

## QUESTION 29

### Hatred

Next we have to consider hatred. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is the cause and object of hatred the bad? (2) Is hatred caused by love? (3) Is hatred stronger than love? (4) Can someone hate himself? (5) Can someone have hatred for the truth? (6) Can something be hated in general (*in universali*)?

### Article 1

#### Is the cause and object of hatred the bad?

It seems that the bad is not the object and cause of hatred:

**Objection 1:** Everything that exists, insofar as it exists, is good. Therefore, if the object of hatred is the bad, it follows that no entity is hated (*nulla res odio habeatur*), but that only the defectiveness of an entity is hated. But this is clearly false.

**Objection 2:** It is praiseworthy to hate what is bad; thus, in praise of certain individuals 2 Maccabees 3:1 says that “the laws were very well kept, because of the piety of Onias the high priest, and their minds hated what was bad.” Therefore, if nothing is hated except what is bad, then it follows that every instance of hatred is praiseworthy. But this is clearly false.

**Objection 3:** The same thing is not simultaneously both good and bad. But the same thing is odious to some and lovable to others. Therefore, there is hatred not only of what is bad, but also of what is good.

**But contrary to this:** Hatred is contrary to love. But as has been explained (q. 26, a. 1 and q. 27, a. 1), the object of love is the good. Therefore, the object of hatred is the bad.

**I respond:** Since a natural appetite (*appetitus naturalis*) flows from an apprehension, even though this apprehension is not conjoined to it [in the same substance], the explanation for the inclination of an animal appetite, which, as was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), follows upon a conjoined apprehension, seems to be the same as that for the inclination of a natural appetite.

Now in the case of a natural appetite it is manifestly obvious that just as each thing has a natural consonance with or aptitude for, i.e., a natural love for, what is fitting for it, so too it has a natural dissonance from, i.e., a natural hatred for, what is repugnant to it and corruptive of it. So, then, in the case of an animal appetite, as well as in the case of an intellective appetite, love is likewise an appetite for what is apprehended as fitting, whereas hatred is likewise the appetite’s dissonance from what is apprehended as repugnant and harmful.

Now just as everything that is fitting, insofar as it is fitting, has the character of being good, so too everything repugnant, insofar as it is repugnant, has character of being bad. And so just as the good is the object of love, so too the bad is the object of hatred.

**Reply to objection 1:** A being, insofar as it is a being, has the character of being fitting rather than the character of being repugnant, since all things share being in common. But a being, insofar as it is *this* determinate being, has the character of being repugnant to some other determinate being. It is in this way that one being is odious to another and is bad. Even if it is not odious in itself, it is nonetheless odious in relation to something else.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as something that is not genuinely good is apprehended as good, so too something that is not genuinely bad is apprehended as bad. Hence, it sometimes happens that hatred for the bad is not good or that love for the good is not good.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason why it happens, in the case of a natural appetite, that the same thing is lovable to some and odious to others is that one and the same thing is fitting by its nature for the one thing and repugnant by its nature to the other; for instance, heat is fitting for fire and repugnant to

water.

The reason why this happens in the case of an appetite that belongs to the soul (*secundum appetitum animale*) is that one and the same thing is apprehended by one individual as good (*sub ratione boni*) and by another individual as bad (*sub ratione mali*).

## Article 2

### Is love a cause of hatred?

It seems that love is not a cause of hatred:

**Objection 1:** As the *Categories* puts it, “Things that are divided by opposites are naturally simultaneous with one another.” But since love and hatred are contraries, they are divided by opposites. Therefore, they are naturally simultaneous with one another. Therefore, it is not the case that love is a cause of hatred.

**Objection 2:** One of two contraries is not a cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore, love is not a cause of hatred.

**Objection 3:** What is posterior is not a cause of what is prior. But it seems that hatred is prior to love; for hatred implies withdrawing from the bad (*recessus a malo*), whereas love implies drawing nearer to the good (*accessus ad bonum*). Therefore, love is not a cause of hatred.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that all the affections are caused by love. Therefore, even hatred, since it is a certain affection of the soul, is caused by love.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), love consists in a certain fit between the lover and what is loved, whereas hatred consists in a certain repugnance or dissonance. Now in every case one has to consider what is fitting prior to considering what is repugnant; for one thing is repugnant to another by virtue of the fact that it corrupts or impedes what is fitting. Hence, it is necessary that (a) love is prior to hatred and that (b) nothing is hated except in virtue of the fact that it is contrary to something fitting that is loved. Accordingly, every instance of hatred is caused by love.

