

QUESTION 45

Daring

Next we have to consider daring or audacity (*audacia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is daring contrary to fear? (2) How is daring related to hope? (3) What are the causes of daring? (4) What are its effects?

Article 1

Is daring contrary to fear?

It seems that daring (*audacia*) is not contrary to fear (*timor*):

Objection 1: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Daring is a vice.” But vice is contrary to virtue. Therefore, since fear is not a virtue, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.

Objection 2: A single thing has a single contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore, daring is not contrary to fear.

Objection 3: Each passion excludes its opposed passion. But what is excluded by fear is carefreeness (*securitas*); for in *Confessiones* 2 Augustine says, “Fear guards against carefreeness.” Therefore, carefreeness is contrary to fear. Therefore, it is not the case that daring is contrary to fear.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, “Daring is contrary to fear.”

I respond: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, it is part of the nature of contraries that “they are maximally distant from one another.” But what is maximally distant from fear is daring. For fear withdraws from a future harm because of the harm’s victory over the one who fears it, whereas daring attacks the imminent danger for the sake of winning a victory over the danger itself. Hence, daring is clearly contrary to fear.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Anger’ (*ira*) and ‘daring’ (*audacia*)—and the names of all the passions—can be taken in two senses:

In one sense, insofar as they imply simply (*absolute*) the sentient appetite’s movement with respect to some good or bad object. And it is in this sense that they are the names of *passions*.

In a second sense, insofar as they imply, along with this movement, a departure from the order of reason; and in this sense they are the names of *vices*. This is the sense in which Augustine is talking about daring, whereas we ourselves are at present talking about daring in the first sense.

Reply to objection 2: There is no more than one contrary for a single thing in the same respect (*secundum idem*). But nothing prevents a single thing from having more than one contrary in different respects. And thus it was explained above (q. 23, a. 2 and q. 40, a. 4) that the passions of the irascible part of the soul have two contraries, one in accord with the opposition between *good* and *bad*, and the other in accord with the opposition between *approaching toward* and *withdrawing from*. And it is in this latter way that daring is opposed to fear, and that despair is opposed to hope.

Reply to objection 3: ‘Carefreeness’ (*securitas*) does not signify anything contrary to fear, but instead signifies only the exclusion of fear. For it is someone unafraid who is said to be carefree. Hence, carefreeness is opposed to fear as its *privation*, whereas daring is opposed to it as its *contrary*. And just as the contrary includes the privation within itself, so daring includes carefreeness within itself.

Article 2

Does daring follow upon hope?

It seems that daring does not follow upon hope (*non consequatur spes*):

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 3 says, daring has to do with what is bad and fearsome. But as was

explained above (q. 40, a. 1), hope has to do with what is good. Therefore, they have diverse objects and do not belong to a single ordering. Therefore, daring does not follow upon hope.

Objection 2: Just as daring is contrary to fear, so despair is contrary to hope. But fear does not follow upon despair; to the contrary, as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric 2*, despair excludes fear. Therefore, daring does not follow upon hope.

Objection 3: Daring intends a certain good, viz., victory. But it is hope that tends toward an arduous good. Therefore, daring is the same thing as hope. Therefore, it does not follow upon hope.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics 3* the Philosopher says, “Those who are full of hope are daring” (*illi qui bonae spei sunt audaces*). Therefore, daring seems to follow upon hope.

I respond: As has already been explained many times (q. 22, a. 2, *et alia*), the passions of the soul belong to the appetitive power.

Now every movement of the appetitive power is traced back to either *approach* or *withdrawal*. And a thing’s approach or withdrawal is either *per se* or *per accidens*. More specifically, approach is *per se* toward something good, whereas withdrawal is *per se* away from something bad; but there can be, *per accidens*, (a) an approach toward something bad, for the sake of some adjoined good, and (b) a withdrawal from something good, because of some adjoined evil.

Now what is such-and-such *per accidens* follows upon what is such-and-such *per se*. And so approaching something bad follows upon approaching something good, just as withdrawing from something good follows upon withdrawing from something bad.

