

QUESTION 32

The Causes of Pleasure

Next we have to consider the causes of pleasure. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is action or operation (*operatio*) a proper cause of pleasure? (2) Is movement a cause of pleasure? (3) Are hope and memory causes of pleasure? (4) Is sadness a cause of pleasure? (5) Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure for us? (6) Is doing good for someone else a cause of pleasure? (7) Is likeness a cause of pleasure? (8) Is wonder (*admiratio*) a cause of pleasure?

Article 1

Is operation a cause of pleasure?

It seems that action or operation (*operatio*) is not a proper and primary cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, “Taking pleasure consists in the sensory power’s undergoing something.” For as has been explained (q. 31, a. 1), cognition is required for pleasure. But the objects of operations are knowable prior to the operations themselves. Therefore, operation is not a proper cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Pleasure consists especially in an acquired end, since the end is what is principally desired. But it is not always the case that an operation is the end; instead, sometimes the end is the very thing that is done through the operation (*ipsum operatum*). Therefore, it is not the case that operation is a proper and *per se* cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Leisure and rest (*otium et requies*) bespeak the cessation of an operation. But as *Rhetoric* 1 points out, they are desirable things. Therefore, it is not the case that operation is a proper cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 and 10 the Philosopher says, “Pleasure is an unimpeded connatural operation (*operatio connaturalis non impedita*).”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the acquisition of a fitting good and (b) the cognition of this acquisition. Now each of these consists in a certain operation, since actual cognition is an operation and, similarly, we acquire a fitting good by some operation. In addition, the operation itself is a certain fitting good. Hence, it must be the case that every pleasure follows upon an operation.

Reply to objection 1: The objects of the operations are themselves pleasurable only insofar as they are joined to us either (a) through cognition alone, as when we take pleasure in thinking about or looking at certain things, or (b) in some other way along with cognition, as when one takes pleasure in knowing that he possesses some good, such as riches or honor, etc., that is pleasurable only if it is apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 2, “To think of something as one’s own is a great pleasure that proceeds from the natural love one has for himself.” For having things of this sort is nothing other than making use of them or being able to make use of them, and this occurs through an operation. Hence, it is clear that every pleasure is traced back to an operation that is a cause of it.

Reply to objection 2: Even in cases in which the things done through the operations—and not the operations—are the end, the things done are themselves pleasurable insofar as they are possessed or made, and this goes back to some operation or act of using.

Reply to objection 3: Operations are pleasurable to the extent that they are proportioned to and connatural to the one who operates. Now since human power is finite, an operation is proportioned to it by some measure. Hence, if the operation exceeds that measure, then it will no longer be proportionate or pleasurable, but will instead be laborious and tedious (*laboriosa et attaediens*). Accordingly, leisure and play and other things involving relaxation are enjoyable to the extent that they remove the sadness that stems from work.

Article 2

Is movement a cause of pleasure?

It seems that movement or change (*motus*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), it is a good that is presently possessed that is a cause of pleasure; hence, in *Ethics 7* the Philosopher says that pleasure is not like generation, but is instead like the operation of a thing that already exists. But what is moving toward something does not yet possess it; rather, it is in a certain sense on the path of generation with respect to it, since, as *Physics 8* says, generation and corruption are adjoined to every movement. Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Movement is mainly a cause of laboriousness and weariness in operations (*in operibus*). But by the fact that operations are laborious and wearying, they are painful (*afflictivae*) rather than pleasurable. Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: ‘Movement’ or ‘change’ implies a certain newness that is opposed to custom (*opponitur consuetudine*). But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 1*, “What is customary is pleasurable to us.” Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones 8* Augustine says, “What does this mean, Lord my God—though You are everlasting joy to Yourself and some things around You rejoice in You always, this local portion of things rejoices in alternating ebbs and flows, offenses and reconciliations?” From this one may infer that men rejoice and take pleasure in certain sorts of changes (*in quibusdam alternationibus*). And so movement or change seems to be a cause of pleasure.

I respond: Three things are required for pleasure, two of which are involved in the pleasurable conjoining, and the third of which is the cognition of this conjoining. And as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics 7* and *Rhetoric 1*, it is in accord with these three things that movement or change becomes pleasurable.

