

QUESTION 22

The Subject of the Passions of the Soul

After this we have to consider the passions of the soul, first in general (questions 22-25) and then in particular (questions 26-48).

In the general treatment, there are four things to consider about the passions: first, their subject (question 22); second, the differences among them (question 23); third, their relation to one another (question 24); and, fourth, their badness and goodness (question 25).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Are there passions in the soul? (2) Does a passion exist in the appetitive part of the soul rather than in the apprehensive part? (3) Does a passion exist in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellective appetite, which is called the will?

Article 1

Are there passions in the soul?

It seems that there are no passions in the soul (*nulla passio sit in anima*):

Objection 1: To be acted upon (*pati*) is proper to matter. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 5), the soul is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 3 says, a passion is a movement. But as is proved in *De Anima* 1, the soul does not undergo movement (*anima non movetur*). Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

Objection 3: A passion is a path toward corruption, since, as *Topics* says, "Every passion, when made stronger, takes away from the substance (*abicit a substantia*).” But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

But contrary to this: In Romans 7:5 the Apostle says, "When we were in the flesh, the passions of the sins which were by the law were working in our members." But sins properly speaking exist in the soul. Therefore, the passions, which are here said to belong to the sins, likewise exist in the soul.

I respond: There are three ways in which something is said to be acted upon (*pati dicitur tripliciter*).

In one way, 'to be acted upon' is used generally, insofar as every instance of receiving something is an instance of being acted upon, even if nothing is taken away from the thing in question; in this sense the air is said to be acted upon when it is illuminated. However, properly speaking, this is to be *perfected* rather than *acted upon*.

In a second sense, something is said to be acted upon, properly speaking, when one thing is received along with the loss of something else. But there are two ways in which this happens:

(a) Sometimes what is taken away is not agreeable to the thing. For instance, when an animal's body is healed, it is said to be acted upon, since it receives health while losing sickness.

(b) Sometimes the reverse happens. For instance, getting sick is said to be an instance of being acted upon, since infirmity is received while health is lost. And this is the most proper sense of 'passion' or 'to be acted upon' (*hic est propriissimus modus passionis*). For 'to be acted upon' is taken from the fact that something is drawn toward the agent, and that which withdraws from what is agreeable to it seems especially to be drawn toward something else. Similarly, *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1 says that when what is more noble is generated from what is less noble there is a generation absolutely speaking (*generatio simpliciter*), but when what is less noble is generated from what is more noble there is, conversely, a generation in a certain respect (*generatio secundum quid*).

These are the three ways in which passions can exist in the soul. For in the sense of just receiving, sensing and intellective understanding are a certain sort of being acted upon (*sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati*). On the other hand, a passion with a loss occurs only through a bodily change (*secundum*

transmutationem coporalem), and so a passion properly speaking belongs to the soul only *per accidens*—viz., insofar as the composite is acted upon. But even here there is a difference, since the sort of change in question has the character of a passion more properly when it is a change for the worse than when it is a change for the better. Hence, sadness (*tristitia*) is more properly a passion than joy (*laetitia*) is.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as being acted upon comes with a loss and a change, it is proper to matter and so is found only in things composed of matter and form. But insofar as being acted upon implies just the reception of something, it does not have to belong just to matter, but is instead able to belong to whatever is in potentiality.

Now even though the soul is not composed of matter and form, it nonetheless does have some potentiality, and accordingly it is suited for receiving and being acted upon. This is the sense in which, as *De Anima* 3 says, to understand intellectually is to be acted upon (*intelligere pati est*).

Reply to objection 2: Even if being acted upon and undergoing movement do not belong to the soul *per se*, they do belong to it *per accidens*, as *De Anima* 1 points out.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to passions that are accompanied by a change for the worse. This sort of passion belongs to the soul only *per accidens*, whereas it belongs *per se* to the composite, which is indeed corruptible.

Article 2

Are the passions in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part?

It seems that the passions are in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part:

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 2 says, what is first in a genus seems to be the greatest of the things belonging to that genus and to be a cause of the others. But the passions are in the apprehensive part before being in the appetitive part; for the appetitive part is not acted upon except when the apprehensive part has previously been acted upon (*non patitur pars appetitiva nisi passione praecedente in parte apprehensiva*). Therefore, the passions exist more in the apprehensive part than in the appetitive part.

Objection 2: What is more active seems to be less passive, since acting is opposed to being acted upon (*actio passioni opponitur*). But the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore, it seems that the passions exist more in the apprehensive part.

Objection 3: Just as the sentient appetite is a power in a corporeal organ, so too is the sentient apprehensive power. But the passions of the soul come to exist, properly speaking, through a bodily change (*secundum transmutationem corporalem*). Therefore, it is not the case that they exist in the sentient appetitive part more than in the sentient apprehensive part.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, “The movements of our mind—πάθη in the Greek—are such that some, like Cicero, call them perturbations (*perturbationes*), and some call them affections (*affectiones*) or affects (*affectus*), while others call them—more clearly, as in the Greek—passions (*passiones*).” From this it is clear that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections clearly belong to the appetitive part and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore, the passions are likewise in the appetitive part rather than in the apprehensive part.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), the name ‘passion’ implies that the thing being acted upon (*patiens*) is drawn toward something that belongs to the agent.

Now the soul is drawn toward a thing through its appetitive power rather than through its apprehensive power. For it is through its appetitive power that the soul is ordered toward the things themselves insofar as they exist in themselves (*ad ipsas res prout in seipsis sunt*). Hence, in *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says that “the good and the bad”—i.e., the objects of the appetitive

power—“exist in the things themselves.”

