent informs its subject not through its substance, but through the form that it causes in the matter.

Reply to objection 3: In *Retractationes* Augustine says, "When I said that grace is the remission of sins, whereas peace lies in reconciliation with God, this should not be taken to mean that peace itself and reconciliation do not belong to general grace. Rather, it should be taken to mean the name 'grace' specifically signifies the remission of sins." Therefore, it is not just the remission of sins that belongs to grace, but many other of God's gifts as well. Moreover, as will become clear below (q. 113, a. 2), even the remission of sins does not occur without some divinely caused effect in us.

Article 2

Is grace a quality of the soul?

It seems that grace is not a quality of the soul:

Objection 1: No quality acts on its own subject, since a quality's action does not exist without the subject's action, and so it would have to be the case that the subject acts on itself. But grace acts on the soul in justifying it. Therefore, grace is not a quality.

Objection 2: A substance is more noble than a quality. But grace is more noble than the nature of the soul, since, as was explained above (q. 109), through grace we can do many things that nature is insufficient for. Therefore, grace is not a quality.

Objection 3: No quality remains after it ceases to exist in a subject. But grace remains, since it is not corrupted. For if it were corrupted, then it would return to nothingness, just as it is created *ex nihilo*—this is why it is called a “new creature” in Galatians 6:15. Therefore, grace is not a quality.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Psalm 103:15 (“... that He might make the face cheerful with oil”) says, “Grace is the splendor of the soul, procuring holy love.” But the splendor of the soul is a certain quality, just as the beauty of the soul is. Therefore, grace is a certain quality.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), when someone is said to have God’s grace or favor, what is signified is that there exists within him an effect of God’s gratuitous will. But it was explained above (q. 109, aa. 1-2 and 5) that there are two ways in which a man is assisted by God’s gratuitous will:

(a) In one way, insofar as a man’s soul is moved by God to know or to will or to do something. And in this mode the gratuitous effect is not a quality in the man, but is instead *a certain movement of the soul*; for as *Physics* 3 says, “The act of the mover in the thing moved is the movement.”

(b) In the second way, a man is assisted by God’s gratuitous will insofar as a *habitual gift* is infused into the soul by God. The reason for this is that it would be inappropriate for God to provide in a lesser way for those creatures whom He loves in order that they might have a supernatural good than for those creatures whom He loves in order that they might have a natural good. Now He provides for natural creatures in such a way that He not only moves them to their natural acts but also gives them certain forms and powers which are the principles of their acts, so that they might be inclined in their own right to acts of this sort. And so the movements by which they are moved by God become connatural to those creatures and easy for them—this according to Wisdom 8:1 (“... and [wisdom] orders all things agreeably” (*suaviter*)). Therefore, *a fortiori*, as regards those beings whom He moves in order that they might have an eternal supernatural good, He infuses into them certain forms, i.e., qualities, by which they might be moved agreeably and promptly by Him toward attaining that eternal good. And in this way the gift of grace is a certain quality.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as grace is a quality, it is said to act on the soul not in the manner of an efficient cause, but in the manner of a formal cause—in the same way that whiteness makes something white, and justice makes someone just.

Reply to objection 2: Every substance is either (a) the very nature of the thing whose substance it is or (b) part of the nature, in the sense in which the matter or the form is called a substance. And since grace lies beyond human nature, it is impossible that it should be either the substance or the substantial form; instead, it is an accidental form that belongs to the soul itself. For what exists as the substance (*substantialiter*) in God exists as an accident (*accidentaliter*) in a soul that is participating in God’s goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. Accordingly, then, since the soul participates imperfectly in God’s goodness, its very participation in God’s goodness, viz., grace, has a less perfect mode of being in the soul than the soul has subsisting in itself (*gratia imperfectiori modo habet esse in anima quam anima in seipsa subsistat*). And yet grace is more noble than the nature of the soul insofar as it is an expression of or participation in God’s goodness—even if not with respect to its mode of being (*non autem quantum ad modum essendi*).

Reply to objection 3: As Boethius says, “The *esse* of an accident is *to exist in* or *to inhere in*” (*accidentis esse est inesse*). Hence, any accident is called an accident not in the sense that it itself has *esse*, but because something exists by means of it. Hence, as *Metaphysics* 7 explains, it is better to say that an accident *belongs to* an entity than that it *is* an entity (*magis dicitur esse entis quam ens*). And since the *coming into being* or *being corrupted* of an entity belongs to that which has *esse*, it follows that, properly speaking, no accident either comes into being or is corrupted; instead, an accident is said to come into being or to be corrupted insofar its subject begins to be or ceases to be actually such-and-such in accord with that accident (*secundum quod subiectum incipit vel desinit esse in actu secundum illum accidens*).

Accordingly, grace is likewise said to be ‘created’ by virtue of the fact that men are ‘created’ in

accord with it, i.e., insofar as they are constituted in a new *esse* ‘out of nothing’, i.e., not because of any merits (*secundum ipsam creantur, idest in novo esse constituuntur ex nihilo, idest non ex meritis*)—this according to Ephesians 2:10 (“... created in Christ Jesus for good works”).

Article 3

Is grace the same as a virtue?

It seems that grace is the same as a virtue (*gratia sit idem quod virtus*):

Objection 1: Augustine claims that operating grace is grace that operates through love, as it says in *De Spiritu et Littera*. But faith that operates through love is a virtue. Therefore, grace is a virtue.

Objection 2: What is defined belongs to whatever the definition belongs to. But the definitions of virtue handed down by both saints and philosophers are appropriate for grace; for grace itself makes the one who has it good and makes his action good, and it is likewise a good quality of the mind by which one lives well, etc. Therefore, grace is a virtue.

Objection 3: Grace is a certain quality. But it is clear that grace is not in the fourth species of quality, i.e., the form and abiding shape of thing, since grace does not belong to a body. Neither is it in the third species, since it is not either a passion or a passible quality—which, as *Physics* 7 proves, are in the sentient part of the soul. Nor, again, is it in the second species, i.e., a natural power or weakness, since grace lies beyond the nature and is not related to the good and the bad in the way that a natural power is. Therefore, what remains is that grace is in the first species of quality, i.e., it is a habit or disposition. But habits of the mind are virtues, since, as was explained above (q. 57, aa. 1 and 2), even knowledge itself is in some sense a virtue. Therefore, grace is the same thing as a virtue.

But contrary to this: If grace is a virtue, then it would seem especially to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is not faith or hope, since these can exist without sanctifying grace (*sine gratia gratum faciente*). Nor, likewise, is it charity, since, as Augustine says in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, “Grace precedes charity.” Therefore, grace is not a virtue.

I respond: Some have claimed that grace and virtue are the same in essence (*idem esse secundum essentiam*) and differ only conceptually (*differre secundum rationem*), so that one and the same thing is called ‘grace’ insofar as it makes man favored by God or insofar as it is given for free, whereas it is called ‘virtue’ insofar as it perfects a man for operating well. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master in *Sentences* 2.

However, if one correctly considers the concept of virtue, then this opinion cannot stand. For as the Philosopher says in *Physics* 7, a virtue is a certain disposition of what is perfect, where I am using ‘perfect’ to mean ‘disposed according to its nature’. From this it is clear that, with respect to any given thing, ‘virtue’ is said in relation to some preexisting nature, viz., when the thing in question is disposed in a way that is congruent with its nature.

Now it is clear that the virtues acquired through human acts, which were discussed above (q. 55ff.), are dispositions by which a man is appropriately disposed in relation to the nature by which he is a man. By contrast, the infused virtues dispose a man in a higher mode and with respect to a higher end, and so they must be related to some higher nature as well. Now they are related to a participated divine nature—this according to 2 Peter 1:4 (“He has given us the greatest and most precious gifts, that by them you might be made partakers in God’s nature”). And because of the reception of this nature, we are said to be generated again as sons of God.

Therefore, just as the natural light of reason is something in addition to the acquired virtues, which are called virtues in relation to the natural light itself, so too the light of grace, which is a participation in God’s nature, is something in addition to the infused virtues, which are derived from that light and are ordered toward that light. Thus, in Ephesians 5:8 the Apostle says, “At one time you were darkness, but

now you are light in the Lord. Walk, then, as children of the light.” For just as the acquired virtues perfect a man in order that he might walk in a way congruent with the light of natural reason, so the infused virtues perfect a man in order that he might walk in a way congruent with the light of grace.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is using the name ‘grace’ for faith operating through love, since the act of faith operating through love is the first act in which sanctifying (or habitual) grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) is made manifest.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Good’ as posited in the definition of virtue expresses a fittingness with respect to a preexistent nature, either an essential nature or a participated nature. But this is not the way in which ‘good’ is attributed to grace. Rather, as has been explained, ‘good’ is attributed to grace as a root of goodness in man.

Reply to objection 3: Grace is traced back to the first species of quality. Yet it is not the same as a virtue; instead, it is a certain habitual condition (*habitus*) that is presupposed by the infused virtues as their source and root (*sicut earum principium et radix*).

Article 4

Is it the essence of the soul that is the subject of grace?

It seems that it not the essence of the soul that is the subject of grace (*gratia non sit in essentia animae sicut in subiecto*):

Objection 1: In *Hypognosticon* Augustine says that grace is related to the will, or to free choice, “as a rider to his horse.” But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 83, a. 2), the will, or free choice, is a certain power. Therefore, it is a power of the soul that grace has as its subject (*gratia est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto*).

Objection 2: As Augustine says, “Man’s merits begin with grace.” But merit consists in an act that proceeds from a power. Therefore, it seems that grace is the perfection of some power of the soul.

Objection 3: If the essence of the soul were the proper subject of grace, then the soul would have to have a capacity for grace insofar as it has an essence. But this is false, since then it would follow that every soul has a capacity for grace. Therefore, it is not the essence of the soul that is the proper subject of grace.

Objection 4: The soul’s essence is prior to its powers. But what is prior is such that one can think of it without thinking of what is posterior to it. Therefore, it will follow that one can think of grace in the soul without thinking of any part or power of the soul—more specifically, without thinking of the will or the intellect or anything of this sort. But this is absurd.

But contrary to this: Through grace we are generated again as sons of God. But generation terminates in an essence prior to terminating in its powers. Therefore, grace is in the essence of the soul prior to its being in the soul’s powers.

I respond: This question depends on the preceding one. For if grace is the same as a virtue, then it has to have a power of the soul as its subject (*necesse est quod sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto*), since, as was explained above (q. 56, a. 1), it is a power of the soul that is the proper subject of a virtue. By contrast, if grace differs from a virtue, then one cannot claim that the subject of grace is a power of the soul, since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 1 and q. 56, a. 1), every perfection of a power of the soul has the character of a virtue.

Hence, what remains is that just as grace is prior to virtue, so too it has a subject that is prior to the powers of the soul—in such a way, namely, that it is in the essence of the soul. For just as by his intellective power a man participates in God’s cognition through the virtue of faith, and just as by his power of will he participates in God’s love through the virtue of charity, so, too, by the nature of his soul

he participates in God's nature, in accord with a certain likeness, by being in a way generated or created again (*per quandam regenerationem sive recreationem*).

Reply to objection 1: Just as the soul's powers, which are the principles of its works, flow from its essence, so too the virtues flow from grace itself into the soul's powers, and through these virtues the powers are moved to their acts. Accordingly, grace is related to the will as a mover to what is moved—which is the relation of a rider to a horse—and not as an accident to a subject.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection. For grace is a principle of meritorious works through the mediation of the virtues, in the same way that the essence of the soul is the principle of vital operations by the mediation of the powers.

Reply to objection 3: The soul is the subject of grace insofar as it is in the species *intellectual* (or *rational*) nature. But the soul is not constituted in this species by any power, since the powers are natural properties of the soul that follow upon the species. And so it is in its essence that the [rational] soul differs in species from other kinds of soul, viz., the souls of brute animals and of plants. For this reason, it does not follow that if the human soul's essence is the subject of grace, then any soul whatsoever can be the subject of grace. For being the subject of grace is fitting for the essence of the soul insofar as the soul belongs to this particular species (*inquantum est talis speciei*).

Reply to objection 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural properties that follow from the species, the soul cannot exist without them. But even if it did exist without them, the soul would still be called *intellectual* (or *rational*) in accord with its species—not because it would have those powers in actuality, but because of the species of the sort of essence from which the relevant powers are apt to flow.

QUESTION 111

The Divisions of Grace

Next we have to consider the divisions of grace. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Is grace appropriately divided into gratuitously given grace (*gratia gratis data*) and sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*)? (2) Is sanctifying grace appropriately divided into operating grace (*gratia operans*) and cooperating grace (*gratia cooperans*)? (3) Is sanctifying grace appropriately divided into prevenient grace (*gratia preveniens*) and subsequent grace (*gratia subsequens*)? (4) What are the divisions of gratuitously given grace? (5) What is the relation between sanctifying grace and gratuitously given grace?

Article 1

Is grace appropriately divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitously given grace?

It seems that grace is not appropriately divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitously given grace (*gratia non convenienter dividatur per gratiam gratum facientem et gratiam gratis datam*):

Objection 1: As is clear from what has been explained above (q. 110, a. 1), grace is a certain sort of gift from God. But it is not because something has been given to a man by God that the man is in God's grace or favor (*ideo non est Deo gratus quia aliquid est ei datum a Deo*); instead, it is just the opposite. For something is freely given to someone by God because he is a man in God's grace or favor. Therefore, there is no such thing as sanctifying grace, i.e., grace that puts one in God's grace or favor (*nulla est gratia gratum faciens*).

Objection 2: Things that are given but not on the basis of preceding merits are given gratuitously. But the good of nature is itself likewise given to a man without any preceding merit, since nature is presupposed for merit. Therefore, nature itself is likewise gratuitously given by God. But nature is divided off from grace. Therefore, it is inappropriate that *gratuitously given* should be posited as one of the differences that divides *grace*, given that it is also found outside the genus *grace*.

Objection 3: Every division should be made by means of opposites. But even sanctifying grace itself, through which we are justified, is given to us gratuitously by God—this according to Romans 3:24 (“... having been justified gratuitously by His grace”). Therefore, sanctifying grace should not be divided off from gratuitously given grace.

But contrary to this: The Apostle attributes both things to grace, viz., (a) that it puts one into God's favor (*gratum facere*), and (b) that it is given gratuitously. With respect to the former he says in Ephesians 1:6, “He has graced us in His beloved Son.” With respect to the latter, he says in Romans 11:6, “And if by grace, it is not now by works; otherwise, grace is no longer grace.” Therefore, grace that has just one of these features can be distinguished from grace that has both of them.

I respond: As the Apostle says in Romans 13:1, “Things that are from God are well-ordered.” Now as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, the order of things consists in some things being led back to God through other things. Therefore, since grace is ordered toward man's being led back to God, this is done in a certain order, viz., with some being led back to God by others.

Accordingly, there are two kinds of grace:

(a) One kind of grace is such that through it a man is himself joined to God, and this is called *sanctifying grace* (*gratia gratum faciens*)

(b) On the other hand, the second kind of grace is such that through it one man cooperates with another in order to be led back to God. Now a gift of this sort is called *gratuitously given grace* (*gratia gratis data*), since (a) it lies beyond the power of nature and (b) is given to a man beyond his personal merits (*supra meritum personae*); however, because it is given not in order that the man himself should be justified by it, but rather in order that he cooperate in the justification of others, it is not called

sanctifying grace. And it is of this kind of grace that the Apostle is speaking in 1 Corinthians 12:7, “To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit for its usefulness,” viz., its usefulness for others.

