

Summa Theologiae

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PROLOGUE TO PART 1

Since, according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 3:1-2 (“As unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat”), a teacher of Catholic truth not only ought to instruct those who are advanced, but is also charged with teaching beginners, our intention in the present work is to propound the things belonging to the Christian religion in a way consonant with the education of beginners. For we have noticed that newcomers to this study are commonly hampered by the writings of different authors—partly because of the proliferation of superfluous questions, articles, and arguments; partly because the things they need to know are taught not according to the order of learning, but instead as is required for the exposition of texts or as opportunities for disputing certain questions present themselves; and partly because frequent repetition in these same writings generates both antipathy and confusion in the minds of the listeners. In an effort to avoid these and other such problems, we will try, with trust in God’s help, to set forth what belongs to sacred doctrine as briefly and clearly as the subject matter allows.

QUESTION 1

The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine

In order to situate our goal within certain set limits, we must first inquire into what sacred doctrine (*sacra doctrina*) is and how far it extends.

On this matter there are ten questions to be asked: (1) Is this doctrine necessary? (2) Is it a science? (3) Is it a single science or more than one science? (4) Is it a speculative science or a practical science? (5) How does it compare to the other sciences? (6) Does it constitute wisdom? (7) What is its subject? (8) Does it make use of arguments? (9) Is it appropriate for it to make use of metaphorical or symbolic locutions? (10) Should the Sacred Scripture relevant to this doctrine be expounded by means of multiple senses?

Article 1

Is it necessary to have a doctrine over and beyond the philosophical disciplines?

It seems unnecessary to have any doctrine over and beyond the philosophical disciplines:

Objection 1: According to Ecclesiasticus 3:22 (“Seek not the things that are too high for you”), man should not strive for things that lie beyond reason. But the things that fall under reason are adequately treated in the philosophical disciplines. Therefore, it seems superfluous to have a doctrine over and beyond the philosophical disciplines.

Objection 2: There cannot be a doctrine that is not about some being, since nothing is known except the true, which is convertible with *being*. But all beings are treated in the philosophical disciplines, even God—this is why one part of philosophy is called theology or divine science, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6. Therefore, it was unnecessary to have another doctrine over and beyond the philosophical disciplines.

But contrary to this: 2 Timothy 3:16 says: “All scripture, inspired of God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice.” But divinely inspired Scripture is not pertinent to the philosophical disciplines, which have been devised according to human reason. Therefore, it is advantageous that, over and beyond the philosophical disciplines, there should be another science that is divinely inspired.

I respond: It was necessary for human salvation that, over and beyond the philosophical disciplines devised by human reason, there should be a doctrine conformable with divine revelation.

For, first of all, according to Isaiah 64:4 (“The eye has not seen, O God, apart from You, what things You have prepared for them that wait for You”), man is ordered toward God as an end who exceeds the comprehension of reason. But the end must first be known to men, since they have to order their intentions and actions toward the end. Hence, it was necessary for man’s salvation that certain things exceeding human reason should be made known to him through divine revelation.

In addition, it was necessary for man to be instructed by divine revelation even with respect to those things about God that can be discovered by human reason. For the truth about God that is discovered by reason would come to man only from a few, and after a long time, and mixed in with many errors. But the whole of man’s salvation, which lies in God, depends on the cognition of this truth. Therefore, in order that salvation should come to men more suitably and more surely, it was necessary for them to be instructed in divine things through divine revelation.

Therefore, over and beyond the philosophical disciplines discovered by human reason, it was necessary that a sacred doctrine be had through revelation.

Reply to objection 1: Even if man should not inquire through human reason into things that are too high for human cognition, such things should nonetheless be accepted through faith when they are revealed by God. This is why in the same place it is added, “For many things are shown to you above the understanding of men.” Sacred doctrine consists in things of this sort.

Reply to objection 2: Diverse conceptual characteristics (*ratio cognoscibilis*) make for diverse sciences. For instance, the astronomer and the natural philosopher demonstrate the same conclusion, viz., that the earth is round. But the astronomer does this through a mathematical middle term—i.e., a middle term abstracted from matter—whereas the natural philosopher does it through a middle term considered materially. Hence, nothing prevents it from being the case that the same things that the philosophical disciplines treat insofar as they are knowable by the light of natural reason should be treated by another science insofar as they are known by the light of divine revelation. Hence, the theology associated with sacred doctrine differs in kind from the theology that is posited as a part of philosophy.

Article 2

Is sacred doctrine a science?

It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science:

Objection 1: Every science proceeds from first principles that are known *per se*. But sacred doctrine proceeds from the articles of the Faith, which are not known *per se*, since they are not conceded by everyone; for as 2 Thessalonians 3:2 puts it, “Not everyone has faith.” Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

Objection 2: A science is not about singular things. But sacred doctrine treats of singular things—e.g., the deeds of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, etc. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a science.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says: “Only this science has the means by which saving faith is begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened.” But this pertains to no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore, sacred doctrine is a science.

I respond: Sacred doctrine is a science. But notice that there are two kinds of science. Some sciences, e.g., arithmetic, geometry, etc., proceed from first principles known by the natural light of the intellect. By contrast, other sciences proceed from first principles known by the light of a higher science.

For instance, the science of perspective proceeds from first principles made known through geometry, and the science of music proceeds from first principles made known through arithmetic.

It is in this second way that sacred doctrine is a science. For it proceeds from first principles known by the light of a higher science, viz., the science had by God and the blessed in heaven. So just as music takes on faith the principles handed down to it by arithmetic, so too sacred doctrine takes on faith the principles revealed to it by God.

Reply to objection 1: The first principles of a science are either known *per se* or else traced back to the knowledge that belongs to a higher science. As was just explained, the first principles of sacred doctrine are of the latter type.

Reply to objection 2: Sacred doctrine treats singular things not because it deals with them principally, but because they are introduced as examples for living, as in the moral sciences, and also because they make clear the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation that grounds Sacred Scripture and sacred doctrine has come down to us.

Article 3

Is sacred doctrine a single science?

It seems that sacred doctrine is not a single science:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1, a single science has just one type of subject. But creator and creature, with which sacred doctrine deals, are not contained under a single type of subject. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a single science.

Objection 2: Sacred doctrine deals with angels, corporeal creatures, and human morals. But these things pertain to different philosophical sciences. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a single science.

But contrary to this: Sacred Scripture speaks of it as a single science. For Wisdom 10:10 says, “She gave him the knowledge (*scientia*) of holy things.”

I respond: Sacred doctrine is a single science. For the unity of a power or a habit must be thought of as following from its object—not from its object taken materially, but rather from some formal characteristic of its object. For instance, a man, a donkey, and a rock agree in the formal characteristic of being colored, which constitutes the object of vision.

Since, as was explained above (a.1), sacred doctrine considers certain things insofar as they have been divinely revealed, everything that can be divinely revealed shares in the one formal characteristic of the object of this science. And so all such things are included under sacred doctrine as a single science.

Reply to objection 1: Sacred doctrine does not deal with God and creatures on an equal basis. Rather, it deals with God principally and with creatures insofar as they are related to God as their origin or their end. Hence, the unity of the science is not obstructed.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents lower powers or habits from being differentiated by subject matters that all fall under a single higher power or habit, since the higher power or habit treats its object under a more general formal characteristic. For instance, the object of the common sensory power is the sensible, which includes both the visible and the audible. Hence, even though the common sensory power is a single power, it extends to all the objects of the five senses.

In the same way, things that are treated in diverse philosophical sciences can be dealt with by sacred doctrine—even while it remains a single science—under a single characteristic, viz., the characteristic of being divinely revealed. In this sense, sacred doctrine is, as it were, a sort of image of God’s own knowledge (*scientia*), which is a unified and simple knowledge of all things.

Article 4

Is sacred doctrine a practical science?

It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 2, the end of a practical science is operation. But according to James 1:22 (“Be you doers of the word, and not hearers only”), sacred doctrine is ordered to operation. Therefore, sacred doctrine is a practical science.

Objection 2: Sacred doctrine is divided into the Old Law and the New Law. But law pertains to moral science, which is a practical science. Therefore, sacred doctrine is a practical science.

But contrary to this: Every practical science is about things that can be done by man. For instance, moral science is about the acts of men, and the science of building is about buildings. But sacred doctrine is principally about God, and it is men who are rather the works of God. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a practical science but instead a speculative science.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), sacred doctrine, while remaining a single science, extends to things that pertain to different philosophical sciences, and this because of the formal characteristic that it considers in the different things, viz., their being knowable by the divine light. Hence, even though some of the philosophical sciences are speculative and others are practical, sacred doctrine includes both types within itself—just as it is by the same knowledge that God knows both Himself and the things that He does.

Still, sacred doctrine is more speculative than practical, since it deals more principally with divine things than with human acts. For it deals with human acts insofar as it is through those acts that a man is ordered toward that perfect knowledge of God in which eternal beatitude consists.

Reply to Objection 1 and Objection 2: The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

Article 5

Is sacred doctrine more noble than the other sciences?

It seems that sacred doctrine is not more noble than the other sciences:

Objection 1: Certitude is relevant to a science’s nobility. But the other sciences, whose first principles cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine, whose first principles—viz., the articles of the Faith—are open to doubt. Therefore, the other sciences seem to be more noble than sacred doctrine.

Objection 2: A lower science borrows from a higher science; for instance, music borrows from arithmetic. But sacred doctrine borrows something from the philosophical sciences. For in the letter *Ad Magnum Oratorem Urbis Romae* Jerome says that the ancient doctors “sprinkled their books with the teachings and opinions of the philosophers to such an extent that you do not know what to admire more in them, their worldly learning or their knowledge of the Scriptures.” Therefore, sacred doctrine is inferior to the other sciences.

But contrary to this: In Proverbs 9:3 (“Wisdom has sent her handmaidens to issue an invitation to the tower”) the other sciences are called the handmaidens of sacred doctrine.

I respond: Since the science of sacred doctrine is in some respects speculative and in other

respects practical, it transcends all the other sciences, both speculative and practical.

Among the speculative sciences, one is more noble than another both because of its certitude and because of the proper nobility of its subject matter. The science of sacred doctrine exceeds the other speculative sciences in both regards. It exceeds them in certitude, because the other sciences have their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which is able to make mistakes, whereas sacred doctrine has its certitude from the light of God's knowledge, which cannot be deceived. And it exceeds them in the nobility of its subject matter, since this science is principally about things that transcend reason in their loftiness, whereas the other sciences consider only those things that fall under reason.

Among the practical sciences, on the other hand, the more noble is that which is ordered toward a more ultimate end. For instance, the science of government is more noble than military science because the good of the army is ordered to the good of the state. But the end of sacred doctrine as a practical science is eternal beatitude, and this is the ultimate end to which all the other ends of the practical sciences are ordered.

Hence, it is clear that sacred doctrine is in every way more noble than the other sciences.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents it from being the case that what is more certain by its nature (*secundum naturam*) is less certain to us, and this because of the weakness of our intellect, which, according to *Metaphysics* 2, "is related to the things that are most manifest by nature as the eye of an owl is related to the light of the sun." So the doubt that occurs in some with regard to the articles of the Faith is due not to a lack of certitude on the part of the things themselves, but rather to the weakness of the human intellect. And yet, according to *De Animalibus* 11, the least cognition that can be had of the highest things is more desirable than the most firm cognition that is had of the lowest things.

Reply to objection 2: Sacred doctrine can borrow something from the philosophical disciplines not because it needs these disciplines out of necessity, but in order to make clearer the matters that are dealt with in this science. For sacred doctrine takes its first principles not from the other sciences, but directly from God through revelation. And so it does not borrow from the other sciences as from its superiors, but rather uses them as its inferiors and handmaidens, in the way that architectonic sciences make use of the sciences that minister to them—as, for instance, the science of government makes use of military science. Furthermore, the fact that sacred doctrine uses the other sciences in this way is due not to its own defectiveness or inadequacy, but rather to the defectiveness of our intellect, which is more easily led toward things that lie beyond reason (the subject matter of sacred doctrine) by things that are known through natural reason (from which the other sciences take their starting points).

Article 6

Does sacred doctrine constitute wisdom?

It seems that sacred doctrine does not constitute wisdom:

Objection 1: No doctrine that takes its first principles from elsewhere is worthy of the name 'wisdom'; for according to *Metaphysics* 1, "it belongs to wisdom to order and not to be ordered." But as is clear from what was said above (a. 2), sacred doctrine takes its first principles from elsewhere. Therefore, this doctrine does not constitute wisdom.

Objection 2: It is the task of wisdom to prove the first principles of the other sciences; this is why wisdom is said to be like the head of the sciences, as is clear from *Ethics* 6. But sacred doctrine does not prove the first principles of the other sciences. Therefore, it does not constitute wisdom.

Objection 3: Sacred doctrine is acquired through study. But wisdom is had by being infused; this is

why it is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, as is clear from Isaiah 11:2. Therefore, sacred doctrine does not constitute wisdom.

But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 4:6, at the beginning of the law, says, “This is our wisdom and understanding in the sight of the nations.”

I respond: Among all human wisdoms, sacred doctrine constitutes wisdom in the highest sense—not just wisdom in some genus, but wisdom absolutely speaking. For since it is the function of the wise man to order and to judge, and since judgment is made about lower things in light of a higher cause, the wise man with respect to any given genus is the one who carefully considers the highest cause in that genus. For instance, in the genus of building, the craftsman who plans the form of a house is called the architect and is said to be wise in relation to the lower craftsmen who cut the wood or prepare the stones; hence, 1 Corinthians 3:10 says, “As a wise architect I have laid the foundation.” Again, in the genus of the whole of human life, the prudent man is called wise insofar as he orders human acts to their due end; hence, Proverbs 10:23 says, “Wisdom is prudence to a man.” Therefore, the one who considers the absolutely highest cause of the entire universe, viz., God, is called wise in the highest sense. Hence, wisdom is said to be “the cognition of divine things,” as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12.

Now it is sacred doctrine that most properly makes determinations about God insofar as He is the highest cause. For it does so not only with respect to that which is knowable through creatures—this the philosophers have discovered, as it says in Romans 1:9 (“That which is known of God is manifest to them”)—but also with respect to that which He alone knows about Himself and which has been communicated to others by revelation. Hence, sacred doctrine is called wisdom in the highest sense.

Reply to objection 1: Sacred doctrine takes its first principles not from any human science but from God’s knowledge, by which all of our cognition is ordered as by the highest wisdom.

Reply to objection 2: The first principles of other sciences are either known *per se*, in which case they cannot be proved, or they are proved by natural arguments in some other science. In contrast, the cognition proper to sacred doctrine comes through revelation and not through natural reason. And so the function of sacred doctrine is not to prove the first principles of the other sciences, but only to pass judgment on those principles. That is, anything in the other sciences that is found to be contrary to the truth of sacred doctrine is condemned as altogether false. Hence, 2 Corinthians 10:4-5 says, “The weapons of our warfare . . . destroy counsels and every height that exalts itself against the knowledge of God.”

Reply to objection 3: Since the function of wisdom is judgment, ‘wisdom’ is understood in two ways, corresponding to the two ways of judging.

One way in which someone can judge is by *inclination*. For instance, someone with a virtuous habit makes correct judgments about the things to be done in accord with that virtue insofar as he is inclined toward those things. This is why *Ethics* 10 says that the virtuous person is the measure and rule of human acts.

The other way in which someone can judge is by *cognition*. For instance, one who is versed in moral science could make judgments about the acts of a given virtue even if he did not have that virtue.

The first way of judging belongs to the wisdom that is posited as a gift of the Holy Spirit—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:15 (“The spiritual man judges all things”) and according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2 (“Hierotheus became learned not only by studying but by experiencing divine things”). The second way of judging, on the other hand, is pertinent to sacred doctrine insofar as it is had through study, even though its first principles are had from revelation.

Article 7

Is God the subject of the science of sacred doctrine?

It seems that God is not the subject of the science of sacred doctrine:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1, every science must presuppose a real definition (*quid est*) of its subject. But the science of sacred doctrine does not presuppose a real definition of God; for Damascene says, “In the case of God, it is impossible to say what He is.” Therefore, God is not the subject of sacred doctrine.

Objection 2: Everything that is determined by a science is included in the subject of that science. But in Sacred Scripture determinations are made about many things other than God, e.g., about creatures and human morals. Therefore, God is not the subject of sacred doctrine.

But contrary to this: The subject of a science is what that science talks about. But in the science of sacred doctrine it is God who is talked about; for sacred doctrine is called theology, i.e., discourse about God. Therefore, God is the subject of sacred doctrine.

I respond: God is the subject of the science of sacred doctrine. For the subject of a science is related to that science in the way that the object of a power or habit is related to that power or habit. But that which is properly designated as the object of a power or habit is such that everything is related to the power or habit under the formal characteristic (*ratio*) of that object. For instance, a man and a rock are related to sight insofar as they are colored, and so *being colored* is the proper object of sight.

In sacred doctrine everything is treated under the formal characteristic *God*, either because the things in question are God Himself or because they are ordered to God as their origin and their end. Hence, it follows that God is indeed the subject of this science.

This is also clear from the fact that the first principles of this science—viz., the articles of the Faith—are about God. But the subject of the first principles of a science is the same as the subject of the science as a whole, since the entire science is contained virtually in its first principles.

However, some authors, focusing on the things that are dealt with in the science of sacred doctrine and not on the formal characteristic under which they are considered, have assigned other subjects to this science—either things and signs, or the works of redemption, or the whole of Christ, both head and members. And, to be sure, all these things are dealt with in the science of sacred doctrine, but only insofar as they are ordered to God.

Reply to objection 1: Even though we cannot know the real definition (*quid est*) of God, nonetheless, in the science of sacred doctrine we use His effects, whether effects of nature or effects of grace, in place of a definition in regard to the things that are considered about God in this doctrine—just as in the other philosophical sciences, too, something is demonstrated about a cause through its effect, where the effect takes the place of a definition of the cause.

Reply to objection 2: All the other things that are determined in sacred doctrine are included under God—not as parts or species or accidents of God, but as things ordered to Him in some way.

Article 8

Does sacred doctrine make use of arguments?

It seems that sacred doctrine does not make use of arguments:

Objection 1: In *De Fide Catholica* 1 Ambrose says, “Do away with arguments when seeking faith.” But in sacred doctrine it is principally faith that is sought; hence, John 20:31 says, “These things have been written in order that you might believe.” Therefore, sacred doctrine does not make use of arguments.

Objection 2: If sacred doctrine made use of arguments, it would argue either from authority or from reason. If it argued from authority, this would seem to conflict with its nobility; for, according to Boethius, proofs derived from authority are the weakest. Likewise, if it argued from reason, this would conflict with its purpose; for according to Gregory in his homily, “Faith is without merit when human reason provides its own test.” Therefore, sacred doctrine does not make use of arguments.

But contrary to this: Titus 1:9 says this about a bishop: “He must embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.”

I respond: The other sciences do not argue in order to prove (*ad probanda*) their first principles, but rather argue from those first principles in order to prove (*ad ostendendum*) other things within the sciences themselves. So, too, sacred doctrine does not argue in order to prove its first principles, which are the articles of the Faith, but instead proceeds on the basis of those principles in order to prove something else. For instance, in 1 Corinthians 15:12ff. the Apostle argues from the resurrection of Christ in order to prove the general resurrection.

Notice, however, that among the philosophical sciences the lower sciences neither prove their own first principles nor dispute with anyone who denies those principles; instead, they leave this to a higher science. In contrast, the highest science among them, viz., metaphysics, does dispute with someone who denies its first principles, as long as that adversary concedes something or other. But if he concedes nothing, it is impossible to dispute with him—though it is still possible to refute his arguments.

Therefore, since sacred doctrine has no science higher than itself, it disputes with someone who denies its first principles—and this by employing arguments—as long as that adversary concedes some of the things that are had by divine revelation. For example, with heretics we dispute by appealing to passages from Sacred Scripture, and against those who deny one article of the Faith we argue by appealing to another article. However, if our adversary believes nothing that has been divinely revealed, then there is no further way to prove the articles of the Faith by arguments—though there is room for answering his objections to the Faith if he offers any. For since the Faith is based on infallible truth, and since it is impossible to demonstrate the contrary of a truth, it is obvious that proofs brought against the Faith do not constitute demonstrations, but are instead answerable arguments.

Reply to objection 1: As noted above, even though the arguments of human reason play no role in proving things that belong to the Faith, sacred doctrine nonetheless does argue from the articles of the Faith to other things.

Reply to objection 2: It is especially appropriate for sacred doctrine to argue from authority. For the first principles of sacred doctrine are had by revelation, and so we must trust the authority of those to whom this revelation has been made. Nor does this detract from the nobility of sacred doctrine. For even though an argument from an authority founded on human reason is the weakest of arguments, an argument from an authority founded on divine revelation is the most efficacious of arguments.

Nonetheless, sacred doctrine uses human reason as well—not, to be sure, in order to prove the Faith, since this would destroy the meritoriousness of faith, but rather to make clear certain other things that are dealt with in this doctrine. For since grace perfects nature and does not destroy it, natural reason must serve the Faith, just as the natural inclination of the will likewise serves charity. This is why in 2 Corinthians 10:5 the Apostle says, “. . . bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ.” This is also why sacred doctrine uses citations from the philosophers in those instances in

which the philosophers have been able to discern the truth through natural reason. For instance, in Acts 17:28 Paul cites the saying of Aratos in these words: “As one of your own poets said: ‘For we are also His offspring’.”

Still, even though sacred doctrine uses citations of the sort in question as extraneous and probable arguments, it properly uses citations from the canonical Scriptures when arguing from necessity, whereas it uses citations from other doctors of the Church as if arguing from what is properly its own, though with probability. For our Faith is based on the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets who wrote the canonical books and not on any revelation that might have been made to the other doctors. Thus, in a letter to Jerome, Augustine says, “It is only to those books of the Scriptures called canonical that I have learned to give the honor of believing with utter confidence that none of their authors has erred in anything. In contrast, I read other authors in such a way that no matter how distinguished they might be in holiness and learning, I do not think something true simply because they have thought it or written it.”

Article 9

Should Sacred Scripture make use of metaphors?

It seems that Sacred Scripture should not make use of metaphors:

Objection 1: That which is proper to the lowest doctrine does not seem to be suitable for the science of sacred doctrine, which, as already noted, holds the highest place among the other sciences. But to proceed by means of various likenesses and representations is proper to poetics, which is the lowest among all doctrines. Therefore, using likenesses of this sort is not appropriate for the science of sacred doctrine.

Objection 2: Sacred doctrine seems to be ordered to the manifestation of truth; thus it is that according to Ecclesiasticus 24:31 (“They that explain me shall have life everlasting”), a reward is promised to those who make the truth manifest. But the truth is obscured by likenesses of the sort in question. Therefore, it is inappropriate for sacred doctrine to teach divine things by means of likenesses drawn from corporeal things.

Objection 3: Creatures are more sublime to the extent that they are more similar to God. So if any creatures are to be likened to God, the similes should be drawn especially from the more sublime creatures and not from the lowliest. Yet this latter sort of simile is often found in Sacred Scripture.

But contrary to this: Osee 12:10 says, “I have multiplied visions, and I have used likenesses by the ministry of the prophets.” But to teach something by means of a likeness is metaphorical. Therefore, making use of metaphors pertains to sacred doctrine.

I respond: It is appropriate for Sacred Scripture to teach about divine and spiritual things by means of likenesses drawn from corporeal things.

For God provides for all things in a way that is suitable to their nature. But it is natural for man to approach intelligible things through sensible things, since all our cognition takes its origin from the senses. Hence, it is appropriate for Sacred Scripture to teach us spiritual things by way of metaphors drawn from corporeal things. Dionysius makes this point in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1: “It is impossible for the divine ray to illumine us unless it is enshrouded by a variety of sacred veils.”

In addition, since Sacred Scripture is proposed generally to everyone (as Romans 1:14 puts it, “To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor”), it is appropriate for spiritual things to be proposed by means of likenesses drawn from corporeal things, in order that Scripture might be grasped even by those who are so untutored as to be incapable of grasping what is intelligible in itself.

Reply to objection 1: A poet uses metaphors for the sake of representation itself, since representation is naturally delightful to man. But, as noted above, sacred doctrine uses metaphors out of necessity and because of their usefulness.

Reply to objection 2: As Dionysius says, the light of divine revelation is not destroyed by the sensible figures in which it is veiled. Rather, it remains in its truth, so that it does not allow the minds to which the revelation is made to persist in the likenesses, but instead raises them to the cognition of intelligible things—and through these minds to which the revelation has been made others are also instructed about those intelligible things. This is why things that in one passage of Scripture are related by means of metaphors are expounded more explicitly in other passages. Indeed, the very obscurity of the figures is useful for exercising more diligent minds, and it is also useful for countering the ridicule of non-believers of which Matthew 7:6 speaks (“Give not that which is holy to dogs”).

Reply to objection 3: As Dionysius teaches in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 2, it is more fitting for divine things to be transmitted in the Scriptures by figures of speech drawn from lower bodies than by figures of speech drawn from more noble bodies—and this for three reasons.

First, in this way the mind is rendered more free from error. For it is obvious that the figures in question are not being predicated properly of divine things, whereas there could be some doubt about this if divine things were described by figures drawn from the more noble bodies—especially in the eyes of those who did not know how to conceive of anything more noble than bodies.

Second, this mode of expression is more appropriate for the cognition that we have of God in this life. For as far as God is concerned, what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. And so likenesses drawn from things that are further removed from God produce in us the more accurate impression that God is beyond what we say or think about Him.

Third, this mode of expression is better at hiding divine things from those who are unworthy of them.

Article 10

Does Sacred Scripture have multiple senses underlying a single passage?

It seems that Sacred Scripture does not have more than one sense underlying a single passage, viz., the *historical* or *literal* sense, the *allegorical* sense, the *tropological* or *moral* sense, and the *anagogical* sense.

Objection 1: A multiplicity of senses for a single passage of Scripture produces confusion and deception, and it undermines the firmness of the arguments; thus, an argument that proceeds from propositions with many senses is not sound, but instead has one or another fallacy ascribed to it. But Sacred Scripture ought to be effective at exhibiting the truth without any fallacy at all. Therefore, in Sacred Scripture there should not be multiple senses underlying a single passage.

Objection 2: In *De Utilitate Credendi* Augustine says, “The Scripture that is called the Old Testament is fourfold, including history, aetiology, analogy, and allegory.” But these four senses seem altogether different from the four enumerated above. Therefore, it does not seem fitting for the same passage of Sacred Scripture to be expounded according to the four senses enumerated above.

Objection 3: In addition to the senses enumerated above there is the parabolic sense, which is not included among those senses.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 20 Gregory says, “By its very manner of speech Sacred Scripture transcends all the sciences. For in one and the same passage it makes known a mystery even as it narrates

a deed.”

I respond: The author of Sacred Scripture is God, who has it in His power to use not only *words* for signifying (which even a man can do), but also the *very things themselves*. And so even though words are used to signify in all the sciences, it is peculiar to the science of sacred doctrine that the things signified by its words likewise signify something themselves.

Thus, the first type of signification, by which words signify things, pertains to the first sense, which is the *historical* or *literal* sense. On the other hand, the type of signification by which the things signified by words in turn signify other things, is called the *spiritual* sense, which is built upon the literal sense and presupposes it.

Now this spiritual sense is divided into three. For as the Apostle says at Hebrews 7:19, the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and the New Law is, as Dionysius puts it in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, a figure of future glory; again, in the New Law those things that were done at the beginning are signs of the things that we ourselves ought to do. Thus, insofar as the things belonging to the Old Law signify things that belong to the New Law, there is the *allegorical* sense. Insofar as the things that were done in Christ (or in those Scriptures that signify Christ) are signs of things that we ourselves ought to do, there is the *moral* sense. And insofar as they signify things pertaining to eternal glory, there is the *anagogical* sense.

Moreover, since the literal sense is the sense intended by the author, and since the author of Sacred Scripture is God, who comprehends all things at once by His intellect, it follows that, as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 12, it is not inappropriate for a single Scriptural passage to have more than one sense even with respect to the literal sense.

Reply to objection 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not make for equivocation or any other type of ambivalence. For, as was just explained, these senses are multiplied not because a single word signifies many things, but because the very things signified by the words are capable of being signs of other things. Likewise, no confusion results in Sacred Scripture, since all the senses are built upon one sense, viz., the literal sense; and, as Augustine explains in *Contra Vincentium Donatistam*, it is from the literal sense alone that an argument can be drawn, and not from those things that are said allegorically. Yet nothing is thereby lost from Sacred Scripture, since everything necessary to the Faith that is contained under a spiritual sense is such that Scripture teaches it explicitly through the literal sense in some other place.

Reply to objection 2: Three of the items in question—history, aetiology, and analogy—all pertain to one sense, viz., the literal sense. For, as Augustine himself explains, there is *history* when something is simply set forth; there is *aetiology* when a cause is assigned to something that has been said, as when Our Lord explained the reason why Moses had given them license to put their wives away, viz., because of the hardness of their hearts (Matthew 19:8); and there is *analogy* when the truth of one Scriptural passage is shown not to conflict with the truth of another passage.

Of the four things mentioned in the objection, *allegory* is the only one posited for the three spiritual senses—just as, in *Summa Sententiarum* 3 Hugo of St. Victor also includes the anagogical sense under the allegorical, positing just three senses, viz., the *historical*, the *allegorical*, and the *tropological*.

Reply to objection 3: The *parabolic* sense is included under the literal sense. For in a parable something is properly signified by the words and something is figuratively signified; and the literal sense is not the figure itself, but rather that which the figure is a figure of. For instance, when Scripture speaks of the arm of God, the literal sense is not that God has a bodily part of the sort in question; rather, the literal sense is that God has what is signified by this bodily part, viz., operative power. This makes clear how it is that nothing false can ever lie at the basis of the literal sense of Sacred Scripture.

QUESTION 2

The Existence of God

As is clear from what was said above, the main purpose of sacred doctrine is to propound our cognition of God—not just our cognition of God as He is in Himself, but also our cognition of Him insofar as He is the origin of things and their end, and especially insofar as He is the origin and end of the rational creature. Therefore, since our intention is to lay out this doctrine, we will deal first with God (Part 1); second, with the rational creature's movement toward God (Part 2); and third, with Christ, who, insofar as He is a man, is our way of going to God (Part 3).

Our treatment of God will be divided into three parts. We will deal, first, with those things that pertain to the divine essence (questions 2-26); second, with those things that pertain to the distinction among the divine Persons (questions 27-43); and, third, with those things that pertain to the procession of creatures from God (questions 44-119).

As far as the divine essence is concerned, we must first inquire into whether there is a God (question 2); second, we must inquire into what His mode of being is or, rather, what it is not (questions 3-13); and, third, we must inquire into those things that pertain to His operation, viz., His knowledge and His will and power (questions 14-26).

As for the first point, there are three questions: (1) Is it known *per se* that there is a God? (2) Is it demonstrable that there is a God? (3) Is there a God?

Article 1

Is it known *per se* that there is a God?

It seems to be known *per se* that there is a God:

Objection 1: The things said to be known to us *per se* are such that the cognition of them is in us by nature, as is clear in the case of first principles. But, as Damascene puts it at the beginning of his book, “The cognition of God’s existence is naturally instilled in everyone.” Therefore, it is known *per se* that there is a God.

Objection 2: The things said to be known *per se* are such that, once their terms are understood, they are immediately known; in *Posterior Analytics* 1 the Philosopher ascribes this status to first principles—for instance, once someone knows what a whole is and what a part is, he immediately knows that every whole is greater than a part of itself. But once someone understands what the name ‘God’ signifies, he immediately has it that there is a God. For what is signified by this name is that than which a greater cannot be signified; but what exists in reality and in the understanding is greater than what exists only in the understanding; since, then, God immediately exists in the understanding when the name ‘God’ is understood, it follows that He also exists in reality. Therefore, it is known *per se* that there is a God.

Objection 3: It is known *per se* that truth exists, since anyone who denies that truth exists is admitting that truth does exist—for if truth does not exist, then it is true that truth does not exist, and if something is true, then it must be the case that truth exists. But according to John 14:6 (“I am the way, the truth, and the life”), God is truth itself. Therefore, it is known *per se* that there is a God.

But contrary to this: As is clear from what the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 4 and *Posterior Analytics* 1 about the first principles of demonstration, no one can think the opposite of something that is known *per se*. But according to Psalm 52:1 (“The fool said in his heart: There is no God”), someone can think the opposite of the proposition that there is a God. Therefore, it is not known *per se* that there is a

God.

I respond: There are two ways in which something can be known *per se*: in one way, in its own right (*secundum se*) but not to us (*quoad nos*); in the second way, both in its own right and to us.

For a proposition is known *per se* because the predicate is included in the definition (*ratio*) of the subject. For instance, *Man is an animal* is known *per se* because *animal* is part of the definition of *man*. So if the real definitions (*quid est*) of the predicate and of the subject are known to everyone, then the relevant proposition will be known *per se* to everyone. This is clearly the case with the first principles of demonstration, whose terms are certain common notions that no one is unacquainted with, e.g., *being* and *non-being*, *whole* and *part*, etc.

However, if there are some who are ignorant of the real definitions of the predicate and of the subject, the proposition in question will, to be sure, be known *per se* as far as it itself is concerned, but it will not be known *per se* to those who are unacquainted with the predicate and the subject of the proposition. And so, as Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, some mental conceptions are such that it is only to the wise that they are common and known *per se*—as, for instance, that incorporeal beings do not exist in a place.

I claim that the proposition ‘There is a God’ is known *per se* as far as it itself is concerned, since the predicate is the same as the subject. For as will become clear below (q. 3, a. 4), God is His own *esse*. But because we do not know the real definition of God, this proposition is not known *per se* to us. Instead, it has to be demonstrated by means of things that are more known to us and less known by their nature, viz., God’s effects.

Reply to objection 1: The cognition that there is a God is naturally instilled in us in a certain general and indistinct way—viz., insofar as God is man’s beatitude. For man by nature desires beatitude, and what man desires by nature is such that it is known to him by nature.

But this is not to know, without qualification, that there is a God—just as knowing that someone is approaching is not the same as knowing that Peter is approaching, even if it is Peter who is approaching. For there are many who think that man’s complete good, i.e., his beatitude, is wealth, whereas others think it is pleasure, and still others something else.

Reply to objection 2: It might be that someone who hears the name ‘God’ does not take it that what is being signified is that than which a greater cannot be thought. For some have believed that God is a corporeal being.

However, even granted that someone thinks that what is signified by the name ‘God’ is what was just said—viz., that than which a greater cannot be thought—it still does not thereby follow that he thinks that what is signified by the name exists in reality rather than just in the intellect’s apprehension. Nor can one argue that it does exist in reality, unless it is granted that there exists in reality something such that a greater cannot be thought. But this is not granted by those who claim that there is no God.

Reply to objection 3: It is known *per se* that truth in general exists, but it is not known to us *per se* that there is a First Truth.

Article 2

Can it be demonstrated that there is a God?

It seems that it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God:

Objection 1: It is an article of the faith that there is a God. But those things that belong to the faith are not demonstrable; for a demonstration makes it the case that one knows (*scire*), but, as is clear

from the Apostle in Hebrews 11:1, faith is about things that are not apparent. Therefore, it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God.

Objection 2: The middle term of a demonstration is a real definition (*quid est*). But as Damascene says, in the case of God we cannot know His real definition; rather, we can know only what He is not. Therefore, we cannot demonstrate that there is a God.

Objection 3: If one were to demonstrate that there is a God, this could only be by means of His effects. But God's effects are not proportionate to Him; for He is infinite and His effects are finite, and there is no ratio of the finite to the infinite. Given, then, that a cause cannot be demonstrated by means of an effect that is not proportionate to it, it seems that it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God.

But contrary to this: In Romans 1:20 the Apostle says, "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made." But this would not be so if were it not the case that it can be demonstrated that there is a God. For the first thing that has to be understood of something is whether it exists.

I respond: There are two kinds of demonstration. One kind is through a cause and is called a demonstration *propter quid*—and this sort of demonstration is through things that are prior, absolutely speaking. The second kind is through an effect and is called a demonstration *quia*—and this sort of demonstration is through things that are prior with respect to us. For since an effect is more apparent to us than its cause, we proceed through the effect to a cognition of the cause.

Now from any effect it can be demonstrated that a cause proper to it exists—as long as its effects are more known to us. For since effects depend on a cause, it follows that once an effect is posited, it must be that its cause exists prior to it. Hence, insofar as it is not known to us *per se* there is a God, this is demonstrable through effects that are known to us.

Reply to objection 1: 'There is a God' and other things of this sort that, according to Romans 1:19, are known through natural reason are not articles of the faith but are instead preambles to the articles. For faith presupposes natural cognition in the way that grace presupposes nature and in the way that perfection presupposes the perfectible. But nothing prevents what is demonstrable and knowable in its own right from being accepted as an object of faith by someone who does not grasp the demonstration.

Reply to objection 2: When a cause is being demonstrated through an effect, the effect has to be used in place of a real definition of the cause in order to prove that the cause exists. This is especially so in the case of God. For in order to prove that something exists, one must take a nominal definition (*quid significat nomen*)—and not a real definition (*quid est*)—as the middle term, since the question "What is it?" is posterior to the question "Is there such a thing?". But as will be shown below (q. 13, a. 1), the names of God are imposed on the basis of His effects. Hence, when we are demonstrating that there is a God on the basis of His effects, we can use a nominal definition of the name 'God' as the middle term.

Reply to objection 3: The perfect cognition of a cause cannot be had through effects that are not proportionate to the cause. However, as was said above, from any effect it can be clearly demonstrated to us that the cause exists. And so from God's effects it can be demonstrated that there is a God, even though we cannot, through those causes, know Him perfectly with respect to His essence.

Article 3

Is there a God?

It seems that there is no God:

Objection 1: If one of a pair of contraries were infinite, it would totally destroy the other contrary. But by the name ‘God’ one means a certain infinite good. Therefore, if there were a God, there would be no evil. But there is evil in the world. Therefore, there is no God.

Objection 2: What can be accomplished with fewer principles is not done through more principles. But it seems that everything that happens in the world could have been accomplished through other principles, even if there were no God; for things that are natural are traced back to nature as a principle, whereas things that are purposeful are traced back to human reason or will as a principle. Therefore, there is no need to claim that there is a God.

But contrary to this: Exodus 1:14 says under the personage of God, “I am Who am.”

I respond: There are five ways to prove that there is a God.

The *first* and clearest way is that taken from movement or change (*ex parte motus*):

It is certain, and obvious to the senses, that in this world some things are moved.

But everything that is moved is moved by another. For nothing is moved except insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to that actuality toward which it is moved, whereas something effects movement insofar as it is in actuality in a relevant respect. After all, to effect movement (*movere*) is just to lead something from potentiality into actuality. But a thing cannot be led from potentiality into actuality except through some being that is in actuality in a relevant respect; for example, something that is hot in actuality—say, a fire—makes a piece of wood, which is hot in potentiality, to be hot in actuality, and it thereby moves and alters the piece of wood. But it is impossible for something to be simultaneously in potentiality and in actuality with respect to same thing; rather, it can be in potentiality and in actuality only with respect to different things. For what is hot in actuality cannot simultaneously be hot in potentiality; rather, it is cold in potentiality. Therefore, it is impossible that something should be both mover and moved in the same way and with respect to the same thing, or, in other words, that something should move itself. Therefore, everything that is moved must be moved by another.

If, then, that by which something is moved is itself moved, then it, too, must be moved by another, and that other by still another. But this does not go on to infinity. For if it did, then there would not be any first mover and, as a result, none of the others would effect movement, either. For secondary movers effect movement only because they are being moved by a first mover, just as a stick does not effect movement except because it is being moved by a hand. Therefore, one has to arrive at some first mover that is not being moved by anything. And this is what everyone takes to be a God.

The *second* way is based on the notion of an efficient cause:

We find that among sensible things there is an ordering of efficient causes, and yet we do not find—nor is it possible to find—anything that is an efficient cause of its own self. For if something were an efficient cause of itself, then it would be prior to itself—which is impossible.

But it is impossible to go on to infinity among efficient causes. For in every case of ordered efficient causes, the first is a cause of the intermediate and the intermediate is a cause of the last—and this regardless of whether the intermediate is constituted by many causes or by just one. But when a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if there were no first among the efficient causes, then neither would there be a last or an intermediate. But if the efficient causes went on to infinity, there would not be a first efficient cause, and so there would not be a last effect or any intermediate efficient causes, either—which is obviously false. Therefore, one must posit some first efficient cause—which everyone calls a God.

The *third* way is taken from the possible and the necessary, and it goes like this:

Certain of the things we find in the world are able to exist and able not to exist (*quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse*); for some things are found to be generated and corrupted and, as a result, they are able to exist and able not to exist.

But it is impossible that everything that exists should be like this; for that which is able not to exist

is such that at some time it does not exist. Therefore, if everything is such that it is able not to exist, then at some time nothing existed in the world. But if this were true, then nothing would exist even now. For what does not exist begins to exist only through something that does exist; therefore, if there were no beings, then it was impossible that anything should have begun to exist, and so nothing would exist now—which is obviously false. Therefore, not all beings are able to exist [and able not to exist]; rather, it must be that there is something necessary in the world.

Now every necessary being either has a cause of its necessity from outside itself or it does not. But it is impossible to go on to infinity among necessary beings that have a cause of their necessity—in the same way, as was proved above, that it is impossible to go on to infinity among efficient causes. Therefore, one must posit something that is necessary *per se*, which does not have a cause of its necessity from outside itself but is instead a cause of necessity for the other [necessary] things. But this everyone calls a God.

The *fourth* way is taken from the gradations that are found in the world:

In the world some things are found to be more and less good, more and less true, more and less noble, etc. But *more* and *less* are predicated of diverse things insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is maximal in a given respect. For instance, the hotter something is, the closer it approaches that which is maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is maximally true, maximally good, and maximally noble, and, as a result, is a maximal being; for according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 2, things that are maximally true are maximally beings.

But, as is claimed in the same book, that which is maximal in a given genus is a cause of all the things that belong to that genus; for instance, fire, which is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things. Therefore, there is something that is a cause for all beings of their *esse*, their goodness, and each of their perfections—and this we call a God.

The *fifth* way is taken from the governance of things:

We see that some things lacking cognition, viz., natural bodies, act for the sake of an end. This is apparent from the fact that they always or very frequently act in the same way in order to bring about what is best, and from this it is clear that it is not by chance (*non a casu*), but as the result of a tendency (*ex intentione*), that they attain the end.

But things lacking cognition tend toward an end only if they are directed by something that has cognition and intellective understanding (*non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente*), in the way that an arrow is directed by an archer. Therefore, there is something with intellective understanding by which all natural things are ordered toward an end—and this we call a God.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, “Since God is maximally good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works if He were not powerful enough and good enough to draw good even from evil.” Therefore, it is part of God’s infinite goodness that He should permit evils and elicit goods from them.

Reply to objection 2: Since it is by the direction of a higher agent that nature acts for the sake of a determinate end, those things that are done by nature must also be traced back to God as a first cause. Similarly, even things that are done by design must be traced back to a higher cause and not to human reason and will. For human reason and will are changeable and subject to failure, but, as was shown above, all things that can change and fail must be traced back to a first principle that is unmoved and necessary *per se*.

QUESTION 3

God's Simplicity

Once we have ascertained that a given thing exists, we then have to inquire into its mode of being in order to come to know its real definition (*quid est*). However, in the case of God we cannot know His real definition, but can know only what He is not; and so we are unable to examine God's mode of being, but instead can examine only what His mode of being is not. Therefore, we have to consider, first, what His mode of being is not (questions 3-11); second, how we apprehend Him (question 12); and, third, how He is named (question 13).

By excluding from God certain things that do not befit Him, e.g., composition, change, and other things of this sort, it is possible to show what His mode of being is not. So, first of all, we will inquire into His simplicity, by which composition is excluded from Him (question 3). And because among corporeal things the simple ones are imperfect and mere parts, we will inquire, second, into His perfection (questions 4-6); third, into His infinity (questions 7-8); fourth, into His immutability (questions 9-10); and fifth, into His oneness (question 11).

As for the first point, there are eight questions: (1) Is God a body? (2) Is there a composition of form and matter in Him? (3) Is there a composition of 'what-ness' (*quidditas*), i.e., essence or nature, and subject in Him? (4) Is there a composition of essence and *esse* in Him? (5) Is there a composition of genus and difference in Him? (6) Is there a composition of substance and accident in Him? (7) Is there any type of composition at all in Him, or is He utterly simple? (8) Does He enter into composition with other things?

Article 1

Is God a body?

It seems that God is a body:

Objection 1: A body is that which has three dimensions. But Sacred Scripture attributes three dimensions to God; for Job 11:8 says: "He is higher than heaven, and what will you do? He is deeper than hell, and how will you know? The measure of him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea." Therefore, God is a body.

Objection 2: Everything that has a shape (*figura*) is a body, since shape is a quality that involves quantity. But God seems to have a shape; for in Genesis 1:26 it is written, "Let us make man to our image and likeness," and, according to Hebrews 1:3, shape is called an image ("For He is the brightness of his glory, and the figure (*figura*) [read: the image] of his substance." Therefore, God is a body.

Objection 3: Everything that has bodily parts is a body. But Scripture attributes bodily parts to God; for Job 40:4 says, "And have you an arm like God?," and Psalm 33:16 says, "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just," and Psalm 117:16 says, "The right hand of the Lord has wrought strength." Therefore, God is a body.

Objection 4: Posture (*situs*) belongs only to a body. But in the Scriptures things pertaining to posture are said of God; for Isaiah 6:1 says, "I saw the Lord sitting," and Isaiah 3:13 says, "The Lord stands up to judge." Therefore, God is a body.

Objection 5: Nothing can be a spatial terminus *a quo* or terminus *ad quem* unless it is a body or something corporeal. But in Scripture God is said to be a spatial terminus *ad quem* (Psalm 33:6: "Come to Him and be enlightened") and a spatial terminus *a quo* (Jeremiah 17:13: "They that depart from You shall be written in the earth"). Therefore, God is a body.

But contrary to this: John 4:24 says, “God is a spirit.”

I respond: One should assert without qualification that God is not a body. This can be shown in three ways.

First, as is clear from an induction over singulars, no body effects movement without itself being moved (*nullum corpus movet non motum*). But it was shown above (q. 2, a. 3) that God is the first unmoved mover. Hence, it is clear that God is not a body.

Second, the first being must be fully actual and in no way in potentiality. For even though in one and the same thing that goes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is temporally prior to the actuality, nonetheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality—because what is in potentiality is led into actuality only by a being that is in actuality in a relevant respect. But it was shown above (q. 2, a. 3) that God is the first being. Therefore, in God there cannot be anything in potentiality. But all bodies are in potentiality, since a continuous thing, as such, is infinitely divisible. Therefore, it is impossible for God to be a body.

Third, as is clear from what was said above (q. 2, a. 3), God is the most noble of beings. But it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings. For a body is either living or non-living, and a living body is clearly more noble than a non-living body. Yet it is not by virtue of being a body that a living body is living, since otherwise all bodies would be living. Therefore, it must be the case that a living body is living because of something else; for instance, our body is alive by virtue of its soul. But that by virtue of which a body is living is more noble than that body. Therefore, it is impossible for God to be a body.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 1, a. 9), Sacred Scripture teaches about spiritual and divine things by means of likenesses drawn from corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes three dimensions to God by a likeness drawn from corporeal quantity, it is signifying the quantitative extent of His power—so that by depth it signifies His power to know what is hidden; by height it signifies the preeminence of His power over all things; by length it signifies the duration of His being; and by width it signifies the affection of His love toward all things. Or, alternatively, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9, by God’s depth is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by His length is meant the outpouring of His power, which penetrates all things; and by His breadth is meant His reaching out to all things, viz., insofar as all things are taken up under His protection.

Reply to objection 2: Man is said to be made to God’s image not because of his body, but because of that by which man surpasses the other animals. This is why in Genesis 1:26, after it says, “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” it adds, “so that he might have dominion over the fishes of the sea, etc.” But man surpasses the other animals because of his reason and intellect. Hence, it is by virtue of his intellect and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is made to God’s image.

Reply to objection 3: It is because of His acts that bodily parts are attributed to God in the Scriptures by a certain likeness. For since the act of an eye is to see, ‘eye’, when said of God, signifies His power to see in an intelligent, rather than sentient, way. And the same holds for other bodily parts.

Reply to objection 4: Similarly, things that pertain to posture are attributed to God only by a certain likeness. For instance, He is said to be sitting because of His immovability and authority, and He is said to be standing because of His power to vanquish everything that is opposed to Him.

Reply to objection 5: Since God is everywhere, He is approached not by bodily footsteps but by the affections of the mind, and it is in this same way that one departs from Him. And so by a likeness drawn from local movement, ‘approach’ and ‘departure’ signify spiritual affections.

Article 2

Is there a composition of form and matter in God?

It seems that in God there is a composition of form and matter:

Objection 1: Everything that has a soul is composed of matter and form, since a soul is the form of a body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for in Hebrews 10:38 God says, “But my just man lives by faith; but if he withdraws himself, he shall not please my soul.” Therefore, God is composed of matter and form.

Objection 2: According to *De Anima* 1, anger, joy, etc., are passions of a conjoined being. But passions of this sort are attributed to God in Scripture; for instance, Psalm 105:40 says, “The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people.” Therefore, God is composed of matter and form.

Objection 3: Matter is the principle of individuation. But God seems to be an individual, since He is not predicated of many. Therefore, He is composed of matter and form.

But contrary to this: Everything composed of matter and form is a body, since dimensional quantity is the first thing that inheres in matter. But, as was shown above (a. 1), God is not a body. Therefore, God is not composed of matter and form.

I respond: It is impossible for there to be matter in God.

First of all, matter is that which is in potentiality. But it has already been shown (a. 1) that God is pure actuality, with no element at all of potentiality. Hence, it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

Second, everything composed of matter and form is perfect and good through its form; hence, it has to be good by participation, i.e., it is good insofar as its matter participates in form. But the first good and optimal being, viz., God, is not good by participation, since being good through one’s essence is prior to being good by participation. Hence, it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

Third, every agent acts through its form, and so a thing is related to its own acting in the way it is related to its form. So in order for something to be a first and *per se* agent, it must be *per se* and primarily a form. But God is a first agent, because, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3), He is the first efficient cause. Therefore, He is a form through His essence and is not composed of matter and form.

Reply to objection 1: A soul is attributed to God by a likeness drawn from the acts of a soul. For, in our own case, it is by means of our soul that we will something. Hence, what is said to be pleasing to the soul of God is that which is pleasing to His will.

Reply to objection 2: Anger and other passions of this sort are attributed to God by a likeness drawn from their effects. For instance, someone who is angry characteristically inflicts punishment, and so the punishment inflicted by God is metaphorically called His anger.

Reply to objection 3: Forms that can be received in matter are individuated by the matter; for the matter cannot exist in another, since it is the first underlying subject. In contrast, the form, taken by itself (i.e., unless something other than itself prevents this), can be received by any number of matters.

However, if the form in question cannot be received in matter but instead subsists *per se*, then it is individuated by the very fact that it cannot be received in another—and this is the sort of form that God is. Hence, it does not follow that God has matter.

Article 3

Is God the same as His essence or nature?

It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature:

Objection 1: Nothing exists within itself. But the essence or nature of God—viz., His divinity (*deitas*)—is said to be ‘in’ God. Therefore, it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.

Objection 2: An effect is similar to its cause, since every agent effects what is similar to itself. But in created things the suppositum is not the same as the nature; for instance, a man is not the same as his human-ness. Therefore, God is likewise not the same as His divinity.

But contrary to this: As is clear from John 14:6 (“I am the way, and the truth, and the life”), it is said of God that He is life and not just that He is living. But divinity is related to God as life is related to the living. Therefore, God is His very divinity.

I respond: God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, notice that in things composed of matter and form the nature or essence has to be different from the suppositum. For the essence or nature includes within itself only those things that are found in the definition of the species. For instance, human-ness (*humanitas*) includes within itself those things that are found in the definition of man; for it is by those things that a man is a man—and this is just what ‘human-ness’ signifies, viz., that by which a man is a man. In contrast, the individual matter, along with all the accidents that individuate it, is not found in the definition of the species. For instance, the definition of man does not include this flesh and these bones, or whiteness or blackness, or anything of this sort—and thus *this* flesh and *these* bones and the accidents that designate *this* matter are not included in human-ness. And yet they are included in that which is a man; thus, that which is a man has something within itself that human-ness does not include. For this reason, a man and human-ness are not completely the same. Instead, human-ness is signified as a formal part of a man, since the defining principles are related as a form to the individuating matter.

Thus, in things which are not composed of matter and form and in which individuation is not due to a material individual—i.e., is not due to *this* matter—but in which the forms themselves are individuated *per se*, the very forms themselves have to be subsisting supposita. Hence, in such things the suppositum and the nature do not differ from one another. And so, since, as has been proved (a. 2), God is not composed of matter and form, God must be His own divinity, His own life, and whatever else is predicated of God in this way.

Reply to objection 1: We ourselves are unable to talk about simple entities except in the way we talk about the composite entities from which we take our cognition. And so, when speaking of God, we use concrete names to signify His subsistence (since by our lights it is only composites that subsist), and we use abstract names to signify His simplicity. So the fact that divinity, life, and other things of this sort are said to be ‘in’ God should be traced back to a duality (*diversitas*) that occurs in our intellect’s grasp of the thing and not to any duality within the thing itself.

Reply to objection 2: God’s effects do not imitate Him perfectly, but rather imitate Him to the extent that they are able to. And their falling short in their imitation stems from the fact that what is simple and unified can be exhibited only through a multiplicity. This is why composition occurs in God’s effects, and it is because of this that in those effects the suppositum is not the same as the nature.

Article 4

Is God's essence the same as His *esse*?

It seems that God's essence is not the same as His *esse*:

Objection 1: If this were so, then nothing would be added to God's *esse*. But *esse* to which nothing is added is *esse*-in-general (*esse commune*), which is predicated of all things. It would thus follow that God is a common being predicable of all things. But this is false according to Wisdom 14:21 ("Men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood"). Therefore, God's *esse* is not the same as His essence.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 2, a. 2), we can know with respect to God whether He exists. But we cannot know what He is (*quid sit*). Therefore, God's *esse* is not the same as what-it-is-to-be-God (*eius quod quid est*), i.e., not the same as His 'what-ness' (*quidditas*) or nature.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 7 Hilary says, "In God the *esse* is not an accident, but rather subsisting truth." Therefore, that which subsists in God is His own *esse*.

I respond: God is not only His own essence, as has been shown (a. 3), but also His own *esse*. This can be proved in a number of ways.

First of all, whatever there is in a thing beyond its essence must be caused either (a) by the principles of its essence, as with the proper accidents that follow from the species—for instance, being capable of laughter follows from the species *man* and is caused by the essential principles of the species—or (b) by some cause outside itself—in the way that, say, heat is caused in water by a fire. Therefore, if a thing's *esse* is distinct from its essence, then the *esse* of the thing must be caused either by something outside itself or by the essential principles of the thing itself. But it is impossible for the *esse* to be caused solely by the essential principles of the thing, since nothing is sufficient to be a cause of its own *esse* if it has *esse* that is caused. Therefore, it must be the case that a thing whose *esse* is distinct from its essence has *esse* that is caused by another. But this cannot be said of God, since what we call 'God' is the first efficient cause. Therefore, it is impossible that in God the *esse* should be one thing and His essence another thing.

Second, the *esse* is the actuality of any form or nature; for goodness or human-ness is signified in actuality only insofar as we signify that it exists. Therefore, the *esse* itself is related to an essence that is distinct from it in the way that actuality is related to potentiality. Therefore, since, as was shown above (a.1), there is no potentiality in God, it follows that in Him the essence is not distinct from His *esse*. Therefore, His essence is His *esse*.

Third, just as that which has fire and is not itself fire is on fire through participation, so too that which has *esse* and is not itself *esse* is a being through participation. But, as was shown above (a. 3), God is His own essence. Therefore, if He is not His own *esse*, He will be a being through participation and not through His essence. Therefore, He will not be the first being—which is absurd. Therefore, God is His own *esse* and not just His own essence.

Reply to objection 1: The phrase 'a thing to which nothing is added' can be taken in two ways. In the first way, it is part of the notion of the thing that the addition *should not* be made to it (*non fiat ei additio*). For instance, it is part of the notion of a non-rational animal that it is without reason. In the second way, the thing is understood as something that the addition *is not* made to (*non fit additio*), since it is not part of its nature that the addition should be made to it. For instance, *animal*, taken in general, is without reason, since it is not part of the notion of an animal in general that it have reason—but neither is it part of its definition that it should lack reason. Hence, it is in the first way that the divine *esse* is *esse* without addition, while it is in the second way that *esse* in general is without addition.

Reply to objection 2: ‘*Esse*’ is said in two ways: in one way, it signifies the act of being, while in the second way it signifies the propositional composition that the mind forms by joining a predicate to a subject. If we take *esse* in the first way, then we cannot know God’s *esse* any more than we can know His essence. It is only if we take *esse* in the second way that we can know God’s *esse*. For we know that the proposition we form about God when we say ‘There is a God’ is true. And, as was explained above (q. 2, a. 2), we know this from His effects.

Article 5

Is God in a genus?

It seems that God is in a genus:

Objection 1: A substance is a being that subsists *per se*. But this is especially true of God. Therefore, God is in the genus of substance.

Objection 2: Each thing is measured by something in its own genus; for instance, lengths are measured by length and numbers are measured by number. But as is clear from the Commentator in *Metaphysics* 10, God is the measure of all substances. Therefore, God is in the genus of substance.

But contrary to this: A genus is prior in the understanding to that which is contained in the genus. But nothing is prior to God either in reality or in the understanding. Therefore, God is not in any genus.

I respond: Something is in a genus in one of two ways. In the first way, it is in a genus simply and properly, as in the case of the species that are included under the genus. In the second way, something is in a genus by reduction, as in the case of principles and privations; for instance, *point* and *unit* are reduced to the genus of quantity as principles of quantity, whereas blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of the corresponding habit. But God is not in a genus in either of these ways.

There are three ways to prove that God cannot be a species of any genus.

First, the species is constituted from the genus and the difference. But that from which the difference constituting the species is taken is always related to that from which the genus is taken as actuality to potentiality. For instance, the genus *animal* is taken in a concrete mode from a sentient nature, since that which is called an animal has a sentient nature; the difference *rational*, on the other hand, is taken from an intellective nature, since the rational is that which has an intellective nature. But the intellective is related to the sentient as actuality to potentiality. And the same thing is clear in other cases. Since, then, in God there is no potentiality joined to actuality, it is impossible for Him to be in a genus in the way that a species is.

Second, since, as was shown above (a. 4), God’s *esse* is His essence, it follows that if God were in a genus, His genus would have to be *being*. For the genus signifies the essence of the thing, since it is predicated as part of the thing’s real definition (*in eo quod quid est*). But in *Metaphysics* 3 the Philosopher shows that *being* cannot be the genus of anything. For every genus has differences that fall outside the essence of the genus, whereas no difference can fall outside of *being*, since a non-being cannot be a difference. Hence, it follows that God is not in a genus.

Third, all the things that are in a given genus share in the ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) or essence of the genus, which is predicated of them as part of their real definition. But these things differ in their *esse*, since the *esse* of a man is not the same as the *esse* of a horse, and the *esse* of *this* man is not the same as the *esse* of *that* man. And so in each of the things in a given genus the *esse* differs from “what-it-is-to-be-that-thing,” i.e., from the essence. But, as was shown above (a. 4), in God the *esse* does not differ from the essence. Hence, it is clear that God is not in a genus in the way that a species is.

And from this it is clear that God does not have a genus or differences; nor is there a definition of Him or a demonstration of Him, except through His effects. For a definition is composed of genus and difference, and the middle term of a demonstration is a definition.

Moreover, the claim that God is not in a genus by reduction, in the manner of a principle, is clear from the fact that a principle that is reduced to a given genus does not extend beyond that genus. For instance, *point* is a principle only of continuous quantity, and *unit* is a principle only of discrete quantity. But, as will be shown below (q. 44, a. 1), God is a principle of the totality of *esse*. Hence, he is not contained in any genus as a principle of that genus.

Reply to objection 1: The term ‘substance’ does not signify just *per se* existence, since *being* cannot itself be a genus, as has been shown. Rather, the term ‘substance’ signifies an essence that exists in a certain way, viz., *per se*, even though *esse* is not its very essence. Thus, it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.

Reply to objection 2: This objection presupposes a proportionate measure, since this measure must be homogeneous with what is measured. But there is nothing with respect to which God is a proportionate measure. Still, God is said to be the measure of all things in the sense that each thing has *esse* only to the degree that it approaches Him.

Article 6

Are there any accidents in God?

It seems that there are some accidents in God:

Objection 1: As *Physics* 1 says, a substance is not an accident to anything. So that which is an accident in one thing cannot be a substance in another thing; for instance, one proves that heat is not the substantial form of fire from the fact that it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, power, and other things of this sort, which are accidents in us, are attributed to God. Therefore, they are accidents in God, too.

Objection 2: In every genus there is one first thing. But there are many genera of accidents. Therefore, if the first things in those genera do not exist in God, there will be many first things in addition to God—which is absurd.

But contrary to this: Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, since, as Boethius puts it in his *De Trinitate*, “A simple form cannot be a subject.” Therefore, there can be no accidents in God.

I respond: From what has already been said, it is clear that there cannot be any accidents in God.

For, first of all, a subject is related to its accident as potentiality to actuality; for the subject is actual in some way because of the accident. But *being in potentiality* is altogether denied of God, as is clear from what was said above (a. 1).

Second, God is His own *esse*, and as Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, “Even though that which exists can have something else adjoined to it, nonetheless, the *esse* itself cannot have anything else adjoined to it.” In the same way, that which is hot can have something extraneous to heat, e.g., whiteness, but the heat itself has nothing besides heat.

Third, everything that exists *per se* is prior to what exists *per accidens*. Therefore, since God is the absolutely first being, nothing can be in Him *per accidens*. But neither can there be *per se* accidents in Him, in the way that *being capable of laughter* is a *per se* accident of a man. For accidents of this sort are caused by the principles of the subject, whereas in God there is nothing that is caused, since He is the

first cause. Hence, there are no accidents in God.

Reply to Objection 1: Power and wisdom are not predicated univocally of God and us, as will become clear below (q. 13, a. 5). Thus, it does not follow that accidents exist in God in the same way they exist in us.

Reply to Objection 2: Since substance is prior to accidents, the principles of accidents are traced back to the principles of substance as something prior. And even though God is not the first being contained under the genus of substance, He is still—outside of every genus—first with respect to all being.

Article 7

Is God altogether simple?

It seems that God is not altogether simple:

Objection 1: The things that come from God imitate Him. Hence, all beings come from the first being, and all good things come from the first good thing. But among the things that come from God, none is absolutely simple. Therefore, God is not absolutely simple.

Objection 2: Everything that is better should be attributed to God. But from our perspective, composite things are better than simple things; for instance, mixed bodies are better than the elements, and the elements are better than their parts. Therefore, one should not say that God is altogether simple.

But contrary to this: According to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 7, God is truly and supremely simple.

I respond: It can be made clear in a number of ways that God is altogether simple.

First of all, through what has been said above (aa. 1-6): There is no composition in God of quantitative parts, since He is not a body. Nor is there in God a composition of form and matter. Again, in God the nature is not different from the suppositum, and the essence is not different from the *esse*. Nor is there in God a composition of genus and difference or of subject and accident. Hence, it is clear that there is no way in which God is composite; instead, He is altogether simple.

Second, every composite thing is posterior to its components and dependent on them. But, as was shown above (q. 2, a.3), God is the first being.

Third, every composite thing has a cause, since things that are diverse, taken in themselves, do not come together into a unified thing unless some cause joins them to one another. But, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3), God does not have a cause, since he is the first efficient cause.

Fourth, in every composite thing there must be both potentiality and actuality, since either (a) one of the parts is actuality with respect to another, or at least (b) all the parts are in potentiality with respect to the whole. But it is not the case [that there is both potentiality and actuality] in God.