Now these four movements belong to four passions: for approaching toward what is good belongs to *hope*, withdrawing from what is bad belongs to *fear*, pursuing (*insecutio*) what is fearsomely bad belongs to *daring*, and withdrawing from what is good belongs to *despair*. Hence, it follows that daring follows upon hope; for because one hopes to overcome something that is fearsome and imminent, one pursues it with daring (*audacter insequitur ipsum*). On the other hand, despair follows upon fear; for one despairs because he fears the difficulty involved with a hoped for good.

Reply to objection 1: This argument would go through if *good* and *bad* were objects that did not have an ordering with respect to one another. But since what is bad has a certain ordering to what is good—for what is bad is posterior to what is good in the way that a privation is posterior to its corresponding disposition—daring, which pursues what is bad, comes after hope, which pursues what is good.

Reply to objection 2: Even if *good* is, simply speaking, prior to *bad*, nevertheless, withdrawal is appropriate with respect to what is bad prior to being appropriate with respect to what is good—just as approach (*insecutio*) is appropriate with respect to what is good prior to being appropriate with respect to what is bad. And so just as hope is prior to daring, so, too, fear is prior to despair. And just as despair does not always follow from fear, but only when the fear is more intense, so, too, daring does not always follow from hope, but only when the hope is strong.

Reply to objection 3: Even if daring has to do with something bad which, in the judgment of the one who is daring, the good of victory is connected to, nonetheless, daring is directed toward something bad, whereas hope is directed toward the connected good thing. Similarly, despair has to do directly with what is good, which it withdraws from, whereas fear has to do with the connected bad thing.

Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a *part* of hope but is instead an *effect* of hope, just as despair is an effect of fear and not a part of it. Also, this is the reason why daring cannot be one of the principal passions (cf. q. 25, a. 4).

Article 3

Is some defect a cause of daring?

It seems that some defect is a cause of daring:

Objection 1: In *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says, “Lovers of wine are strong and daring.” But the defect of being inebriated follows from wine. Therefore, daring is caused by a defect.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “It is those who lack experience with dangers who are daring.” But the lack of experience is a certain defect. Therefore, daring is caused by a defect.

Objection 3: Those who suffer injustices (*iniusta passi*) are usually daring, “just like beasts who have been beaten,” as *Ethics 3* puts it. But to suffer an injustice is a sort of defect. Therefore, daring is caused by some defect.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says that the cause of daring “is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are near at hand and that what needs to be feared either does not exist or is far off.” But any relevant defect involves either the exclusion of the means of safety or the proximity of what needs to be feared. Therefore, nothing that involves a defect is a cause of daring.

I respond: As was explained above (aa. 1-2), daring follows upon hope and is contrary to fear, and so anything that is apt to cause hope or to remove fear is a cause of daring. However, since, given that they are passions, fear, hope, and daring consist in (a) a movement of the appetite and (b) a bodily change, there are two possible ways to think about a cause of daring, regardless of whether it involves evoking hope or removing fear: (a) on the part of the appetitive movement and (b) on the part of the bodily change.

As regards the appetitive movement that follows upon an apprehension, the hope that causes daring is evoked by whatever makes us judge that it is possible to attain victory, either (a) by our own power, e.g., by our bodily strength, or experience with dangers, or a lot of money, or other such things, or (b) by the power of others, e.g., by a large number of friends or other helpers, and especially if a man is confident of God’s help. Hence, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, “Those who have a good relationship with the divine are daring.”

On the other hand, again as regards the appetitive movement, fear is removed by excluding whatever is both fearsome and close by (*per remotionem terribilium appropinquantium*), e.g., by a man’s having no enemies, or by his having harmed no one, or by his not seeing that a danger is approaching. For dangers seem imminent most of all to those who have done harm to others.

As regards the bodily change, daring is caused—via hope’s being evoked and fear’s being excluded—by whatever builds up heat around the heart. Hence, in *De Partibus Animalium* the Philosopher says, “Those who have a quantitatively small heart are daring, and animals that have a quantitatively large heart are timid, because natural heat cannot heat up a large heart to the extent that it can a small one, just as a fire cannot burn a large house to the extent that it can a small one.” And in *De Problematibus* he says, “Those whose lungs contain a lot of blood are daring, because of the heating of the heart that follows from this.” And in the same place he says, “Lovers of wine are more daring because of the wine’s heat.” Hence, it was explained above (q. 40, a. 6) that inebriation gives one good hope, since heat in the heart repels fear and causes hope by extending and enlarging the heart.