Reply to objection 1: Grace is said to put one in God’s favor not as an *efficient* cause, but as a *formal* cause (*non effective sed formaliter*), since through it a man is justified and made worthy of being said to be in God’s grace or favor—this according to Colossians 1:12 (“He has made us worthy of sharing the lot of the saints in light”).

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as grace is given *gratuitously*, what is excluded is the character of a debt. Now there are two ways in which a debt can be thought of:

(a) In one way, the debt arises from merit and is owed to the person who does the meritorious works (*quod refertur ad personam cuius est agere meritoria opera*)—this according to Romans 4:4 (“To someone who works, the reward is imputed as a debt and not according to grace”).

(b) In the second way, the debt is based on the constitution of a nature (*ex conditione naturae*), as when we say that it is owed to man that he should have reason and the other things that pertain to human nature.

It is not because God is under obligation to a creature that ‘debt’ is used in either of these senses; rather, it is because a creature ought to be subject to God in order that God’s ordination might be fulfilled in it, and God’s ordination is that such-and-such a nature should have such-and-such a constitution and properties, and that doing such-and-such should follow upon such-and-such a constitution and properties.

Therefore, natural gifts are not owed in the first sense of ‘debt’, but they are owed in the second sense (*dona naturalia carent primo debito, non autem carent secundo debito*). On the other hand, supernatural gifts are not owed in either sense (*dona supernaturalia utroque debito carent*), and so they deserve the name ‘grace’ in a more special way.

Reply to objection 3: Sanctifying grace adds something that (a) is over and beyond the character of gratuitously given grace and that also (b) pertains to the character of grace, viz., it puts a man into God’s grace or favor. And so the gratuitously given grace that does not do this retains the name that is common to them, as happens in many other cases. And it is in this sense that the two parts of the division are opposed to one another as *sanctifying* and *non-sanctifying*.

Article 2

Is grace appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace?

It seems that grace is not appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace:

Objection 1: As was explained above (qu. 110, a. 2), grace is a certain accident. But an accident cannot act on its own subject. Therefore, no kind of grace should be called ‘operating grace’.

Objection 2: If grace effects anything within us, then it especially effects justification. But it is not grace alone that effects this within us; for in his commentary on John 14:12 (“The works that I do he also shall do”) Augustine says, “He who created you without you, will not justify you without you.” Therefore, no kind of grace should be called simply ‘operating grace’.

Objection 3: Cooperating with someone seems to belong to a lower agent and not to a more principal agent. But grace operates within us as a more principal agent than free choice (*gratia principalius operatur in nobis quam liberum arbitrium*)—this according to Romans 9:16 (“It is not of him who wills or of him who runs, but of God, who shows mercy”) Therefore, no kind of grace should be called ‘cooperating grace’.

Objection 4: A division ought to be made by appeal to opposites. But *operating* and *cooperating* are not opposites, since one and the same thing can both operate and cooperate. Therefore, grace is not appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace.

But contrary to this: In *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “By cooperating, God

brings to completion within us what He begins by operating. For He Himself operates at the beginning in order that we might will, and He cooperates with those who will in order to perfect them.” But the operations of God by which He moves us toward the good pertain to grace. Therefore, grace is appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 109, aa. 2 and 3 and 9, and q. 110, a. 2), there are two ways in which grace can be thought of: (a) as a divine assistance by which God moves us to will correctly and act correctly, and (b) as a habitual gift that is poured into us by God. Now grace taken in either of these senses is appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace:

(a) The operation with respect to a given effect is attributed not to the thing being moved but instead to the thing that effects the movement. Thus, in case of that effect in which our mind is moved but is not effecting the movement, whereas God alone is effecting the movement, the operation is attributed to God and the grace is accordingly called *operating grace*. On the other hand, in the case of that effect in which our mind is both effecting the movement and being moved, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to our soul and the grace is accordingly called *cooperating grace*.

Now there are two sorts of acts within us:

(i) The first is an *interior act of the will*. And as regards this sort of act, the will is being moved, whereas God is effecting the movement—especially when the will begins to will what is good after having willed what is bad prior to this (*praesertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle quae prius malum volebat*). And so insofar as God is moving the human mind to its act, the grace is called *operating grace*.

(ii) The second is the *exterior act*, which, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 9), is commanded by the will; the result is that the operation with respect to this act is attributed to the will. And since God, too, assists us with respect to this act—both by interiorly strengthening the will to arrive at the act and by exteriorly providing the power to operate—the grace is called *cooperating grace* with respect to this act. Hence, after the passage quoted above, Augustine adds, “He operates in order that we might will, and when we will, He cooperates with us in order that we might bring the act to completion.”

Therefore, if ‘grace’ is being taken for the gratuitous motion of God’s by which He moves us to a meritorious good, then grace is appropriately divided into operating grace and cooperating grace.

(b) On the other hand, if ‘grace’ is being taken for a habitual gift, then, just as with any other form, grace has two effects, the first of which is *esse*, and the second of which is *operation*, in the way that the operation of heat is make something hot and an exterior act of heating (*sicut caloris operatio est facere calidum et exterior calefactio*).

So, then, insofar as habitual grace heals or justifies the soul, or puts the soul into God’s favor, it is called *operating grace*, whereas insofar as it is a principle of the meritorious works that also proceed from free choice, it is called *cooperating grace*.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as grace is a certain accidental quality, it acts on the soul not as an efficient cause but as a formal case, in the way that whiteness is said to make a surface white.

Reply to objection 2: God does not justify us without us in the sense that while we are being justified we consent to God’s justice by a movement of free choice. However, that movement is an *effect* of grace and not a *cause* of grace. Hence, the operation as a whole belongs to grace.

Reply to objection 3: Someone is said to cooperate with another not only as a secondary agent with a principal agent, but also as an assisting agent with respect to a presupposed end. Now through operating grace a man is assisted by God in order to will the good. And so, with the end already presupposed, the result is that the grace cooperates with us.

Reply to objection 4: Operating grace and cooperating grace are the same grace, but, as is clear from what has been said, they are distinguished by their diverse effects.

Article 3

Is grace appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace?

It seems that grace is not appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace:

Objection 1: Grace is an effect of God's love. But God's love is always prevenient and never subsequent—this according to 1 John 4:10 ("It is not that we have loved God, but that He has first loved us"). Therefore, one should not posit both prevenient grace and subsequent grace.

Objection 2: Sanctifying grace is just a single thing in a man, since it is sufficient—this according to 2 Corinthians 12:9 ("My grace is sufficient for you"). But being prior is not the same as being posterior. Therefore, grace is not appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace.

Objection 3: Grace is known through its effects. But grace has infinitely many effects, one of which precedes another. Therefore, if, given this, grace were to be divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace, it seems that there would be infinitely many species of grace. But infinities are ignored by every art. Therefore, grace is not appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace.

But contrary to this: God's grace proceeds from His mercy. But we read both things in the Psalms: "His mercy shall precede me," and, again, "His mercy shall follow me." Therefore, grace is appropriately divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace

I respond: Just as grace is divided into operating grace and cooperating grace because of its diverse effects, so, too, in whatever sense 'grace' is taken, grace is divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace.

Now there are five effects of grace in us:

- (a) The soul is healed.
- (b) The soul wills the good.
- (c) The soul efficaciously does the good that it wills.
- (d) The soul perseveres in the good.
- (e) The soul attains glory.

And so insofar as grace causes the first effect in us, it is called *prevenient* with respect to the second effect, and insofar as it causes the second effect in us, it is called *subsequent* with respect to the first effect. And just as a given effect is posterior to one effect and prior to another, so as regards one and the same effect, grace can be called both prevenient and subsequent in different respects. This is the point Augustine is making in *De Natura et Gratia*: "It is prevenient in order that we might be healed, and it is subsequent in order that, having been healed, we might be invigorated; it is prevenient in order that we might be called, and it is subsequent in order that we might be glorified."

Reply to objection 1: 'God's love' names something eternal, and so it can never be called anything but prevenient. But 'grace' signifies a temporal effect that can precede one thing and be subsequent to another. And so grace can be called prevenient and subsequent.

Reply to objection 2: The fact that it is both prevenient and subsequent does not make grace diverse *in its essence*, but instead makes it diverse *only with respect to its effects*—in the same sense that was explained above (a. 2) concerning operating grace and cooperating grace.

Likewise, the fact that subsequent grace pertains to glory does not make it numerically different from the prevenient grace through which we are now justified. For just as the charity of our earthly pilgrimage (*caritas viae*) is not laid aside in heaven but is instead perfected, so the same should be said of the light of grace. For in their concepts, neither charity nor grace implies any imperfection.

Reply to objection 3: Even if the effects of grace can be infinitely many, in just the way that human acts are infinitely many, still, all of them are traced back to things that are determinate in species. Furthermore, all agree in the fact that one precedes another.

Article 4

Does the Apostle appropriately distinguish the kinds of gratuitously given grace ?

It seems that the Apostle does not appropriately distinguish the kinds of gratuitously given grace:

Objection 1: Every gift that is given to us gratuitously by God can be called a gratuitously given grace. But there are infinitely many gifts which (a) are given to us gratuitously by God, among both goods of the soul and goods of the body, and yet which (b) are not sanctifying (*quae tamen nos Deo gratos non faciunt*). Therefore, gratuitously given grace cannot be comprehended under any fixed divisions.

Objection 2: Gratuitously given grace is distinguished from sanctifying grace. But faith (*fides*) has to do with sanctifying grace, since we are justified by it—this according to Romans 5:1 (“... having therefore been justified by grace, etc.”). Therefore, it is inappropriate to put faith among the gratuitously given graces, especially since the other virtues such as hope and charity are not put there.

Objection 3: The working of healings (*operatio sanitatum*), along with speaking in different tongues (*loqui diversa genera linguarum*), are miracles of a certain sort. Again, the interpretation of tongues (*interpretatio sermonum*) pertains to wisdom or knowledge—this according to Daniel 1:17 (“And to these young men God gave knowledge and learning in every book and wisdom”). Therefore, it is inappropriate to divide the grace of the working of healings and speaking in different of tongues from the working of miracles (*operatio virtutum*), and to divide the interpretation of tongues from the word of wisdom and knowledge (*sermo sapientiae et sermo scientiae*).

Objection 4: Just as wisdom and knowledge are certain gifts of the Holy Spirit, so too, as was explained above (q. 68, a. 4), are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear. Therefore, these, too, should have been posited among the gratuitously given graces.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 12:8-10 the Apostle says, “To one, indeed, by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom (*sermo sapientiae*); and to another, the word of knowledge (*sermo scientiae*), according to the same Spirit; to another, faith (*fides*), in the same Spirit; to another, the grace to work healings (*gratia sanitatum*); to another, the working of miracles (*operationes virtutum*); to another, prophecy (*prophetia*); to another, the discerning of spirits (*discretio spirituum*); to another, diverse kinds of tongues (*genera linguarum*); to another, the interpretation of tongues (*interpretatio sermonum*).”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), gratuitously given grace is ordered toward one man’s cooperating with others in order that they might be led back to God. But a man cannot accomplish this by effecting an interior movement in the others, since this belongs to God alone; rather, he can accomplish it only exteriorly, by teaching and persuading. And so gratuitously given graces include those which a man needs for instructing others in those divine matters that lie beyond reason.

Now three things are required for this: (a) that the man be given a fullness of cognition of divine things, so that on this basis he might be able to instruct others; (b) that he be able to confirm or prove the claims he makes, since otherwise his teaching might not be efficacious; and (c) that he be able to present the things he understands to his hearers in an appropriate way.

As regards the first of these, three things are necessary, as is obvious in the case of a human teacher:

First of all, the one who is charged with instructing another in a given science has to be such that the principles of that science are absolutely certain to him. And in this regard what is posited is *faith*, which is certitude with respect to the invisible realities that are presupposed as principles in Catholic doctrine.

Second, the teacher has to have the correct relation to the main conclusions of the science. And in this regard what is posited is the *word of wisdom*, i.e., the cognition of divine matters.

Third, he has to abound in examples and in his cognition of the effects through which he must sometimes make known their causes. And in this regard what is posited is the *word of knowledge*, i.e.,

the cognition of human matters; for “the invisible things of God ... are clearly seen ... through the things that have been made” (Romans 1:20).

Now in those things that are subject to reason, confirmation comes through arguments. By contrast, in those things that are revealed by God beyond reason, confirmation comes through the things proper to God’s power—and this in two ways:

First, in such a way that the teacher of sacred doctrine does, in miraculous works, what only God is able to do, whether (a) these works are ordered toward the health of bodies, and in this regard what is posited is the grace *to work healings*, or whether (b) they are ordered solely to the manifestation of God’s power, e.g., the sun’s standing still or being darkened, or the sea’s being divided, and in this regard what is posited is the *working of miracles*.

Second, in such a way that the teacher of sacred doctrine is able to make manifest things that only God knows. And these things are (a) future contingents, and in this regard what is posited is *prophecy*, and also (b) the secrets of the heart, and in this regard what is posited is the *discerning of spirits*.

Now the power of proclaiming (*facultas pronuntiandi*) can occur either (a) with respect to the languages in which someone can be understood, and accordingly what is posited is the *diverse kinds of tongues*, or (b) with respect to understanding the things that are said, and in this regard what is posited is the *interpretation of tongues*.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 1), not all gifts that are given to us by God are called gratuitously given graces, but only those that exceed the power of nature, e.g., that a fisherman should abound in the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge, etc. And these are the sorts of gifts that are included here under *gratuitously given grace*.

Reply to objection 2: Faith is counted here not insofar as it is a virtue that justifies a man in himself, but insofar as it implies a certain preeminent certitude of faith, on the basis of which a man is especially capable of instructing others about those things that pertain to the faith. By contrast, hope and charity pertain to the appetitive power, since it is through the appetitive power that a man is ordered toward God.

Reply to objection 3: The grace to work healings is distinguished from the general working of miracles by the fact that it has a special character that induces one to faith. For someone is rendered more ready for faith through the gift of corporeal health which he has received through the power of faith.

Similarly, speaking in various tongues and interpreting tongues have certain special characters for moving others to faith, and so they are posited as special gratuitously given graces.

Reply to objection 4: Wisdom and knowledge are not counted among the gratuitously given graces by reason of the fact they are enumerated among the gifts of Holy Spirit, viz., insofar as a man’s mind is able to be moved easily by the Holy Spirit to what belongs to wisdom or knowledge; for, as was explained above (q. 68, aa. 1 and 4), this is how it is with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Instead, wisdom and knowledge are counted among the gratuitously given graces insofar as they imply a certain abundance of knowledge and wisdom, with the result that the man is not only able to be appropriately wise about divine things in his own case, but is also able to instruct others and to refute opponents. And the reason why the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge are prominently placed among the gratuitously given graces is that, as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 14, “It is one thing to know merely what a man ought to believe in order to attain the happy life; it is another thing to know the way in which this enriches the pious and is defended against the impious.”

Article 5

Is gratuitously given grace superior to sanctifying grace?

It seems that gratuitously given grace is superior to (*dignior quam*) sanctifying grace:

Objection 1: As Aristotle says in *Ethics* 1, “The good of a nation is better than the good of one man.” But sanctifying grace is ordered toward the good of just one man, whereas gratuitously given grace, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 4), is ordered toward the common good of the whole Church. Therefore, gratuitously given grace is superior to sanctifying grace.