Fifth, no composite thing is predicated of any one of its parts. This is obvious in the case of wholes that are composed of dissimilar parts; for instance, no part of a man is itself a man, and no part of a foot is itself a foot. On the other hand, in the case of wholes composed of similar parts, even though something predicated of the whole is also predicated of a part—for instance, a part of [a volume of] air is air and a part of [a volume of] water is water—there is still something said of the whole that does not belong to any of the parts. For instance, it is not the case that if the whole [volume] of water is two cubits, then a part of it is also two cubits. Therefore, in every composite thing there is something that is not the composite itself. Yet even if it can be said of something having a form that it has something which is not itself (for instance, in a white thing there is something that does not pertain to the nature

white), still, in the form itself there is nothing that is not the form itself. Hence, since God is a form—or, better, *esse* itself—he can in no way be composite. In *De Trinitate* 7 Hilary touches on this when he says, “God, who is power, is not composed of weak things; nor is He who is light made up of dim things.”

Reply to Objection 1: The things that come from God imitate God the first cause insofar as they are caused. But it is part of the concept of a thing that is caused that it is in some way composite, since, as will be shown below (q. 50, a. 2), it is at least the case that its *esse* is different from what it is.

Reply to Objection 2: Composite things are better from our perspective than simple things because the perfection of a creature’s goodness is found in many things rather than one simple thing. In contrast, as will be shown below (q. 4, a. 2), the perfection of God’s goodness is found in one simple thing.

Article 8

Does God enter into composition with other things?

It seems that God enters into composition with other things:

Objection 1: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The *esse* of all things is that which lies beyond *esse*, the divine nature.” But the *esse* of all things enters into composition with everything. Therefore, God enters into composition with other things.

Objection 2: God is a form; for in *De Verbis Domini* Augustine says that the Word of God—which is God—is a form that has not been formed. But a form is part of a composite. Therefore, God is part of some composite.

Objection 3: Things that exist and in no way differ from one another are the same. But God and primary matter exist and do not differ from one another. Therefore, they are entirely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition of things. Therefore, God does, too.

Proof of the minor: Things that differ from one another differ by virtue of certain differences, and so they must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore, they do not differ from one another in any way.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says, “Neither does anything touch Him (i.e., God) nor is there any other sort of union with Him through a mixing of parts.” Furthermore, in the *Liber de Causis* it says, “The first cause rules all things without being mixed in with them.”

I respond: On this matter there have been three errors.

As is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 7, some have claimed that God is the soul of the world and, what amounts to the same thing, some have claimed that God is the soul of the first heaven. Others have claimed that God is the formal principle of all things; this is said to have been the opinion of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who very stupidly claimed that God is primary matter.

All of these positions are patently false. It is impossible for God to enter into composition with anything in any way, either as a formal principle or as a material principle.

First of all, we said above (q. 2, a. 3) that God is the first efficient cause. But an efficient cause is not numerically the same with the form of the thing that is made, but only the same in species; for example, a man generates a man. On the other hand, the matter is neither numerically the same nor the same in species with the efficient cause, since the matter is in potentiality, whereas the efficient cause is

in act.

Second, since God is the first efficient cause, it belongs to Him to act primarily and *per se*. But that which enters into composition with another is not primarily and *per se* an agent. Instead, it is the composite thing that is primarily and *per se* an agent. For it is not the hand that acts, but the man who acts through the hand; and fire gives warmth through its heat. Hence, God cannot be a part of any composite.

Third, no part of a composite thing can be absolutely the first among beings. And neither can the matter or the form, which are the first parts of composite things, be the first among beings. For, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1), the matter is in potentiality, and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality. On the other hand, a form that is part of a composite thing is a participated form; and just as that which participates in such-and-such is posterior to that which is such-and-such through its essence, so too the participated entity itself is posterior to that which is such-and-such through its essence. For instance, fire in things that are on fire is posterior to that which is fire through its essence. But it has been shown (q. 2, a. 3) that God is the first being, absolutely speaking.

Reply to Objection 1: The divine nature is said to be all things as an efficient cause and an exemplar, but not through its essence.

Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form, but not the sort of form that is part of a composite thing.

Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by virtue of any other differences, since this feature belongs to composites. For instance, a man and a horse differ by virtue of the differences *rational* and *non-rational*, but these differences themselves do not further differ from one another by virtue of any other differences. Hence, if we attend to the meaning of the terms, such things are properly said not ‘to differ’ but ‘to be diverse’. For according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 10, the term ‘diverse’ is said in an unqualified way, whereas everything that differs differs in some respect. Hence, if we attend to the meaning of the terms, primary matter and God do not ‘differ’ from one another but are instead ‘diverse’ in themselves. Hence, it does not follow that they are the same.

QUESTION 4

God's Perfection

Now that we have examined God's simplicity, we must consider the perfection of God Himself. And since each thing is called good to the extent that it is perfect, we must first talk about God's perfection and then about His goodness. On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Is God perfect? (2) Is God totally perfect, having within Himself the perfections of all things? (3) Can creatures be said to be similar to God?

Article 1

Is God perfect?

It seems that being perfect does not befit God:

Objection 1: That which is perfect is said to be made, as it were, to completion. But *being made* is not compatible with God. Therefore, neither is *being perfect*.

Objection 2: God is the first principle of things. But the principles of things seem to be imperfect; for example, the seed (*semen*) is a principle of animals and plants. Therefore, God is not perfect.

Objection 3: It was shown above (q. 3, a. 4) that God's essence is *esse* itself. But *esse* itself seems to be the least perfect thing, since it is the most common and receives all other things as additions. Therefore, God is not perfect.

But contrary to this: Matthew 5:48 says: "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect."

I respond: As the Philosopher tells us in *Metaphysics* 12, certain ancient philosophers—viz., the Pythagoreans and Speusippus—did not attribute *best* and *most perfect* to the first principle. The reason is that the ancient philosophers were thinking of the material principle alone, and the first material principle is the least perfect. For since matter as such is in potentiality, the first material principle must have maximal potentiality and thus be maximally imperfect.

However, God is posited not as the first *material* principle, but as the first principle in the genus of *efficient* causes; and the first efficient principle has to be absolutely perfect. For just as matter as such is in potentiality, so an agent as such has actuality. Hence, the first acting principle must have maximal actuality and, as a result, must be maximally perfect. For something is said to be perfect to the extent that it has actuality, since what is called perfect is that which lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says: "In stammering to the extent we can, we re-echo the high things of God. For that which is not made cannot properly be called complete (*perfectum*)."

However, because among the things that are made something is called perfect when it is brought from potentiality into actuality, the term 'perfect' is transferred to signify anything that is not lacking in actuality, whether or not it has this condition by virtue of having been made.

Reply to Objection 2: Material principles, which we find to be imperfect, cannot be first absolutely speaking, but instead are preceded by another principle that is perfect. Thus, even though the seed (*semen*) is a principle of an animal generated out of semen, it is nonetheless preceded by the animal or plant from which it is derived. For prior to anything that exists in potentiality, there must be something in actuality, since a being in potentiality is not brought into actuality except by some being that is already in actuality.

Reply to Objection 3: *Esse* itself is the most perfect of all things, since it is related to all things as their actuality. For nothing has actuality except insofar as it exists; hence, *esse* itself is the actuality of

all things and especially of their forms. For this reason, *esse* is related to other things not in the way that what receives is related to what is received, but rather in the way that what is received is related to what receives. For when I talk about the *esse* of a man or the *esse* of a horse or the *esse* of anything else, it is the *esse* itself that is being thought of as something formal and received, and not that to which the *esse* belongs.

Article 2

Do the perfections of all things exist in God?

It seems that it is not the case that the perfections of all things exist in God:

Objection 1: As has been shown (q. 3, a. 7), God is simple. But the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore, it is not the case that all the perfections of things exist in God.

Objection 2: Opposites cannot exist in the same thing. But the perfections of things are opposites, since each species is perfected through its specific difference, and the differences by which the genus is divided and the species constituted are opposites. Therefore, since opposites cannot simultaneously exist in the same thing, it seems that it is not the case that all the perfections of things exist in God.

Objection 3: A living thing is more perfect than a [mere] being, and one who is wise is more perfect than one who is merely alive. Therefore, it is likewise the case that *living* is more perfect than *being* and that *being wise* is more perfect than *living*. But God's essence is simply to be (*esse*). Therefore, He does not have within himself the perfection of being alive or the perfection of being wise or other perfections of this sort.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, Dionysius says that God in His oneness already has all things.

I respond: The perfections of all things exist in God. And He is said to be totally perfect because, as the Commentator puts it in *Metaphysics* 5, He does not lack any type of nobility that is found in any genus.

This can be thought of in two ways:

First of all, the same perfection that is found in an effect must be found in the efficient cause either (a) according to the same nature when the agent is a *univocal* cause, as when a man generates a man, or (b) in a more eminent mode when the agent is an *equivocal* cause—for example, in the sun there is a likeness of the things that are generated through the sun's power. For it is clear that the effect preexists virtually in its agent cause, and that to preexist in the agent cause's power is to preexist in a more perfect, rather than less perfect, mode—even though to preexist in the potentiality of a *material* cause is to preexist in a less perfect mode, given that matter as such is imperfect. In contrast, an agent as such is perfect. Therefore, since God is the first efficient cause of things, the perfections of all things must preexist in God in a more eminent mode. Dionysius touches on this line of reasoning in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, when he says of God, "It is not that He is this thing and not that thing; rather, He is all things as the cause of all."

Second, given what was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), viz., that God is *esse* itself subsisting *per se*, it must be the case that He contains within Himself the total perfection of being. For it is clear that if a hot thing does not have the whole perfection of a hot thing, this is because its heat is not participated to a perfect degree; but if the heat subsisted *per se*, it would not be able to lack any of the power of heat. Hence, since God is subsistent *esse* itself, he cannot lack any of the perfection of *esse*. But the perfections of all things are pertinent to the perfection of *esse*, since they are perfect to the extent that

they have *esse* in some mode or other. So it follows that there is no entity whose perfection God lacks. Dionysius touches on this line of reasoning as well in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, when he says, “God does not exist in any particular way; instead, He already has within Himself, simply and without qualification, the whole of *esse* in a uniform way.” And later he adds, “He is *esse* for all subsistent things.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, “Just as the sun, while itself existing as a unity and shining uniformly, has within itself in a uniform way many different sensible substances and qualities, so too, *a fortiori*, all things must preexist by a sort of natural union in the cause of all things.” And so things that in themselves are diverse and opposite preexist as one in God without any detriment to His simplicity.

Reply to Objection 2: The same answer applies to this objection.

Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says in the same chapter, even though, when they are considered as distinct in nature from one another (*secundum quod distinguuntur ratione*), *esse* itself is more perfect than life and life itself is more perfect than wisdom itself, nonetheless, a living thing is more perfect than a mere being, since a living thing is also a being; and someone who is wise is both a being and a living thing. Therefore, even if some being does not include either *living* or *wise* within itself—for that which participates in *esse* need not participate in every mode of being—nonetheless, God’s very *esse* does include within itself both life and wisdom. For no perfection of being can be lacking in one who is subsistent *esse* itself.

Article 3

Can a creature be similar to God?

It seems that no creature can be similar to God:

Objection 1: Psalm 85:8 says, “There is none among the gods like unto You, O Lord.” But it is the more excellent of all creatures that are being called gods here by a kind of participation. Therefore, it is even less the case that other creatures can be called similar to God.

Objection 2: Similarity is a relation. But there is no relation among things that belong to diverse genera. Therefore, there is no similarity among them; for instance, we do not say that sweetness is similar to whiteness. But no creature belongs to the same genus as God, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 5), God is not in a genus. Therefore, no creature is similar to God.

Objection 3: It is things that agree in form that are called similar. But nothing agrees in form with God, since nothing except God is such that its essence is its very *esse*. Therefore, no creature can be similar to God.

Objection 4: In things that are similar, the similarity is mutual. For what is similar is similar to what is similar to it. Therefore, if a creature is similar to God, then God will be similar to some creature. But this is contrary to Isaiah 40:18: “To whom then have you likened God?”

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:26 says, “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” and 1 John 3:2 says: “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him.”

I respond: Since similarity has to do with agreement or commonality in form, there are many kinds of similarity corresponding to the many ways of sharing in a form.

Some things are called similar because they share in the same form according to the same nature and the same mode. These things are called not just similar but equal in their similarity. For instance, two equally white things are called similar in whiteness. This is *perfect similarity*.

In a second way, things are called similar because they share a form according to the same nature but not according to the same mode, with one having more and the other less. For example, a thing that is less white is called similar to a thing that is more white. This is *imperfect similarity*.

In a third way, things are called similar when they share in the same form, but not according to the same nature. This is clear in the case of non-univocal agents. For since every agent, as an agent, effects what is similar to itself while effecting each thing in accord with its own form, it must be the case that in the effect there is some likeness of the agent's form. Therefore, if the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a similarity in form according to the same nature of the species between the maker and what is made, as when a man generates a man. But if the agent is not contained in the same species, then there will be a similarity, but not a similarity according to the same nature of the species. For instance, the things generated by the sun's power bear some similarity to the sun, but only to the extent that they receive the form of the sun according to a similarity of genus and not according to a similarity of species. Therefore, if there is an agent that is not contained in any genus, its effects will bear a still more remote similarity to the form of the agent—not in such a way that they participate in a similarity to the form of the agent according to the nature of either the genus or the species, but in such a way that they participate in a similarity to the form of the agent according to some sort of analogy (*secundum aliquam analogiam*), in the way that *esse* itself is common to all things. And this is the way in which the things that come from God, insofar as they are beings, are assimilated to Him as the first and universal principle of all being.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9, when Sacred Scripture says that something is not similar to God, “this is not contrary to something's being assimilated to Him. For the same things are both similar and dissimilar to God—similar insofar as they imitate Him to the extent that it is possible to imitate Him who is not perfectly imitable, but dissimilar insofar as they fall short of their cause.” And they do not fall short just with respect to intensity and remission, in the way that a less white thing falls short of something that is more white; rather, they fall short because there is no agreement either according to species or according to genus.

Reply to Objection 2: God stands to creatures not as a thing of a diverse genus stands to another, but rather as that which is outside of every genus and the principle of all genera.

Reply to Objection 3: A creature is said to be similar to God not because they share in a form according to the same nature of genus or species, but only because of an analogy, viz., insofar as God is a being through His essence and the others are beings through participation.

Reply to Objection 4: Even though there is a sense in which it may be conceded that a creature is similar to God, one must in no way concede that God is similar to a creature. For, as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9, “Things that belong to the same order are susceptible to a mutual similarity, but not a cause and that which is caused.” For instance, we say that an image is similar to a man, but not conversely. Likewise, it can be said in some sense that a creature is similar to God, but not that God is similar to a creature.

QUESTION 5

The Good in General

Next we will ask about the good—first about the good in general (*bonum in communi*) (question 5) and then about the goodness of God (question 6).

On the first point there are six questions: (1) Are *good* and *being* the same in reality? (2) Assuming that they differ only conceptually, which of the two, *good* or *being*, is conceptually prior? (3) Assuming that *being* is prior, is every being good? (4) To what cause is the notion *good* traced back? (5) Does the nature of good consist in mode, species, and order? (6) In what sense is the good divided into the noble, the useful, and the pleasant?

Article 1

Does *good* differ in reality from *being*?

It seems that *good* (*bonum*) differs in reality from *being* (*ens*):

Objection 1: In *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius says, “Among entities I see that it is one thing for them to be good and another for them to exist.” Therefore, *good* and *being* differ in reality.

Objection 2: Nothing has itself as a form. But, as a comment on the *Liber de Causis* puts it, *good* is predicated of a being as a form. Therefore, *good* differs in reality from *being*.

Objection 3: *Good* admits of more and less. But *being* does not admit of more and less. Therefore, *good* differs in reality from *being*.

But contrary to this: In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, “To the extent that we exist, we are good.”

I respond: *Good* and *being* are the same in reality and differ only conceptually.

This is clear from the following line of reasoning: The nature of the good consists in something’s being desirable; thus, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, “The good is what all things desire.” But it is obvious that each thing is desirable to the extent that it is perfect, since all things desire their own perfection. But each thing is perfect to the extent that it has actuality. Hence, it is clear that something is good to the extent that it is a being, since, as is obvious from what was said above (q. 3, a. 4 and q. 4, a. 1), being (*esse*) is the actuality of each thing. Hence, it is clear that *good* and *being* are the same in reality, but that *good* expresses the nature of being desirable, whereas *being* does not.

Reply to Objection 1: Even though *good* and *being* are the same in reality, the fact that they nonetheless differ conceptually explains why something is not called unqualifiedly good in the same way that it is called unqualifiedly a being.

For since *being* expresses that something properly has actuality, and since actuality is properly ordered toward potentiality, something is unqualifiedly called a being insofar as it is set off in the first instance from that which is merely in potentiality. Now this is the substantial *esse* of each thing, and so it is because of its substantial *esse* that each thing is called a being unqualifiedly. In contrast, it is through additional acts that something is said to exist in a qualified way. For example, *being white* signifies existing in a qualified way. For a thing’s being white does not bring to an end that thing’s existing merely in potentiality, since being white accrues to a thing that already exists in actuality.

In contrast, *good* expresses the nature of the perfect, i.e., the desirable, and thus expresses the nature of an ultimate point. Hence, it is what is ultimately perfect that is called good in an unqualified way. And if something does not have the ultimate perfection that it ought to have, then even though it

has some perfection insofar as it is actual, it is not called perfect in an unqualified way or good in an unqualified way, but is instead called perfect or good only in a qualified way.

So, then, by virtue of its first *esse*, which is its substantival *esse*, a thing is called a being in an unqualified way and good in a qualified way, i.e., good insofar as it is a being. In contrast, by virtue of its ultimate act it is called a being in a qualified way and good in an unqualified way.

Thus, when Boethius says that “among entities . . . it is one thing for them to be good and another for them to exist,” this should be taken to mean unqualified goodness and unqualified being. For it is by virtue of its first act that something is unqualifiedly a being, and it is by virtue of its ultimate act that it is unqualifiedly good. On the other hand, by virtue of its first act it is good in a qualified way, and by virtue of its ultimate act it is a being in a qualified way.

Reply to Objection 2: *Good* is predicated as a form insofar as it means *unqualifiedly good*, by virtue of its ultimate act.

Reply to Objection 3: Similarly, it is because of some supervening actuality such as scientific knowledge or virtue that *good* is predicated according to a greater or lesser degree.

Article 2

Is *good* conceptually prior to *being*?

It seems that *good* is conceptually prior to *being*:

Objection 1: The order of names mirrors the order of the things signified by the names. But as is clear in *De Divinibus Nominibus*, chap. 3, Dionysius puts *good* before *being* among the names of God. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *being*.

Objection 2: That which is conceptually prior extends to more things. But *good* extends to more things than *being*, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinibus Nominibus*, chap. 5, “*Good* extends both to things that exist and to things that do not exist, whereas *being* extends only to things that exist.” Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *being*.

Objection 3: That which is more universal is conceptually prior. But *good* seems to be more universal than *being*, since the good has the nature of being desirable, and non-being is itself desirable for certain things. For instance, Matthew 26:24 says of Judas that “it were better for him, if that man had not been born”—and there are other such examples. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *being*.

Objection 4: It is not just being that is desirable, but also life and wisdom and many other such things. And so it seems that being is one particular desirable thing, whereas the good is something universally desirable. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *being*.

But contrary to this: The *Liber De Causis* says, “Being (*esse*) is the first among creatures.”

I respond: *Being* (*ens*) is conceptually prior to *good* (*bonum*). For the nature signified by a term is that which the intellect conceives with respect to an entity and signifies through the spoken term. Therefore, it is that which comes first in the intellect’s conception that is conceptually prior. But *being* comes first in the intellect’s conception, since, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, each thing is susceptible to cognition insofar as it is actual. Hence, *being* is the proper object of the intellect and so is the first intelligible thing, in the same way that sound is the first audible thing. Therefore, *being* is conceptually prior to *good*.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius orders the divine names according to how they express God’s status as a cause. For, as he says, we name God from creatures, as a cause from its effects.

Since *good* has the nature of the desirable, it expresses the status of a final cause. Now the

causality of the final cause is first, since an agent acts only for the sake of an end, and the matter is moved toward the form by the agent. This is why the end is called the cause of causes. And so, as far as causality is concerned, *good* is prior to *being*, in the sense that the end is prior to the form. For this reason, among the names signifying God's causality, *good* is prior to *being*.

Likewise, according to the Platonists—who, not distinguishing the matter from the privation, claimed that the matter is a non-being—participation in the good extends to more things than does participation in being. For primary matter participates in the good—since it desires the good, and nothing desires what is not similar to itself—but it does not participate in being, given that it is claimed to be a non-being. This is why Dionysius says that “the good extends itself to things that do not exist.”

Reply to Objection 2: The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said.

An alternative reply is that one could claim that *good* extends to both existents and non-existents not by predication but by causality—as long as ‘non-existent’ does not mean things which simply do not exist at all, but rather things that exist in potentiality and not in actuality. For the good has the nature of an end, and an end is not only such that things with actuality come to rest in it, but also such that things existing only in potentiality and not in actuality move toward it. By contrast, *being* (*ens*) implies only the condition of a formal cause, be it inherent or exemplary, the causality of which extends only to things that are actual.

Reply to Objection 3: Non-being is not desirable taken in itself, but is desirable only *per accidens*, viz., insofar as the removal of some evil is desirable and the evil is removed through non-being. But the removal of an evil is desirable only insofar as one is deprived of some being because of the evil. Therefore, that which is desirable *per se* is being, whereas non-being is desirable only *per accidens*, viz., insofar as some [other] being is desired which a man does not tolerate being deprived of. It is in this way, too, that non-being is said to be good *per accidens*.

Reply to Objection 4: Life and knowledge and other things of this sort are desired to the extent that they are actual. Hence, in all cases some being is desired. And so nothing is desired except being, and, consequently, nothing is good except a being.

Article 3

Is every being good?

It seems that not every being is good:

Objection 1: As is clear from what has been said (a. 1), *good* adds something to *being*. But those things that add something to *being*—for instance, *substance*, *quantity*, *quality*, etc.—limit it. Therefore, *good* limits *being*. Therefore, not every being is good.

Objection 2: Nothing evil is good, according to Isaiah 5:20 (“Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil”). But some beings are called bad. Therefore, not every being is good.

Objection 3: The good has the nature of the desirable. But primary matter does not have the nature of something desirable; instead, it only has the nature of something that desires. Therefore, primary matter does not have the nature of the good. Therefore, not every being is good.

Objection 4: In *Metaphysics* 3 the Philosopher says that among mathematical entities there is no such thing as the good. But mathematical entities are certain beings—otherwise, there would be no science with respect to them. Therefore, not every being is good.

But contrary to this: Every being that is not God is a creature of God. But, as 1 Timothy 4:4 says, every creature of God is good, while God is maximally good. Therefore, every being is good.

I respond: Every being, insofar as it is a being, is good. For every being, insofar as it is a being, has actuality and is in some sense perfect, since every actuality is a certain perfection. But, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1), what is perfect has the nature of something desirable and good. Hence, it follows that every being, as such, is good.

Reply to Objection 1: *Substance, quantity, quality*, and the things contained under them limit *being* by applying *being* to some ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) or nature. However, this is not the way in which *good* adds something to *being*; instead, it adds only the notion of desirability and perfection, which belong to being itself (*ipsi esse*) no matter what nature it is in. Hence, *good* does not limit *being*.

Reply to Objection 2: No being is called bad insofar as it is a being. Rather, it is called bad insofar as it lacks some sort of being. For instance, a man is called bad insofar as he lacks the being of virtue, and an eye is called bad insofar as it lacks keenness of sight.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as primary matter is a being only in potentiality, so too it is good only in potentiality. And even though, according to the Platonists, one could claim that matter is a non-being because of the privation connected with it, it nonetheless has some participation in the good because of its very ordering or inclination toward the good. This is why primary matter is appropriately said to desire rather than to be desirable.

Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as separate entities with their own *esse*. For if they did so subsist, there would be goodness in them, viz., their very *esse* itself. Rather, mathematical entities are separate only conceptually, insofar as they are abstracted from movement and matter and thus abstracted from the notion of an end, which has the nature of a mover. But there is nothing problematic about a conceptual entity not having the good or the nature of the good, since, as was said above (a. 2), the concept of being is prior to the concept of good.

Article 4

Does *good* have the nature of a final cause?

It seems that *good* does not have the nature of a final cause, but that it instead has the nature of one of the other causes:

Objection 1: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, “The good is praised as beautiful.” But *beautiful* expresses the nature of a formal cause. Therefore, *good* has the nature of a formal cause.

Objection 2: The good is diffusive of its own *esse*, according to one interpretation of the words of Dionysius when he says that “the good is that by which all things subsist and have their being.” But *to be diffusive* expresses the nature of an efficient cause. Therefore, *good* has the nature of an efficient cause.

Objection 3: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “We exist because God is good.” But our existence is from God as an efficient cause. Therefore, *good* expresses the nature of an efficient cause.

But contrary to this: In *Physics* 2 the Philosopher says, “That for the sake of which something exists is, as it were, the end and the good of other things.” Therefore, *good* has the nature of a final cause.

I respond: Since the good is that which everything desires, and since [being desired] has the character of an end, it is clear that *good* expresses the nature of an end.

Still, the concept of the good presupposes the concept of an efficient cause as well as the concept of a formal cause. For we notice that what is first in causing is last in being caused. For example, fire gives

heat before inducing the form of fire, and yet the heat in the [caused] fire follows upon the substantial form of fire.

Now in causing, the first thing we find is the good and the end, which moves the efficient cause; next is the action of the efficient cause, moving [the patient] toward the form; and third is the appearance of the form. Thus, the converse must be the case in the thing caused: First comes the form itself, through which there is being; next we see the form's effective power, by virtue of which it has perfection in being (since, as the Philosopher says in *Meteorologia* 4, a thing is perfect when it can make something similar to itself); and third follows the nature of the good, through which the perfection is grounded in the entity.

Reply to Objection 1: *Good* and *beautiful* are the same in the subject, since they are grounded in the same reality, viz., the form, and it is for this reason that the good is praised as beautiful. However, they differ conceptually.

For *good* has to do properly with desire, since everything desires the good. And because of this it has the nature of an end, since desire is, as it were, a sort of movement toward a thing.

Beautiful, on the other hand, has to do with the cognitive power. For things are called beautiful because they are pleasing to look at. Hence, the beautiful consists in due proportion, since the sensory power delights in things that are duly proportioned, because they are similar to it. For the sensory power, like every cognitive power, involves a kind of proportion. And because cognition is accomplished through assimilation, and because similarity has to do with form, the beautiful properly pertains to the nature of a formal cause.

Reply to Objection 2: *Good* is said to be diffusive of itself in the sense that the end is said to cause movement.

Reply to Objection 3: Whoever has a will is called good insofar as he has a good will, since it is through the will that we make use of all that is in us. Hence, a man is called good not because he has a good intellect, but because he has a good will. Now the will has the end as its proper object, and so what Augustine says—viz., that we exist because God is good—has to do with final causality.

Article 5

Does the nature of the good consist in mode, species, and order?

It seems that the nature of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order:

Objection 1: As was said above (a. 1), *good* and *being* differ conceptually. But mode, species, and order seem to pertain to the concept *being*, since Wisdom 11:21 says, “You have ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight,” and these three are traced back to species, mode, and order. For, as Augustine puts it in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, “Measure fixes the mode for every being, and number gives a species for every being, and weight is what draws each being to rest and stability.” Therefore, the nature of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Objection 2: Mode, species, and order are themselves certain goods. Therefore, if the nature of the good consists in mode, species, and order, then it must be the case that mode likewise has mode, species, and order—and similarly for species and order. Therefore, there will be an infinite regress.

Objection 3: Evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil does not totally destroy the good. Therefore, the nature of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Objection 4: That in which the nature of the good consists cannot be called bad. But some modes are called bad modes and some species bad species and some orders bad orders. Therefore, the nature of the good does not consist in mode, species, and order.

Objection 5: As the passage from Augustine cited above makes clear, mode, species, and order are caused by weight, number, and measure. But not all good things have weight, number, and measure. For in *Hexaemeron* Ambrose says that “the nature of light is such that it is not created either in number or in weight or in measure.” Therefore, it is not the case that the nature of the good consists in mode, species, and order.

But contrary to this: In *De Natura Boni* Augustine says: “These three—mode, species, and order—are general goods in the things made by God. And so where these three are great, there are great goods; and where they are small, there are small goods; and where they are absent, there is no good.” But this would not be the case if the nature of the good did not consist in these things. Therefore, the nature of the good consists in mode, species and order.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), each thing is called good to the extent that it is perfect; for it is in this sense that it is desirable. But what is called perfect is such that it lacks nothing with respect to the mode of its perfection. Now since each thing is what it is through its form, and since the form presupposes certain things and has other things necessarily consequent upon it, it follows that in order for something to be perfect and good, it must have (a) the form and (b) the things presupposed by the form and (c) the things consequent upon the form.

What is presupposed by the form is the determination or commensuration of its principles—either its material principles or the principles that effect it. This is signified by ‘mode’, and this is why measure is said to fix the mode.

The form itself, on the other hand, is signified by ‘species’, since it is through its form that each thing is constituted in a species. And the reason why number is said to give the species is that the definitions signifying the species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 8. For just as the addition or subtraction of a unit changes the species of a number, so too the addition or subtraction of a difference changes the definition.

What is consequent upon the form is its inclination to an end or to action or to something else of this sort. For each thing acts insofar as it is in actuality, and it tends toward that which befits it, given its form. And this pertains to weight and order.

Hence, the nature of the good, insofar as it consists in perfection, likewise consists in mode, species, and order.

Reply to Objection 1: These three things follow upon *being* only insofar as it is perfect and thus good.

Reply to Objection 2: Mode, species, and order are called goods—as well as beings—not because they are, as it were, subsistent things, but because other things are both beings and good because of them. Hence, they themselves do not need to have some other things by virtue of which they are good. For they are called good not because they are formally good by virtue of other things, but because certain things are formally good by virtue of them. In the same way, whiteness is called a being not because it itself exists in some way, but rather because by virtue of it something exists in a qualified way, viz., as a white thing.

Reply to Objection 3: Every *esse* corresponds to some form. Thus, it is by virtue of the *esse* of a thing that mode, species, and order follow upon it. For instance, a man has a species, a mode, and an order insofar as he is a man; and, similarly, insofar as he is white, he likewise has a mode, a species, and an order; and insofar as he is virtuous, and insofar as he has knowledge, and so on for all the other things that are predicated of him.

Evil, on the other hand, is the privation of some *esse* or other, in the way that, say, blindness is the privation of the *esse* of sight. Hence, it does not destroy every mode, species, and order, but rather destroys only the mode, species, and order that follow upon the *esse* of sight.

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says in *De Natura Boni*, “Every mode, insofar as it is a mode, is good” (and one can say the same of species and order), “but a mode or a species or an order is called bad either because it is less than it ought to be or because it is not proportioned to the things it should be proportioned to; hence, they are called bad when they are out of place and incongruous.”

Reply to Objection 5: The nature of light is said to be without number, weight, and measure not absolutely speaking, but rather by comparison to corporeal things. For the power of light extends to all corporeal things insofar as it is an active quality of the first body that is an agent of change, viz., a celestial body.

Article 6

Is the good appropriately divided into the noble, the useful, and the pleasant?

It seems that the good is not appropriately divided into the noble (*honestum*), the useful (*utile*), and the pleasant (*delectabile*):

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says that *good* is divided into the ten categories. But the noble, the useful, and the pleasant are all found in just one category. Therefore, the good is not appropriately divided into them.

Objection 2: Every division is made by means of opposites. But the three things in question do not seem to be opposites. For noble things are pleasant; and, as Tully claims in *De Officiis*, nothing ignoble is useful (which would have to be the case if the division were being made by means of opposites in such a way that the noble and the useful were opposed). Therefore, the division in question is not appropriate.

Objection 3: Where one thing is for the sake of another, there is just a single thing. But the useful is good only for the sake of either the pleasant or the noble. Therefore, the useful should not be divided off from the pleasant and the noble.

But contrary to this: Ambrose uses this division of the good in *De Officiis*.

I respond: The division in question seems, properly speaking, to be a division of the human good. But even if we are considering a higher and more general notion of the good, this division seems to belong properly to the good insofar as it is good.

For something is good insofar as it is desirable and is the terminus of a movement of desire. The termination of such a movement can be thought of like the movement of a natural body. The movement of a natural body terminates, absolutely speaking, at the last point, but it also terminates, relatively speaking, at the middle point through which it passes on its way to the last point that terminates the movement. This middle point is called a terminus of the movement insofar as it terminates a part of the movement. And the last terminus of the movement can be understood in one of two ways: either (a) as the thing itself toward which the movement tends, e.g., a place or a form, or (b) as rest in that thing.

So, then, in a movement of desire, that which is desirable in such a way that it terminates the movement of desire, relatively speaking—that is, as a middle point through which it tends toward another—is called the *useful*.

On the other hand, that which is desired as the last point and wholly terminates the movement of desire as the thing toward which the desire tends *per se*, is called the *noble*. For what is called noble is that which is desired for its own sake (*per se*).

Lastly, that which terminates the movement of desire, in the sense of resting in the thing desired, is *pleasure*.

Reply to Objection 1: *Good* is divided into the ten categories insofar as it is identical in subject with *being*. However, the division under discussion belongs to it in accord with its proper nature.

Reply to Objection 2: The division in question is not by means of opposite things, but rather by means of opposed concepts. Still, the things that are properly called pleasant have no desirable character other than pleasure, since such things are sometimes harmful and ignoble. On the other hand, the things that are [properly] called useful have nothing desirable within themselves, but are desired only because they lead to other things—as, for example, ingesting bitter medicine. Lastly, the things that are [properly] called noble have within themselves something that is desirable.

Reply to Objection 3: The good is not divided into the three types in question as if it were something univocal predicated on a par of each of them. Rather, it is divided into them as something analogous that is predicated of them according to an ordering of the prior and the posterior. For the good is first predicated of the noble, then of the pleasant, and, thirdly, of the useful.

QUESTION 6

God's Goodness

Next we ask about God's goodness. And on this matter there are four questions: (1) Does it befit God to be good? (2) Is God the greatest good? (3) Is He alone good through His essence? (4) Are all things good by God's goodness?

Article 1

Does it befit God to be good?

It seems that it does not befit God to be good:

Objection 1: The nature of the good consists in mode, species, and order. But these do not seem to befit God. For God is immense and is not ordered to anything. Therefore, it does not befit God to be good.

Objection 2: The good is that which all things desire. But it is not the case that all things desire God; for not all things know Him, and nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore, it does not befit God to be good.

But contrary to this: Lamentations 3:25 says: "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeks Him."

I respond: It especially befits God to be good. For something is good to the extent that it is desirable. But each thing desires its own perfection, and the perfection and form of an effect is a certain likeness of the agent, since every agent effects what is similar to itself. Hence, the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of the good; for what is desired of it is that its likeness should be participated in. Therefore, since God is the first efficient cause of all things, it is clear that the nature of the good and the desirable befits Him. This is why in *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius attributes goodness to God as the first efficient cause, claiming that God is called good "insofar as all things subsist because of Him."

Reply to Objection 1: Having mode, species, and order pertains to the nature of caused goodness. By contrast, God's goodness is, as it were, the goodness in a cause; hence, it is His role to impose mode, species, and order on other things. Hence, these three things are in God as a cause.

Reply to Objection 2: In desiring their own proper perfections, all things desire God Himself insofar as the perfections of all things are certain likenesses of the divine *esse*—as was made clear above (q. 4, a. 3). And so of those things that desire God, some know Him in Himself (this is proper to the rational creature); others know some types of participation in His goodness (this includes sentient cognition as well); and others have a natural desire without cognition insofar as they are inclined to their ends by a higher knower.

Article 2

Is God the greatest good?

It seems that God is not the greatest good:

Objection 1: *Greatest good* adds something to *good*—otherwise, it would belong to every good thing. But everything that has something by addition is composite. Therefore, the highest good is composite. But, as was shown above (q. 3), God is maximally simple. Therefore, God is not the greatest good.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says, “The good is that which all things desire.” But nothing other than God, who is the end of all things, is such that all things desire it. Therefore, nothing other than God is good; this is also evident from Matthew 19:17 (“No one is good except God alone”). But ‘greatest’ is said in comparison with other things; for instance, something is said to have the greatest heat in comparison to other hot things. Therefore, God cannot be called the greatest good.

Objection 3: ‘Greatest’ implies a comparison. But things that do not belong to the same genus are not comparable; for example, it is not appropriate to say that sweetness is either greater or less than a line. Therefore, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 5), God does not belong to same genus as other good things, it seems that God cannot be called the greatest good in relation to them.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, “The Trinity of divine persons is the greatest good and is seen by the most purified minds.”

I respond: God is the greatest good, absolutely speaking, and not just the greatest good in some genus or order of things.

For, as has been explained (a. 1), *good* is attributed to God insofar as all desired perfections flow from Him as the first cause. But, as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 3), these perfections flow from Him not as a univocal cause, but rather as an agent who does not agree with His effects either in the nature of their species or in the nature of their genus (*neque in ratione speciei nec in ratione generis*). Now the likeness in the effect is found in exactly the same way in a univocal cause, whereas in an equivocal cause it is found in a more excellent way—for instance, heat exists in a more excellent way in the sun than it does in a fire. So, then, since goodness exists in God as the non-univocal first cause of all things, it must exist in Him in the most excellent way. And because of this He is called the greatest good.

Reply to Objection 1: *Greatest good* adds to *good* not any absolute entity, but merely a relation. And a relation that is predicated of God relative to creatures is a real entity in the creature but not in God; rather, in God it exists only conceptually. In the same way, what is knowable is predicated relative to the knowledge of it, not because it is related [by a real entity] to the knowledge, but because the knowledge is related to it. And so it is not necessary that there be any composition in the greatest good; rather, all that is necessary is that the other things fall short of it [in goodness].

Reply to Objection 2: When we say, “The good is what all things desire,” this should be understood to mean not that there is some single good that is desired by all things, but rather that whatever is desired has the nature of a good. On the other hand, when it is said that “No one is good but God alone,” it means “good through His essence.” This will be explained below (a. 3).

Reply to Objection 3: Things that are not in the same genus—if, that is, each is contained in a different genus—are in no way comparable. However, in the case of God, it is denied that He is in the same genus with other goods, not because He is in some other genus, but rather because He is outside of any genus and the principle of every genus. And so He can be compared to other things by the fact that He exceeds them. It is a comparison of this sort that *greatest good* implies.

Article 3

Is it proper to God alone to be good through His essence?

It seems that it is not proper to God alone to be good through His essence (*esse bonum per essentiam*):

Objection 1: As explained above (q. 5, a. 1), just as *one* is convertible with *being*, so too *good* is convertible with *being*. But, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 4, every entity is one

through its essence. Therefore, every entity is good through its essence.

Objection 2: If the good is what all things desire, then since *esse* itself is desired by all things, the very *esse* of each entity is its good. But each entity is a being (*ens*) through its essence. Therefore, each entity is good through its essence.

Objection 3: Every entity is good through its own goodness. Therefore, if some entity is not good through its essence, then it will have to be the case that its goodness is not its essence. Therefore, since this goodness itself is an entity, it must be good, and if it is good by yet another goodness, then the same question will be asked about that goodness. So either there will be an infinite regress or we will come to some goodness that is not good through another goodness. For this reason, then, we should have stopped with the very first goodness. It follows that each thing is good through its essence.

But contrary to this: In *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius says that all things other than God are good through participation. Therefore, they are not good through their essence.

I respond: God alone is good through His essence.

For each thing is called good to the extent that it is perfect, and there are three types of perfection a given entity might have. It has the first type insofar as it is constituted in its own *esse*; it has the second type insofar as certain accidents required for its complete operation are added to it; and it has the third type of perfection by virtue of the fact that it attains to something other than itself as an end. For example, in the case of fire the first type of perfection consists in its *esse*, which it has through its substantial form; the second type of perfection consists in its hotness, weightlessness, dryness, etc.; and it has the third type of perfection insofar as it finds rest in its proper place.

Now these three types of perfection belong to no created entity through its essence, but only to God. For God alone is such that His essence is His *esse*. Again, no accidents are added to Him; instead, as is clear from what was said above (q. 3, a. 6), things predicated of other entities as accidents belong to Him essentially, e.g., being powerful, wise, etc. Moreover, He is not ordered to anything other than Himself as an end; rather, He Himself is the ultimate end of all things.

Hence, it is clear that God alone has every type of perfection by virtue of His essence. And so He alone is good through His essence.

Reply to Objection 1: *One* does not connote the nature of perfection, but only the nature of undividedness, which belongs to each thing by virtue of its essence. Now the essences of simple entities are undivided both in actuality and in potentiality, whereas the essences of composite entities are undivided only in actuality. And so each entity must be one through its essence, but, as has been shown, not good through its essence.

Reply to Objection 2: Even though each thing is good insofar as it has *esse*, the essence of a created entity is nevertheless not its very *esse*. And so it does not follow that a created entity is good through its essence.

Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of a created entity is not its very essence, but something added to its essence, viz., either (a) its very *esse*, or (b) some added perfection, or (c) its being ordered to an end.

And even though the goodness added in any of these ways is itself called good in the same way that it is called an entity, still, it is called an entity because it is something and not because it is something by some other thing. Hence, it is called good because it is something good and not because it has some other goodness by which it is good.

Article 4

Are all things good by God's goodness?

It seems that all things are good by God's goodness:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “*This* good and *that* good—take away the *this* and the *that* and look at the good itself, if you can. Then you will see God, who is not good by any other good, but is the good of all good.” But each thing is good by its own goodness. Therefore, each thing is good by the very goodness that is God.

Objection 2: As Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, all things are called good insofar as they are ordered to God, and this by reason of God's goodness. Therefore, all things are good by God's goodness.

But contrary to this: All things are good insofar as they exist. But every entity is called an entity through its own proper *esse* and not through God's *esse*. Therefore, every being is called good by its own proper goodness and not by God's goodness.

I respond: In the case of that which connotes a relation, nothing prevents a thing from being denominated extrinsically. For instance, a thing that is located in a given place is denominated by that place, and a thing that is measured is denominated by the measure.

By contrast, in the case of that which is predicated non-relationally (*absolute*), there are different opinions.

Plato claimed that the species of all entities are separate, and that the individuals are denominated by them in virtue of participating, as it were, in the separated species. So, for instance, Socrates is called a man by virtue of the separated idea *man*. And just as Plato posited the separated ideas *man* and *horse*, which he called ‘man *per se*’ and ‘horse *per se*’, so too he posited a separated idea *being* and a separated idea *one*, which he called ‘being *per se*’ and ‘one *per se*’, and each thing is called a being or one in virtue of its participation in those ideas. But that which is good *per se* and one *per se* he claimed to be the most high God, in virtue of whom all things are called good by way of participation.

Now even though, as Aristotle proved in many ways, this view seems unreasonable in positing separated species, subsisting *per se*, for natural things, still, as is clear from what was said above (q. 2, a. 3), this much is absolutely true: There is some one thing that is good through its essence, which we call God. Even Aristotle agreed with this claim.

Therefore, as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 3), each entity can be called good and a being in virtue of the first being—which is good and a being through its essence—insofar as the entity participates, even if remotely and deficiently, in that first being by way of some sort of assimilation. In this sense, then, each thing is called good by God's goodness insofar as He is the first exemplary, efficient, and final principle of all goodness.

Nonetheless, each thing is called good by a likeness of God's goodness that inheres in it and formally constitutes the goodness that denominates it.

And so it is the case both (a) that there is a single goodness of all things and also (b) that there are many goodnesses.

Reply to Objections 1 and 2: The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 7

God's Infinity

Having examined God's perfection, we must now examine His infinity (question 7) and His existence in all things (question 8). For it is insofar as God is uncircumscribable and infinite that it is attributed to Him that He is everywhere and in all things.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is God infinite? (2) Is anything besides Him infinite in its essence (*infinitum secundum essentiam*)? (3) Can anything be infinite in magnitude? (4) Can there be an infinite multitude of things?

Article 1

Is God infinite?

It seems that God is not infinite:

Objection 1: Anything infinite is imperfect, since, as *Physics* 3 says, it has the nature of a part and of matter. But God is utterly perfect. Therefore, He is not infinite.

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 1, *finite* and *infinite* belong to [the genus of] quantity. But there is no quantity in God, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 1), He is not a body. Therefore, being infinite does not belong to Him.

Objection 3: Whatever is *here* in such a way that it is not somewhere else is finite with respect to place. Therefore, whatever is *this* in such a way that it is not something else is finite with respect to substance. But God is *this* and not something else; for instance, He is not a rock or a piece of wood. Therefore, God is not infinite with respect to substance.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, "God is infinite and eternal and uncircumscribable."

I respond: According to *Physics* 3, all the ancient philosophers attribute infinity to the first principle—and reasonably so—arguing that entities flow from the first principle *ad infinitum*.

However, the fact that some of them were in error about the nature of the first principle led them to err about His infinity. For they thought that the first principle is matter, and as a result they attributed material infinity to the first principle, claiming that the first principle of things is an infinite body.

Note, therefore, that something is called infinite in virtue of the fact that it is not limited. But matter is in a certain way limited by form, and form is in a certain way limited by matter. Specifically, matter is limited by form in the sense that before it receives a form, matter is in potentiality with respect to many forms, whereas once it receives a single form, it is limited by that form. Form, on the other hand, is limited by matter in the sense that a form, considered in itself, is common to many things, but once it is received in matter, it becomes determinately the form of just this thing.

Now matter is perfected by the form through which it is limited, and so infinity, as attributed to matter, has the nature of an imperfection; for it is, as it were, matter without form.

By contrast, a form is not perfected by matter; instead, its scope is contracted by the matter. Hence, infinity, as attributed to a form not determined by matter, has the nature of perfection. But, as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 1), that which is the most formal of all things is *esse* itself. Therefore, since God's *esse* is not received in anything, and since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), He is His own subsistent *esse*, it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.

Reply to Objection 1: The reply to this objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: The terminus of a quantity is like a form of the quantity. A sign of this is that shape, which consists in the termination of a quantity, is a certain form with respect to quantity. Hence, the type of infinity that belongs to quantity is an infinity on the part of the matter and, as has been

explained, this type of infinity is not attributed to God.

Reply to Objection 3: God's *esse* is distinct from all other things, and all other things are distinct from it, by the very fact that it is subsistent *per se* and not received in anything (which is why it is called infinite). In the same way, if there were a subsistent whiteness, then by the very fact that it did not exist in another, it would differ from every whiteness that exists in a subject.

Article 2

Can anything other than God be infinite through its essence?

It seems that something other than God can be infinite through its essence (*infinitum per essentiam*):

Objection 1: The power of an entity is proportionate to its essence. Therefore, if God's essence is infinite, then His power must be infinite. Therefore, He can produce an infinite effect, since the quantity of an entity's power is known from its effect.

Objection 2: Whatever has infinite power has an infinite essence. But a created intellect has infinite power, since it apprehends the universal, which can extend to infinitely many singulars. Therefore, every created intellectual substance is infinite.

Objection 3: As was shown above (q. 3, a. 8), primary matter is distinct from God. But primary matter is infinite. Therefore, something besides God can be infinite.

But contrary to this: As *Physics* 3 explains, what is infinite cannot come from any principle. But everything that is distinct from God comes from God as a first principle. Therefore, nothing other than God can be infinite.

I respond: Something other than God can be infinite in a certain respect (*secundum quid*), but not absolutely speaking (*non simpliciter*).

For if we are speaking of infinity insofar as it belongs to matter, then it is clear that everything existing in actuality has some form or other, and so the matter is terminated through its form. But insofar as it exists under a substantial form, the matter remains in potentiality with respect to many accidental forms. For this reason, though it is finite, absolutely speaking, it can be infinite in a certain respect. For example, a piece of wood is finite by virtue of its form, but it is nonetheless infinite in a certain respect, since it is in potentiality with respect to infinitely many shapes.

On the other hand, if we are speaking of infinity insofar as it belongs to form, then it is clear that things whose forms exist in matter are finite, absolutely speaking, and not infinite in any way at all. However, if there are created forms that are not received in matter but instead subsist *per se*—as some believe with respect to angels—then they will indeed be infinite in a certain respect, insofar as forms of this sort are neither terminated nor limited by any matter. Still, because a created form that subsists in this way has *esse* and is not its own *esse*, its *esse* must be received in and limited to a determinate nature. Hence, it cannot be infinite absolutely speaking.

Reply to Objection 1: It is contrary to the nature of an entity that is produced that the entity's essence should be its very *esse*. For subsistent *esse* is not created *esse*. Hence, it is contrary to the nature of something that is produced that it should be infinite, absolutely speaking. So just as God, even though He has infinite power, cannot produce something that is not produced (for this would be for contradictories to be true at the same time), so too He cannot produce something that is absolutely infinite.

Reply to Objection 2: The fact that the intellect's power extends in some sense to infinitely many

things stems from the fact that the intellect is a form that does not exist in matter, but is either (a) totally separate from matter, as in the case of the substances of angels, or at least (b) an intellectual power that is not the act of any [corporeal] organ, as in the case of an intellectual soul that is conjoined to a body.

Reply to Objection 3: Primary matter does not exist in reality by itself, since it is not a being in actuality, but is instead a being merely in potentiality. Hence, it is something that is co-created (*aliquid concreatum*) rather than created. Still, even with respect to potentiality, primary matter is infinite only relatively speaking and not absolutely. For its potentiality extends only to natural forms.

Article 3

Can anything be actually infinite in magnitude?

It seems that something can be actually infinite in magnitude (*infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem*):

Objection 1: In the mathematical sciences there is no falsity, since, as *Physics* 2 says, “there is no falsehood among abstract things.” But the mathematical sciences make use of infinite magnitude; for instance, in his demonstrations the geometer says, “Let such-and-such a line be infinite.” Therefore, it is not impossible for something to be infinite in magnitude.

Objection 2: If something is not contrary to a given nature, then it is not impossible for it to belong to that nature. But to be infinite is not contrary to the nature of magnitude; to the contrary, *finite* and *infinite* seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore, it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.

Objection 3: A magnitude is infinitely divisible, since, as is clear from *Physics* 3, a continuous thing is defined as that which is divisible *ad infinitum*. But contraries are apt to be effected with respect to the same thing. Therefore, since addition is opposed to division, and since increase is opposed to decrease, it seems that a magnitude can increase *ad infinitum*. Therefore, it is possible for there to be an infinite magnitude.

Objection 4: As *Physics* 4 says, movement and time have quantity and continuity from the magnitude over which the movement passes. But it is not contrary to the nature of time and movement that they be infinite, since any designated indivisible contained in time or in a circular movement is both a beginning point and an endpoint. Therefore, neither will it be contrary to the nature of a magnitude that it be infinite.

But contrary to this: Each body has a surface. But each body that has a surface is finite, since a surface is the terminus of a finite body. Therefore, each body is finite. And the same thing that is said of a surface can also be said of a line. Therefore, nothing is infinite in magnitude.

I respond: Being infinite in essence (*infinitum secundum essentiam*) is different from being infinite in magnitude (*infinitum secundum magnitudinem*). For even if a body—say, fire or air—were infinite in magnitude, it would still not be infinite in essence, since its essence would be limited to some species by its form and to some individual by its matter.

And so, assuming on the basis of what has been said (a. 2) that no creature is infinite in essence, we still need to ask whether any creature might be infinite in magnitude.

Note that the notion of a body, i.e., a complete magnitude, can be taken in two ways—viz., (a) *mathematically*, in which case only its quantity is considered, or (b) *naturally*, in which case its matter and form are considered.

As far as a *natural* body is concerned, it is clear that no body can be actually infinite. For each

natural body has a determinate substantial form, and since its accidents follow upon its substantial form, it must be that determinate accidents follow upon a determinate form. And among these accidents is quantity. Hence, each natural body has a greater or lesser determinate quantity. Hence, it is impossible for any natural body to be infinite.

This is also clear from movement (*ex motu*). Each natural body has a natural movement. But an infinite body could not have any natural movement:

(a) It could not have natural movement along a straight line, since nothing moves naturally with a straight movement except when it goes beyond its own place. But this could not happen with an infinite body, since it would occupy all places, and so every place would equally be its own place.

(b) Nor, likewise, could an infinite body have a circular movement. For in a circular movement it has to be the case that one part of the body is transferred to a place where another part previously was. But if we posit an infinite circular body, then this would not be possible. For two lines protracted from the center [of the body] become more and more distant from each other as they are protracted farther and farther from the center. So if the body in question were infinite, the lines would be infinitely distant from one another and, as a result, the one line could never arrive at the place of the other.

The same argument holds in the case of a *mathematical* body as well. For if we are to imagine a mathematical body existing in actuality, then we must imagine it as existing under some form, since nothing is actual except through a form. Hence, since the form of a body with quantity (*forma quanti*) as such is a shape, the body will have to have some shape. And so it will be finite, since a shape is that which is circumscribed by a limit or limits.

Reply to Objection 1: The geometer does not need to assume that any line is actually infinite. Rather, what he needs to do is to posit some actually finite line from which he can take however much he requires. And this he calls an infinite line.

Reply to Objection 2: Even though *infinite* is not contrary to the general nature of magnitude, it is nonetheless contrary to the nature of each of the species of magnitude—that is, it is contrary to the nature of a two-cubit magnitude or a three-cubit magnitude, etc., whether that magnitude be circular or triangular, etc. But a genus cannot contain anything that is not contained in any of its species. Hence, it is impossible for there to be any infinite magnitude, since none of the species of magnitude is infinite.

Reply to Objection 3: As has been said (a. 1), *infinite* as applied to quantity is taken from the matter. By the division of a whole one ends up with matter, since the parts are related to one another in the nature of matter. Through addition, on the other hand, one ends up with [another actual] whole, which is related to the nature of form. And so the infinite is found not in the addition of magnitude, but only in its division.

Reply to Objection 4: Movement and time are actual not as wholes, but successively. Hence, they have potentiality mixed in with their actuality. By contrast, a magnitude is an actual whole. And so *infinite* as applied to quantity and taken from the matter is incompatible with a whole magnitude, but not with the whole composed of time or movement. For existing in potentiality belongs to matter.

Article 4

Can there be an actual infinite multitude of things?

It seems that it is possible for there to be an actual infinite multitude (*possibile sit esse multitudinem infinitam secundum actum*):

Objection 1: It is not impossible for that which exists in potentiality to be brought into actuality.

But number can be increased to infinity. Therefore, it is not impossible for there to be an actual infinite multitude.

Objection 2: Any given species is such that it is possible for there to be an actual individual [of that species]. But there are infinitely many species of shape. Therefore, it is possible for there to be infinitely many shapes existing in actuality.

Objection 3: Things that are not opposed to one another do not impede one another. But, given any fixed multitude of things, there can be still other things not opposed to them. Therefore, it is not impossible for some further things to exist simultaneously with them, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, it is possible for there to be infinitely many actual things.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 11:21 says, “You have ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.”

I respond: On this matter there have been two opinions.

Some, like Avicenna and Al-Ghazali, have claimed that it is impossible for there to be an actual infinite multitude of things *per se*, but that it is not impossible for there to be an infinite multitude *per accidens*.

A multitude is said to be infinite *per se* when something requires for its existence that there be an infinite multitude. And this is impossible, since if it were possible, then something would have to depend for its generation on infinitely many things, and thus the generation would never be completed, since it is impossible to traverse an infinite multitude.

On the other hand, a multitude is said to be infinite *per accidens* when an infinite multitude is not required for anything, but instead it is incidental that there should be such a multitude.

This can be made clear from a carpenter’s work, for which a certain multitude is required *per se*—e.g., the skill existing in the carpenter’s soul, the movement of his hands, and the hammer. If such things were multiplied to infinity, then the carpenter’s construction would never be completed, because it would depend on infinitely many causes. But the number of hammers that might result from one being broken and another being taken up is a *per accidens* multitude. For the carpenter could work with many different hammers, and it would make no difference whether he worked with one or two or more—or even infinitely many if he worked for an infinite stretch of time.

On the basis of this line of reasoning, then, they claimed that it is possible for there to be an actual infinite multitude of things *per accidens*.

But this is impossible. For every multitude must be contained under some species of multitude, and the species of multitude correspond to the species of number. But no species of number is infinite, since each number is such that it is a multitude measured by the unit. Hence, it is impossible for there to be an actual infinite multitude, whether it be *per se* or *per accidens*.

Likewise, the multitude of things existing in nature is created, and every created entity is included within some fixed intention of the creator, since an agent does nothing in vain. Hence, all created things are included under a set number (*sub certo numero omnia creata comprehendantur*). Therefore, it is impossible for there to be an actual infinite multitude, even *per accidens*.

However, it is indeed possible for there to be an infinite multitude in potentiality, since an increase in multitude is consequent upon the division of a magnitude. For the more something is divided, the greater the number of things that result. Hence, just as the infinite is found in potentiality in the division of a continuous thing—since, as was shown above (a. 3), such a division proceeds in the direction of the matter—so too for the same reason the infinite is found in potentiality in the addition of a multitude.

Reply to Objection 1: Each thing that exists in potentiality is brought into actuality in a way that accords with the mode of its being. For example, a day is brought into actuality not as a simultaneous whole, but instead successively; and, similarly, an infinite multitude is brought into actuality not as a

simultaneous whole, but successively. For given any multitude, another multitude can be added, *ad infinitum*.

Reply to Objection 2: The species of shape have infinity from the infinity of number. For the species of shape are the trilateral, the quadrilateral, and so on. Hence, just as a denumerable infinite multitude is not brought into actuality as a simultaneous whole, so neither is a multitude of shapes.

Reply to Objection 3: Even though, with certain things posited, the positing of other things is not opposed to them, still, for infinitely many things to be posited is in fact opposed to every species of multitude. Hence, it is not possible for there to be any actual infinite magnitude.

QUESTION 8

God's Existence in Things

Since it seems to belong to what is infinite that it should exist everywhere and in all things, we have to ask whether this is true of God. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does God exist in all things? (2) Is God everywhere? (3) Is God everywhere by His essence, power, and presence? (4) Is being everywhere proper to God alone?

Article 1

Does God exist in all things?

It seems that God does not exist in all things:

Objection 1: That which is above all things does not exist in all things. But according to Psalm 112:4 (“The Lord is high above all nations, etc.”), God is above all things. Therefore, God does not exist in all things.

Objection 2: That which exists in something is contained by that thing. But God is not contained by things; rather, He contains things. Therefore, God does not exist in things; rather, things exist in Him. This is why in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “[It is better to say that] all things are in Him than that He is everywhere.”

Objection 3: An agent is more powerful to the extent that its action reaches out to a greater distance. But God is the most powerful of agents. Therefore, His action can reach even to those things that are distant from Him, and so He does not have to exist in all things.

Objection 4: The demons are certain things. Yet God does not exist in the demons, since, as 2 Corinthians 6:14 says, light has no fellowship with darkness. Therefore, God does not exist in all things.

But contrary to this: A thing exists wherever it operates. But God operates in all things—this according to Isaiah 26:12 (“For You have wrought all our works in us, Lord”). Therefore God exists in all things.

I respond: God exists in all things—not, to be sure, as a part of their essence or as an accident, but in the way an agent is present in that which it acts on.

For every agent must be conjoined to that which it directly acts on, and it must touch that thing by its power. This is how *Physics* 7 proves that what moves and what is moved must exist together. Now since God is *esse* itself through His essence, created *esse* must be His proper effect, in the same way that fire’s proper effect is to ignite. And God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to exist, but also for as long as they are conserved in *esse*—just as the sun causes light in the air for as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore, for as long as a thing has *esse*, God must be present to it in a way befitting the *esse* it has. But *esse* is that which is most intimate to any given thing and that which is in all things most deeply (*illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet et quod profundius omnibus inest*). For, as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 1), *esse* is formal with respect to everything that exists within a given entity. Hence, it must be the case that God exists within all things and intimately so.

Reply to Objection 1: God is above all things because of the excellence of His nature, and yet, as was just explained, He exists in all things insofar as He causes the *esse* of all things.

Reply to Objection 2: Even though corporeal entities are said to exist in something as that which contains them, spiritual entities contain those things in which they exist, in the way that the soul contains the body. Hence, God, too, exists in things as that which contains them. Still, by a certain analogy with corporeal entities, all things are said to exist in God insofar as they are contained by Him.

Reply to Objection 3: Regardless of how powerful an agent is, its action extends to a distant thing only insofar as it acts on that thing through some medium. But it pertains to God's maximal power that he acts immediately in all things. Hence, nothing is distant from Him in the sense that it does not have God within itself. Still, things are said to be distant from God because of a dissimilarity in nature or grace, just as He Himself is indeed above all things because of the excellence of His nature.

Reply to Objection 4: In the case of the demons, one may consider both their nature, which is from God, and the deformity of sin, which is not from Him. And so one should concede that God exists in the demons—not absolutely speaking, but with the qualification that He exists in them insofar as they are certain entities. By contrast, in the case of things which bespeak an undeformed nature, one should say that God exists in them absolutely speaking.

Article 2

Is God everywhere?

It seems that God is not everywhere (*non sit ubique*):

Objection 1: *To be everywhere* signifies being in every place. But it does not befit God to be in every place, since it does not befit Him to be in a place; for, as Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, incorporeal beings do not exist in a place. Therefore, God is not everywhere.

Objection 2: Place is related to permanent entities as time is related to successive entities. But an indivisible unit of action or movement cannot exist at different times. Therefore, an indivisible unit in the genus of permanent things cannot exist in all places. But to be divine is to be a permanent entity and not a successive entity. Therefore, God cannot exist in more than one place. And so He is not everywhere.

Objection 3: That which exists as a whole in a given place is such that nothing of it exists outside that place. But if God exists in some given place, then He is wholly there, since He does not have parts. Therefore, nothing of Him exists outside that place. Therefore, God is not everywhere.

But contrary to this: Jeremiah 23:24 says, "Do not I fill heaven and earth?"

I respond: Since a place is a certain entity, there are two ways in which a thing can be understood to be in a place. Either (a) it is in a place in the manner of other things (i.e., corresponding to one of the ways in which one thing is said to exist in other things), as the accidents of a given place exist in that place; or (b) it is in a place in the mode proper to a place, as are the things that are located in the place.

Now in a certain sense it is in both of these ways that God is in every place—which is what it is to be everywhere.

In the first way, just as He is in all things insofar as He gives them their *esse*, power, and operation, so too He is in every place insofar as He gives that place its *esse* and locative power.

Second, things are located in a place insofar as they fill that place, and God fills every place. He does not do this in the way a body does, since a body is said to fill a place insofar as another body is incompatible with it in that place, whereas the fact that God is in a given place does not exclude other things from being there. Rather, God fills all places by the fact that He gives *esse* to all the located things that fill all the places.

Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal things are in a place not through a contact of dimensional quantity, in the way that bodies are, but instead through a contact of power.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two kinds of indivisibles.

One kind is the terminus of a continuous thing, such as a point in the case of permanent entities and

a moment in the case of successive entities. And because, in the case of permanent entities, this sort of indivisible has a determinate position, it cannot be in many parts of a place or in many places. The same thing holds for an indivisible with respect to action or movement. Since it occurs within a determinate ordering in the movement or action, it cannot exist in more than one part of time.

On the other hand, the second type of indivisible is such that it is outside the whole genus of continuous things. And this is the sense in which incorporeal substances such as God, an angel, and a soul are said to be indivisible. This sort of indivisible is related to a continuous thing not as a part of it, but rather insofar as it touches it by its power. Hence, such an individual is in one place or many, and in a small place or a large one, insofar as its power can extend to one or many places and to a small place or a large one.

Reply to Objection 3: *Whole* is predicated relative to *part*. However, there are two types of parts: (a) parts of an *essence*, in the way that the form and the matter are called parts of a composite, and in the way that the genus and the difference are called parts of the species; and (b) parts of a *quantity*, viz., the parts into which a quantity is divided.

That which is a whole in a given place by a totality of quantity cannot [at the same time] be outside that place. For the quantity of a located body is commensurate with the quantity of the place, and so there is no totality of quantity unless there is a totality of place.

On the other hand, a totality of essence is not commensurate with the totality of the place. Hence, that which is a whole in a given place by a totality of essence is not such that it does not exist in any way outside that place.