For *on the part of us who take pleasure*, change (*transmutatio*) becomes pleasurable to us because our nature is changeable. For this reason, what is now fitting for us will not be fitting for us later on; for instance, getting warm in front of a fire is fitting for a man in the winter, but not in the summer.

Next, *on the part of the pleasurable good that is conjoined to us*, change is again pleasurable. For the continued action of any agent adds to the effect; for instance, the longer someone stays near a fire, the warmer and drier he becomes. But a ‘natural condition’ (*naturalis habitudo*) consists in a measure. And so when the continued presence of a pleasurable thing exceeds the measure of one’s natural condition, then the thing’s removal becomes pleasurable.

Next, *on the part of the cognition itself*, by reason of the fact that a man desires to have a complete and perfect cognition of a thing. Therefore, since some things cannot be apprehended all at once (*tota simul*), change is more pleasing in the case of these things, so that one part passes away and another part succeeds it, and in this way the whole thing comes to be sensed. Hence, in *Confessiones 4* Augustine says, “You do not want the syllable to stay; instead, you want it to fly away so that others might come and you might hear the whole thing. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many but they do not all exist together at the same time, all of them, if they can all be sensed, are more pleasing than they are one by one.”

Therefore, if an entity is such that (a) its nature is unchangeable, and (b) its natural condition cannot be exceeded by a continuation of the pleasurable thing, and (c) it can intuit the pleasurable thing as a whole all at once, then change will not be pleasurable to it. And the closer a given pleasure comes to being like this, the more capable it is of being prolonged.

Reply to objection 1: Even if what is moving does not yet possess perfectly what it is moving toward, it nonetheless is already beginning to have something of what it is moving toward—and,

accordingly, the movement is itself pleasurable to a certain degree (*habet aliquid delectationis*). Yet it falls short of being a perfect pleasure, since the most perfect pleasures exist in unchangeable things.

Also, as was just explained, a movement or change also becomes pleasurable to the extent that because of it a thing that was previously unfitting either becomes fitting or ceases to exist.

Reply to objection 2: Movement leads to laboriousness and weariness to the extent that the natural condition is exceeded. But movement in this sense is not pleasurable; instead, it is pleasurable to the extent that it removes contraries of the natural condition.

Reply to objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasurable to the extent that it becomes natural. For custom is, as it were, a second nature (*altera natura*). Now movement or change is not pleasurable because it departs from custom; instead, it is pleasurable to the extent that it impedes the sort of corruption of the natural condition that could come from the prolongation of an operation. And so custom and the movement are both pleasurable by the same cause, viz., connaturality.

Article 3

Are hope and memory causes of pleasure?

It seems that hope and memory are not causes of pleasure:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, pleasure has to do with a good that is present. But memory and hope have to do with what is absent; for memory is about the past, whereas hope is about the future. Therefore, memory and hope are not causes of pleasure.

Objection 2: It is not the case that the same thing is a cause of contrary things. But hope is a cause of affliction, since Proverbs 13:12 says, “Hope deferred afflicts the soul.” Therefore, hope is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Just as hope agrees with pleasure in having to do with the good, so too do concupiscence and love. Therefore, hope should not be designated as a cause of pleasure any more than concupiscence or love are.

But contrary to this: Romans 12:12 says, “..... rejoicing in hope.” And Psalm 76:4 says, “I remembered God and was delighted.”

I respond: Pleasure is caused by the presence of a fitting good insofar as that good is sensed or perceived in some way or other. Now there are two ways in which something is present to us: (a) *by cognition*, viz., insofar as what is known exists in the knower by means of a likeness of it; and (b) *in reality*, viz., insofar as the one thing is joined in reality to the other, either in actuality or in potentiality, in accord with some mode of conjoining.

And since (a) a conjoining in reality is greater than a conjoining by means of a likeness, which is the sort of conjoining that belongs to cognition, and since likewise (b) the conjoining of a real thing is greater in actuality than in potentiality, it follows that the greatest pleasure is that which comes through the sensory power, and this requires the presence of the sensible thing.

However, in second place is the pleasure that belongs to hope, in which the pleasurable conjoining exists not only with respect to apprehension, but also with respect to one’s ability or power to acquire the good that gives pleasure.