Objection 2: It takes more power (*maioris virtutis est*) for a given thing to act on another than for it simply to be perfected in itself; for instance, the brightness of a body that is also able to illuminate other bodies is greater than the brightness of a body that shines in its own right in such a way that it is unable to illuminate other bodies. For this reason, in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher says, “The most outstanding virtue is justice, through which a man is correctly related to others as well.” But it is through sanctifying grace that a man is perfected in his own right, whereas it is through gratuitously given grace that a man works for the perfection of others. Therefore, gratuitously given grace is superior to sanctifying grace.

Objection 3: What is proper to those who are better is more excellent than what is common to the many; for instance, to reason discursively, which is proper to man, is more excellent than sensing, which is common to all the animals. But sanctifying grace is common to all the members of the Church, whereas gratuitously given grace is the proper gift of the more excellent members of the Church. Therefore, gratuitously given grace is more excellent than sanctifying grace.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 12:31, after having enumerated the gratuitously given graces, the Apostle adds, “I show you a still more excellent way,” and as become clear from what follows, he is talking about charity, which pertains to sanctifying grace. Therefore, sanctifying grace is more excellent than gratuitously given grace.

I respond: A power (*virtus*) is more excellent to the extent that it is ordered to a higher good. And it is always the case that the end is more important (*potior*) than the means to that end.

Now sanctifying grace orders a man directly to being joined with his ultimate end. By contrast, gratuitously given graces order a man toward things that are preparatory for the ultimate end; for instance, through prophecies and miracles and other things of this sort men are led toward being joined to their ultimate end. And so sanctifying grace is much more excellent than gratuitously given grace.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 7, the good of a multitude is twofold. There is one sort of good that exists within the multitude itself, e.g., the ordering within an army. But there is another sort of good that is separate from the multitude, e.g., the good of the leader; and this good is better, because the other good is also ordered toward it.

Now gratuitously given grace is ordered toward the common good of the Church, which is the ordering within the Church (*ordo ecclesiasticus*); but sanctifying grace is ordered toward a common separate good, viz., God Himself. And this is why sanctifying grace is more excellent.

Reply to objection 2: If gratuitously given grace were able effect in another what a man attains through sanctifying grace, then it would follow that gratuitously given grace is more excellent, in just the way that the brightness of the illuminating sun is more excellent than the brightness of an illuminated body. But a man is not able, through gratuitously given grace, to cause another to be joined to God, which is what he himself has through sanctifying grace. And so gratuitously given grace need not be more excellent—just as, in the case of a fire, the heat that manifests the fire’s species and through which the fire acts to induce heat in another is not more excellent than the substantial form of the fire.

Reply to objection 3: Sensing is ordered toward discursive reasoning as its end, and this is why discursive reasoning is more excellent. But in the present case the opposite holds, since what is proper is ordered toward what is common as its end. And so there is no parallel.

QUESTION 112

The Cause of Grace

Next we have to consider the causes of grace. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Is God alone an efficient cause of grace? (2) Is any disposition toward grace required on the part of the one who receives the grace, through an act of free choice? (3) Can this sort of disposition be a necessity for grace? (4) Is grace equal in everyone? (5) Can someone know that he has grace?

Article 1

Is God alone a cause of grace?

It seems not to be the case that God alone is a cause of grace:

Objection 1: John 1:17 says, “Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.” But in the name ‘Jesus Christ’ one understands not just the divine nature that assumes, but also the created nature that is assumed. Therefore, some creature is able to be a cause of grace.

Objection 2: The difference posited between the sacraments of the New Law and the sacraments of the Old Law is that the sacraments of the New Law are a cause of the grace which the sacraments of the Old Law merely signified. But the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is a cause of grace.

Objection 3: According to Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, the angels cleanse, illuminate, and perfect both lower angels and men. But a rational creature is cleansed and illuminated and perfected through grace. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is a cause of grace.

But contrary to this: Psalm 83:12 says, “The Lord will give grace and glory.”

I respond: No entity is able to act beyond its species, since it must always be the case that a cause is more powerful (*potior*) than its effect. But the gift of grace exceeds every power of created nature, since it is nothing other than a certain participation in God’s nature, which exceeds every other nature. And so it is impossible for any creature to be a cause of grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify (*deificet*), by communicating a share of the divine nature through a certain participation in His likeness, as that it is impossible that anything other than fire alone should produce fire.

Reply to objection 1: As Damascene puts it in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, Christ’s human nature (*humanitas Christi*) is “like an instrument (*organum*)” of His divinity. But an instrument effects the principal agent’s action not by its own power but by the power of the principal agent. And so Christ’s human nature is a cause of grace not by its own power, but by the power of the adjoined divine nature (*sed virtute divinitatis adiunctae*), by virtue of which the actions of Christ’s human nature are salvific (*ex qua actiones humanitatis Christi sunt salutes*).

Reply to objection 2: Just as, in the very person of Christ, the human nature is a cause of our salvation through grace, with the divine power acting as the principal cause, so, too, in the sacraments of the New Law, which flow from Christ (*quae derivantur a Christo*), grace is caused instrumentally, as it were, through the sacraments themselves, whereas it is caused principally by the power of the Holy Spirit operating in the sacraments—this according to John 3:5 (“Unless a man be born again from water and Holy Spirit, etc.”).

Reply to objection 3: An angel cleanses, illuminates, and perfects an angel or a man by means of some sort of instruction, and not by justifying him through grace (*per modum instructionis cuiusdam, non autem iustificando per gratiam*). Hence, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says that this sort of cleansing, illuminating, and perfecting is “nothing other than the reception of divine knowledge.”

Article 2

Is any preparation or disposition for grace required on the part of a man?

It seems that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on the part of a man:

Objection 1: In Romans 4:4 the Apostle says, “To someone who works, the reward is imputed as a debt and not according to grace.” But a man’s preparation through free choice occurs only through some work (*non nisi per aliquam operationem*). Therefore, the character of grace would be destroyed.

Objection 2: Someone who persists in his sin is not preparing himself to have grace. But grace has been given to some who were persisting in their sin, as is clear in the case of Paul, who, as Acts 9:1 reports, received grace even while he was “breathing threats and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord.” Therefore, no preparation for grace is required on the part of a man.

Objection 3: An agent with infinite power does not require a disposition on the part of the matter, since he does not even require matter itself; this is clear in the case of the act of creating, since this act is compared with the giving of grace, which is itself called “a new creature” in Galatians 6:15. But as has been explained (a. 1), only God, who has infinite power, is a cause of grace. Therefore, no preparation is required on the part of a man for receiving grace.

But contrary to this: Amos 4:12 says, “Prepare to meet your God, O Israel,” and 1 Kings 7:3 says, “Prepare your hearts for the Lord”.

I respond: As has been explained above (q. 109, aa. 2 and 3 and 6 and 9, and q. 110, a. 2, and q. 111, a. 2), ‘grace’ is said in two ways: (a) sometimes for God’s habitual gift itself and (b) sometimes for God’s assistance in moving the soul toward the good.

Thus, on the first way of taking ‘grace’, some preparation for grace is needed for grace, since no form can exist except in disposed matter.

However, if we are speaking of ‘grace’ insofar as it signifies God’s assistance in moving the soul toward the good, then no preparation is required on the part of a man in the sense of something that precedes God’s assistance. To the contrary, any preparation that can exist in a man is itself from God’s assistance in moving the soul toward the good. Accordingly, the good movement of free choice by which someone is prepared to receive the gift of grace is itself an act of free choice as moved by God, and it is in this respect that a man is said to prepare himself—this according to Proverbs 16:1 (“It is the part of man to prepare his mind”). This movement is from God as a principal cause (*principaliter a Deo*) moving the faculty of free choice and, accordingly, a man’s will is said to be prepared by God and a man’s steps to be directed by the Lord (Psalm 36:23).

Reply to objection 1: A man’s act of preparing (*preparatio*) to have grace is something simultaneous with the very infusion of the grace. And such an operation is, to be sure, meritorious; however, it merits not *grace*, which is already had, but instead *glory*, which is not yet had.

Now there is another, imperfect act of preparing for grace that sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace and yet is still from God as a mover. However, as long as the man has not yet been justified through grace, this sort of act is not sufficient for merit. For as will be explained below (q. 114, a. 2), there can be no merit except on the basis of grace.

Reply to objection 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God comes in first and moves him toward the good (*nisi Deo eum praeveniente et movente ad bonum*), it does not matter whether someone comes to complete preparation quickly or little by little. For Ecclesiasticus 11:23 says, “It is easy in God’s eyes to make a poor man rich all of a sudden.”

Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man toward some good, but not toward a perfect good; and this sort of preparation precedes grace. However, He sometimes moves a man toward the good completely and instantaneously (*statim perfecte*), and the man receives grace suddenly—this according to John 6:45 (“Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me”). And this is the way

it happened with Paul, since while he was still persisting in his sin, his heart was moved suddenly and perfectly by God to listen and to learn and to come. And in this way he received grace all of a sudden.

Reply to objection 3: An agent with infinite power does not need matter or the disposition of matter in the way that they are presupposed by the action of some other cause. However, it must still be the case that, in keeping with the constitution of the thing to be caused, the agent causes within that thing itself its matter and the appropriate disposition for its form. Likewise, in order for God to infuse grace into a soul, there is no preparation required that He does not bring about Himself.

Article 3

Must grace necessarily be given to someone who prepares himself for grace or who does what is within his power?

It seems that grace must necessarily be given to someone who prepares himself for grace or who does what is within his power (*ex necessitate detur gratia se praeeparanti ad gratiam, vel facienti quod in se est*):

Objection 1: A Gloss on Romans 5:1 (“Having been justified by faith, let us have peace”) says, “God accepts the one who flees to Him; otherwise, there would be iniquity in Him.” But it is impossible for there to be iniquity in God. Therefore, it is impossible for God not to accept someone who flees to Him. Therefore, he must necessarily receive grace.

Objection 2: In *De Casu Diaboli* Anselm says, “The reason why God did not give the devil grace is that he willed not to accept it; nor was he prepared for it.” But when the cause is removed, the effect is necessarily removed. Therefore, if someone wills to accept grace, then it must necessarily be given to him.

Objection 3: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is communicative of itself. But the good of grace is better than the good of nature. Therefore, since a natural form must necessarily come to a disposed matter, it seems that, *a fortiori*, grace must necessarily be given to someone who prepares himself for grace.

But contrary to this: A man is related to God as clay to a potter—this according to Jeremiah 18:6 (“As clay is in the hand of a potter, so you are in my hand”). But no matter how the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive a form from the potter. Therefore, no matter how a man prepares himself, he does not receive grace from God necessarily.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), a man’s act of preparing for grace comes *from God* as a mover and *from free choice* as what is moved. Therefore, there are two possible ways to consider the act of preparing:

(a) First, insofar as it comes from free choice. In this regard, the act has no necessity of attaining grace, since the gift of grace exceeds all the preparation that belongs to human power.

(b) Second, the act can be considered insofar as it is from God as a mover. And in this case it does have a necessity with respect to that toward which it is ordered by God—not a necessity of coercion, but a necessity of infallibility (*non quidem coactionis sed infallibilitatis*), since God’s intention cannot fail. This accords with what Augustine says in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*: “Whoever is liberated through God’s gifts is liberated with absolute certitude.” Hence, if it is God’s intention as mover that a man whose heart He is moving should receive grace, then the man infallibly receives it—this according to John 6:45 (“Everyone that has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me”).

Reply to objection 1: The Gloss in question is talking about someone who flees to God through a meritorious act of free choice as already informed by grace, where it would be contrary to the justice that God Himself has established if the man were not to receive grace.

Alternatively, if the Gloss is referring to a movement of free choice before grace, then it is speaking in such a way that the man's very fleeing to God comes through God's motion, which cannot fall short of what is just.

Reply to objection 2: The first cause of a lack of grace comes from us, whereas the first cause of the reception of grace comes from God—this according to Hosea 13:9 (“The perdition, O Israel, is yours; your help is only from me”).

Reply to objection 3: Even among natural things, the disposition of the matter necessarily follows upon the form only through the power of the agent that causes the disposition.

Article 4

Is grace greater in one man than in another?

It seems that grace is not greater in one man than in another:

Objection 1: As has been explained (q. 110, a. 4), grace is caused in us by God's love. But Wisdom 6:8 says, “He has made the little and the great, and He cares equally for all.” Therefore, everyone receives grace equally from Him.

Objection 2: What is said in the superlative does not admit of more and less (*ea quae in summo dicuntur non recipiunt magis et minus*). But ‘grace’ is said in the superlative, since grace joins one to the ultimate end. Therefore, it does not admit of more and less. Therefore, it is not greater in one man than in another.

Objection 3: In the sense explained above (q. 110, a. 1), grace is the life of the soul. But ‘to live’ does not admit of more and less. Therefore, neither does ‘grace’.

But contrary to this: Ephesians 4:7 says, “To each of us grace is given according to the measure of Christ's giving.” But what is given in a measured way is not given equally to all. Therefore, it is not the case that all have equal grace.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 52, aa. 1 and 2, and q. 66, aa. 1 and 2), there are two possible ways to measure the greatness of a habit: (a) the one based on the habit's *end* or *object*, in accord with which one virtue is more noble than another to the extent that it is ordered toward a greater good; and (b) the other based on the *subject*, which participates to a greater or lesser degree in the inhering habit.

Therefore, in accord with the first measure of greatness, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or lesser, since by its nature grace joins a man to the highest good, viz., God.

However, on the part of the subject grace can admit of more and less, viz., insofar as one individual is illuminated more perfectly by grace than another is. One reason for this difference stems from someone's preparing himself for grace; for one who prepares himself to a greater degree for grace receives a fuller grace.

Still, this cannot be the primary reason for the difference in question, since the preparation for grace belongs to a man only insofar as his free choice is prepared by God. Hence, the primary cause of the difference has to be taken from God Himself, who dispenses the gifts of His grace in different ways, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church might emerge from different grades, just as He has instituted diverse grades of entities in order that the universe might be perfect. Hence, in Ephesians 4, after having said, “To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of Christ's giving” (4:7), the Apostle, having enumerated the different graces, adds, “... for the perfecting of the saints in building up the body of Christ” (4:12).

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible ways to think of God's care:

The first is with respect to *God's act itself*, which is simple and uniform, and in this sense His care

is related equally to everyone, since He dispenses greater and lesser things by a single and simple act.

But one can think of another sense on the part of the things in creatures that come from God's care. And in this sense one finds inequality, viz., insofar as by His care God provides greater gifts for some and lesser gifts for others.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for the first sense of the greatness of grace. For grace cannot be greater in the sense of being ordered to a greater good; rather, it can be greater because it orders one to a greater or lesser degree toward participating in the same good to a greater or lesser degree. For as far as the subject's participation is concerned, there can be differences of intensity or remission, both in the grace itself and in final glory.

Reply to objection 3: Natural life has to do with a man's substance, and this is the reason why it does not admit of more and less. By contrast, a man participates in the life of grace as an accident (*accidentaliter*), and so the man can have it to a greater or lesser degree.

Article 5

Can a man know that he has grace?

It seems that a man can know that he has grace:

Objection 1: Grace is in the soul through the soul's essence. But as is clear from Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, the soul's most certain cognition is of those things that are in the soul through the soul's essence. Therefore, grace can be known with the highest certitude by someone who has grace.