**Reply to objection 1:** Among things that are divided by opposites, some are naturally simultaneous both *in reality* (*secundum rem*) and *in concept* (*secundum rationem*), e.g., two species of animal or two species of color. Some are simultaneous in concept, but the one is prior in reality to the other and a cause of it; this is clear in the case of the species of number, shape, and movement. On the other hand, some are simultaneous neither in reality nor in concept, e.g., substance and accident, given that (a) a substance is a cause in reality of its accident, and (b) ‘being’ is attributed to a substance conceptually prior to its being attributed to its accident, since it is attributed to the accident only insofar as the accident exists in the substance.

Now love and hatred are, to be sure, naturally simultaneous in concept, but not in reality. Hence, there is nothing to prevent love from being a cause of hatred.

**Reply to objection 2:** Love and hatred are contraries when they are taken with respect to the same thing. But when they are taken with respect to contraries, then they are not themselves contrary but result from one another. For the fact that something is loved is of the same nature as the fact that its contrary is hated. And so the love of one thing is a cause of its contrary being hated.

**Reply to objection 3:** As regards *execution*, withdrawing from the one terminus is prior to coming closer to the other terminus. But as regards *intention*, the converse holds; for one withdraws from the one terminus *in order to* draw nearer to the other terminus.

Now an appetitive movement has to do with intention rather than with execution. And so love is prior to hatred, since both of them are appetitive movements.

### Article 3

#### Is hatred stronger than love?

It seems that hatred is stronger than love:

**Objection 1:** In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “There is no one who does not flee from pain (*dolor*) more than he desires pleasure (*voluptas*).” But to flee from pain pertains to hatred, while the desire for pleasure pertains to love. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

**Objection 2:** The weaker is conquered by the stronger. But love is conquered by hatred, viz., when love is converted into hatred. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

**Objection 3:** The soul’s affections are made manifest by their effects. But a man persists more strongly in repelling what is odious than in pursuing what is loved—in the same way that, as Augustine notes in *83 Quaestiones*, even beasts abstain from delectable things because of the whip. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

**But contrary to this:** The good is stronger than the bad, since “the bad acts only in the power of the good,” as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4. But hatred and love differ in accord with the difference between the good and the bad. Therefore, love is stronger than hatred.

**I respond:** It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. But as was explained above (a. 2), every instance of hatred proceeds from some instance of love as its cause. Hence, it is impossible for hatred to be stronger, absolutely speaking, than love.

But, further, it is necessary for love to be stronger, absolutely speaking, than hatred. For something moves toward an end more strongly than it does toward a means to that end. But a withdrawal from the bad is ordered toward attaining the good as its end. Hence, absolutely speaking, the soul’s movement with respect to the good is stronger than its movement with respect to the bad.

Yet sometimes hatred seems stronger than love, and this for two reasons:

First of all, hatred is felt more than love is (*odium est magis sensibile quam amor*). For since the sensory power’s perception involves a certain change, by the fact that something has already been changed, it is not sensed in the same way as when it is in the very process of being changed (*quando est in ipso immutari*). Hence, even though the heat of a chronic fever (*calor febris hecticae*) might be greater, it is not felt as much as the heat of an acute fever, since the heat of the chronic fever has by now become, as it were, habitual and natural. It is also because of this that love is felt more in the absence of what is loved; as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, “Love is not felt as much when need does not bring it forth.” And it is likewise because of this that the repugnance of what is hated is perceived in a more sensible way than the fittingness of what is loved.

Second, the hatred is not being compared to the love that corresponds to it. For corresponding to the diversity of goods there is a diversity of greater and lesser among the instances of love, and the opposite instances of hatred are proportioned to them. Hence, a hatred that corresponds to a greater love effects a greater movement than does a lesser love.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection. For the love of pleasure is not as great as the love of conserving oneself, which the avoidance of pain corresponds to. And so pain is avoided to a greater degree than pleasure is loved.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hatred never conquers love except because of a greater love to which the hatred corresponds. For instance, a man loves himself more than he loves his friend, and because of this he hates even his friend if his friend opposes him.