And third place is occupied by the pleasure that belongs to memory, in which there is only a conjoining of apprehension.

Reply to objection 1: Hope and memory have to do with things which are absent absolutely speaking but which are present in a certain respect, viz., either through apprehension alone or through apprehension and ability, at least estimated ability.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing from being, in different respects, a cause of contraries. So, then, insofar as it involves a present judgment about a future good, hope is a cause of

pleasure, whereas insofar as the thing's presence is lacking, hope is a cause of affliction.

Reply to objection 3: Love and concupiscence are also causes of pleasure. For everything that is loved is pleasurable to the lover, because love is a sort of union or connaturality between the lover and what is loved. Similarly, everything for which there is concupiscence is pleasurable to the one who desires it, since concupiscence is mainly a desire for pleasure.

However, to the extent that hope involves a sort of certitude about the presence of a pleasurable good—something that neither love nor concupiscence involves—it is hope that is posited as a cause of pleasure more than love and concupiscence are. Similarly, hope is posited as a cause of pleasure more than memory is, because memory is of something that has already passed away.

Article 4

Is sadness a cause of pleasure?

It seems that sadness or pain (*tristitia*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: A contrary is not a cause of its contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore, it is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Contraries are the effects of contraries. But remembered pleasurable things are a cause of pleasure. Therefore, remembered sad things are a cause of pain and not of pleasure.

Objection 3: Sadness is related to pleasure as hatred is related to love. But as was explained above (q. 29, a. 2), hatred is not a cause of love, but instead vice versa. Therefore, sadness is not a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: Psalm 41:4 says, "Tears have been to me my bread, day and night." But 'bread' here means pleasurable refreshment. Therefore, tears, which arise from sadness, can be pleasurable.

I respond: Sadness can be thought of in two ways: (a) insofar as it exists *in actuality* and (b) insofar as it exists *in memory*. And in both of these ways sadness can be a cause of pleasure.

Sadness that exists in actuality is a cause of pleasure insofar as it effects a memory of something beloved at the absence of which one is saddened and yet in the mere apprehension of which one takes pleasure.

On the other hand, the memory of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure in light of the later escape from sadness. For not possessing something bad is taken as a good (*accipitur in ratione boni*), and insofar as a man apprehends himself to have escaped from sadness and pain, the stuff of joy grows for him. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 22 Augustine says, "Often, while joyful, we remember sad things and, while healthy, we remember pains but without the pain, and because of this we become even more joyful and thankful." And in *Confessiones* 8 he says, "The more danger there was in the battle, the more joy there will be in the victory."

Reply to objection 1: A contrary is sometimes a *per accidens* cause of its contrary, in the way that, as *Physics* 8 points out, what is cold sometimes gives warmth. And, similarly, sadness is a *per accidens* cause of pleasure insofar as it effects the apprehension of something pleasurable.

Reply to objection 2: Remembered sad things are a cause of joy not insofar as they are sad and contrary to pleasurable things, but rather insofar as a man is now free of them.

Reply to objection 3: Hatred can likewise be a *per accidens* cause of love; for some individuals love one another because they agree in their hatred of one and the same thing.

Article 5

Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure for us?

It seems that the operations or actions (*actiones*) of others are not a cause of pleasure for us:

Objection 1: It is a conjoined good of one's own that is a cause of pleasure. But the operations of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore, they are not a cause of pleasure for us.

Objection 2: An operation is a good that belongs to the one who operates. Therefore, if the operations of others were a cause of pleasure for us, then by parity of reasoning all the other goods that belong to others would be a cause of pleasure for us. But this is clearly false.

Objection 3: An operation is pleasurable insofar as it proceeds from a habit that exists within us (*procedit ex habitu nobis innato*); this is why *Ethics* 3 says, "We must take as a sign of a generated habit the pleasure that is effected in its act." But the operations of others do not proceed from habits that exist in us, though they do in some cases proceed from habits that exist in those who are operating. Therefore, the operations of others are pleasurable not to us, but to the very individuals who are operating.

But contrary to this: 2 John, verse 4, says, "I rejoiced greatly to find some of your children walking in the truth."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the acquisition of a good for oneself (*consecutio proprii boni*) and (b) the cognition of this acquired good that belongs to one.