This distinction is apparent in the case of those accidental forms that have quantity insofar as they are accidents. For if a whiteness is taken as a totality of essence, then it is a whole in each part of the surface, since the complete nature of its species is found in each part of the surface; on the other hand, if it is taken as a totality of quantity—which it is *per accidens*—then it is not a whole in each part of the surface.

In incorporeal substances, however, there is no totality—either *per se* or *per accidens*—except the complete nature of the essence. And so, in the same way that a soul exists as a whole in each part of a body, so too God exists as a whole in each and every place.

Article 3

Is God everywhere by His essence, presence, and power?

It seems that when God is said to be in all things by His essence, presence, and power, the modes of God's existence in things are mistakenly designated:

Objection 1: That which is in something by its essence is essentially in it. But God is not in things essentially, since He is not part of the essence of any entity. Therefore, it should not be said that God is in things by His essence, presence, and power.

Objection 2: To be present to a given thing is to be not absent from it. But for God to be in things by His essence is precisely this, viz., that He is not absent from anything. Therefore, God's existing in all things by His essence is the same as His existing in all things by His presence. Therefore, it is redundant to say that God is in all things by His essence, presence, and power.

Objection 3: Just as God is a principle of all things by His power, so too He is a principle of all things by His knowledge and will. But God is not said to be in things by His knowledge and will. Therefore, He should not be said to be in all things by His power.

Objection 4: Just as grace is a certain perfection added to the substance of an entity, so too there are many other added perfections. Therefore, if God is said to be in certain things in a special way by grace, it seems that a special mode of God's existence in things should be assigned for every perfection whatsoever.

But contrary to this: In his commentary on the Cantic of Canticles, Gregory says, "While God is in all things in a general way by His presence, power, and substance, He is said to be in some entities in a more intimate way by grace."

I respond: There are two ways in which God is said to be in a given entity.

In the first way, He is in a thing as an agent cause, and in this way He is in all the things created by Him.

In the second way, He is in a thing in the way that an object of an operation exists in the one who is acting. This mode is proper to the operations of the soul, in the way that what is known exists in the knower and what is desired exists in the one who desires. In this second way God exists in a special sense in a rational creature who knows and loves Him either actually or habitually. And since, as will become clear below (q. 43, a. 3), a rational creature has this condition by grace, it is in this way that God is said to be in the saints by *grace*.

But the question of how it is with regard to the other things created by Him should be looked at by way of a comparison with what we say about human affairs. For a king is said to be in his entire kingdom by his power, even though he is not present everywhere. On the other hand, something is said to be in all things by its presence when those things are within its purview. For example, all the things in a given house are said to be present to someone, even though he is not in every part of the house by his substance. Again, something is said to be in a place by its substance or essence when its substance is there in that place.

Thus, there were some—viz., the Manicheans—who claimed that spiritual and incorporeal entities are subject to God's power, whereas they claimed that visible and corporeal things are subject to the power of a contrary principle. Against them, then, one should say that God is in all things by His *power*.

Again, there were others who, even though they believed that God is in all things by his power, nonetheless did not extend divine providence all the way to the lower bodies here below. Job 22:14 says on their behalf, "He walks about the poles of heaven, and He does not consider our things." And against these, one should claim that God is in all things by His *presence*.

There were still others who, even though they acknowledged that God's providence extends to all things, nonetheless held that not all things are immediately created by God, but that instead He immediately created the first creatures and that these first creatures created the others. And against these one should say that He is in all things by His *essence*.

So, then, He is in all things by His power insofar as all things are subject to His power. He is in all things by His presence insofar as all things are bare and open to His eyes. He is in all things by His essence insofar as He is the cause of being for all things, as has been explained (a. 1).

Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be in all things by essence—not, to be sure, by the essence of the things, as if He were part of the essence of the things, but by *His own* essence, since, as has been explained (a. 1), His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.

Reply to Objection 2: One thing is said to be present to another to the extent that the latter falls within its purview, even if, as has been explained, it is far removed from that thing according to its substance [or essence]. Therefore, it is necessary to posit two modes, viz., by essence and by presence.

Reply to Objection 3: The nature of knowing and willing are such that what is known exists in the one who knows and what is willed exists in the one who wills. Hence, when it comes to knowing and willing, things exist in God rather than God in things. By contrast, the nature of power is such that it is a

principle of acting on another. Hence, when it comes to power, the agent is related and applied to an exterior thing. And this is why the agent can be said to be in the other by its power.

Reply to Objection 4: Other than grace, there is no perfection added to a substance that makes God exist in another as an object that is known and loved. And so grace alone effects a special mode of God's existing in things. However, there is yet another special mode, by which God exists in a man through *union*. This mode will be discussed in its own place (*ST* 3, q. 2).

Article 4

Is it peculiar to God to be everywhere?

It seems that it is not peculiar to God to be everywhere:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher, a universal is everywhere and always, and primary matter is likewise everywhere, since it exists in all bodies. Neither of these is God, as is clear from what has been said (q. 3, aa. 5 and 8). Therefore, it is not peculiar to God to be everywhere.

Objection 2: Number exists in the things that are numbered. But, as is clear from Wisdom 11:21, the whole universe is constituted in number. Therefore, there is some number that exists in the whole universe and thus is everywhere.

Objection 3: According to *On the Heavens and the World* 1, the entire universe is a sort of whole and complete body. But the entire universe is everywhere, since there is no place outside of it. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is everywhere.

Objection 4: If there were an infinite body, there would be no place outside of it. Therefore, it would be everywhere. So it does not seem peculiar to God to be everywhere.

Objection 5: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 6, "the soul is a whole in the whole body and a whole in each part of it." Therefore, if there were nothing in the world except a single animal, then the soul of that animal would be everywhere. And so it is not peculiar to God to be everywhere.

Objection 6: As Augustine says in his letter *Ad Volusianum*, "Wherever the soul sees, there it senses; and wherever it senses, there it lives; and wherever it lives, there it exists." But the soul sees everywhere, as it were, since it sees in succession the whole of the heavens. Therefore, the soul is everywhere.

But contrary to this: In *De Spiritu Sancto* Ambrose says, "Who would dare call the Holy Spirit a creature, given that He exists in all things and everywhere and always—which is peculiar to the divine nature?"

I respond: It is peculiar to God to be everywhere primarily and *per se*.

When I say "to be everywhere primarily," I mean that He is everywhere according to Himself as a whole. If something were everywhere in such a way that diverse parts of it existed in different places, then it would not be everywhere primarily. For being everywhere would belong to it by reason of its parts and not primarily. In the same way, if a man is white with respect to his teeth, the whiteness does not belong primarily to the man, but instead belongs primarily to his teeth.

When I say "to be everywhere *per se*," I mean that being everywhere does not belong to Him *per accidens*, in light of some assumption that is being made. For in this latter sense a millet grain would be everywhere on the assumption that no other body existed. Therefore, being everywhere *per se* belongs to something when that thing is such that, given any assumption whatsoever, it exists everywhere. And this belongs solely to God. For no matter how many places are posited—even if one posited infinitely many places over and beyond those that in fact exist—God would have to exist in all of them, since nothing

can exist except through Him.

So, then, it belongs to God to be everywhere primarily and *per se*, and this belongs to Him alone. For no matter how many places are posited, God has to exist in each of them, not with some part of Himself, but according to Himself [as a whole].

Reply to Objection 1: Universals and primary matter are, to be sure, everywhere, but they are not everywhere with the same *esse*.

Reply to Objection 2: Since number is an accident, it is in a place *per accidens* and not *per se*. Nor is it a whole in each of the things that is numbered; rather, number is in them through its parts. And so it does not follow that it is everywhere *per se* and primarily.

Reply to Objection 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not everywhere primarily, since it is not a whole in each place; rather, it exists in each place through its parts. Again, it is not everywhere *per se*, since if other places were posited, it would not exist in them.

Reply to Objection 4: If there were an infinite body, it would exist everywhere, but it would do so through its parts.

Reply to Objection 5: If there were just a single animal, its soul would indeed be everywhere primarily, but *per accidens*.

Reply to Objection 6: When the soul is said to see somewhere, this can be understood in two ways:

In one way, insofar as the adverb 'somewhere' determines the act of seeing as an object. And in this sense it is true that when one looks at the heavens one sees 'in' the heavens and likewise senses 'in' the heavens. But it does not follow that one lives or exists in the heavens, since to live or to exist does not involve a *transeunt* action on an exterior object.

In the second way, it can be understood insofar as the adverb determines the act of the one who sees in the sense that it goes forth from the one who sees. Accordingly, it is true that the soul exists and lives where it senses and sees, given that way of speaking. And so it does not follow that it exists everywhere.

QUESTION 9

God's Immutability

The next things to consider are God's immutability (question 9) and His eternity, which follows from His immutability (question 10).

As for immutability, there are two questions to be asked: (1) Is God altogether immutable? (2) Is it peculiar to God to be immutable?

Article 1

Is God altogether immutable?

It seems that God is not altogether immutable (*omnino immutabilis*):

Objection 1: Whatever moves itself is in some sense mutable. But, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8, "The Spirit creator moves Himself, but neither through time nor through space." Therefore, God is in some sense mutable.

Objection 2: Wisdom 7:24 says of wisdom that it is "more active than all active things." But God is wisdom itself. Therefore, God is moveable.

Objection 3: 'To come closer' and 'to go farther away' signify movement. But things of this sort are said of God in Scripture (James 4:8: "Draw near to God, and He will draw near to you"). Therefore, God is mutable.

But contrary to this: Malachy 3:6 says, "I am the Lord, and I change not."

I respond: On the basis of what has already been said, it can be shown that God is altogether immutable.

First, it was shown above (q. 2, a. 3 and q. 3, a. 1) that there is a first being that we call God, and that a first being of this sort must be pure actuality without the admixture of any potentiality, since potentiality is posterior in an absolute sense to actuality. But anything that changes in any way is in some sense in potentiality. From this it is clear that it is impossible for God to be changed in any way.

Second, everything that is moved is such that it stays the same with respect to something and undergoes a transition with respect to something else. For instance, that which is moved from whiteness to blackness stays the same with respect to its substance. And so in each thing that is moved some sort of composition is present. However, it was shown above (q. 3, a. 7) that there is no composition in God, but that instead He is altogether simple. Hence, it is clear that He cannot be moved.

Third, everything that is moved acquires something by its movement, and it attains to something that it did not attain to beforehand. But since God is infinite, including within Himself the fullness of the perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything or attain to anything that He did not attain to beforehand. Hence, there is no way in which movement befits God.

And so it is that certain of the ancients—compelled, as it were, by the truth itself—held that the first principle of being is unmoveable (*immobile*).

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is here speaking in the manner of Plato, who claimed that the first mover moves itself because he was calling every operation a 'movement'. In this manner of speaking, even understanding and willing and loving are themselves movements. Thus, since God understands and loves Himself, they claimed accordingly that God moves Himself, but not in the sense in which movement and change belong to something that exists in potentiality—as we ourselves are now speaking of change and movement.

Reply to objection 2: Wisdom is called moveable metaphorically because it diffuses its likeness even to the least of things. For there cannot be anything that does not proceed, through a certain

imitation, from God's wisdom as a first effective and formal principle—in the way that artifacts proceed from the wisdom of the craftsman.

So, then, because the likeness of God's wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which have a greater participation in His likeness, all the way to the lowest things, which have a lesser participation, God's wisdom is said to have a 'procession' and 'movement' toward those things—just as if we were to say that the sun proceeds toward the earth because the rays of its light reach all the way to the earth. This is how Dionysius explains it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, when he says, "Every procession of God's manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of lights."

Reply to objection 3: Things of this sort are metaphorically predicated of God in the Scriptures. For just as the sun is said to enter a house or leave it to the extent that its rays reach the house, so, too, God is said to approach us or recede from us to the extent that we perceive the influence of His goodness or withdraw from Him.

Article 2

Is it peculiar to God to be immutable?

It seems that it is not peculiar to God to be immutable:

Objection 1: In *Metaphysics* 2 the Philosopher says that there is matter in everything that is moved. But, as is evident to some, certain created substances, such as angels and souls, do not have matter. Therefore, it is not peculiar to God to be immutable.

Objection 2: Everything that is moved is moved for the sake of some end, and so if it has already attained its final end, it is no longer moved. But some creatures, e.g., all the blessed in heaven, have already attained their ultimate end. Therefore, some creatures are unmoveable.

Objection 3: Everything that is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for the book *Sex Principia* says, "A form consists in a simple and invariable essence." Therefore, it is not peculiar to God alone to be immutable.

But contrary to this: In *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, "Only God is immutable, whereas the things He has made are mutable because they come from nothing."

I respond: Only God is altogether immutable, whereas every creature is mutable in some way or other. Now notice that something can be called 'mutable' in one of two ways: first, because of a potentiality (*potentia*) that exists in its very self; second, because of a power (*potentia*) that exists in something else.

Before any creatures existed, they were not possible through any created power, since nothing created was eternal; rather, they were possible only because of God's power, i.e., only because God was able to bring them into being. But just as God's bringing things into being depends on His will, so too His conserving them in being depends on His will; for He conserves them in being precisely by always giving them being. Hence, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, if God were to withhold His action from them, all things would fall back into nothingness. Therefore, just as, before things existed in themselves, their existence depended on the creator's power, so too, after they exist in themselves, their non-existence depends on the creator's power. So, then, creatures are mutable through a power that exists in another, viz., in God, because they were able to be produced by Him from nothing and because they are able to be reduced by Him to non-being.

If, on the other hand, something is being called mutable because of a potentiality (*potentia*) that exists in its very self, then it is likewise the case that every creature is mutable in some way or other. For

in every creature there are two types of potentiality, viz., active and passive. Now I call a potentiality passive insofar as the thing in question is capable of attaining its own perfection, either in *being* or in *attaining its end*.

If we are talking about a thing's mutability with respect to potentiality for *being*, then this sort of mutability is not found in every creature, but only in those creatures in which what is possible in them is compatible with their non-being.

Thus, in lower bodies there is mutability both (a) with respect to *substantial* being, given that their matter can exist along with a privation of their substantial form, and (b) with respect to *accidental* being, as long as the subject is compatible with the privation of a given accident, in the way that the subject *man* is compatible with non-whiteness and so can change from being white to not being white. On the other hand, if the accident in question follows upon the subject's essential principles, then the privation of that accident is not compatible with the subject, and so the subject is not mutable with respect to that accident—in the way that snow cannot become black.

By contrast, in celestial bodies the matter is not compatible with the privation of their form, since their form perfects the whole potentiality of their matter, and so they are not mutable with respect to their substantial being. However, they are mutable with respect to their local being, since the subject is compatible with the privation of this or that place.

On the other hand, since incorporeal substances are themselves subsistent forms (which are nonetheless related to their *esse* as potentiality to actuality), they are not compatible with the privation of this act [of being]. For *esse* follows upon form, and nothing is corrupted except by losing a form. Hence, in the form itself there is no potentiality for non-being, and so substances of this sort are immutable and invariable with respect to their being. This point is made by Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4: "Created intellectual substances are free from generation and from every variation, since they are incorporeal and immaterial." However, there are still two types of mutability in such creatures. For, first, they are in potentiality with respect to their *end*, and because of this, as Damascene says, they can change from goodness to badness by their own choice. Second, they are mutable with respect to *place*, because by their finite power they can affect places that they had not previously affected—something that cannot be said of God, who, as was explained above (q. 8, a. 2), fills all places by His infinity.

So, then, in every creature there is some potentiality for change, either (a) with respect to *substantial being*, as in the case of corruptible bodies; or (b) just with respect to *local being*, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or (c) with respect to *their being ordered to their end* or with respect to *the application of their power to diverse things*, as in the case of the angels. Moreover, all creatures in general share a common mutability because of the power of their creator, given that their being and non-being fall within His power.

Hence, since God is not mutable in any of these ways, it is peculiar to Him to be altogether immutable.

Reply to objection 1: This objection concerns things that are mutable with respect to both substantial being and accidental being, since these are the types of changes the philosophers had talked about.

Reply to objection 2: In addition to the immutability of being, which belongs to them by nature, the good angels have an immutability of choice by God's power. Yet mutability with respect to place still remains in them.

Reply to objection 3: Forms are called invariable because they themselves cannot be the subject of a variation. Yet they are subject to variation in the sense that their subjects are variable with respect to them. Hence, it is clear that they vary in a sense that accords with what they are. For they are called beings not because they themselves are the subject of being, but because something exists by virtue of them.

QUESTION 10

God's Eternity

Next we ask about eternity. On this topic there are six questions: (1) What is eternity? (2) Is God eternal? (3) Is it peculiar to God to be eternal? (4) Does eternity differ from time? (5) What is the difference between aeviternity (*aevum*) and time? (6) Is there a single aeviternity in the same way that there is a single time and a single eternity?

Article 1

Is eternity correctly defined as 'the simultaneously whole and complete possession of interminable life'?

It seems that in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 5 Boethius gives an incorrect definition of eternity when he says, "Eternity is the simultaneously whole and complete possession of interminable life (*aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio*)":

Objection 1: 'Interminable' is a negative term. But a negation is part of the definition only of things that are defective—which is not true of eternity. Therefore, 'interminable' should not be used in the definition of eternity.

Objection 2: 'Eternity' signifies a certain duration. But duration has to do with *esse* more than with life. Therefore, 'life' should not be used in the definition of eternity; instead, '*esse*' should be.

Objection 3: Whatever is called a whole has parts. But this is not true of eternity, since eternity is simple. Therefore, it is wrong to call it a whole.

Objection 4: It is impossible for more than one day, or more than one time, to exist simultaneously. But [in the Scriptures] days and times are ascribed to eternity in the plural; for Micah 5:2 says, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity," and Romans 16:25 says, "... according to the revelation of the mystery which was kept secret from eternal times." Therefore, eternity is not a simultaneous whole.

Objection 5: 'Whole' and 'complete' are the same. Thus, once eternity is said to be a whole, it is redundant to add that it is complete.

Objection 6: Possession is irrelevant to duration. But eternity is a certain duration. Therefore, eternity is not a possession.

I respond: Just as it is through composite things that we have to approach the cognition of simple things, so too it is through time, which is just the numbering of movement with respect to *before* and *after*, that we have to approach the cognition of eternity. For since in every movement there is a succession, with one part coming after another, it is by numbering the *before* and *after* in movement that we apprehend time, which is just the numbering of what is prior and posterior in movement. However, in that which lacks movement and always remains the same, there is no room for prior and posterior. Therefore, just as the concept of time consists in the numbering of prior and posterior in movement, so the concept of eternity consists in the apprehension of the uniformity of that which lies completely outside of movement.

Again, as *Physics* 4 says, the things that are said to be measured by time have a beginning and an end in time, and this is because in everything that is moved one can designate some beginning and some end. But just as that which is altogether immutable can have no succession, so neither can it have a beginning or an end.

Eternity, then, is characterized by two things: first, by the fact that what exists in eternity is interminable, i.e., lacking a beginning and an end (since 'terminus' refers to both); second, by the fact

that eternity itself lacks succession and is a simultaneous whole.

Reply to objection 1: Simple things are normally defined by means of a negation—e.g., a point is that which has no parts. This is not because the negation is part of their essence, but rather because our intellect, which primarily apprehends composite things, cannot arrive at the cognition of simple things except by way of ruling out composition.

Reply to objection 2: That which is truly eternal is not only a being but a living being, and ‘to live’, though not ‘to be’, itself includes operation in some way. But the protraction of duration seems to pertain more to operation than it does to being. This is why time is the numbering of movement.

Reply to objection 3: Eternity is called a whole not because it has parts, but rather in the sense that it lacks nothing.

Reply to objection 4: Just as God, given that He is incorporeal, is denominated metaphorically by the names of corporeal things in the Scriptures, so too eternity, which exists as a simultaneous whole, is denominated by the names of successive temporal entities.

Reply to objection 5: In the case of time there are two things to consider: (a) time itself, which is a successive entity, and (b) the temporal *now*, which is incomplete. Therefore, one says ‘simultaneous whole’ in order to rule out time, and one says ‘complete’ in order to exclude the temporal *now*.

Reply to objection 6: That which is possessed is had firmly and steadily. Therefore, to designate the immutable and unfailing nature of eternity, one uses the term ‘possession’.

Article 2

Is God eternal?

It seems that God is not eternal:

Objection 1: Nothing that is made can be said of God. But eternity is something made; for Boethius says, “The flowing *now* makes time, the abiding *now* makes eternity,” and in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says that God is the author of eternity. Therefore, God is not eternal.

Objection 2: That which exists both before eternity and after eternity is not measured by eternity. But God exists before eternity, as the *Liber de Causis* says, and He exists after eternity, since Exodus 15:18 says, “The Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond.” Therefore, it is not fitting for God to be eternal.

Objection 3: Eternity is a certain measure. But it does not befit God to be measured. Therefore, it does not belong to Him to be eternal.

Objection 4: Since, as has been explained (a. 1), eternity is a simultaneous whole, there is no present, past, or future in it. But present-tense, past-tense, and future-tense verbs are predicated of God in the Scriptures. Therefore, God is not eternal.

But contrary to this: The Athanasian creed says, “The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal.”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (a. 1), the nature of eternity follows upon immutability, just as the nature of time follows upon movement. Hence, since God is maximally immutable, it belongs to Him especially to be eternal. And not only is He eternal, but He is His own eternity—even though no other thing is its own duration, since no other thing is its own *esse*. But God is His own *esse* in all respects; so just as He is His own essence, so too He is His own eternity.

Reply to objection 1: The abiding *now* is said to ‘make eternity’ according to our apprehension. For just as the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flowing of the

temporal *now*, so too the apprehension of eternity is caused in us insofar as we apprehend an abiding *now*.

Moreover, when Augustine says that God is the author of eternity, he is talking about participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some beings, just as He communicates His immutability as well.

Reply to objection 2: The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said. For God is said to exist ‘before eternity’ to the extent that His eternity is participated in by immaterial substances. Hence, the same passage says, “An intelligence is likened to eternity.”

As for the passage from Exodus, “The Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond,” note that ‘eternity’ is taken here for ‘the ages’ (*saeculum*), as another translation has it. So, then, it is said that He will reign ‘beyond eternity’ because He endures beyond every age, i.e., beyond any given duration. For, as *De Caelo* 1 says, an age is nothing other than the period of each thing.

An alternative reply is that He is said to reign ‘beyond eternity’ because even if something other [than God] always existed (e.g., the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers), God would still reign ‘beyond’ it in the sense that His reign is a simultaneous whole.

Reply to objection 3: Eternity is nothing other than God Himself. Hence, God is not said to be eternal in the sense that He is measured in some way. Rather, the notion of a measure is understood here only according to our apprehension.

Reply to objection 4: Verbs of different tenses are attributed to God insofar as His eternity includes all times and not because He Himself varies over the present, past, and future.

Article 3

Is it proper to God alone to be eternal?

It seems not to be the case that it is proper to God alone to be eternal.

Objection 1: Daniel 12:3 says, “They that instruct many to justice are as stars for everlasting eternities.” But there would not be more than one eternity if God alone were eternal. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is eternal.

Objection 2: Matthew 25:41 says, “Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire.” Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is eternal.

Objection 3: Everything necessary is eternal. But many things are necessary, e.g., all the principles of demonstration, and all the demonstrated propositions. Therefore, it is not the case that God alone is eternal.

But contrary to this: In *Ad Marcellum* Jerome says, “God alone does not have a beginning.” But whatever has a beginning is not eternal. Therefore, God alone is eternal.

I respond: Eternity is truly and properly found in God alone. For as is clear from what has been said (a. 1), eternity follows upon immutability. But, as was shown above (q. 9, a. 2), God alone is altogether immutable.

However, to the extent that certain things receive immutability from God, they participate in His eternity.

For some things receive immutability from God insofar as they never cease to exist; accordingly, Ecclesiastes 1:4 says of the earth that it remains for eternity.

Again, in the Scriptures other things are called eternal because of the great length of their duration, even though they are corruptible; for instance, in Psalm 75:5 the mountains are called eternal, and

Deuteronomy 33:15 speaks of the “fruits of the eternal hills.”

Still other things participate in the nature of eternity insofar as they have untransmutability (*intransmutabilitas*) with respect to *esse* or, even further, with respect to operation, as in the case of the angels and the blessed in heaven, who take joy in the Word. For, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, the saints have no changeable thoughts with respect to their vision of the Word. That is why those who see God are said to have eternal life, in accord with John 17:3 (“This is eternal life, that they may know . . .”).

Reply to objection 1: Many eternities are spoken of because there are many who participate in eternity by contemplating God.

Reply to objection 2: The fire of hell is called eternal only because of its interminability. However, there are changes in their punishments, according to Job 24:19 (“They will pass from the waters of snow to excessive heat.”) Hence, in hell there is no genuine eternity, but instead time—in keeping with Psalm 80:16 (“Their time shall be for ever”).

Reply to objection 3: ‘Necessary’ signifies a certain mode of truth. But according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6, the true exists in the intellect. Therefore, the true and the necessary are eternal because they exist in an eternal intellect, which is God’s intellect alone. Hence, it does not follow that anything outside of God is eternal.

Article 4

Does eternity differ from time?

It seems that eternity is not different from time:

Objection 1: There cannot be two simultaneous measures of duration unless one is a part of the other; for no two days or two hours are simultaneous, whereas a day and an hour are simultaneous because the hour is part of the day. But eternity and time, both of which involve a measure of duration, are simultaneous. Therefore, since eternity is not a part of time, given that it exceeds time and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity and thus not distinct from eternity.

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 4, the temporal *now* remains the same throughout the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be constituted by the fact that it remains indivisibly the same throughout the whole course of time. Therefore, eternity is the temporal *now*. But the temporal *now* does not differ in substance from time. Therefore, eternity does not differ in substance from time.

Objection 3: Just as the measure of the first movement is, as *Physics* 4 says, the measure of all movements, so too it seems that the measure of the first *esse* is the measure of all *esse*. But eternity is the measure of the first *esse*, which is the divine *esse*. Therefore, eternity is the measure of all *esse*. But the *esse* of corruptible things is measured by time. Therefore, time is either eternity or some part of eternity.

But contrary to this: Eternity is a simultaneous whole, whereas in time there is a *before* and an *after*. Therefore, time and eternity are not the same.

I respond: It is clear that time and eternity are not the same.

However, some have given as an explanation for this difference the fact that eternity lacks a beginning and an end, whereas time has a beginning and an end. But this difference is *per accidens* and not *per se*. For even if time has always existed and always will exist—the position of those who posit a sempiternal movement of the heavens—there will still be a difference between eternity and time, just as Boethius explains in *De Consolatione Philosophiae*. The reason is that eternity is a simultaneous

whole—something that does not befit time—because eternity is a measure of permanent *esse*, whereas time is the measure of movement.

However, if the explanation just cited is applied to the things that are measured rather than to the measures, then it has some plausibility. For, as *Physics* 4 says, the only things measured by time are those which have a beginning and an end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens endured forever, then time would not measure that movement with respect to its whole duration, since the infinite is not measurable; instead, it would measure any given revolution, which has a beginning and an end in time.

However, there is another possible explanation having to do with the things measured, if the end and the beginning are thought of as potential. For even given that time lasts forever, it is possible to designate a beginning and an end in time by focusing on some part of time. For instance, we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year—something that is not possible in the case of eternity.

Still, these differences follow upon the primary and *per se* difference, viz., that eternity, but not time, is a simultaneous whole.

Reply to objection 1: This argument proceeds on the assumption that time and eternity are measures that belong to a single genus. The falsity of this assumption is clear from the things of which time and eternity are the measures.

Reply to objection 2: The temporal *now* is the same in subject (*idem subiecto*) throughout the whole of time, but differs in concept (*differens ratione*). The reason is that the temporal *now* stands to the thing that is moving in just the way that time stands to the movement. The thing moving is the same in subject throughout the whole course of the time, but it differs in concept insofar as it is *here* and *there*, and this alternation [of places] is just the movement. Similarly, the flow of this *now*, insofar as it alternates in concept, is just time. But eternity remains the same both in subject and in concept. Hence, eternity is not the same as the temporal *now*.

Reply to objection 3: Just as eternity is the proper measure of *esse* itself, so time is the proper measure of movement. Hence, to the extent that some *esse* falls short of permanence of being and is subject to transmutation, it falls short of eternity and is subject to time. Therefore, since the *esse* of corruptible things is transmutable, it is measured not by eternity, but by time. For time measures not only those things that actually undergo transmutation, but also those things that are able to undergo transmutation. Hence, it measures not only movement, but also rest, which belongs to that which is apt to be moved and yet is not [actually] being moved.

Article 5

Is aeviternity different from time?

It seems that aeviternity (*aevum*) does not differ from time:

Objection 1: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8, Augustine says, “God moves the spiritual creature through time.” But the measure of spiritual substances is called aeviternity. Therefore, time does not differ from aeviternity.

Objection 2: It is the nature of time to have a *before* and an *after*, whereas it is the nature of eternity to be a simultaneous whole, as has been explained (a. 1). But aeviternity is not eternity, since according to Ecclesiasticus 1:1, eternal wisdom precedes aeviternity. Therefore, aeviternity is not a simultaneous whole, but instead has a *before* and an *after*, and so is the same as time.

Objection 3: If there were no *before* or *after* in aeviternity, then it would follow that in aeviternity *exists*, *existed*, and *will exist* do not differ from one another. Therefore, since it is impossible for

aeviternal entities not to have existed, it would follow that it is impossible for them not to exist in the future. But this is false, since God could reduce them to nothingness.

Objection 4: Given that the duration of aeviternal entities is infinite with respect to the future (*ex parte post*), if aeviternity is a simultaneous whole, then it follows that some created thing is actually infinite—which is impossible. Therefore, aeviternity does not differ from time.

But contrary to this: Boethius says, “He commands time to go forth from aeviternity.”

I respond: Aeviternity differs from time and eternity as something midway between them.

Now some characterize the difference among them by claiming that (a) *eternity* lacks a beginning and an end, (b) *aeviternity* has a beginning but no end, and (c) *time* has both a beginning and an end. But, as was explained above (a. 4), this difference is *per accidens*. For even if, as some claim, aeviternal things were such that they always have existed and always will exist—or even if aeviternal things ceased to exist at some future time, which would be possible for God to bring about (*Deo possibile esset*)—aeviternity would still be distinct from eternity and from time.

By contrast, others claim that the difference among the three is that (a) *eternity* does not have a *before* or an *after*, (b) *time* has a *before* and an *after* along with newness and oldness, and (c) *aeviternity* has a *before* and an *after* without any newness or oldness. But this position entails a contradiction. This is manifestly obvious if newness and oldness are taken to apply to the measure itself. For given that a duration’s *before* and *after* cannot exist simultaneously, if aeviternity has a *before* and an *after*, then when an earlier part of aeviternity recedes, a later part must newly arrive, and so there will be newness in aeviternity itself, just as there is in time. But even if newness and oldness are taken to apply to the things that are measured, it is still the case that an absurdity follows. For a temporal entity grows old with time because it has transmutable *esse*, and, as is clear from *Physics* 4, the *before* and *after* in the measure derive from the transmutability of the thing being measured. So if an aeviternal entity is itself incapable of either newness or oldness, this will be because it has untransmutable *esse*. Therefore, its measure will not have a *before* or an *after*.

So, then, one should respond as follows:

Since eternity is a measure of permanent *esse*, to the extent that something falls short of permanence of *esse*, it falls short of eternity.

Some things fall short of permanence of *esse* in such a way that their *esse* is either the subject of transmutation or consists in transmutation, and things of this sort are measured by time—e.g., every movement as well as the *esse* of all corruptible things.

On the other hand, some things fall short of permanence of *esse* to a lesser degree, since their *esse* neither consists in transmutation nor is the subject of transmutation, though they have transmutation adjoined to them either in actuality or in potentiality. This is clear in the case of the celestial bodies, which have untransmutable substantial *esse*, but have this untransmutable substantial *esse* along with a transmutability with respect to place. Likewise, in the case of the angels it is clear that they have untransmutable [substantial] *esse* along with a transmutability with respect to choice, as it pertains to their nature, as well as a transmutability with respect to acts of understanding and affection and (in their own way) with respect to place. And so entities of this sort are measured by aeviternity, which falls midway between eternity and time.

By contrast, the *esse* that is measured by eternity is neither mutable nor adjoined to any mutability.

So then, (a) time has a *before* and an *after*, (b) aeviternity does not have a *before* or an *after* in its own right (*in se*), but can have a *before* and *after* conjoined to it, and (c) eternity does not have a *before* or an *after* and is incompatible with them.

Reply to objection 1: With respect to their acts of affection and understanding, which involve succession, spiritual creatures are measured by time. Hence, in the same place Augustine says that to be moved through time is to be moved through acts of affection. On the other hand, with respect to their

natural *esse* they are measured by aeviternity, whereas with respect to the vision of glory, they participate in eternity.

Reply to objection 2: Aeviternity is a simultaneous whole, but it is not eternity because it is compatible with a *before* and an *after*.

Reply to objection 3: There is no difference between past and future in the very *esse* of an angel, considered in itself; instead, this difference arises solely because of the adjoined mutations.

Moreover, when we say that an angel exists or existed or will exist, the difference stems from the apprehension of our intellect, which apprehends the *esse* of an angel by relating it to different parts of time. And when the objection says that an angel exists or existed, it makes an assumption, the opposite of which is not [now] subject to God's power, whereas when it says that the angel will exist, it is not yet positing any assumption. For because the *esse* and non-*esse* of an angel fall under God's power, absolutely considered, God can make it the case that the angel's *esse* will not be; and yet God cannot make it the case either that (a) the angel, while he exists, does not exist or that (b) the angel, after he has existed, has not existed.

Reply to objection 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite because it is not limited by time. However, there is nothing problematic about some created thing being infinite in the sense that it is not limited by some other created thing.

Article 6

Is there a single aeviternity?

It seems that there is not just a single aeviternity (*non sit tantum unum aevum*):

Objection 1: The apocryphal Esdra (3 Esdra 4:40) says, "The majesty and power of all the aeviternities stands before You, Lord."

Objection 2: There are different measures for different genera. But some aeviternal things are in the genus of corporeal things, viz., the celestial bodies, whereas others are spiritual substances, viz., the angels. Therefore, there is not just a single aeviternity.

Objection 3: Since 'aeviternity' is the name of a duration, things that have a single aeviternity have a single duration. But there is not just one duration for all aeviternal things, since some of them begin to exist after others, as is especially clear in the case of human souls. Therefore, there is not just a single aeviternity.

Objection 4: Things that do not depend on one another do not seem to have a single measure of duration. For it seems that the reason why there is a single time for all temporal things is that the first movement, which is prior to time, is in some sense a cause of all movements. By contrast, aeviternal things do not depend on one another, since it is not the case that one angel is a cause of another. Therefore, there is not just a single aeviternity.

But contrary to this: Aeviternity is more simple than time, and it is closer to eternity than time is. But there is just a single time. Therefore, *a fortiori* there is just a single aeviternity.

I respond: On this question there are two opinions. Some claim that there is just a single aeviternity, whereas others claim that there are many. To determine which of these opinions is closer to the truth, we have to inquire into the reason for the oneness of time, since we arrive at the cognition of spiritual things through corporeal things.

Now some claim that there is a single time for all temporal things because there is a single numbering for all the things that are numbered; for according to the Philosopher, time is a numbering. But this does not suffice, since time is not a numbering that is abstracted from what is being numbered.

Rather, it exists in the thing being numbered; otherwise, the numbering would not be continuous. For tenells of cloth have continuity not because of the numbering, but because of the thing numbered. However, the numbering that exists in the thing numbered is not the same for all things, but is instead diverse in diverse things.

Others explain the oneness of time by appealing to the oneness of eternity, which is the principle of every duration; on this view, all durations are one if their principle is considered, whereas they are many if we consider the diversity of things that receive their duration from the influence of the first principle. Still others explain the oneness of time by appealing to primary matter, which is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. However, neither of these explanations seems sufficient, since things that are one because of a principle or a subject—especially a remote principle or remote subject—are not one absolutely speaking, but one only in a certain respect (*secundum quid*).

So, then, the reason for the oneness of time is the oneness of the first movement. Since this movement is the simplest, all the other movements are measured by it, as *Metaphysics* 10 says. Thus, time is related to this particular movement not only as a measure to what is measured, but also as an accident to its subject; and so time receives its oneness from this movement. Moreover, this movement is related to other movements only as a measure to what is measured. Hence, time is not multiplied according the multiplicity of those movements, since the many separate things can be measured by a single measure.

Given this, we should note that there are two opinions about spiritual things. Some have claimed that all spiritual substances proceeded from God with a certain equality, as Origen maintained, or at least that many of them did, as others have maintained. By contrast, others have claimed that spiritual substances proceeded from God according to a certain gradation and ordering. This is what Dionysius seems to think, since in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 10, he says that among spiritual substances some are first, some are in the middle, and some are last—even within a single order of angels.

Thus, in keeping with the first opinion, one has to claim that there are many aeviternities, insofar as there are many first equals among aeviternal things.

On the other hand, in keeping with the second opinion, one has to claim that there is just a single aeviternity. For since, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, each thing is measured by what is most simple in its genus, it must be the case that the *esse* of all aeviternal things is measured by the *esse* of the first aeviternal thing. For the more simple a thing is, the more priority it has. And since, as will be shown below (q. 50, a. 4), this second opinion is closer to the truth, we will concede for now that there is just a single aeviternity.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Aeviternity’ is sometimes taken for ‘age’ (*saeculum*), which is a given entity’s period of duration. And so the term ‘many aeviternities’ means ‘many ages’.

Reply to objection 2: Even though celestial bodies and spiritual substances differ in their natural genus, they nonetheless agree in having untransmutable *esse*. And that is why they are measured by aeviternity.

Reply to objection 3: It is likewise not the case that all temporal things begin simultaneously; and yet there is a single time for all of them because of the first thing that is measured by time. So, too, all aeviternal things have a single aeviternity because of the first aeviternal thing, even if they do not all begin to exist simultaneously.

Reply to objection 4: In order for it to be the case that certain things are measured by a single thing, that single thing does not have to be a cause of all the others. Rather, what is required is that it be more simple than the others.

QUESTION 11

God's Oneness

Given what has gone before, the next thing to consider is God's oneness. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Does *one* add anything to *being*? (2) Are *one* and *many* opposed to each other? (3) Is God one? (4) Is God maximally one?

Article 1

Does *one* add anything to *being*?

It seems that *one* adds something to *being*:

Objection 1: Everything that belongs to a determinate genus is related by addition to *being*, since *being* encompasses every genus. But *one* belongs to a determinate genus, since it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore, *one* adds something to *being*.

Objection 2: That which divides something common is related by addition to that thing. But *being* is divided by *one* and *many*. Therefore, *one* adds something to *being*.

Objection 3: If *one* added nothing to *being*, then to call something one would be the same as calling it a being. But it is trivial to say that a being is a being. Therefore, it would be trivial to say that a being is one. But this is false. Therefore, *one* adds something to *being*.

But contrary to this: In the last chapter of *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, "There is nothing among the things that exist that does not participate in *one*." But this would not be the case if *one* added to *being* something which contracted it. Therefore, *one* is not related to *being* by addition.

I respond: *One* does not add any entity to *being*, but instead adds just the negation of division. For *one* signifies the same thing as *undivided being*.

From this it is clear that *one* is convertible with *being*. For every being is either simple or composite. A simple being is undivided both in actuality and in potentiality, whereas a composite being does not have *esse* as long as its parts are divided, but has it once the parts constitute and compose the composite being itself. Hence, it is clear that the *esse* of any given thing consists in undividedness. And so it is that each thing is such that insofar as it maintains its own *esse*, it also preserves its own oneness.

Reply to objection 1: Those who thought that the *one* which is convertible with *being* is the same as the *one* which is the principle of number were divided into contrary positions.

Pythagoras and Plato, noticing that the *one* which is convertible with *being* does not add any entity to *being* but instead signifies the substance of a being insofar as it is undivided, thought that this was also true of the *one* which is the principle of number. And since a number is composed of unities, they believed that numbers were the substances of all things.

Contrary to this, Avicenna, noting that the *one* which is the principle of number adds some entity to the substance of a being (otherwise, number as composed of unities would not be a species of quantity), believed that the *one* which is convertible with *being* adds some entity to the substance of a being, in the way that *white* adds an entity to *man*. But this is manifestly false, since each entity is one by its own substance. For if each entity were one through some other entity, then since the latter would again be one, if it were again one through some other entity, there would be an infinite regress. Hence, one should stop the regress at the first step.

Accordingly, one should say that the *one* which is convertible with *being* does not add any entity to a being, whereas the *one* which is the principle of number does add a further being that belongs to the genus of quantity.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents what is divided in one way from being undivided in

another way; for instance, that which is divided in number is undivided in species. And so it is possible for something to be one in one way and many in another way.

Still, if something is undivided absolutely speaking—either (a) because it is undivided with respect to what pertains to its essence, even though it is divided with respect to things that lie outside its essence, as, e.g., that which is one in subject and many with respect to accidents, or (b) because it is undivided in actuality and divided in potentiality, as, e.g., that which is one as a whole and many with respect to its parts—then an entity of this sort will be one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect.

If, by contrast, something is undivided in a certain respect and divided absolutely speaking—because, say, it is divided with respect to essence and undivided in concept or with respect to some principle or cause—then it will be many absolutely speaking and one in a certain respect. This is the case, for instance, with things that are many in number and one in species or one with respect to some principle.

Now *being* is divided by *one* and *many* in such a way that it is, as it were, one absolutely speaking and many in a certain respect, since a multitude would not itself be contained under *being* unless it were contained in some way under *one*. For in the last chapter of *De Divinis Nominibus*, Dionysius says, “There is no multitude that does not participate in *one*. For things that are many in their parts are one as a whole; and things that are many in their accidents are one in subject; and things that are many in number are one in species; and things that are many in species, are one in genus; and things that are many in their emanations are one in their principle.”

Reply to objection 3: The reason that it is not trivial for a being to be called one is that *one* adds something conceptually to *being*.

Article 2

Are *one* and *many* opposed to each other?

It seems that *one* and *many* are not opposed to each other:

Objection 1: No opposite is predicated of its opposite. But every multitude is in some sense one, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1). Therefore, *one* is not opposed to *multitude*.

Objection 2: No opposite is constituted out of its opposite. But a multitude is constituted out of ones. Therefore, *one* is not opposed to *multitude*.

Objection 3: A given thing has only one opposite. But *few* is opposed to *many*. Therefore, it is not the case that *one* is opposed to *many*.

Objection 4: If *one* were opposed to *multitude*, then it would be opposed to it as *undivided* is opposed to *divided*, and so it would be opposed to it as a privation to a disposition. But this seems absurd, since it would follow that *one* is posterior to *multitude* and defined in terms of it, even though *multitude* is defined in terms of *one*. Hence, there would be a circularity in the definitions, which is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that *one* and *many* are opposites.

But contrary to this: If the definitions are opposed, then the things themselves are opposed. But the definition of *one* consists in *indivisibility*, whereas the definition of *multitude* contains *division*. Therefore, *one* and *many* are opposites.

I respond: *One* is opposed to *many*, but in various ways.

The *one* which is a principle of number is opposed to the *multitude* which is a number in the way that a measure is opposed to what it measures. For *one* has the nature of a first measure, and number is a multitude measured by *one*, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 10.

By contrast, the *one* which is convertible with *being* is opposed to *multitude* in the manner of a privation, in the way that *undivided* is opposed to *divided*.

Reply to objection 1: No privation negates *esse* completely, since, according to the Philosopher, a privation is a negation within a subject. But every privation does negate some *esse* or other. And so in the case of *being*, because of its commonality, it happens that any privation of *being* is grounded in *being*—something that does not occur with the privations of specific forms such as vision or whiteness, or other forms of this sort.

And what holds for *being* also holds for *one* and *good* insofar as they are convertible with *being*. For a privation of goodness is grounded in something that is good, and, similarly, a negation of unity is grounded in something that is one. Because of this, it happens that a multitude is in some sense one, and a thing that is evil is in some sense good, and a thing that is a non-being is in some sense a being. Still, it is not the case here that an opposite is being predicated of its opposite, since one of the two opposites is being predicated absolutely speaking and the other is being predicated in a certain respect. For example, something that is a being in a certain respect—as, e.g., a being in potentiality—is not a being absolutely speaking, i.e., a being in actuality. Again, something that is a being absolutely speaking in the genus of substance is not a being in a certain respect, i.e., something with accidental *esse*. Similarly, something that is good in a certain respect is evil absolutely speaking, or vice versa. And, likewise, something that is one absolutely speaking is many in a certain respect, and vice versa.

Reply to objection 2: There are two sorts of wholes. One sort of whole is homogeneous, i.e., composed of similar parts, whereas another sort of whole is heterogeneous, i.e., composed of dissimilar parts. In any homogeneous whole, the whole is constituted out of parts that have the same form as the whole. For instance, every part of a quantity of water is itself water; and the composition of a continuous thing out of its parts is also like this. On the other hand, in any heterogeneous whole, each part lacks the form of the whole. For instance, no part of a house is itself a house, and no part of a man is itself a man.

A multitude is a whole of the latter sort. Given that its parts do not have the form of the multitude, a multitude is composed of unities, as a house is composed of non-houses. However, the unities do not constitute the multitude in virtue of having the characteristic *undividedness* by which they are opposed to multitude. Rather, the unities constitute the multitude in virtue of having the nature of *being*—just as the parts of a house constitute the house in virtue of being certain corporeal beings, not in virtue of the fact that they are not themselves houses.

Reply to objection 3: *Many* is taken in two ways: (a) in one way, absolutely, and this is the sense in which it is opposed to *one*; (b) in a second way, insofar as it implies a certain excess, and this is the sense in which it is opposed to *few*. Thus, in the first sense, two things are many, but not in the second sense.

Reply to objection 4: *One* is opposed privatively to *many* insofar as part of the concept *many* is that the many things are divided. Hence, the division has to be prior to the unity—not absolutely speaking, but rather according to the nature of our apprehension. For we apprehend simple things through composite things. This is why we define a point as that which has no parts, or as the beginning of a line.

But *multitude*, even in concept, is consequent to *one*, since we do not grasp the divided things as having the nature of a multitude unless we attribute unity to the two things that have been divided. Hence, *one* is posited in the definition of *multitude*, but *multitude* is not posited in the definition of *one*. Rather, *division* falls under our understanding by the very negation of *being*. Thus, *being* is the first thing that falls under our understanding; second is the fact that *this* being is not *that* being, and so the second thing we apprehend is *division*; the third thing is *one*; and the fourth is *many*.

Article 3

Is God one?

It seems that God is not one:

Objection 1: 1 Corinthians 8:5 says, “For there are gods many and lords many.”

Objection 2: The *one* which is the principle of number cannot be predicated of God, since no quantity is predicated of God. Likewise, the *one* which is convertible with *being* cannot be predicated of God, either. For it implies a privation, and every privation is an imperfection that cannot belong to God. Therefore, we should not say that God is one.

But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 6:4 says, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one.”

I respond: There are three ways to demonstrate that God is one.

First, from *His simplicity*: That in virtue of which a singular thing is a *this-something* cannot, it is clear, be communicated in any way to many. For instance, that in virtue of which Socrates is a man can be communicated to many, but that in virtue of which he is *this* man can be communicated only to one thing. Therefore, if Socrates were a man in virtue of that by which he is *this* man, then just as there cannot be more than one Socrates, so there could not be more than one man. But this very thing is true of God, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 3), God Himself is His own nature. Accordingly, then, *God* is the same as *this God*. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be more than one God.

Second, from *the unlimitedness of His perfection*: It was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that God includes within Himself the total perfection of being. Now if there were more than one God, then they would have to differ from one another. Therefore, something would belong to the one that did not belong to the other. If this something were a privation, then the first God would not be absolutely perfect, whereas if it were a perfection, then the other God would not have it. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be more than one God. Hence, compelled, as it were, by the truth itself, the ancient philosophers, when they posited an infinite principle, posited just one such principle.

Third, from *the unity of the world*: All the things that exist are ordered to one another, with some subject to others. But diverse things do not belong to the same ordering unless they are ordered by some one thing. For it is better that many things be brought into a single ordering by one thing than by many, since one thing is a cause of one thing *per se*, whereas many things are a cause of one thing only *per accidens*, viz., insofar as they are in some sense one. Therefore, since that which is first is the most perfect and a *per se* (and not *per accidens*) [principle], there must be just one first being that brings all things into a single ordering. And this is God.

Reply to objection 1: The gods are called many in light of the error of those who worshiped many gods, thinking the planets and other stars to be gods, or even particular parts of the world. Hence, he adds, “Yet to us there is but one God . . .”

Reply to objection 2: The *one* which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but is instead predicated only of those things that have their *esse* in matter. For the *one* which is the principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematical entities, which have *esse* in matter but are abstracted from matter conceptually.

On the other hand, the *one* which is convertible with *being* is metaphysical in the sense that it does not depend on matter with respect to its *esse*.

And even though there is no privation in God, nonetheless, according to the mode of our apprehension, we have cognition of Him only by way of privation and negation. And so there is nothing to prevent certain ‘that’-clauses (*dicta*) from being predicated privatively of God, e.g., that He is incorporeal or that He is infinite. And in the same way it is said of God that He is one.

Article 4

Is God maximally one?

It seems that God is not maximally one:

Objection 1: *One* is predicated in virtue of a privation of division. But a privation does not admit of *more* and *less*. Therefore, God is not called one to a greater degree than the other things that are one.

Objection 2: Nothing seems to be more indivisible than that which is indivisible in both actuality and potentiality, e.g., a point, or oneness itself. But something is called one to a greater degree insofar as it is more indivisible. Therefore, God is not one to a greater degree than is oneness or a point.

Objection 3: That which is good through its essence is maximally good; therefore, that which is one through its essence is maximally one. But, as the Philosopher makes clear in *Metaphysics* 4, every being is one through its essence. Therefore, every being is maximally one. Therefore, God is not one to a greater degree than other beings.

But contrary to this: Bernard says, “Among all the things that are called one, the unity of the divine Trinity stands at the summit.”

I respond: Since *one* is *undivided being*, in order for something to be maximally one, it must be both maximally a being and maximally undivided. But both of these belong to God.

God is maximally a being insofar as He does not have any *esse* that is limited by some nature which receives it. Instead, He is subsistent *esse* itself, unlimited in any way.

Moreover, He is maximally undivided insofar as He is divided neither in actuality nor in potentiality according to any mode of division whatsoever. For, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7), He is simple in every way.

Hence, it is clear that God is maximally one.

Reply to objection 1: Even though a privation, taken in itself, does not admit of *more* and *less*, still, to the extent that its opposite admits of *more* and *less*, the privative terms themselves are predicated to greater and lesser degrees. So, then, to the extent that something is divided (or divisible) either more or less or in no way at all, it is called less or more or maximally one.

Reply to objection 2: A point and the oneness which is the principle of number are not maximally beings, since they do not have *esse* except in some subject. Hence, neither of them is maximally one. For just as, because of the difference between a subject and its accident, the subject is not maximally one, so neither is the accident maximally one.

Reply to objection 3: Even though every being is one through its substance, still, not every substance is equal at making for unity. For the substance of some things is composed of many things, whereas the substance of other things is not.

QUESTION 12

How We Know God

Since in what has gone before we have investigated how it stands with God in Himself, we must now investigate how it stands with Him in our cognition, i.e., how God is known by creatures. And on this topic there are thirteen questions: (1) Can any created intellect see God's essence? (2) Does the intellect see God's essence by means of a created species? (3) Can God's essence be seen by a bodily eye? (4) Does any created intellectual substance have enough natural power to see God's essence? (5) In order to see God's essence, does a created intellect stand in need of some created light? (6) Among those who see God's essence, does one see it more perfectly than another? (7) Can any created intellect comprehend God's essence? (8) Does a created intellect that sees God's essence know all things in that essence? (9) Does a created intellect that sees God's essence know by means of likenesses the things that it knows in God's essence? (10) Does a created intellect that sees God's essence know all the things it sees in God simultaneously? (11) Can any man see God's essence in this life? (12) Can we know God through natural reason in this life? (13) In addition to the cognition of natural reason, is there in the present life any cognition of God through grace?

Article 1

Can any created intellect see God's essence?

It seems that no created intellect can see God through His essence:

Objection 1: In *Super Ioannem* Chrysostom, in commenting on John 1:18 ("No one has seen God at any time"), says, "Not just the prophets, but even the angels and archangels have not seen Him who is God. For how could that which has a creatable nature see that which is uncreatable?" Likewise, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius, in speaking of God, says, "Of Him there is no sensation (*sensus*) or imagination (*phantasia*) or opinion (*opinio*) or definition (*ratio*) or scientific knowledge (*scientia*)."

Objection 2: Everything infinite is, as such, unknown. But, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 1), God is infinite. Therefore, God in Himself is unknown.

Objection 3: A created intellect has cognition only of things that exist; for the first thing that falls under the intellect's apprehension is *being*. However, according to Dionysius, God is not an existent thing, but instead lies beyond existent things. Therefore, He is not intelligible, but lies beyond all understanding.

Objection 4: A knower must have some proportion to what is known, since the thing known is the perfection of the knower (*cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis*). But a created intellect is not proportioned to God, since they are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore, a created intellect cannot see God's essence.

But contrary to this: 1 John 3:2 says, "We shall see Him as He is."

I respond: Each thing is knowable to the extent that it has actuality, and so God, who is pure actuality without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself maximally knowable (*maxime cognoscibilis*). But what is maximally knowable in its own right may not be knowable to some intellect because its intelligibility is too great for that intellect—just as the sun, which is maximally visible, cannot be seen by a bat because its light is too great. Taking note of this fact, some have claimed that no created intellect can see God's essence.

However, it is wrong to say this. For man's ultimate beatitude consists in his highest operation, which is an operation of the intellect, and so if a created intellect can never see God's essence, then either it will never attain beatitude or else its beatitude will lie in something other than God—which is

contrary to the Faith. For the ultimate perfection of a rational creature lies in God, since He is the rational creature's principle of being, and each thing is perfect to the extent that it attains to its own principle.

The claim in question is likewise opposed to reason. For man has a natural desire to know the cause when he perceives an effect; and it is from this desire that wonder originates in men. Therefore, if the rational creature's intellect were unable to attain to the first cause of things, this natural desire would remain unfulfilled.

Hence, one should simply grant that the blessed in heaven see God's essence.

Reply to objection 1: Both of these passages are talking about a vision that involves comprehension. Thus, just before the quoted words Dionysius says, "He is incomprehensible to everyone in His totality, and of Him there is no sensation, etc." And Chrysostom, a little after the cited passage, adds, "Here he is speaking of the absolutely certain vision of the Father—as great a contemplation and comprehension as the Father has of the Son."

Reply to objection 2: What is unknown in itself is the infinity had by matter that has not been perfected by form; for every type of cognition is through form. By contrast, the infinity had by a form that is not limited by matter is in itself maximally known. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 7., a. 1), it is in the second way, and not the first, that God is infinite.

Reply to objection 3: God is said not to be an existent thing, not because He does not in any way exist, but rather because He is above every existing thing insofar as He is His own *esse*. Hence, from this it does not follow that He cannot be known in any way; all that follows is that He exceeds every cognition, i.e., that He is not comprehended.

Reply to objection 4: There are two senses of 'proportion':

The first sense is the fixed relation of one quantity to another, and in this sense *double*, *triple*, and *equal* are species of proportion.

In the second sense, any relation of one thing to another is called a proportion. And in this sense a creature can be proportioned to God insofar as it is related to Him as an effect to a cause, or as potentiality to actuality. And this is the sense in which a created intellect can be proportioned to knowing God.

Article 2

Does a created intellect see God's essence by means of some likeness?

It seems that a created intellect sees God's essence by means of some likeness:

Objection 1: 1 John 3:2 says: "We know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, and we shall see Him as He is."

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, "When we know God, some likeness of God comes to exist in us."

Objection 3: An act of intellectual understanding is the intelligible thing in act (*intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu*), just as an act of a sensory power is the sensible thing in act. But this is so only insofar as the sensory power is informed by a likeness of the thing that is sensed, and only insofar as the intellect is informed by a likeness of the thing that is understood. Therefore, if God is seen by an act of a created intellect, then He must be seen by means of some likeness.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, "When the Apostle says, 'We see now through a mirror and dimly' (1 Corinthians 13:12), by the terms 'mirror' and 'dimly' he can be taken to

be referring to any likenesses that are accommodated to understanding God.” However, seeing God through His essence is not a dim or mirror-like vision, but is instead contrasted with such a vision. Therefore, it is not the case that the divine essence is seen by means of likenesses.

I respond: Two things are required for an act of seeing (*ad visionem*), whether it be a sensory act of seeing or an intellectual act of seeing, viz., (a) the visual power and (b) the union of the thing seen with the visual power. For there is no act of seeing unless the thing that is seen exists in some way in the one who is seeing.

In the case of corporeal things, it is clear that the thing seen cannot exist *through its essence* in the one who is seeing, but rather can exist in him only *by means of a likeness*. For example, what exists in the eye is not the very substance of a stone, but rather a likeness of the stone by means of which the act of seeing comes to be. However, if one and the same thing were both the principle of the visual power and also the thing that is seen, then the one who sees would have to have from that thing both the visual power and the form by means of which he sees.

Now it is clear that God is the author of the intellectual power and is also able to be seen by the intellect.

Since a creature’s *intellective power* is not itself God’s essence, it follows that it has some sort of participated likeness of the one who is the first intellect. This is why a creature’s intellectual power is said to be a certain intelligible light—derived, as it were, from the first source of light—regardless of whether this is taken to mean its natural power or some added perfection of grace or glory. Therefore, in order to see God, what is required on the part of the seeing power is some likeness of God by means of which the intellect is capable of seeing God.

However, on the part of the *thing seen*, which must in some way be united to the one who sees, God’s essence cannot be seen by means of any created likeness.

For, first of all, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, higher things can in no way be cognized by means of likenesses of things of a lower order. For instance, the essence of an incorporeal thing can in no way be known by means of the species of a body. Therefore, *a fortiori*, God’s essence cannot be seen by means of any created species.

Second, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), God’s essence is His *esse* itself—something that cannot be true of any created form. Therefore, it is impossible for any created form to be the representing likeness (*similitudo repraesentans*) for one who is seeing God’s essence.

Third, the divine essence is uncircumscribed and eminently contains within itself whatever can be signified or understood by a created intellect. And this can in no way be represented by means of any created species. For every created form is determined to some species of wisdom or of power or of *esse* itself, etc.

Hence, to claim that God is seen through a likeness is to claim that the divine essence is not seen—which is erroneous.

Therefore, one should say that in order to see God’s essence what is required on the part of the visual power is a certain likeness, viz., *the light of glory*, which empowers the intellect to see God. This is spoken of in Psalm 35:10: “In Your light we shall see light.” However, God’s essence cannot be seen by means of any created likeness which represents God’s essence as it is in itself.

Reply to objection 1: This passage is talking about a likeness that exists by participation in the light of glory.

Reply to objection 2: Augustine is here talking about the cognition of God that is had in this life.

Reply to objection 3: The divine essence is *esse* itself. Hence, just as other intelligible forms that are not their own *esse* are united to the intellect with some *esse* by means of which they inform the intellect itself and make it to be in act, so the divine essence is united to the created intellect as something actually understood and through its very self makes the intellect to be in act.

Article 3

Can God's essence be seen by a bodily eye?

It seems that God's essence can be seen by a bodily eye:

Objection 1: Job 19:26 says: "In my flesh I shall see God . . ." And Job 42:5 says: "With the hearing of the ear, I have heard You, but now my eye sees You."

Objection 2: In the last book of *De Civitate Dei*, chap. 29, Augustine says, "And so their eyes (*read*: the eyes of those who are glorified) will have a remarkable power of sight—not that they will see more sharply than certain serpents or eagles are reputed to see (for however great the sharpness of vision these creatures are blessed with, they can see nothing other than corporeal things), but rather that they will see even incorporeal things." But anyone who can see incorporeal things can be elevated to see God. Therefore, the glorified eye can see God.

Objection 3: God can be seen by a man in an imaginative vision; for Isaiah 6:1 says: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne . . ." But an imaginative vision has its origins in the senses; for, as *De Anima* 3, chap. 3, says: "The imagination is a movement brought to actuality by the senses." Therefore, God can be seen by a sentient act of vision.

But contrary to this: In *De Videndo Deum ad Paulinam* Augustine says: "No one, either in this life or in the life of the angels, has ever seen God as He is in the manner in which visible things are discerned by bodily vision."

I respond: It is impossible for God to be seen with the sense of sight or with any other sense or power that belongs to the sentient part [of the soul]. For, as will be explained below (a. 4), every power of this sort is the act of a bodily organ. But an act is proportioned to that of which it is the act. Hence, no power of the sort in question can extend itself beyond corporeal things. But, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 1), God is incorporeal. Therefore, He can be seen neither by the senses nor by the imagination, but only by the intellect.

Reply to objection 1: When it is said, "In my flesh I shall see God, my savior," this does not mean that God will be seen with an eye of flesh. Instead, it means that someone who exists in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Similarly, when it is said, "Now my eye sees You," this refers to the eye of the mind—just as the Apostle says at Ephesians 1:17-18: "May He give to you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, the eyes of your heart enlightened . . ."

Reply to objection 2: In this passage Augustine is speaking in an exploratory and conditional manner. This is clear from the fact that he prefaces the passage with these words: "They [*read*: glorified eyes] will have a far different power, if that incorporeal nature will be seen through them." But shortly afterwards he explains the matter as follows: "It is entirely believable that we will then see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth in such a way as to see God with utter clarity as present everywhere and governing all those corporeal things—not in the way that the invisible things of God are now seen by understanding the things that have been made, but rather in the way that we now look upon the men with whom we live as they live and exercise the functions of life. We do not *believe* that they are alive; rather, we *see* that they are."

From this it is clear that what he means is that glorified eyes will see God in the way that our eyes now see that someone is alive. But a corporeal eye sees life not as visible *per se*, but rather as sensible *per accidens*. That is, life is not cognized by the senses, but is instead immediately cognized by some other cognitive power in conjunction with the senses.

Now the fact that God's presence will be immediately known by the intellect when corporeal things

are seen depends on two things, viz., the perspicacity of the intellect and the reflection of the divine brightness in the renewed corporeal things.

Reply to objection 3: God's essence is not seen in an imaginative vision. Rather, a form that represents God in some manner of likeness is effected in the imagination—just as in the divine Scriptures divine things are described metaphorically through sensible things.

Article 4

Can a created intellect see God's essence by its own natural powers?

It seems that a created intellect can see God's essence by its own natural powers:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that an angel is a pure and absolutely clear mirror-image (*speculum purum, clarissimum*) that "receives, if one may say so, the full beauty of God." But a thing is seen when its mirror-image is seen. Therefore, since an angel understands himself by his own natural powers, it seems that he also understands God's essence by his own natural powers.

Objection 2: What is maximally visible is less visible to us because of a deficiency in either our bodily vision or our intellectual vision. But an angel's intellect does not suffer from any deficiency. Therefore, since God, taken in Himself, is maximally intelligible, it seems that He is maximally intelligible to an angel. Therefore, if an angel is able by his own natural powers to understand other intelligible things, then *a fortiori* he is able to understand God.

Objection 3: The corporeal senses cannot be elevated so as to understand an incorporeal substance, since such a substance lies beyond their nature. Therefore, if seeing God through His essence lies beyond the nature of every created intellect, then it seems that no created intellect can reach the act of seeing God's essence—which, as was made clear above (a. 1), is erroneous. Therefore, it seems that seeing God's essence is natural to a created intellect.

But contrary to this: Romans 6:23 says: "The grace of God is eternal life." But eternal life consists in seeing God's essence, according to John 17:3 ("This is eternal life: that they may know You, the only true God"). Therefore, seeing God's essence belongs to a created intellect by grace and not by nature.

I respond: It is impossible for any created intellect to see God's essence by its own natural powers. For cognition occurs insofar as what is known exists in the knower. But what is known exists in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence, every knower's cognition accords with the mode of its own nature. Therefore, if the thing known is such that its mode of being exceeds the mode of a given knower's nature, then the cognition of that thing must lie beyond the nature of that knower.