Objection 2: Just as knowledge is God's gift, so too is grace. But one who receives knowledge from God knows that he has knowledge—this according to Wisdom 7:17 ("The Lord has given me true knowledge of the things that are"). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, one who receives graces from God knows that he has grace.

Objection 3: Light is more knowable than darkness, since according to the Apostle in Ephesians 5:13, "All that is made manifest is light." But sin, which is spiritual darkness, can be known with certitude by one who has sin. So, all the more, can grace be known, since it is spiritual light.

Objection 4: In 1 Corinthians 2:12 the Apostle says, "Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given to us by God." But grace is God's principal gift. Therefore, a man who receives grace through the Holy Spirit knows through that same Spirit that grace has been given to him.

Objection 5: In Genesis 22:12 it is said to Abraham in the person of God, "Now I know that you fear God," i.e., "I have made you know." Now this is said here because of his chaste fear, which does not exist without grace. Therefore, a man is able to know that he has grace.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiastes 9:1, "No man knows whether he is worthy of hatred or worthy of love." But sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) is what makes a man worthy of God's love. Therefore, no one can know whether he has sanctifying grace.

I respond: There are three ways in which something can be known (*potest cognosci*):

In one way, *through revelation*. And someone can know in this way that he has grace. For God sometimes reveals this to certain individuals by a special privilege, in order that the joy of security might begin in them in this life, so that they might more confidently and courageously carry out magnificent deeds and sustain the evils of the present life—just as it was said to Paul, "My grace is sufficient for you" (2 Corinthians 12:9).

In a second way, *a man knows something on his own and with certitude (per seipsum et hoc certitudinaliter)*. And in this sense no one can know that he has grace. For certitude cannot be had with

respect to anything unless that matter can be judged by its proper principle, since it is in this way that certitude is had with respect to conclusions that are demonstrated through universal indemonstrable principles. But no one can know that he has knowledge of any given conclusion, if he does not know the relevant principle. But the principle of grace, as well as its object, is God Himself, who because of His excellence is not known to us—this according to Job 36:26 (“Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge”). And so the presence or absence of grace in us cannot be known with certitude in this way—this according to Job 9:11 (“If He comes to me, I will not see Him; if He departs, I will not perceive it”). And so a man cannot discern with certitude whether or not he himself has grace—this according to 1 Corinthians 4:3-4 (“But neither do I judge my own self ... Rather, the one who judges me is the Lord”).

In a third way, something is known *conjecturally through signs*. And someone can know in this way that he has grace, viz., insofar as (a) he perceives himself to take delight in God and to contemn worldly things, and insofar as (b) the man is not conscious of any mortal sin in himself. It is in this way that one can understand what is said in Apocalypse 2:17 (“To him who overcomes I will give the hidden manna ... which no man knows except the one who receives it”—since he who receives it knows it through his experience of sweetness, which he who does not receive it does not experience. But this is an imperfect sort of cognition. That is why the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 4:4, “I am not conscious of anything in myself, but I am not thereby justified.” For as Psalm 18:13 says, “Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord.”

Reply to objection 1: The things that exist in the soul through its essence are known by an experiential cognition to the extent that a man experiences intrinsic principles through their acts, in the way that we perceive the will by willing and life in the vital works.

Reply to objection 2: It is part of the nature of knowledge (*de ratione scientiae*) that a man has certitude about the things of which he has knowledge, and it is likewise part of the nature of faith that a man is certain about those things with respect to which he has faith. This is because certitude has to do with the perfection of the intellect, in which these two gifts exist. And so whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. However, there is no similar argument for grace or charity or other things of this sort, which perfect the *appetitive* power.

Reply to objection 3: Sin has as its principle and as its object some changeable good that is known to us. But the object or end of grace is not known to us because of the immensity of the light source (*propter sui luminis immensitatem*)—this according to 1 Timothy 6:16 (“... who inhabits light inaccessible”).

Reply to objection 4: The Apostle is here speaking about the gifts of glory, which are given to us in hope and which we know with greatest certitude through faith—even though we do not know with certitude that we have grace, through which we are able to merit those gifts.

An alternative reply is that he is talking about the sort of privileged knowledge that comes through a revelation. This is why he adds, “But to us God has revealed them through His Holy Spirit.”

Reply to objection 5: The words spoken to Abraham can likewise be traced back to experiential knowledge, which occurs through the manifestation of a work. For in that work which Abraham had done he was able to know experientially that he had the fear of God.

An alternative reply is that it can also be traced back to a revelation.

QUESTION 113

The Effects of Grace

Next we have to consider the effects of grace: first, the justification of a sinner, which is an effect of operating grace (question 113) and, second, merit, which is an effect of cooperating grace (question 114).

On the first topic there are ten questions: (1) What is the justification of a sinner? (2) Does it require an inpouring of grace? (3) Does it require any movement of free choice? (4) Does it require a movement of faith? (5) Does it require a movement of free choice against sin? (6) Should the forgiveness of sin be counted among the requirements already mentioned? (7) Is there a temporal ordering in the justification of a sinner, or does it occur all at once? (8) What is the natural ordering of the things that come together for justification? (9) Is the justification of a sinner God's greatest work? (10) Is the justification of a sinner a miracle?

Article 1

Is the justification of a sinner the forgiveness of sins?

It seems that the justification of a sinner (*iustificatio impii*) is not the forgiveness of sins:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 71, a. 1), sin is opposed not only to justice but to all virtues. But 'justification' signifies a certain movement toward justice. Therefore, not every instance of the forgiveness of sin is a justification, since every movement is from one contrary to another.

Objection 2: As is explained in *De Anima* 2, each thing ought to be denominated from what is most important in it. But the forgiveness of sins is effected primarily (a) by faith—this according to Acts 15:9 ("... purifying their hearts by faith")—and (b) by charity—this according to Proverbs 10:12 ("Charity covers all sins"). Therefore, the forgiveness of sins should be denominated from faith or charity rather than from justice.

Objection 3: The forgiveness of sins seems to be the same thing as a calling (*vocatio*), since it is someone distant who is called, and one is distant from God through sin. But being called is prior to justification—this according to Romans 8:30 ("Those whom He called He also justified"). Therefore, justification is not the forgiveness of sins.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Romans 8:30 ("Those whom He called He also justified") says, "By the forgiveness of their sins." Therefore, justification is the forgiveness of sins.

I respond: An act of justifying (*justificatio*), taken passively, implies a movement toward justice, just as an act of heating (*calefactio*) implies a movement toward heat. And since justice by its nature implies a certain rectitude of order, 'justice' can be taken in two ways:

In one way, 'justice' implies a correct ordering within a man's *action itself*. And as *Ethics* 5 makes clear, this is the sense in which justice is posited as a virtue, whether it be *particular justice*, which orders a man's act with respect to its rectitude in relation to another individual man, or *legal justice*, which orders a man's act with respect to its rectitude in relation to the common good of the many.

In the second way, 'justice' implies a certain rectitude of order within a man's *interior disposition itself*, viz., insofar as the man's highest part is subject to God and insofar as the lower powers of his soul are subject to the highest power, viz., reason. And this is the disposition that in *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher likewise calls "justice metaphorically speaking."

Now there are two ways in which this sort of justice can be effected in a man:

In one way, in the manner of a simple generation, which goes *from a privation to a form*. And justification in this sense could belong to a man who was not in sin, as long as he received justice of this sort from God in the way that Adam is said to have received original justice.

In the second way, this sort of justice can be effected in a man in accord with the sort of movement

that goes *from one contrary to another*. In this sense, ‘justification’ implies a certain change from a state of injustice to a state of justice of the sort just mentioned. And it is in this sense that we are talking here about the justification of a sinner—in accord with what the Apostle says in Romans 4:5 (“To him who does not works, yet believes in Him who justifies a sinner,” etc.). And since a movement is denominated from its *terminus ad quem* rather than from its *terminus a quo*, it follows that a change of this sort, by which someone is changed from a state of injustice through the forgiveness of his sins, is given its name from its *terminus ad quem* and is called ‘the justification of a sinner’.

Reply to objection 1: Every sin, insofar as it involves a certain disorder on the part of a mind not subject to God, can be called a injustice that is contrary to the sort of justice explained above—this according to 1 John 3 (“Everyone who commits a sin likewise commits an iniquity, and his sin is an iniquity”). Accordingly, the removal of any sin is called a justification.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Faith’ and ‘charity’ express a specific ordering of the human mind to God with respect to intellect or with respect to affection. By contrast, ‘justice’ implies in a more generic way a *total* rectitude of order. And so a change of the sort in question is denominated from justice rather than from charity or faith.

Reply to objection 3: The ‘calling’ refers back to God’s assistance in moving and exciting the mind interiorly toward giving up sin. This motion on God’s part is a cause of the forgiveness of sin and not itself the forgiveness of sin.

Article 2

Is an inpouring of grace required for that forgiveness of sin which is the justification of a sinner?

It seems that an inpouring of grace (*infusio gratiae*) is not required for that forgiveness of sin which is the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: Someone can be removed from one contrary without being led all the way to the other contrary, as long as the contraries admit of something in the middle (*si contraria sint mediata*). But the state of sin and the state of grace are contraries that admit of something in the middle; for between them lies the state of innocence, in which a man has neither grace nor sin. Therefore, it is possible for someone’s guilt to be remitted without his being led all the way to grace.

Objection 2: The forgiveness of sin (*remissio culpae*) consists in God’s reckoning—this according to Psalm 31:2 (“Blessed the man to whom the Lord has not imputed his sin”). But as was established above (q. 110, a. 1), the inpouring of grace posits something within us as well. Therefore, the inpouring of grace is not required for the forgiveness of sin.

Objection 3: No one is simultaneously the subject of two contraries. But certain sins are contraries, e.g., prodigality and stinginess (*prodigalitas et illiberalitas*). Therefore, someone who is the subject of the sin of prodigality is not simultaneously the subject of the sin of stinginess. Therefore, when one sins by the vice of prodigality, he is freed from the sin of stinginess. And in this sense a certain sin is forgiven without grace.

But contrary to this: Romans 3:24 says, “... justified graciously (*gratis*) by His grace.”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 71, a. 6 and q. 87, a. 3), by sinning a man offends God. But no one’s offense is forgiven unless the mind of the one who has been offended is at peace with the offender. So our sin is said to be forgiven insofar as God is at peace with us. This peace consists in the love by which God loves us (*consistit in dilectione qua Deus nos diligit*). But God’s love, on the part of the divine act, is eternal and immutable, whereas, on the part of the effect that it imprints upon us, it is sometimes interrupted, viz., insofar as we sometimes fall short of it, and sometimes such that we get it back again. But the effect of God’s love in us, which is removed through sin, is grace, by

which a man is made worthy of the eternal life from which mortal sin excludes us. And so the forgiveness of sin is unthinkable without the presence of an inpouring of grace.

Reply to objection 1: More is required for an offender's sin to be forgiven than that some non-offender's is not hated. For among men it can happen that one man neither loves nor hates another; on the other hand, if he offends him, then his being forgiven for the offense cannot occur without special benevolence.

Now God's benevolence with respect to a man is said to be restored through the gift of grace. And so even though, before man sinned, he could have existed both without grace and without sin, nonetheless, after his sin, he is no longer able to exist without sin unless he has grace.

Reply to objection 2: Just as God's love does not, as was explained above (q. 110, a. 1), consist only in the act of God's will, but also implies a certain effect of grace, so, too, the fact that God does not impute to a man his sin implies a certain effect in the one whose sin is not imputed. For the fact that a sin is not imputed by God proceeds from God's love.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, "If ceasing to sin were the same as not having sin, then it would be sufficient for Scripture to issue this warning: 'Son, you have sinned; do not add to this any more'. But this is not sufficient; rather, it adds, 'Also pray that your past sins might be forgiven you.'" For as has been explained (q. 87, a. 6), the actual sin passes away, but the guilt remains (*transit peccatum actu et remanet reatu*). And so when someone passes from the sin of one vice to this sin of a contrary vice, he does, to be sure, cease to have the *act* of the past sin, but he does not cease to have the *guilt*, and so he simultaneously has the guilt of both sins. For the sins are not contrary to one another as far as the turning away from God is concerned, and it is on this score that a sin carries guilt.

Article 3

Is a movement of free choice required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that a movement of free choice is not required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: We see that through the sacrament of Baptism children, and sometimes even adults, are justified without a movement of free choice. For instance, in *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says that when a certain friend of his was afflicted with a fever, "he lay senseless for a long time in a deadly sweat, and when hope was lost, he was baptized unknowingly and re-created"—where re-creation comes about through justifying grace. But God has not fettered His power to the sacraments (*potentiam suam non alligavit sacramentis*). Therefore, He is likewise able to justify a man without the sacraments in the absence of any movement of free choice.

Objection 2: When a man is sleeping, he does not have the use of reason, and without the use of reason there cannot be a movement of free choice. But according to 3 Kings 3:5ff. and 2 Paralipomenon 1:7ff., it was in his sleep that Solomon received from God the gift of wisdom. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the gift of justifying grace is sometimes given to a man by God without any movement of free choice.

Objection 3: It is through the same cause that grace is both brought into being and conserved; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, "A man should turn himself to God in such a way that he is always being made just by God." But grace is conserved in a man without a movement of free choice. Therefore, it can be poured into him from the beginning without a movement of free choice.

But contrary to this: John 6:45 says, "Everyone who has heard from the Father and learned comes to me." But learning does not take place without a movement of free choice, since the learner gives his consent to the teacher. Therefore, no one comes to God through justifying grace without a movement of free choice.

I respond: The justification of a sinner occurs when God moves a man to justice; for according to Romans 4:5, it is “He who justifies a sinner.” Now God moves each thing in accord with its own mode; for instance, we see among natural things that heavy and lightweight things are moved by Him in different ways because of their diverse natures. Hence, He likewise moves men in accord with the condition of human nature. Now a man by his proper nature has the power of free choice (*homo secundum propriam naturam habet quod sit liberi arbitrii*). And so in someone who has the use of free choice, God’s moving him to justice does not occur without a movement of free choice. Rather, God infuses the gift of justifying grace in such a way that, along with this, He simultaneously moves free choice to accept the gift of grace in the case of those who have a capacity for this movement.

Reply to objection 1: Young children (*pueri*) do not have the capacity for free choice, and so they are moved by God to justice solely through the informing of their soul. However, this does not occur without the sacrament. For just as original sin, in opposition to which they are justified (*a quo iustificantur*), comes to them not by their own will but from a carnal origin, so, too, grace flows into them from Christ through a spiritual regeneration.

The same line of reasoning holds for those who are insane or mentally incapacitated and who have never had the use of free choice. On the other hand, if someone at one time had the use of free choice and afterwards lost it either through infirmity or sleep, he would not receive justifying grace through Baptism administered exteriorly—or through any other sacrament—unless he had previously intended to have the sacrament (*nisi prius habuerit sacramentum in proposito*), and this could not occur without the use of free choice. It is in this sense that the man that Augustine is talking about was re-created; for he accepted his Baptism both beforehand and afterwards.

Reply to objection 2: Solomon did not merit or receive wisdom in his sleep. Rather, in his sleep it was declared to him that, because of his previous desire, wisdom would be poured into him by God; hence, in Wisdom 7 it says in his person, “I desired it, and understanding (*sensus*) was given to me.”