Therefore, there are three ways in which someone else's operation can be a cause of pleasure:

In the first way, insofar as *we acquire some good* through someone's operation. On this score, the operations of those who do some good for us are pleasurable to us, since it is pleasurable to be treated well by another (*bene pati ab alio est delectabile*).

In the second way, insofar as through the operations of others *some cognition of or judgment about our own good* is effected in us. The reason why men take pleasure in being praised or honored by others is that they thereby receive the assessment (*aestimatio*) that some good exists within themselves. And since this sort of assessment is more forcefully generated by the testimony of good and wise individuals, men take more pleasure in being praised and honored by such individuals. Moreover, since someone who flatters gives the appearance of praising (*quia adulator est apparens laudator*), flattery is also pleasurable to some individuals. And since love is directed toward something good, and since admiration is directed toward something great, it is pleasurable to be loved by others and to be held in admiration by them. For a man thereby gets an assessment of the goodness or greatness which belongs to him and which someone else takes pleasure in.

In the third way, insofar as the operations of others, if they are good, *are themselves thought of as our own good* because of the force of love, which makes one think of his friend as identical with himself. Moreover, because of hatred, which makes one think of someone else's good as contrary to his own good, an enemy's bad action becomes pleasurable; this is why 1 Corinthians 13:6 says that charity "does not rejoice over iniquity, but rejoices with the truth."

Reply to objection 1: Someone else's action can be joined to me either through its *effect*, as in the first way above; or through *apprehension*, as in the second way; or through *affection*, as in the third way.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through with respect to the third way above, but not with respect to the first two ways.

Reply to objection 3: Even if the actions of others do not proceed from habits that exist within me, they nonetheless either (a) cause something pleasurable in me, or else (b) they give me an assessment or apprehension of my own habits, or else (c) they proceed from a habit that belongs to someone who is united with me through love.

Article 6

Is doing good for another a cause of pleasure?

It seems that doing good for another (*benefacere alteri*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), pleasure is caused by the acquisition of one's own good (*ex consecutione proprii boni*). But doing good is more akin to expending one's own good than to acquiring it (*non pertinet ad consecutionem proprii boni, sed magis ad emissionem*). Therefore, doing good seems to be a cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "A lack of generosity (*illiberalitas*) is more natural to men than is prodigality." But doing good for others belongs to prodigality, whereas refraining from doing good belongs to a lack of generosity. Therefore, since, as *Ethics* 7 and 10 say, a natural operation is pleasurable to an individual, it seems that doing good for others is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But doing certain bad things to others (*quaedam quae pertinent ad malefacere*) is naturally pleasurable to a man—for instance, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, winning against another (*vincere*), disproving another (*redarguere*), rebuking another (*increpare*), and even, in the case of angry men, punishing another (*punire*). Therefore, doing good is a cause of sadness rather than a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Politics* 2 the Philosopher says, "It is very pleasurable to give gifts or assistance to friends or strangers."

I respond: There are three ways in which doing good for another can itself be a cause of pleasure:

In the first way, in relation to the *effect*, which is a good established in the other. On this score, to the extent that we think of the other's good as our own good because of a union of love, we take pleasure in the good that we do for others, especially our friends, in the same way that we take pleasure in our own good.

In the second way, in relation to the *end*, as when someone, by doing good for another, hopes to gain some good for himself, either from God or from man. But hope is a cause of pleasure.

In the third way, in relation to the *principle*. And on this score, there are three principles in relation to which doing good for another can be a cause of pleasure:

One of them is the *ability to do good* (*facultas benefaciendi*), and on this score doing good for another becomes pleasurable to the extent that it effects for a man some idea of the abundant good which exists within him and which it is possible to share with others. And so men take pleasure in their children and in their own works as something by which they share their own good.

A second principle is *an inclining habit* in accord with which it becomes connatural to someone to do good. Hence, generous individuals give to others with pleasure.

The third principle is *the motive*—as, for instance, when someone is moved by an individual he loves toward doing good for someone. For all the things that we do or undergo for the sake of a friend are pleasurable, since love is the main cause of pleasure.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as the expending points toward one's own good, it is pleasurable. But insofar as it empties one of one's own good, it can sadden one, as when it is immoderate.