Now there are several modes of being found among things (*est multiplex modus essendi rerum*). There are some things whose nature has *esse* only in *this* individual matter. All corporeal things are of this sort. Again, there are some things whose natures subsist *per se* and not in any matter, even though they are not their own *esse*, but are instead things that have *esse*. The incorporeal substances we call angels are of this sort. On the other hand, there is the mode of being peculiar to God alone, insofar as He is His own subsistent *esse*.

Thus, it is connatural for us to know those things that have *esse* only in individual matter. For our soul, through which we have cognition, is the form of a certain matter and has two cognitive powers. One of them is the act of a corporeal organ, and it is connatural to this power to have cognition of things insofar as they exist in individual matter. Thus, the senses have cognition only of singular things. The

second of the soul's cognitive powers is the intellect, which is not the act of any corporeal organ. Hence, through the intellect it is connatural for us to have cognition of natures that have *esse* only in individual matter, yet to have cognition of them not insofar as they exist in individual matter, but rather insofar as they are abstracted from it by the intellect's consideration. Hence, by means of the intellect we are able to know things of this sort in a universal way (*in universali*)—something that lies beyond the faculty of sense.

On the other hand, it is connatural to an angel's intellect to know natures that do not exist in matter—something that lies beyond the natural power of the intellect had by the human soul in this life, during which the soul is united to the body.

It follows, then, that to know subsistent *esse* itself is connatural only to the divine intellect, and that this lies beyond the natural power of every created intellect. For no creature is its own *esse*; instead, every creature has participated *esse*. Therefore, no created intellect can see God through His essence except insofar as God conjoins Himself to the created intellect through His grace in order to be intelligible to it.

Reply to objection 1: The mode of knowing God that is connatural to an angel is to know Him through the likeness of Him that shines forth in the angel himself. But, as was shown above (a. 2), to know God by means of a created likeness is not to know God's essence. Hence, it does not follow that an angel can know God's essence through his natural powers.

Reply to objection 2: An angel's intellect has no deficiency, as long as 'deficiency' is taken *privatively*, i.e., as implying that the angel lacks something that he ought to have. On the other hand, if 'deficiency' is taken *negatively*, then every creature is deficient in comparison to God, since no creature has the excellence which is found in God.

Reply to objection 3: Since the sense of sight is completely material, it cannot in any way be elevated [so as to understand] anything immaterial. But because the intellect—whether ours or an angel's—is by its nature elevated beyond matter in a certain way, it is capable of being further elevated beyond its nature to something higher through grace.

An indication of this is that the sense of sight cannot in any way know in abstraction that which it knows in the concrete, since it cannot perceive a nature in any way other than as *this* nature. Our intellect, by contrast, can consider in abstraction what it knows in the concrete. For even though it knows things that have forms in matter, it nonetheless resolves the composite thing into the two of them, and it considers the form itself *per se*. Similarly, even though it is connatural to an angelic intellect to know concrete *esse* in some nature, an angel can nonetheless through his intellect isolate the *esse* itself (*potest ipsum esse discernere*), because he knows that he himself is one thing and his own *esse* is something else.

And so since a created intellect can by its nature apprehend a concrete form and concrete *esse* in abstraction through some type of resolution, it can be elevated by grace to know a separated subsistent substance and a separated subsistent *esse*.

Article 5

Does a created intellect need some created light in order to see God's essence?

It seems that a created intellect does not need any created light in order to see God's essence:

Objection 1: In the case of sensible things, what is luminous in itself does not need any other light in order to be seen; therefore, neither is there such a need in the case of intelligible things. But God is the intelligible source of light. Therefore, He is not seen by means of any created light.

Objection 2: When God is seen through a medium, He is not seen through His essence. But when He is seen by means of a created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore, He is not seen through His essence.

Objection 3: If a thing is created, then nothing prevents that thing from being natural to some creature. Therefore, if God's essence is seen by means of a created light, that light will be able to be natural to some creature. And so the creature in question will not need any further light in order to see God—which is impossible. Therefore, it is not necessary that every creature should need some additional light in order to see God's essence.

But contrary to this: Psalm 35:10 says: “In Your light we shall see light.”

I respond: When anything is elevated to a condition that exceeds its own nature, it has to be disposed by some disposition that lies beyond its nature. For instance, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be disposed to that form by some disposition.

Now when a created intellect sees God through His essence, God's very essence is the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence, it is necessary for some supernatural disposition to be added to the intellect in order for it to be elevated to such great sublimity. Therefore, since, as has been shown (a. 4), a created intellect's natural power is not sufficient for seeing God's essence, a power of intellective understanding has to be added to it by God's grace. This addition of intellective power is what we call the illumination of the intellect, just as the intelligible thing itself is called light or a source of light. This illumination is the light of which Apocalypse 21:23 says, “The glory of God will illuminate it [*read*: the society of the blessed who see God].” And by this light the blessed are made godlike, i.e., similar to God—this according to 1 John 3:2: “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and we shall see Him as He is.”

Reply to objection 1: A created light is necessary for seeing God's essence, but not because God's essence, which is intelligible in itself, becomes intelligible by this light. Rather, the created light is necessary in order for the intellect to become capable of understanding God's essence—in the way that a habit makes a power better able to operate, or again, in the way that corporeal light is necessary for exterior vision insofar as it makes the medium actually transparent, so that it can be moved by color.

Reply to objection 2: This light is required for seeing God's essence, not as a likeness in which God is seen, but rather as a certain perfection of the intellect that empowers the intellect to see God. And so one can say that the light is not a medium *in which* God is seen, but rather a medium *subject to which* He is seen. And this sort of medium does not destroy the immediacy of the vision of God.

Reply to objection 3: A disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to something that has the form of fire. Hence, the light of glory could not be natural to a creature unless it were a creature with a divine nature—which is impossible. For, as was just claimed, by this light the rational creature becomes godlike.

Article 6

Among those who see God's essence, does one see it more perfectly than another?

It seems that it is not the case that, among those who see God's essence, one sees it more perfectly than another:

Objection 1: 1 John 3:2 says: “We shall see Him as He is.” But He is just one way. Therefore, He will be seen in one way by everyone. Therefore, He will not be seen more and less perfectly.

Objection 2: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says that a single entity cannot be understood more by one person than by another. But everyone who sees God through His essence understands the essence of God; for, as was established above (a. 3), God is seen by the intellect and not by the senses. Therefore, it

is not the case that among those who see God's essence, one sees more clearly than another.

Objection 3: The fact that one thing is seen more perfectly than another can be traced back to one of two things: either (a) to the visible object or (b) to the seer's visual power.

On the part of the object, this happens because the object is received more perfectly in the one who sees; that is, it happens because of a more perfect likeness. But this does not apply in the present case, since it is not by means of a likeness, but through His essence, that God is present to the intellect of one who sees His essence.

It must be the case, then, that if one person sees Him more perfectly than another does, this is because of a difference in intellective power. And so it follows that the someone whose intellective power is naturally more imposing will see Him more clearly. But this is wrong, since men have been promised equality with the angels in beatitude.

But contrary to this: According to John 17:3 ("This is eternal life . . ."), eternal life consists in seeing God. Therefore, if everyone sees God's essence equally, then in eternal life everyone will be equal. But the Apostle says just the opposite of this in 1 Corinthians 15:41: "Star differs from star in glory."

I respond: Among those who see God through His essence, one will see Him more perfectly than another. To be sure, this will not be because there is a more perfect likeness of God in the one than in the other, since, as has been shown (a. 2), this vision will not occur by means of any likeness. Rather, it will be because the intellect of the one has a greater power or capacity to see God than the intellect of the other does.

Now the capacity to see God belongs to a created intellect not by its nature, but rather through the light of glory, which, as is clear from what was said above (a. 5), gives the intellect a certain godlikeness. Hence, an intellect that has a greater share in the light of glory will see God more perfectly. But the one who will have a greater share in the light of glory is the one who has greater charity. For where there is greater charity, there is greater desire, and it is the desire that in some sense makes the one who desires disposed and prepared to receive that which is desired. Hence, it is the one who has greater charity who will see God more perfectly and be more beatified.

Reply to objection 1: When it is said that we shall see Him as He is, the particle 'as' determines the mode of the act of seeing on the part of the thing that is seen, so that the sense of the phrase is this: "We shall see Him to be such as He is." For we will see His very *esse*, which is His essence.

However, 'as' does not determine the mode of the act of seeing on the part of the one who is seeing, as if this were the sense of the phrase: "The mode of seeing will be as perfect as God's mode of being is."

Reply to objection 2: The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said. For when it is claimed that a single entity cannot be more understood by one person than by another, this is true if it is referring to the mode of the *thing that is understood*. For if anyone understands a thing to be otherwise than it is, he does not truly understand it. However, the claim is not true if it is referring to the mode of the *act of understanding*. For one person's act of intellective understanding is more perfect than another's act of intellective understanding.

Reply to objection 3: The differences in seeing will not stem from the object, since the same object, viz., God's essence, will be presented to everyone. Nor will the differences stem from diverse likenesses leading to different degrees of participation in the object. Rather, they will stem from diverse capacities on the part of the intellects—not diverse natural capacities, but diverse glorified capacities, as has been explained.

Article 7

Do those who see God through His essence comprehend Him?

It seems that those who see God through His essence comprehend Him:

Objection 1: In Philippians 3:12 the Apostle says: “I follow after, if I may in any way comprehend.” But he did not follow in vain; for as he himself says in 1 Corinthians 9:26, “I therefore so run, not as at an uncertainty.” Therefore, he comprehended, and so, too, the others whom he invites to do the same, saying: “So run that you may comprehend.”

Objection 2: As Augustine says in *De Videndo Deum ad Paulinam*, “Something is comprehended when it is seen as a whole in such a way that nothing of it lies hidden from the seer.” But if God is seen through His essence, then He is seen as a whole and nothing of Him lies hidden from the seer; for God is simple. Therefore, He is comprehended by anyone who sees Him through His essence.

Objection 3: Someone might reply that He is seen as a whole, but not totally.

Against this: ‘Totally’ expresses either a mode of the seer or a mode of the thing seen. But one who sees God through His essence sees him totally, if ‘totally’ signifies a mode of the thing seen. For, as was noted above (a. 6), he sees Him as He is. Similarly, he sees Him totally, if ‘totally’ signifies a mode of the seer. For the intellect will see God’s essence with all its might. Therefore, anyone who sees God through His essence will see Him totally. Therefore, he will comprehend Him.

But contrary to this: Jeremiah 32:18-19 says: “O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Your name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought.” Therefore, He cannot be comprehended.

I respond: Comprehending God is impossible for any created intellect, “but to attain to God with the mind in any way is great beatitude,” as Augustine says.

To see this clearly, note that something is comprehended when it is known perfectly, and something is known perfectly when it is known to the full extent that it is knowable. Hence, if something that is knowable through demonstrative scientific knowledge (*cognoscibile per scientiam demonstrativam*) is held by mere opinion (*opinio*) stemming from a probable argument, then it is not comprehended. For instance, if someone knows through a demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, then he comprehends this. By contrast, if someone accepts this proposition as a probable opinion because it is asserted by many people or by the wise, then he does not comprehend it, since he has not reached that perfect mode of cognition by which the proposition is knowable.

Now no created intellect can reach the perfect mode of cognition by which God’s essence is knowable. This is clear as follows: Each thing is knowable to the extent that it is a being in actuality. Therefore, God, whose *esse*, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 1), is infinite, is infinitely knowable. But no created intellect can know God in an infinite way. For a created intellect knows the divine essence more or less perfectly to the extent that it is imbued with a greater or lesser light of glory. Therefore, since the created light of glory received in a created intellect cannot be infinite, it is impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite way. Hence, it is impossible for it to comprehend God.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Comprehension’ has two senses.

In the first sense, the strict and proper one, something is enclosed within the comprehending thing. Given this sense, there is no way in which God is comprehended, whether by an intellect or anything else. For since He is infinite, He cannot be enclosed in anything finite in the sense that something finite should grasp Him in an infinite way that corresponds to the infinite way in which He exists. And this is the sense of ‘comprehension’ that we are asking about here.

In a second sense, ‘comprehension’ is taken more broadly in such a way that comprehending is opposed to simply pursuing. For whoever catches up with someone is said to comprehend him when

once he grabs hold of him. In this sense God is comprehended by the blessed in heaven, according to Canticles 3:4 (“I held him, and I will not let him go.”). And this is how to interpret the passages from the Apostle that have to do with comprehension.

In this sense, comprehension is one of the three ‘gifts of the soul’, and it corresponds to hope, just as the act of seeing corresponds to faith and act of enjoying corresponds to charity. For us it is not the case that everything that is seen is already had or possessed, since we sometimes see things that are distant or things that are not within our power. Again, we do not enjoy all the things that we have, either because we do not delight in them or because they are not the ultimate end of our desire in the sense of fulfilling and quieting our desire. But the blessed in heaven have these three gifts in God. For they see Him; and seeing Him, they hold Him present, having it within their power to see Him always; and holding on to Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate end that fulfills their desire.

Reply to objection 2: God is said to be incomprehensible not because there is something of Him that is not seen, but because He is not seen in as perfect a way as He is visible. Similarly, when a demonstrable proposition is known [only] through some probable argument, it is not the case that there is something of it—say, a subject or predicate or the composition of the two—that is not known. Rather, the whole is not known in as perfect a way as it is knowable. Hence, Augustine, in defining comprehension, says, “A whole is comprehended by sight when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it lies hidden from the seer or in such a way that its limits can be surveyed.” For the limits of a thing are surveyed when one reaches the limit in the way that thing is known.

Reply to objection 3: ‘Totally’ expresses a mode of the object—not, to be sure, in the sense that the whole mode of the object does not fall under our cognition, but rather in the sense that the mode of the object is not the mode of the knower. Therefore, one who sees God through His essence sees in Him that He exists in an infinite way and is knowable in an infinite way, but he also sees that this infinite way does not belong to him in the sense that he himself knows God in an infinite way. Similarly, someone can have probable knowledge that a given proposition is demonstrable, even if he himself does not know it demonstratively.

Article 8

Do those who see God through His essence see all things in God?

It seems that those who see God through His essence see all things in God:

Objection 1: In *Dialogorum Libri* 4 Gregory asks, “What is there they do not see who see the one who sees all things?” But God is the one who sees all things. Therefore, those who see God see all things.

Objection 2: Anyone who sees a mirror sees the things that are reflected in the mirror. But everything that has been made or can be made is reflected in God as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore, whoever sees God sees all the things that exist and all the things that can be made.

Objection 3: As *De Anima* 3 says, someone who understands that which is greater can understand the things that are least. But all the things that God effects or can effect are less than His essence. Therefore, whoever understands God is able to understand all the things that God effects or can effect.

Objection 4: A rational creature desires by nature to know all things. Therefore, if he does not know all things in seeing God, his natural desire will not be quieted, and in seeing God he will not be beatified—which is absurd. Therefore, in seeing God he knows all things.

But contrary to this: The angels see God through His essence and yet do not know all things. For

as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the lower angels are cleansed of their ignorance by the higher angels. Moreover, even the higher angels themselves do not know future contingents or the inmost thoughts of hearts, since this belongs to God alone. Therefore, it is not the case that whoever sees God's essence sees all things.

I respond: A created intellect, in seeing God's essence, does not see in it all the things that God effects or can effect. For it is clear that some things are seen in God insofar as they exist in Him. But all the other things exist in Him in the way that effects exist virtually in their cause. Therefore, these other things are seen in God in the way that effects are seen in their cause.

But it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For instance, someone with high intelligence is such that, once a demonstrative principle has been proposed, he immediately recognizes many of the conclusions that follow from it. This does not happen with someone of lesser intelligence; instead, the conclusions have to be explained to him one by one. Therefore, it is the intellect that totally comprehends a cause that is able to know in the cause all of its effects and all the aspects of its effects.

However, as has been shown (a. 7), no created intellect can totally comprehend God. Therefore, no created intellect, in seeing God, can know all the things that God effects or can effect—for this would be to comprehend His power. Rather, an intellect knows more of the things that God effects or can effect to the extent that it sees God more perfectly.

Reply to objection 1: Gregory is speaking about the sufficiency of the object, viz., God, and claiming that, taken in Himself, He sufficiently contains and manifests all things. However, it does not follow that one who sees God knows all things; for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

Reply to objection 2: One who looks in a mirror does not necessarily see all the things in the mirror unless he comprehends the mirror by his vision.

Reply to objection 3: Even though it is greater to see God than to see all other things, nonetheless, it is greater to see God in such a way that all things are known in Him than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but just more or fewer things, are known in Him. For it has already been shown that the number of things known in God depends on whether one's mode of seeing Him is more perfect or less perfect.

Reply to objection 4: A rational creature has a natural desire to know all those things that pertain to the perfection of the intellect. These include the species and genera of things and their natures. Everyone who sees the divine essence will see all these things in God.

However, it is not part of a created intellect's perfection to know other singular things and their thoughts and deeds. The intellect's natural desire does not tend toward this; nor, again, does it tend toward knowing things that do not yet exist but can be effected by God.

Still, if a created intellect were to see just God, who is the font and principle of all being and truth, He would satisfy its natural desire for knowing in such a way that nothing else would be sought, and the intellect would be beatified. This is why Augustine says in *Confessiones* 5, "A man is unhappy if he knows all those things [*read: creatures*] but does not know You, whereas he is happy if he knows You, even if he does not know those things. And even if he knows You and those things, he is not happier because of them, but is happy solely because of You."

Article 9

Do those who see God's essence see the things they see in God by means of likenesses?

It seems that those who see God's essence see the things they see in God by means of likenesses:

Objection 1: Every cognition takes place through the assimilation of the knower to what is known. For in this way the act of the intellect becomes the actuality of what is understood. And the act of the senses becomes the actuality of what is sensed insofar as the senses are informed by a likeness of that thing, in the way that the pupil is informed by a likeness of color. Therefore, if the intellect of one who sees God through His essence is to understand creatures in God, it has to be informed by likenesses of those creatures.

Objection 2: We hold in memory things that we have previously seen. But as Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, Paul, who saw God's essence in a rapture, remembered, after he ceased to see God's essence, many of the things he had seen in that rapture. Thus, in 2 Corinthians 12:4 he says that he "heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter." Therefore, one has to concede that certain likenesses of the things he remembered had remained in his intellect. And, for the same reason, while he was actually seeing God's essence, he had likenesses or species of the things that he saw in that essence.

But contrary to this: A mirror and the things that appear in the mirror are seen by means of a single species. But all things are seen in God as in a kind of intelligible mirror. Therefore, if God Himself is seen through His essence and not by means of a likeness, then the things that are seen in Him are likewise not seen by means of any likenesses or species.

I respond: Those who see God through His essence do not see the things they see in God's essence by means of any species. Rather, they see those things through the divine essence itself united to their intellect.

Each thing is known insofar as its likeness exists in the knower. But this can happen in one of two ways; for since things that are similar to one and the same thing are similar to each other, there are two ways in which a cognitive power can be assimilated to a given knowable thing. In the first way, it is assimilated to the knowable thing in its own right when it is directly informed by a likeness of that thing, and in such a case the thing is known in itself. In the second way, it is assimilated to the knowable thing insofar as it is informed by a species of something that is similar to that thing, and in such a case the thing is not said to be known in its very self, but is instead said to be known in what is similar to it. For instance, a cognition by which some man is known in himself is different from a cognition by which he is known in a picture of him.

So, then, to know things through likenesses of them that exist in the knower is to know them in themselves, i.e., in their proper natures. But to know them insofar as their likenesses preexist in God is to see them in God. And these two cognitions differ from one another.

Hence, in the sort of cognition by which things are known in God Himself by those who see God through His essence, those things are not seen by means of any other likenesses. Rather, they are seen through the divine essence itself insofar as it is present to the intellect, and it is through this essence that God is likewise seen.

Reply to objection 1: The intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to the things that are seen in God insofar as it is united to God's essence, in which likenesses of all things preexist.

Reply to objection 2: There are some cognitive powers that can form new species from species that have already been first conceived. For example, from the previously conceived species of a mountain and of gold, the imagination can form the species of a golden mountain; and from the previously conceived species of a genus and a difference, the intellect can form the definition of a species. Similarly, from the likeness of a picture we are able to form within us a likeness of the thing whose picture it is.

Thus, Paul (or anyone else who sees God) can, on the basis of the very vision of God's essence, form within himself likenesses of the things that are seen in the divine essence. And these likenesses remained in Paul even after he had ceased to see God's essence. Still, the vision by which things are

seen by means of species conceived in this way is different from the vision by which things are seen in God.

Article 10

Do those who see God through His essence see all the things they see in Him simultaneously?

It seems that those who see God through His essence do not see all the things they see in Him simultaneously:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher, it is possible to know (*scire*) many things, but to have an occurrent act of intellective understanding (*intelligere*) with respect to just one thing [at a time]. But the things which are seen in God are understood, since it is by intellective understanding (*intellectus*) that God is seen. Therefore, it is not possible for those who see God to see many things in God all at once.

Objection 2: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “God moves the spiritual creature through time,” that is, He moves the spiritual creature through acts of intellective understanding and affection. But an angel is a spiritual creature who sees God. Therefore, those who see God have acts of understanding and affection one after another; for time implies succession.

But contrary to this: In the last book of *De Trinitate* Augustine says, “Our cognitions will not be changeable, going and returning from one to another. Instead, we will see all our knowledge at once in a single vision.”

I respond: The things that are seen in the Word will be seen all at once and not successively.

To see this clearly, note that the reason why we cannot understand many things all at once is that we understand the many things by means of different species. And a single intellect cannot be actually informed by many species all at once in such a way as to understand by means of them—just as a single body cannot be configured by different shapes simultaneously.

Hence, it happens that when some multitude of things can be understood by means of a single species, they are understood all at once. Take, for example, the different parts of a given whole. If each part is understood by means of its own proper species, then the parts are understood successively and not simultaneously, whereas if they are all understood by means of the single species of the whole, then they are understood simultaneously.

Now it has been shown (a. 9) that the things which are seen in God are not seen one by one by means of their own likenesses. Rather, they are seen through the single essence of God. Therefore, they are seen all at once and not successively.

Reply to objection 1: We understand just one thing in the sense that we understand it by means of a single species. But when many things are understood by means of a single species, they are understood simultaneously. For instance, in the species *man* we understand *animal* and *rational*, and in the species *house* we understand *wall* and *roof*.

Reply to objection 2: As regards the natural cognition by which angels know things through the different species infused in them, they do not know them all simultaneously, and this is the sense in which they are moved through time with respect to intellective understanding. But insofar as they see things in God, they see them all at once.

Article 11

Is it possible for someone to see God's essence in this life?

It seems possible for someone to see God's essence in this life:

Objection 1: In Genesis 32:30 Jacob says, "I have seen God face to face." But to see God face to face is to see God through His essence—as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:12 ("We see now through a glass and dimly, but then face to face"). Therefore, God can be seen through His essence in this life.

Objection 2: In Numbers 12:8 the Lord says of Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth and plainly, and not by riddles and figures does he see God." But this is to see God through His essence. Therefore, it is possible for someone in this life to see God through His essence.

Objection 3: That in which we know all things and that by which we judge other things is known to us in itself.

But even now we know all things in God. For in *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says, "If both of us see that what you say is true, and if both of us see that what I say is true, then where, I ask, do we see this? I do not see it in you, nor do you see it in me, but rather both of us see it in that unchangeable truth which lies beyond our minds."

Likewise, in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says that we judge all things by God's truth. And in *De Trinitate* 12 he says, "It belongs to reason to judge these corporeal things by incorporeal and eternal standards, which would not be really unchangeable if they did not lie beyond our minds."

Therefore, even in this life we see God Himself.

Objection 4: According to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, the things which exist in the soul through their essence are seen by an intellectual vision. But, as he says in the same place, it is through their essences, and not through likenesses, that intelligible things are seen in an intellectual vision. Therefore, since God exists through His essence in our soul, He is seen by us through His essence.

But contrary to this: Exodus 33:20 says, "Man shall not see me and live." A Gloss adds: "As long as one is in this mortal life, God can be seen through certain images, but He cannot be seen through the very likeness of His nature."

I respond: A mere man cannot see God through His essence unless he is cut off from this mortal life. The reason is that, as was explained above (a. 4), the mode of cognition is consequent upon the mode of the nature of the thing that knows. But as long as our soul is living in this life, it has *esse* in a material body, and thus it does not naturally know things unless they have a form in matter or can be known through things of this sort. But it is clear that God's essence cannot be known through the natures of material things. For it was shown above (a. 2) that a cognition of God by means of any sort of created likeness is not a vision of His essence. Hence, it is impossible for the soul of a man living in this life to see God's essence.

One indication of this is that the more our soul is abstracted from matter, the more fit it becomes for abstract intelligibles. Hence, it is in dreams and withdrawals from the bodily senses that divine revelations and precognitions of the future are perceived. Therefore, the elevation of the soul to the highest intelligible thing, viz., God's essence, cannot occur as long as the soul partakes of this mortal life.

Reply to objection 1: According to Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, the Scriptures say that someone has seen God in the sense that sensible or imaginary figures representing something divine are fashioned according to a certain likeness. Therefore, Jacob's statement, "I have seen God face to face," should be interpreted as referring not to God's essence itself, but to a figure in which God was represented. As will become clear below when we discuss the degrees of prophecy (*ST* 2-2, q. 174, a. 3), it is itself indicative of a certain high degree of prophecy that the personage of God should be seen

speaking, even if in an imaginary vision.

An alternative reply is that Jacob is saying this in order to signify a certain high level of intelligible contemplation, beyond the normal degree.

Reply to objection 2: Just as God does something miraculous supernaturally in the case of corporeal things, so too he has likewise elevated—supernaturally and beyond the common order—the minds of certain people living in the flesh (but not using their bodily senses) all the way up to the vision of His essence. This is what Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 and in *De Videndo Deum* about Moses, who was the teacher of the Jews, and about Paul, who was the teacher of the gentiles. More will be said about this when we talk about rapture (*ST* 2-2, q. 175, a. 3).

Reply to objection 3: We are said to see all things in God and to judge all things by Him insofar as we know and judge all things through a participation in His light, since the natural light of reason is itself a certain participation in the divine light. And this is like the way in which we are said to see and judge all sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the light of the sun. Hence, in *Soliloquia* 1 Augustine says, “Proofs in the academic disciplines cannot be seen unless they are, as it were, illuminated by a sun of their own, viz., God.” Therefore, just as it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun in order to see something sensibly, so, too, it is not necessary to see God’s essence in order to see something intelligibly.

Reply to objection 4: Intellectual vision is had of those things which exist in the soul through their essence in the way that intelligible things exist in the intellect. This is the way in which God exists in the soul of the blessed in heaven, but not in our soul. Rather, He exists in our soul by His presence, essence, and power (q. 8, a. 3).

Article 12

Can we know God in this life through natural reason?

It seems that we cannot know God in this life through natural reason:

Objection 1: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says, “Reason does not grasp a simple form.” But as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7), God is a maximally simple form. Therefore, natural reason cannot attain to a cognition of Him.

Objection 2: As *De Anima* 3 says, without images the soul does not understand anything through natural reason. But there cannot exist in us a phantasm with respect to God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore, He cannot be known by us through a natural cognition.

Objection 3: Cognition through natural reason is common to both good men and bad men, just as [human] nature is common to them both. But a cognition of God belongs only to those who are good; for as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 1, “The human mind’s acuteness is not fixed in such an excellent light unless it is cleansed by the righteousness of faith.” Therefore, God cannot be known through natural reason.

But contrary to this: Romans 1:19 says, “That which is known about God is manifest in them,” i.e., that which can be known about God through natural reason.

I respond: Our natural cognition takes its origin from the senses, and so our natural cognition can extend only as far as it can be led by sensible things. But from sensible things our intellect cannot reach the vision of God’s essence, since sensible creatures are effects of God’s that are not equal to the power of their cause. Therefore, on the basis of the cognition of sensible things we cannot know the whole power of God nor, as a result, see His essence.

However, since His effects are dependent upon their cause, we can be led by those effects to know of Him whether He exists, and to know of Him what must belong to Him as the first cause of all things,

exceeding all the things He causes. Hence, we know His relationship to creatures, viz., that He is a cause of all of them; and we know how creatures differ from Him, viz., that He is not any of the things that are caused by Him; and we know that these things are denied of Him not because of any defect on His part, but rather because He exceeds the things He causes.

Reply to objection 1: Reason cannot attain to a simple form in such a way as to know of it what it is (*quid est*), but it can have a cognition of it such that it knows whether it exists.

Reply to objection 2: God is known through natural reason by means of phantasms of His effects.

Reply to objection 3: Since the cognition of God through His essence occurs by means of grace, it belongs only to those who are good. But the cognition of Him that occurs through natural reason can belong both to the good and to the bad. This is why, in *Retractationes*, Augustine says, “I do not approve of something I once said in a prayer, viz., ‘O God, who wills that only the clean should know the truth’, since one can reply that many who are not clean also know many truths”—viz., through natural reason.

Article 13

Is a deeper cognition of God had through grace than is had through natural reason?

It seems that it is not the case that a deeper cognition of God is had through grace than is had through natural reason:

Objection 1: In *De Mystica Theologia* Dionysius says that the one who is more closely united to God in this life is united to Him as to something altogether unknown; he says this even of Moses, who had a certain excellence in the cognition effected by grace. But it is likewise possible through natural reason to be conjoined to God while not knowing His real definition (*quid est*). Therefore, God is not better known to us through grace than He is through natural reason.

Objection 2: One cannot reach the cognition of divine things through natural reason except by means of phantasms. But the same thing also holds for the cognition of divine things had through grace; for in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, “It is impossible for the divine ray to illumine us unless it is enshrouded by a variety of sacred veils.” Therefore, we do not know God more fully through grace than through natural reason.

Objection 3: Our intellect adheres to God through the grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be a kind of cognition; for in *Homilia* Gregory says that there is faith (*fides*) and not cognition (*agnitio*) for those things that are not seen. Therefore, grace does not give us a more excellent cognition of God.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 2:10 the Apostle says, “To us God has revealed them by His Spirit,” viz., those things which “none of the princes of this world knew,” i.e., those things which, as a Gloss explains, none of the philosophers knew.

I respond: Through grace we have a more perfect cognition of God than we do through natural reason. This is clear from the following:

The cognition we have through natural reason requires two things, viz., (a) images taken from sensible things and (b) a natural intelligible light by virtue of which we abstract intelligible conceptions from them. And with respect to both of these, human cognition is aided by the revelation of grace.

For the natural light of the intellect is strengthened through the infusion of the light of grace. And as is clear in the case of prophetic visions, sometimes even the phantasms in a man’s imagination are divinely fashioned in order to better express divine matters than do the images that we naturally receive from sensible things. Again, sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely fashioned to express something divine. For instance, at the [Lord’s] baptism the Holy Spirit was seen in the likeness of a dove and the voice of the Father was heard saying, “This is my beloved Son.”

Reply to objection 1: Through the revelation of grace in this life we do not know the real definition (*quid est*) of God and so are conjoined to Him as, so to speak, something unknown. Still, we know Him more fully because (a) more of His effects, and more excellent effects, are shown to us and because (b) on the basis of divine revelation we attribute to Him certain things that natural reason does not attain to, e.g., that God is both three and one.

Reply to objection 2: On the basis of phantasms—either phantasms received from the senses according to the natural order or phantasms divinely fashioned in the imagination—a more excellent intellective cognition is had to the extent that the intelligible light in a man is made stronger. And so through revelation a fuller cognition is received from the phantasms because of the infusion of divine light.

Reply to objection 3: Faith is a kind of cognition insofar as the intellect is determined through faith to something knowable. But this determination to one thing proceeds not from an act of seeing on the part of the believer (*non ex visione credentis*) but rather from an act of seeing on the part of the one who is believed. And so, insofar as there is no act of seeing (*inquantum deest visio*), faith falls short of the type of cognition that is found in scientific knowledge (*scientia*). For scientific knowledge determines the intellect to one thing through an act of seeing and understanding first principles.

QUESTION 13

The Names of God

Now that we have considered what pertains to our cognition of God, we must proceed to a consideration of the names of God. For each thing is named by us insofar as we know it. On this topic there are twelve questions: (1) Can God be named by us? (2) Are some of the names said of God predicated of him substantively? (3) Are some of the names said of God said of Him properly, or are all the names attributed to Him metaphorically? (4) Are the many names said of God synonyms? (5) Are some names said univocally of God and creatures, or are they all said equivocally? (6) Assuming that the names are said analogously, are they said in the primary sense (*per prius*) of God or of creatures? (7) Are some names said of God from a given point in time? (8) Is the name 'God' the name of a nature or of an operation? (9) Is the name 'God' a shareable name? (10) Is the name 'God' taken univocally or equivocally in signifying God through nature, according to participation, and according to opinion? (11) Is the name 'He Who Is' ('*Qui est*') an especially proper name of God? (12) Can affirmative propositions be formulated about God?

Article 1

Does any name befit God?

It seems that no name befits God:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, "There is no name for Him, or even a conjecture." And Proverbs 30:4 says: "What is His name, and what is the name of His son, if you know?"

Objection 2: Every name is predicated either abstractly (*in abstracto*) or concretely (*in concreto*). But names that signify concretely do not belong to God because He is simple; and names that signify abstractly do not belong to Him because they do not signify anything that is a complete subsistent being. Therefore, no name can be said of God.

Objection 3: Names signify a substance with a quality, whereas verbs and participles signify temporally, and pronouns signify either demonstratively or relatively. But none of these belong to God. For He exists without qualities and, indeed, without any accident; and He exists without time; and He cannot be sensed, so that He might be pointed at; nor can He be signified relatively, since relative [pronouns] refer back to antecedents that are names or participles or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore, God cannot be named by us in any way.

But contrary to this: Exodus 15:3 says, "The Lord is as a man of war, Almighty is His name."

I respond: According to the Philosopher, spoken words are signs of acts of intellectual understanding (*signa intellectuum*), and acts of intellectual understanding are likenesses of things (*rerum similitudines*). And so it is clear that spoken words are used to signify things by the mediation of the intellect's conception (*mediante conceptione intellectus*). Therefore, insofar as we can have a cognition of a thing through an act of intellectual understanding, it can be named by us.

Now it was shown above (q. 12, a. 12) that in this life we cannot see God through His essence, but that instead we have cognition of Him from creatures (a) in His status as a principle, (b) through the way of preeminence, and (c) through the way of negation (*secundum habitudinem principii et per modum excellentiae et remotionis*). Therefore, God can be named by us from creatures, but not in such a way that the name signifying Him expresses what the divine essence is—i.e., not in the way that the name 'man' expresses by its signification the essence of man as such. For 'man' signifies the definition of a man, thus making clear his essence, since the conception (*ratio*) that the name signifies is the definition.

Reply to objection 1: The reason that God is said not to have a name, or to be beyond naming, is that His essence is beyond that which we understand intellectually about God and which we signify by spoken words.

Reply to objection 2: Since we come to the cognition of God from creatures and on this basis name Him, the names that we attribute to God signify in a mode that belongs to material creatures, the cognition of which is connatural to us, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 4).

Among creatures of this sort, the ones that are complete and subsistent are composite, whereas in their case form is not a complete subsistent thing, but is instead that by which something is such-and-such. Because of this, all the names that we impose to signify something complete (*completum*) and subsistent signify concretely (*in concretione*), since they belong to composite things. On the other hand, the names that are imposed to signify simple forms signify something not as subsistent but as that by which something is such-and-such; for instance, ‘whiteness’ signifies that by which something is white.

Therefore, since God is both simple and subsistent, we attribute to him both (a) *abstract* names, in order to signify His simplicity, and (b) *concrete* names, in order to signify His subsistence and completeness (*perfectionem*), even though both sorts of names fall short of His mode of being—just as, in this life, our intellect does not know Him as He is.

Reply to objection 3: To signify “a substance with a quality” is to signify a suppositum with a determinate nature or form in which it subsists. Hence, since, as has just been explained, some names are said of God concretely (*in concretione*) in order to signify His subsistence and completeness, it follows that some names that signify “a substance with a quality” are said of God.

On the other hand, verbs and participles that co-signify a time are said of Him because eternity includes all of time. For just as we are to able to apprehend and signify simple subsistent things only in the mode of composite things, so we can understand and verbally express eternity only in the mode of temporal things. This is because our intellectual understanding is connatural with composite and temporal things.

Pronouns are said of God insofar as they refer demonstratively to that which is understood, not to that which is sensed. For to the extent that something is understood by us, it falls under demonstrative reference.

And just as it is in this way that names and participles and demonstrative pronouns are said of God, so too it is in this way that God can be signified by relative pronouns.

Article 2

Is any name said of God substantively?

It seems that no name is said of God substantively (*substantialiter*):

Objection 1: Damascene says, “It must be the case that each of the things said of God does not signify what He is according to His substance, but rather expresses either what He is not, or some relation, or something that follows from His nature or operation.”

Objection 2: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, “You will find all the hymns of the holy theologians dividing the names of God in a clear and praiseworthy manner according to the beneficent processions of the supreme deity.” His meaning is that the names that the holy doctors use in praise of God are distinguished in accord with what proceeds from God Himself (*secundum processum ipsius Dei*). But that which signifies what proceeds from a given thing does not signify anything

pertaining to its essence. Therefore, the names said of God are not said of Him substantively.

Objection 3: A thing is named by us insofar as it is understood. But in this life we cannot understand God according to His substance. Therefore, neither can any name imposed by us be said of God according to His substance.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “But in the case of God, to be is the same as to be powerful or to be wise or whatever else you might say of that simplicity, by which His substance is signified.” Therefore, all names of this sort signify the divine substance.

I respond: As regards those names which are said of God *negatively* or which signify His *relation to creatures*, it is clear that they do not signify His substance in any way. Rather, they signify either (a) the denial of something of Him or (b) His relation to another (or, better, another’s relation to Him).

However, as regards the names that are said of God *affirmatively* and *non-relationally* (*absolute*)—such as ‘good’, ‘wise’, and others of this sort—there are differing opinions.

Some have claimed that even though all these names are said affirmatively of God, we nonetheless find that they deny something of God rather than posit something in Him. Thus, they claim that when we say that God is living, what we signify is that God does not exist in the way that non-living things do; and all the other cases should be dealt with in a similar way. This is the position of Rabbi Moses.

Others claim that these names are imposed to signify a relation of God to created things. For instance, when we say that God is good, the meaning is that God is a cause of goodness in things. And the same line of reasoning holds in the other cases.

But both of these positions seem wrong, and for three reasons:

First, neither of these positions can explain why certain names are said of God rather than others. For example, He is a cause of bodies in the same way that He is a cause of good things. So if, when God is called good, nothing is signified other than that He is a cause of good things, one could likewise claim that God is a body because He is a cause of bodies. Again, in saying that He is a body, one would be denying that He is merely a being in potentiality, like primary matter.

Second, it follows that all the names said of God would be said of Him in a derived sense (*per posterius*), in the way that ‘healthy’ is said in a derived sense of medicine by virtue of the fact that it signifies merely that medicine is a cause of health in an animal, which is called ‘healthy’ in the primary sense (*per prius*).

Third, the positions in question are contrary to the intention of those who speak about God. For when they say that God is living, they mean something other than that He is a cause of our life or that He differs from non-living bodies.

And so we must respond in another way by claiming that (a) names of this sort do indeed signify the divine substance and are predicated of God substantively, but that (b) they fall short in their representation of Him (*deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius*). This is clear as follows:

Names signify God according to the way in which our intellect has cognition of Him. But when our intellect has a cognition of God from creatures, it has a cognition of Him in accord with the way in which creatures represent Him. Now it was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that God, as a being who is perfect absolutely speaking and in all respects, contains within Himself all the perfections of creatures. Hence, each creature represents Him, and is similar to Him, to the extent that it has some perfection—not in the sense that it represents Him as something of the same species or genus, but rather in the sense that it represents Him as a supreme principle whose effects fall short of His form, but to whom His effects nonetheless bear some sort of similarity in the way that the forms of lower bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (q. 4, a. 3) when we were discussing God’s perfection. So, then, the names mentioned above signify God’s substance, albeit imperfectly, in the same way that creatures represent God’s substance. Thus, when God is said to be good, the meaning is not that God is a cause of goodness or that God is not evil; rather, the meaning is that what we call goodness in creatures preexists

in God and does so in some higher mode. Hence, from this it follows not that ‘good’ belongs to God insofar as He causes goodness, but rather, just the opposite, that because God is good, He diffuses His goodness to things—in accord with Augustine’s claim in *De Doctrina Christiana* that “because He is good, we exist.”

Reply to objection 1: Damascene is claiming that these names do not signify what God is because none of them expresses perfectly what God is; instead, each signifies Him imperfectly, just as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

Reply to objection 2: In the signification of names, it is sometimes the case that *that because of which* a name is imposed to signify differs from *what* the name is imposed to signify. For instance, the name ‘rock’ (*lapis*) is imposed *because* a rock hurts the foot (*laedit pedem*). However, it is imposed not to signify what ‘hurts the foot’ signifies, but instead to signify a certain species of corporeal thing; otherwise, everything that hurts the foot would be a rock.

Therefore, one should claim that divine names of the sort in question are, to be sure, imposed because of what proceeds from God. For just as creatures represent God, though imperfectly, according to the diverse processions of perfections [from God], so too our intellect has cognition of God and names God with respect to each of these processions. Yet these names are not imposed to signify the processions themselves—as if it were the case that when God is said to be living, the meaning is that life proceeds from Him. Rather, they are imposed to signify the very principle of things insofar as life preexists in Him, though in a more eminent way than is understood or signified by us.

Reply to objection 3: In this life we cannot have a cognition of God’s essence as it is in itself. Rather, we have a cognition of it insofar as it is represented in the perfections had by creatures. And this is how the names imposed by us signify God’s essence.

Article 3

Are some names said of God properly, or are all names attributed to Him metaphorically?

It seems that no name is said of God properly:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), all the names that we say of God are taken from creatures. But the names of creatures are said metaphorically of God, as when God is said to be a rock or a lion or something of that sort. Therefore, all the names said of God are said metaphorically.

Objection 2: No name is properly said of a thing that is such that the name is more truly denied of it than predicated of it. But according to Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 2, all names such as ‘good’, ‘wise’, etc., are more truly denied of God than predicated of Him. Therefore, none of these names is said of God properly.

Objection 3: The names of corporeal things are said only metaphorically of God, since He is incorporeal. But all names of the sort in question imply certain corporeal conditions, since they signify temporally and with composition and with other things of this sort, which are conditions of corporeal things. Therefore, all names of this sort are said of God metaphorically.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide* 2 Ambrose says, “There are some names that point clearly to what is proper to God, and there are some that express the clear truth about God’s majesty. By contrast, there are other names that are transferred to God because of some likeness.” Therefore, not all names are said of God metaphorically; instead, some are said properly.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 2), we have cognition of God from the perfections that

proceed from Him to creatures. To be sure, these perfections exist in God in a more eminent manner than in creatures. However, our intellect apprehends them in the way in which they exist in creatures, and it signifies them by names in accord with how it apprehends them.

Therefore, there are two things to consider regarding the names we attribute to God, viz., (a) the perfections that are signified, e.g., goodness, life, etc., and (b) the mode of signifying.

With regard to *what is signified* by names of this sort, these perfections belong properly to God—indeed, they belong more properly to Him than to the creatures themselves, and they are said of God in the primary sense (*per prius*).

On the other hand, as regards *the mode of signifying*, these names are not said of God properly, since they have a mode of signifying that belongs to creatures.

Reply to objection 1: Perfections that proceed from God to creatures are signified by some of these names in such a way that the imperfect way in which the creature participates in the divine perfection is itself included in what the name signifies. For instance, ‘rock’ signifies something that exists materially. Names of this sort can be predicated of God only metaphorically.

On the other hand, some names signify the perfections themselves absolutely speaking, without including in their signification any mode of participation. Examples are ‘being’, ‘good’, ‘living’, and others of this sort. Such names are said of God properly.

Reply to objection 2: Dionysius is claiming that names of this sort are denied of God because what is signified by the name belongs to Him not in the mode by which the name signifies it, but instead in a more excellent mode. Hence, in the same place Dionysius says that God lies beyond every substance and every life.

Reply to objection 3: The names that are said of God properly do not imply corporeal conditions in the very thing signified by the name; rather, they imply corporeal conditions with respect to their mode of signifying. By contrast, the names that are said of God metaphorically imply a corporeal condition in the very thing that they signify.

Article 4

Are the names said of God synonyms?

It seems that the names said of God are synonymous names (*nomina synonyma*):

Objection 1: Names are called synonyms when they signify exactly the same thing. But the names said of God signify exactly the same thing in God, since God’s goodness is His essence, and so is His wisdom. Therefore, these names are exact synonyms (*omnino synonyma*).

Objection 2: Someone might reply that these names signify the same reality, but do it according to diverse concepts (*secundum rationes diversas*).

Against this: A concept is empty when nothing in reality corresponds to it. Therefore, if these concepts are many and the reality is one, it seems that the concepts are empty.

Objection 3: A thing which is one both in reality and in concept (*unum re et ratione*) is one to a greater degree than a thing which is one in reality and many in concept. But God is maximally one. Therefore, it seems that He is not one in reality and many in concept. And thus the names said of God do not signify diverse concepts, and so they are synonyms.

But contrary to this: All synonyms, when strung together, produce something silly—as, e.g., if someone were to say, “Clothes garments.” Therefore, if all the names said of God were synonyms, then it could not be fitting to say “good God” or anything else of this sort. Yet in Jeremiah 32:18 it is written,

“Most mighty, great, and powerful, Lord of hosts is Your name.”

I respond: Names of the sort in question, when said of God, are not synonyms.

This would be easy to see if we were claiming that names of this sort are used to deny something of God or to designate His status as a cause with respect to creatures. For in that case there would be diverse concepts associated with those names corresponding to the diverse things that were being denied or to the diverse effects that were being connoted.

But even given that it has already been explained (a. 2) that names of this sort signify the divine substance, albeit imperfectly, it is still obvious, on the basis of what was said above (aa. 1-2), that these names have diverse concepts. For the concept signified by a name is the intellect’s conception of the reality signified by the name. But since our intellect has cognition of God from creatures, in order to understand God it forms concepts proportioned to the perfections that proceed from God to creatures. These perfections preexist in God in a simple and unified way, whereas they are received in creatures in a fragmented and diversified way. Therefore, corresponding to the diverse perfections of creatures there is a simple unified principle, represented in various and multiple ways by the diverse perfections of the creatures; and in the very same way, corresponding to the various and multiple concepts of our intellect there is a unified and altogether simple being that is imperfectly understood by means of conceptions of the sort in question.

So even though the names attributed to God signify a single reality, they are nonetheless not synonyms; for they signify that reality under many and diverse concepts.

Reply to objection 1: The answer to the first objection is clear from what has been said. For names are called synonyms when they signify a single thing under a single concept (*significans unum secundum unam rationem*). Names that signify diverse concepts of a single thing do not signify that one thing *per se* and primarily, since, as has been explained (a. 1), a name signifies a thing only through the mediation of a conception of the intellect.

Reply to objection 2: The many concepts associated with these names are not hollow and empty, because corresponding to all of them there is some one simple thing, represented by all of them in a diversified and imperfect way.

Reply to objection 3: The very fact that what exists in a diversified and multiplied way in other things exists in a simple and unified way in God attests to God’s perfect oneness. And the fact that He is one in reality and many in concept stems from the fact that our intellect apprehends Him in a multiplicity of ways, just as things represent Him in a multiplicity of ways.

Article 5

Are the names said of both God and creatures said of them univocally?

It seems that what is said of both God and creatures is said of them univocally:

Objection 1: Whatever is equivocal is traced back to something univocal, in the same way that what is many is traced back to what is one. For instance, if the name ‘dog’ is said equivocally of something that barks and of a fish, then it must be said of some things univocally, viz., of everything that barks. Otherwise, there would be an infinite regress.

Now some agents are univocal, agreeing with their effects in both name and definition, e.g., a man generates a man, whereas other agents are equivocal, e.g., the sun generates something that is hot, even though it itself is hot only equivocally.

Therefore, it seems that the first agent, to which all other agents are traced back, is a univocal

agent. And so what is said of both God and creatures is predicated univocally.

Objection 2: No likeness is found among equivocals. Therefore, since, according to Genesis 1:26 (“Let us make man to our image and likeness”), God has some likeness with a creature, it seems that something is said univocally of God and creatures.

Objection 3: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, a measure is homogenous with that which is measured by it. But, as it says in the same place, God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore, God is homogenous with creatures. And so something can be said univocally of God and creatures.

But contrary to this:

1. Whatever is predicated of given things according to the same name but not the same concept is predicated of them equivocally. But no name belongs to God according to the same concept by which it is said of a creature. For instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God; and when the genus is varied, it changes the concept, since the genus is part of the definition. Moreover, the same line of reasoning holds for the other cases. Therefore, whatever is said of both God and creatures is said equivocally.

2. God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from one another. But because of the distance between certain creatures, it turns out that nothing can be predicated univocally of them; for instance, nothing can be predicated univocally of things that do not agree in some genus. Therefore, *a fortiori*, nothing is predicated univocally of God and creatures; instead, everything is predicated equivocally.

I respond: It is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and creatures. For any effect that does not measure up to the full power of its agent cause receives a likeness of the agent that is not of the same nature as the agent, but falls short of it. The result is that what exists in the effects in a fragmented and diversified way exists in the cause in a simple and unified way. For instance, by its unified power the sun produces many and varied forms in lower bodies. In the same way, as was explained above (a. 4), all the perfections that exist in created things in a fragmented and diversified way preexist in God in a unified way.

So, then, when a name pertaining to a perfection is said of a creature, it signifies that perfection as something distinct in definition from other perfections. For instance, when the name ‘wise’ is said of a man, we signify a perfection distinct from the man’s essence and from his power and from his *esse*, etc. By contrast, when we predicate this name of God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence or from His power or from His *esse*. And so when the name ‘wise’ is said of a man, it in some sense circumscribes and comprehends the thing that is signified. But this is not the case when ‘wise’ is said of God; instead, the thing signified is left as something that is uncomprehended and that exceeds the signification of the name. From this it is clear that the name ‘wise’ is not said of both God and the man according to same concept. Moreover, this line of reasoning applies to all other such cases. Hence, no name is predicated univocally of God and creatures.

But neither are such names predicated in a purely equivocal way, as some have claimed. For if this were so, then it would be impossible to know or demonstrate anything about God from creatures; instead, there would always be a fallacy of equivocation. And this is contrary to the philosophers, who prove many things demonstratively about God, and also contrary to the Apostle, who says in Romans 1:20, “The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

Therefore, one should say that names of the sort in question are said of God and creatures according to an analogy, i.e., a proportion. This can occur in two ways among names: either (a) because many things have a proportion to one thing, as when ‘healthy’ is said of medicine and of urine insofar as both are ordered and proportioned to the health of an animal, the latter as a sign of health and the former as a cause of health; or (b) because the one thing has a proportion to the other, as when ‘healthy’ is said

of medicine and of an animal, insofar as medicine is a cause of the health that exists in the animal. It is in this latter way that certain things are said analogously—and neither univocally nor purely equivocally—of God and creatures. For, as was explained above (a. 1), we cannot name God except from creatures. And so whatever is said of God and creatures is said insofar as the creature is ordered toward God as toward a principle and cause in which the perfections of all things preexist in a most excellent way.

This mode of commonality falls between pure equivocation and simple univocity. For in things that are said analogously there is not just one concept, as there is in the case of univocals. Nor are the concepts totally diverse, as in the case of equivocals. Rather, the name is said in many ways, so that it signifies diverse relations to some one thing—just as ‘healthy’, when said of urine, signifies a sign of the health of an animal, whereas, when said of medicine, it signifies a cause of that same health.

Reply to objection 1: Even though the equivocal is traced back to the univocal in the case of predications, nonetheless, in the case of actions a non-univocal agent necessarily precedes a univocal agent. For a non-univocal agent is a universal cause of a whole species, in the way that the sun is a cause of the generation of all men. By contrast, a univocal agent is not a universal agent cause of a whole species (otherwise, it would be a cause of itself, since it itself is contained in the species); rather, it is a particular cause with respect to *this* individual, which it constitutes as something that participates in the species. Therefore, a universal cause of a whole species is not a univocal agent. But a universal cause is prior to a particular cause.

However, even though this universal agent is not a univocal agent, it is nonetheless not altogether equivocal, since if it were, it would not effect anything that is similar to itself. Rather, it can be called an analogous agent—just as, in the case of predication, all univocal things are traced back to one primary thing which is not univocal but analogous, viz., *being*.

Reply to objection 2: The likeness of a creature to God is imperfect, because, as was said above (q. 4, a. 3), a creature does not represent God as being the same in genus with itself.

Reply to objection 3: God is not a measure that is proportioned to the things that are measured. Hence, God and creatures do not have to be contained in a single genus.

Reply to argument 1 and argument 2 for the contrary: The arguments on behalf of the contrary position show only that names of the sort in question are not predicated univocally of God and creatures. They do not, however, show that these names are predicated equivocally.

Article 6

Are names said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God?

It seems that names are said in the primary sense (*per prius*) of creatures rather than of God:

Objection 1: We name a thing according to the way in which we have cognition of it; for, according to the Philosopher, names are signs of acts of understanding. But we have cognition of creatures prior to cognition of God. Therefore, the names imposed by us apply in the primary sense to creatures rather than to God.

Objection 2: According to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, we name God from creatures. But names transferred from creatures to God—e.g., ‘lion’, ‘rock’, etc.—are said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God. Therefore, all the names that are said of both God and creatures are said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God.

Objection 3: As Dionysius says, all names that are said in common of God and creatures are

said of God as a cause of all things. But what is said of something because it is a cause is said of that thing in a derived sense. For example, ‘healthy’ is said in the primary sense of an animal rather than of medicine, which is a cause of health. Therefore, names of this sort are said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God.

But contrary to this: Ephesians 3:14-15 says, “I bend my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named.” And the same line of reasoning seems to hold for the other names that are said of God and creatures. Therefore, these names are said in the primary sense of God rather than of creatures.

I respond: In the case of all names that are said of many things analogously, there must be some one thing with respect to which they are all said, and so that one thing must be posited in the definition of all of them. And since, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the concept signified by the name is the definition, the name is said in the primary sense of that which is posited in the definition of the others, and it is said in a derived sense of the others in accord with the ordering by which they approach that first thing to greater or lesser degrees. For instance, ‘healthy’ as said of an animal is found both (a) in the definition of ‘healthy’ as said of medicine, which is called healthy because it causes health in an animal, and (b) in the definition of ‘healthy’ as said of urine, which is called healthy because it is a sign of an animal’s health.

So, then, all the names that are said metaphorically of God are said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God. For as said of God, they signify only likenesses to such creatures. In the same way, ‘smiling’, as said of a meadow, signifies—according to a likeness of proportion—nothing other than that when a meadow is blossoming, it is attractive like a man is when he is smiling. So, too, the name ‘lion’, as said of God, signifies only that God operates in His works as powerfully as a lion does in its works. And so it is clear that when such names are said of God, their signification can be defined only by reference to what is said of creatures.

Now as regards those other names, which are not said of God metaphorically, the same line of reasoning would also hold for them if, as some have claimed, they were said of God only insofar as He is a cause. For on such a view, when God is said to be good, this would mean only that God is a cause of goodness in creatures, and so the name ‘good’, as said of God, would include in its meaning the goodness of creatures. In that case, ‘good’ would be said in the primary sense of creatures rather than of God.

However, it was shown above (a. 2) that names of this sort are said of God with respect to His essence and not of God simply as a cause. For when it is said that God is good or wise, what is signified is not only that He is a cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these perfections preexist in Him in a more eminent way.

Accordingly, one should claim that as regards *the reality that is signified* by such names, these names are said in the primary sense of God rather than of creatures. For perfections of this sort emanate from God to creatures. On the other hand, as regards the imposition of the names, they are imposed by us in the first place (*per prius*) on creatures, which we have cognition of first. Hence, as was explained above (a. 3), they have a *mode of signifying* that belongs to creatures.

Reply to objection 1: This objection has to do with the imposition of the name.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, it is not the case that the same line of reasoning holds both for names that are said metaphorically of God and for the other names.

Reply to objection 3: This objection takes for granted that these names are said of God only as a cause—in the way that ‘healthy’ is said of medicine—and not with respect to His essence.

Article 7

Are names that imply a relation to creatures said of God from a given point in time?

It seems that names implying a relation to creatures are not said of God from a given point in time:

Objection 1: As is commonly claimed, all names of the sort in question signify the divine substance; thus, Ambrose says that the name ‘Lord’ is a name of power, which is God’s substance, and that the name ‘Creator’ signifies God’s action, which is His essence. But the divine essence is eternal and not temporal. Therefore, names of this sort are said of God from eternity and not from a given point in time.

Objection 2: Anything to which something belongs from a given point in time can be said to become such-and-such; for instance, that which is white from a given point in time becomes white. But it does not befit God to become such-and-such. Therefore, nothing is predicated of God from a given point in time.

Objection 3: If some names are said of God from a given point in time because they imply a relation to creatures, then, it seems, the same account will hold for all names that imply a relation to creatures. But some names that imply a relation to creatures are said of God from eternity; for example, according to Jeremiah 31:3 (“I have loved you with an everlasting love”), He knew and loved a creature from eternity. Therefore, the other names that imply a relation to creatures, e.g., ‘Lord’ and ‘Creator’, are likewise said of God from eternity.

Objection 4: Names of the sort in question signify a relation. Therefore, that relation must be either something in God or something just in the creature. But it is impossible for it to exist only in the creature. For if this were so, then God would be called ‘Lord’ because of the [corresponding] opposite relation that exists in the creature. But nothing is denominated from its own opposite. Therefore, it follows that the relation is also something in God. But nothing can exist in God from a given point in time, since He Himself is beyond time. Therefore, it seems that names of this sort are not said of God from a given point in time.

Objection 5: Something is predicated relationally because of a relation; for instance, ‘lord’ is predicated because of lordship, just as ‘white’ is predicated because of whiteness. Therefore, if the relation of lordship exists in God not as a real being but only as a being of reason (*non secundum rem sed solum secundum rationem*), then it follows that God is not really a lord—which is patently false.

Objection 6: In relatives that are not simultaneous in nature, the one can exist without the other existing; for instance, according to the *Categories*, what is knowable exists even when knowledge of it does not exist. But relatives that are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore, it is possible for something to be predicated relationally of God with respect to a creature even when no creatures exist. And so names of this sort, such as ‘Lord’ and ‘Creator’, are said of God from eternity and not from a given point in time.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine says that the relational name ‘Lord’ belongs to God from a given point in time.

I respond: Some names implying a relation to a creature are said of God from a given point in time and not from eternity.

To see this clearly, note that some have claimed that relations are not real beings but only beings of reason. This seems false, because things themselves have a natural ordering to and connection with one another. Still, notice that because a relation requires two terms or extremes (*extrema*), there are three possible cases in which a relation might be either a real being (*res naturae*) or a being of reason (*res*

rationis):

Sometimes a relation is only a being of reason on the part of both extremes, viz., when the ordering or connection can exist between them only because of reason's apprehension—as, e.g., when we say that the same thing is the same as itself. For insofar as reason apprehends some one thing twice, it counts it as two and in this way apprehends a certain relation of the thing to itself. The same holds for all relations between a being and a non-being; such relations are formed by reason insofar as it apprehends a non-being as a kind of extreme. Again, the same holds for all relations that follow upon an act of reason, e.g., *genus* and *species*, etc.

By contrast, some relations are real beings on the part of both extremes, viz., when there is a connection between two things insofar as something belongs to both of them in reality. This is clear, for instance, in the case of all relations that follow upon quantity, e.g., *large* and *small*, *double* and *half*, etc.; for quantity exists in both of the extremes. The same holds for relations that follow upon action and passion, e.g., *mover* and *moveable*, *father* and *son*, etc.

Sometimes, however, the relation is a real being in one of the extremes and only a being of reason in the other extreme. This happens whenever the two extremes do not belong to the same order. For instance, sensation and knowledge are related to the sensible thing and the knowable thing, which, insofar as they are entities with natural *esse*, lie outside the order of sensible *esse* and intelligible *esse*. And so there is a real relation in the knowledge and sensation, insofar as they are ordered toward knowing or sensing real entities. However, these real entities, considered just in themselves, lie outside the order of knowing and sensing, and so in them there is no real relation to the knowledge and sensation; instead, there is only a relation of reason, insofar as the intellect apprehends them as the extremes of the relations of knowledge and sensation. This is why, in *Metaphysics* 5, the Philosopher claims that these entities receive the predication of the relational names ['sensible' and 'knowable'] not because they themselves are related to the others, but rather because the others are related to them. In the same way, 'to the right' is said of a column only because it is positioned to the right of the animal. Hence, a relation of this sort is a real relation not in the column, but in the animal.

Therefore, because God lies outside the whole order of creatures, and because all creatures are ordered toward Him and not vice versa, it is clear that creatures have real relations to God, whereas in God there are no real relations of Him to creatures, but only relations of reason, insofar as the creatures are related to Him. And so nothing prevents names of the sort in question, which imply a relation to a creature, from being predicated of God from a given point in time, not because of any change in Him, but because of a change in the creature—just as the column is to the right of the animal not because of a change that involves the column, but because the animal has moved.

Reply to objection 1: Some relational names—e.g., 'lord', and 'servant', 'father' and 'son', etc.—are imposed to signify the relations themselves (*ipsas habitudines relativas*), and these are called relatives *secundum esse*. On the other hand, some relational names—e.g., 'mover' and 'moved', 'head' and 'having a head', etc.—are imposed to signify things that certain relations follow upon, and these are called relatives *secundum dici*.

This distinction, then, must be taken into account in the case of God's names, too. For some of them, e.g., 'Lord', signify the relation itself to a creature. And names of this sort signify God's substance indirectly rather than directly, because they presuppose it. For instance, lordship presupposes the power that is the divine substance. On the other hand, some of these names signify the divine essence directly. For instance, 'Savior', 'Creator' and others of this sort signify God's action, which is His essence, and derivatively imply a relation (*ex consequenti important habitudinem*).

Both sorts of names are said of God from a given point in time as regards the relations they imply either principally or as a consequence, but not insofar as they signify His essence, whether directly or indirectly.

Reply to objection 2: Relations that are said of God from a given point in time exist in God only as beings of reason, and so it is not being said of God either that He becomes such-and-such or that He is made such-and-such—except according to reason and without any change existing in Him, as, e.g., “Lord, you have become our refuge.”

Reply to objection 3: Operations of the intellect and will exist within the one who is operating, and names signifying relations following upon an act of intellect or will are said of God from eternity. However, names such as ‘Savior’ and ‘Creator’, which follow upon these acts as they proceed (in our way of understanding it) to outward effects are said of God from a given point in time.

Reply to objection 4: Relations signified by names that are said of God from a given point in time exist in God only according to reason, whereas the opposite relations exist in reality in the creatures. And it is not inappropriate that God should be denominated from relations which really exist in the creature, insofar as our intellect understands along with them the opposed relations in God. For God receives the predication of relational names with respect to a creature because the creature is related to Him—just as the Philosopher claims in *Metaphysics* 5 that an intelligible thing receives the predication of a relational name because the knowledge is related to it.

Reply to objection 5: God is related to a creature in virtue of the fact that the creature is related to Him. Since the relation of subjection to God really exists in the creature, it follows that God is a Lord not only according to reason, but in reality. For He is called ‘Lord’ in the sense that the creature is subject to Him.

Reply to objection 6: To determine whether or not relatives are simultaneous in nature, one must consider the signification of the relational names themselves rather than the ordering of the things of which the relational names are said. For if the one name includes the other within its conception and vice versa, then they are simultaneous in nature—e.g., ‘double’ and ‘half’, ‘father’ and ‘son’, and others of this sort. On the other hand, if the one includes the other within its conception but not vice versa, then they are not simultaneous in nature. This is the way in which ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowable’ are related. For ‘knowable’ is said according to potentiality, whereas ‘knowledge’ is said according to habit or act. Hence, the knowable, given the way in which it is signified, exists before the knowledge of it. However, if ‘knowable’ is taken according to act, it is simultaneous with ‘knowledge’ taken according to act; for nothing is [actually] known unless there is [actual] knowledge of it.

Thus, even though God is prior to creatures, nonetheless, because the signification of ‘lord’ includes having a servant and vice versa, the two relational names ‘lord’ and ‘servant’ are simultaneous in nature. Hence, God was not a Lord before He had a creature subject to Him.