An alternative reply is that the sleep in question was not natural sleep, but a sleep of prophecy—this in accord with Numbers 12:6 (“If there is a prophet of the Lord among you, I will speak to him through his sleep or in a vision”). In such a case the one in question has the use of free choice.

Notice, however, that the line of reasoning is not the same for the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace. For the gift of justifying grace orders a man principally toward the good, which is the object of the will, and so a man is moved toward it by a movement of the will, i.e., by a movement of free choice. By contrast, wisdom perfects the intellect, which precedes the will, and so the intellect can be illuminated by the gift of wisdom without a complete movement of free choice. In the same way, we see that certain things are revealed to men in their sleep—this according to Job 33:15-16: “When deep sleep falls upon men and they are sleeping in their beds, then He opens the ears of men, and teaching, instructs them in what they are to learn.”

Reply to objection 3: When justifying grace is poured into the soul, there is a certain transmutation of the soul, and so a proper movement of the human soul is required in order for the soul to be moved in accord with its own mode. By contrast, the conservation of grace occurs without a transmutation, and so it does not require any movement on the part of the soul; rather, it requires only a continuation of God’s influence.

Article 4

Is a movement of faith required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that a movement of faith is not required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: Just as a man is justified through faith, so he is likewise justified through other things as well—for instance,

(a) through *fear*, about which Ecclesiasticus 1:27 says, “The fear of the Lord drives out sin, for he who is without fear cannot be justified,” and

(b) through *charity*—this according to Luke 7:47 (“Many sins have been forgiven her, because she has loved much”), and

(c) through *humility*—this according to James 4:6 (“God resists the proud, but gives grace to the humble”), and

(d) through *mercy*—this according to Proverbs 15:27 (“Through mercy and faith sins are washed away”).

Therefore, it is not the case that a movement of faith is required for justification more than movements of the virtues just mentioned.

Objection 2: An act of faith is required for justification only insofar as it is through faith that a man has cognition of God. But there are also other ways in which a man can have cognition of God, viz., through natural cognition and through the gift of wisdom. Therefore, it is not the case that an act of faith is required for the justification of a sinner.

Objection 3: The articles of the Faith are diverse. Therefore, if an act of faith were required for the justification of a sinner, then, it seems, when a man was first justified, he would have to think of all the articles of the Faith. But this seems absurd, since such thinking would require a long period of time. Therefore, it seems that an act of faith is not required for justification.

But contrary to this: Romans 5:1 says, “Therefore, having been justified by faith, let us have peace with God.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), a movement of free choice is required for the justification of a sinner in the sense that a man’s mind is moved by God. But God moves a man’s soul by turning it toward Himself—as it says in Psalm 84:7 (according to the alternative version): “You will turn us, O God, and bring us to life.” And so what is required for the justification of a sinner is a movement of the mind by which it is turned toward God.

But the initial turning toward God (*prima conversio in Deum*) is effected through faith—this according to Hebrews 11:6 (“He who comes to God must have faith that He exists”). And so a movement of faith is required for the justification of a sinner.

Reply to objection 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is informed by charity, and so a movement of charity also occurs in the justification of a sinner along with the movement of faith.

Now free choice is moved toward God in order to submit itself to Him, and so an act of filial fear and an act of humility likewise occur, since it is possible for one and the same act of free choice to belong to diverse virtues, insofar as the one commands and the other is commanded, i.e., insofar as the act can be ordered to diverse ends.

Now an act of mercy works against sin either (a) in the manner of satisfaction, and in this sense it *follows upon* justification; or (b) in the manner of *preparation*, insofar as the merciful receive mercy, and in that sense it can also precede justification; or (c) it can also concur *simultaneously* in justification along with the other virtues mentioned above, insofar as mercy is included in the love of neighbor.

Reply to objection 2: It is not the case that through natural cognition a man is turned toward God insofar as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. Hence, that sort of cognition is not sufficient for justification. Moreover, as is clear from what was said above (q. 68, a. 2), the gift of wisdom presupposes the cognition that belongs to faith (*praesupponit cognitionem fidei*).

Reply to objection 3: As the Apostle says in Romans 4:5, “But to him who believes in the one who justifies a sinner, his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God.” From this it is clear that in the justification of a sinner an act of faith is required in the sense of the man’s believing that God is the one who justifies men through the mystery of the Christ (*quod homo credit Deum esse iustificatorem hominum per mysterium Christi*).

Article 5

Is a movement of free choice with respect to sin required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that a movement of free choice with respect to sin is not required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: Charity suffices by itself for erasing sin—this according to Proverbs 10:12 (“Charity covers all sins”). But the object of charity is not sin. Therefore, a movement of free choice with respect to sin is not required for the justification of a sinner.

Objection 2: One who is going forward should not pay attention to what is behind him—this according to the Apostle in Philippians 3:13 (“Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching myself forth to the things that are before me, I press on toward the mark, to the prize of my lofty vocation”). But to someone who is going forward toward justice, his past sins are behind him. Therefore, he should forget about them, and he should not “stretch himself” toward them (*nec in ea se extendere debet*) through a movement of free choice.

Objection 3: In the justification of a sinner it is not the case that one sin is forgiven without the others, since “it is impious to hope for half a pardon from God.” Therefore, if in the justification of a sinner there had to be a movement of free choice with respect to sin, then he would have to think of all his sins. But this seems absurd, both because this sort of thought would require a long time and also because the man would not be able to have forgiveness for the sins he has forgotten about. Therefore, a movement of free choice against sin is not required for the justification of a sinner.

But contrary to this: Psalm 31:5 says, “I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and You have forgiven the wickedness of my sin.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), the justification of a sinner is a certain movement by which the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of justice. Therefore, the human mind must be related to both extremes in its movement of free choice, just as a body that is moved in place by some mover is related to the two termini of the movement. Now it is clear that in the case of the local movement of bodies, a body that is being moved moves away from the terminus *a quo* and moves toward the terminus *ad quem*. Hence, when the human mind is being justified, it must, through its movement of free choice, move away from sin and move toward justice. But in the case of a movement of free choice, *moving away from* and *moving toward* have to do with hatred and desire (*accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium*). For as Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, when commenting on the passage, “The mercenary flees, etc.” (John 10:12), “Our affections are movements of the mind: joy is the mind’s extending outward (*diffusio*) and fear is the mind’s fleeing. You go forward in mind when you desire something; you flee in mind when you are afraid.” Therefore, in the justification of a sinner there must be two movements of free choice: by the first one tends through his desire toward God’s justice, and by the second he detests sin.

Reply to objection 1: It belongs to the same virtue to move toward one of the two opposites and to move away from the other. And so just as it belongs to charity to love God, so it likewise belongs to charity to detest the sins through which the soul is separated from God.

Reply to objection 2: As for the things that are behind him, a man should not go back to them through love; rather, he should forget them in the sense of not being attached to them. Yet he ought to keep them in mind (*debet eorum recordari per considerationem*) in order to detest them, since it is in this way that he withdraws from them.

Reply to objection 3: In the time that precedes justification, a man must detest each sin which he has committed and remembers. From this sort of thought process there follows in the soul a certain movement of detesting all sins in general, among which are also included his now forgotten sins. For a man in this state is so disposed that he would also be sorry for the sins he does not remember if they were present to his memory. And this is a movement that occurs in justification (*iste motus concurrit ad*

iustificationem).

Article 6

Should the forgiveness of sins be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that the forgiveness of sins should not be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: An entity's substance is not counted among those things required for the entity; for instance, *man* should not be counted along with *soul* and *body*. But as has been explained (a. 1), the justification of a sinner is itself the forgiveness of sins. Therefore, the forgiveness of sins should not be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner.

Objection 2: The inpouring of grace is the same as the forgiveness of sin (*culpae remissio*), just as the act of illuminating is the same as the expulsion of darkness. But the same thing should not be counted along with itself, since *one* is opposed to *many*. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt should not be counted along with the inpouring of grace.

Objection 3: The forgiveness of sins follows upon a movement of free choice—with respect to God and with respect to sin—in the same way that an effect follows upon a cause. For sins are forgiven through faith and contrition. But an effect should not be enumerated with its cause, since things that are enumerated together in the sense of being divided off from one another are at the same level by nature (*simul natura*). Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt should not be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner.

But contrary to this: In the enumeration of what is required for a thing, the end, which is the most important aspect in each thing, should not be omitted. But the forgiveness of sins is the end in the justification of a sinner. For Isaiah 27:9 says, “This all the fruit: that his sin should be taken away.” Therefore, the forgiveness of sins should be counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner.

I respond: There are four items counted among the things required for the justification of a sinner, viz., (a) the inpouring of grace, (b) the movement of free choice with respect to God through faith, (c) the movement of free choice with respect to sin, and (d) the forgiveness of guilt.

The reason for this is that, as has been explained (a. 1), justification is a certain movement by which the soul is moved by God from a state of sin into a state of justice (*movetur a Deo a statu culpae in statum iustitiae*). But there are three things required in every movement by which something is moved by another: (a) the motion of the mover itself (*motio ipsius moventis*), (b) the movement of the thing to be moved (*motus mobilis*), and (c) the consummation of the movement, i.e., the attainment of the end. Thus, on the part of God's motion, there is the inpouring of grace; on the part of free choice as moved, there are its two movements, i.e., the moving away from the terminus *a quo* and the moving toward the terminus *ad quem*; and the consummation, i.e., the arrival at the terminus of this movement, is connoted by ‘the forgiveness of sins’, since it is in the forgiveness of sin that justification is consummated.

Reply to objection 1: The justification of a sinner is said to be the forgiveness of sins itself in the sense in which every movement takes its species from its terminus. And yet, as is clear from what has been said above (a. 5), many other things are required for this terminus.

Reply to objection 2: There are two possible ways to think of the inpouring of grace and the forgiveness of guilt:

The first way is with respect to the very *substance of the act*. And in this sense they are the same act, since it is by the same act that God both bestows grace and forgives sin (*eodem actu Deus et largitur gratiam et remittit culpam*).

They can also be thought of as regards the *objects [of the act]*. And in this sense they differ from one another in accord with the difference between the guilt that is removed and the grace that is poured in. It is in this same way that generation and corruption differ among natural things, even though the act of generating one thing is the act of corrupting another (*quamvis generatio unius sit corruptio alterius*).

Reply to objection 3: The enumeration in question is not a division of a genus into its species; in that sort of enumeration the things enumerated must be on the same level (*oportet quod sint simul*). Rather, it is an enumeration of the different things that are required for the completion of something. In this sort of enumeration it is possible for one thing to be prior and another posterior; for among the principles and parts of a composite thing, one can be prior to another.

Article 7

Does the justification of a sinner occur instantaneously or successively?

It seems that the justification of a sinner occurs successively and not instantaneously:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 3), a movement of free choice is required for the justification of a sinner. But the act of free choice is to choose, and, as was established above (q. 13, a. 1), this requires the deliberation of counsel. Therefore, since deliberation involves a certain sort of discursive reasoning, which itself contains successiveness, it seems that the justification of a sinner is successive.

Objection 2: A movement of free choice does not take place without an act of considering (*absque actuali consideratione*). But as was explained in the First Part (ST 1, q. 85, a. 4), it is impossible to have intellectual understanding of many things simultaneously. Therefore, since the justification of a sinner requires a movement of free choice with respect to diverse objects, viz., God and sin, it seems that the justification of a sinner cannot be instantaneous (*non possit esse in instanti*).

Objection 3: A form that admits of greater and lesser degrees is received successively in a subject, as is clear in the case of whiteness and blackness. But as was explained above (q. 112, a. 4), grace admits of greater and lesser degrees. Therefore, it is not received all at once (*subito*) in a subject. Therefore, since an inpouring of grace is required for the justification of a sinner, it seems that the justification of a sinner cannot take place instantaneously.

Objection 4: The movement of free choice that accompanies the justification of a sinner is meritorious, and so it must proceed from grace, without which there is no merit; this will be explained below (q. 114, a. 2). But a thing acquires a form before it operates in accord with that form. Therefore, grace is first poured in and then free choice is moved with respect to God and with respect to detesting sin. Therefore, justification does not occur all at once as a whole (*non est tota simul*).

Objection 5: If grace is poured into the soul, then there must be an instant at which it first exists in the soul. Similarly, if guilt is forgiven, then there must be a last instant at which a man is subject to the guilt. But these cannot be the same instant, since in that case opposites would exist in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, they must be two successive instants, between which—according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 6—there has to be a temporal interval (*inter quae oportet esse tempus medium*). Therefore, justification occurs successively and not all at once as a whole.

But contrary to this: The justification of a sinner is effected through the grace of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit comes all of a sudden—this according to Acts 2:2 (“And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming”), where a Gloss on this passage says, “The grace of the Holy Spirit knows no tardy endeavors.” Therefore, the justification of a sinner is instantaneous and not successive.

I respond: The whole of the justification of a sinner consists at the beginning in the inpouring of grace (*tota originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione*), since it is through this inpouring of grace that free

choice is moved and that guilt is forgiven. But the inpouring of the grace occurs in an instant and without successiveness.

This is so because the reason why a given form is not impressed on a subject all at once is that its subject is not disposed and the agent needs time to dispose the subject. And so we see that a substantial form is acquired by its matter as soon the matter is disposed by the preceding alteration; and, for the same reason, a diaphanous body is illuminated all at once by an actively illuminating body because it is disposed in its own right for receiving light.

Now it was explained above (q. 112, a. 2) that in order for God to infuse grace, He does not require any disposition other than the disposition that He Himself effects. But He makes this sort of disposition sufficient for receiving grace—sometimes all at once and sometimes little by little and successively, as was explained above (*ibid.*). The fact that a natural agent is unable to dispose its matter all at once stems from the fact that there is a certain lack of proportion to the agent's power on the part of that which is resisting it in the matter, and because of this we see that the stronger the agent's power, the more quickly the matter is disposed. Therefore, since God's power is infinite, He is able to dispose any created matter whatsoever all at once for a form, and He is able to do this all the more to a man's free choice, the movement of which can be instantaneous in accord with its nature.

So, then, the justification of a sinner is effected by God instantaneously.

Reply to objection 1: The movement of free choice that accompanies the justification of a sinner is a consent to detesting sin and to approaching God, and this consent does indeed occur all at once.

Now it sometimes happens that this consent is preceded by some sort of deliberation, but the deliberation is not itself part of the substance of justification; instead, it is a path toward justification, in the same way that a local motion is a path to illumination and that an alteration is a path to generation.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 85, a. 5), nothing prevents someone from having actual intellective understanding of two things simultaneously to the extent that they are in some sense one. For instance, we simultaneously understand the subject and predicate insofar as they are united in the ordering of a single affirmation. And in the same way free choice can be moved simultaneously toward two objects insofar as the one is ordered to the other. But the movement of free choice with respect to sin is ordered to the movement of free choice with respect to God, since a man detests sin because it is contrary to God, whom he wills to adhere to. And so in the justification of a sinner free choice simultaneously detests sin and turns itself toward God, in the same way that a body approaches one place by simultaneously withdrawing from another place.

Reply to objection 3: The fact that a form admits of greater and lesser degrees is not a reason for its not being received all at once in matter. For otherwise light would not be received all at once in the air, given that the air can be illuminated to greater and lesser degrees. Rather, as has been explained, the reason should be taken from the side of the disposition of the matter or subject.