Reply to objection 2: Prodigality is immoderate expending, which is contrary to nature. And this is why prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.

Reply to objection 3: To win against another, to disprove another, and to punish another are pleasurable not insofar as they are bad for the other, but insofar as they pertain to a man's own good, which he loves more than he hates what is bad for the other.

For instance, to win against another is naturally pleasurable insofar as it gives a man an assessment of his own excellence. And because of this, all games which involve competition (*omnes ludi in quibus est concertatio*) and in which there can be victory are especially pleasurable. And, in general, so are all competitions, insofar as they involve the hope for victory.

Now there are two ways in which disproving or rebuking another can be pleasurable. In one way, insofar as it gives a man some idea of his own wisdom and excellence (*facit homini imaginationem propriae sapientiae et excellentiae*). And to rebuke or to reproach another belongs to those who are wise and greater in a second way, insofar as someone, by rebuking and reproaching another, does something good for the other—and this, as has been explained, is pleasurable.

Now for someone who is angry it is pleasurable to inflict punishment, insofar as this seems to remove the apparent threat (*remove apparentem minorationem*) that seems to come from a previous wound. For when someone is wounded by another, it thereby appears to him that he is threatened, and so he seeks to be liberated from this threat by wounding in return (*per retributionem laesionis*).

And so it is clear that doing good for another can be pleasurable *per se*, whereas doing something bad to another is pleasurable only insofar as it seems to belong to one's own good.

Article 7

Is likeness a cause of pleasure?

It seems that likeness is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: 'To rule' (*principari*) and 'to preside over' (*praesesse*) imply a certain dissimilarity. But as *Rhetoric* 1 says, "It is naturally pleasurable to rule and to preside." Therefore, it is dissimilarity, rather than likeness, that is a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Nothing is more unlike pleasure than sadness. But as *Ethics* 7 says, it is those who suffer from sadness who especially pursue pleasures. Therefore, it is dissimilarity, rather than likeness, that is a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Those who are sated with certain types of pleasurable things (*repleti aliquibus delectabilibus*) do not take pleasure in them, but instead are disgusted by them (*fastidiunt ea*)—as is clear in the case of those who are sated with food. Therefore, it is not the case that likeness is a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), likeness is a cause of love. But love is a cause of pleasure. Therefore, likeness is a cause of pleasure.

I respond: Likeness is a kind of unity; hence, what is similar to someone is pleasurable insofar as it is united with him, in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), what is similar is lovable. And if what is similar adds to and does not corrupt the individual's own good, then it is pleasurable absolutely speaking, e.g., one man with respect to another, and one youth with respect to another.

By contrast, if it corrupts the individual's own good, then it becomes disdainful or painful *per accidens*—not insofar as it is united with the individual, but insofar as it corrupts something that is more united with him (*inquantum corrumpit id quod est magis unum*). Now there are two ways in which what is similar corrupts an individual's own good:

In one way, by corrupting the measure of his own good by a sort of excess. For the good, especially a corporeal good like health, consists in a certain balance (*in quadam commensuratione consistit*). Because of this, an overabundance of food or of any corporeal pleasure becomes loathsome.

In a second way, through a direct opposition to the individual's own good, in the way that potters dislike other potters—not insofar as they are potters, but insofar as, because of the others, they lose either their superiority or their money (*amittunt excellentiam propriam sive proprium lucrum*), which they desire as goods of their own.

Reply to objection 1: Since a leader and his subject share something in common (*est communicatio principantis ad subiectum*), there is some likeness in such a case—yet it is a likeness with respect to a certain excellence, given that ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of one's own good. For to rule and to preside belong to the wise and to one's betters (*sapientum et meliorum est*

principari et praeesse). Hence, this gives a man some idea of his own proper goodness.

An alternative reply is that by the fact that a man rules and presides, he does good for others, and this is pleasurable.