Reply to objection 1: Inebriation causes daring not insofar as it is a defect, but insofar as it makes the heart larger and also insofar it makes a man judge that he is great in some way (*inquantum etiam facit aestimationem cuiusdam magnitudinis*).

Reply to objection 2: Those who lack experience with dangers are daring not because of their defect, but rather *per accidens*, viz., insofar as, because of their inexperience, they do not recognize their own weakness or the presence of dangers. And so daring follows because the causes of fear have been

excluded.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, “Those who suffer injustice are rendered more daring, because they believe that God gives assistance to those who suffer injustice.”

And so it is clear that no defect causes daring except *per accidens*, viz., insofar as the defect has some excellence connected with it—regardless of whether it is a genuine excellence or something thought to be an excellence, and regardless of whether it is an excellence on one’s own part or on the part of someone else.

Article 4

Are those who are daring more eager at the beginning than in the midst of the dangers themselves?

It seems not to be the case that those who are daring are more eager at the beginning than in the midst of the dangers themselves (*non sint promptiores in principio quam in ipsis periculis*):

Objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (q. 44, a. 3), quivering is caused by fear, which is contrary to daring. But as the Philosopher points out in *De Problematibus*, those who are daring sometimes quiver at the beginning. Therefore, they are not more eager at the beginning than when they are in the midst of the dangers themselves.

Objection 2: A passion is increased by increasing its object; for instance, a good is lovable, and the more good it is, the more lovable it is. But the object of daring is what is arduous. Therefore, if the arduousness is increased, then the daring is increased. But a danger becomes more arduous and difficult when it is actually present. Therefore, daring should increase at that time as well.

Objection 3: Anger is provoked by wounds that have been inflicted. But anger causes daring; for in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “Anger emboldens one.” Therefore, once men are in the midst of the dangers themselves and are struck, it seems that they are rendered more daring.

But contrary to this: *Ethics 3* says, “The daring hasten along and are willing before the dangers, but in the midst of them they draw back.”

I respond: Since daring is a certain movement of the sentient appetite, it follows upon an apprehension by the sentient power. Now the sentient power does not collate and inquire into a thing’s singular circumstances, but instead makes a quick judgment (*non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium*).

Now it sometimes happens that, because of the quick apprehension, not everything that will pose a difficulty in a given situation can be recognized, and so a movement of daring rises up to meet the danger. Hence, when the men in question experience the danger itself, they sense that there is more difficulty than they had estimated. And so they draw back.

Reason, however, takes into account all the things that pose difficulties in a given situation. And so courageous men, who go out to meet dangers in accord with the judgment of reason (*ex iudicio rationis*), seem at the beginning to be relaxed, since they meet the dangers with due deliberation and not passively. And when they find themselves in the midst of the dangers themselves, they do not experience anything unexpected. And so they continue on steadfastly. Or, again, this is because they meet dangers for the sake of the good of virtue, and they persevere in willing this good, no matter how great the dangers are.

By contrast, as has been explained, those who are daring act solely on the basis of a judgment that makes for hope and excludes fear.

Reply to objection 1: Quivering also occurs in those who are daring, because of the withdrawal of heat from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts—just as likewise occurs in those who are afraid. But in the case of those who are daring, the heat withdraws to the heart, whereas in those who are

afraid, it withdraws to the lower parts.

Reply to objection 2: The object of love is the good simply speaking, and a good that is simply speaking increased increases the love. But the object of daring is composed of what is good and what is bad, and the movement of daring toward what is bad presupposes a movement of hope toward what is good. Therefore, if so much arduousness is added to a danger that the danger exceeds the hope, then the movement of daring will not follow, but will instead be diminished.

However, if there is in fact a movement of daring, then the greater the danger is, the greater the daring is judged to be.

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 46, a. 1), anger is not caused by a wound unless some sort of hope is presupposed. And if the danger were so great that it exceeded the hope of victory, anger would not follow. But it is true that if the anger does follow, then the daring will be increased.