Reply to objection 4: At the very instant at which a form is acquired, the entity begins to operate in accord with that form; for instance, as soon as fire is generated, it moves upward. And if the thing's movement is instantaneous, then the movement is completed in that same instant.

Now the movement of free choice, i.e., *to will*, is instantaneous and not successive. And so the justification of a sinner does not have to be successive.

Reply to objection 5: The succession of two opposites in the same subject has to be thought of in one way in things that are subject to time and in another way in things that lie beyond time (*supra tempus*).

In things that are subject to time, there is no last instant (*non est dare ultimum instans*) in which the prior form exists in the subject, but instead there is a last temporal interval (*est dare ultimum tempus*) and a first instant at which the succeeding form exists in the matter or subject. The reason for this is that in time there cannot be one instant immediately preceding another instant, because, as is proved in *Physics* 6, the instants are not arranged consecutively in time (*instantia non consequenter se habeant in tempore*), just as the points in a line are not arranged consecutively. But a temporal interval terminates in

an instant. And so in the whole of the preceding temporal interval (*in toto tempore praecedenti*), in which something is being moved toward a given form, that thing is the subject of the opposite form; and in the last instant of that temporal interval, which is the first instant of the following temporal interval, the thing has the form that is the terminus of the movement.

However, it is different with things that lie beyond time. For if there is a succession of affections and intellectual conceptions (*succession affectuum vel intellectualium conceptionum*) in such a case—for instance, in angels—then a succession of this sort is measured not by continuous time, but instead by discrete time, in the same way that, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 53, a. 2), the things themselves that are being measured are not continuous. Hence, in such cases there is a last instant in which the first thing exists and a first instant in which what follows exists, and there does not have to be an intermediate time, since there is no continuous time to require this in such a case (*quia non est ibi continuïtas temporis quae hoc requirebat*).

Now the human mind, which is what is justified, lies beyond time in its own right, but it is *per accidens* subject to time, viz., insofar as it has intellective understanding of something continuous and temporal in accord with the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species (*intelligit cum continuo et tempore secundum phantasmata in quibus species intelligibiles considerat*); this was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 85, aa. 1 and 2). And so, accordingly, the mind's change should be judged in accord with the condition of temporal movements—so, that, more specifically, we claim that there is a last temporal interval, but no last instant, in which guilt exists in the mind; on the other hand, there is a first instant in which grace exists in the mind, whereas guilt existed in it in the whole of the preceding temporal interval.

Article 8

Is the inpouring of grace first in the natural ordering of the things required for the justification of a sinner?

It seems that the inpouring of grace is not first in the natural ordering of the things required for the justification of a sinner:

Objection 1: Withdrawing from evil is prior to approaching good—this according to Psalm 36:15 (“Turn away from evil and do good”). But the forgiveness of guilt (*remissio culpae*) has to do with withdrawing from evil, whereas the inpouring of grace has to do with pursuing the good. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt is naturally prior to the inpouring of grace.

Objection 2: The disposition for a form naturally precedes the form for which it is a disposition. But the movement of free choice is, as it were, a disposition for receiving grace. Therefore, it naturally precedes the inpouring of grace.

Objection 3: Sin prevents the soul from freely tending toward God. But removing that which prevents a movement is prior to the movement's ensuing. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt and the movement of free choice with respect to sin are naturally prior to the movement of free choice with respect to God and the inpouring of grace.

But contrary to this: A cause is naturally prior to its effect. But as was explained above (a. 7), the inpouring of grace is a cause of all the other things required for the justification of a sinner. Therefore, it is naturally prior to them.

I respond: The four things mentioned above that are required for the justification of a sinner are, to be sure, *simultaneous in time*, since, as has been explained (a. 7), the justification of a sinner is not successive; nevertheless, one is indeed prior to another in the *order of nature*:

The first among them in the order of nature is the inpouring of grace; the second is the movement of free choice with respect to God; the third is the movement of free choice with respect to sin; and the

fourth is the forgiveness of sin (*remissio culpae*).

The reason for this ordering is that in any movement what is naturally first is the motion of the mover itself (*motio ipsius moventis*); second is the disposition of the matter, i.e, the movement of the movable thing itself (*motus ipsius mobilis*); and last of all is the end or terminus of the movement in which the mover's motion terminates (*finis vel terminus motus ad quem terminatur motio moventis*). As was explained above (a. 6), the very motion of God the mover is the inpouring of grace, whereas the movement or disposition of the movable thing is the twofold movement of free choice; and, as is clear from what was said above (a. 6), the terminus or end of the movement is the forgiveness of sin.

And so in the justification of a sinner the first thing in the natural ordering is the inpouring of grace. The second thing is the movement of free choice with respect to God. The third thing is the movement of free choice with respect to sin—for the one who is justified hates sin because it is contrary to God, and so the movement of free choice with respect to God naturally precedes the movement of free choice with respect to sin, since it is its reason and cause. And the fourth and last thing is the forgiveness of sin, since, as has been explained (aa. 1 and 6), this whole transmutation is ordered toward the forgiveness of sin as its end.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible ways to think about withdrawing from a terminus and approaching a terminus:

The first is on the part of the *thing moved*. In this sense, withdrawing from a terminus naturally precedes approaching a terminus. For the opposite that is being withdrawn from exists beforehand in the movable subject and what exists later is that which the movable thing reaches through its movement.

But on the part of the *agent*, the reverse holds. For the agent, through a form that preexists in it, acts to remove the contrary.

For instance, the sun through its light acts to remove darkness. And so on the sun's part, illuminating is prior to removing darkness, whereas on the part of the air to be illuminated, being purged of darkness is prior in the order of nature to acquiring light—even though the two of them are simultaneous in time.

Since the inpouring of grace and the forgiveness of sin are attributed to God as the one effecting justification, it follows that the inpouring of grace is prior in the order of nature to the forgiveness of sin. On the other hand, if we take the things attributed to the man as the one being justified, then the reverse holds. For the liberation from sin is prior in the order of nature to the acquisition of justifying grace.

An alternative reply is that one can claim that the termini of justification are sin as the terminus *a quo* and justice as the terminus *ad quem*, and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and the acquisition of justice.

Reply to objection 2: The subject's disposition is prior in the order of nature to the reception of the form, and yet it follows upon the agent's action, through which the subject itself is likewise disposed. And so the movement of free choice is prior in the order of nature to the acquisition of the grace, but it follows upon the inpouring of the grace.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Physics 2*, in the case of movements of the mind what is altogether first is the movement toward the principle of speculation or toward the end of action, whereas in the case of exterior movements the removal of impediments precedes the attainment of the end. And since the movement of free choice is a movement of the mind, it is moved with respect to God as an end naturally prior to being moved toward removing the impediment of sin.

Article 9

Is the justification of a sinner God's greatest work?

It seems that the justification of a sinner is not God's greatest work:

Objection 1: Through the justification of a sinner one attains the grace for this life (*consequitur gratiam viae*). But through glorification one attains the grace of heaven (*consequitur gratiam patriae*), which is greater. Therefore, the glorification of angels or men is a greater work than the justification of a sinner.

Objection 2: The justification of a sinner is ordered toward the particular good of a single man. But as is clear from *Ethics* 1, the good of the universe is greater than the good of a single man. Therefore, the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of a sinner.

Objection 3: To make something from nothing, when nothing is cooperating with the agent, is greater than to make something from something with some cooperation on the part of the patient. But in the work of creation something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with the agent, whereas in the justification of a sinner God makes something from something, i.e., He makes a just man from a sinner, and in this case there is some cooperation on the man's part, since, as has been explained (a. 3), there is a movement of free choice here. Therefore, the justification of a sinner is not God's greatest work.

But contrary to this: Psalm 144:9 says, "His tender mercies are over all His works." And there is a Collect that says, "O God, who does show forth your almightiness most by pardoning and having mercy ..." And in commenting on John 14:12 ("Greater works than these shall he do") Augustine says, "To make a just man from a sinner is a greater work than to create heaven and earth."

I respond: There are two ways in which a work can be called great:

In the first way, on the part of *the mode of acting*. And in this sense the greatest work is the work of creation, in which something is made from nothing.

In the second way, a work can be called great because of *the magnitude of what is effected*. And in this sense the justification of a sinner, which terminates in the eternal good of participation in God (*quae terminatur ad bonum aeternum divinae participationis*), is a greater work than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates in the good of a mutable nature. This is why Augustine, after having claimed that it is greater to make a just man out of a sinner than to create heaven and earth, adds, "For heaven and earth will pass away, but the salvation and justification of the predestined will remain forever."

However, there are two ways in which [an effect] is called 'great':

In one way, with respect to *absolute quantity*. And in this sense the gift of glory is greater than the gift of the grace that justifies a sinner.

In the second way, something is called great by a *proportionate quantity* (*magnum quantitate proportionis*), in the way that a mountain might be called 'small' and a grain 'great'. And in this sense the gift of grace that justifies a sinner is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, since the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the sinner, who deserved punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the just man, who is deserving of glory by the very fact that he has been justified. This is why, in the same place, Augustine says, "Let him who is capable of it judge whether it is greater to create the angels just than to justify sinners. Certainly, if they both involve equal power, the latter involves greater mercy."

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of a single individual, as long as both are assumed to be in the same genus. But the good of grace that belongs to a single individual is greater than the good of nature of the whole universe.

Reply to objection 3: This argument proceeds from the side of the mode of acting, according to which creation is God's greatest work.

Article 10

Is the justification of a sinner a miraculous work?

It seems that the justification of a sinner is a miraculous work:

Objection 1: Miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous works. But as is clear from Augustine in the place cited above, the justification of a sinner is greater than all other miraculous works. Therefore, the justification of a sinner is a miraculous work.

Objection 2: A movement of the will exists in the soul in the way that a natural inclination exists in natural entities. But when God does something contrary to the inclination of nature in natural entities, it is a miraculous work—as when He gives sight to the blind or resuscitates the dead. But a sinner’s will tends toward evil. Therefore, since, in justifying a man, God moves him toward the good, it seems that the justification of a sinner is miraculous.

Objection 3: Just as wisdom is a gift from God, so too is justice. But it is miraculous that someone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. Therefore, it is miraculous that a sinner should be justified by God.

But contrary to this: Miraculous works are beyond natural power. But the justification of a sinner is not beyond natural power; for in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* Augustine says, “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to men, whereas having grace belongs to the faithful.” Therefore, the justification of a sinner is not miraculous.

I respond: There are three things usually found in miraculous works:

The first is on the part of the *agent’s power*, since the work is able to be effected only by God’s power. And, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 105, a. 8), such works are miraculous absolutely speaking, since they have a hidden cause. In this sense, both the justification of a sinner and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, any work that can be effected by God alone, can be called miraculous.

Second, in certain miraculous works one finds that the induced form is *beyond the natural power of the matter involved*; for instance, the resuscitation of the dead is beyond the natural power of the body involved. And in this regard, the justification of a sinner is not miraculous, since the soul is naturally capable of grace (*naturaliter anima est gratiae capax*). For by reason of the fact that the soul is made to the image of God, it is, as Augustine says, capable of God through grace.

In the third way, one finds in miraculous works something outside of the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when someone sick suddenly attains perfect health outside of the usual course of healing that is effected by nature or by skill. And in this regard, the justification of a sinner is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For it is the usual and customary course of justification that when God moves the soul interiorly, the man turns toward God first by an imperfect conversion and later comes to a perfect conversion, since, as Augustine puts it, “the inchoate charity merits an increase, and when it is increased, it merits to be perfected.” Sometimes, by contrast, God moves the soul so vehemently that it immediately attains a sort of perfection of justice, as happened in the conversion of Paul, which was also accompanied exteriorly by a miraculous prostration. And this is why Paul’s conversion is festively commemorated in the Church.

Reply to objection 1: Even if certain miraculous works are lesser than the justification of a sinner with respect to the goodness that occurs, they are nonetheless beyond the usual order of such effects. And this is why they have more of the character of a miracle.

Reply to objection 2: It is not the case that there is a miraculous work whenever a natural thing is moved in a way contrary to its inclination; otherwise, it would be miraculous for water to be heated or for a rock to be thrown upward. Rather, there is a miraculous work when this happens outside the order of a proper cause that is apt to do this sort of thing. But no cause other than God is able to justify a sinner, just as no cause other than fire is able to heat water. And this is why the justification of a sinner by God

is not, in this respect, miraculous.

Reply to objection 3: A man is apt to acquire wisdom and knowledge from God through his own talent and study (*per proprium ingenium et studium*), and so when a man is made wise or knowledgeable outside of this manner, it is miraculous. But a man is apt to acquire justifying grace through God's working and not through his own work. Hence, the cases are not parallel.

QUESTION 114

Merit

Next we have to consider merit, which is an effect of cooperating grace.

On this topic there are ten questions: (1) Can a man merit anything from God? (2) Can someone without grace merit eternal life? (3) Can someone through grace merit eternal life by his own worthiness (*ex condigno*)? (4) Is grace the principle of merit mainly by the mediation of charity? (5) Can a man merit first grace for himself? (6) Can one man merit grace for another? (7) Can someone merit his own restoration (*sibi mereri reparationem*) after a fall? (8) Can someone merit an increase of grace or of charity? (9) Can someone merit final perseverance for himself (*sibi mereri finalem perseverantiam*)? (10) Do any temporal goods fall under merit?

Article 1

Can a man merit anything from God?

It seems that a man cannot merit anything from God:

Objection 1: It seems that no one merits a reward by rendering to someone what he owes him. But we are unable, through all the good things we do, to pay God back what we owe Him in an adequate way, i.e., without always owing yet more; the Philosopher likewise points this out in *Ethics* 8. Hence, as Luke 17:10 says, “When you have done all these things that are commanded, say: ‘We are unprofitable servants; we have done what we were obliged to do’.” Therefore, a man cannot merit anything from God.

Objection 2: By the fact that a man profits himself, it seems that he merits nothing in the eyes of someone whom he does not profit in any way at all. But in acting a man profits himself, or perhaps some other man, but not God; for as Job 35:7 says, “If you act justly, what shall you be giving Him, or what will He receive from your hand?” Therefore, a man cannot merit anything from God.

Objection 3: If someone merits something in the eyes of another, he makes the latter his debtor, since one should repay a merited fee (*debitum est ut aliquis merendi mercedem rependat*). But God is a debtor to no one; hence, Romans 11:35 says, “Who has first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?” Therefore, no one can merit anything from God.

But contrary to this: Jeremiah 31:16 says, “There is a reward for Your work.” But a reward involves something given because of merit. Therefore, it seems that a man can merit something from God.

I respond: ‘Merit’ (*meritum*) and ‘reward’ or ‘wage’ or ‘compensation’ (*merces*) refer to the same thing, since what is called a reward or wage is paid to someone in compensation for his work or labor (*pro retributione operis vel laboris*) as a certain fee (*pretium*) for it. Hence, just as it is an act of justice to pay a just price (*iustum pretium*) for an item received from someone, so too it is act of justice to pay a reward or wage in compensation for work or labor (*recompensare mercedem operis vel laboris*).