Reply to objection 2: Even if what the sad man takes pleasure in is not similar to sadness, it is nonetheless similar to the sad man. For sadness is contrary to the proper good of the one who is sad. And so those who are sad desire pleasure in order that it might contribute to their own good, insofar as it is medicine against its contrary (*inquantum est medicativa contrarii*). This is the reason why corporeal pleasures, which certain sorts of sadness are contrary to, are desired more than intellectual pleasures, which, as will be explained below (q. 35, a. 5), do not have contrary forms of sadness (*non habet contrarietatem tristitiae*).

From this it likewise follows that all animals naturally desire pleasure because an animal is always laboring through its sensory power and movement. This is also why youths especially desire pleasure, because of the many changes that occur within them while they are still growing (*dum sunt in statu augmenti*). Again, those who are melancholic strongly desire pleasures in order to expel sadness, since, as *Ethics 7* puts it, “Their body is corroded, as it were, by a base humor.”

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal goods consist in a certain measure, and so an excess of similar things corrupts one’s own good. And thus such an excess becomes distasteful and saddening, insofar as it is contrary to a man’s own good.

Article 8

Is wonder a cause of pleasure?

It seems that wonder (*admiratio*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, someone who wonders is ignorant of nature. But it is scientific knowledge (*scientia*) rather than ignorance that is pleasurable. Therefore, wonder is not a source of pleasure.

Objection 2: As the beginning of the *Metaphysics* says, wonder is the beginning of wisdom—a path, as it were, to inquiring into the truth. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics 10*, “It is more pleasurable to contemplate what is already known than to inquire into what is unknown.” For the latter involves difficulty and obstacles, whereas the former does not, and, as *Ethics 7* says, pleasure is caused by an unimpeded operation. Therefore, wonder is not a cause of pleasure, but instead impedes it.

Objection 3: Each individual takes pleasure in what he is used to; hence, the operations of habits acquired by custom are pleasurable. But as Augustine says in his commentary on the Gospel of John, what is customary is not an object of wonder (*consueta non sunt admirabilia*). Therefore, wonder is opposed to a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric 1* the Philosopher says that wonder is a cause of pleasure.

I respond: As was said above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 31, a. 1), it is pleasurable to acquire what is desired. And so the more the desire for something that is loved grows, the more the pleasure over its acquisition grows. And there is even an increase in pleasure in the very increase in the desire, since hope is likewise effected with respect to the thing that is loved. For as was explained above (a. 3), the desire is itself pleasurable because of hope.

Now wonder is a certain sort of desire to know, and it arises in a man from the fact that he sees an effect without knowing its cause, or from the fact that the cause of such an effect exceeds his cognition or ability. And so wonder is a cause of pleasure insofar as there is adjoined to it the hope of acquiring cognition of what one desires to know.

Because of this, all things that give rise to wonder (*mirabilia*) are pleasurable, as are things that are rare and all representations of things—even of those things that are not pleasurable in themselves. For

the soul rejoices in connecting one thing with another, since, as the Philosopher says in his *Poetics*, connecting one thing to another is the proper and natural act of reason.

For this reason, moreover, “being freed from great dangers is more pleasurable because it gives rise to wonder,” as *Rhetoric* 1 puts it.

Reply to objection 1: Wonder is pleasurable not because it involves ignorance, but rather because it involves a desire to learn the cause and because someone who wonders learns something new, viz., that he did not know that anything was quite like this.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure involves two things, viz., (a) coming to rest in a good and (b) perceiving this rest.

Thus, as regards the first of these, since it is more perfect to contemplate a known truth than to inquire into what is unknown, acts of contemplation with respect to known things are, speaking *per se*, more pleasurable than are acts of inquiry into unknown things.

Still, as regards the second point, it happens *per accidens* that acts of inquiry are sometimes more pleasurable because they proceed from a more intense desire (*ex maiori desiderio procedunt*), given that desire is excited to a higher degree by the perception of ignorance. Hence, a man takes pleasure especially in those things that he discovers or learns for the first time (*de novo*).

Reply to objection 3: What is customary is pleasurable to do because it is, as it were, connatural. Yet what is rare can be pleasurable either (a) by reason of *cognition*, since knowledge of such things is desired because they give rise to wonder (*inquantum sunt mira*), or (b) by reason of *operation*, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, “the mind is more inclined by desire to operate intensely in new matters.” For a more perfect operation is a cause of a more perfect pleasure.