**Reply to objection 3:** The reason why a thing acts more intensely to repel what is odious is that hatred is felt to a greater degree.

## Article 4

### Can someone hate himself?

It seems that someone can hate himself (*aliquis possit seipsum odio habere*):

**Objection 1:** Psalm 10:6 says, “He who loves iniquity hates his own soul.” But there are many who love iniquity. Therefore, there are many who hate themselves.

**Objection 2:** We hate someone when we will what is bad for him and do what is bad to him. But sometimes someone wills what is bad for himself and does what is bad to himself, e.g., those who kill themselves. Therefore, there are some who hate themselves.

**Objection 3:** In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 2 Boethius says, “Avarice makes men odious.” From this one can conclude that every man hates an avaricious man. But some men are avaricious. Therefore, those men hate themselves.

**But contrary to this:** In Ephesians 5:29 the Apostle says, “No one ever hated his own flesh.”

**I respond:** It is impossible for anyone, speaking *per se*, to hate himself. For each thing naturally desires the good, and no one can desire anything except as a good (*nisi sub ratione boni*). For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “To love someone is to will the good for him.” Hence, it is necessary for someone to love himself, and it is impossible for anyone, speaking *per se*, to hate himself.

Yet it is possible for someone to hate himself *per accidens*, and this in two ways.

First, on the part of *the good* that someone wills for himself. For it sometimes happens that what is desired as good in a certain respect (*secundum quid bonum*) is bad absolutely speaking (*simpliciter malum*) and, accordingly, someone *per accidens* wills what is bad for himself—which is what it is to hate oneself.

Second, on the part of *the man himself*, for whom he wills the good. For each thing is most especially that which exists more principally within itself; hence, the city-state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole city-state. Therefore, it is clear that a man is especially the man’s mind. But it happens that some men think themselves to be especially that which corresponds to their corporeal and sentient nature. Hence, they love themselves in a way that corresponds to what they take themselves to be, but they hate what they truly are when they will what is contrary to reason.

And it is in these two ways that “he who loves iniquity” hates not only “his own soul,” but even his very self.

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** No one wills what is bad for himself and does what is bad to himself except insofar as he apprehends it as a good. For even those who kill themselves apprehend dying itself as a good insofar as it terminates some sorrow or pain.

**Reply to objection 3:** An avaricious man hates an accident of himself, but he does not for this reason hate himself—just as a sick man hates his own sickness in virtue of the very fact that he loves himself.

An alternative reply is that avarice makes men odious to others, but it does not make a man odious to himself. To the contrary, it is caused by a disordered love of oneself, in the sense that someone wills more temporal goods for himself than he should.

## Article 5

### Can someone hate the truth?

It seems that no one can hate the truth (*aliquis non possit habere odio veritatem*):

**Objection 1:** *Good* and *being* and *true* are convertible with one another. But no one is able to hate the good. Therefore, it is likewise the case that no one is able to hate the truth.

**Objection 2:** As it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, “All men by nature desire to know.” But scientific knowledge is only of the truth. Therefore, the truth is naturally desired and naturally loved. But what exists in someone naturally exists in him always. Therefore, no one is able to hate the truth.

**Objection 3:** In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Men naturally love those who are not deceptive (*homines amant non fictos*).” But this is only for the sake of the truth. Therefore, a man naturally loves the truth. Therefore, he is not able to hate it.

**But contrary to this:** In Galatians 4:16 the Apostle says, “Have I become an enemy to you by telling you the truth?”

**I respond:** *Good* and *true* and *being* are the same in reality but differ in concept. For *good*, but not *being* or *true*, has the character of being desirable, since the good is “what all things desire.” And so the good under the concept *good* cannot be hated, either in general or in particular.

Now, to be sure, *being* in general and *true* in general cannot be hated, since dissonance (*dissonantia*) is a cause of hatred and fittingness (*convenientia*) a cause of love, and *being* and *true* are common to all things. However, there is nothing to prevent some *being* in particular or some *true* in particular from being hated insofar as it has the character of being contrary and repugnant. For contrariety and repugnance are not at odds with (*non adversatur*) the notions *being* and *true* in the way that they are at odds with the notion *good*.

There are three ways in which some particular truth can be repugnant or contrary to a good that is loved:

(a) First, insofar as the truth exists by causality and by origin in the things themselves. And a man sometimes hates a truth in this sense when he wishes something that is true not to be true.