Now as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 5, justice is a certain sort of equality. And so justice absolutely speaking exists among those who are equal absolutely speaking. On the other hand, among those who are not equal absolutely speaking, justice does not exist absolutely speaking, but there can be a certain mode of justice, in the way that one speaks of a father’s right or a master’s right (*sicut dicitur quoddam ius paternum vel dominativum*), as the Philosopher notes in the same book. Because of this, in cases in which justice exists absolutely speaking, the notions of merit and reward likewise apply absolutely speaking, whereas in cases in which justice exists in a certain respect (*secundum quid*) and not absolutely speaking, the notion of merit likewise applies in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking, to the extent that the character of justice is preserved in such a case. For it is in this sense that a son might merit something from his father and a servant from his master.

Now it is clear that there is maximal inequality between God and man, since (b) they are infinitely distant from one another and (b) the whole of the good that belongs to man comes from God. Hence, there can be justice on the part of man with respect to God only according to a certain proportion and not according to absolute equality, viz., insofar as each operates according to his own mode. But man has the mode and measure of human virtue from God. And so man's merit in the eyes of God can exist only on the presupposition of a divine ordination—so that, more specifically, through his own operations a man obtains from God as a reward that for which God has allotted him his power to operate, in the same way that through their own movements and operations natural entities likewise achieve what they have been ordered toward by God. There is a difference, however, since through his free choice a rational creature moves himself to act, and so his action has the character of merit; this is not so in the case of other creatures.

Reply to objection 1: A man merits insofar as he does what he should by his own will. Otherwise, an act of justice by which someone pays back a debt would not be meritorious.

Reply to objection 2: God seeks no profit from our good works; rather, He seeks glory, i.e., the manifestation of His own goodness, which is what He likewise seeks from His own works.

Now from the fact that we worship Him something accrues to us rather than to Him. And so we merit something from God not in the sense that something accrues to Him because of our works, but rather in the sense that we work for the sake of His glory.

Reply to objection 3: From the fact that our action has the character of merit only on the presupposition of a divine ordination, it does not follow that God becomes a debtor to us absolutely speaking. Rather, He becomes a debtor to Himself insofar as it ought to be the case that His ordination is fulfilled.

Article 2

Can someone merit eternal life without grace?

It seems that someone can merit eternal life without grace:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), a man merits from God that toward which he is divinely ordered. But by his nature a man is ordered toward beatitude as his end, and so he likewise naturally desires to be beatified. Therefore, a man by his own power (*per sua naturalia*) can merit beatitude—that is to say, eternal life.

Objection 2: The less obligatory a given work is, the more meritorious it is (*quanto est minus debitum, tanto est magis meritorium*). But a good that is less obligatory is one that is done by someone who has been given smaller benefits. Therefore, since someone who has only natural goods (*habet solum bona naturalia*) has received smaller benefits from God than someone who has the goods of grace (*bona gratuita*) along with the natural goods, it seems that the former's works are more meritorious in the eyes of God. And so, if someone who has grace can in some way merit eternal life, then *a fortiori* someone who does not have grace can merit eternal life.

Objection 3: God's mercy and generosity infinitely exceed human mercy and generosity. But one man can merit in the eyes of another man even if he has never been in that man's good graces beforehand (*etiam si nunquam suam gratiam ante habuerit*). Therefore, it seems that, *a fortiori*, a man without grace can merit eternal life from God.

But contrary to this: In Romans 6:23 the Apostle says, "The grace of God, life eternal."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 109, a. 2), it is possible to think of two states belonging to a man without grace (*hominis sine gratia duplex status considerari potest*): (a) the state of *integral nature* (*status naturae integrae*), such as existed in Adam before the sin, and (b) the state of *corrupted nature* (*status naturae corruptae*), such as exists in us before the restoration effected by grace (*ante*

reparationem gratiae).

Thus, if we are speaking of a man with respect to the first state, then there is a single reason why he cannot merit eternal life without grace through his natural powers—viz., that a man's merit depends on God's preordination. Now every entity's act is such that it is not divinely ordered to anything that exceeds the measure of the power that is the principle of the act (*excedens proportionem virtutis quae est principium actus*), since it is by the institution of God's providence that nothing acts beyond its own power. But eternal life is a good that exceeds the measure of any created nature, since it likewise exceeds that nature's cognition and desire—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:9 (“Eye has not seen, nor has ear heard, nor has it entered into man's heart ...”). And so it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act that merits eternal life, unless a supernatural gift, which is called ‘grace’, is added to it.

On the other hand, if we are speaking of a man who exists under sin, then to this is added a second reason in light of the impediment of sin. For since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 113, a. 2), sin is a certain offense against God that excludes one from eternal life, no one who exists in a state of sin can merit eternal life unless he is first reconciled with God by his sin's being forgiven (*nisi prius Deo reconcilietur dimisso peccato*)—something that is effected by grace. For a sinner is owed death and not life—this according to Romans 6:23 (“The wages of sin is death”).

Reply to objection 1: God ordered human nature toward attaining the end of eternal life not by its own power, but through the assistance of grace. And it is in this way that its act can merit eternal life.

Reply to objection 2: A man without grace cannot have a work equal to a work that proceeds from grace, since the more perfect the principle of an action, the more perfect the action. However, the argument would go through if an equality of operation were assumed in the two cases.

Reply to objection 3: As regards the first reason set forth above, there is a dissimilarity between God and man. For a man has all his power of doing good from God and not from any man. And so a man cannot merit anything from God except through God's gift. The Apostle makes this point explicitly when he says, “Who has first given to Him, and recompense will be made to him?”

But as regards the second reason, taken from the impediment of sin, there is a similarity between man and God, since one man cannot merit from another whom he has previously offended unless he is reconciled to him by making satisfaction.

Article 3

Can a man who is in the state of grace merit eternal life by his own worthiness?

It seems that a man who is in the state of grace (*homo in gratia constitutus*) cannot merit eternal life by his own worthiness (*non possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno*):

Objection 1: In Romans 8:18 the Apostle says, “The sufferings of this time are not worthy (*non sint condignae*) to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us.” But among all meritorious works, the sufferings of the holy ones seem to be the most meritorious. Therefore, none of men's works merit eternal life by their own worthiness (*ex condigno*).

Objection 2: A Gloss on Romans 6:23 (“The grace of God, life eternal”) says, “One could correctly say, ‘The wages of justice is eternal life’, but it would be preferable to say, ‘The grace of God is eternal life’, so that we might understand that God leads us to eternal life for the sake of His own mercy (*pro sua miseratione*) and not because of our merits (*non meritis nostris*).” But what someone merits because of his own worthiness (*ex condigno*) is received because of his merit and not out of mercy. Therefore, it seems that a man cannot through grace merit eternal life by his own worthiness (*non possit per gratiam mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno*).

Objection 3: Merit seems to be worthy (*condignum*) when it equals the reward. But no act in this

life can equal eternal life, which exceeds our cognition and desire. It also exceeds the charity or love present in this life (*excedit caritatem vel dilectionem viae*), in the same way that it exceeds nature. Therefore, a man cannot through grace merit eternal life by his own worthiness.

But contrary to this: What is rendered in accord with a just judgment seems to be a reward that one is worthy of (*videtur esse merces condigna*). But eternal life is granted by God in accord with a just judgment—this according to 2 Timothy 4:8 (“As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day”). Therefore, a man merits eternal life by his own worthiness (*meretur vitam aeternam ex condigno*).

I respond: A man’s meritorious work can be thought of in two ways: (a) insofar as it proceeds from free choice, and (b) insofar as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit.

If we think of the substance of the work and the fact that it proceeds from free choice, then there cannot be any *worthiness* (*non potest ibi esse condignitas*) there, and this because of a maximal inequality. But there can be a *fittingness* (*congruitas*) there because of a certain equality of proportion, since it seems fitting (*videtur congruum*) that when a man operates in accord with his own virtue, God should repay him according to the excellence of his virtue.

On the other hand, if we are speaking of a meritorious act insofar as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, then it merits eternal life by its worthiness (*ex condigno*). For the value of the merit is attendant upon the power of the Holy Spirit as He moves us toward eternal life—this according to John 4:14 (“There shall come to be in him a fount of water springing up unto life everlasting”). Again, the reward for the work is attendant upon the worthiness of the grace through which a man, now made to share in God’s nature (*consors factus divinae naturae*), is adopted as a son of God to whom the inheritance is owed by right of adoption—this according to Romans 8:17 (“If sons, heirs also”).

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is talking about the sufferings of the holy ones as regards the substance of those sufferings.

Reply to objection 2: The Gloss in question should be understood to be talking about the first cause of attaining eternal life, which is God’s mercy. By contrast, our merit is a subsequent cause (*causa subsequens*).

Reply to objection 3: Even if the grace of the Holy Spirit that we have in this life is not actually equal to the grace of glory, it is nonetheless virtually equal to it (*aequalis in virtute*), like the seed of a tree that virtually contains the whole tree (*in quo est virtus ad totam arborem*). Similarly, the Holy Spirit, who is the sufficient cause of eternal life, inhabits a man through grace, and this is why He is said to be “the pledge of our inheritance” in 2 Corinthians 1:22.

Article 4

Is grace the principle of merit mainly through charity rather than through the other virtues?

It seems not to be the case that grace is the principle of merit mainly through charity rather than through the other virtues:

Objection 1: Compensation (*merces*) is due for work—this according to Matthew 20:8 (“Call the laborers and pay them their wages (*mercedem*)”). But every virtue is the principle of some work, since, as was established above (q. 55, a. 2), a virtue is a habit of operation (*habitus operativus*). Therefore, every virtue is equally a principle of meriting.

Objection 2: In 1 Corinthians 3:8 the Apostle says, “Every man shall receive his own reward according to his labor.” But charity diminishes labor rather than increasing it, since, as Augustine says in *De Verbis Domini*, “Love makes every hard and repulsive task easy and next to nothing.” Therefore, charity is not a principle of meriting more principally than any other virtue is.

Objection 3: The virtue that seems to be the main principle of meriting is the one whose acts are

the most meritorious. But it is acts of faith and patience, i.e., fortitude, that seem to be the most meritorious, as is clear in the case of the martyrs, who patiently and courageously contended for the faith up to the point of death. Therefore, virtues other than charity are more principally a principle of meriting.

But contrary to this: In John 14:21 our Lord says, “If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and make myself manifest to him.” But eternal life consists in a manifest cognition of God—this according to John 17:3 (“This is eternal life, that they should know you, the only living and true God”). Therefore, the meriting of eternal life lies especially in charity.

I respond: As can be gathered from what has been said (a. 1), a human act has the character of meriting from two things: first, and principally, from divine ordination, according to which an act is said to merit that good toward which a man is ordered by God; and, second, from free choice, viz., insofar as it belongs to a man, in preference to other creatures, that he acts *per se* by acting voluntarily. And with respect to both of these, merit rests mainly on charity (*principalitas meriti penes caritatem consistit*).

The first thing to note is that eternal life consists in the enjoyment of God. But the movement of the human mind toward the enjoyment of the divine good is the proper act of charity, through which all the acts of the other virtues are ordered toward this end, insofar as the other virtues are commanded by charity. And so meriting eternal life pertains in the first place to charity and secondarily to the other virtues, insofar as their acts are commanded by charity.

Similarly, it is also clear that what we do out of love, we do in a way that is maximally voluntary. Hence, to the extent that what is required for the character of merit is that the act be voluntary, merit is attributed principally to charity.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as charity has the ultimate end as its object, it moves the other virtues to operate. For, as is clear from what was said above (q. 9, a. 1) it is always the case that the habit to which the end pertains commands the habits to which the means to the end pertain.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which a work can be laborious and difficult:

The first is because of the magnitude of the work, and in this way the magnitude of the work involves an increase of merit. In this sense, charity does not diminish the labor; indeed, it makes one pursue the greatest works. For as Gregory says in one of his homilies, “It does great things if it exists.”

In the second way, it is because of a weakness in the one who is working (*ex defectu ipsius operantis*). For what is laborious and difficult for each individual is what he does not do with a prompt will. This is the sort of toil (*labor*) that diminishes merit and is removed by charity.

Reply to objection 3: As Galatians 5:6 puts it, an act of faith is meritorious only if “faith is operating through love.” Similarly, even acts of patience and fortitude are meritorious only if one does them out of charity—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:3 (“If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profits me nothing”).

Article 5

Can a man merit first grace for himself?

It seems that a man can merit first grace for himself:

Objection 1: As Augustine says, “Faith merits justification.” But a man is justified through first grace. Therefore, a man can merit first grace for himself.

Objection 2: God does not give grace except to those who are worthy (*nisi dignis*). But one is said to be worthy of a gift only when he merits the gift by his worthiness (*ex condigno*). Therefore, one can merit first grace by his worthiness.

Objection 3: Among men it is possible for someone to merit a gift that has already been received; for instance, someone who receives a horse from his master merits it by making good use of it in the

service of his master. But God is more generous than a man. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it is possible for a man, through his subsequent works, to merit first grace that has already been received.

But contrary to this: The character of grace is incompatible with its being a reward for works—this according to Romans 4:4 (“To him that works, the reward is credited not as grace but as a debt”). But a man merits that which is credited to him as a reward for his work. Therefore, a man cannot merit first grace.

I respond: There are two possible ways to think of the gift of grace (*donum gratiae*):

In one way, as a gratuitous gift. And in this sense it is clear that any sort of merit is incompatible with grace; for as the Apostle says in Romans 11:6, “If by grace, it is already not by works.”

In the second way, grace can be thought of with respect to the nature of the very thing that is given. And in this sense it likewise cannot fall under the merit of anyone who does not have grace, both because it exceeds the measure of nature (*excedit proportionem naturae*), and also because before grace, in the state of sin, a man has an impediment to meriting grace, viz., sin itself.

Moreover, once someone already has grace, the grace that is already had cannot fall under merit, since the reward is the terminus of the work, whereas grace is the principle of any good work in us, as was explained above (q. 109). On the other hand, if someone merits another gratuitous gift by virtue of his previous grace, then this later gift will no longer be first grace.

Hence, it is clear that no one can merit first grace for himself.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine relates in *Retractationes*, he was at one time deceived into believing that the beginnings of faith are from us, but that the consummation of faith is given to us by God. He retracts this belief in this same place. And it is this belief that seems to be involved in the claim that faith merits justification.

By contrast, if we suppose, as the truth of the Faith holds, that the beginnings of faith are in us from God, then even the act of faith itself follows upon first grace, and so it cannot merit first grace.

Therefore, a man is justified through faith not in the sense that, by having faith, the man merits justification, but rather because he has faith while he is being justified (*dum iustificatur credit*). For as was explained above (q. 113, a. 4), a movement of faith is required for justification.

Reply to objection 2: God gives grace only to those who are worthy of it—not in the sense that they were worthy beforehand, but in the sense that through grace He Himself makes them worthy. For He alone “can make clean what is conceived of unclean seed” (Job 14:4).

Reply to objection 3: Every good work that belongs to a man proceeds from first grace as its principle. By contrast, it is not the case that every good work proceeds from any human gift. And so there is no parallel between the gift of grace and a human gift.

Article 6

Can one man merit first grace for another man?

It seems that one man can merit first grace for another man:

Objection 1: A Gloss on Matthew 9:2 (“When Jesus saw their faith ...”) says, “How much is one’s own faith worth in the eyes of God, in whose eyes the faith of the others (*aliena*) was of such value that he healed the man both interiorly and exteriorly.” But a man’s interior healing comes through first grace. Therefore, one man can merit first grace for another.

Objection 2: The prayers of the just are efficacious and not empty—this according to James 5:16 (“The continual prayer of the just man is very powerful”). But in the same place, just before this, it says, “Pray for one another, that you might be saved.” Therefore, since a man’s salvation can exist only through grace, it seems that one man can merit first grace for another man.