By contrast, the apprehensive power is not drawn to things insofar as they exist in themselves; rather, it has cognition of a thing in accord with the thing’s intention (*secundum intentionem rei*), which it has or receives within itself in its own mode. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that “the true and the false”—which pertain to cognition—“exist in the mind and not in the things.”

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found in the appetitive part more than in the apprehensive part.

Reply to objection 1: What pertains to perfection behaves in a way contrary to what pertains to defectiveness (*e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad perfectionem et in his quae pertinent ad defectum*).

In the case of what pertains to perfection, intensity is associated with an approach toward a single first principle (*attenditur per accessum ad unum primum principium*), so that the closer something is to that principle, the more intense it is. For instance, the intensity of light is associated with its approach toward something that is maximally bright, so that the closer it gets to that thing, the brighter it is.

By contrast, in what pertains to defectiveness, intensity is associated not with an approach toward some highest thing, but instead with a movement away from the perfect, since this is what the character of privation and defectiveness consists in. And so the less remote a defect is from the first thing, the less intense it is; and, for this reason, at the beginning a defect is always small, and then later, as it proceeds further, it becomes greater (*postea procedendo magis multiplicatur*).

Now the passions have to do with defectiveness, since a passion belongs to something insofar as it is in potentiality. Hence, in things that are close to the first perfect thing, viz., God, there is hardly anything of the character of potentiality and passion, whereas in the other things that come after them, there is more potentiality and passion. And so it is likewise the case that there is less of the character of a passion in that prior power of the soul, viz., the apprehensive power.

Reply to objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active because it is more of a source (*principium*) for the exterior act. It has this feature from the very fact in virtue of which it is more passive, viz., that it has an ordering toward a thing insofar as that thing exists in itself. For it is through the exterior act that we arrive at the attainment of things.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*ST 1, q. 78, a. 3*), there are two ways in which an organ of the soul can be changed:

(a) *by a spiritual change (transmutatione spirituali)*, insofar as it receives the intention of a thing (*recipit intentionem rei*). This sort of change exists *per se* in the act of the sentient apprehensive power; for instance, the eye is changed by the visible thing not in such a way that it becomes colored, but in such a way that it receives the intention of color.

(b) *by a separate natural change in the organ*, insofar as the organ is changed with respect to its natural condition—e.g., becoming hot or cold or being changed in some similar way. This sort of change is related *per accidens* to the act of the sentient apprehensive power—as, for instance, when the eye is fatigued by an intent gaze or weakened by the intensity of a visible thing. However, a change of this sort is ordered *per se* toward an act of the sentient appetite. This is why a natural change in an organ is posited materially in the definition of movements of the appetitive part—as, for instance, when it is said that anger is the heating of the blood around the heart.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more in the act of sentient appetitive power than in the act of the sentient apprehensive power, even though both are acts of a corporeal organ.

Article 3

Are the passions in the sentient appetite more than in the intellective appetite?

It seems that the passions are not in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellective appetite:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says that Hierotheus “was taught by a more divine inspiration, not only learning divine things, but also undergoing them (*non solum discens sed etiam patiens divina*).” But the undergoing of divine things (*passio divinorum*) cannot belong to the sentient appetite, the object of which is the sensible good. Therefore, the passions exist in the intellective appetite as well as in the sentient appetite.

Objection 2: The more powerful the agent (*activum*) is, the stronger the passion. But the intellective appetite’s object, viz., the good in general (*bonum universale*), is a more powerful agent than the sentient appetite’s object, viz., a particular good. Therefore, the character of being a passion is found more in the intellective appetite than in the sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Joy and love are said to be passions. But they are found in the intellective appetite and not just in the sentient appetite; otherwise, they would not be attributed in the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore, it is not the case that the passions exist more in the sentient appetite than in the intellective appetite.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene, in describing the animal passions, says, “A passion is a movement of the sentient appetitive power upon one’s imagining something good or bad.” And in another place: “A passion is a movement of the non-rational soul upon one’s receiving an indication of something good or bad.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), a passion properly speaking exists when there is a bodily change (*ubi est transmutatio corporalis*). Such a change is found in the acts of the sentient soul—and not only a *spiritual* change, as in the case of sentient apprehension, but a *natural* change as well. By contrast, in the case of an act of the intellective appetite no bodily change is required, because this sort of appetite is not a power of any organ.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more properly in an act of the sentient appetite than in an act of the intellective appetite, and this is likewise clear from the definitions cited from Damascene.

Reply to objection 1: Here what is called an “undergoing of divine things” is (a) an affection directed toward divine things and (b) a union with those things through a love that occurs without a bodily change.

Reply to objection 2: The magnitude of a passion depends not only on the agent’s power but also on the patient’s susceptibility (*sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis*), since things that are highly susceptible (*bene passibilia*) are acted upon strongly even by puny agents (*etiam a parvis activis*). Therefore, even if the intellective appetite’s object is more active than the sentient appetite’s object, the sentient appetite is nonetheless more passive.

Reply to objection 3: When ‘love’, ‘joy’, and other names of this sort are attributed to God or the angels—or to men with respect to their intellective appetite—they signify a simple act of willing along with a likeness of the effect, but without any passion. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, “The holy angels punish without anger and give help without compassionate sadness. And yet—because of a certain likeness in the works and not because of the weakness of having affections—the names of those passions are by a custom of human speech applied to the angels as well.”