Article 8

Is the name ‘God’ the name of a nature or an operation?

It seems that the name ‘God’ is not the name of a nature:

Objection 1: In [*De Fide Orthodoxa*] 1 Damascene says, “‘God’ (*théos*) is taken either from *théein*, i.e., to course through and nurture all things, or from *aíthein*, i.e., to burn (for God is our fire who consumes all malice), or from *theásthai*, i.e., to consider all things.” But all of these pertain to operation. Therefore, the name ‘God’ signifies an operation and not a nature.

Objection 2: A thing is named by us insofar as it is known. But God’s nature is unknown to us. Therefore, the name ‘God’ does not signify God’s nature.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide* 1 Ambrose says that ‘God’ is the name of a nature.

I respond: *What* a name is imposed to signify is not always the same as *that because of which* the name is imposed to signify. For just as we know the substance of a thing from its properties or operations, so sometimes we denominate the substance of the thing from some operation or property of it. For instance, we denominate the substance of a rock (*lapis*) from one of its actions, viz., that it hurts the foot (*laedit pedem*); still, the name ‘rock’ is imposed to signify the substance of the rock and not this action.

On the other hand, if the things in question are known to us in themselves—e.g., cold, heat, whiteness, etc.—then we do not denominate them from other things. Hence, in such cases what a name signifies is the same as that because of which it is imposed to signify.

Therefore, since God is not known to us in His nature, but is instead known to us from His operations and effects, it is possible for us to name Him from these operations and effects, as was explained above (a. 1). Hence, as regards that because of which the name is imposed to signify, the name ‘God’ is the name of an operation. For this name is imposed because of His universal providence over things, since everyone who talks about God intends to name God from the fact that He has universal providence over things. Thus, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 12, Dionysius says, “The deity is the one who oversees all things with perfect providence and goodness.” Nonetheless, the name ‘God’, having been taken from this operation, is imposed to signify God’s nature.

Reply to objection 1: All the things Damascene posited pertain to the providence because of which the name ‘God’ is imposed to signify.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as we can have cognition of the nature of a given thing from its properties and effects, we are able to signify it by a name. Hence, because from its properties we can have cognition of the substance of a rock in itself, by knowing what (*quid est*) a rock is, the name ‘rock’ signifies the very nature of a rock as it is in itself. For it signifies the definition of a rock, through which we know what a rock is. For, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the concept that the name signifies is the definition (*ratio quam significat nomen est definitio*).

However, from God’s effects we cannot have cognition of God’s nature as it is in itself, i.e., we cannot have cognition of it in such a way as to know of it what it is; instead, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 12), we know it through the ways of preeminence and causality and negation (*per modum eminentiae et causalitatis et negationis*). And so the name ‘God’ signifies God’s nature. For the name is imposed to signify something which exists above all things, which is a principle of all things, and which is denied of all things. For this is what those who name God intend to signify.

Article 9

Is the name ‘God’ a shareable name?

It seems that the name God is shareable (*communicabilis*):

Objection 1: If the thing signified by a name is shared, then the name itself is shared. But, as has been explained (a. 8), the name ‘God’ signifies God’s nature, which can be shared by others, according to 2 Peter 1:4 (“He has given us great and precious promises: that by these we may be made partakers of the divine nature”). Therefore, the name ‘God’ is shareable.

Objection 2: It is only proper names that cannot be shared. But the name ‘God’ is an appellative name and not a proper name; this is clear from the fact that it has a plural form, according to Psalm 81:6 (“I have said: you are gods”). Therefore, the name ‘God’ is shareable.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 8), the name ‘God’ is imposed because of an operation.

But other names imposed on God because of His operations or effects are shareable, e.g., ‘good’, ‘wise’, etc. Therefore, the name ‘God’ is shareable as well.

But contrary to this: In speaking of the name ‘God’, Wisdom 14:21 says, “They gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood.” Therefore, the name ‘God’ is unshareable.

I respond: A name can be shareable in two ways: (a) *properly (proprie)* and (b) *through a likeness (per similitudinem)*. A name is *properly* shareable insofar as the entire signification of the name is shareable by many, whereas a name is shareable *through a likeness* insofar as it is shareable with respect to some of the things included in the name’s signification. For instance, the name ‘lion’ is properly shareable by all those things in which the nature signified by the name ‘lion’ is found, whereas it is shareable through a likeness by things that participate in some feature of lions—say, audacity or courage—and that are called lions metaphorically.

Now to determine which names are properly shareable, we must take into account that every form that exists in a singular suppositum that individuates it is shareable by many, either in reality or at least conceivably (*vel secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem*). For instance, human nature is common to many both in reality and conceivably, whereas the nature of the sun is common to many not in reality, but only conceivably; for the nature of the sun can be conceived of as existing in many supposita. This is because the intellect understands the nature of a given species by abstraction from the singular. Hence, the question of whether the nature actually exists in just one suppositum or in many supposita lies beyond our conception (*intellectus*) of the nature of the species. So if we keep the conception of the nature of the species fixed, that nature can be conceived of as existing in many.

However, a singular thing, by the very fact that it is singular, is divided off from all other things. Hence, every name imposed to signify a singular thing as such is unshareable both in reality and conceivably; for it is impossible for us even to conceive of more than one of *this* individual. Hence, no name that signifies an individual as such is properly shareable by many; rather, it is shareable only through a likeness—in the way, for instance, that someone can be called an Achilles metaphorically because he has one of Achilles’s properties, e.g., courage.

On the other hand, in the case of forms that are individuated not by some suppositum but by themselves (because they are subsistent forms), if they are conceived of as they exist in themselves, then they cannot be shared either in reality or conceivably—though perhaps they can be shared through a likeness, in the way just explained for individuals. However, because simple forms that subsist *per se* cannot be understood by us as they exist in themselves, but are instead understood by us in the manner of composite entities that have forms in matter, it follows that, as was explained above (a. 1), we impose on them concrete names that signify a nature in some suppositum. Hence, as far as the nature of the names is concerned (*quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum*), the same explanation holds both for the names that we impose to signify the natures of composite entities and for the names that we impose to signify simple subsistent natures.

So since, as has been said (a. 8), the name ‘God’ is imposed to signify God’s nature, and since, as was shown above (q. 11, a. 3), God’s nature is not multipliable, it follows that the name ‘God’ is not shareable in reality, though it is shareable according to opinion—in the way that the name ‘sun’ would be shareable according to the opinion of someone who claimed that there were many suns. This is why Galatians 4:8 says, “You served them who, by nature, are not gods”; and a Gloss adds, “They were gods not by nature, but in the opinion of men.”

Still, the name ‘God’ is shareable through a sort of likeness— not according to its entire signification, but according to some part of it. For instance, they are called gods who participate in something divine through a likeness, in keeping with the verse “I have said: you are gods.”

However, if there were a name imposed to signify God not on the part of the nature but on the part of the suppositum—i.e., insofar as He is thought of as a *this-something (hoc aliquid)*—then that

name would not be shareable in any way at all, as perhaps is the case with God's four-letter name (*tetragrammaton*) among the Hebrews. The same thing would hold if someone were to impose on the sun a name that designated just *this* individual.

Reply to objection 1: The divine nature is shareable only through participation in a likeness.

Reply to objection 2: The reason that the name 'God' is an appellative name, and not a proper name, is that it signifies the divine nature as existing in one who has that nature—even though God Himself is in reality neither universal nor particular. For names correspond not to the mode of being that is found in things, but rather to the mode of being insofar it is found in our cognition.

Nonetheless, according to the truth of the matter, the name 'God' is unshareable in the sense explained for the case of the name 'sun'.

Reply to objection 3: The names 'good', 'wise', etc. are imposed because of the perfections that proceed from God to creatures, but they are not imposed to signify God's nature. Rather, they are imposed to signify the perfections themselves absolutely speaking. And so, according to the truth of the matter, they are shareable by many. The name 'God', however, is imposed to signify God's nature because of an operation proper to God that we continually experience.

Article 10

Is the name 'God' taken univocally or equivocally when 'God' is predicated through His nature, according to participation, and according to opinion?

It seems that the name 'God' is said univocally of God when it is predicated through His nature, according to participation, and according to opinion (*dicatur per naturam et per participationem et secundum opinionem*):

Objection 1: Where there is diversity of signification, there is no contradiction between affirming and denying, since equivocation obstructs the contradiction. But a Catholic who claims that an idol is not God contradicts a Pagan who claims that the idol is God. Therefore, the name 'God' is being taken univocally in the two claims.

Objection 2: Just as an idol is God according to opinion but not according to the truth, so too the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness according to opinion but not according to the truth. But the name 'happiness' is predicated univocally of happiness according to opinion and happiness according to the truth. Therefore, the name 'God' is likewise predicated univocally of God according to the truth and God according to opinion.

Objection 3: Univocal names have a single concept (*ratio una*). But when a Catholic claims that there is one God, he means by the name 'God' an omnipotent being who is to be venerated above all things; and a Gentile has the same thing in mind when he claims that an idol is God. Therefore, the name 'God' is predicated univocally in the two claims.

But contrary to this:

1. As *Perihermenias* 1 says, what exists in the intellect is a likeness of what exists in reality. But 'animal' is predicated equivocally of a real animal and a picture of an animal. Therefore, the name 'God' is predicated equivocally of God according to the truth and God according to opinion.

2. No one can signify what he does not have a cognition of. But a Gentile does not have a cognition of the divine nature. Therefore, when he claims that an idol is God, he does not signify the true divine nature. But this nature is what the Catholic signifies when he claims that there is one God. Therefore, the name 'God' is predicated equivocally, and not univocally, of God according to the truth

and God according to opinion.

I respond: As regards the three significations mentioned above, the name ‘God’ is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogously. This is clear as follows:

Univocal names have altogether the same concept, and equivocal names have altogether diverse concepts, whereas in the case of analogous names what is required is that the name taken with one signification be used in the definition of the same name taken with the other significations. For instance, ‘being’ as said of a substance is used in the definition of ‘being’ as said of an accident. Likewise, ‘healthy’ as said of an animal is used in the definition of ‘healthy’ as said of urine and medicine; for urine is a sign, and medicine a cause, of the health that exists in the animal.

So, too, in the present case. The name ‘God’, insofar as it is taken for the true God, is used in the definition of ‘God’ insofar as ‘God’ is predicated according to opinion or participation. For when we call someone God according to participation, we mean by the name ‘God’ something that has a likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol God, by the name ‘God’ we mean to signify something which men think to be God.

And so it is clear that the significations of the name differ from one another, but that one of the significations is included in the other significations. Hence, it is manifest that the name ‘God’ is predicated analogously.

Reply to objection 1: The multiplicity of names has to do not with the *predication* of a given name but rather with its *signification*. For instance, whatever the name ‘man’ is predicated of, whether truly or falsely, it is said with one sense. But the name ‘man’ would be predicated with multiple senses if we intended to signify diverse things by it—say, if someone intended to signify by the name ‘man’ that which is truly a man and someone else intended to signify by the same name a rock or something else.

Hence, it is clear that a Catholic who claims that an idol is not God contradicts a pagan who asserts this, since both of them are using the name ‘God’ to signify the true God. For when the pagan says that the idol is God, he is not using this name to signify God according to opinion; if he were, then he would be asserting a truth, since even Catholics sometimes use the name with this signification, as when it is said [in Psalm 95:51], “All the gods of the Gentiles are demons.”

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: Something similar should be said in reply to the second and third objections. For these arguments are premised on a diversity of *predications* of the name and not on a diversity of its *significations*.

Reply to argument 1 for the contrary: ‘Animal’ as predicated of a true animal and a picture of an animal is not predicated wholly equivocally. Rather, the Philosopher is taking ‘equivocal’ in a broad sense that includes ‘analogous’. For he sometimes says even of ‘being’, which is predicated analogously, that is predicated equivocally of the different categories.

Reply to argument 2 for the contrary: Neither the Catholic nor the pagan knows the very nature of God as it exists in itself. Rather, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 12), both of them know Him according to some notion of causality or preeminence or negation. Accordingly, it is possible that when the Gentile claims that an idol is God, he is taking the name ‘God’ with the same signification that the Catholic is taking it with when he claims that the idol is not God. However, if there were someone who did not know God according to any notion at all, then he would not be naming God—unless, perhaps, he were doing so in the way that we utter names whose signification we do not know.

Article 11

Is the name 'He Who Is' an especially proper name of God?

It seems that the name 'He Who Is' (*Qui est*) is not an especially proper name of God:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 9), the name 'God' is an unshareable name. But the name 'He Who Is' is not an unshareable name. Therefore, the name 'He Who Is' is not an especially proper name of God.

Objection 2: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 3, Dionysius says, "The name 'good' makes manifest everything that proceeds from God." But it belongs especially to God to be a universal principle of things. Therefore, it is the name 'good', and not the name 'He Who Is', that is especially proper to God.

Objection 3: Every divine name seems to imply a relation to creatures, since we have cognition of God only through creatures. But the name 'He Who Is' implies no relation to creatures. Therefore, the name 'He Who Is' is not especially proper to God.

But contrary to this: In Exodus 3:13-14, Moses asks, "If they shall say to me: 'What is His name?', what shall I say to them?" And the Lord answers him, "Thus shall you say to them: 'He Who Is has sent me to you.'" Therefore, the name 'He Who Is' is a maximally proper name of God.

I respond: There are three reasons why the name 'He Who Is' is an especially proper name of God:

First, because of its *signification*. For it does not signify any particular form, but instead signifies *esse* itself. Hence, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), God's *esse* is His very essence—something that is true of nothing else—it is clear that of all names, this name denominates God in an especially proper way. For each thing is denominated from its form.

Second, because of its *universality*. For all other names are such that either (a) they are less common than it, or (b) if they are convertible with it, they still add something conceptual to it and thus in some way inform it and make it more determinate. Now in this life our intellect cannot have cognition of the very essence of God as it is in itself; instead, whatever determinations our intellect makes regarding what it understands about God, it falls short of the way that God exists in Himself. And so names are predicated of God by us in a more proper way to the extent that they are less determinate and more common and absolute. Hence, Damascene says, "'He Who Is' is more central than all the names that are said of God. For since it includes everything within itself, it signifies the *esse* itself as a certain infinite and uncircumscribed sea of substance." For every other name determines some particular mode of the substance of a thing, whereas the name 'He Who Is' does not determine any mode of being, but is related indeterminately to all modes of being. And so it names "an infinite sea of substance."

Third, because of its *cosignification*. For it signifies *esse* in the present, and this is said in an especially proper way of God, whose *esse*, as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 5, knows no past or future.

Reply to objection 1: The name 'He Who is' is a more proper name than the name 'God' both with respect to that because of which it is imposed, viz., *esse*, and also with respect to its mode of signifying and co-signifying, as has been explained. But with respect to *what* it is imposed to signify, the name 'God' is more proper, because it is imposed to signify God's nature. A still more proper name is the four-letter name (*tetragrammaton*), which is imposed to signify the unshareable and, if one may say it, singular substance of God.

Reply to objection 2: The name 'good' is the principal name of God insofar as He is a cause, but it is not the principal name of God absolutely speaking. For, absolutely speaking, *esse* is

conceptually prior to *cause*.

Reply to objection 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should imply a relation to creatures. Rather, it suffices that all the divine names should be imposed because of some perfection that proceeds from God to creatures. But the first among these perfections is *esse* itself, from which the name ‘He Who Is’ is taken.

Article 12

Is it possible to formulate affirmative propositions about God?

It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formulated about God:

Objection 1: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 2, Dionysius says, “Negations are true of God, but affirmations are incongruous.”

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “A simple form cannot be a subject.” But, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7), God is a maximally simple form. Therefore, He cannot be a subject. But anything about which an affirmative proposition is formulated is taken as a subject. Therefore, it is impossible for an affirmative proposition to be formulated about God.

Objection 3: Every act of intellective understanding is false that understands a thing otherwise than it is. But, as was proved above (q. 3, a. 7), God has *esse* without any composition. Therefore, since every affirmative act of the intellect understands something involving composition, it seems that a true affirmative proposition cannot be formulated about God.

But contrary to this: What is false does not underlie the Faith. But some affirmative propositions are part of the Faith, e.g., that God is three and one, and that He is omnipotent. Therefore, true affirmative propositions can be formulated about God.

I respond: True affirmative propositions can be formulated about God.

To see this clearly, note that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject must signify something that is in some sense the same in reality and diverse in concept. This is clear both in the case of propositions that have an accidental predicate and propositions that have a substantial predicate. For it is clear that a man and a white thing are the same in subject and differ in concept, since the concept *man* is different from the concept *white*. And the same holds when I say, ‘A man is an animal’, since the very thing that is a man is truly an animal. For in the same suppositum there exists a sentient nature, by virtue of which he is called an animal, and a rational nature, by virtue of which he is called a man. Hence, the predicate ‘animal’ and the subject ‘man’ are the same in suppositum but conceptually diverse.

But this holds in a certain sense even in the case of propositions in which the same thing is predicated of itself. For that which the intellect posits as the subject points to a suppositum, whereas that which it posits as the predicate points to the nature of a form that exists in the suppositum. Accordingly, predicates are said to be taken formally and the subjects are said to be taken materially. And the plurality of subject and predicate corresponds to this conceptual diversity, whereas the intellect signifies the identity of the thing through the very composition of subject and predicate.

Now God, considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple. But our intellect has cognition of Him by means of diverse conceptions, because it is unable to see Him as He is in Himself. Still, even though it understands Him under diverse conceptions, it nonetheless knows that one and same reality, absolutely speaking, corresponds to all these conceptions. Therefore, the intellect represents the conceptual plurality (*pluralitatem quae est secundum rationem*) by means of the plurality of predicate

and subject, whereas it represents the unity by means of the composition of predicate and subject.

Reply to objection 1: Dionysius says that affirmations about God are ‘incongruous’ (or ‘inappropriate’, according to an alternative translation) because, as was explained above (a. 3), no name belongs to God with respect to its mode of signifying.

Reply to objection 2: Our intellect cannot apprehend simple subsistent forms as they exist in themselves; instead, it apprehends them according to the mode of composite things, in which there is something that is a subject and something that exists in the subject. And so it apprehends a simple form in the manner of a subject and then attributes something to it.

Reply to objection 3: The proposition, ‘An act of intellective understanding is false that understands a thing otherwise than it is’ has two meanings, because the adverb ‘otherwise’ can modify the verb ‘understands’ either with respect to the thing that is understood or with respect to the one who understands.

If it modifies the verb with respect to the thing that is understood, then the proposition is true and its meaning is that if any act of intellect understanding understands a thing to be otherwise than it is, then it is false. But this reading is not relevant to the present case, since our intellect, in formulating a proposition about God, does not assert that He is composite, but asserts that He is simple.

On the other hand, if ‘otherwise’ modifies the one who understands, then the proposition is false, since the mode of the act of intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in being. For it is clear that our intellect understands the material things that are lower than it in an immaterial mode—not that it understands them to be immaterial, but rather that it has an immaterial mode in understanding them. And, similarly, when it understands simple things that are higher than it, it understands them according to its own mode, viz., in a composite way—yet not in such a way that it understands them to be composite. And so our act of understanding is not false when it formulates a [propositional] composition about God.

QUESTION 14

God's Knowledge

Having considered the things that pertain to God's substance, we must now consider the things that pertain to His operation (questions 14-25).

Since some operations remain within the one who is operating and others proceed to an outward effect, we will first discuss God's knowledge (*scientia*) (questions 14-18) and His will (*voluntas*) (questions 19-24)—for understanding exists within the knower, and willing exists within the one who wills—and after that His power (question 25), which is thought of as a principle of God's operation as it proceeds to an outward effect.

Now since to understand is to be alive in a certain way, after considering the divine knowledge (question 14), we will have to consider God's life (question 18). And since knowledge is of truths, we will also have to consider truth (question 16) and falsity (question 17). Again, since whatever is known exists in the knower, and since the natures of things as they exist in God as a knower are called ideas, a consideration of God's ideas (question 15) will have to be adjoined to the consideration of His knowledge.

On the topic of God's knowledge there are sixteen questions: (1) Is there knowledge in God? (2) Does God understand Himself? (3) Does God comprehend Himself? (4) Is God's act of understanding His substance? (5) Does God understand things that are distinct from Himself? (6) Does God have a proper cognition of those things? (7) Is God's knowledge discursive? (8) Is God's knowledge a cause of things? (9) Does God have knowledge of things that do not exist? (10) Does God have knowledge of evils? (11) Does God have knowledge of singular things? (12) Does God have knowledge of infinities? (13) Does God have knowledge of future contingents? (14) Does God know propositions (*enuntiabilia*)? (15) Is God's knowledge variable? (16) Is God's knowledge of things speculative or practical?

Article 1

Is there knowledge in God?

It seems that there is no knowledge (*non sit scientia*) in God:

Objection 1: Scientific knowledge (*scientia*) is a habit. But habits do not belong to God, since they fall in between potentiality and actuality. Therefore, there is no knowledge in God.

Objection 2: Since scientific knowledge is of conclusions, it is a type of cognition that is caused by something else, viz., by the cognition of the principles. But there is nothing caused in God. Therefore, there is no knowledge in God.

Objection 3: Every instance of knowledge is either universal or particular. But, as was shown above (q. 13, a. 9), the universal and the particular do not exist in God. Therefore, there is no knowledge in God.

But contrary to this: In Romans 11:33 the Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God!"

I respond: Knowledge exists in God in the most perfect way.

To see this clearly, notice that things with cognition differ from things that lack cognition by the fact that things that lack cognition have nothing except their own form alone, whereas things with cognition are capable of having the form of another thing as well, since a species of a thing of which there is cognition exists in the thing that has the cognition. Hence, it is clear that the nature of a thing that lacks cognition is more contracted and limited, whereas the nature of a thing with cognition is more expansive and extensive. This is why, in *De Anima* 3, the Philosopher says, "The soul is in a certain way

all things.”

Now form is contracted by matter. That is why we said above (q. 7, aa. 1-2) that the more immaterial a form is, the closer it comes to being in some sense infinite. Therefore, it is clear that the immateriality of a given thing is the reason that it is capable of cognition, and its mode of cognition corresponds to its mode of immateriality. Hence, *De Anima* 2 says that it is because of their materiality that plants do not have cognition. On the other hand, the senses are capable of cognition because they are receptive of species without matter, and the intellect is even more capable of cognition because, as *De Anima* 3 says, it is more separated from matter and unmixed with it.

So because, as is clear from what was said above (q. 7, a. 1), God is at the summit of immateriality, it follows that He is at the summit of cognition.

Reply to objection 1: Since, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2), the perfections that proceed from God to creatures exist in a higher mode in God Himself, it follows that whenever a name taken from some perfection of a creature is attributed to God, it is necessary to exclude from its signification anything that pertains to the imperfect mode which belongs to the creature. Hence, knowledge is not a quality or habit in God, but is instead His substance and pure actuality.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 13, a. 4), things that are fragmented and multiplied in creatures exist in God in a simple and unified way. Now a man has diverse cognitions corresponding to the diverse things that he has cognition of. Insofar as he has cognition of principles, he is said to have *understanding (intelligentia)*; insofar as he has cognition of conclusions, he is said to have *scientific knowledge (scientia)*; insofar as he has cognition of the highest cause, he is said to have *wisdom (sapientia)*; and insofar as he has cognition of things to be done, he is said to have *counsel (consilium)* or *prudence (prudentia)*.

Now, as will be explained below (a. 7), God has cognition of all these things by a unified and simple cognition. Hence, God’s simple cognition can be called by all of the above names, but in such a way that when these names are used in predications about God, whatever involves imperfection is excluded from them and whatever involves perfection is held on to. And this is in accord with Job 12:13, “With Him is wisdom and strength, He has counsel and understanding.”

Reply to objection 3: Knowledge exists according to the mode of the knower, since what is known exists in the knower according to the mode of the knower. And so because the mode of God’s essence is higher than the mode with which creatures exist, God’s knowledge does not have the mode of created knowledge; more specifically, it does not have the mode of being universal or particular, or of existing as a habit or in potentiality, or of being disposed in accord with any other such mode.

Article 2

Does God understand Himself?

It seems that God does not understand Himself (*non intelligat se*):

Objection 1: The *Liber De Causis* says, “Every knower who knows his own essence returns to his essence with a complete return.” But God does not exit from His essence; nor is He in any way moved. And so it does not belong to Him to return to His essence. Therefore, He does not know His own essence.

Objection 2: As *De Anima* 3 says, to understand is to be acted upon and moved in a certain way; again, knowledge is an assimilation to the thing that is known; yet again, the knower is perfected by what is known. But nothing is moved or acted upon or perfected by itself; and, as Hilary puts it, “nothing is a

likeness of itself.” Therefore, God does not know Himself.

Objection 3: We ourselves are similar to God principally because of our intellect, since, as Augustine says, it is because of our minds that we are in the image of God. But, as *De Anima* 3 says, our intellect does not understand itself except insofar as it understands other things. Therefore, neither does God understand Himself—except, perhaps, by understanding other things.

But contrary to this: 1 Corinthians 2:11 says, “The things that are of God, no man knows, but the Spirit of God.”

I respond: God understands Himself through Himself (*se per seipsum intelligit*).

To see this clearly, notice that in actions that pass to an outward effect, the object of the action, which is signified as its terminus, is something outside of the thing that is acting; by contrast, in actions that exist within the thing that is acting, the object signified as the terminus of the action exists within the very thing that is acting. And it is just insofar as this object exists within the thing that is acting that the action exists in actuality. This is why *De Anima* says that the sensible thing in actuality is an act of the sensory power, and that the intelligible thing in actuality is an act of intellective understanding. For we are actually sensing or actually understanding something by virtue of the fact that our intellect or sensory power is being actually informed by an intelligible or sensible species. Accordingly, the sensory powers or the intellect are distinct from the thing sensed or the thing understood only insofar as they are in potentiality [with respect to the act of sensing or the act of intellective understanding].

Therefore, since God has nothing at all of potentiality, but is instead pure actuality, in Him the act of intellective understanding and the thing understood are the same in every way. More specifically, He does not lack an intelligible species in the way our intellect does when it is understanding only in potentiality; nor is the intelligible species distinct from the substance of God’s intellect, as happens with our intellect when it is understanding in actuality. Rather, in the case of God, the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself. And so God understands Himself through Himself.

Reply to objection 1: ‘To return to its own essence’ is nothing other than for the thing to subsist in its very self. For insofar as a form perfects matter by giving it *esse*, it is in a sense poured out upon it, whereas insofar as it has *esse* in itself, it returns to itself. Therefore, those cognitive powers that are not subsistent, but are instead acts of certain organs, do not know themselves, as is clear in the case of the particular sensory powers. But cognitive powers that are subsistent *per se* do know themselves. This is why the *Liber de Causis* says that “one who knows his own essence returns to his own essence.”

Now subsisting *per se* belongs especially to God. Hence, using this manner of speaking, it is especially true of God that He ‘returns to His own essence’ and knows Himself.

Reply to objection 2: As *De Anima* 3 says, ‘moved’ and ‘acted upon’ are being taken equivocally when one says that to understand is to be moved or acted upon in a certain way. For an act of intellective understanding (*intelligere*) is not a movement, i.e., an act of something incomplete that exists in one thing because of something else. Rather, an act of intellective understanding is an act of something complete, i.e., an act that exists within the agent itself.

Likewise, it is [only] in the case of an intellect that is sometimes in potentiality [with respect to an act of understanding] that the intellect is perfected by, or assimilated to, the intelligible thing. For the reason it is in potentiality is that it differs from the intelligible thing and is assimilated to it by means of an intelligible species, which is a likeness of the thing that is understood. And the intellect is perfected by the intelligible species in the way that potentiality is perfected by actuality.

By contrast, God’s intellect, which is not in potentiality in any way, is neither perfected by nor assimilated to the intelligible thing, but is instead its own perfection and its own intelligible thing.

Reply to objection 3: Natural *esse* does not belong to primary matter, which exists in potentiality, except insofar as it is brought into actuality by a form. Now our passive intellect (*intellectus noster*

possibilis) has the same status in the order of intelligible things that primary matter has in the order of natural things, since it is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things in the same way that primary matter is in potentiality with respect to natural things.. Hence, our passive intellect cannot have an act of understanding except insofar as it is perfected by the intelligible species of some entity. And so it understands itself, just as it understands other things, by means of an intelligible species. For it is clear that by having a cognition of an intelligible thing, it understands its very own self as engaged in understanding, and through the act of understanding it knows the intellective power.

By contrast, God is pure actuality both in the order of existing things and in the order of intelligible things. And so He understands Himself through Himself.

Article 3

Does God comprehend Himself?

It seems that God does not comprehend Himself (*non comprehendat seipsum*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “That which comprehends itself is finite with respect to itself.” But God is infinite in all respects. Therefore, He does not comprehend Himself.

Objection 2: Someone might reply that He is infinite with respect to us, but finite with respect to Himself.

Against this: Each thing is more true as it appears to God than as it appears to us. Therefore, if God is finite with respect to Himself but infinite with respect to us, then it is more true that God is finite than that He is infinite. But this is contrary to what was proved above (q. 7, a. 1). Therefore, God does not comprehend Himself.

But contrary to this: In the same place Augustine says, “Everything that understands itself comprehends itself.” But God understands Himself. Therefore, God comprehends Himself.

I respond: God comprehends Himself perfectly. This is clear as follows:

Something is said to be comprehended when the limit of the cognition of that thing is reached, and this occurs when the thing is known as perfectly as it can be known. For instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when it is known through a demonstration, but not when it is known through some probable argument.

Now it is clear that God knows Himself as perfectly as He can be perfectly known. For each thing is knowable according to the degree of its actuality, since, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, something is known insofar as it exists in actuality and not insofar as it exists in potentiality. But God’s power in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing. For, as was shown above (a. 1), God has cognition because He is actual and separated from any matter or potentiality. Hence, it is clear that He knows Himself to the full extent that He can be known, and because of this He perfectly comprehends Himself.

Reply to objection 1: If ‘comprehend’ is taken properly, then it signifies something that possesses and includes another. And in this sense anything that is comprehended must be finite, just as everything that is included in another is finite. But this is not the sense in which God is said to be comprehended by Himself—as if His intellect were distinct from Himself, and captured and included Him.

Instead, locutions of this sort have to be explained in terms of negation. For just as God is said to exist in Himself because He is not contained by anything external, so, too, He is said to be comprehended by Himself because there is nothing of Him that lies hidden from Him (*nihil est sui quod lateat ipsum*). For as Augustine says in *De Videndo Deum*, “A whole is comprehended by sight when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it lies hidden from the seer.”

Reply to objection 2: When one says ‘God is finite with respect to Himself’, this should be interpreted according to a proportional similarity. For in not exceeding His own intellect, He is like something finite in not exceeding a finite intellect. However, God is not called ‘finite with respect to Himself’ in the sense that He understands Himself to be something finite.

Article 4

Is God’s very act of understanding His substance?

It seems that God’s very act of understanding is not His substance:

Objection 1: Understanding is a certain action. But ‘action’ signifies something that proceeds from the one who is acting. Therefore, God’s act of understanding is not itself God’s very substance.

Objection 2: When someone understands that he understands, this is not to understand anything great or central, but is instead to understand something secondary and subordinate. Therefore, if God is His very act of understanding, then to understand God will be, as it were, understanding an act of understanding. And so it will be no great thing to understand God.

Objection 3: Every act of understanding is an act of understanding something or other. Therefore, if, when God understands Himself, He Himself is not distinct from His own act of understanding, then He understands that He understands, and He understands that He understands that He understands—and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, it is not the case that God’s very act of understanding is His substance.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “For God, to be is the same as to be wise.” But to be wise is to understand. Therefore, for God to be (*esse*) is the same as to understand (*intelligere*). But, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), God’s *esse* is His substance. Therefore, God’s act of understanding is His substance.

I respond: It is necessary to say that God’s act of understanding is His essence. For if God’s act of understanding were distinct from His essence, then, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 12, the actuality and perfection of God’s substance would have to be some distinct thing to which God’s substance would be related as potentiality to actuality—which is altogether impossible. For an act of understanding is the perfection and actuality of the one who understands.

But we have to consider how this is so. For, as was explained above (a. 2), to understand is not an action that proceeds toward something extrinsic, but instead it remains within the agent as his actuality and perfection, in the way that *esse* is the perfection of a thing that exists. For just as *esse* follows upon a form, so an act of understanding follows upon an intelligible species. But, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), in God there is no form that is other than His *esse*. So because, as was explained above (a. 2), His very essence is also an intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His very act of understanding is His essence and His *esse*.

So from everything that has been said so far, it is clear that in God the following are altogether one and the same thing: (a) the intellect, (b) that which is understood, (c) the intelligible species, and (d) the very act of understanding. Hence, it is clear that when God is claimed to be an intelligent being, no multiplicity is being posited within His substance.

Reply to objection 1: An act of understanding is not an action that goes forth from the who is acting, but rather remains in him.

Reply to objection 2: When an act of understanding that is not subsistent is understood, then what is understood is no great thing—as when we understand our own act of understanding. And so there is no comparison with God’s act of understanding, which is subsistent.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to this objection is clear from the reply to the second objection.

For God's act of understanding, which subsists in itself, is an understanding of His very self—and not of anything distinct from Him, which is what would be necessary in order to generate an infinite regress.

Article 5

Does God understand things that are distinct from Himself?

It seems that God does not understand things that are distinct from Himself:

Objection 1: Anything that is distinct from God exists outside of Him. But in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “God does not see anything outside of Himself.” Therefore, God does not know things that are distinct from Himself.

Objection 2: The thing that is understood is a perfection of the one who understands. Therefore, if God understands things that are distinct from Himself, then something distinct from God will be God's perfection and more noble than Him—which is impossible.

Objection 3: An act of understanding takes its species from the intelligible thing, just as every other kind of action takes its species from its object; hence, an act of understanding is itself more noble to the extent that the thing understood is more noble. But, as explained above (a. 4), God is His very own act of understanding. Therefore, if God understands something distinct from Himself, then God Himself will take His species from something distinct from Himself—which is impossible. Therefore, God does not understand things distinct from Himself.

But contrary to this: Hebrews 4:13 says, “All things are naked and open to His eyes.”

I respond: It must be the case that God knows things that are distinct from Himself. For it is clear that He understands Himself perfectly; otherwise, His *esse* would not be perfect, since His *esse* is His act of understanding. But if something is known perfectly, then its power must be known perfectly; and something's power cannot be known perfectly unless the things to which that power extends are known. Hence, since God's power extends to things distinct from Himself in virtue of the fact that, as is clear from what was said above (q. 2, a. 3), He is the first efficient cause of all beings, it must be the case that God knows things that are distinct from Himself.

This becomes even more evident if we add that the very *esse* of the first efficient cause, i.e., God, is His act of understanding. Hence, if all effects preexist in God as in a first cause, then they must exist in His very act of understanding, and all of them must exist in Him according to an intelligible mode. For everything that exists in another exists in it according to the mode of that in which it exists.

Now in order to determine the way in which God knows things distinct from Himself, notice that there are two ways in which something can be known: (a) in itself and (b) in another. Something is known in itself when it is known through a proper species that measures up to the knowable thing itself—as when the eye sees a man through a species of the man. On the other hand, a thing is seen in another when it is seen in the species of something that contains it—as when a part is seen in the whole through a species of the whole, or as when a man is seen in a mirror through a species of the mirror, or in whatever other way it is possible for one thing to be seen in another.

Therefore, one should say that God sees Himself in Himself, since He sees Himself through His own essence. Things distinct from Himself, however, He sees not in themselves, but in His own self, insofar as His essence contains a likeness of things that are distinct from Himself.

Reply to objection 1: The passage from Augustine, where he says that God “does not see anything outside of Himself,” should not be interpreted to mean that nothing which exists outside of Himself is seen. Rather, as has been explained, it should be interpreted to mean that what exists outside of Himself is not seen except in Himself.

Reply to objection 2: The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, but not according to its substance. Rather, it is the perfection of the one who understands according to the species by which it exists in the intellect as the intellect's form and perfection. As *De Anima* 3 puts it, "It is not the rock, but a species of the rock, that exists in the soul."

However, things that are distinct from God are understood by God insofar as His essence contains species of them in the way that has been explained. Hence, it does not follow that anything distinct from the very essence of God is a perfection of the divine intellect.

Reply to objection 3: An act of understanding takes its species not from what is understood in another, but from the principal thing which is understood and in which the other things are understood. For an act of understanding takes its species from its object insofar as the intelligible form is a principle of the intellectual operation, since every action takes its species from the form that is the principle of the action, in the way that the action of giving heat takes its species from the heat. Hence, an intellectual operation takes its species from the intelligible form that makes the intellect to be in act. And this is the species of the principal thing that is understood—which in the case of God is nothing other than His essence, in which all the species of things are included. Hence, God's act of understanding—or, better, God Himself—does not need to take a species from anything distinct from the divine essence.

Article 6

Does God know things that are distinct from Himself by means of a proper cognition?

It seems that God does not know things that are distinct from Himself by means of a proper cognition (*propria cognitione*):

Objection 1: As was just explained (a. 5), God knows things distinct from Himself insofar as things distinct from Himself exist within Him. But things distinct from Him exist within Him as in a general and universal first cause. Therefore, things distinct from God are likewise known by Him as in a first and universal cause. But this is to know them in general and not according to a proper cognition. Therefore, God knows things distinct from Himself in general and not according to a proper cognition.

Objection 2: God's essence is as far distant from a creature's essence as a creature's essence is from God's essence. But as was explained above (q. 12, a. 2), God's essence cannot be known through a creature's essence. Therefore, neither can a creature's essence be known through God's essence. And so, since God does not know anything except through His own essence, it follows that He does not know a creature according to its essence in the sense of knowing of it what it is (*quid est*)—which is what it means to have a proper cognition of an entity.

Objection 3: A proper cognition is had of an entity only by means of a concept that is proper to it. But since God knows all things through His own essence, it does not seem that He knows each thing through a proper concept. For it cannot be the case that one and the same thing is a proper concept of many and diverse entities. Therefore, God has a general, and not a proper, cognition of things. For to know things without knowing them according to a proper concept is to know them only in general.

But contrary to this: To have a proper cognition of things is to know them not only in general, but insofar as they are distinct from one another. But this is the way in which God knows things. Hence, Hebrews 4:12-13 says, "He reaches unto the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight."

I respond: On this topic some have made the mistake of asserting that God knows things distinct from Himself only in general, viz., insofar as they are beings. For, they claim, just as fire, if it knew

itself as a principle of heat, would know the nature of heat and would know all other things insofar as they are hot, so too God, insofar as He knows Himself as a principle of being, knows the nature of being and knows all other things insofar as they are beings.

But this is impossible. For to understand something in general, and not specifically, is to know it imperfectly. Hence, as is clear from *Physics* 1, when our intellect goes from potentiality into its act, it proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, attaining a universal and vague cognition of things before attaining a proper cognition of them. Therefore, if God's cognition of things distinct from Himself were only general and not specific, it would follow that His act of understanding—and, consequently, His *esse* as well—is not perfect in every way. But this is contrary to what was shown above (q. 4, a. 1). Therefore, one must maintain that He knows things distinct from Himself by means of a proper cognition, i.e., not just insofar as they share in the nature of being, but insofar as one is distinct from another.

To see this clearly, notice that some writers, when they want to show that God knows many things by means of one thing, use a certain type of example: If, say, the center of a circle knew itself, it would know all the lines that proceed from the center; or, again, if light knew itself, it would know all the colors. Now these examples are, to be sure, similar [to the case of God] in one respect, viz., universal causality. However, the examples are deficient because the one universal principle in question is a cause of the multiplicity and diversity not with respect to the principle of distinction, but only with respect to what the things share in common. For the diversity of the colors is caused not by the light alone, but also by the diverse dispositions of the diaphanous recipients of light. Similarly, the diversity of lines [in the circle] is caused by the diverse places. And from this it follows that diversity and multiplicity of the sort in question can be known in their principle only by means of a general cognition and not by means of a proper cognition.

But this is not how it is with God. For it was shown above (q. 4, a. 2) that all the perfections that exist in creatures preexist in their entirety within God and are contained within Him in the most excellent way. But what pertains to perfection is not just that which the creatures share in common, viz., the very fact that they exist, but also that by virtue of which the creatures are distinct from one another—e.g., living, and understanding, and other such perfections by virtue of which living beings differ from non-living beings and intelligent beings from non-intelligent beings. In addition, every form through which an entity is constituted in its own species is a certain perfection. And so all things preexist in God not just with respect to what is common to all of them, but also with respect to that by virtue of which they differ from one another.

And so since God contains all perfections within Himself, God's essence is related to all the essences of things not as what is common to what is proper—in the way that unity is related to numbers, or the center of a circle to the lines—but rather as a perfect actuality is related to an imperfect actuality—in the way, say, that *man* is related to *animal*, or that the number six, which is a perfect number, is related to the imperfect numbers contained under it. But it is clear that an imperfect actuality can be known through a perfect actuality not only in general, but also by means of a proper cognition. For instance, if someone knows a man, then he knows an animal by means of a proper cognition; and if someone knows the number six, then he knows the number three by means of a proper cognition.

So, then, since God's essence has within itself whatever perfection is had by the essence of any other entity, and still more beyond that, it follows that God can know all things within Himself by means of a proper cognition. For the proper nature of each thing consists in its participating in some way in God's perfection. But God would not know Himself perfectly if He did not know all the ways that His own perfection can be participated in by other things; in fact, He would not even know the very nature of being perfectly if He did not know all the modes of being. Hence, it is clear that God knows all things by means of a proper cognition, i.e., He knows them insofar as they are distinct from one another.

Reply to objection 1: The proposition ‘A thing is known insofar as it exists in the knower’ can be taken in two senses.

In one sense, the adverb ‘insofar as’ connotes the mode of cognition on the part of the thing known. Taken in this sense, the proposition is false. For it is not always the case that a knower knows the thing that is known with respect to the *esse* that the latter has in the knower. For instance, it is not the case that the eye has cognition of a rock with respect to the *esse* that the rock has in the eye; instead, by means of the species of the rock that exists within itself, the eye has a cognition of the rock with respect to the *esse* that the rock has outside the eye. Even if the knower knows the thing that is known with respect to the *esse* it has within the knower, it is still the case that he knows it with respect to the *esse* that it has outside the knower. For example, the intellect knows a rock with respect to the intelligible *esse* it has within the intellect insofar as it knows that it itself is understanding [a rock]; but it still knows the rock’s *esse* in its proper nature.

On the other hand, if the proposition is taken in such a way that the adverb ‘insofar as’ connotes the mode of cognition on the part of the knower, then it is true that the knower knows the thing that is known only insofar as the latter exists within the knower. For the more perfectly the thing known exists in the knower, the more perfect the mode of cognition.

So, then, one should say that God not only knows that the things exist within Himself, but also knows the things in their proper natures by virtue of containing them within Himself. And the more perfectly a thing exists within Him, the more perfectly He knows it in its proper nature.

Reply to objection 2: A creature’s essence is related to God’s essence as an imperfect actuality is related to a perfect actuality. And so a creature’s essence is not sufficient to lead to a cognition of God’s essence, but God’s essence is indeed sufficient to lead to a cognition of a creature’s essence.

Reply to objection 3: The same concept cannot be taken as the concept of diverse things in the sense of corresponding exactly to each of the things. But God’s essence is something that surpasses all creatures. Hence, God’s essence can be taken as the proper concept of each thing insofar as it is able to be participated in, or imitated by, diverse creatures in diverse ways.

Article 7

Is God’s knowledge discursive?

It seems that God’s knowledge is discursive (*discursiva*):

Objection 1: God’s knowledge exists not as a habit of knowing, but as an occurrent act of intellective understanding (*non est secundum scire in habitu sed secundum intelligere in actu*). But according to the Philosopher in *Topics* 2, one can know many things at once in a habit of knowing, whereas one can have an act of intellective understanding only with respect to one thing. Therefore, since God knows many things—for, as has been shown (aa. 2 and 5), He knows both Himself and other things—it seems that He does not understand all things at once, but instead moves from one to another (*de uno in aliud discurrat*).

Objection 2: To know an effect through its cause is to know as a discursive reasoner. But God knows other things through Himself in the way that one knows an effect through a cause. Therefore, His cognition is discursive.

Objection 3: God knows each creature more perfectly than we do. But we ourselves know effects in their created causes, and so we move from the causes to what is caused by them. Therefore, the same thing seems to be true of God.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “God does not see all things one by one

or individual by individual, as if He were turning His sight from here to there and from there to here; rather, He sees all things at once.”

I respond: There is no discursive reasoning in God’s knowledge (*in divina scientia nullus est discursus*). This is clear as follows:

In our knowledge there are two types of discursive reasoning. The one type involves *only succession*, as when, after having an act of intellective understanding with respect to one thing, we turn to consider something else. The second type involves *causality*, as when we arrive at the cognition of conclusions through their principles.

The first type of discursive reasoning cannot belong to God. For while we understand many things successively when each is considered in itself, we understand them all at once when we understand them in some one thing—as, for example, when we understand the parts in the whole, or when we see diverse things in a mirror. But, as has been established (a. 5), God sees all things in some one thing, viz., in Himself. Hence, He sees them all at once and not successively.

Similarly, the second type of discursive reasoning cannot belong to God. For, first of all, the second type presupposes the first type, since those who are proceeding from principles to conclusions do not consider both of them simultaneously. Second, this sort of discursive reasoning is had by one who is proceeding from what is known to what is unknown. Hence, it is clear that while he is considering the first, he is still ignorant of the second, and so the second is being discerned not *in* the first, but rather *on the basis of* the first (*non in primo sed ex primo*). By contrast, the terminus of discursive reason occurs when the second is seen *in* the first—after the effects have been analyzed into their causes—and at that point discursive reasoning ceases. Hence, since God sees His own effects *in* Himself as in a cause, His cognition is not discursive.

Reply to objection 1: Even though just one thing at a time can be understood in itself, nonetheless, as has been explained, it is possible to understand many things in some one thing.

Reply to objection 2: God does not know effects *through* a cause in the sense that the cause is first discerned while the effects are still unknown. Rather, he knows the effects *in* the cause. Hence, as has been explained, His cognition does not involve discursive reasoning.

Reply to objection 3: God sees the effects of created causes in those very causes much better than we do. However, He does not see the effects in such a way that His cognition of the effects is caused in Him by His cognition of their created causes—as happens with us. Hence, His knowledge is not discursive.

Article 8

Is God’s knowledge a cause of things?

It seems that God’s knowledge is not a cause of things:

Objection 1: In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Origen says, “It is not the case that something will occur because God knows that it will occur; rather, it is because it will occur that it is known by God before it occurs.”

Objection 2: Once a cause is posited, its effect is posited. But God’s knowledge is eternal. Therefore, if God’s knowledge is a cause of created things, then it seems that creatures exist from eternity.

Objection 3: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, what is knowable is prior to the knowledge of it and is a measure of that knowledge. But what is posterior and is measured cannot be a cause [of what is prior to it and measures it]. Therefore, God’s knowledge is not a cause of things.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “It is not because they exist that God knows all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal. Rather, they exist because He knows them.”

I respond: God’s knowledge is a cause of things. For God’s knowledge is related to all created things as a craftsman’s knowledge is related to his artifacts. But a craftsman’s knowledge is a cause of the artifacts, because the craftsman acts through his understanding. Hence, the form of his act of intellectual understanding must be a principle of his action, in the way that heat is a principle of producing warmth.

Notice, however, that a natural form does not denominate a principle of action insofar as it is a form that remains in the thing to which it gives *esse*; rather, it denominates an action insofar as it has an inclination toward its effect. Similarly, an intelligible form does not denominate a principle of action insofar as it merely exists in the knower, unless it is joined to an inclination toward its effect—an inclination that comes from the will. For because an intelligible form is related to opposites (since the same knowledge applies to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect if it were not determined by a desire to one of the opposites, as *Metaphysics* 9 points out.

Now it is clear that God causes things through His understanding, since His very *esse* is His own act of understanding. Hence, His knowledge must be a cause of things insofar as it is joined to His act of will. This is why God’s knowledge, insofar as it is a cause of things, is customarily called His *knowledge of approbation* (*scientia approbationis*).

Reply to objection 1: Origen was invoking the nature of knowledge, which, as has been explained, does not involve the nature of causality unless it is adjoined to an act of will.

However, his claim that God foreknows certain things because they will exist should be interpreted as referring to a cause of *inference*, and not to a cause of *being*. For if anything will occur, it follows that God foreknows it—even though it is not the case that the future things are a cause of God’s knowing them.

Reply to objection 2: God’s knowledge is a cause of things according to the way in which the things are contained in His knowledge. But it was not part of God’s knowledge that the things should exist from eternity. Hence, even though God’s knowledge is eternal, it nonetheless does not follow that creatures exist from eternity.

Reply to objection 3: Natural things fall in between God’s knowledge and our knowledge. For we take our knowledge from the natural things of which God is a cause through His knowledge. Hence, just as knowable natural things are prior to our knowledge and a measure of that knowledge, so God’s knowledge is prior to natural things and a measure of those things. In the same way, a house falls in between the knowledge of the craftsman who built it and the knowledge had of it by someone who takes his cognition from the house after it has already been built.

Article 9

Does God have knowledge of non-beings?

It seems that God does not have knowledge of non-beings (*Deus non habeat scientiam non entium*):

Objection 1: God’s knowledge is only of things that are true. But *true* and *being* are convertible. Therefore, God does not have knowledge of non-beings.

Objection 2: Knowledge requires a likeness between the knower and the thing known. But things that do not exist cannot bear any likeness to God, who is *esse* itself. Therefore, things that do not exist cannot be known by God.

Objection 3: God’s knowledge is a cause of the things known by Him. But God’s knowledge is

not a cause of non-beings, since a non-being does not have a cause. Therefore, God does not have knowledge of non-beings

But contrary to this: In Romans 4:17 the Apostle says, “He calls those things that are not, as those that are.”

I respond: God knows all things whatsoever, in whatever way they exist. But nothing prevents things that do not exist absolutely speaking from existing in some way or other. For things that exist absolutely speaking are those that have actuality. But things that do not have actuality exist in the power either of God Himself or of some creature—where this power may be active or passive, or a power of conceiving or of imagining or of signifying in some way or other. Therefore, even if they do not exist with actuality, God knows all things that can be made or conceived of or talked about by a creature, as well as all the things that He Himself can make. And it is in this sense that one can claim that He has knowledge even of non-beings.

However, we must note a certain diversity among things that do not exist with actuality.

For some of them, even though they do not now actually exist, have actually existed or will actually exist—and all of these God is said to know by His *knowledge of vision* (*scientia visionis*). For since God’s act of understanding, which is His *esse*, is measured by eternity, which exists without succession and comprehends the whole of time, God’s present vision carries through to the whole of time and to all things that exist at any time whatsoever, insofar as they are subject to that vision in their presentness (*sicut in subiecta sibi praesentatialiter*).

By contrast, there are other things which are in God’s power or in the power of some creature, but which nonetheless do not actually exist and have never actually existed and will never actually exist. And with respect to these God is said to have *knowledge of simple understanding* (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*) and not knowledge of vision. This is because in our own case the objects of vision have *esse* outside of the one who is seeing them.

Reply to objection 1: Things that do not actually exist have truth insofar as they exist in potentiality. For it is true that these things exist in potentiality. And they are known by God as such.

Reply to objection 2: Since God is *esse* itself, each thing exists to the extent that it participates in a likeness of God—just as each thing is hot to the extent that it participates in heat. So, too, things that exist in potentiality, even if they do not actually exist, are known by God.

Reply to objection 3: God’s knowledge is a cause of things when it is joined to His act of will. Hence, it need not be the case that everything known by God either exists or has existed or will exist. Rather, only those things that He wills to exist or permits to exist are such that they exist or have existed or will exist. Again, what is contained in God’s knowledge is that the things in question *can* exist and not that they *do* exist.

Article 10

Does God have cognition of evils?

It seems that God does not have cognition of evils (*non cognoscat mala*):

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that an intellect that is not in potentiality does not have cognition of privations. But, as Augustine says, evil is a privation of good. Therefore, since, as is clear from what has been said (a. 2), God’s intellect is always acting and is never in potentiality, it seems that God does not have cognition of evils.

Objection 2: All knowledge either is a cause of what is known or is caused by what is known. But God’s knowledge is not a cause of evil, and it is not caused by evil. Therefore, God does not have

knowledge of evils.

Objection 3: Everything that is known is known either through its likeness or through its opposite. Now, as is clear from what has been said (aa. 2 and 5), it is through His own essence that God has cognition of whatever He has cognition of. But God's essence is not a likeness of evil; nor is it an opposite of evil, since, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 12, nothing is contrary to God's essence. Therefore, God does not have cognition of evils.

Objection 4: What is known through another and not through itself is known imperfectly. But evil is not known by God through itself, since otherwise evil would have to exist in God. For what is known must exist in the knower. Therefore, if evil is known through another, viz., through what is good, then it will be known imperfectly by God. But this is impossible, since there is no imperfect cognition in God. Therefore, God does not have knowledge of evils.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 15:11 says, "Hell and destruction are before the Lord."

I respond: In order to know something perfectly, one must know all the things that can happen to it. But there are some good things to which it can happen that they are corrupted by evils. Hence, God would not know goods perfectly if He did not also know evils.

Now each thing is knowable insofar as it exists. Hence, since the *esse* of an evil is to be the privation of a good, by the very fact that God knows goods He also knows evils—just as shadows are known through light. This is why, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, "God has a vision of shadows through His very self, just like one who sees shadows because of the light."

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher's words should be taken to mean that an intellect that is not in potentiality does not know a privation through any privation that exists within itself. This fits in with what he had previously said, viz., that points and all other indivisibles are known [by us] through a privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms do not actually exist in our intellect, but exist in it only in potentiality—since if they actually existed in our intellect, they would not be known through privations. For simple things are known by separated substances without recourse to privations. Therefore, God does not know an evil through a privation that exists within Himself, but instead knows it through the opposite good.

Reply to objection 2: God's knowledge is a cause not of the evil, but rather of the good through which the evil is known.

Reply to objection 3: Even though evil is not opposed to God's essence, which is not corruptible by evil, evil is nonetheless opposed to God's effects. He knows these effects through His essence, and in knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.

Reply to objection 4: To know something just through another is to have an imperfect cognition as long as the thing in question is knowable through itself. But evil is not knowable through itself, since it is part of the concept of an evil that it is the privation of something good. And so it cannot be either defined or known except through something good.

Article 11

Does God have cognition of singular things [as singular]?

It seems that God does not have cognition singular things [as singular]:

Objection 1: God's intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. But because of its immateriality, the human intellect does not have cognition of singular things [as singular]; instead, as *De Anima* 2 puts it, "reason is of universals, whereas sensation is of singulars." Therefore, God does not have cognition of singular things [as singular].

Objection 2: The only powers in us that have cognition of singular things [as singular] are those that receive species that are not abstracted from material conditions. But things exist in God in such a way that they are maximally abstracted from every sort of materiality. Therefore, God does not have cognition of singular things [as singular].

Objection 3: Every cognition takes place through a likeness. But no likeness of singular things as singular seems to exist in God. For the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is merely a being in potentiality, is altogether dissimilar from God, who is pure actuality. Therefore, God cannot have cognition of singular things [as singular].

But contrary to this: Proverbs 16:2 says, “All the ways of a man are open to His eyes.”

I respond: God knows singular things [as singular]. For, as is clear from what has been said (q. 4, a. 2), all the perfections found in creatures preexist in God in a higher way. But to have cognition of singular things [as singular] pertains to our perfection. Hence, it is necessary that God should know singular things [as singular]. For even the Philosopher considers it absurd that we should have cognition of something that God does not have cognition of. Thus, in *De Anima* 1 and *Metaphysics* 3 he argues against Empedocles that God would be utterly stupid if He did not know about strife. But the perfections that are divided among lower beings exist in God in a simple and unified way. Hence, even though we ourselves have cognition of that which is universal and immaterial by one [cognitive] power and of that which is singular and material by another power, God has cognition of both sorts of things through His simple intellective understanding.

Now some writers, wishing to show how this is possible, have claimed that God knows singular things through universal causes. For there is nothing in any singular thing that does not find its origin in some universal cause. And they invoke the following example: If an astronomer knew all the universal motions of the heavens, he could predict every future eclipse.

But this is not enough. For singular things receive from their universal causes certain forms and powers which, in whatever way they might be connected with one another, are individuated only by individual matter. Hence, someone who had a cognition of Socrates insofar as he is white, or insofar as he is the son of Sophroniscus, or whatever else of this sort might be said, would not have a cognition of him insofar as he is *this* man. Hence, given the proposed mode of cognition, God would not have cognition of singular things in their singularity (*non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate*).

Other writers have claimed that God knows singular things by virtue of the fact that He applies universal causes to particular effects.

But this amounts to nothing. For no one can apply one thing to another unless he has prior knowledge of that other thing. Hence, the application in question cannot be the explanation for the cognition of particulars, but instead presupposes the cognition of singular things [as singulars].

And so we must respond in a different way: Since, as has been explained (a. 8), God is a cause of things through His knowledge, His knowledge extends as far as His causality does. Hence, since God’s active power extends not only to forms, from which the universal concept is taken, but also—as will be shown below (q. 44, a. 2)—to matter, God’s knowledge must extend to the singular things that are individuated by matter. For since He knows things distinct from Himself through His own essence insofar as His essence is a likeness of things and their active principle, His essence must be a sufficient principle for knowing all the things that are made by Him, not only in their universal features, but also in their singularity. The same would be true of a craftsman’s knowledge if the craftsman’s knowledge produced the whole of a thing and not just its form.

Reply to objection 1: Our intellect abstracts an intelligible species from individuating principles, and so our intellect’s intelligible species cannot be a likeness of the individual principles. For this reason, our intellect does not have cognition of singular things.

However, the divine intellect’s intelligible species, which is God’s essence, is immaterial not

through abstraction but through itself, and it is a principle of all the principles that enter into the composition of a thing—regardless of whether they are the principles of the species or the principles of the individual. Hence, through His essence God knows not only universals, but also singulars [as singulars].

Reply to objection 2: Even though the divine intellect's [intelligible] species does not have material conditions in its own *esse*, in the way that the species received in the imagination and senses do, still, as has been explained, by its power it extends to both material and immaterial things.

Reply to objection 3: Even though matter is far removed from a likeness of God because of its potentiality, still, insofar as it has *esse* even of this sort, it retains a certain likeness to God's *esse*.

Article 12

Does God have cognition of infinities?

It seems that God cannot have cognition of infinities (*non possit cognoscere infinita*):

Objection 1: The infinite *qua* infinite is unknown, since, as *Physics* 3 says, "The infinite is such that if one takes a quantity of it, it is always possible to take something else outside that quantity."

Also, in *De Civitate Dei* 12, Augustine says, "Whatever is comprehended by knowledge is limited by the comprehension of the knower." But infinities cannot be limited. Therefore, they cannot be comprehended by God's knowledge.

Objection 2: Someone might reply that what is infinite in itself is finite with respect to God's knowledge.

Against this: As *Physics* 3 says, the nature of the infinite is such that it cannot be traversed, and the nature of the finite is such that it can be traversed. But, as *Physics* 6 proves, what is infinite cannot be traversed either by what is finite or by what is infinite. Therefore, the infinite cannot be finite either with respect to what is finite or even with respect to what is the infinite. And so what is infinite cannot be finite with respect to God's knowledge, which is infinite.

Objection 3: God's knowledge is a measure of the things known. But it is contrary to the nature of the infinite that it should be measured. Therefore, infinities cannot be known by God.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 12 Augustine says, "Even though none of the infinite numbers is numbered, the infinite is nonetheless not incomprehensible to Him whose knowledge is not numbered."

I respond: Since (a) God knows not only things that exist in actuality, but also, as has been shown (a. 9), things that exist either in His own power or in the power of a creature, and since (b) there are clearly infinitely many of the latter, one must claim that God knows infinities. And even though God's knowledge of vision, which is only of things that now exist or will exist or have existed, is not a knowledge of infinitely many things in the way that some claim—for we do not hold that the world has existed from eternity, or that generation and motion will continue into eternity, so that individuals are multiplied to infinity—nonetheless, if we consider the matter more carefully, we must claim that God knows infinitely many things even by His knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of the heart, which will be multiplied to infinity, since rational creatures will endure without end.

Now this is because each knower's cognition extends to things in accord with the type of form that is the principle of cognition. For instance, a sensible species that exists in the senses is a likeness of just a single individual, and so only a single individual can be known through it. On the other hand, an intelligible species of our intellect is a likeness of a thing with respect to the nature of its species, which

can be participated in by infinitely many particular things. Thus, through the intelligible species of a man our intellect in some sense knows infinitely many men—not, to be sure, insofar as they are distinct from one another, but rather insofar as they share in the nature of the species. For this reason, an intelligible species of our intellect is a likeness of men not with respect to their individual principles, but only with respect to the principles of the species.

However, as has been shown (a. 11), God's essence, through which God's intellect has cognition, is a sufficient likeness of all the things that exist or can exist, not only with respect to their common principles, but also with respect to the proper principles of each individual. Hence, it follows that God's knowledge extends to infinitely many things, even insofar as they are distinct from one another.

Reply to objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 1, "The nature of the infinite is congruent with quantity." But what belongs to the nature of quantity is the ordering of the parts. Therefore, to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know one part after another. And in this sense there is no way in which it is possible to know the infinite. For no matter how many parts are taken, something always remains outside of what has been taken.

However, God does not know the infinite, or infinitely many things, in such a way that He enumerates one part after another. For, as has been explained (a. 7), He knows all things at once and not successively. Hence, nothing prevents Him from knowing infinitely many things.

Reply to objection 2: 'To traverse' implies a certain succession in the parts, and this is why the infinite cannot be traversed either by what is finite or even by what is infinite.

Equality, however, is indeed sufficient for the notion of comprehension, since something is said to be comprehended when nothing of it escapes the one who comprehends it. Hence, it is not contrary to the nature of the infinite that it should be comprehended by an infinite being. And so what is infinite in itself can be said to be finite with respect to God's knowledge in the sense of being comprehended by it, though not in the sense of being traversable by it.

Reply to objection 3: God's knowledge is a measure of things, but not a quantitative measure of the sort lacked by what is infinite. Rather, it is a measure because it measures the essence and truth of a thing. For each thing participates in the truth of its own nature to the extent that it imitates God's knowledge—in the way that an artifact comports with its corresponding art or craft.

Now if there were things that were actually infinite either according to number (e.g., infinitely many men) or according to continuous quantity (as, e.g., if air were infinite, as some ancients claimed), then it is clear that they would have determinate and finite *esse* in the sense that their *esse* would be limited to certain determinate natures. So in this sense they would be measurable by God's knowledge.

Article 13

Does God have knowledge of future contingents?

It seems that God does not have knowledge of future contingents (*scientia Dei non sit futurorum contingentium*):

Objection 1: From a necessary cause there proceeds a necessary effect. But, as was explained above (a. 8), God's knowledge is a cause of the things that are known by it (*causa scitorum*). Therefore, since that knowledge is itself necessary, it follows that the things known by it (*scita eius*) are necessary. Therefore, God does not have knowledge of contingent things.

Objection 2: Every conditional is such that if its antecedent is absolutely necessary, its consequent is absolutely necessary. For the antecedent is related to the consequent in the way that principles are related to a conclusion, and, as is proved in *Posterior Analytics* 1, the only sort of conclusion that follows

from necessary principles is a necessary conclusion.

Now the following is a true conditional: ‘If God knew that this was going to be, then it is going to be’. For God has knowledge only of truths. But the antecedent of this conditional is absolutely necessary, both because it is eternal and also because it is signified as past. Therefore, the consequent is likewise absolutely necessary. Therefore, whatever is known by God is necessary. And so God does not have knowledge of contingent things.

Objection 3: If anything is known by God, it is necessarily so, since it is even the case that if anything is known by us, it is necessarily so—and God’s knowledge is more certain than our knowledge. But no future contingent must be so. Therefore, no future contingent is known by God.

But contrary to this: Psalm 32 says, “He who has made the hearts of every one of them, who understands all their works,” i.e., the works of men. But the works of men are contingent, since they are subject to free choice. Therefore, God knows future contingents.