Objection 3: Luke 16:9 says, “Make yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity, so that when

you fail, they may receive you in the eternal dwellings.” But no one is received into the eternal dwellings except through grace, through which alone, as has been explained (a. 2), one may merit eternal life. Therefore, one man can, by meriting, acquire first grace for another man.

But contrary to this: Jeremiah 15:1 says, “Even if Moses and Samuel should stand before me, my soul is not turned toward this people”—and yet Moses and Samuel had the greatest merit in the eyes of God. Therefore, it seems that no one can merit first grace for another.

I respond: As is clear from what has been said above (aa. 1 and 3 and 4), our work has the character of merit from two sources:

The first is the force of God’s motion, and on this score someone may merit by his worthiness (*meretur aliquis ex condigno*).

Second, our work has the character of merit because it proceeds from free choice, insofar as we do something voluntarily. And on this score there is the merit of fittingness (*ex hac parte est meritum congrui*), since it is fitting that when a man uses his power well (*dum homo bene utitur sua virtute*), God should operate in a more excellent way that corresponds with the excellent power.

From this it is clear that no one except Christ can merit first grace for another by a merit of worthiness. For each of us is moved by God through the gift of grace in order that he himself might come to eternal life, and so the merit of worthiness does not extend beyond this motion. By contrast, Christ’s soul is moved by God through grace not only in order that Christ himself might come to the glory of eternal life, but also in order that He lead others to this glory insofar as He is head of the Church and the author of salvation—this according to Hebrews 2:10 (“He has brought many children into glory, the author of salvation”).

On the other hand, one man can merit first grace for another by a merit of fittingness. For given that a man in the state of grace fulfills God’s will, it is fitting, by the measure of friendship, that God should fulfill the man’s will in the matter of another’s salvation. Still, there can sometimes be an impediment on the part of the one whose justification a holy man desires; it is this sort of case that the passage quoted in the last place above from Jeremiah is talking about.

Reply to objection 1: The strength of others strengthens one for salvation by a merit of fittingness, not by a merit of worthiness (*merito congrui, non merito condigni*).

Reply to objection 2: The appeal made by prayer (*impetratio orationis*) relies on mercy, whereas the merit of worthiness relies on justice. And in praying for many things a man appeals to God’s mercy, even though he does not merit them in justice—this according to Daniel 9:18 (“For it is not in light of our justifications that we present our prayers before your face, but in light of your many mercies”).

Reply to objection 3: The poor who receive alms are said to “receive others into the eternal dwellings” either by appealing in their prayer for them to be forgiven (*impetrando eis veniam orando*), or by meriting for them by a merit of fittingness through other good works. Or they might even receive them materially speaking, since through the works of mercy that one exercises for the poor, he merits to be received into the eternal dwellings.

Article 7

Can someone merit restoration for himself after a fall?

It seems that someone can merit restoration for himself after a fall (*possit mereri sibi reparationem post lapsum*):

Objection 1: It seems that it is possible for a man to merit what is justly sought from God. But as Augustine says, nothing is more justly sought from God than to be restored after a fall—this according to Psalm 70:9 (“When my strength fails, do not abandon me, O Lord”). Therefore, a man can merit his being restored after a fall.

Objection 2: A man's own works profit him much more than do the works of another. But a man is able in some way to merit restoration for another after a fall, just as he is able to merit first grace for him. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he is able to merit restoration for himself after a fall.

Objection 3: As is clear from what was said above (a. 2), a man who at one time was in a state of grace merited eternal life by the works that he did. But no one is able to arrive at eternal life unless he is restored by grace (*nisi reparetur per gratiam*). Therefore, it seems that one can merit restoration for himself by grace.

But contrary to this: Ezechiel 18:24 says, "If a just man turns himself away from his justice and does iniquity, then all his justices which he has done shall not be remembered." Therefore, his previous merits will avail him nothing toward his recovering. Therefore, it is not the case that one can merit restoration for himself after a future fall.

I respond: No one can merit restoration for himself after a future fall, either by the merit of worthiness or by the merit of fittingness.

The reason why he cannot merit this for himself by the merit of worthiness is that the character of this sort of merit depends on the motion of God's grace, and this motion is interrupted by a subsequent sin. Hence, none of the benefits which one later acquires from God and by which he is restored fall under merit, since the motion of his prior grace does not reach this far.

Moreover, the merit of fittingness by which someone merits first grace for another man is impeded from attaining its effect by the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the efficacy of this sort of merit is impeded by an impediment of sin that exists both in the one who is meriting and in the one for whom it is merited, since in this case both of them are joined in a single person (*hic utrumque in unam personam concurrit*).

And so there is no way in which someone can merit restoration for himself after a fall.

Reply to objection 1: The desire by which one desires restoration after a fall is called 'just'—and the same holds for the prayer—because it tends toward justice, and yet in such a way that it relies solely on mercy and not on justice in the manner of merit.

Reply to objection 2: One can merit first grace for another by fittingness, since in such a case there is at least no impediment on the part of the one who merits. But such an impediment is present when someone withdraws from justice after the merit of grace.

Reply to objection 3: Some have claimed that no one merits eternal life absolutely speaking except through an act of final grace; rather, one merits eternal life only under the condition that he perseveres.

But this is an unreasonable claim, since sometimes the act of final grace is less meritorious, and not more meritorious, than the preceding act, and this because of the stress caused by illness (*propter aegritudinis oppressionem*).

Hence, one should claim that every act of charity merits eternal life absolutely speaking, but that an impediment to previous merit is posed by subsequent sin, so that the effect is not attained—in just the way that natural causes likewise fail of their effects because of a supervening impediment.

Article 8

Can a man merit an increase of grace or charity?

It seems that a man cannot merit an increase of grace or charity:

Objection 1: When someone receives a reward he has merited, no other reward is owed to him—as is said of certain men in Matthew 6:2 ("They have received their reward"). Therefore, if someone merited an increase of charity or grace, it would follow that, when the grace is increased, he would not be able to look forward to any further reward. But this is absurd.

Objection 2: Nothing acts beyond its own species. But as is clear from what was said above (aa. 2 and 4), the principle of merit is grace or charity. Therefore, no one can merit more grace or charity than he has.

Objection 3: A man merits what falls under merit through any act that proceeds from grace or charity; for instance, through any act of this sort a man merits eternal life. Therefore, if an increase of grace or charity fell under merit, it seems that one would merit an increase of charity through any act informed by charity. But what a man merits is received infallibly from God if it is not impeded by a subsequent sin; for 2 Timothy 1:12 says, “I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to preserve what I have deposited with Him.” So, then, it would follow that grace or charity is increased through every meritorious act. But this seems absurd, since meritorious acts are sometimes not fervent enough for an increase of charity. Therefore, an increase of charity does not fall under merit.

But contrary to this: In *Super Epistolas Ioannis* Augustine says, “Charity merits being increased, and what is increased merits being perfected.” Therefore, an increase of charity or grace falls under merit.

I respond: As has been explained (aa. 6 and 7), the motion of grace extends to whatever falls under the merit of worthiness. But a mover’s motion extends not only to the movement’s ultimate terminus, but also to the all of the progress contained in the movement (*ad totum progressum in motu*).

Now the terminus of the movement of grace is eternal life, whereas the progress contained in this movement involves an increase of charity or grace—this according to Proverbs 4:18 (“The path of the just proceeds as a shining light and increases unto perfect daylight,” i.e., the daylight of glory).

So, then, an increase of grace falls under the merit of worthiness.

Reply to objection 1: The reward is the terminus of merit. But a movement has two sorts of termini, viz., (a) an ultimate terminus and (b) a mediate terminus, which is both a beginning and a terminus. And the reward of an increase [of grace] is this latter sort of terminus.

Now the reward of human favor is like an ultimate terminus for those who set up their end in that reward. Hence, such men receive no other reward.

Reply to objection 2: An increase of grace does not exceed the *power* of the preexisting grace, even though it does exceed its *quantity*. In the same way, even though the tree exceeds the quantity of the seed, it nonetheless does not exceed its power.

Reply to objection 3: A man merits an increase of grace by any meritorious act, just as he merits the consummation of grace, i.e., eternal life. But eternal life is given in its own time and not immediately. So, too, grace is increased not immediately, but in its own time, viz., when one is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.

Article 9

Can someone merit [final] perseverance?

It seems that someone can merit [final] perseverance (*possit perseverantiam mereri*):

Objection 1: What a man obtains by petitioning can fall under merit for one who has grace. But by petitioning men obtain perseverance from God; otherwise, as Augustine explains in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, perseverance would be sought from God in vain in the petitions of the Lord’s prayer. Therefore, perseverance can fall under merit for one who has grace.

Objection 2: Not being able to sin is greater than being able to sin. But not being able to sin falls under merit, since one merits eternal life, part of the nature of which is the inability to sin (*de cuius ratione est impeccabilitas*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, someone can merit not sinning, i.e., persevering.

Objection 3: An increase of grace is greater than perseverance in the grace that one already has. But as was explained above (a. 8), a man can merit an increase of grace. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he can

merit perseverance in the grace that he has.

But contrary to this: One obtains from God everything that he merits, unless he is impeded by sin. But there are many who have meritorious works and yet do not receive perseverance. Nor can one claim that this happens because of an impediment of sin, since it is sinning itself that is opposed to perseverance, so that if someone merited perseverance, then God would not permit him to fall into sin. Therefore, it is not the case that perseverance falls under merit.

I respond: Since a man naturally has free choice that is open to both good and bad, there are two possible ways in which someone can obtain from God perseverance in the good.

In one way, through free choice's being determined to the good through final grace (*per gratiam consummatam*); this will occur in the state of glory (*quod erit in gloria*).

In the second way, on the part of God's motion, which inclines a man toward the good right up to the end (*inclinat ad bonum usque in finem*). However, as is clear from what has been said (aa. 6 and 7 and 8), what falls under human merit is what is related as a *terminus* to the movement of free choice insofar as free choice is directed by God, and not what is related to this movement as a *principle*.

Hence, it is clear that the perseverance associated with the state of glory, which is the terminus of the movement just mentioned, falls under merit, whereas perseverance in this life (*perseverantia viae*) does not fall under merit, since it depends solely on God's motion, which is the principle of all merit. Still, God graciously (*gratis*) grants the good of perseverance to whomever it is granted.

Reply to objection 1: We seek through our prayer even what we do not merit. For God listens to sinners who seek the forgiveness of their sins, as is clear from Augustine's commentary on John 11:31 ("We know that God does not hear sinners"). Otherwise, it would have been useless for the publican to say, "O God, be merciful to me, a sinner" (Luke 18:13). Similarly, by petitioning one seeks the gift of perseverance from God either for himself or for another, even though it does not fall under merit.

Reply to objection 2: The perseverance that will exist in the state of glory is related to the movement of free choice as a terminus, but not the perseverance that exists in this life, for the reason explained.

Reply to objection 3: Something similar should be said in reply to the third objection, the one that concerns an increase of grace; this is clear from what has been said (a. 8).

Article 10

Do temporal goods fall under merit?

It seems that temporal goods fall under merit:

Objection 1: What falls under merit is that which is promised to someone as a reward of justice (*ut praemium iustitiae*). But as is clear from Deuteronomy 28, in the Old Law temporal goods were promised as a reward of justice. Therefore, it seems that temporal goods fall under merit.

Objection 2: It seems that what God gives someone in compensation for service he has rendered falls under merit. But sometimes God gives temporal goods to men in compensation for service done to Him. For instance, Exodus 1:21 says, "Because the midwives feared God, He built them houses," where Gregory's Gloss says, "The reward given in return for their kindness could have been in eternal life, but because of their sin of lying, they received an earthly compensation instead." Again, Ezechiel 29:18 says, "The king of Babylon has made his army undergo hard service against Tyre, and no reward was given it." And later it is added, "There will be a reward for his army, and I have given him the land of Egypt in return for what he has done for me." Therefore, temporal goods fall under merit.

Objection 3: Evil is related to demerit as good is related to merit. But as is clear from the Sodomites in Genesis 19, because of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal punishments. Therefore, temporal goods fall under merit.

But contrary to this: The things that fall under merit are not related in the same way to everyone. By contrast, temporal goods and temporal evils are related in the same way to good and bad men—this according to Ecclesiastes 9:2 (“All things equally happen to the just and the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offers victims and to him that despises sacrifices”).

I respond: What falls under merit is a reward or wage (*praemium vel merces*), which has the character of a certain sort of good. Now there are two sorts of goods that belong to a man: one sort is good absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*), and the other is good relatively speaking (*secundum quid*).

The good for a man absolutely speaking is (a) his ultimate end—this according to Psalm 72:27 (“It is good for me to adhere to God”)—and, as a result, (b) all the things that are ordered in such a way as to lead to the ultimate end. And things of this sort fall under merit absolutely speaking.

By contrast, the good that belongs to a man relatively speaking and not absolutely speaking is what is good for him right now or what is good for him in some respect. Goods of this sort fall under merit relatively speaking and not absolutely speaking.

Accordingly, one should reply that if temporal goods are thought of insofar as they are *useful for the works of the virtues*, by which we are led to eternal life, then in this sense they fall directly and simply under merit, in the same way that an increase of grace does, along with everything else by which a man is assisted after first grace in arriving at beatitude. For God gives just men as much of temporal goods—and temporal evils, too—as expedites their arriving at eternal life. And to that extent temporal goods of this sort are good absolutely speaking. Hence, the Psalm [33:10] says, “Those who fear the Lord are not lacking in any good,” and, again, in another place [Psalm 36:25], “I have not seen a just man forsaken.”

On the other hand, if temporal goods of this sort are thought of *in their own right (secundum se)*, then they are human goods relatively speaking and not absolutely speaking. And in this sense they fall under merit not absolutely speaking but relatively speaking, viz., insofar men are moved by God to do certain things temporally in which their goals are attained with God’s favor. Just as eternal life is, as was explained above (aa. 3 and 6), the reward absolutely speaking of works of justice because of their relation to God’s motion, so temporal goods thought of in their own right have the character of a reward, as long as they have a relation to the divine motion by which men’s wills are moved to pursue them—even though sometimes in these cases the men do not have an upright intention (*non habeant rectam intentionem*).

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in *Contra Faustum* 4, “In these temporal promises there were figures of spiritual things to come. For the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life, and not only was their speech prophetic, but also their life.”

Reply to objection 2: The compensations in question are said to be rendered by God by way of comparison to God’s motion, but with respect to the badness of the will. This applies mainly to the king of Babylon, who attacked Tyre not because he wished to serve God, but rather in order to usurp dominion for himself. Similarly, even though the midwives had a good will as regards the liberation of the children, their will was not upright as regards the fact that they told a lie (*quantum ad hoc quod mendacium confinxerunt*).

Reply to objection 3: Temporal evils are inflicted as punishment on bad men (*infliguntur in poenam impiis*) in the sense that through them those men are not assisted in attaining eternal life. For just men, on the other hand, who are assisted by evils of this sort, they are not punishments but are instead medicines, as was also explained above (q. 87, a. 8).

Reply to the argument for the contrary: All things happen equally to good men and bad men as far as the *substance* of temporal goods and evils is concerned, but not as far as their *end* is concerned. For good men are led to beatitude by goods and evils of this sort, whereas bad men are not.

What has been said is sufficient concerning morals in general.