(b) Second, insofar as a truth that impedes a man’s pursuit of what he loves enters into his cognition. For instance, some men might wish not to know the truth of the Faith in order that they might sin freely. Job 21:14 says in the person of such individuals, “We do not want the knowledge of Your ways.”

(c) Third, a particular truth is hated as something repugnant insofar as it exists in the mind of another. For instance, when someone wants to lie hidden in some sin, he hates it that someone might learn the truth about his sin. Accordingly, in *Confessiones 10* Augustine says that men “love the truth that enlightens and hate the truth that reproves.”

**Reply to objection 1:** This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

**Reply to objection 2:** To know the truth is something lovable in its own right (*secundum se*); this is why Augustine says that they “love the truth that enlightens.” But cognition of the truth can be odious *per accidens* insofar as it keeps one from something he desires.

**Reply to objection 3:** From the fact that those who are not deceptive are loved it follows that a man loves in its own right the truth that non-deceptive men make manifest.

## Article 6

### Can there be hatred of something in general?

It seems that there cannot be hatred of something in general (*odium non possit esse alicuius in universali*):

**Objection 1:** Hatred is a passion of the sentient appetite, which is moved by sentient apprehension. But the sensory power cannot apprehend a universal (*non potest apprehendere universale*). Therefore, there cannot be hatred of something in general (*in universale*).

**Objection 2:** Hatred is caused by dissonance, which is repugnant to commonality (*quae communitate repugnat*). But commonality is part of the notion *universal*. Therefore, there cannot be hatred of something in general.

**Objection 3:** The object of hatred is the bad. But as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the bad “exists in things and not in the mind.” Therefore, since a universal exists only in the mind (*cum universale sit solum in mente*), which abstracts the universal from the particular, it seems that there cannot be hatred of something in general (*in universali*).

**But contrary to this:** In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Anger is always directed toward singulars, whereas hatred is also directed to things in general (*ad genera*); for everyone hates a thief and a backbiter (*furem odit et calumniatorem unusquisque*).”

**I respond:** There are two possible ways of talking about a universal: (a) talking about it insofar as it is the subject of an intention of universality (*secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis*); and (b) talking about the nature that such an intention is attributed to. For it is one thing to consider *man* as a universal, and it is another thing to consider a man insofar as he is a man (*alia est consideratio hominis universalis et alia hominis in eo quod homo*).

Thus, if a universal is taken in the first way, then no power of the sentient part—neither an apprehensive power nor an appetitive power—can be directed toward a universal (*non ferri potest in universale*). For a universal is fashioned by abstraction from the material individual in which every sentient power is rooted.

Nonetheless, it is possible for sentient powers—both the apprehensive power and the appetitive power—to be directed toward something in general (*ferri potest in aliquid universaliter*). For instance, we say that the object of the visual power is color in general (*color secundum genus*), not because the visual power has a cognition of the universal *color*, but because the fact that a color is susceptible to cognition by the visual power belongs to a color not insofar as it is *this* color, but insofar as it is a color absolutely speaking.

So, then, it is likewise the case that the hatred that belongs to the sentient part of the soul can be directed toward something in general (*potest respicere aliquid in universali*). For it is by its common nature, and not just by the fact that it is a particular, that something is an adversary of an animal—in the way that a wolf is an adversary of a sheep. Hence, a sheep hates wolves in general (*ovis odit lupum generaliter*). By contrast, anger is always caused by something particular, since it is caused by a harmful act and acts are particulars. This is why the Philosopher says that anger is always directed toward something singular, whereas hatred can be directed toward something in general.

However, insofar as hatred exists in the intellective part of the soul, it can exist with respect to a universal in both ways, since it follows upon the intellect’s universal apprehension.

**Reply to objection 1:** The sensory power does not apprehend a universal insofar as it is a universal, but it does apprehend something to which universality accedes through abstraction.

**Reply to objection 2:** What is common to *all* things cannot be a reason for hatred. But nothing prevents a thing from being common to *many* things and yet being dissonant with respect to others; and so it is odious to those other things.

**Reply to objection 3:** This argument goes through in the case of a universal insofar as it is the subject of an intention of universality. For in this sense it is not susceptible to either sentient apprehension or sentient appetite (*sic non cadit sub apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo*).