I respond: It was shown above (a. 9) that God knows all things—not only (a) those that are actual, but also (b) those that exist either in His own power or the power of a creature. Some of the latter are contingent things that are future to us. It follows that God knows future contingents.

To see this clearly, note that there are two ways in which a contingent thing can be thought of.

First, it can be thought of in itself, insofar as it is already actual. And when considered in this way, it is not being thought of as future; rather, it is being thought of as present, and it is being thought of not as contingent with respect to two opposites, but rather as determined to one of them. For this reason, it can be infallibly subject to a cognition that is certain—e.g., to the cognition of the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting.

Second, a contingent thing can be thought of as existing in its cause. And considered in this way, it is being thought of as future and as contingent, not yet determined to one opposite; for a contingent cause is open to both opposites. And a contingent thing, when thought of in this way, is not subject to a cognition that is certain. Thus, if someone knows a contingent effect only in its cause, then he has only a conjectural cognition of it.

Now God knows all contingent things not only insofar as they exist in their causes, but also insofar as each them is actual in itself. And even though contingent things become actual successively, nonetheless, God, unlike we ourselves, does not know contingent things successively as they exist in their own *esse*; rather, he knows them all at once. For His cognition, like His *esse*, is measured by eternity. But as was explained above (q. 10, a. 2), eternity, which exists as a simultaneous whole, embraces the whole of time. Hence, all the things that exist in time are present to God from eternity, not just because, as some claim, God has the natures of things present to Himself, but because His gaze extends from eternity to all things as they exist in their presentness. Hence, it is clear that contingent things are both (a) known infallibly by God insofar as they are subject to the divine gaze according to their presentness and yet (b) future contingents in relation to their causes.

Reply to objection 1: Even if the highest cause is necessary, the effect can nonetheless be contingent because of a contingent proximate cause. For instance, the germination of a plant is contingent because of a contingent proximate cause, even though the motion of the sun, which is a first cause, is necessary. Similarly, the things known by God are contingent because of their proximate causes, even though God’s knowledge, which is a first cause, is necessary.

Reply to objection 2: Some claim that the antecedent ‘God knew that this contingent thing was going to be’ is contingent and not necessary, because even though it is past-tense, it implies a relation to the future. However, this does not undermine the necessity of the antecedent. For that which once had a relation to the future is now such that it is necessary that it once had that relation—even if that which was going to be never follows at any time.

Others claim that the antecedent in question is contingent because it is composed of something

necessary and something contingent—just as the dictum *that Socrates is a white man* is contingent. But this, too, amounts to nothing. For when one says, ‘God knew that this contingent thing was going to be’, what is contingent is posited here only as the subject-matter of the main verb and not as the principal part of the proposition. Hence, this subject-matter’s contingency or necessity has no bearing on whether the proposition itself is necessary or contingent, or true or false. For instance, it can be true that I said that a man is a donkey, just as it can be true that I said that Socrates is running or that God exists. And the same line of reasoning holds for necessity and contingency.

Therefore, one should assert that the antecedent in question is absolutely necessary.

However, some claim that from this it does not follow that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is a remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent because of some proximate cause. But this amounts to nothing. For the proposition would be false if its antecedent were a remote necessary cause and its consequent were a contingent effect—as, for instance, if I were to say, ‘If the sun moves, the plant will germinate.’

So we must respond in an alternative way: When something pertaining to an act of the soul is posited in the antecedent, the consequent should be taken not as it exists in itself, but as it exists in the soul. For the existence of a thing in itself is different from its existence in the soul. So, for instance, when I say, ‘If the soul understands something intellectually, then that thing is immaterial’, this should be taken to mean that the thing in question is immaterial insofar as it exists in the intellect and not that it is immaterial insofar as it exists in itself. Similarly, if I say, ‘If God knew something, it is going to be’, the consequent should be taken to mean ‘insofar as it falls under God’s knowledge’, i.e., ‘insofar as it exists in its presentness’. And, given this meaning, the consequent is necessary in the same way that the antecedent is; for, as *Perihermenias* 1 says, “Everything that is, while it is, is such that it is necessary that it be.”

Reply to objection 3: Those things that become actual in time are known by us successively in time, but they are known by God in eternity, which is beyond time. Thus, since we know future contingents insofar as they are contingent, they cannot be certain to us; rather, they are certain only to God, whose act of understanding exists in eternity and beyond time. Similarly, someone who is traveling along a road does not see those who come after him, whereas someone who is viewing the whole road from a height sees all the travelers on the road at once.

And so that which is known (*scitur*) by us must also be necessary insofar as it exists in itself, since things that are future contingent in themselves cannot be known by us. However, as has been explained, the things that are known by God have to be necessary insofar as they are subject to God’s knowledge—though they are not absolutely necessary insofar as they are considered in their proper causes.

Accordingly, the proposition, ‘If anything is known by God, it is necessarily so’ has two distinguishable meanings, since it can be either *de re* or *de dicto*. If it is interpreted *de re*, then it has a divided sense and is false—for its meaning is, ‘Anything that God knows is such that it is necessarily so’. Alternatively, it can be interpreted *de dicto*, in which case it has a composed sense and is true—for its meaning is, ‘The dictum *If anything is known by God, it is so* is necessary.’

However, some raise an objection here. They claim that this distinction is relevant in the case of forms that are separable from their subject, as when I say ‘A white thing is possibly black’—which is false if taken *de dicto* and true if taken *de re*, since a thing which is white is able to be black, whereas the dictum *A white thing is black* is never true. But, they say, in the case of forms that are inseparable from their subject, there is no room for this distinction, as when I say, ‘A black crow is possibly white’—for this is false in both senses. But being known by God is inseparable from a thing, since that which is known by God is not able not to be known.

Now this objection would be to the point if the term ‘known [by God]’ connoted a disposition that

inheres in a subject. However, since it instead connotes the act of a knower, something can be attributed to the known thing in its own right (*secundum se*), even if it is always known, that is not attributed to it insofar as it is subject to an act of knowing (*inquantum stat sub actu sciendi*)—just as material *esse* is attributed to a rock in itself, but is not attributed to it insofar as it is intelligible.

Article 14

Does God have cognition of propositions?

It seems that God does not have cognition of propositions (*non cognoscat enuntiabilia*):

Objection 1: Having cognition of propositions belongs to our intellect insofar as it composes and divides. But there is no composition in God's intellect. Therefore, God does not know propositions.

Objection 2: Every cognition is effected by means of some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of propositions, since He is altogether simple. Therefore, God does not have cognition of propositions.

But contrary to this: Psalm 93:11 says, "The Lord knows the thoughts of men." But propositions are included among the thoughts of men. Therefore, God has cognition of propositions.

I respond: Since (a) to formulate propositions lies within the power of our intellect, and since (b), as was explained above (a. 9), God knows whatever lies within either His own power or the power of a creature, it must be the case that God knows all the propositions that can be formulated.

However, just as He knows material things in an immaterial mode and composite things in a simple mode, so, too, it is not according to the mode of propositions that He knows propositions; that is, He does not know them in the sense that the composition or division of propositions exists in His intellect. Rather, through His simple understanding He has cognition of each thing by understanding the essence of each thing.

For instance, suppose that we ourselves were such that by the very fact that we understood intellectually what a man is, we understood everything that could be predicated of a man. Now, to be sure, this does not happen with our intellect, which goes from one thing to another. For an intelligible species [in our intellect] represents one thing in such a way that it does not represent another. Hence, we do not, simply by virtue of understanding what a man is, understand the other things that exist in a man; instead, we understand them bit by bit, according to a certain succession. Because of this, we have to bring together, in the mode of composition and division, the things that we understand separately, thus formulating a proposition.

By contrast, the species of God's intellect, viz., His very essence, is sufficient for making known all things. Hence, in understanding His own essence, God knows the essences of all things and whatever can accrue to them.

Reply to objection 1: This argument would go through if God had cognition of propositions through the mode of propositions.

Reply to objection 2: A propositional composition signifies the *esse* of a thing. And so through His own *esse*, which is His essence, God is a likeness of all those things that can be signified by propositions.

Article 15

Is God's knowledge variable?

It seems that God's knowledge is variable:

Objection 1: 'Knowledge' is predicated relationally with respect to what is knowable. But names that connote a relation to creatures are predicated of God from a given point in time, and they vary according to variations in the creatures. Therefore, God's knowledge is variable according to variations in the creatures.

Objection 2: God can know whatever He can effect. But God is able to effect more things than He in fact effects. Therefore, He is able to know more things than He in fact knows. And so His knowledge can vary by way of addition and subtraction.

Objection 3: God knew that Christ would be born. However, He does not now know that Christ will be born, since it is not now the case that Christ will be born. Therefore, it is not the case that God now knows everything that He once knew. And so God's knowledge seems to be variable.

But contrary to this: James 1:17 says that with God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration."

I respond: Since, as is clear from what has been said (a. 4), God's knowledge is His substance, it follows that just as His substance is altogether immutable—as was shown above (q. 9, a. 1)—so too His knowledge must be altogether invariable.

Reply to objection 1: 'Lord', 'creator', and other names of this sort connote a relation to creatures as they exist in themselves. By contrast, 'God's knowledge' connotes a relation to creatures insofar as they exist in God. For each thing is actually understood insofar as it exists in the knower. But created things exist in an invariable way in God, even though they exist in a variable way in themselves.

An alternative reply is that 'lord', 'creator', and other names of this sort connote relations that follow upon acts that are understood to terminate in the creatures themselves insofar as they exist in themselves; and this is why relations of this sort are predicated of God in a way that varies according to variations in the creatures. By contrast, 'knowledge', 'love', and other names of this sort connote relations that follow upon acts that are understood to exist in God; and this is why they are predicated of God in an invariable way.

Reply to objection 2: God knows even those things that He can effect and yet does not effect. Hence, from the fact that He can effect more things than He does effect, it does not follow that He can know more things than He does know—unless we are talking about His knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things that actually exist at some time or other.

Now from the fact that He knows that some things are able to exist and yet do not exist, or that some things are able not to exist and yet do exist, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable. Rather, all that follows is that He knows about the variability of things. To be sure, if there were something that God did not previously know and afterwards did know, then His knowledge would be variable. But this is impossible. For in eternity God knows whatever does exist or can exist at any time. And so on the assumption that a thing exists at some time or other, one must assert that it is known by God from eternity.

And so it should not be conceded that God can know more things than He does know, since this proposition implies that He previously did not know something and afterwards knows it.

Reply to objection 3: The old nominalists (*antiqui nominales*) claimed that 'Christ is born', 'Christ will be born', and 'Christ has been born' are the same proposition because exactly the same thing is signified by all three of them, viz., the birth of Christ. On this view it follows that whatever God did know, He now knows. For he now knows that Christ has been born, and this signifies the same thing as

that Christ will be born.

But this opinion is false. First, a diversity in the parts of a sentence makes for a diversity of propositions. Second, it would follow that a proposition that is true at any one time (*semel*) would always be true—which is contrary to the Philosopher, who says that the sentence ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true as long as Socrates is sitting and is false once he gets up.

And so one should concede that ‘God now knows everything that He once knew’ is not true, if we are talking about propositions. But from this it does not follow that God’s knowledge is variable. For just as God’s knowledge does not vary by virtue of the fact that He knows that one and same thing exists at some times and not at other times, so too God’s knowledge does not vary by virtue of the fact that He knows that a given proposition is true at some times and false at other times.

To be sure, God’s knowledge would be variable if He knew propositions through the mode of propositions by composing and dividing, as happens with our intellect. Hence, our cognition varies either (a) according to truth and falsity, as, e.g., when, once a thing has changed, we maintain the same opinion about that thing, or (b) according to diverse opinions, as when we first think that someone is sitting and afterwards think that he is not sitting. But neither of these can happen with God.

Article 16

Is God’s knowledge of things speculative?

It seems that God does not have speculative knowledge of things (*de rebus non habet scientiam speculativam*):

Objection 1: As was shown above (a. 8), God’s knowledge is a cause of things. But speculative knowledge is not a cause of the things known by it. Therefore, God’s knowledge is not speculative.

Objection 2: Speculative knowledge occurs through abstraction from things. But this feature does not belong to God’s knowledge. Therefore, God’s knowledge is not speculative.

But contrary to this: Everything that is more noble should be attributed to God. But as is clear from the Philosopher at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, speculative knowledge is more noble than practical knowledge. Therefore, God has speculative knowledge of things.

I respond: Some knowledge is purely speculative and some purely practical, but some knowledge is both speculative in one respect and practical in another respect.

To see this clearly, notice that there are three ways in which knowledge can be called speculative:

First, on the part of the *things known*, when they are not things that can be effected by the knower—as, e.g., human knowledge about natural or divine things.

Second, with respect to the *mode of knowing*—as, e.g., when a builder thinks about a house by defining, distinguishing, and inquiring into its universal predicates. For here a thing that can be effected is being considered in a speculative way and not insofar as it can be effected, since something that can be effected exists through the application of form to matter and not through the analysis of a composite into its universal formal principles.

Third, with respect to its *end (finis)*. For as *De Anima* 3 says, “Practical understanding differs in its end from speculative understanding.” For practical understanding is ordered toward the end of effecting something, whereas the end of speculative understanding is the consideration of truth. Hence, if a builder is thinking about how a given house might be built, and he is ordering his thought only toward knowing it and not toward the end of making it, then his inquiry will be speculative with respect to its end, even though it is about a thing that can be effected.

Thus, knowledge that is speculative by reason of the thing known is purely speculative. On the

other hand, knowledge that is speculative by reason of either its mode or its end is speculative in one respect and practical in another respect. And when knowledge is ordered toward the end of effecting something, then it is purely practical.

So, then, one should claim that God has purely speculative knowledge about Himself, since He is not a thing that can be effected. But His knowledge of all other things is both speculative and practical. It is speculative with respect to its mode. For anything that we ourselves know speculatively about things by defining and distinguishing is such that God knows all of it much more perfectly. On the other hand, as regards those things that He is able to effect but does not effect at any time, He does not have practical knowledge of them in the sense in which practical knowledge is called practical because of its end. However, He does have practical knowledge of those things which He does effect at some time.

On the other hand, even though He cannot effect evils, they, like goods, nonetheless fall under His practical cognition insofar as He permits them or impedes them or orders them [toward some end]—in the way that illnesses fall under a physician's practical knowledge insofar as he cures them through his art.

Reply to objection 1: God's knowledge is a cause not of Himself, but of other things. It is an actual cause of some of them, viz., those which are effected at some time, and it is a virtual cause of others, viz., those which God is able to effect and yet which are never effected.

Reply to objection 2: The fact that knowledge is taken from the things that are known is a feature that belongs to speculative knowledge not *per se*, but *per accidents*, viz., insofar as it is human knowledge.

Reply to argument for the contrary: Perfect knowledge is had of things that are able to be effected only if they are known precisely insofar as they are able to be effected. And so since God's knowledge is perfect in every way, He must know the things that can be effected by Him insofar as they can be effected by Him and not just insofar as they are knowable speculatively. Still, this does not fall short of the nobility of speculative knowledge, since He sees all things that are distinct from Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively. And so in His speculative knowledge of Himself He has both speculative cognition and practical cognition of all other things.

QUESTION 15

God's Ideas

Now that we have considered God's knowledge, we have to consider His ideas. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Are there divine ideas? (2) Is there more than one divine idea, or just one? (3) Are there ideas of all the things that are known by God?

Article 1

Are there divine ideas?

It seems that there are no [divine] ideas (*ideae*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says that God does not know things by means of an idea. But ideas are posited for no other reason than that things might be known through them. Therefore, there are no ideas.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 14, a. 5), God knows all things in Himself. But He does not know Himself through an idea. Therefore, neither does He know things distinct from Himself through an idea.

Objection 3: An idea is posited as a principle of knowing and a principle of acting. But God's essence is a sufficient principle of knowing all things and of effecting all things. Therefore, there is no need to posit ideas.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "The power in ideas is so great that if they were not understood, no one could be wise."

I respond: It is necessary to posit ideas in God's mind.

For 'idea' (*idea*) in Greek corresponds to 'form' (*forma*) in Latin. Hence, it is through ideas that the forms of other things are understood outside of the existent things themselves. Now outside of the existent thing itself, the form of a thing can have two roles: either (a) as an exemplar of the thing of which it is called the form, or (b) as a principle of the cognition of the thing, since the forms of knowable things are said to exist within the knower. And it is necessary to posit the ideas for both of these roles.

This is clear as follows: In all things that are not generated by chance, the form has to be the end of the generation of a thing. But an agent would not be acting for the sake of a form unless a likeness of the form existed within it. This can happen in two ways. For in the case of some agents, the form of the thing to be effected preexists in the agent according to its natural *esse*—viz., in those agents that act through their nature, as when a man generates a man or a fire generates a fire. However, in the case of other agents, the form preexists in the agent according to its intelligible *esse*—viz., in those agents that act through their understanding, as when a likeness of a house preexists in the mind of the builder. And this likeness can be called an idea of the house, since the builder intends to assimilate the house to the form that he mentally conceives.

Therefore, since, as will become clear below (q. 47, a. 1), the world was not made by chance, but was instead made by God acting through His understanding, there has to be in God's mind a form in the likeness of which the world was made. And this is what the nature of an idea consists in.

Reply to objection 1: God does not understand things according to an idea that exists outside of Himself. This is also the line of reasoning by which Aristotle disproves Plato's opinion about ideas, insofar as Plato posited the ideas as existing *per se* and not in an intellect.

Reply to objection 2: Even though God understands both Himself and other things through His essence, His essence is an efficient principle of the other things, but not of Himself. And so God's essence has the nature of an idea insofar as it is related to other things, but not insofar as it is related to

God Himself.

Reply to objection 3: It is according to His essence that God is a likeness of all things. Therefore, an idea in God is nothing other than God's essence.

Article 2

Is there more than one divine idea?

It seems that there is not more than one [divine] idea:

Objection 1: An idea in God is His essence. But there is only one essence of God. Therefore, there is likewise only one idea.

Objection 2: Just as an idea is a principle of knowing and acting, so too are wisdom and art. But in God there is not more than one wisdom or more than one art. Therefore, neither is there more than one idea.

Objection 3: Someone might reply that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to diverse creatures.

Against this: The plurality of ideas exists from eternity. Therefore, if there is more than one idea and creatures are temporal, then what is temporal will be a cause of what is eternal.

Objection 4: The relations in question are real relations either in the creatures alone or in God as well.

If they are real relations in the creatures alone, then, since the creatures do not exist from eternity, the plurality of ideas will not exist from eternity, given that the ideas are multiplied only according to relations of this sort.

On the other hand, if the relations really exist in God, then it follows that there is some real plurality in God distinct from the plurality of the divine Persons. But this is contrary to Damascene, who says that in God all things are one except for "the ungeneration, the generation, and the procession." Therefore, it is not the case that there is more than one divine idea.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "The ideas are certain principal forms or conceptions of things (*formae vel rationes*), stable and unchangeable. For they themselves are not formed, and because of this they are eternal and always remain the same, since they are contained in God's understanding. But even though they themselves have no beginning and no end, it is according to them that everything that can have a beginning and an end, and everything that does have a beginning and an end, is said to be formed."

I respond: It is necessary to posit more than one idea.

To see this clearly, note that in the case of every effect, it is the ultimate end that is properly intended by the principal agent; for instance, the order of the army is what is intended by the general. Now as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12, the highest good there is among things is the good of the order of the universe. Therefore, the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and this order does not emerge *per accidens* from a succession of agents—in the way suggested by some who claimed that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on until a great multitude of things was produced. According to this opinion, God would have an idea only of the first created thing.

However, if it is the very order of the universe that has been created *per se* by Him and was intended by Him, then He must have an idea of the order of the universe. But one cannot have a conception (*ratio*) of a whole without also having proper notions of the things out of which the whole is

constituted. For instance, a builder is unable to conceive a likeness of a house without having a proper conception of each of its parts. So, then, it must be the case that in God's mind there are proper conceptions of all things. Accordingly, in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Each thing is created by God through its own proper conception." Hence, it follows that there are many ideas in God's mind.

Moreover, it is easy to see that this does not conflict with God's simplicity, as long as one keeps in mind that the idea of a thing that is to be effected exists in the agent's mind as *that which* is understood—and not as a species *by which* something is understood, i.e., a form that makes the intellect to be in act. For the form of a house in the builder's mind is something that is understood by him and in whose likeness he forms the house in the relevant matter. But it is not contrary to the simplicity God's intellect that He should understand many things; rather, what would be contrary to its simplicity is that His intellect should be formed by many species. Hence, the many ideas exist in God's mind as ideas that are understood by Him.

This can be seen as follows: He knows His own essence perfectly. Hence, He knows it according to every way in which it can be known. But it can be known not only as it exists in itself, but also insofar as it can be participated in by creatures according to one or another mode of likeness. But each creature has its own proper species insofar as it participates in some way in a likeness of God's essence. So, then, insofar as God knows His own essence as imitable in this way by such a creature, He knows it as a proper conception and idea of this creature. And the same holds for the other creatures. And so it is clear that God understands the many proper natures of many things—and these are the many ideas.

Reply to objection 1: 'Idea' denominates God's essence not insofar as it is an essence, but insofar as it is a likeness or conception of this or that thing. Hence, since there are many conceptions understood by the one essence, they are called many ideas.

Reply to objection 2: Wisdom and art are assigned as that *by which* God understands, whereas an idea is assigned as *that which* God understands. But by one wisdom and art God understands many things, not only insofar as they exist in themselves, but also insofar as they are understood—and the latter is what it is to understand many conceptions of things. Similarly, if a craftsman understands the form of a house as it exists in matter, he is said to understand the house, whereas if he understands the form of a house as something that he is thinking about, then by the very fact that he understands that he is understanding it, he understands an idea or conception of a house (*intelligit ideam vel rationem domus*). But God not only understands many things through His essence, but also understands that He understands many things through His essence. But this is what it is to understand many conceptions of things—or, alternatively, this is what it is for many ideas to exist in His intellect as things that are understood.

Reply to objection 3: Relations of the sort by which ideas are multiplied are caused not by the things but by the divine intellect as it compares its essence to things.

Reply to objection 4: The relations that multiply ideas exist not in created things, but in God. However, they are not real relations like the relations by which the Persons are distinguished; instead, they are relations that are understood by God.

Article 3

Are there ideas in God of all the things that are known by Him?

It seems that it is not the case that there are ideas of all the things known by Him:

Objection 1: The idea of evil does not exist in God, since otherwise it would follow that evil exists in God. But evils are known by God. Therefore, it is not the case that there are ideas of all the

things that are known by God.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 14, a. 9), God knows those things that do not exist and will not exist and have not existed. But there are no ideas of such things, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, “The exemplars are divine volitions that are determinative of things and effect them.” Therefore, it is not the case that there are ideas in God of all the things that are known by Him.

Objection 3: God knows primary matter, which cannot have an idea because it has no form. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 4: It is clear that God knows not only species, but also genera and singular things and accidents. But, as Augustine explains, there are no ideas of genera, singular things, and accidents according to Plato, who was the first to introduce the ideas. Therefore, it is not the case that there are ideas in God of all the things that are known by Him.

But contrary to this: As is clear from Augustine, the ideas are conceptions that exist in God’s mind. But God has proper conceptions of all the things He knows. Therefore, He has an idea for each thing that He knows.

I respond: Since Plato posited the ideas as principles both of the cognition of things and of their generation, an idea as posited in God’s mind has both these roles.

Insofar as it is a principle for effecting things, an idea is called an *exemplar* and pertains to practical cognition, whereas insofar as it is a cognitive principle, it is properly called a *conception* (*ratio*) and can also pertain to speculative knowledge.

Therefore, insofar as an idea is an exemplar, it is related to all the things that are made by God at some time or other. On the other hand, insofar as it is a cognitive principle, it is related (a) to all the things that are known by God, even if they are never made, and (b) to all the things that are known by God according to a proper conception and insofar as they are known by Him in a speculative way.

Reply to objection 1: Evil is known by God not through a proper conception, but rather through the conception of the good. And so evil does not have an idea in God, either insofar as an idea is an exemplar or insofar as an idea is a conception.

Reply to objection 2: God does not have a practical cognition—except just virtually—of those things that do not exist and will not exist and have not existed. Hence, with respect to those things there is no idea in God insofar as ‘idea’ signifies an exemplar; instead, there is an idea of them only insofar as ‘idea’ signifies a conception.

Reply to objection 3: According to some authors, Plato posited uncreated matter and so claimed that there is no idea of matter but that the idea is a co-cause with matter. However, since we ourselves posit a matter created by God and yet not without form, matter has, to be sure, an idea in God, but not an idea distinct from the idea of a composite thing. For matter does not of itself have *esse* and is not of itself knowable.

Reply to objection 4: Insofar as ‘idea’ signifies an exemplar, genera cannot have an idea distinct from the idea of a species, since a genus is never effected except in some species.

The same holds for accidents that are inseparably connected with a subject, since they are effected simultaneously with their subject. However, accidents that are added to a subject have a special idea. For through the form of a house the craftsman makes all the accidents that are connected with the house from the beginning, but he effects through another form those things that are added to the house once it has already been built, e.g., pictures or other such things.

On the other hand, individuals, according to Plato, do not have an idea distinct from the idea of their species, both because (a) singular things are individuated by matter, which (some claim) he took to be uncreated and a co-cause with the idea, and also because (b) nature’s intention has to do with the

species, and it produces individuals only in order to preserve the species in them. However, as will be explained below (q. 22, a. 2), God's providence extends not only to species but also to singular things.

QUESTION 16

Truth

Since knowledge is of things that are true (*scientia verorum est*), now that we have considered God's knowledge, we must inquire into truth (*de veritate*). On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Does truth exist in things or only in the intellect (*in re vel tantum in intellectu*)? (2) Does truth exist in the intellect only insofar as the intellect composes and divides? (3) How is *true* related to *being*? (4) How is *true* related to *good*? (5) Is God truth? (6) Are all things true by one truth or by many truths? (7) Is truth eternal? (8) Is truth immutable?

Article 1

Does truth exist in things or only in the intellect?

It seems that truth exists not only in the intellect but even more so in things (*non tantum in intellectu sed magis in rebus*):

Objection 1: In *Soliloquia* Augustine disproves the account of *true* according to which the true is that which is seen; for on this account, rocks that lie in utterly remote recesses of the earth would not be true rocks, since they are not seen.

He likewise disproves the account of *true* according to which the true is that which is as it is seen by one who has cognition, if he is able to and wants to have cognition of it; for on this account it follows that nothing would be true if there were no one capable of having cognition.

And so he defines the true as follows: The true is that which is. And so it seems that truth exists in things and not in the intellect.

Objection 2: Whatever is true is true by reason of truth. Therefore, if truth exists in the intellect alone, then nothing will be true unless it is understood—which is the error of those ancient philosophers who claimed that whatever is seen is true (*omne quod videtur esse verum*). From this it follows that contradictories are simultaneously true, since contradictories are seen to be true by different individuals at the same time.

Objection 3: As is clear from *Posterior Analytics* 1, “That because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself even more so.” But, according to the Philosopher in the *Categories*, “A belief or spoken sentence is true or false because the thing itself is or is not so.” Therefore, truth exists more in the things than in the intellect.

But contrary to this: *Metaphysics* 6 says, “The true and the false exist not in the things, but in the intellect.”

I respond: Just as *good* names that toward which an appetite tends, so, too, *truth* names that toward which an intellect tends. However, the difference between the appetite and the intellect (or any kind of cognition) is that cognition exists insofar as what is known exists in the knower, whereas appetition exists insofar as the one who desires is inclined toward the desired thing itself. And so the terminus of an appetite, which is the good, exists in the desirable thing, whereas the terminus of cognition, which is the true, exists in the intellect itself.

However, the good exists in a thing insofar as the thing bears a relation to the appetite, and for this reason the concept *good* migrates from the desirable thing to the desire in such a way that the desire itself is called good insofar as it is a desire for something good. In the same way, since the true exists in an intellect insofar as that intellect is conformed to the thing that is understood, the concept *true* has to migrate from the intellect to what is understood in such a way that the thing that is understood is also called true insofar as it bears a certain relation to the intellect.

Now the relation that the thing that is understood bears to an intellect can be either *per se* or *per accidens*. It bears a *per se* relation to an intellect on which it depends for its own *esse*, whereas it has a *per accidens* relation to an intellect insofar it is knowable by that intellect. For example, we say that a house is related *per se* to the craftsman's intellect, whereas it is related *per accidens* to an intellect on which it does not depend for its *esse*. But a judgment about a thing derives not from what exists in it *per accidens*, but rather from what exists in it *per se*. Hence, each thing is called true absolutely speaking according to the relation it has to an intellect on which it depends for its *esse*.

Thus, artifacts are called true in relation to our intellect. For a house is called a true house when it attains a likeness of the form that exists in the mind of the craftsman; and a spoken sentence is called true insofar as it is a sign of a true understanding.

Similarly, natural things are called true to the extent that they attain a likeness of the species that exist in God's mind. For instance, a rock is called a true rock when it attains the proper nature of a rock as this is preconceived by God's intellect.

So, then, truth exists primarily in the intellect, but secondarily in the things insofar as they are related to an intellect as their principle. Accordingly, truth is explained in different ways.

For in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, "Truth is that by which what exists is made manifest." And Hilary says, "Truth clarifies and manifests being." Such accounts pertain to truth as it exists in the intellect.

On the other hand, as regards the truth of a thing in its relation to the intellect, a pertinent definition is that given by Augustine in *De Vera Religione*: "Truth is the highest likeness of the principle, a likeness that has no dissimilarity to the principle." Again, here is a definition given by Anselm: "Truth is a correctness (*rectitudo*) that is perceptible only to the mind; for what is in agreement with the principle is correct (*rectum*)." Again, Avicenna gives this definition: "The truth of each thing is a property of its *esse* that is stable for it."

Moreover, the claim that truth is a correspondence between the intellect and the thing (*adequatio rei et intellectus*) can pertain to both sorts of truth.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is speaking here of the truth of a thing, and he is excluding a relation to *our* intellect from the conception of this sort of truth (*a ratione huius veritatis*). For what is *per accidens* is excluded from every definition.

Reply to objection 2: The ancient philosophers claimed that the species of natural things originated by chance and did not proceed from any intellect; and because they noticed that *true* connotes a relation to an intellect, they were forced to define the truth of things in terms of a relation to *our* intellect. From this followed the various absurdities that the Philosopher attacks in *Metaphysics* 4. However, these absurdities do not arise if we claim that the truth of things consists in their relation to *God's* intellect.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the truth in our intellect is caused by the things, the concept *true* need not be realized primarily in the things—just as the concept *health* is realized in the primary sense not in the medicine but rather in the animal. For it is the power of medicine—and not its health—that causes health, since medicine is not a univocal agent. Similarly, it is the *esse* of a thing—and not its truth—that causes truth in the intellect. This is why the Philosopher says that an opinion or spoken sentence (*opinio et oratio*) is true "in virtue of the fact that the thing is such-and-such, not in virtue of the fact that the thing is true."

Article 2

Does truth exist in the intellect only insofar as the intellect composes and divides?

It seems that it is not the case that truth exists in the intellect only insofar as the intellect composes and divides:

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that just as the sensing of proper sensibles is always true, so the understanding of what a thing is (*quid est*) is always true. But composition and division are found neither in the senses nor in the intellect's cognition of what a thing is. Therefore, it is not the case that truth is found only in the intellect's composing and dividing.

Objection 2: In *De Definitionibus* Isaac says that truth is a correspondence between the intellect and the thing. But just as the understanding of propositions (*complexa*) can correspond to the things, so, too, can the understanding of simple terms (*incomplexa*), as well as the senses sensing a thing as it is. Therefore, it is not the case that truth is found only in the intellect's composing and dividing.

But contrary to this: In *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says that there is no truth, either in the intellect or in things, with respect to simple terms or with respect to what a thing is (*circa simplicia et quod quid est*).

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the true, according to its primary concept, exists in the intellect. However, since every entity is true insofar as it has the proper form of its own nature, it must be the case that the intellect, insofar as it is an entity that has cognition, is true insofar as it bears a likeness to the thing that is known; for this likeness is the intellect's form insofar as the intellect is an entity that has cognition. It is for this reason that truth is defined as a conformity between the intellect and the thing. Hence, to have a cognition of this conformity is to have a cognition of truth.

Now the senses do not in any way have a cognition of this conformity. For instance, even though the sense of sight has a likeness of the visible thing, it nonetheless does not itself have a cognition of the relation that obtains between the thing that is seen and what it itself apprehends about that thing.

By contrast, the intellect is able to have a cognition of its own conformity to an intelligible thing. However, it does not apprehend this conformity by grasping what a thing is. Rather, it is when it judges the thing to be like the form it apprehends with respect to that thing that it first has a cognition of truth and asserts truth (*tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum*). And it does this by composing and dividing. For in every proposition the intellect either applies the form signified by the predicate to the thing signified by the subject, or else it separates off (*removet*) the form signified by the predicate from the thing signified by the subject.

For this reason, even though it might well be the case that a sensory power *is true* with respect to a given thing, or that the intellect *is true* in grasping what a thing is, nonetheless, it is not the case that it *has a cognition of* what is true or *asserts* what is true. And the same difference holds between spoken simple terms and spoken sentences (*de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis*).

So, to be sure, truth can exist in—as in a certain true entity—the senses or the intellect when the intellect grasps what a thing is; however, truth cannot exist in them as something that there is a cognition of in the knower—which is what the name 'true' connotes. For the perfection of the intellect is the true as known (*verum ut cognitum*). And so, properly speaking, truth exists in the intellect when it composes and divides, but it does not exist in the senses or in the intellect when the intellect grasps what a thing is.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

Article 3

Is *true* convertible with *being*?

It seems that *true* and *being* are not convertible:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), what is true properly exists in the intellect. But being properly exists in things. Therefore, they are not convertible.

Objection 2: That which extends to both being and non-being is not convertible with *being*. But *true* extends to both being and non-being; for it is true that what is is and that what is not is not. Therefore, *true* and *being* are not convertible.

Objection 3: Things that are related as prior and posterior do not seem to be convertible. But *true* seems to be prior to *being*, since a being is understood only under the notion of the true (*sub ratione veri*). Therefore, it seems that they are not convertible.

But contrary to this: In *Metaphysics* 2 the Philosopher says that things have the same disposition in being and in truth.

I respond: Just as *good* has the nature of the desirable, so *true* has a relation to cognition. But each thing is knowable to the extent that it has *esse*. Because of this, *De Anima* 3 says that in a certain sense the soul is all things in its sensing and its intellectual understanding. And so just as *good* is convertible with *being*, so is *true*. Still, just as *good* adds to *being* the notion of the desirable, so *true* adds a relation to the intellect.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 1), the true exists both in things and in the intellect. Now the true as it exists in things is convertible with *being* according to its substance, while the true as it exists in the intellect is convertible with *being* in the sense that what manifests is convertible with what is manifested (*manifestativum cum manifestato*). For, as has been explained (a. 1), this is the nature of the true.

Now even though one could claim that being, like the true, exists both in things and in the intellect, it is still the case that the true exists principally in the intellect, whereas being exists principally in things. And this is so because *true* and *being* differ in concept.

Reply to objection 2: Non-being is not in itself capable of being known, but is instead known insofar as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence, the true is here grounded in being, insofar as a non-being is a certain being of reason, i.e., something apprehended by reason.

Reply to objection 3: There are two ways to interpret the claim that a being cannot be apprehended without the notion of the true (*sine ratione veri*).

In the first way, it has this sense: 'A being is not apprehended unless the notion of the true follows upon the apprehension of the being'. So interpreted, the claim is true.

In the second way, it can be interpreted as follows: 'A being could not be apprehended unless the notion of the true were apprehended'. And this is false.

It is the case, however, that something true cannot be apprehended unless the notion of being is apprehended. For *being* enters into the definition of *true*.

It is the same as comparing *intelligible* to *being*. For a being cannot be understood unless that being is intelligible, and yet a being can be understood without its intelligibility being understood. Similarly, a being as understood is true, but it is not the case that in understanding *being*, one understands *true*.

Article 4

Is good conceptually prior to true?

It seems that *good* is conceptually prior to *true*:

Objection 1: As is clear from *Physics* 1, that which is more universal is conceptually prior (*secundum rationem prius*). But *good* is more universal than *true*, since the true is a certain good, viz., the good of an intellect. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *true*.

Objection 2: The good exists in the things, whereas the true exists in the intellect as it composes and divides, as has been explained (a. 2). But things that exist in reality are prior to things that exist in the intellect. Therefore, *good* is conceptually prior to *true*.

Objection 3: As is clear from *Ethics* 4, truth (*veritas*) is a certain species of virtue. But virtue is contained under the good, since, as Augustine says, a virtue is a good quality of the mind. Therefore, *good* is prior to *true*.

But contrary to this: That which exists in more things is conceptually prior. But the true exists in certain things in which the good does not exist, viz., mathematical entities. Therefore, *true* is prior to *good*.

I respond: Even though *good* and *true* are convertible with *being* as far as their subject (*suppositum*) is concerned, they differ in concept. And on this score *true* is, absolutely speaking, prior to *good*. This is clear from two considerations:

First, *true* is more closely related to *being*, which is itself prior to *good*. For *true* is related simply and immediately to *esse* itself, whereas the concept *good* follows upon *esse* insofar as *esse* is in some way perfect. For this is why it is desirable.

Second, cognition naturally precedes desire. Hence, since *true* has to do with cognition, whereas *good* has to do with appetite, *true* will be conceptually prior to *good*.

Reply to objection 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one another. For the intellect understands the will, and the will wills that the intellect understand. So, then, the things that pertain to the intellect are contained among the things that are ordered to an object of the will, and vice versa. Hence, in the order of desirable things, the good stands as a universal and the true as a particular, whereas the opposite holds in the order of intelligible things.

Thus, from the fact that the true is a certain good it follows that the good is prior in the order of desirable things, but not that it is prior absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 2: A thing is conceptually prior to the extent that it is prior in the understanding. But the intellect first apprehends being itself, and then apprehends that it is understanding being, and thirdly apprehends that it desires being. Hence, the concept *being* comes first, the concept *truth* comes second, and the concept *good* comes third—even though the good exists in the things.

Reply to objection 3: The virtue that is called truth is not truth in general, but truth insofar as a man, in what he says and does, manifests himself as he is. Moreover, ‘truth of life’ is predicated in a particular sense, insofar as in his life a man fulfills that to which he is ordered by God’s intellect—in the same way that, as has been explained (a. 1), truth exists in other things as well. Again, the ‘truth of justice’ exists insofar as a man attends to that which he owes to others according to the order of law. Hence, one cannot infer anything about truth in general from these particular senses of truth.

Article 5

Is God truth?

It seems that God is not truth (*non sit veritas*):

Objection 1: Truth consists in the intellect's composing and dividing. But in God there is no composition and division. Therefore, there is no truth there.

Objection 2: According to Augustine in *De Vera Religione*, truth is a likeness to a thing's principle. But in God there is no likeness to His principle. Therefore, truth does not exist in God.

Objection 3: Whatever is said of God is said of Him as the first cause of all things. For instance, God's *esse* is a cause of all *esse*, and God's goodness is a cause of every good. Therefore, if truth exists in God, then everything that is true will come from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore, this truth will come from God. But this is clearly false.

But contrary to this: In John 14:6 our Lord says: "I am the way, the truth, and the life."

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), truth is found in the intellect insofar as it apprehends a thing as it is, and truth is found in a thing insofar as it has *esse* that is conformable to an intellect. But the latter is found especially in God. For God's *esse* is not only conformed to His intellect, but is His very act of understanding; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of all other *esse* and of every other intellect. And He Himself is His own *esse* and His own act of understanding. Hence, it follows not only that truth exists in Him, but that He Himself is the first and highest truth.

Reply to objection 1: Even though there is no composition or division in God's intellect, He nonetheless judges all things according to His simple understanding, and He has cognition of all the propositions. And this is the sense in which truth exists in His intellect.

Reply to objection 2: Truth exists in our intellect insofar as our intellect is conformed to its principle, viz., the things themselves from which it takes its cognition. Likewise, truth exists in the things insofar as they are conformed to their principle, viz., God's intellect.

However, this conformity to a principle cannot, properly speaking, be predicated of God's truth—unless perhaps insofar as truth is appropriated to the Son, who has a principle. Still, if we are speaking of truth as predicated of God's essence, then conformity is unintelligible unless the affirmation is analyzed as a negation—as, for instance, when one says 'The Father is from Himself' because He is not from another'. Similarly, one can call God's truth a likeness of its principle insofar as His *esse* is not dissimilar to His intellect.

Reply to objection 3: Non-beings and privations have truth not of themselves, but only from the intellect's apprehension. But all of the intellect's apprehensions are from God. Thus, when I say, 'It is true that he is fornicating', whatever truth is contained therein is wholly from God. However, if someone goes on to infer, 'Therefore, the fact that he is fornicating is from God', then he is committing a fallacy of accident.

Article 6

Is there just one truth according to which all things are true?

It seems that there is just one truth according to which all things are true:

Objection 1: According to Augustine, nothing except God is greater than the human mind. But truth is greater than the human mind; otherwise, the mind would be the judge of truth, whereas in fact it

judges all things according to the truth and not according to itself. Therefore, God alone is the truth. Therefore, there is no truth other than God.

Objection 2: In *De Veritate* Anselm says that truth is related to true things as time is related to temporal things. But there is one time for all temporal things. Therefore, there is one truth by which all things are true.

But contrary to this: Psalm 11:2 says: “Truths are decayed from among the children of men.”

I respond: In a certain sense there is one truth by which all things are true, and in a certain sense there is not.

To see this clearly, note that when something is predicated univocally of many things, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature, in the way that *animal* is found in every species of animal. However, when something is predicated analogously of many things, it is found in just one of them according to its proper nature, and it is from this one that the others are denominated. For example, ‘healthy’ is predicated of an animal, of urine, and of medicine. It is not that health is found anywhere except in the animal alone; rather, medicine is denominated as healthy from the health of the animal, insofar as it effects that health, and urine is denominated as healthy insofar as it is a sign of that health. And even though health exists neither in the medicine nor in the urine, nonetheless, in the one there is something in virtue of which it effects health, while in the other there is something in virtue of which it is a sign of health.

Now it has been explained (a. 1) that truth exists primarily in the intellect and secondarily in the things insofar as they are ordered to God’s intellect. Therefore, if we are talking about truth as it exists in the intellect according to its proper nature, then there are many truths in the many created intellects and many truths even in one and the same intellect insofar as it knows many things. Hence, a Gloss on Psalm 11:2 (“Truths are decayed from among the children of men”) says that in the same way that many likenesses of a single human face might appear in a mirror, so too many truths result from the one divine truth.

On the other hand, if we are talking about truth as it exists in the things, then all the things are true by the one First Truth to which each is assimilated according to its own being (*entitas*). And so even though the things have many essences or forms, there is nonetheless one truth of God’s intellect in virtue of which all things are denominated as true.

Reply to objection 1: The soul judges of each thing not according to just any truth but according to the First Truth, insofar as that truth comes to exist in it, as in a mirror, by reason of the first intelligible things (cf. q. 15). Hence, it follows that the First Truth is greater than the soul.

And yet even the created truth that exists in our intellect is greater than the soul—not absolutely speaking, but in a certain respect, viz., insofar as it is the soul’s perfection. In this same sense, knowledge can also be said to be greater than the soul.

However, it is true that nothing *subsistent*, except God, is greater than the rational mind.

Reply to objection 2: This passage from Anselm is true in the sense that things are called true because of their relation to God’s intellect.

Article 7

Is created truth eternal?

It seems that created truth is eternal:

Objection 1: In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says that there is nothing more eternal than the

nature of a circle or the fact that two plus three equals five. But the truth of these things is created truth. Therefore, created truth is eternal.

Objection 2: Everything that always exists is eternal. But universals exist always and everywhere. Therefore, they are eternal. Therefore, truth, which is especially universal, is likewise eternal.

Objection 3: That which is true at present is such that the proposition ‘It is going to be’ was always true. But just as the truth of a present-tense proposition is a created truth, so too is the truth of a future-tense proposition. Therefore, some created truth is eternal.

Objection 4: Everything that lacks both a beginning and an end is eternal. But the truth of propositions lacks both a beginning and an end.

For if truth began to exist after it had not previously existed, then the proposition ‘Truth does not exist’ was true. But surely it was true by some truth, and so truth existed before it began to exist.

Similarly, if someone claims that truth has an end, then it follows that truth exists after it will have ceased to exist. For the proposition ‘Truth does not exist’ will then be true.

Therefore, truth is eternal.

But contrary to this: As was established above (q. 10, a. 3), God alone is eternal.

I respond: The truth of propositions (*enuntiabilia*) is nothing other than the truth of the intellect. For propositions exist both in the intellect and in speech. Insofar as a proposition exists in the intellect, it has its truth *per se*. On the other hand, as existing in speech, a proposition is called true insofar as it signifies some truth of the intellect and not because of any truth that exists in it itself as in a subject—just as urine is called healthy not because of any health that exists in it itself, but because of the animal’s health, which it signifies.

Similarly, it was likewise explained above (a. 1) that things themselves are denominated as true from the truth of the intellect.

Hence, if no intellect were eternal, then no truth would be eternal. But since only God’s intellect is eternal, it is in that intellect alone that truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that something other than God is eternal. For, as was shown above (a. 5), the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself.

Reply to objection 1: The nature of a circle and the fact that two plus three equals five have eternity in the mind of God.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which a thing can be understood to exist always and everywhere.

In the first way, the thing exists always and everywhere because it has within itself that in virtue of which it extends to every time and to every place. This is the way in which it belongs to God to exist always and everywhere.

In the second way, the thing exists always and everywhere because it does not have anything within itself by which it is limited to a certain time or place. This is like the way in which primary matter is said to be one. It is one not because it has one form—in the way, e.g., that a man is one because of the unity of his one form—but because of the absence of all distinguishing forms.

It is in this second way that a universal is said to exist always and everywhere. For universals abstract from the here and now. But from this it does not follow that universals are eternal—unless they are eternal in an intellect, if there is an eternal intellect.

Reply to objection 3: The reason why that which now exists was, before it existed, going to exist, is that its cause was such that that thing was going to exist. Hence, if that cause had been removed, then it would not have been the case that that thing was going to exist. But only the first cause is eternal. Hence, it does not follow that the things that now exist are such that the proposition ‘They are going to exist’ was always true, except insofar as an everlasting cause was such that they were going to exist. But God alone is such a cause.

Reply to objection 4: Since our intellect is not eternal, neither is it the case that the truth of any proposition formulated by us is eternal; rather, the truth of any such proposition begins to exist at some time. And before a truth of this sort existed, it was not true to assert ‘This truth does not exist’—unless it was being asserted by God’s intellect, in which alone truth is eternal.

To be sure, the assertion ‘This truth did not exist at that time’ is now true. But this is true only by a truth that now exists in our intellect, and not by any truth that now exists on the part of a thing. For it is a truth about a non-being. But a non-being does not have its truth of itself; rather, its being true comes solely from an intellect’s apprehending it. Hence, to the extent that we apprehend that the non-existence of the truth in question preceded its existence, the assertion ‘This truth did not exist’ is true.

Article 8

Is truth immutable?

It seems that truth is immutable:

Objection 1: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 2 Augustine says that truth is not of equal status with the mind, because otherwise it would be changeable, just like the mind is.

Objection 2: What remains after every change is immutable; for instance, primary matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, since it remains after every instance of generation and corruption. But truth remains after every change, since after each change either the assertion ‘This thing exists’ or the assertion ‘This thing does not exist’ will be true. Therefore, truth is immutable.

Objection 3: If the truth of a proposition changed, it would do so especially because of a change in things. But it does not change for this reason. For according to Anselm, truth is a sort of rectitude, viz., a thing’s fulfilling what is contained about it in God’s mind. But the fact that the proposition ‘Socrates is sitting’ signifies that Socrates is sitting derives from God’s mind, since the proposition signifies this even when Socrates is not sitting. Therefore, a proposition’s truth does not change in any way.

Objection 4: When the cause is the same, the effect is also the same. But the same reality is the cause of the truth of these three propositions: ‘Socrates is sitting’, ‘Socrates will be sitting’, and ‘Socrates was sitting’. Therefore, the truth of these propositions is the same. But one or another of these propositions must be true. Therefore, the truth of these propositions persists immutably—and, for the same reason, so does the truth that belongs to any other proposition.

But contrary to this: Psalm 11:2 says: “Truths are decayed from among the children of men.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), truth exists properly in the intellect alone, whereas things are called true in a sense that derives from the truth that exists in an intellect. Hence, the mutability of truth must be thought of as having to do with an intellect.

Now the truth of the intellect consists in its conforming to the things that are understood. This conformity, just like any other kind of likeness, can change in two ways, viz., because of a change in one or the other of its terms. Hence, in the first way, truth changes on the part of the intellect, viz., from the fact that someone accepts a different opinion about a thing while the thing itself remains the same, whereas in the second way, truth changes when the thing changes while the opinion remains the same—assuming in both cases that there is a change from truth to falsity.

Therefore, if there is an intellect which is such that (a) a change of opinion cannot occur in it and (b) no entity can undermine its acceptance of an opinion, then immutable truth will exist in that intellect. As is clear from what was said above (q. 14, a. 15), God’s intellect is like this. Hence the truth of God’s intellect is immutable.

By contrast, the truth of our intellect is mutable. This is not because truth itself is subject to change, but because our intellect changes from truth to falsity. (For this is the sense in which forms can be called mutable.)

On the other hand, it is the truth of God's intellect according to which natural things are called true, and this sort of truth is altogether immutable.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is speaking here of God's truth.

Reply to objection 2: *True* and *being* are convertible. Hence, just as, according to *Physics* 1, being itself is generated and corrupted not *per se* but *per accidens*, insofar as *this* or *that* being is corrupted or generated, so too truth changes not because no truth remains, but because *this* truth, which previously existed, does not remain.

Reply to objection 3: A proposition does not have truth merely in the way that other things are said to have truth, viz., insofar as they fulfill what is ordained for them by God's intellect. Rather, a proposition is also said to have truth in a certain special way, viz., insofar as it signifies the truth of an intellect. This latter truth consists in the conformity between the intellect and the thing, and once this conformity is removed, the truth of the opinion—and, consequently, the truth of the proposition—changes.

So, then, when Socrates is sitting, the spoken proposition 'Socrates is sitting' is true both (a) with the *truth of a thing*, insofar as it is a certain meaningful locution, and also (b) with the *truth of signification*, insofar as it signifies a true opinion (*veram opinionem*). However, once Socrates gets up, the first sort of truth remains, while the second changes.

Reply to objection 4: Socrates's sitting, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition 'Socrates is sitting', does not have the same status while Socrates is sitting and after he will have sat and before he sits. Hence, the truth caused by Socrates's sitting likewise exists in different ways and is signified in different ways by the present-tense proposition, the past-tense proposition, and the future-tense proposition. Hence, even though one or the other of the propositions is true, it does not follow that the same truth remains invariable.

QUESTION 17

Falsity

Next we must inquire into falsity. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does falsity exist in things? (2) Does falsity exist in the senses? (3) Does falsity exist in the intellect? (4) How are the true and the false related?

Article 1

Does falsity exist in things?

It seems that falsity does not exist in things:

Objection 1: In the *Soliloquia* Augustine says, “If the true is that which is, one may infer—no matter who objects—that the false does not exist anywhere.”

Objection 2: The term ‘false’ derives from *fallere*, to deceive. But in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says that things do not deceive “because they do not manifest anything other than their own species.” Therefore, the false is not found in things.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), ‘true’ is predicated of things because of their relation to God’s intellect. But each thing, insofar as it exists, imitates God. Therefore, each thing is true without any falsity. And so no entity is false.

But contrary to this: In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “Each body is a true body and a false unity,” since it merely imitates unity and is not a unity. But each entity imitates God’s goodness and falls short of that goodness. Therefore, falsity exists in all things.

I respond: Since the true and the false are opposed to one another, and since opposites are related to the same subject, falsity has to be looked for first where truth is primarily found, i.e., in the intellect.

Now neither truth nor falsity is found in the things except because of their relation to an intellect. And since each thing is named absolutely speaking in light of what belongs to it *per se*, whereas it is named only in a derivative way in light of what belongs to it *per accidens*, a thing can be called false absolutely speaking because of its relation to an intellect on which it depends [for its *esse*] and to which it is related *per se*, whereas in relation to other intellects to which it is related *per accidens* it can be called false only in a derivative way.

Now natural things depend on *God’s intellect* in the way that artifacts depend on a human intellect. Artifacts are called false absolutely speaking and in themselves insofar as they are defective in relation to the form of the relevant craft; thus, a craftsman is said to fashion a false work when that work is defective in relation to the operation associated with the craft. So in the case of things that depend on God, falsity cannot be found in relation to God’s intellect; for whatever accrues to things proceeds from the ordination of God’s intellect—except perhaps in the lone case of voluntary agents, who have it within their power to withdraw themselves from the ordination of God’s intellect. This is what the evil of sin consists in. Accordingly, in the Scriptures sins themselves are called falsehoods and lies (Psalm 4:3: “Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?”)—just as, on the opposite side, virtuous action is called the ‘truth of life’ insofar it is subject to the order of God’s intellect (John 3:21: “He that does truth comes to the light.”).

On the other hand, as regards the order of *our intellect*, to which they are related *per accidens*, natural things can be called false not absolutely speaking, but in a derived sense. This happens in two ways:

In one way, things are called false because of the nature of the thing signified, so that what is signified or represented by a false assertion or conception is said to be false in the things. In this sense,

each thing can be said to be false with respect to what does not exist in it—as, for instance, if we were to call a diameter a false commensurable, as the Philosopher does in *Metaphysics* 5, or, as Augustine says in *Soliloquia*, “The tragic actor is a false Hector.” On the other hand, each thing can also be called true with respect to that which belongs to it.

In the second way, things are called false in the manner of a cause. A thing is called false in this sense when it is prone to cause a false belief about itself. Since it is natural for us to judge things by their exterior appearances, given that our cognition begins with the senses, which have to do *per se* and primarily with exterior accidents, it follows that things which resemble other things in their exterior accidents are said to be false with respect to those other things. For instance, gall is false honey, and tin is false silver. Accordingly, in *Soliloquia* Augustine says, “We call things false when we apprehend them as very similar.” And in *Metaphysics* 5 the Philosopher says, “If a thing is prone to appear such as it is not, or to appear as what it is not, then it is called false.” In this sense a man can be called false to the extent that he is enamored with false opinions and assertions—not, however, because he is able to formulate false opinions and assertions, since in that case, as *Metaphysics* 5 says, even those who are wise and knowledgeable would be called false.

Reply to objection 1: In relation to an intellect, a thing is called true with respect to what it is and false with respect to what it is not. Hence, as *Soliloquia* 2 says, “The true tragic actor is a false Hector.” So to the extent that a sort of non-being is found in things which exist, so too a certain type of falsity is found in things that exist.

Reply to objection 2: Things deceive us *per accidens* rather than *per se*. For they provide an occasion for falsity in that they bear a resemblance to things whose reality they do not have.

Reply to objection 3: Entities are not called false in relation to *God’s* intellect, which would be for them to be false absolutely speaking. Rather, they are called false in relation to *our* intellect, which is for them to be false in a derived sense.

Reply to argument for the contrary: A defective likeness or representation brings with it the nature of falsity only insofar as it presents an occasion for a false opinion. Hence, it is not the case that whenever there is a resemblance, the thing is called false. Rather, a thing is called false whenever the resemblance is apt to effect a false opinion—not in all cases, but for the most part.

Article 2

Does falsity exist in the senses?

It seems that falsity does not exist in the senses (*in sensu*):

Objection 1: In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “If all the bodily senses testify to the way in which they are affected, I do not know what more we should demand of them.” So it seems that we are not deceived by the senses. And so falsity does not exist in the senses.

Objection 2: In *Metaphysics* 4 the Philosopher says, “Falsity is proper not to the senses, but to the imagination.”

Objection 3: The true and the false exist only in propositions (*complexa*) and not in simple terms (*incomplexa*). But it does not pertain to the senses to compose and divide. Therefore, falsity does not exist in the senses.

But contrary to this: In the *Soliloquia* Augustine says, “It appears that we err in all the senses because of deceptive resemblances.”

I respond: Falsity should be looked for in the senses only to the extent that truth exists in them.

Now as was explained above (q. 16, a. 2), truth does not exist in the senses in such a way that the senses themselves have cognition of the true; rather, truth exists in them insofar as they have a true apprehension of sensible things. This happens to the extent that they apprehend the things as those things are. Hence, falsity can exist in the senses to the extent that they apprehend or assess things to be otherwise than those things are.

Now the senses know things insofar as a likeness of the things exists in them. But there are three ways in which a likeness of things exists in the senses:

In the first way, the likeness exists in them primarily and *per se*. This is the way in which a likeness of colors and other proper sensibles exists in the sense of sight.

In the second way, the likeness exists in them *per se* but not primarily. This is the way in which a likeness of shape or of magnitude or of the other common sensibles exists in the sense of sight.

In the third way, the likeness exists in them neither primarily nor *per se*, but rather *per accidens*. This is the way in which the likeness of a man exists in the sense of sight—not insofar as he is a man, but insofar as a thing of this particular color happens to be a man.

Now with respect to the proper sensibles the senses do not have a false cognition except *per accidens* and in just a few cases, viz., when, because a sense organ is not properly disposed, it does not receive the sensible form in the right way—just as other things that are acted upon likewise receive an agent's impression in a defective way because they are not properly disposed. Thus, it is because of a disorder in the tongue that sweet things seem bitter to sick people.

On the other hand, as regards the common sensibles and the things that are sensed *per accidens*, there can be a false assessment even in properly disposed senses. For the senses are not related directly to these things, but are related to them *per accidens* or as a consequence of their being related to other things.

Reply to objection 1: The senses are such that their being affected is their very sensing. Hence, if the senses testify to the way in which they are affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we are sensing something. However, because the senses are sometimes affected in a way different from the way the thing is, it follows that they sometimes testify to us differently from the way the thing is. And because of this we are deceived by the senses with respect to a given thing, but not with respect to the sensing itself.

Reply to objection 2: Falsity is said not to be proper to the senses because the senses are not deceived with respect to their proper object. Hence, in another and clearer translation the passage reads as follows: “The sensing of a proper sensible is not false.”

On the other hand, falsity is attributed to the imagination to the extent that it presents the likeness of a thing even when it is absent. Hence, when someone turns to the likeness of a thing as if to the thing itself, then falsity results from such an apprehension. Hence, in *Metaphysics* 5 the Philosopher also says that shadows and pictures and dreams are called false, insofar as they are not grounded in the things to which they have a likeness.

Reply to objection 3: This argument proves that falsity does not exist in the senses in the same way that it exists in a power that has cognition of the true and the false.

Article 3

Does falsity exist in the intellect?

It seems that falsity does not exist in the intellect (*in intellectu*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Whoever is deceived has no understanding (*non*

intelligit) of that about which he is deceived.” But the false is said to exist in a cognition insofar as we are deceived by that cognition. Therefore, falsity does not exist in the understanding (*in intellectu*).

Objection 2: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher claims that an act of understanding (*intellectus*) is always correct. Therefore, falsity does not exist in the understanding (*in intellectu*).

But contrary to this: *De Anima* 3 says, “The true and the false exist where there is a composition of thoughts.” But the composition of thoughts occurs in the intellect. Therefore, the true and the false exist in the intellect.

I respond: Just as a thing has *esse* through its proper form, so a cognitive power has its cognition through a likeness of the thing that it has cognition of. Now a natural thing is not defective with respect to the *esse* that belongs to it through its form, but it can be defective with respect to certain things that are accidental to or follow upon its form. For instance, a man might be defective with respect to having two feet, but not with respect to being a man. In the same way, a cognitive power is not defective in its cognition with respect to that thing by whose likeness it is informed, but it can be defective with respect to what follows upon or is accidental to that likeness. This is similar to the claim, made above (a. 2), that the sense of sight is not deceived with respect to a proper sensible, but might be deceived with respect to (a) the common sensibles that are consequent upon a proper sensible or (b) things that are sensible *per accidens*.

Now the intellect is informed by a likeness of a thing’s ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) in just the way that the senses are directly informed by a likeness of the proper sensibles. Hence, just as the senses are not deceived about proper sensibles, so too the intellect is not deceived about a thing’s ‘what-ness’. However, in its composing and dividing the intellect can be deceived when it attributes to a thing whose ‘what-ness’ it understands something which does not follow upon that ‘what-ness’ or which is opposed to it. For the intellect is related to a judgment about such things in the same way that the senses are related to judgments about common sensibles or about things that are sensible *per accidens*. Still, we must keep in mind this difference, explained above (q. 16, a. 2) for the case of truth: Falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect’s cognition is false, but also because the intellect has a cognition of falsity in the same way that it has a cognition of truth, whereas, as has been explained (a. 2), falsity does not exist in the senses as something that the senses have cognition of.

However, even though falsity exists *per se* in the intellect only with respect to the intellect’s composition, there can also be falsity *per accidens* in the operation of the intellect by which it has cognition of what a thing is (*qua cognoscit quod quid est*), since the intellect’s composition may get mixed in with this operation. This can happen in two ways:

In the first way, it happens when the intellect attributes the definition of one thing to some other thing—for instance, if it should attribute the definition of a circle to a man. Hence, the definition of one thing is false of another thing.

In the second way, it happens insofar as the intellect puts together as parts of a definition things that cannot go together. For in such a case the definition is false in itself and not just with respect to some entity or other. For instance, if the intellect formulated a definition such as *rational quadrupedal animal*, then it would be false in formulating such a definition because it would be false if it formulated the proposition ‘Some rational animal is a quadruped’. It is for this reason that the intellect cannot be false in its cognition of simple ‘what-nesses’ (*in cognoscendo quidditates simplices*); rather, either it is true or else it understands nothing at all.

Reply to objection 1: The ‘what-ness’ of a thing is the proper object of our understanding (*intellectus*), and for this reason we are properly said to understand something when, tracing it back to what it is, we make a judgment about it of the sort that occurs in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. This is how to interpret Augustine’s claim that whoever is deceived does not understand that about which he is deceived. However, his claim should not be interpreted to mean that no one is

deceived in any operation of the intellect.

Reply to objection 2: The understanding is always correct to the extent that it is the understanding of principles about which no one is deceived—and this for the very same reason that no one is deceived about the ‘what-ness’ of a thing. For the principles that are known *per se* are those which are such that they are known as soon as their terms are understood, because the predicate is posited in the definition of the subject.

Article 4

Are the true and the false contraries?

It seems that the true and the false are not contraries:

Objection 1: The true and the false are opposed as that which is and that which is not; for, as Augustine says, “The true is that which is.” But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore, the true and the false are not contraries.

Objection 2: One of two contraries does not exist in the other. But the false exists in the true; for as Augustine says in the *Soliloquia*, “The tragic actor would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragic actor.” Therefore, the true and the false are not contraries.

Objection 3: In God there is no contrariety, since, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 12, nothing is contrary to God’s substance. But falsity is opposed to God, since in Scripture an idol is called a lie (Jeremiah 8:5: “They have laid hold on lying”; Gloss: “that is, idols”). Therefore, the true and the false are not contraries.

But contrary to this: In *Perihermenias* 2 the Philosopher claims that a false opinion is contrary to a true opinion.

I respond: The true and the false are opposed as contraries—and not, as some have claimed, as an affirmation and a negation.

To see this clearly, note that a *negation* neither posits anything nor determines a subject for itself. For this reason, a negation—e.g., ‘non-seeing’ or ‘non-sitting’—can be predicated either of a being or of a non-being.

A *privation*, on the other hand, does not posit anything but does determine a subject for itself. For, as *Metaphysics* 4 says, a privation is a negation in a subject. For instance, ‘blind’ is predicated only of something that is apt by its nature to have sight.

By contrast, a *contrary* both posits something and determines a subject for itself. For example, black is a certain species of color.

Now the false posits something. For, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 4, something is false because it is asserted (or seen) to be what it is not or because it is asserted (or seen) not to be what it is. For just as the true posits an acceptance of what corresponds to the thing (*ponit acceptionem adaequatam rei*), so the false posits the acceptance of what does not correspond to the thing. Hence, it is clear that the true and the false are contraries.

Reply to objection 1: What exists in things is the truth of a thing, but what exists *as apprehended* is the truth of the intellect, in which truth exists primarily. Hence, the false is likewise that which is not *as apprehended*. And as the Philosopher proves in *Perihermenias* 2, apprehending what is and apprehending what is not are contraries; for example, the opinion ‘A good thing is good’ is contrary to the opinion ‘A good thing is not good’.

Reply to objection 2: The false is not grounded in the true that is contrary to itself, just as evil

does not exist in a good that is contrary to itself. Rather, evil is grounded in the good which is its subject. In both cases, this happens because the true and the good are universal and convertible with being. Hence, just as every privation is grounded in a subject that is a being, so too everything evil is grounded in something good, and everything false is grounded in something true.

Reply to objection 3: Contraries and things opposed privatively are apt to have the same subject. Therefore, nothing is contrary to God considered in Himself, either because of His goodness or because of His truth, since there cannot be any falsity in His intellect.

However, in *our* apprehension God *does* have a contrary in the sense that a false belief about Him is contrary to a true belief about Him. And so idols are called lies opposed to the divine truth, insofar as a false belief about idols is contrary to a true belief about God's oneness.

QUESTION 18

God's Life

Since understanding belongs to living things, now that we have considered God's knowledge and understanding, we must turn to a consideration of His life. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Which things are living? (2) What is life? (3) Does life belong to God? (4) Are all things the life in God?

Article 1

Do all natural things have life?

It seems that all natural things have life:

Objection 1: In *Physics* 8 the Philosopher says that movement (*motus*) is, as it were, a sort of life in all things that exist by nature. But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore, all natural things participate in life.

Objection 2: Plants are said to be alive because they have within themselves a principle of the movements of growth and diminution. But as *Physics* 8 proves, local movement is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the movements of growth and diminution. Therefore, since all natural bodies have some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies have life.

Objection 3: Among natural bodies, the least perfect are the elements. But life is attributed to the elements—for instance, waters are called 'living waters'. Therefore, *a fortiori*, all natural bodies have life.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 6, Dionysius says, "Plants have life in its last echoes." From this one can infer that plants have the lowest grade of life. But inanimate bodies are lower than plants. Therefore, they do not have life.

I respond: Beginning with those things that clearly have life, we can determine which things have life and which do not. Now life clearly belongs to animals; for *De Vegetabilibus* says, "Life is manifest in the animals." Hence, we should distinguish living things from non-living things by looking at the reason why animals are said to have life. But this will be whatever life is first manifested in and which remains to the last.

Now we first say that an animal has life when it begins to have movement from itself, and an animal is judged to be alive for as long as such movement is apparent in it; and when it no longer has movement from itself, but is moved only by another, then an animal is said to be dead because of the absence of life. From this it is clear that the things that have life in the proper sense are those that move themselves with some type of movement—regardless of whether (a) movement is taken in the proper sense, according to which a movement is said to be the act of what is imperfect, i.e., of something that exists in potentiality, or (b) movement is taken in a broad sense, according to which an act of what is perfect is called a movement—in the way that acts of understanding and of sensing are called movements according to *De Anima* 3. Accordingly, things that impel themselves to some sort of movement or action are said to have life, whereas things whose nature is not such that they impel themselves to any movement or action cannot be said to have life, except according to some likeness.

Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first movement, viz., the movement of the celestial bodies, or to movement in general. And in both cases movement is called 'the life' of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. For the movement of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the movement of the heart by which life is conserved in an animal. Similarly, every natural movement is, as it were, a certain

likeness of a vital operation in natural things. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were a single animal, so that (as some have claimed) its movement were from an intrinsic mover, then it would follow that its movement is the life of all natural bodies.

Reply to objection 2: Movement belongs to heavy and light bodies only insofar as what their nature is disposed to remains unfulfilled—more specifically, only when they are located outside of their proper place. For when they are located in their proper and natural place, they are at rest. By contrast, plants and other living things are moved by a vital motion insofar as what their nature is disposed to is fulfilled—and not insofar as they are approaching it or receding from it. Indeed, to the extent that they recede from that movement, they recede from what their nature is disposed to.

What's more, as *Physics* 8 says, heavy and light bodies are moved either (a) by an extrinsic mover, or (b) by what generates them and gives them their form, or (c) by what removes an impediment. And so they do not move themselves in the way that living bodies do.

Reply to objection 3: What are called living waters are waters that are continuously flowing. For standing waters, which are not connected to a continually flowing source, are called dead waters, e.g., the waters in cisterns or ponds. And this is said by way of a likeness. For insofar as waters seem to move themselves, they have a likeness to life. Still, they do not have the true nature of life, since they have this movement not from themselves, but from the cause that generates them—just as happens with the movements of other heavy and light bodies.

Article 2

Is life an operation?

It seems that life is a certain operation:

Objection 1: Nothing is divided except into things that belong to its genus. But *to live* is divided into certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher in *De Anima* 2, where he divides *to live* into four operations, viz., (a) to take nourishment, (b) to sense, (c) to move oneself by local movement, and (d) to understand. Therefore, life is a certain operation.

Objection 2: The active life is said to differ from the contemplative life. But contemplative people differ from active people only with respect to certain operations. Therefore, life is a certain operation.

Objection 3: To know God is a certain operation. But, as is clear from John 17:3 (“Now this is eternal life: that they may know You, the only true God”), this operation is life. Therefore, life is an operation.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says, “In the case of living things, their living is their being.”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 17, aa. 1 and 3), our intellect, which properly grasps the ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) of a thing as its proper object, begins from the senses, whose proper objects are exterior accidents. So from a thing's external appearances (*ex his quae exterius apparent de re*) we arrive at a cognition of the thing's essence.

And, as is clear from what was said above (q. 13, a. 1), because we name a thing as we know it, in many cases we impose names derived from exterior properties in order to signify the essences of things. Hence, names of this sort are sometimes taken properly for the essences of the things which the names were principally imposed to signify, but sometimes they are taken instead—less properly—for the properties because of which they were imposed. For instance, it is clear that the name ‘body’ was

imposed to signify a certain genus of substances, and it was imposed because three dimensions are found in those substances. So sometimes this name is used to signify the three dimensions themselves, in which case ‘body’ is being used for a species of quantity.

Now something similar must be said about the name ‘life’. For the name ‘life’ is taken from a certain external appearance of a thing, viz., that it moves itself. But this movement is not what the name was imposed to signify. Rather, it was imposed to signify a substance which by its nature moves or impels itself in some way to an action. Accordingly, to live is nothing other than to exist in such a nature, and the name ‘life’ signifies this very thing, but in the abstract—in just the way that the name ‘a run’ signifies running itself in the abstract. Hence, [the concrete name] ‘living’ is not an accidental predicate but a substantival predicate.

However, sometimes the name ‘life’ is taken less properly for the vital operations from which the name ‘life’ was first taken. This is the way that the Philosopher is talking in *Ethics* 9 when he says, “Life is principally sensing or understanding.”

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is here taking *to live* for a vital operation.

An alternative, and better, reply is to claim that ‘to sense’ and ‘to understand’, etc., are sometimes taken for certain operations and sometimes for the very *esse* of those things that have these operations. For *Ethics* 9 says, “To be is to sense or to understand,” i.e., to have a nature capable of sensing or understanding. And this is the sense in which the Philosopher divides *to live* into the four operations. For the genera of living things are contained in these four logical subordinates: Some living things have a nature capable only of *taking nourishment* and of what follows from this, viz., growth and generation; other living things have, in addition, a nature capable of *sensing*, as is clear in the case of immobile animals such as oysters; others also have, along with these operations, natures capable of *moving themselves by local movement*, e.g., perfect animals like quadrupeds and birds, etc.; and still others have, in addition, a nature capable of *understanding*, e.g., men.

Reply to objection 2: The vital works are those whose principles exist within the agents, so that agents induce operations of this sort within themselves. However, it is possible for there to exist within men not only natural principles (e.g., natural powers) for certain works, but also certain added principles, e.g., habits that incline them in the manner of a nature to certain types of actions and render those actions pleasant. And on this basis—through, as it were, a certain likeness—a particular activity which is pleasant to a man, and to which he is inclined, and in which he spends his time, and to which he orders his life, is itself called the man’s life. Hence, some are said to lead the life of pleasure and some the noble life. It is in this same way that the contemplative life is distinguished from the active life. Also, it is in this same way that to know God is called eternal life.

Reply to objection 3: The answer to this objection is clear from what was just said.

Article 3

Does God have life?

It seems that life does not befit God:

Objection 1: As has been explained (aa. 1-2), the things that are said to live are those that move themselves. But it does not belong to God to be moved. Therefore, neither does it belong to Him to live.

Objection 2: In all things that are living, there is some principle of life; hence, *De Anima* 2 says, “The soul is the cause and principle of a living body.” But God does not have any principle. Therefore, it does not belong to God to live.

Objection 3: The principle of life in the living things that surround us is the vegetative soul, which exists only in corporeal things. Therefore, it does not belong to incorporeal things to live.

But contrary to this: Psalm 83:3 says, “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.”

I respond: Life exists in God in an especially proper way.

To see this clearly, consider that things are said to have life insofar as they operate by themselves and not as moved by others. The more perfectly this characteristic belongs to a thing, the more perfectly is life found in it.

Now among the things that move and are moved we find three elements in the following order: First, there is the *end* that moves the agent, whereas a principal agent is one that acts through its own *form*; and a principal agent sometimes acts through an instrument, which does not act by the power of its own form but instead acts by the power of the principal agent, so that it is only the *execution* of the action that belongs to the instrument.

Thus, there are some agents that move themselves, but not with respect to either the *form* or the *end*, which exist in them by nature. Rather, they move themselves only with respect to the *execution* of the action, whereas the form through which they act and the end for the sake of which they act are determined for them by their nature. Plants are agents of this sort. Given the form imparted to them by nature, they move themselves with respect to growth and diminution.

There are some agents that move themselves in a further way, not only with respect to the *execution* of the movement, but also with respect to the *form* that is the principle of the movement; for they acquire this form by themselves. Animals are agents of this sort. Their principle of movement is a form that is received through the senses rather than imparted to them by nature. Hence, the more perfect their sensory powers are, the more perfectly they move themselves. For animals that have only the sense of touch, e.g., oysters, move themselves only by movements of reaching out and drawing back, hardly surpassing the movement of a plant. On the other hand, animals that have a complete sentient power to know not only things conjoined to and touching them, but also things at a distance from them, move themselves to remote places by a progressive movement. However, even though animals of this sort receive through the senses the *form* that is the principle of action, they nonetheless do not determine for themselves the *end* of their action or movement; instead, this end is imparted to them by nature, so that it is through natural instinct that they are moved to do something by the form apprehended through their senses.

Hence, in addition to such animals, there are other animals that move themselves even with respect to the *end*, which they determine for themselves. This happens only through reason and understanding, whose function it is to know the relation between the end and the means to that end and to order the one to the other. Hence, a more perfect mode of living belongs to those animals that have understanding, since they move themselves in a more perfect way. An indication of this is that in one and the same man the intellective power moves the sentient powers, and the sentient powers by their command move the organs that execute the movement—just as, in the case of crafts, we see that the craft which makes use of a ship, viz., the navigational craft, directs the craft that designs the ship, and the latter directs the craft that executes just the task of assembling the materials.

However, even though our intellect moves itself with respect to some things, there are nonetheless other things that are determined for it by its nature—e.g., its *first principles*, with respect to which it cannot alter itself, and the *ultimate end*, which it is unable not to will. Hence, even though our intellect can move itself with respect to some things, it must nonetheless be moved by another with respect to other things.

Therefore, the highest grade of life is had by that which by its nature is its very act of understanding and which is such that what it has by nature is not determined by another. But God is such a being. Hence, life exists especially in God. Thus, in *Metaphysics* 12 the Philosopher, having shown that God is

intelligent, concludes that He has the most perfect and everlasting life, since His intellect is the most perfect and is always in act.

Reply to objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 9 says, there are two types of actions, one of which passes into an exterior matter, e.g., heating and cutting, and the other of which remains within the agent, e.g., understanding, sensing, and willing. The difference between them is that the first type of action is a perfection of the thing that is moved and not of the agent that effects the motion, whereas the second type of action is a perfection of the agent.

Hence, since a movement is an act of a movable thing, this second type of action, insofar as it is an act of the agent's, is called the agent's movement on the basis of a likeness. For just as a movement is an act of a movable thing, so an action of the second type is an act of the agent's—even though, as *De Anima* 3 says, a movement is the act of something imperfect, viz., something that exists in potentiality, whereas an action of the second type is the act of something perfect, i.e., something that exists in actuality.

Therefore, given this sense in which an act of understanding is a movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. And it is in this sense that Plato claimed that God moves Himself—and not in the sense in which a movement is the act of something imperfect.

Reply to objection 2: Just as God is His own *esse* itself and His own act of understanding, so too He is His own life. And because of this, He is alive in such a way that He has no principle of living.

Reply to objection 3: Among lower things life is received in a corruptible nature that requires generation for the conservation of the species and nourishment for the conservation of the individual. Because of this, in lower things one does not find life without a vegetative soul. But this does not hold for the case of incorruptible things.

Article 4

Are all things the life in God?

It seems that it is not the case that all things are the life in God (*non omnia sint vita in Deo*):

Objection 1: Acts 17:28 says, “In Him we live and move and have our being.” But it is not the case that all things are the movement in God. Therefore, it is not the case that all things are the life in God.

Objection 2: All things exist in God as in a first exemplar. But the exemplifiers should be conformed to their exemplar. Therefore, since it is not the case that all things are alive in themselves, it seems that it is not the case that all things are the life in God.

Objection 3: In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says that a living substance is better than any non-living substance. Therefore, if things that are not alive in themselves are the life in God, then it seems that things exist more truly in God than in themselves. But this seems to be false, since in themselves they exist in actuality, whereas in God they exist in potentiality.

Objection 4: Just as good things are known by God, along with the things that are made at some time or other, so too evil things are known by God, along with the things that He is able to make and yet are never made. Therefore, if all things are the life in God insofar as they are known by Him, then it seems that even evil things and things that are never made are the life in God insofar as they are known by Him. But this seems absurd.

But contrary to this: John 1:3-4 says: “What was made . . . was life in Him.” But all things other than God were made. Therefore, all things are the life in Him.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), God's life is His act of understanding. But the intellect, what is understood, and the very act of understanding are all the same in God. Hence, whatever exists in God as something understood is His very living or life. Hence, since all the things that have been made by God exist in Him as things that are understood, it follows that all the things in Him are the very life of God.

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which creatures are said to exist in God.

In the first way, they exist in God insofar as they are contained in and conserved by God's *power*, just as we say that we 'have it in us' when something is within our power. And so creatures are said to exist in God even insofar as they exist in their proper natures. And this is the way to understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live and move and have our being." For our life, and our being, and our movement are all caused by God.

In the second way, things are said to exist in God as in a *knower*. And in this sense they exist in God through their proper conceptions (*rationes*), which in God are nothing other than the divine essence. Hence, insofar as they exist in God in this way, they are the divine essence. And since God's essence is life but not movement, it follows that, in this manner of speaking, things are the life in God, but they are not the movement in Him.

Reply to objection 2: The exemplifiers should be conformed to their exemplar with respect to the nature of their form but not with respect to their mode of being. For sometimes the form in the exemplar and the form in the exemplifier have different modes of being. For instance, the form of a house has immaterial and intelligible *esse* in the craftsman's mind, but it has material and sensible *esse* in the house that exists outside the soul. So, too, the natures of things that are not alive in themselves are the life in God's mind, since in God's mind they have divine *esse*.

Reply to objection 3: If matter were not part of the nature of natural things, but only form were, then natural things would in all respects exist in a truer mode through their ideas in God's mind than they do in themselves. This is why Plato claimed that the separated Man was a true man, whereas a material man is a man through participation.

However, since matter is part of the nature of natural things, one must say that (a) natural things have *esse* more truly, absolutely speaking, in God's mind than in themselves—for in God's mind they have uncreated *esse*, whereas in themselves they have created *esse*, but that (b) they have *this particular esse* (e.g., the *esse* of a man or a horse) more truly in their proper natures than in God's mind. For material *esse*, which they do not have in God's mind, pertains to the truth of a man [or a horse]. In the same way, a house has *esse* in a more noble way in the craftsman's mind than in matter, but, nonetheless, the house which exists in matter is more truly called a house than the house which exists in the craftsman's mind. For the former is a house in actuality, whereas the latter is a house in potentiality.

Reply to objection 4: Even though evils exist in God's knowledge insofar as they are included in God's knowledge, they nonetheless do not exist in God either as created by God and conserved by Him or as having a conception in God. For God knows them through the conceptions of things that are good. Hence, it cannot be claimed that evils are the life in God.

As for things which do not exist at any time, they can be said to be the life in God insofar as 'life' names only the act of understanding by which God understands them, but not insofar as 'life' implies a principle of action.

QUESTION 19

God's Will

Having considered the things that pertain to God's knowledge, we must now consider the things that pertain to God's will. First, we will consider God's will itself (question 19); second, we will consider what pertains to His will absolutely speaking (questions 20-21); and, third, we will consider what pertains to His intellect in relation to His will (questions 22-24).

On the topic of God's will itself there are twelve questions: (1) Is there a will in God? (2) Does God will things distinct from Himself? (3) Does God will whatever He wills by necessity? (4) Is God's will a cause of things? (5) Can a cause be assigned for God's act of willing? (6) Is God's will always fulfilled? (7) Is God's will mutable? (8) Does God's will impose necessity on the things willed? (9) Does God will evils? (10) Does God have free choice? (11) Should signs be ascribed to God's will? (12) Is it appropriate to posit five signs of God's will?

Article 1

Is there a will in God?

It seems that there is no will in God:

Objection 1: The object of the will is the end and the good. But no end can be assigned to God. Therefore, there is no will in God.

Objection 2: The will is a certain sort of desire (*appetitus quidam*). But since a desire is for a thing that is not had, it indicates an imperfection—which cannot belong to God. Therefore, there is no will in God.

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, the will is a moved mover. But as *Physics* 8 proves, God is the first unmovable mover. Therefore, in God there is no will.

But contrary to this: Romans 12:2 says: "... that you may prove what is ... the will of God."

I respond: There is a will in God, just as there is an intellect in Him, since the will follows upon the intellect.

For just as a natural thing has *esse* in actuality through its form, so an intellect understands in actuality through its intelligible form. But every entity is related to a form that is natural to it in such a way that (a) when it does not possess it, it tends toward it, and (b) when it does possess it, it comes to rest in it. The same holds for every natural perfection that is a good of the entity's nature. And this relation to the good is called *natural appetite* in things that lack cognition. Hence, an intellectual nature has a similar relation to the good apprehended through an intelligible form, so that (a) when it possesses that good, it rests in it, and (b) when it does not possess it, it seeks after it. And both of these points pertain to the will. Hence, in anything that has an intellect there is a will, just as there is an animal appetite in anything that has sensory cognition.

And so there has to be a will in God, because there is an intellect in Him. Hence, just as His act of understanding is His *esse*, so too is His act of will.

Reply to objection 1: Even though nothing distinct from God is God's end, nonetheless, He Himself is the end with respect to all the things that are made by Him. And this is so because of His essence, since, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 3), He is good through His essence. For the end has the nature of a good.

Reply to objection 2: In us the will pertains to the appetitive part of the soul. But even though the appetitive part gets its name from the fact that it desires, it is not the case that its only act is to desire what it does not possess. Rather, it also has the act of loving what it possesses, and the act of delighting

in it. And it is with respect to these two acts that a will is posited in God. For God's will always possesses the good that is its object, since, as has been explained, it does not differ from that object in its essence.

Reply to objection 3: A will whose principal object is a good that exists outside the will must be moved by something. But the object of God's will is His own goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since God's will is His essence, it is moved by itself alone and not by anything distinct from it—in the sense in which understanding and willing are called movements. (This is the sense in which Plato claimed that the first mover moves itself.)

Article 2

Does God will things distinct from Himself?

It seems that God does not will things distinct from Himself:

Objection 1: God's act of will is His *esse*. But God is not distinct from Himself. Therefore, He does not will anything distinct from Himself.

Objection 2: What is willed moves the will in the way that what is desirable moves the appetite, according to *De Anima* 3. Therefore, if God willed something distinct from Himself, His will would be moved by something distinct from Himself—which is impossible.

Objection 3: If the thing willed is sufficient for a given will, then it does not seek anything else. But God's goodness is sufficient for Himself, and His will is satisfied by it. Therefore, God does not will anything distinct from Himself.

Objection 4: Acts of will are multiplied according to the things that are willed. Therefore, if God willed both Himself and things distinct from Himself, it would follow that His act of will is multiplied, and as a result His *esse*, which is His act of will, would be multiplied. But this is impossible. Therefore, He does not will things distinct from Himself.

But contrary to this: In 1 Thessalonians 4:3 the Apostle says: "This is the will of God, your sanctification."

I respond: God wills not only Himself, but also things distinct from Himself.

This is clear from the comparison introduced above (a. 1). For a natural thing has a natural inclination toward its own good—not only in order that it might acquire it when it does not possess it, or rest in it when it does possess it, but also in order that it might diffuse its own good to others as much as possible. Hence, we see that every agent, insofar as it is perfect and acting, effects what is similar to itself.

Hence, it likewise pertains to the nature of the will that it should, to the extent that this is possible, communicate to others the good that it itself possesses. And this pertains in a special way to God's will, from which every perfection is derived through a certain likeness. Hence, if natural things communicate their own good to others insofar as they are perfect, then *a fortiori* it pertains to the divine will that it should communicate its own good to others through a likeness, to the extent that this is possible. So, then, God wills both that He Himself should exist and that other things should exist. But He wills Himself as an end and other things as ordered to that end, insofar as it is fitting that other things should also participate in the divine goodness.

Reply to objection 1: Even though God's act of will is His *esse* in reality, nonetheless, as is clear from what was said above (q. 13, a. 4), it differs conceptually from His *esse* according to different modes of understanding and signifying. For when I say 'God exists', no relation to anything is implied in the

way it is implied when I say, ‘God wills’. And so even though God is not something distinct from Himself, He nonetheless wills something distinct from Himself.

Reply to objection 2: In those things that we ourselves will for the sake of an end, the end has the complete nature of a mover, and this is what moves the will. This is especially clear in the case of those things that we will *only* for the sake of an end. For instance, when someone wills to take a bitter potion, he wills nothing in it except health, and it is health alone that moves his will. It is otherwise with someone who takes a sweet potion; he is able to will the potion not only for the sake of health, but also for its own sake.

Hence, since, as has been explained, God wills things distinct from Himself only for the sake of that end which is His own goodness, it does not follow that something other than His goodness moves His will. And so just as He understands things distinct from Himself by understanding His own essence, so too He wills things distinct from Himself by willing His own goodness.

Reply to objection 3: From the fact that God’s own goodness is sufficient for the divine will it does not follow that He wills nothing else; instead, all that follows is that He does not will anything else except because of His own goodness. In the same way, even though God’s intellect is perfect by reason of the fact that it knows the divine essence, it nonetheless knows other things in that essence.

Reply to objection 4: Just as God’s act of understanding is one because He sees many things in only one thing, so too God’s act of will is one and simple because He wills many things through just one thing, viz., His own goodness.

Article 3

Does God will whatever He wills by necessity?

It seems that God wills whatever He wills by necessity:

Objection 1: Everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity; otherwise, His will would be mutable. Therefore, whatever God wills, He wills by necessity.

Objection 2: God wills things distinct from Himself insofar as He wills His own goodness. But God wills His own goodness by necessity. Therefore, He wills things distinct from Himself by necessity.

Objection 3: Whatever is natural to God is necessary, since, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3), God is a necessary being *per se* and the source of all necessity. But it is natural to Him to will whatever He wills, since, as *Metaphysics* 5 says, in God there cannot be anything besides His own nature. Therefore, whatever He wills, He wills of necessity.

Objection 4: *Not necessary to be* is equivalent to *possible not to be*. Therefore, if it is not necessary that God will some of the things that He wills, then it is possible that He not will those things, and it is possible that He will something that He does not in fact will. Therefore, the divine will is contingent with respect to two opposites. And so the divine will is imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.

Objection 5: As the Commentator says in *Physics* 2, no action follows from something that is open to two opposites, unless it is inclined by something else to one of the opposites. Therefore, if God’s will is open to two opposites in some matters, it follows that He is determined to His effect by something else. And so He has some prior cause.

Objection 6: Whatever God knows, He knows by necessity. But just as God’s knowledge is His essence, so too is His act of will. Therefore, whatever God wills, He wills by necessity.

But contrary to this: Ephesians 1:11 says: “He who works all things according to the counsel of

His will.” But what we ourselves do according to the counsel of our will, we do not will by necessity. Therefore, it is not the case that whatever God wills, He wills by necessity.

I respond: ‘Necessary’ is predicated in two ways, viz., absolutely (*absolute*) and conditionally (*ex suppositione*).

Something is judged to be *absolutely necessary* because of the relation between the terms, i.e., either because (a) the predicate occurs in the definition (*definitio*) of the subject, as in ‘It is necessary that a man is an animal’, or because (b) the subject is part of the nature (*ratio*) of the predicate, as in ‘It is necessary that a number is either even or odd.’ In this sense of ‘necessary’, it is not necessary that Socrates is sitting. Hence, this is not absolutely necessary, though it can be called *conditionally necessary*. For once it is assumed that Socrates is sitting, then, for as long as he is sitting, it is necessary that he is sitting.

As for the things willed by God, one must take into account that (a) it is absolutely necessary that God will some of them, but that (b) this is not true of all the things that He wills.

For instance, God’s will has a necessary relation to His own goodness, which is its proper object. Hence, God wills by necessity that His own goodness should exist, just as our own will wills happiness by necessity. In the same way, every other power has a necessary relation to its proper and principal object, e.g., sight to color. For it is part of its nature to tend toward that object.

However, God wills things distinct from Himself insofar as they are ordered toward His goodness as an end. But we ourselves, in willing an end, do not will by necessity the things that are ordered to that end, unless they are such that the end cannot exist without them—in the way that we will to eat food because we will to conserve our life, or in the way that we will a ship because we will to cross the sea. However, we do not will by necessity things without which the end can exist. For instance, we do not by necessity will to have a horse in order to go somewhere, since we can travel without a horse. And the same line of reasoning holds for other cases.

Hence, since God’s goodness is perfect and can exist without other things—for no perfection is added to Him by other things—it follows that things distinct from Himself are such that it is not absolutely necessary that He will them. And yet it is conditionally necessary. For once it is assumed that He has willed something, He is not able not to will it, since His will cannot change.

Reply to objection 1: From the fact that God wills something from eternity, it does not follow that it is necessary that He will it, except conditionally.

Reply to objection 2: Even though God wills His own goodness by necessity, He nonetheless does not will by necessity those things that He wills for the sake of His goodness, since His goodness can exist without those other things.

Reply to objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of the other things that He does not will by necessity. But neither is it unnatural or contrary to His nature; instead, it is voluntary.

Reply to objection 4: In some cases a necessary cause does not have a necessary relation to any effect, and this happens because of a defect in the effect and not because of a defect in the cause. For instance, the sun’s power does not have a necessary relation to any of the things that happen contingently here below—not because of a defect in the sun’s power, but because of a defect in an effect that does not necessarily issue from the cause. Similarly, the fact that God does not will by necessity certain of the things that He wills stems not from a defect in the divine will, but from a defect that belongs by its nature to the thing willed—more specifically, because the thing is such that God’s perfect goodness can exist without it. Indeed, this defect is endemic to every created good.

Reply to objection 5: A cause that is of itself contingent must be determined to its effect by something external to it. But God’s will, which has necessity of itself, determines itself to what it wills when it has a non-necessary relation to the thing willed.

Reply to objection 6: Just as God's *esse* is necessary in itself, so too are the divine act of willing and the divine act of knowing. However, God's act of knowing has a necessary relation to the things known, whereas God's act of willing does not have a necessary relation to the things willed. The reason for this is that an act of knowing is had of things insofar as they exist in the knower, whereas an act of willing is related to things insofar as they exist in themselves. Therefore, all things distinct from God have necessary *esse* insofar as they exist in God, whereas insofar as they exist in themselves, they do not have absolute necessity in the sense of being necessary through themselves. Because of this, whatever God knows, He knows by necessity, whereas it is not the case that whatever He wills, He wills by necessity.

Article 4

Is God's will a cause of things?

It seems that God's will is not a cause of things:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "Just as our sun—neither deliberating nor choosing, but through its very being—illuminates all things in such a way that by its power they participate in its light, so too the divine good—through its very essence—sends the rays of its goodness into all the things that exist." But anything that acts through its will acts with deliberation and choice. Therefore, God does not act through His will. Therefore, God's will is not a cause of things.

Objection 2: The first thing in any ordering is that which is such-and-such through its essence. For instance, in the ordering of things that are on fire, the first thing is that which is fire through its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore, He is an agent through His essence, which is His nature. Therefore, He acts through His nature and not through His will. Therefore, God's will is not a cause of things.

Objection 3: If something is a cause of an effect by virtue of its being what it is, then it is a cause through its nature and not through its will. For instance, fire is a cause of warmth by virtue of its being hot, whereas, by contrast, a craftsman is a cause of a house by virtue of the fact that he wills to make it. But in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore, it is through His nature that God is a cause of things, and not through His will.

Objection 4: There is a single cause for a single thing. But, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 8), God's knowledge is a cause of created things. Therefore, God's will should not be posited as a cause of those things.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 11:26 says, "How could anything endure, if You did not will it?"

I respond: One must assert that God's will is a cause of things, and that God acts through His will and not, as some have claimed, by a necessity of nature. This can be made clear in three ways.

First, *from the very ordering of agent causes*: Since, as *Physics* 2 proves, both intellect and nature act for the sake of an end, a thing that acts through its nature must have both its end and the necessary means to that end predetermined for it by some higher intellect. For instance, an arrow has its end and fixed mode of acting predetermined for it by the archer. Hence, that which acts through its intellect and will must be prior to that which acts through its nature. Therefore, since God is first in the ordering of agents, He must act through His intellect and will.

Second, *from the nature of a natural agent*: It pertains to a natural agent to produce a single sort of effect, since its nature acts in one and the same way as long as it is unimpeded. This is because it acts by virtue of being what it is. Hence, as long as it is what it is, it produces only that sort of effect. For

everything that acts through its nature has delimited *esse* (*esse determinatum*). Therefore, since God's *esse* is not delimited but contains within itself all the perfections of being, it is impossible that God should act by a necessity of nature, unless perhaps He were to effect something indeterminate and unlimited in being—which, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 2), is impossible. Therefore, He does not act by a necessity of nature; instead, determinate effects proceed from His infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.

Third, *from the relation of effects to their cause*: Effects proceed from an agent cause to the extent that they preexist in that cause. For every agent effects what is similar to itself. Now effects preexist in a cause according to the mode of that cause. Hence, since God's *esse* is His very act of understanding, His effects preexist in Him in an intelligible mode. Therefore, they also proceed from Him through an intelligible mode. And so, as a result, they proceed from Him through the mode of an act of willing. For His inclination to effect what is conceived by His intellect pertains to His will.

Therefore, God's will is a cause of things.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage Dionysius does not mean to deny choice to God absolutely speaking, but only in a certain respect—viz., insofar as He communicates His goodness not just to some things, but to all things. So choice is denied only insofar as it implies a certain sort of selectivity.

Reply to objection 2: Since God's essence is His act of understanding and His act of willing, from the fact that He acts through His essence, it follows that He acts through the mode of intellect and will.

Reply to objection 3: The good is the object of the will. Therefore, as was explained above (a. 2), the assertion, "Because God is good, we exist," is made because God's goodness is the reason for His willing all other things.

Reply to objection 4: Even in our own case, one and the same effect is caused both (a) by the guidance of knowledge, by which the form of the work is conceived, and (b) by the authority of the will, since it is only through the will that the form as existing just in the intellect is ordered toward existing or not existing in the effect.

Hence, the term 'speculative intellect' does not imply anything about acting. Instead, power is the cause that executes the action, since the term 'power' denominates the immediate principle of action. But these things are all one in God.

Article 5

Can a cause be assigned for God's act of willing?

It seems that a cause can be assigned for God's act of willing:

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Who would dare to claim that God has created all things without reason?" But a voluntary agent's reason for acting is also a cause of his act of willing. Therefore, God's act of willing has a cause.

Objection 2: When things are effected by someone who wills them for the sake of no cause at all, one should not assign any cause to them except the will of the one who wills them. But, as has been shown (a. 4), God's will is a cause of all things. Therefore, if His act of willing does not have a cause, then in all natural things one should seek no cause other than God's will alone. And so all the sciences, which try to assign causes to various effects, would be in vain—which seems absurd. Therefore, some cause can be assigned to God's act of willing.

Objection 3: If something is effected by one who wills it for the sake of no cause at all, then it depends on his simple act of willing. Therefore, if God's act of willing has no cause, it follows that all

the things that are effected depend on His simple act of willing and do not have any other cause—which is absurd.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Every efficient cause is greater than that which is effected by it; but nothing is greater than God’s act of willing; therefore, no cause should be sought for it.”

I respond: There is no way in which God’s act of willing has a cause.

To see this clearly, notice that since the will follows the intellect, there can be a cause of one who wills *qua* willing in the same way that there can be a cause of one who understands *qua* understanding.

Now in the case of the intellect, things are such that if someone understands a principle and its conclusion separately from one another, then the understanding of the principle is a cause of the knowledge of the conclusion. However, if some intellect were to discern the conclusion *in* the principle itself, apprehending both of them in a single thought, then in that intellect the knowledge of the conclusion would not be caused by an understanding of the principles. For one and the same thing is not a cause of itself. Nonetheless, that intellect would still understand that the principles are a cause of the conclusion.

Something similar holds in the case of the will. In the will, an end is related to the means to that end in the same way that, in the intellect, principles are related to their conclusions. Hence, if someone wills the end by one act and the means to that end by a separate act, then the act of willing the end will be a cause of the act of willing the means to that end. However, this cannot be the case if he wills both the end and the means to that end in a single act. For one and the same thing cannot be a cause of itself. Yet it will still be true to assert that he wills that the means to the end should be ordered toward that end.

Now just as God understands all things in His own essence by a single act, so too He wills all things in His goodness by a single act. In God’s case, His understanding a cause is not a cause of His understanding its effects; instead, He understands the effects *in* the cause. In exactly the same way, His willing an end is not a cause of His willing the means to that end; instead, [by one act] He wills that the means to an end should be ordered to that end. Therefore, He wills that *this* should exist because of *that*, but it is not because He wills *that* that He wills *this*.

Reply to objection 1: God’s will is reasonable not because there is some cause of God’s act of willing, but because He wills that one thing should exist because of another.

Reply to objection 2: Since God wills effects to exist in such a way that they issue forth from various causes, so that a certain order is preserved among things, it is not vain to look for other causes along with God’s will.

Still, it would be vain if these other causes were sought after as if they were first causes and did not depend on God’s will. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, “It pleased the vanity of the philosophers to attribute contingent effects to other causes, since they were completely incapable of seeing a cause higher than all the rest, viz., God’s will.”

Reply to objection 3: Since God wills that effects should exist because of their causes, any effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend on God’s will alone, but also depend on some other thing. However, the first effects depend on God’s will alone. For instance, we may say that (a) God willed that man should have hands in order to serve his intellect in carrying out various tasks; and that (b) He willed that he should have an intellect in order that he would be a man, and that (c) He willed him to be a man in order that he might enjoy God or in order to fill out the universe—which effects cannot be traced back to further created ends. Hence, effects of this last sort depend on God’s simple act of will, whereas the other effects depend as well on the order of causes other than God.

Article 6

Is God's will always fulfilled?

It seems that God's will is not always fulfilled:

Objection 1: In 1 Timothy 2:4 the Apostle says, "God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But it has not turned out that way. Therefore, God's will is not always fulfilled.

Objection 2: The will is related to the good as knowledge is related to the true. But God knows every truth. Therefore, He wills every good. But it is not the case that every good is effected, since there are many goods that can be effected but are not in fact effected. Therefore, God's will is not always fulfilled.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 5), since God's will is a first cause, it does not rule out mediate causes. But a first cause's effect can be impeded because of a defect in a secondary cause; for instance, the effect of our body's moving power is impeded because of lameness in the leg. Therefore, an effect of God's will can likewise be impeded because of defects in secondary causes. Therefore, God's will is not always fulfilled.

But contrary to this: Psalm 113:11 says, "He has done all things whatsoever He willed."

I respond: God's will must always be fulfilled.

To see this clearly, note that since an effect is conformed to an agent by virtue of its form, the same line of reasoning that applies to formal causes also applies to agent causes. Now in the case of formal causes, things are such that even though something can fall short with respect to a particular form, nothing can fall short with respect to a universal form. For instance, there can be something that is neither a man nor a living thing, but there cannot be anything that is not a being.

Hence, this same thing must likewise be true in the case of agent causes. That is, something can occur outside the order of some particular agent cause, but not outside the order of a universal cause under which all the particular causes are included. For if some particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of some other particular impeding cause which is itself subordinated to the universal cause. Hence, an effect cannot in any way fall outside the order of the universal cause.

This is clear in the case of corporeal agent causes. For instance, a celestial body can be prevented from inducing its effect, but any effect that follows among corporeal things because of an impeding corporeal cause must be traced back through the mediate causes to the universal power of the first heaven.

Therefore, since God's will is a universal cause of all things, it is impossible that God's will should not attain its effect. Hence, whatever seems to deviate from God's will in one order falls back under it in another order. For instance, a sinner, who, considered in himself, deviates from God's will by sinning, falls back under the order of God's will when he is punished through God's justice.

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle's statement, "God wills all men to be saved, etc.," can be interpreted in three ways:

First, it can be interpreted in such a way that the [logical] distribution is restricted (*accommoda*), in which case its meaning is this: 'God wills to be saved all the men who are saved'—"not that there is no man whom He does not will to be saved, but rather that no man is saved whom He does not will to be saved," as Augustine puts it.

Second, the statement can be interpreted in such a way that the distribution is made over the genera of the singulars and not over the singulars of the genera. On this interpretation, its meaning is: 'God wills men of every status to be saved, i.e., males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, etc., but not everyone of each status.'

Third, according to Damascene, the statement should be understood as referring to God's *antecedent will* (*de voluntate antecedente*) and not to God's *consequent will* (*non de voluntate consequente*). This distinction applies not to God's will itself, in which there is nothing prior or posterior, but instead to the things that are willed. To understand this, note that each thing, insofar as it is good, is willed as such by God. However, there can be something which is good or evil when it is first thought of, considered absolutely, but which, insofar as it is thought of as conjoined with something else (which is a *consequent* consideration of it), turns out to be the opposite. For instance, considered absolutely, it is good for a man to live and bad for a man to be killed. However, if we add in a particular case that the man is a murderer or that his living poses a grave danger to society, then it is good for him to be killed and bad for him to live. Hence, one can say that a just judge *antecedently* wills that all men should live, but *consequently* wills that the murderer should be hanged. Similarly, God antecedently wills that all men should be saved, but He consequently wills that some should be damned in accord with the demands of His justice. However, what we antecedently will is not what we will absolutely speaking, but is instead what we will in a certain respect (*secundum quid*). For the will is related to things as they exist in themselves. But in themselves they are particulars. Hence, we will something absolutely speaking insofar as we will that thing while taking into account all the particular circumstances—which is just to will it *consequently*. Hence, one can say that a just judge wills absolutely speaking that the murderer should be hanged, whereas he wills in a certain respect that the man should live insofar as he is a man. Hence, the latter can be called a wish (*velleitas*) rather than an absolute act of willing. And so it is clear that what God wills absolutely speaking is effected, even though what He antecedently wills may not be effected.

Reply to objection 2: The act of a cognitive power occurs insofar as what is known exists in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power is ordered toward things insofar as they exist in themselves. Now everything that has the nature of being and of the true exists virtually in God as a whole, but it is not the case that everything that has the nature of being and of the true exists as a whole among created things. And so God knows everything that is true, but He does not will everything that is good except insofar as He wills Himself, in whom everything that is good exists virtually.

Reply to objection 3: A first cause can be impeded from producing its effect because of a defect in a secondary cause only when it is not itself a universally first cause that includes all causes under itself. For it were a universally first cause, then no effect could in any way escape its order. And so it is with God's will, as has been explained.

Article 7

Is God's will mutable?

It seems that God's will is mutable:

Objection 1: In Genesis 6:7 the Lord says, "I regret that I have made man." But whoever regrets something he has done has a mutable will. Therefore, God has a mutable will.

Objection 2: Jeremiah 18:7-8, speaking in the person of the Lord, says, "I will speak against a nation, and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it. But if that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them." Therefore, God has a mutable will.

Objection 3: Whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same things; for sometimes He has commanded that laws be observed, and sometimes He has prohibited this.

Therefore, He has a mutable will.

Objection 4: As was explained above (a. 3), God does not will what He wills by necessity. Therefore, He is able to will and able not to will the same thing. But everything that has power with respect to two opposites is mutable. For instance, that which is able to exist and able not to exist is mutable with respect to its substance; and that which is able to be here and able not to be here is mutable with respect to its place. Therefore, God is mutable with respect to His will.

But contrary to this: Numbers 23:19 says, “God is not a man, that He should lie, nor is He like a son of man, that He should be changed.”

I respond: God’s will is altogether immutable.

However, on this topic one should note that it is one thing to change one’s will and another thing to will a change in certain things. For even while someone’s will remains unchangeably the same, he can will that something should happen now and that its contrary should happen later. On the other hand, his will would change if he began to will what he previously did not will or ceased to will what he had previously willed. This cannot happen except on the assumption that there is a change either in the cognition of the one who wills or else in the disposition of his substance. For given that willing is of the good, there are two ways in which someone can begin to will something *de novo*:

The first way is that something should begin *de novo* to be good for him. This cannot happen without a change in him. For instance, when he gets cold, it begins to be good for him to sit by a fire—which was not the case beforehand.

The second way is that he should come to see *de novo* that something is good for him, when he had previously been ignorant of this. For instance, we deliberate precisely in order to ascertain what is good for us.

Now it was shown above (q. 9, a. 1 and q. 14, a. 15) that both God’s substance and His knowledge are altogether immutable. Hence, His will must be altogether immutable.

Reply to objection 1: These words of the Lord should be understood metaphorically according to a likeness with us. For when we regret something, we destroy what we have made. However, this can happen without a change of will; for even a man, without a change of will, may sometimes will to make something, all the while intending to destroy it afterwards.

Therefore, God is said to have regretted something according to a likeness of action—for man, whom He had made, He wiped from the face of the earth through the flood.

Reply to objection 2: Since God’s will is a first and universal cause, it does not rule out mediate causes that have it within their power to produce certain effects. But because all the mediate causes are unequal in power to the first cause, there are many things contained in God’s power, knowledge, and will that are not contained within the order of lower causes, e.g., the raising of Lazarus from the dead. Thus, someone who was thinking of the lower causes might have said, ‘Lazarus will not rise’, whereas someone who was thinking of the first divine cause might have said, ‘Lazarus will rise’. And God wills both of these, viz., that sometimes something will occur because of a lower cause that will not occur because of a higher cause, and vice versa.

Therefore, we should claim that God sometimes announces that something is going to occur insofar as it is contained in the order of lower causes, i.e., according to the disposition of nature or of merits, and yet that thing does not occur, because it is otherwise with the higher divine cause. For instance, God foretold to Hezekiah, “Take order with your house, for you shall die, and not live” (Isaiah 38:1), and yet this did not happen, because from eternity it was otherwise in God’s knowledge and will, which are immutable. For this reason, Gregory says, “God changes the sentence, but He does not change His counsel,” i.e., the counsel of His will. Therefore, the words, “I will repent,” are to be taken metaphorically. For when men do not carry out their threats, they seem to have repented.

Reply to objection 3: From this argument it does not follow that God has a changeable will; what follows instead is that He wills a change.

Reply to objection 4: As was explained above (a. 3), even if something is such that it is not absolutely necessary that God will it, it is nonetheless conditionally necessary (*ex suppositione*) that He will it—and this because of the immutability of God's will.

Article 8

Does God's will impose necessity on the things willed?

It seems that God's will imposes necessity on the things willed:

Objection 1: In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "No one is saved unless God wills that he be saved. And so he should implore God to will it, since if He wills it, it will necessarily happen."

Objection 2: Every unimpedible cause produces its effect by necessity; for, as *Physics* 2 explains, nature always does the same thing unless something impedes it. But God's will is unimpedible; for in Romans 9:19 the Apostle asks, "Who resists His will?" Therefore, God's will imposes necessity on things.

Objection 3: That which has necessity from something prior to it is absolutely necessary; for instance, it is necessary for an animal to die because it is composed of contrary parts. But a thing created by God is related to God's will as to something prior to it by virtue of which it has necessity; for the conditional, 'If God wills something, it exists', is true, and every true conditional is necessary. Thus, it follows that everything that God wills is absolutely necessary.

But contrary to this: All the goods that are effected are such that God wills that they be effected. Therefore, if His will imposed necessity on the things that are willed, it would follow that all goods occur by necessity. And so that would be the end of free choice, deliberation, and all other such things.

I respond: God's will imposes necessity on some of the things willed, but not on all of them.

Some have wanted to explain this by appeal to the mediating causes, claiming that the things God's will produces through necessary causes are necessary, whereas the things God's will produces through contingent causes are contingent. But this explanation seems inadequate on two counts:

First, the reason why the effect of a first cause is contingent in virtue of a secondary cause is that the first cause's effect is impeded by some defect in the secondary cause—in the way, for instance, that the sun's power is impeded by a defect in a plant. But no defect in a secondary cause can prevent God's will from producing its effect.

Second, if the distinction between contingent effects and necessary effects were traceable solely to the secondary causes, it would follow that this distinction falls outside of God's intention and will—which is false.

And so a better explanation is that this distinction occurs because of the efficacy of God's will. For when a cause is efficacious in its action, the effect follows upon the cause not only with respect to *what* is effected but also with respect to the *mode* in which it is effected or in which it exists. For instance, because of a defect in the active power of the semen, it is possible for a son to be born who is dissimilar to his father in various accidents that pertain to a thing's mode of existing. Therefore, since God's will is absolutely efficacious, it follows not only that the things God wills to be effected are in fact effected, but also that they are effected in the mode in which God wills them to be effected. But God wills some things to be effected necessarily and others contingently, so that there might be an order among things for the sake of the completeness of the universe. And so for some effects He has applied necessary causes

which cannot fail and from which the effects issue forth by necessity, whereas for other effects He has applied contingent and defectible causes, from which the effects issue forth contingently.

Therefore, the reason why effects willed by God come about contingently is not that their proximate causes are contingent, but rather that God has willed them to come about contingently and has prepared contingent causes for them.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage Augustine should be understood to be talking about a conditional, rather than absolute, necessity in the things willed by God. For this conditional is necessarily true: 'If God wills this thing, then it exists.'

Reply to objection 2: From the fact that nothing resists God's will it follows not only that what God wills to be effected is in fact effected, but also that what He wills to be effected contingently or wills to be effected necessarily is indeed effected in that way.

Reply to objection 3: What is posterior has its necessity from what is prior according to the mode of that prior thing. Hence, the things effected by God's will have necessity of the sort that God wills them to have, viz., either absolute necessity or merely conditional necessity. And so not all of them are absolutely necessary.

Article 9

Does God will evils?

It seems that God wills evils:

Objection 1: God wills every good that is effected. But it is good that evils should be effected; for in the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "Even though evils, insofar as they are evil, are not good, nonetheless, it is good not only that there should be goods, but also that there should be evils." Therefore, God wills evils.

Objection 2: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil will contribute to the perfection of everything (i.e., of the universe). And in the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "All things are part of the admirable beauty of the universe, so that even what is called evil makes the good things stand out more prominently when it is correctly ordered and put in its proper place. For the good things are more pleasing and more laudable when they are compared to the evils." But God wills everything that pertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, since it is this perfection and beauty that God wills most of all in creatures. Therefore, God wills evils.

Objection 3: *That evils be effected* and *that evils not be effected* are opposed as contradictories. But God does not will that evils not be effected; for since some evils are in fact effected, it would follow that God's will is not always fulfilled. Therefore, God wills that evils be effected.

But contrary to this: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "A man becomes worse when he has no wise man to guide him. But God is more excellent than any wise man. Therefore, when God is guiding him, a man will all the less become worse. But 'when God is guiding' is equivalent to 'when God wills'." Therefore, it is not the case that when God wills, a man becomes worse. But it is clear that something is made worse by every evil. Therefore, God does not will evils.

I respond: Since, as was explained above (q. 5, a. 1), the nature of the good is the nature of what is desirable, whereas evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be desired either by a natural desire or by an animal desire or by an intellectual desire, i.e., by the will.

However, an evil may be desired *per accidens* to the extent that it follows upon some good. This is evident with every kind of desire. For a natural agent does not desire privation or corruption; rather, it

desires a form that is conjoined with the privation of some other form, and it desires the generation of one thing, which is the corruption of another. Again, when a lion kills a stag, it desires food that is conjoined with the death of an animal. Similarly, a fornicator desires a pleasure that is conjoined with the deformity of sin. Thus, an evil that is conjoined to one good is the privation of some other good. Therefore, evil would never be desired—not even *per accidens*—if the good that the evil is conjoined to were not desired more than the good that is undermined by the evil.

Now there is no good that God wills more than His own goodness, and yet He desires some goods more than others. God in no way wills the evil of sin, which undermines one's ordination to the divine good. On the other hand, He does will the evil of a natural defect or the evil of punishment by willing a good that is conjoined to such an evil. For instance, in willing justice, He wills punishment; and in willing that the order of nature be preserved, He wills that certain things be naturally corrupted.

Reply to objection 1: Some have claimed that even though God does not will evils, He nonetheless wills that evils exist or that they be effected—for even though evils are not good, it is nonetheless good that evils exist or that they be effected. They made this claim because things that are evil in themselves are ordered toward some good, and they believed that this ordering is implied when one says that evils exist or are effected.

But this claim is mistaken, since evil is ordered toward good *per accidens* and not *per se*. For it lies outside the sinner's intention that some good should follow from his sin; for example, it lay outside the intention of the tyrants that their persecutions should have made the patience of the martyrs shine forth. And so one cannot claim that such an ordering toward the good is implied when one says that it is good for evil to exist or to be effected. For nothing is judged according to what belongs to it *per accidens*; rather, it is judged according to what belongs to it *per se*.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, evil does not work toward the perfection and beauty of the universe except *per accidens*. Moreover, in the place where Dionysius says that evil contributes to the perfection of the universe, he is arguing by way of a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Reply to objection 3: Even though *that evils be effected* and *that evils not be effected* are opposed as contradictories, it is nonetheless the case that *to will that evils be effected* and *to will that evils not be effected* are not opposed as contradictories, since both are affirmative. Thus, God wills neither that evils be effected nor that evils not be effected; instead, He wills to permit evils to be effected. And this is something good.

Article 10

Does God have free choice?

It seems that God does not have free choice:

Objection 1: In a homily on the prodigal son, Jerome says, "God alone is such that sin neither does nor can belong to Him. Others, since they have free choice, can incline themselves to either part of a contradiction."

Objection 2: Free choice is a faculty of reason and will by which good and evil are chosen. But, as has been explained (a. 9), God does not will evil. Therefore, free choice does not exist in God.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide* Ambrose says, "The Holy Spirit gives to each as He wills, i.e., according to the choice of His free will, which is not subject to any necessity."

I respond: We ourselves have free choice with respect to those things that we do not will necessarily or by natural instinct. For instance, it pertains to natural instinct and not to free choice that

we will to be happy. Hence, other animals, which are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free choice.

Therefore, since, as was shown above (a. 3), God wills His own goodness by necessity, but does not will other things by necessity, He has free choice with respect to those things that He does not will by necessity.

Reply to objection 1: Jerome seems to be denying free choice to God not absolutely speaking, but only with respect to falling into sin.

Reply to objection 2: Since, as was shown above (a. 2), the evil of sin implies a turning away from the divine goodness through which God wills all things, it is clearly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin. Yet He is open to opposites insofar as He is able to will that *this* thing should exist or not exist—just as we ourselves are able, without sinning, to will to sit and not to will to sit.

Article 11

Should God's will be distinguished by signs?

It seems that God's will should not be distinguished by signs (*non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas signi*):

Objection 1: Just as God's will is a cause of things, so too is His knowledge. But no signs are ascribed to God's knowledge. Therefore, neither should signs be ascribed to God's will.

Objection 2: Any sign that does not correspond to that of which it is a sign is a false sign. Therefore, any signs ascribed to God's will are such that (a) if they do not correspond to God's will, then they are false, and (b) if they do correspond to God's will, then it is superfluous to ascribe them. Therefore, no signs should be ascribed to God's will.

But contrary to this: God's will is unified, since it is God's very essence. But it is sometimes signified in the plural, as when it is said, "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills" (Psalm 110:2). Therefore, a sign of God's will sometimes has to be taken for His will.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 13, a. 3), some things are predicated of God properly speaking and other things are predicated of Him metaphorically. When certain human passions are appropriated metaphorically in predications about God, this is because of a similarity in their effects—so that something that is a sign of a given passion in our case is signified metaphorically in God by the name of that passion. For instance, we ourselves are prone to punish someone when we are angry with him, so that the punishment is a sign of our anger. Because of this, it is the punishment itself that is signified by the name 'anger' when anger is attributed to God.

Similarly, that which is normally in our case a sign of what we will is sometimes metaphorically called 'will' in the case of God. For instance, when someone commands something, this is a sign that he wills that thing to be done; hence, a divine command is sometimes metaphorically called 'God's will'—e.g., "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven" (Matthew 6:10).

However, there is a difference between 'will' and 'anger'. For 'anger' is never properly predicated of God, since it includes a passion in its principal meaning; by contrast, 'will' is properly predicated of God. And so in the case of God 'will' as properly predicated is distinct from 'will' as metaphorically predicated. For when 'will' is *properly* predicated of God, it is called his 'will of good pleasure' (*voluntas beneplaciti*), whereas when 'will' is *metaphorically* predicated of God, it is called His 'will of sign' (*voluntas signi*), because a sign of His will is itself being called His will.

Reply to objection 1: It is only through the will that knowledge is a cause of the things that are

effected. For we do not effect the things we know unless we will to. And so signs are not attributed to knowledge in the way they are attributed to the will.

Reply to objection 2: Signs of the will are called ‘God’s wills’ not because they are signs that God has willed something, but rather because things that in our case are usually signs of what we will are called ‘wills’ in the case of God. In the same way, punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; rather, since punishment is a sign of anger in us, punishment is called ‘anger’ in the case of God.

Article 12

Is it appropriate to posit these five signs with respect to God’s will: *prohibition, command, counsel, operation, and permission?*

It seems inappropriate to posit these five signs with respect to God’s will, viz., *prohibition, command, counsel, operation, and permission*:

Objection 1: God sometimes operates to effect in us the same things that He commands or counsels us to do. And He sometimes prohibits the same things that at other times He permits. Therefore, these five signs should not be distinguished from one another as opposites.

Objection 2: As Wisdom 11:25-26 says, God does not operate to effect anything unless He wills that thing. But His will of sign (*voluntas signi*) is distinct from His will of good pleasure (*voluntas beneplaciti*). Therefore, *operation* should not be included under God’s will of sign.

Objection 3: *Operation* and *permission* apply to all things in general, since God operates in all things and permits things to happen among all things. By contrast, *command, counsel, and prohibition* apply only to rational creatures. Therefore, since these five signs do not belong to the same order, it is inappropriate for them to come together under a single division.

Objection 4: Evil occurs in more ways than good does; for, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 2 and from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, good occurs in just one way, whereas evil occurs in many ways. Therefore, it is wrong to ascribe just one sign with respect to evil, viz., *prohibition*, and two signs with respect to good, viz., *counsel* and *command*.

I respond: These signs of the will are those by which we ourselves normally show that we will something.

Now someone can show that he wills something *through himself* (*per seipsum*) or that he wills something *through another* (*per aliud*).

He shows that he wills it *through himself* insofar as he does something either (a) *directly* or (b) *indirectly* and *per accidens*: *Directly*, when he does it by himself, and on this score the sign is called *operation*. *Indirectly*, insofar as he himself does not prevent an operation, since, according to *Physics* 8, one who removes an impediment is called a *per accidens* mover; and on this score the sign is called *permission*.

He shows that he wills something *through another* insofar as he directs another to do something—and this either (a) through a obligatory direction, which he does by *commanding* what he wills and *prohibiting* the contrary, or (b) through a persuasive direction, which pertains to *counsel*.

Therefore, since these are the ways in which someone shows that he wills something, these five things are sometimes called ‘God’s will’ in the sense of signs of His will. That *command, counsel, and prohibition* are called God’s will is clear from Matthew 6:10, “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” That *permission* and *operation* are called ‘God’s will’ is clear from Augustine, who says in the *Enchiridion*, “Nothing is effected unless the omnipotent one wills that it be effected, either by doing it or

by allowing it to be done.”

Alternatively, one can say that *permission* and *operation* relate to the present, with *permission* pertaining to evil and *operation* pertaining to good—whereas, with respect to the future, *prohibition* pertains to evil, *command* pertains to the sort of good that is necessary, and *counsel* pertains to the sort of good that is superabundant.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents someone from showing in diverse ways that he wills one and the same thing—just as there are many names that signify the same thing. Hence, nothing prevents the same thing from falling under a command, a counsel, and an operation; and nothing prevents the same thing from falling under a prohibition or a permission.

Reply to objection 2: Just as one can signify metaphorically that God wills something that He does not will properly speaking, so too one can signify metaphorically that He wills something that He does will properly speaking. Hence, nothing prevents God from having both a will of good pleasure and a will of sign with respect to the same thing.

Now *operation* always coincides with God’s will of good pleasure, whereas this is not the case with *command* or *counsel*. For, as has been explained, (a) operation has to do with the present, whereas command and counsel have to do with the future, and (b) operation is an effect that God wills through Himself, whereas command and counsel are willed through another.

Reply to objection 3: A rational creature has dominion over his acts, and so special signs of God’s will are assigned for him insofar as God orders the rational creature toward acting voluntarily and through himself. However, other creatures do not act unless they are moved by God’s operation, and so in their case there is no room for anything other than operation and permission.

Reply to objection 4: All sinful evil, even if it happens in many ways, nonetheless concurs in being incompatible with God’s will, and this is why a single sign, viz., *prohibition*, is assigned with respect to evils. On the other hand, goods are related in different ways to God’s goodness. For there are some goods without which we cannot attain the enjoyment of God’s goodness, and with respect to these goods there is *command*. By contrast, there are other goods by which we attain God’s goodness in a more perfect manner, and with respect to these goods there is *counsel*. Alternatively, one can say that *counsel* pertains not only to the pursuit of greater goods, but also to the avoidance of lesser evils.

QUESTION 20

God's Love

Next we have to consider those things that pertain to God's will absolutely speaking. Now in the appetitive part of our soul we find both (a) the passions of the soul, e.g., joy, love, etc., and also (b) the habits of the moral virtues, e.g., justice, fortitude, etc. Hence, we will first consider God's love (question 20) and, second, God's justice and His mercy (question 21).

On the topic of God's love there are four questions: (1) Is there love in God? (2) Does God love all things? (3) Does God love one thing more than another? (4) Does God love better things more?

Article 1

Is there love in God?

It seems that there is no love (*amor*) in God:

Objection 1: There are no passions in God. Love is a passion. Therefore, there is no love in God.

Objection 2: Love, anger, sadness, etc., fall under the same classification. But sadness and anger are not predicated of God except metaphorically. Therefore, neither is love predicated of God except metaphorically.

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "Love is a unitive and coalescent force." But there cannot be any place for this in God, since He is simple. Therefore, there is no love in God.

But contrary to this: 1 John 4:16 says, "God is love (*Deus caritas est*)."

I respond: Love must be posited in God. For love is the first movement of the will and of any appetitive power, since an act of will (or of any appetitive power) tends toward good and evil as its proper objects. Since the good is the more principal and *per se* object of will and appetite, whereas evil is the secondary and *per aliud* object, insofar as it is opposed to the good, it follows that acts of will and appetite that have to do with the good must be naturally prior to those that have to do with evil. For instance, joy is prior to sadness, and love is prior to hate. For it is always the case that what is *per se* is prior to what is *per aliud*.

Again, what is more common is naturally prior; hence, it is also the case that the intellect is ordered toward truth in general prior to being ordered to certain particular truths. Now there are some acts of will and appetite that have to do with the good under some special condition; for instance, joy and pleasure have to do with a good that is present and possessed, whereas desire and hope have to do with a good that is not yet possessed. Love, on the other hand, has to do with the good in general (*bonum in communi*), whether or not it is possessed.

Hence, love is by nature the first act of will and appetite. Because of this, all other appetitive movements presuppose love as their primary root. For no one desires anything except a good that is loved, and no one takes joy in anything except a good that is loved. Hate, too, is directed only toward what is contrary to something that is loved. Similarly, it is clear that sadness and the other passions are traced back to love as their first source. Hence, there must be love in any being that has will or appetite. For when what is first is removed, everything else is removed as well.

Now it was shown above (q. 19, a. 1) that there is a will in God. Hence, it is necessary to posit love in Him.

Reply to objection 1: A cognitive power effects a movement only by the mediation of an appetitive power. And just as, according to *De Anima* 3, a universal notion effects movement in us by the mediation of a particular notion, so too the intellectual appetite, which is called the will, effects

movement in us by the mediation of the sentient appetite. Hence, the sentient appetite is the proximate mover of the body in us. Thus, it is always the case that an act of the sentient appetite is accompanied by some bodily change—especially near the heart, which is the first principle of movement in an animal. So, then, insofar as they have a bodily change conjoined to them, acts of the sentient appetite are called passions, but not acts of willing.

Therefore, love, joy, and pleasure are passions insofar as these terms signify acts of the sentient appetite—but not insofar as they signify acts of the intellective appetite. And it is as acts of the intellective appetite that they are posited in God. Hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, “God rejoices by a single and simple operation.” And, for the same reason, He loves in the absence of any passion.

Reply to objection 2: In the passions of the sentient appetite there is, as it were, something *material* to consider, viz., the bodily change, and also, as it were, something *formal*, i.e., something on the part of the appetite. For instance, as *De Anima* 1 says, in the case of anger the material element is the heating of the blood around the heart or something of that sort, whereas the formal element is the desire for vindication.

Then again, some of the passions involve an imperfection on the part of the formal element. For instance, desire has to do with a good that is not yet possessed, and sadness has to do with an evil that is already possessed. And the same holds for anger, which presupposes sadness. On the other hand, some of them, e.g., love and joy, involve no imperfection.

As has been said, none of them belongs to God with respect to what is material in them. Again, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 2 and q. 19, a. 11), those which also imply an imperfection in their formal element cannot belong to God except metaphorically, because of a likeness in their effects. However, those that do not imply an imperfection, e.g., love and joy, can be properly predicated of God—though, as has been explained, without any passion.

Reply to objection 3: An act of love always tends toward two things, viz., (a) *the good* that one wills for someone and (b) *the one to whom* he wills this good. For to love someone, properly speaking, is to will the good for him.

Hence, for someone to love himself is for him to will a good for himself, and thus he seeks to unite that good to himself as far he is able to. It is for this reason that love is called a *unitive* force even in the case of God—yet without composition. For the good that He wills for Himself is none other than Himself, who is good through His essence, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 3).

Now for someone to love another is for him to will a good for that other. And in this sense he treats the other as himself, rendering good to the other as to himself. And it is for this reason that love is called a *coalescing* force. For he gathers the other to himself, rendering to the other as he renders to himself. And it is also in this sense that God’s love is a coalescent force, existing in God without composition, insofar as He wills goods to others.

Article 2

Does God love all things?

It seems that God does not love all things:

Objection 1: According to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, love places the lover outside of himself and in a sense transports him into what he loves. But it is absurd to claim that God is placed outside of Himself and transported into other things. Therefore, it is absurd to claim that God loves things distinct from Himself.

Objection 2: God’s love is eternal. But things distinct from God do not exist from eternity except

within God. Therefore, God does not love them except within Himself. But insofar as they exist within Him, they are not distinct from Him. Therefore, God does not love things distinct from Himself.

Objection 3: There are two kinds of love, love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*) and love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*). But God does not love non-rational creatures with a love of concupiscence, since He does not need anything besides Himself. Nor does He love them with a love of friendship, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, such love cannot be had for non-rational beings. Therefore, God does not love all things.

Objection 4: Psalm 5:7 says, “You hate all the workers of iniquity.” But nothing can be both hated and loved at the same time. Therefore, God does not love all things.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 11:25 says, “For You love all things that are, and hate none of the things which You have made.”

I respond: God loves all the things that exist. For all existing things are good insofar as they exist, since the very *esse* of each thing is a certain good, as are each of its perfections. Now it was shown above (q. 19, a. 4) that God’s will is a cause of all things, and so to the extent that a thing is willed by God, it must have some sort of *esse* or some sort of goodness. Therefore, God wills some good to each thing that exists. Thus, since to love is nothing other than to will some good to some existing thing, it is clear that God loves all the things that exist.

However, He does not love them in the same way that we ourselves do. For since our own will is not a cause of the goodness of things, but is instead moved by their goodness as by an object, it follows that the love by which we will some good to a thing is not a cause of its very goodness. To the contrary, the thing’s goodness, whether real or apparent (*vel vera vel aestimata*), induces the love by which we will that the good had by the thing should be preserved and that the good lacked by it should be added to it—and we act accordingly. God’s love, by contrast, is a love that pours out and creates the goodness in things.

Reply to objection 1: A lover is transported outside of himself into the thing that is loved in the sense that he wills the good for the thing loved and by his providence cares for that thing as for himself. Hence, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “One should dare to say—and take as the truth—that even He who is the cause of all things, through the abundance of His loving goodness, goes outside of Himself in exercising His providence over all the things that exist.”

Reply to objection 2: Even though creatures did not exist from eternity except within God, nonetheless, by the fact that things existed from eternity in God, God knew them from eternity in their proper natures and loved them in the same way. Similarly, it is through the likenesses of things existing in us that we ourselves likewise know the things that exist in themselves.

Reply to objection 3: Friendship can be had only with rational creatures, who are able to return love and to share in the works of life, and for whom things can turn out well or badly with respect to fortune and happiness. In the same way, it is to such creatures that benevolence, properly speaking, is directed.

Non-rational creatures, on the other hand, cannot attain to loving God or to sharing the intellectual and happy life that God lives. So, then, God does not, properly speaking, love non-rational creatures with a love of friendship. Rather, He loves them with something like a love of concupiscence to the extent that He orders them toward rational creatures as well as toward Himself—not in the sense that He needs them, but for the sake of His own goodness and for our advantage. For we ourselves desire (*concupiscimus*) things for others as well as for ourselves.

Reply to objection 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing from being loved in one respect and hated in another. Now God loves sinners insofar as they are certain natures; for as such they exist and are from Himself. On the other hand, insofar as they are sinners, they do not exist but instead are

deficient in *esse*—a condition that is not in them because of God. Hence, in this respect He hates them.

Article 3

Does God love one thing more than another?

It seems that God loves all things equally:

Objection 1: Wisdom 6:8 says, “He cares equally for all things.” But the providence that God has for things stems from the love by which He loves them. Therefore, God loves all things equally.

Objection 2: God’s love is His essence. But God’s essence does not admit of *more* and *less*. Therefore, neither does His love. Therefore, it is not the case that He loves some things more than others.

Objection 3: God’s love reaches out to created things in the same way that His knowledge and will do. But God is not said to know or to will some things more than others. Therefore, neither does He love some things more than others.

But contrary to this: In *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “God loves all the things that He has made; and among these things He loves rational creatures more; and among rational creatures He loves more fully those who are members of His only-begotten; and He loves His only-begotten much more.”

I respond: Since to love is to will a good for something, there are two ways in which a thing can be loved to a greater or lesser degree:

First, on the part of the very *act of the will*, which can be more or less intense. And in this sense God does not love some things more than others, since He loves all things by the single and simple act of His will, which always remains the same (*semper eodem modo se habente*).

Second, on the part of the *good that one wills* for the thing loved. Thus, we are said to love someone more than another because we will him a greater good—even if we do not love him with a more intense act of will. And in this sense one must claim that God loves some things more than others. For since, as has been explained (a. 2), God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, one thing would not be better than another if God did not will a greater good to the one than to the other.

Reply to objection 1: God is said to care equally for all things not because He gives equal goods to all things in exercising His care for them, but because He administers all things with equal wisdom and goodness.

Reply to objection 2: This argument has to do with the intensity of love on the part of the act of will, which is God’s essence. However, the good that God wills for a creature is not the divine essence. Hence, nothing prevents that good from being greater or less.

Reply to objection 3: ‘To understand’ and ‘to will’ signify only the acts and do not include in their signification any objects in virtue of whose differences God might be said to know them or to will them to a greater or lesser degree. By contrast, as has been explained, this is indeed the case with love.

Article 4

Does God love better things more?

It seems that God does not always love better things more:

Objection 1: It is clear that Christ is better than the whole human race, since He is God and man. But God loves the human race more than Christ; for Romans 8:32 says, “He spared not even His own

Son, but delivered Him up for us all.” Therefore, God does not always love better things more.

Objection 2: An angel is better than a man; thus, Psalm 8:6 says, “You have made him a little less than the angels.” But God loves men more than angels; for Hebrews 2:16 says, “Nowhere does He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He takes hold.” Therefore, God does not always love better things more.

Objection 3: Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence, the Lord, knowing that this was true, asked Peter, “Simon son of John, do you love me more than these?” (John 21:15). Yet Christ loved John more than Peter; for as Augustine says in commenting on John 21:15 (“Simon, son of John, do you love me?”), “John was set off from the other disciples not because Christ loved him alone, but because he loved him more than the others.” Therefore, it is not the case that God always loves better things more.

Objection 4: Someone who is blameless is better than someone who repents (*melior est innocens poenitente*); for, as Jerome says, “Repentance is the second plank, after the shipwreck.” But God loves the one who repents more than the blameless, since He rejoices more over him; for as Luke 15:7 says, “I say to you that even so there shall be joy in heaven upon one sinner that repents, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not repentance.” Therefore, God does not always love better things more.

Objection 5: A just man who is such that it is foreknown that he will be damned (*praescitus*) is now better than a sinner who is predestined to glory (*praedestinatus*). But God loves the predestined sinner more, since He wills him a greater good, viz., eternal life. Therefore, God does not always love better things more.

But contrary to this: Each thing loves what is similar to itself; for as Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, “Every beast loves its like.” But the more similar a thing is to God, the better it is. Therefore, better things are loved more by God.

I respond: On the basis of what was said above (a. 3), one must claim that God loves better things more. For it was explained that for God to love a thing more is nothing other than for Him to will that thing a greater good, since God’s will is the cause of goodness in things. And so the reason why some things are better is that God wills a greater good for them. And from this it follows that He loves them more.

Reply to objection 1: God loves Christ not only more than the whole human race, but even more than the whole universe of creatures. For He willed him a greater good, since He gave him the name that is above every name, so that he was true God. Nor does it diminish his excellence that God gave him over to death for the salvation of the human race. To the contrary, by this very fact he became a glorious victor. For as Isaiah 9:6 says, “The government is upon his shoulder.”

Reply to objection 2: According to what has been said, God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than all the angels, and that human nature is better than all the angels, especially because of its union with God.

However, if we are talking about human nature in general and comparing it to the nature of an angel, then they are equal in the order of grace and glory, since, as Apocalypse 21:17 says, the measure of man is the same as the measure of an angel—though in such a way that some angels are better than some men and some men are better than some angels.

On the other hand, as far as the status of the natures is concerned, an angel is better than a man. For God assumed a human nature not because He loved man more, absolutely speaking, but because man needed it more. In the same way, a good father of a household might give something very costly to a sick servant that he does not give to his healthy son.

Reply to objection 3: This question about Peter and John has been answered in many ways. Augustine calls it a mystery. He claims that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than

the contemplative life, signified by John, since the active life is more aware of the tribulations of the present life and desires more ardently to be liberated from them and to go to God. However, God loves the contemplative life more, since He conserves it for a longer time; for it does not end with the end of our bodily life in the way that the active life does.

On the other hand, there are those who claim that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and in this regard he was also loved more by Christ, who for this reason entrusted the Church to him. By contrast, John loved Christ more in Himself, and in this regard he was also loved more by Christ, who for this reason entrusted His mother to him.

Others claim that (a) it is uncertain which of the two loved Christ more with the love of charity and, similarly, that (b) it is uncertain which one God loved more as regards a greater degree of the glory of eternal life. However, Peter is said to have loved Christ more because of his promptitude or fervor, whereas John is said to have been loved more because of the signs of familiarity that Christ showed to him in virtue of his youthfulness and purity.

Still others claim that Christ loved Peter more because of his more excellent gift of charity, but that He loved John more because of his more excellent gift of understanding. Hence, Peter was better and more loved absolutely speaking, whereas John was better and more loved in a certain respect.

However, it seems presumptuous to adjudicate this matter, since, as Proverbs 16:2 says, the Lord, and no other, is the weigher of spirits.

Reply to objection 4: The penitents and the blameless are related as that which exceeds and that which is exceeded. For the ones who are better and more loved are those who have more grace, regardless of whether they are righteous or repentant. However, all other things being equal, blamelessness is more worthy and more loved.

Yet God is said to rejoice more over the one who repents than the one who is blameless because oftentimes when those who repent come back, they are more circumspect, more humble, and more fervent. Hence, in commenting on this passage, Gregory says, “In battle the commander has a greater love for the soldier who turned back after fleeing and bravely fought the enemy than for the soldier who never fled but also never acted courageously.”

An alternative explanation is that an equal gift of grace counts for more in relation to the penitent, who deserved punishment, than in relation to the blameless, who did not merit punishment—just as a hundred pieces of gold constitute a greater gift when given to a poor man than when given to a king.

Reply to objection 5: Since God’s will is the cause of the goodness in things, one has to measure the goodness of someone loved by God with reference to the time at which a relevant good is to be given to him by God’s goodness. Therefore, at the time at which the predestined sinner is to be given a greater good by God’s will, he is better, even though he might be worse at some other time. For there is also a time at which he is neither good nor bad.

QUESTION 21

God's Justice and Mercy

Now that we have considered God's love, we have to discuss His justice and mercy.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is there justice in God? (2) Can God's justice be called truth? (3) Is there mercy in God? (4) Do justice and mercy exist in every work of God?

Article 1

Is there justice in God?

It seems that there is no justice in God (*in Deo non sit iustitia*):

Objection 1: Justice and temperance fall under the same classification. But temperance does not exist in God. Therefore, neither does justice.

Objection 2: If someone does all things at the pleasure of his own will (*facit omnia pro libito suae voluntatis*), then he does not act in accord with justice. But in Ephesians 1:11 the Apostle says that God "works all things according to the counsel of His will." Therefore, justice should not be attributed to God.

Objection 3: The act of justice is to render a debt. But God is a debtor to no one. Therefore, justice does not belong to God.

Objection 4: Whatever exists in God is His essence. But justice cannot be God's essence; for in *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius says, "The good has to do with essence, whereas the just has to do with action." Therefore, justice does not belong to God.

But contrary to this: Psalm 10:8 says, "The Lord is just, and has loved justice."

I respond: There are two types of justice.

The first has to do with mutual giving and receiving—as, for instance, the giving and receiving involved in buying and selling and in other types of trades or exchanges. In *Ethics* 5 the Philosopher calls this *commutative justice*, i.e., justice that directs exchanges or trades. This type of justice does not belong to God, since as the Apostle says in Romans 11:35, "Who has first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?"

The second type, which consists in distribution, is called *distributive justice*, whereby a ruler or manager gives to each according to his deserts. Therefore, just as the appropriate ordering of a family—or of any governed group of people—exhibits this sort of justice in the one who has authority over it, so too the order of the universe, which is apparent in both natural effects and voluntary effects, exhibits God's justice. Hence in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 8, Dionysius, says, "God's true justice must be seen in the fact that (a) He gives what is appropriate to all things according to the worthiness of each of the things that exist, and that (b) He preserves the nature of each thing in its own proper order and with its own proper powers."

Reply to objection 1: Some of the moral virtues have to do with the passions. For instance, temperance (*temperantia*) has to do with sentient desires, fortitude (*fortitudo*) has to do with fear and daring, and gentleness (*mansuetudo*) has to do with anger. Virtues of this sort cannot belong to God except metaphorically, since, as was explained above (q. 20, a. 1), in God there are no passions; moreover, in God there is no sentient appetite, which, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 3, is the subject in which virtues of this sort exist.

On the other hand, some moral virtues have to do with actions; for instance, justice and generosity (*liberalitas*) and magnificence (*magnificentia*) have to do with giving and taking. These virtues exist not in the sentient part of the soul, but in the will. Hence, nothing prevents virtues of this sort from being

posited in God—yet not with respect to civic actions, but rather with respect to actions that are appropriate for God. For, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, it would be ridiculous to praise God for His political virtues.

Reply to objection 2: Since the object of the will is the good as understood, God cannot will anything other than what conforms to the measure of His wisdom. For the measure of His wisdom is, as it were, the law of justice, in accord with which His will is upright and just. Hence, God does justly whatever He does in accord with His will, just as we ourselves do justly whatever we do in accord with the law. But we act in accord with a law that is given to us by a superior, whereas God is a law unto Himself (*Deus sibi ipsi est lex*).

Reply to objection 3: What is due to each thing is what is its own; and what is its own is that which is ordered toward it. For instance, a servant is his master's own, and not vice versa, since what is free is master of itself. Therefore, the term 'debt' implies that the thing toward which the debt is ordered has a certain need or requirement.

Now we have to take into account two types of orderings among things. The first is that by which one created thing is ordered toward another created thing—in the way that the parts are ordered toward the whole, and accidents toward substances, and each thing toward its proper end. The second type of ordering is that by which all created things are ordered toward God.

Thus, there are two types of debt that have to be considered in the case of God's action: (a) what is owed to God and (b) what is owed to a created thing. And God renders a debt in both cases.

For it is owed to God that what belongs to His wisdom and will, along with what manifests His goodness, should be fulfilled in things. In this sense, God's justice has to do with His own uprightness, in accord with which He renders to Himself what is owed to Himself.

Moreover, it is owed to each created thing that it should have that which is ordered toward it. For instance, it is owed to man that he should have hands and that the other animals should serve him. And so God also enacts His justice when He gives to each thing what is owed to it by reason of its nature and status. However, this second debt depends upon the first, since each thing is owed what is ordained for it in the order of God's wisdom. And even though God in this sense renders a debt to another thing, He is nonetheless not Himself a debtor. For it is not the case that He Himself is ordered toward other things; just the opposite, the other things are ordered toward Him.

And so justice in God is sometimes called His conformity with His own goodness, whereas at other times it is called His recompense for what is deserved. Anselm touches on both these modes when he says, "It is just when You punish evildoers, because it corresponds to what they deserve; and it is just when You spare evildoers, because it befits your goodness."

Reply to objection 4: Even though justice has to do with acts, it is not thereby excluded from being God's essence. For what belongs to a thing's essence can also be a principle of action.

However, it is not always the case that the good has to do with action. For something is said to be good not only insofar as it acts, but also insofar as it is perfected in its essence. This is why Boethius says in the same place that goodness is related to justice as the generic is related to the specific.

Article 2

Can God's justice be called truth?

It seems that God's justice is not truth:

Objection 1: Justice exists in the will; for as Anselm says, justice is rectitude of the will. But according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6 and *Ethics* 6, truth exists in the intellect. Therefore,

justice does not pertain to truth.

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 4, truth (*veritas*) is a certain virtue distinct from justice. Therefore, truth does not pertain to the nature of justice.

But contrary to this: Psalm 84:11 says, “Mercy and truth have met each other.” And ‘truth’ is here being used for justice.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), truth consists in a correspondence between the intellect and reality (*veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei*).

Now an intellect that is a cause of the relevant real thing is related to it as a rule and measure, whereas the converse holds in the case of an intellect that takes its scientific knowledge from the things.

Thus, when, as happens with us, the things are the measure and rule of the intellect, then truth consists in the intellect’s corresponding to the thing. For it is because reality is or is not such-and-such that our opinions and statements are true or false.

By contrast, when the intellect is the rule or measure of the things, then truth consists in the thing’s corresponding to the intellect. So, for instance, the craftsman is said to produce a true work when that work agrees with his craft. Now just actions are related to the law with which they accord as artifacts are related to their craft. Therefore, God’s justice, which establishes among things the order that conforms to the measure of His wisdom, i.e., His law, is appropriately called ‘truth’. And this is why, even among us, one speaks of the truth of justice.

Reply to objection 1: With respect to the *law* that regulates, justice exists in reason or in the intellect, but with respect to the *command* by which actions are regulated in accord with the law, justice exists in the will.

Reply to objection 2: The ‘truth’ of which the Philosopher is speaking here is a certain virtue by which someone’s words and deeds reveal what he is really like. And so it consists in the conformity of a sign to the thing signified—and not, as has been said about the truth of justice, in the conformity of an effect to its cause and its rule.

Article 3

Is there mercy in God?

It seems that mercy or pity (*misericordia*) does not belong to God:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, mercy is a species of sadness. But sadness does not exist in God. Therefore, neither does mercy.

Objection 2: Mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot omit what pertains to His justice. For as 2 Timothy 2:13 says, “If we believe not, He continues faithful, He cannot deny Himself,” and as a Gloss says in the same place, He would be denying Himself if He denied His own dictates. Therefore, mercy does not belong to God.

But contrary to this: Psalm 110:4 says, “He is a merciful and gracious Lord.”

I respond: Mercy must especially be attributed to God—though according to its effect and not according to the affective element in the passion.

To see this clearly, note that someone is called merciful (*misericors*) when he has, as it were, a saddened heart (*miserum cor*)—viz., because he is affected with sadness at the misery (*miseria*) of another as if it were his own misery. And from this it follows that he acts to dispel the other’s misery as his own misery, and this is the effect of mercy.

Thus, to be saddened at the misery of another does not belong to God, but it does especially belong

to Him to dispel another's misery, insofar as we mean by 'misery' any sort of defect. But defects are removed only through the perfection of some type of goodness, and, as was shown above (q. 6., a. 4), the first source of goodness is God.

Note, however, that the distribution of perfections to things pertains—though under different concepts—to God's goodness and to His justice and to His generosity (*liberalitas*) and to His mercy. For, as was shown above (a. 6, a. 1 and 4), the communication of perfections, considered absolutely, pertains to God's *goodness*. However, as was noted just above (a. 1), it pertains to God's *justice* that perfections are given to things by God in a way that is appropriate to them. On the other hand, it pertains to His *generosity* that He grants perfections to things not for His own advantage, but solely because of His goodness. Finally, it pertains to God's *mercy* that the perfections given by Him to things expel every sort of defect.

Reply to objection 1: This objection argues from mercy's affective element as a passion

Reply to objection 2: God acts mercifully not by doing anything contrary to His justice, but by doing something that goes beyond His justice. In the same way, if one gives two hundred denarii of his own money to someone who is owed one hundred denarii, then he is acting generously or mercifully and not contrary to justice. The same thing holds if someone forgives an offense committed against himself. For in forgiving this debt, he is in a certain sense making a gift of it; hence, in Ephesians 4:32 the Apostle calls forgiveness a 'gift': "Make a gift to one another, just as Christ has made a gift to you."

From this it is clear that mercy, far from destroying justice, is a certain fullness of justice. Hence, James 2:13 says, "Mercy is exalted above judgment."

Article 4

Do both mercy and justice both exist in every work of God?

It seems that mercy and justice do not both exist in every work of God:

Objection 1: Some of God's works, e.g., the justification of the wicked, are attributed to His mercy, whereas others, e.g., the damnation of the wicked, are attributed to His justice; hence, James 2:13 says: "Judgment will come without mercy to him that has not done mercy." Therefore, mercy and justice do not both appear in every work of God.

Objection 2: In Romans 15:8-9 the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, whereas he attributes the conversion of the Gentiles to mercy. Therefore, justice and mercy do not both exist in every work of God.

Objection 3: Many just men are afflicted in this world. But this is unjust. Therefore, justice and mercy do not both exist in every work of God.

Objection 4: To render a debt belongs to justice, whereas to alleviate misery belongs to mercy. And so acts of both justice and mercy presuppose something. But creation does not presuppose anything. Therefore, in the act of creation there is neither mercy nor justice.

But contrary to this: Psalm 24:10 says: "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."

I respond: It is necessary for both mercy and truth to be found in every work of God—as long as mercy is understood as the removal of any sort of defect. (However, not every defect can be properly called 'misery' (*miseria*), since this applies only to defects in a rational nature, which is able to be happy. For misery is opposed to happiness (*felicitas*).)

The reason for this necessity is that since the debt rendered by God's justice is either a debt owed to God or a debt owed to some creature, neither of these can be overlooked in any of God's works. For

God cannot do anything that conflicts with His wisdom and goodness—which is the sense in which, as we explained above (a. 1), something is owed to God. Similarly, whatever God does among created things, He does with a fitting order and proportion—which is what the nature of justice consists in. And so it is necessary that justice should exist in every work of God.

Moreover, a work of God's justice always presupposes, and is founded upon, a work of His mercy. For a creature is not owed anything except because of something that preexists or is preconceived in it. Again, if anything is owed to a creature, this will be because of something prior. And since an infinite regress is impossible here, we finally come down to something which depends solely on the goodness of God's will, which is the ultimate end. So, for instance, we say that having hands is owed to man because of his rational soul, and having a rational soul is owed to him because he is man; but that man should exist at all is due to God's goodness. And so mercy appears in every work of God as its first source. For the force of mercy is preserved in each of the consequent things, and it operates even more powerfully in them, in just the way that a first cause has a more powerful influence than a secondary cause. For this reason, even the things that are owed to a given creature are such that God, out of the abundance of His goodness, dispenses them more generously than is demanded by what is fitting for the thing's nature. For what would be sufficient to preserve the order of justice is less than what is in fact conferred by God's goodness, which exceeds what is merely fitting for each creature.

Reply to objection 1: Some works are attributed to God's justice and others to His mercy because justice appears more forcefully in some and mercy appears more forcefully in others.

Yet mercy is apparent even in the damnation of the reprobate—not in the sense that it totally relaxes justice, but in the sense that it slackens it in some way by making the punishment less than what is deserved.

Again, justice is apparent even in the justification of the wicked, when it remits sins because of the love which God Himself has mercifully infused into the sinner—as we read in Luke 7:47 about Mary Magdalene: “Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much.”

Reply to objection 2: Justice and mercy are apparent in the conversion of both the Jews and the Gentiles. However, in the conversion of the Jews there is a certain element of justice that is not present in the conversion of the Gentiles, since the Jews are saved because of the promises made to their fathers.

Reply to objection 3: Justice and mercy both appear in the fact that the just are punished in this world. For through these afflictions certain of their inconstancies are purged, and they are instead directed away from a love for earthly things toward God. Accordingly, Gregory says, “The evils that oppress us in this world impel us to go toward God.”

Reply to objection 4: Even though creation presupposes nothing in the nature of things, it nonetheless presupposes something in God's cognition. Accordingly, even in this case the nature of justice is preserved, since a thing is brought into being insofar as this accords with God's wisdom and goodness. Likewise, the nature of mercy is in some way preserved insofar as a thing passes from non-being into being.

QUESTION 22

God's Providence

Now that we have considered what pertains to God's will absolutely speaking, we must proceed to those things that are related to both His intellect and will together. These include providence, which is had with respect to all things (question 22), as well as predestination and reprobation and what follows upon them in the order of salvation—especially with respect to human beings (questions 23-24). For in moral science prudence, which clearly pertains to providence, is considered after the moral virtues.

On the topic of providence there are four questions: (1) Does providence exist in God? (2) Are all things subject to God's providence? (3) Is God's providence immediate with respect to all things? (4) Does God's providence impose necessity on the things it provides for?

Article 1

Does providence exist in God?

It seems that providence (*providentia*) does not exist in God:

Objection 1: According to Tully, providence is a part of prudence (*pars prudentiae*). But since, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, prudence involves good deliberation, it cannot belong to God; for there is nothing which God is not sure about and which He would thus need to deliberate about (*qui nullum dubium habet, unde eum consiliari oporteat*). Therefore, providence does not belong to God.

Objection 2: Whatever exists in God is eternal. But providence is not eternal, since, according to Damascene, providence has to do with existing things that are not themselves eternal. Therefore, providence does not exist in God.

Objection 3: Nothing composite exists in God. But providence seems to be something composite, since it includes within itself both the will and the intellect. Therefore, providence does not exist in God.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 14:3 says, "But Your providence, O Father, governs all things."

I respond: It is necessary for providence to be posited in God. For, as has been shown (q. 6, a. 4), all the good that exists in things is created by God. But good is found in things not only with respect to their substance, but also with respect to their being ordered toward their end, and most especially toward their ultimate end, which, as was established above (q. 21, a. 4), is God's goodness. Therefore, this good of ordering that exists among created things is itself created by God. However, since God is a cause of things through His intellect, and since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 15, a. 2 and q. 19, a. 4), the idea of each of His effects must thus preexist in Him, it is necessary that a plan for the ordering of things to their end should preexist in God's mind (*necesse est quod ratio ordinis reum in finem in mente divina praeexistat*). And this plan for ordering things to their end is providence, properly speaking.

For providence is the principal part of prudence, and the other two parts—viz., memory of what is past and understanding of what is present (*memoria praeteritorum et intelligentia praesentium*)—are ordered toward it. For it is from the past as remembered and the present as understood that we make inferences about future things that have to be provided for (*coniectamus de futuris providendis*). Now according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, it is the role of prudence to order other things toward their end—whether this be (a) with respect to one's own self, and in this sense a prudent man is one who skillfully orders his acts toward the goal of his life, or (b) with respect to the end of others who are subject to one in the family or in the city or in the kingdom, and it is in this sense that Matthew 24:45 says, "... the faithful and prudent servant, whom his lord has appointed over his family." It is in this second way that prudence or providence can belong to God. For in God Himself there is nothing that can be ordered toward an end, since He Himself is the ultimate end.

Therefore, it is this plan for ordering things toward their end that is called providence in God. Accordingly, in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4, Boethius says, “Providence is divine reason itself, grounded in the ultimate ruler of all things, which disposes all things.” Now ‘disposition’ can refer either to a plan for ordering things toward their end or a plan for ordering the parts in a whole.

Reply to objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, prudence, properly speaking, gives commands about matters which good deliberation (*euboulia*) has correctly inquired into and which sound judgment (*sunesis*) has correctly passed judgment on. Hence, even though deliberating does not belong to God, given that deliberation involves inquiry into matters that one is not sure about, nonetheless, it does belong to God that He should issue commands about the ordering of things toward their end, concerning which He has ‘right reason’ (*recta ratio*)—this, according to Psalm 148:6 (“He has made a decree, and it shall not pass away.”) And this is the sense in which the nature of prudence and providence belongs to God.

Moreover, even though one can claim that the plan for things to be done may itself be called ‘deliberation’ or ‘counsel’ (*consilium*) in God, this will not be because of any sort of inquiry in God; instead, it will be because of the cognitional certitude that all those who deliberate aim to arrive at by means of their inquiry. Hence, Ephesians 1:11 says, “Who works all things according to the counsel of His will.”

Reply to objection 2: Two things are pertinent to care (*pertinent ad curam*), viz., (a) the *plan* of the ordering, which is called *providence* and *disposition*, and (b) the *execution* of that ordering, which is called *governance*. The first of these is eternal, and the second is temporal.

Reply to objection 3: Providence exists in the intellect but presupposes the willing of the end. For one does not give commands concerning what is to be done for the sake of an end unless he has willed the end. Hence, prudence also presupposes the moral virtues, through which the appetite is ordered toward the good, as *Ethics* 6 says.

Still, even if providence were related equally to God’s will and to His intellect, this would still not compromise God’s simplicity. For, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 1 and a. 4), in God the will and the intellect are the same.

Article 2

Are all things subject to God's providence?

It seems that not all things are subject to God’s providence:

Objection 1: Nothing that is provided for is fortuitous. Therefore, if all things are provided for by God, then nothing will be fortuitous, and so there will be no such thing as chance or fortune. But this is contrary to common opinion.

Objection 2: Every wise provider eliminates defects and evils as much as possible from the things that he takes care of. But we see that many evils exist among things. Therefore, either God is unable to prevent them and so is not omnipotent, or else He does not have care of all of them.

Objection 3: What happens by necessity does not require providence, i.e., prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6, prudence is right reason with respect to contingent things that are open to deliberation and choice. Therefore, since many things in the world happen by necessity, not everything is subject to providence.

Objection 4: Whoever is left to himself is not subject to the providence of any ruler. But men are left to themselves by God, according to Ecclesiasticus 15:14 (“God made man from the beginning, and

left him in the hand of his own counsel”). And this holds especially for evil men, according to Psalm 80:13 (“So He let them go according to the desires of their heart”). Therefore, not all things are subject to God’s providence.

Objection 5: In 1 Corinthians 9:9 the Apostle says, “God is not concerned about oxen,” or, for the same reason, about other non-rational creatures. Therefore, not all things are subject to God’s providence.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 8:1 says of God’s wisdom, “She reaches, therefore, from end to end mightily, and orders all things sweetly.”

I respond: Some thinkers, e.g., Democritus and Epicurus, have completely denied providence, claiming that the world came about by chance.

Others have claimed that only incorruptible things are subject to providence, and that corruptible things are subject to providence not as individuals but only according to their species, since in this respect they are incorruptible. In the person of these thinkers Job 22:14 says, “The clouds are His hiding place, and He does not consider our things, and He walks about the poles of heaven.” Rabbi Moses separated men off from the general run of corruptible things because of the splendor of the intellect they participate in, but he followed the opinion of the others in the case of other corruptible individuals.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to claim that *all things* are subject to divine providence—not only in general, but also *as individuals*. This is made clear as follows:

Since every agent acts for the sake of an end, the ordering of effects toward their end extends as far as the first agent’s causality does. For in the works of any given agent, the reason why an effect occurs that is not ordered toward the end is that this effect follows from some other cause and falls outside the intention of the relevant agent. But the causality of God, who is the first agent, extends to all beings—not only with respect to the principles of their species, but also with respect to their individual principles, and not only with respect to the principles of incorruptible things, but also with respect to the principles of corruptible things. Hence, everything that has *esse* in any way must be ordered by God toward its end—this according to the Apostle in Romans 13:1 (“The things that are from God are ordered by God”). Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), God’s providence is nothing other than a plan for ordering things toward their end, it must be the case that all things, insofar as they participate in *esse*, are to that extent subject to God’s providence.

Similarly, it was shown above (q. 14, a. 11) that God knows all things, both universals and particulars. And since, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 8), God’s cognition is related to things as a craftsman’s cognition is related to his artifacts, it must be the case that all things are subject to God’s ordering in the way that all of a craftsman’s artifacts are subject to his ordering.

Reply to objection 1: Universal causes differ from particular causes, since something can elude a particular cause’s ordering, but not a universal cause’s ordering. For something eludes a particular cause’s ordering only because of some other particular cause that impedes that ordering; for instance, a piece of wood is prevented from bursting into flame by the action of water. Hence, since all the particular causes are included under the universal cause, it is impossible for any effect to escape the universal cause’s ordering.

Therefore, insofar as a given effect escapes the ordering of some particular cause, it is called a chance effect or fortuitous effect with respect to that particular cause. However, with respect to the universal cause, whose ordering it cannot be released from, it is said to be provided for. Similarly, it might happen that two servants of the same master meet one another, and that even though the meeting is a chance event from their perspective, it was nonetheless provided for by their master, who knowingly dispatched them to the same place in such a way that neither knew about the other.

Reply to objection 2: Someone who has care of a particular thing differs here from someone who

is a universal provider. For a particular provider eliminates defects as much as possible from that which is subject to his care, whereas a universal provider permits defects to occur in particular cases in order not to impede the good of the whole. Hence, the corruptions and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to a particular nature, but they nonetheless fall within the intention of nature as a whole, insofar as a defect in one thing works to the good of some other thing or to the good of the universe as a whole. For instance, the corruption of one thing is the generation of some other thing, and through this generation a species is preserved.

Therefore, since God is the universal provider for the totality of being, it pertains to His providence that He should permit certain defects to exist in some particular things in order that the complete good of the universe not be impeded. For if all evils were prevented, then many goods would be absent from the universe. For instance, the life of a lion would not exist if there were no killing of animals; again, the patience of the martyrs would not exist if it were not for the tyrants' persecution. Hence, in the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "Almighty God would never allow any evil to exist among His works if He were not good and powerful enough to do well even given the evil."

Now these first two objections that we have just answered seem to have influenced those who excluded corruptible things from God's providence, since it is among corruptible things that chance events and evils occur.

Reply to objection 3: Man did not institute nature, but instead uses natural entities to his own advantage in his works of art and virtue. Hence, human providence does not extend to the necessary things that happen by nature. However, the providence of God, who is the author of nature, does indeed extend to these things.

This third objection seems to have influenced those who removed the course of natural things from God's providence and attributed it to the necessity of matter—e.g., Democritus and other ancient natural philosophers.

Reply to objection 4: Man is not excluded from God's providence by the statement that "God left man to himself." Instead, what this statement shows is that an operative power determined to a single effect is not fixed for man ahead of time, as it is for natural things. For natural things act only as if they are directed by another toward their end, and they do not act as if they are directing themselves toward the end, in the way that rational creatures do through the power of free choice by which they deliberate and choose. Hence, rational creatures are explicitly said to be "in the hand of their own counsel."

However, since the very act of free choice is traced back to God as a cause, the things that are done by free choice must be subject to God's providence. For human providence is contained under God's providence in the way that a particular cause is contained under a universal cause.

Moreover, God has providence over just men in a more excellent way than over wicked men, since He does not permit anything to happen to just men that would definitively undermine their salvation. For as Romans 8:28 says, "To them that love God all things work together unto good." On the other hand, from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to send them away—not, however, in the sense that they are totally excluded from His providence. For they would fall into nothingness if He did not conserve them through His providence.

The present objection seems to have influenced Tully, who removed from God's providence human affairs of the sort we deliberate about.

Reply to objection 5: Since, as has been explained, a rational creature has dominion over his own acts through free choice, he is subject to God's providence in a special way, so that guilt and merit are imputed to him and punishment and reward are rendered to him. And it is in this respect that the Apostle denies that God cares about oxen. However, he does not mean that individual non-rational creatures do not fall under God's providence, as Rabbi Moses thought.

Article 3

Is God's providence immediate with respect to all things?

It seems that God does not have immediate providence with respect to all things:

Objection 1: Whatever is dignified must be attributed to God. But it is part of a king's dignity that he has ministers through the mediation of whom he provides for the things subject to him. Therefore, *a fortiori* God does not provide immediately for all things.

Objection 2: It pertains to providence to order things toward their end, and the end of each thing is its perfection and its good. But it pertains to a cause that it should lead its own effect to the good. Therefore, every agent cause is a cause of an effect of providence. Therefore, if God provided immediately for all things, then all secondary causes would be eliminated.

Objection 3: In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "There are some things it is better not to know about than to know about, e.g., vile things." And the Philosopher says the same thing in *Metaphysics* 12. But everything that is better should be attributed to God. Therefore, God does not have immediate providence with respect to things that are vile and evil.

But contrary to this: Job 34:13 says, "What other has He appointed over the earth? Or whom has He set over the world which He made?" Commenting on this, Gregory says, "He rules by Himself the world which He created by Himself."

I respond: Two things are relevant to providence: (a) a *plan* for ordering the things provided for toward their end (*ratio ordinis rerum provisarum in finem*); and (b) the *execution* of this ordering, which is called *governance* (*gubernatio*).

As regards the first of these, God immediately provides for all things. For in His intellect He has a plan for all things, even the very least things, and He has given the power to produce given effects to every cause that He has preordained for those effects. Hence, He had to have had the order of those effects in His plan beforehand (*oportet quod ordinem illorum effectuum in sua ratione prae habuerit*).

As regards the second, there are certain mediators of God's providence. For God's providence governs lower things by means of higher things—not because of any defect in His power, but rather because of the abundance of His goodness, so that He might communicate the dignity of causal activity even to His creatures.

This rules out an opinion of Plato's that is reported by Gregory of Nyssa. According to this opinion, there are three kinds of providence. The first kind belongs to the highest God, who provides primarily and principally for spiritual things and, as a result, for the whole world with respect to its genera, species, and universal causes. The second kind of providence is that by which generable and corruptible individuals are provided for, and this kind of providence he attributes to the gods who circle the heavens, i.e., to the separated substances that move the celestial bodies in circles. Lastly, the third kind of providence has to do with human affairs, and this kind of providence he attributes to the daimons (*attribuebat daemonibus*), whom the Platonists posited between us and the gods, as reported by Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 9.

Reply to objection 1: It is indeed part of a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence, but it is a defect for him not to have a plan for those things that are to be done through his ministers. For all operational knowledge (*scientia operativa*) is more perfect to the extent that it considers things that are more particular, since acts have to do with particulars.

Reply to objection 2: As is clear from what has been said, the fact that God has immediate providence with respect to all things does not rule out secondary causes insofar as they *execute* this ordering.

Reply to objection 3: For us it is better not to know evil and vile things because (a) they keep us from considering better things, since we are unable to hold many things in our understanding at the same time, and also because (b) thinking about evil things sometimes perverts our will toward evil. However, these considerations have no place in God, who sees all things at once with a single act of vision and whose will cannot be turned to evil.

Article 4

Does God's providence impose necessity on the things it provides for?

It seems that God's providence imposes necessity on the things it provides for:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 6, every effect that has a *per se* cause which now exists or has already existed and from which that effect follows by necessity is such that it has issued forth by necessity. But since God's providence is eternal, it has already existed; and an effect follows from it by necessity, since God's providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore, God's providence imposes necessity on the things it provides for.

Objection 2: Every provider makes what he produces as stable as possible, lest it perish. But God is maximally powerful. Therefore, to the things He provides for He gives the firmness of necessity.

Objection 3: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says that fate, "proceeding from the sources of immutable providence, constrains men's acts and fortunes with an indissoluble series of causes." Therefore, it seems that providence imposes necessity on the things provided for.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It is not part of providence to corrupt nature." But the nature of certain things is such that they are contingent. Therefore, divine providence does not impose necessity on things in a way that excludes contingency.

I respond: God's providence imposes necessity on some things, but not—as some have held—on all things.

For it pertains to providence to order things toward their end. But after God's own goodness, which is an end that is separated from things, the principal good that exists in the things themselves is the perfection of the universe, which would not exist if there were not many grades of being found among things. Hence, it pertains to God's providence to produce all the grades of beings. And so God has prepared necessary causes for certain effects, so that those effects occur necessarily, whereas for other effects He has prepared contingent causes, so that they occur contingently in accord with the status of their proximate causes.

Reply to objection 1: The effect of God's providence is not just that something should occur in some way or other, but that something should occur contingently or that it should occur necessarily. And so if God's providence disposes a thing to occur infallibly and necessarily, then it occurs infallibly and necessarily, whereas if the plan of God's providence decrees that a thing should occur contingently, then it occurs contingently.

Reply to objection 2: The ordering of God's providence is unshakable and certain in the sense that the things that are provided for by God all occur in the mode which He Himself has provided for them, i.e., either necessarily or contingently.

Reply to objection 3: The indissolubility and immutability that Boethius mentions pertain to the certitude of providence itself, which cannot fail either in its effect or in the mode of occurrence that it has provided for. Nonetheless, indissolubility and immutability do not pertain to the necessity of the effects themselves.

Also, notice that *necessary* and *contingent* follow upon *being* as such. Hence, the modes of contingency and necessity fall under the oversight of God, who is the universal provider for all of being, and not just under the oversight of certain particular providers.

QUESTION 23

Predestination

Now that we have considered God's providence, we have to discuss predestination (question 23) and the book of life (question 24).

On the topic of predestination there are eight questions: (1) Is predestination fitting for God? (2) What is predestination, and is it an entity that exists in the one who is predestined? (3) Does God reprobate some men? (4) As regards the relation of predestination to election, are the predestined elected? (5) Are merits a cause of, or explanation for, predestination or reprobation or election? (6) As regards the certainty of predestination, are the predestined infallibly saved? (7) Is the number of the predestined fixed? (8) Can predestination be assisted by the prayers of the holy?

Article 1

Are men predestined by God?

It seems that men are not predestined by God:

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, "We must understand that God foreknows all things but does not predetermine all things (*omnia praecognoscit Deus, non autem omnia praedeterminat*). He foreknows what exists in us, but He does not predetermine it." But human merits and demerits exist in us insofar as we are masters of our own acts through the power of free choice. Therefore, whatever pertains to merits and demerits is not predestined by God. And thus the predestination of men is ruled out.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 22, a. 1), all creatures are ordered to their ends by God's providence. But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore, neither are men predestined.

Objection 3: Angels are capable of happiness, in the same way that men are. But, so it seems, angels are not predestined, since there was never any unhappiness (*miseria*) in them and, as Augustine says, predestination is a work of mercy. Therefore, men are not predestined.

Objection 4: The gifts that God has conferred on men are revealed to holy men by the Holy Spirit—this according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 2:12 ("We have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given us from God"). Therefore, if men were predestined by God, then given that predestination is a divine gift, the predestined would know about their own predestination. But this is clearly false.

But contrary to this: Romans 8:30 says, "And whom He predestined, them He also called."

I respond: It is fitting for God to predestine men. For as was shown above (q. 22, a. 2), all things are subject to God's providence. But as was explained (q. 22, a. 1), it pertains to providence to order things toward their end.

Now there are two kinds of ends toward which created things are ordered by God. The one kind is disproportionate to, and exceeds the power of, a created nature; and this end is eternal life, which consists in seeing God (*in divina visione consistit*) and which, as has been shown (q. 12, a. 4), lies beyond the nature of any creature. The other kind of end is proportioned to a created nature, so that the created thing can attain it by the power of its own nature.

Now the kind of end that a thing cannot attain by the power of its own nature is such that the thing must be sent to it by another, in the way that an arrow is sent to its target by an archer. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, who is capable of eternal life, is led to eternal life in the sense of being sent to it by God (*perducitur in ipsam quasi a Deo transmissa*). But the plan for this sending (*transmissionis*

ratio) preexists in God, in the same way that there exists in Him a plan for ordering all things toward their end—which, as we explained above (q. 22, a. 1), is His providence. But a plan of action that exists in the mind of the agent is a sort of preexistence in the agent of the very thing that is going to be done. Hence, the plan for sending a rational creature to the end or goal of eternal life is called *predestination* (*ratio transmissionis creaturae rationaleis in finem vitae aeternae praedestinatio nominatur*). For to destine something is to send it (*destinare est mittere*). And so it is clear that with respect to its object, predestination is a certain part of providence.

Reply to objection 1: Damascene is using the name ‘predetermination’ for the imposition of necessity, as happens with natural things that are predetermined to a single effect. This is clear from the fact that he adds, “For He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue.” Hence, predestination is not being ruled out.

Reply to objection 2: Non-rational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the power of human nature. Hence, they are not properly said to be predestined—even if the name ‘predestination’ might sometimes be used in an improper sense with respect to other ends.

Reply to objection 3: It is fitting for angels to be predestined, just as it is for men, even though the angels were never unhappy. For a movement takes its species not from its terminus *a quo*, but from its terminus *ad quem*. For instance, it makes no difference, as far as the nature of whitewashing is concerned, whether the thing that is being whitewashed was black or gray or red beforehand. Similarly, it makes no difference, as far as the nature of predestination is concerned, whether or not it is from a state of unhappiness that someone is predestined to eternal life—even though, as was explained above (q. 21, a. 3), one can claim that *every* conferral of a good that goes beyond what is owed to the thing on which it is conferred belongs to mercy.

Reply to objection 4: Even if, by a special privilege, their own predestination is revealed to some men, it is not appropriate for it to be revealed to everyone. For if it were so revealed, then those who are not predestined would despair, and, among the predestined, the security of predestination might engender negligence.

Article 2

Is predestination an entity that exists in the one who is predestined?

It seems that predestination is an entity that exists in the one who is predestined:

Objection 1: Every action of itself entails an instance of being acted upon (*passio*). Therefore, if predestination is an action in God (*si predestinatio actio in Deo*), then predestination must be an instance of being acted upon in those who are predestined (*oportet quod predestinatio passio sit in praedestinatis*).

Objection 2: In his commentary on Romans 1:4 (“Who was predestined ...”) Origen says, “Predestination belongs to one who does not yet exist, whereas the sending (*destinatio*) belongs to one who does exist.” But in *Praedestinatio Sanctorum* Augustine says, “What is predestination, if not the sending (*destinatio*) of someone?” Therefore, predestination belongs only to something that exists. And so it is an entity that exists in the one who is predestined (*ponit aliquid in praedestinato*).

Objection 3: Preparation is an entity that exists in a thing that is prepared. But as Augustine says in *Praedestinatio Sanctorum*, predestination is a preparation for God’s gifts. Therefore, predestination is an entity that exists in those who are predestined (*est aliquid in praedestinatis*).

Objection 4: What is temporal does not appear in the definition of what is eternal. But grace,

which is something temporal, appears in the definition of predestination. For predestination is said to be “a preparation for grace in the present and for glory in the future.” Therefore, predestination is not something eternal. And so it must exist not in God, but in those who are predestined. For whatever exists in God is eternal.

But contrary to this: Augustine says that predestination is the foreknowledge of God’s gifts. But foreknowledge is an entity that exists in the one who has the foreknowledge and not in the things that are foreknown. Therefore, predestination likewise exists in the one who predestines and not in those who are predestined.

I respond: Predestination is something that exists only in the one who predestines and not in those who are predestined. For it has been explained (a. 1) that predestination is a certain part of providence. But providence does not exist in the things that are provided for; instead, as has been explained (q. 22, a. 1), it is a plan that exists in the provider’s intellect. On the other hand, the execution of providence, which is called governance, is indeed something passive that exists in the things that are governed, whereas it exists as something active in the one who governs.

Thus, it is clear that predestination is a plan, existing in God’s mind, for ordering certain persons to eternal salvation. On the other hand, the execution of this ordering is something passive that exists in those who are predestined, whereas it exists in God as something active. Now this execution of predestination is a *calling* (*vocatio*) and *glorification* (*magnificatio*) according to the Apostle in Romans 8:30: “And whom He predestined, them He also called. And whom He called . . . them He also glorified.”

Reply to objection 1: Actions that pass into a exterior subject (*transeuntes in exteriorem materiam*)—e.g., heating and cutting—entail of themselves an instance of being acted upon (*passio*). However, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 2 and q. 18, a. 3), this is not the case with actions that remain within the agent, e.g., intellectual understanding and willing. And predestination is an action of this latter sort. Hence, predestination does not posit any entity (*aliquid*) in the one who is predestined.

On the other hand, the execution of predestination, which passes into exterior things, exists as a certain effect in those things.

Reply to objection 2: ‘To send’ or ‘to destine’ (*destinare*) is sometimes taken for the real transmission of something toward a target, and in this sense an instance of being sent is an entity that exists only in something that itself exists.

In a second sense, ‘to send’ or ‘to destine’ is taken for a sending which someone mentally conceives of, and in this sense we are said to ‘destine’ something when we firmly intend it in our minds—this according to 2 Maccabees 6:20, where Eleazar “destined himself (*destinavit*) not to do any unlawful things for the sake of the love of life.” And in this sense destining can belong to something that does not yet exist.

However, because of the antecedent character (*ratio antecessionis*) that ‘predestination’ implies, predestination can belong to something that does not yet exist, regardless of how the term ‘destine’ is taken.

Reply to objection 3: There are two kinds of preparation. The first kind is the preparation of what is acted upon insofar as it is being acted upon, and this kind of preparation exists in the thing that is being prepared. The second kind of preparation belongs to an agent with respect to its acting, and this kind of preparation exists within the agent.

Predestination is a preparation of this latter kind. For an agent, through his intellect, is said to prepare himself for acting insofar as he preconceives a plan for what is going to be done. And in this sense God prepared from eternity by predestining, conceiving of a plan for ordering certain persons to salvation.

Reply to objection 4: Grace appears in the definition of predestination not as something that is part of the essence of predestination, but rather insofar as predestination implies a relation to grace, viz., the relation of a cause to its effect, and the relation of an act to its object. Hence, it does not follow that predestination is something temporal.

Article 3

Does God reprobate some men?

It seems that God does not reprobate any man (*Deus nullum hominem reprobat*):

Objection 1: No one reprobates someone whom he loves. But God loves all men, according to Wisdom 11:25 (“For You love all things that exist, and hate none of the things that You have made”). Therefore, God does not reprobate any man.

Objection 2: If God reprobates some man, then it must be the case that reprobation is related to those who are reprobated in exactly the same way that predestination is related to those who are predestined. But predestination is a cause of salvation for those who are predestined. Therefore, reprobation will be a cause of perdition for those who are reprobated. But this is false; for Hosea 13:9 says, “Your perdition is from yourself, O Israel: your help is only from me.” Therefore, God does not reprobate anyone.

Objection 3: No one ought to be held responsible for what he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates someone, then that person cannot avoid perishing; for Ecclesiastes 7:14 says, “Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He has despised.” Therefore, men should not be held responsible for perishing. But this is false. Therefore, God does not reprobate anyone.

But contrary to this: Malachi 1:2-3 says, “I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.”

I respond: There are some whom God reprobates.

For it was asserted above (a. 1) that predestination is a part of providence. But as was explained before (q. 22, a. 2), it pertains to providence to permit some defects in the things that are subject to providence. Hence, since it is through divine providence that men are ordered toward eternal life, it likewise pertains to providence that it should permit some to fall short of this end. And this is what is called reprobation.

So, then, just as predestination is the part of providence that has to do with those who are divinely ordered toward eternal salvation, so reprobation is the part of providence that has to do with those who fall short of this end. Hence, reprobation does not signify just foreknowledge, but adds something to it conceptually (*secundum rationem*)—as was explained above (q. 22, a. 1) in the case of providence. For just as predestination includes the intention (*voluntas*) to confer grace and glory, so reprobation includes the intention to permit someone to fall into sin and to impose the punishment of damnation for that sin.

Reply to objection 1: God loves all men—and, indeed all creatures—in the sense that He wills some good for all of them, but not in the sense that He wills every good for all of them. Therefore, insofar as He does not will the good of eternal life for some, He is said to hate them or reprobate them.

Reply to objection 2: Reprobation is different from predestination in the way it functions as a cause.

For predestination is a cause both (a) of that which awaits in the future life for those who are predestined, viz., glory, and also (b) of that which is perceived in the present, viz., grace.

By contrast, reprobation is not a cause of that which exists in the present, viz., sin. However, it is a cause of one’s being abandoned by God (*est causa derelictionis a Deo*) and a cause of what is rendered

in the future, viz., eternal punishment. Sin, on the other hand, comes from the free choice of the one who is reprobated and deserted by grace. It is in this sense that what the prophet said is verified: “Your perdition is from yourself, O Israel.”

Reply to objection 3: God’s reprobation does not take away any power at all from the one who is reprobated. Hence, when it is claimed that one who is reprobated cannot obtain grace, this should be understood to mean a relative impossibility rather than an absolute impossibility—in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3), one who is predestined is necessarily saved, but with a relative necessity that does not destroy free choice. Hence, even if someone who is reprobated by God cannot obtain grace, nonetheless, the fact that he falls into this or that sin happens because of his free choice. Hence, he is rightly held to be guilty of his sin (*unde et merito sibi imputatur in culpam*).

Article 4

Are the predestined elected by God?

It seems that the predestined are not elected by God (*non eligantur a Deo*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that just as the corporeal sun emits its light to all bodies without choosing (*non eligendo*) them, so too God emits His goodness without election. But God’s goodness is communicated in a special way to some by their participation in grace and glory. Therefore, God communicates grace and glory, which pertain to predestination, without any election.

Objection 2: Election has to do with what exists. But predestination from eternity is also of those who do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.

Objection 3: Election implies a certain selectivity (*electio quandam discretionem importat*). But as 1 Timothy 2:4 says, “God wills all men to be saved.” Therefore, predestination, which preordains men to salvation, occurs without election.

But contrary to this: Ephesians 1:4 says, “He elected us in [Christ] before the foundation of the world.”

I respond: Predestination logically presupposes election, and election logically presupposes love.

The reason for this is that, as has been explained (a. 1), predestination is a part of providence. But providence, like prudence, is a plan which exists in the intellect and which issues commands about the ordering of certain things toward their end, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 2). However, one does not command anything to be ordered toward an end unless the end has already been willed.

Hence, the predestination of some to eternal salvation logically presupposes that God has willed their salvation. And it is to this willing that election and love are relevant (*ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio*). Love (*dilectio*) is relevant insofar as He wills the good of eternal salvation for them; for, as was explained above (q. 20, a. 2 and 3), to love is to will a good for someone. On the other hand, election (*electio*) is relevant insofar as He wills this good to some in preference to others; for as was said above (a. 3), there are some whom He reprobates.

However, election and love have an ordering in God that is different from their ordering with us, since in our case the will does not cause goodness by its love; instead, we are spurred to love by a preexisting good. Thus, we elect someone in order to love him, and so in our case election precedes love. With God, however, the reverse is the case. For His act of will, by which He wills a good to someone in loving Him, is a cause of the person’s having that good in preference to others. And so it is clear that love is logically presupposed by election, and that election is logically presupposed by predestination.

Hence, all those who are predestined are elected and loved.

Reply to objection 1: If one considers the communication of God's goodness in general, then He communicates His goodness in the absence of election, since, as was explained above (q. 6, a. 4), there is nothing that does not participate in His goodness. However, if one is considering the communication of this or that particular good, then He does not confer the good without election, since He gives certain goods to some things which He does not give to other things. And it is in this way that election is present in the conferral of grace and glory.

Reply to objection 2: When the will of the one who elects is spurred to love by a good that preexists in the thing, the election must be from among the things that exist—as happens when we elect something. But things are otherwise with God, as has been explained. And so as Augustine puts it, “Those who do not exist are elected by God, and He who elects them does not err.”

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 19, a. 6), God wills *antecedently* that all men should be saved—which is not to will it absolutely speaking, but only in a certain respect. However, He does not will this *consequently*. i.e., He does not will it absolutely speaking.

Article 5

Is the foreknowledge of merits a cause of predestination?

It seems that the foreknowledge of merits (*praescientia meritorum*) is a cause of predestination:

Objection 1: In Romans 8:29 the Apostle says, “Whom He foreknew, He also predestined.” Again, in Ambrose's gloss on Romans 9:15 (“I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy”) he says, “I will give mercy to him whom I foreknow will turn to me with all his heart.” Therefore, it seems that the foreknowledge of merits is a cause of predestination.

Objection 2: Since, as Augustine says, predestination is a work of mercy, God's predestination includes the divine act of will, which cannot be unreasonable. But there can be no reason for predestination except the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore, the foreknowledge of merits is a cause of, or explanation for, predestination.

Objection 3: As Romans 9:14 says, “There is no injustice with God.” Now it seems unjust that those who are equal should be treated unequally. But all men are equal both with respect to nature and with respect to original sin, whereas inequalities are present in them because of the merits and demerits that stem from their own actions. Therefore, God prepares unequal treatments for men, by predestining some and reprobating others, only because of His foreknowledge of different merits.

But contrary to this: In Titus 3:5 the Apostle says, “Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us.” But He predestined us to be saved in the same way that He saved us. Therefore, it is not the case that the foreknowledge of merits is a cause of, or explanation for, predestination.

I respond: Since, as was explained above (a. 3 and 4), predestination includes an act of will, a reason for predestination has to be sought in the same way that a reason for God's act of will is sought. But it was explained above (q. 19, a. 5) that it is impossible to assign a cause of God's act of will on the part of the act of willing itself, whereas it is possible to assign an explanation on the part of the things willed to the extent that God wills one thing to exist for the sake of another. Thus, no one has been crazy enough (*insanae mentis*) to claim that merits are a cause of God's predestination with respect to the very act of predestining. Instead, this matter has been discussed under the question of whether predestination has some cause on the part of the effect. And this is just to ask whether it was because of merits that God

preordained that He would give the effect of predestination to someone.

Thus, there have been some who claimed that the effect of predestination is preordained for someone because of merits that preexisted in another life. This was the position of Origen, who held that human souls were created from the beginning and that when they were united to bodies in this world, they were assigned different states according to differences in their works. But the Apostle excludes this position in Romans 9:11-12, when he says: “For when they had not yet been born, nor had done any good or evil . . . Not of works, but of Him that calls, it was said to her: ‘The elder shall serve the younger.’”

Thus, there have been others who claimed that preexisting merits in this life are an explanation for, and cause of, the effect of predestination. For instance, the Pelagians held that the beginning of good works comes from us, whereas their consummation is from God. And so the reason why one person, and not another, is given the effect of predestination is that the one, and not the other, had made a beginning by preparing himself. However, this position is contrary to what the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 3:5, “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.” For no principle can be found that is prior to thought. Hence, it cannot be claimed that some beginning exists in us that might be the explanation for the effect of predestination.

Hence, there have been others who claimed that the merits which follow upon the effect of predestination are an explanation for predestination. The idea is that God gives grace to someone, and preordained that He would give it, because He foreknew that this person would make good use of the grace—in the way that a king might give a horse to some soldier whom he knows will make good use of it.

However, these thinkers seem to have distinguished what comes from free choice and what comes from grace in such a way that the same effect could not come from both of them at once. Now it is clear that what belongs to grace is an effect of predestination, and it cannot be counted as a reason for predestination because it is included under predestination. Therefore, if something else on our part is an explanation for predestination, it will not be an effect of predestination. But what comes from free choice is not distinct from what comes from predestination, since what comes from a secondary cause is not distinct from what comes from the first cause. For God’s providence produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3). Hence, what comes from free choice comes from predestination as well.

Therefore, one should claim that the effect of predestination can be thought of in two ways:

(a) One way is *in particular*, and in this sense nothing prevents one effect of predestination from being a cause of, and explanation for, another effect of predestination—where a later effect is a *final cause* of a prior effect, and a prior effect is a *meritorious cause* (which is traced back to a material disposition) of a later effect. For instance, we might say that God preordained that He would give glory to some individual because of his merits, and that He preordained that He would give him grace in order that he might merit glory.

(b) The second way to think of the effect of predestination is *in general*, and in this sense it is impossible that the whole effect of predestination in general should have any cause on our part. For whatever there is in a man that orders him toward salvation is wholly included under the effect of predestination, even the very preparation for grace, which does not come about except through God’s assistance—this according to Lamentations 5:21 (“Convert us, O Lord, to You, and we shall be converted”). Predestination, taken in this way on the part of the effect, has God’s goodness for its explanation. For it is God’s goodness to which the whole effect of predestination is ordered as to an end and from which it proceeds as a first efficient principle.

Reply to objection 1: The foreknown use of grace is not a reason for the conferral of grace except as a final cause in the sense just explained.

Reply to objection 2: Predestination *taken in general* has God's goodness as an explanation on the part of the effect. But, as has been explained, predestination *taken in particular* is such that one of its effects is an explanation for another.

Reply to objection 3: An explanation for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others can be taken from God's goodness itself. For God is said to have made all things because of His goodness in such a way that the divine goodness is represented among things. But it is necessary for God's goodness, which is one and simple in itself, to be represented in a multitude of ways in the things, since created things cannot attain to God's simplicity. And so diverse grades of things are required for the completion of the universe—with some things occupying high places and others the lowest places in the universe. And as was explained above (q. 2, a. 3 and q. 22, a. 2), in order for this multiplicity of grades to be conserved among things, God permits certain evils to be effected, lest many goods should be impeded.

So, then, suppose that we think of the whole human race as a complete collection of things. God willed that some men, whom He predestines, should represent His goodness in the mode of mercy, by sparing them; and He willed that other men, whom He reprobates, should represent His goodness in the mode of justice, by punishing them. And this is the reason why God chooses some and reprobates others. This is the explanation the Apostle gives in Romans 9:22-23 when he says, "God, willing to show His wrath [*read: the vindication of His justice*] and to make His power known, endured [*read: permitted*] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, so that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy which He has prepared unto glory." And in 2 Timothy 2:20 he says, "But in a great house there are vessels not only of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth, and some indeed unto honor, but some unto dishonor."

However, there is no explanation other than God's will for why He chose these *particular* men for glory and reprobated those *particular* men. Hence, in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, "As to why He draws this one to Himself and not that one—do not dare to judge if you do not want to be mistaken."

Similarly, among natural things one can give an explanation for why the whole of primary matter, which is uniform in itself, is such that one part of it was created by God at the beginning under the form of fire and another part under the form of earth, viz., in order that there might be a diversity of species among natural things. But why this *particular* part of matter should exist under this *particular* form and that *particular* part of matter should exist under that *particular* form—this is something that depends on God's simple act of willing. In the same way, it depends on the craftsman's simple act of will that this *particular* stone should be in this *particular* part of the wall and that *particular* stone in another part of the wall—even though the nature of the art itself dictates that some stone or other should be in this part and that some stone or other should be in that part.

Yet it does not follow from this that there is any injustice in God when He prepares unequal treatments for equals. This would be contrary to the nature of justice if the effect of predestination were rendered as a debt and not conferred as a grace. For in those things that are given as a grace, one can, without any prejudice to justice, give as he wills to whom he wills, and he can give more or less, as long as he does not withhold what is owed. And this is what the master of the house says in Matthew 20:14-15: "Take what is yours, and go your way. Or is it not lawful for me to do what I will?"

Article 6

Is predestination certain?

It seems that predestination is not certain:

Objection 1: In commenting on Apocalypse 3:11 (“Hold fast that which you have, that no man take your crown”) Augustine says, “Another will not be accepted unless this one perishes.” Therefore, the crown—i.e., the effect of predestination—can be gained and lost. Therefore, predestination is not certain.

Objection 2: When something possible is posited, nothing impossible follows from it. But it is possible for someone who is predestined, say Peter, to sin and then be killed. But if this is posited, then it follows that the effect of predestination is thwarted. Therefore, this is not impossible. Therefore, predestination is not certain.

Objection 3: God is now able to do whatever He was able to do. But He was able not to have predestined someone whom He has in fact predestined. Therefore, He is even now able not to predestine that person. Therefore, predestination is not certain.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Romans 8:29 (“Whom He foreknew, He also predestined”) says, “Predestination is foreknowledge plus the preparation for God’s gifts, and whoever is liberated by it is liberated with utter certainty.”

I respond: Predestination attains to its effect infallibly and with utmost certainty, and yet it does not impose necessity in the sense that its effect issues forth by necessity. For as was explained above (a. 1), predestination is a part of providence. But not all the things subject to providence are necessary; instead, some occur contingently according to the status of their proximate causes, which God’s providence has ordered toward effects of this sort. And yet, as was shown above (q. 22, a. 4), the order of providence is itself infallible. So, then, the order of predestination is likewise certain, and yet this does not undermine free choice, from which the effect of predestination issues forth contingently.

On this point, notice also what was said above about God’s knowledge and God’s will (q. 14, a. 13 and q. 19, a. 8), which do not destroy the contingency of things even though they themselves are infallible and utterly certain.

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which a crown can be said to belong to someone: (a) *from divine predestination*, and in this sense no one loses his crown, and (b) *from the merit of grace* (since what we merit is in some sense our own), and in this sense someone can lose his crown through a subsequent mortal sin.

Now someone else receives this lost crown insofar as he is substituted for the one who has lost it. For God does not permit any to fall without raising up others—this according to Job 34:24: “He shall break in pieces the many and the innumerable, and shall make others to stand in their stead.” Thus, men were substituted for the fallen angels, and Gentiles were substituted for the Jews. Moreover, the one who is substituted into the state of grace receives the crown of the one who has fallen even in the sense that he will rejoice in eternal life over the good things that the latter did. For in eternal life each one will rejoice over both the good things that he himself has done and also the good things that others have done.

Reply to objection 2: Even though it is possible for someone who is predestined, considered just in himself, to die in mortal sin, this is nonetheless impossible once it is assumed (as indeed it is being assumed here) that he is predestined. Hence, it does not follow that predestination can fail.

Reply to objection 3: Predestination involves God’s will, and so just as it was explained above (q. 19, a. 3) that it is conditionally necessary that God will that some created thing should exist—and this because of the immutability of God’s will—but that this is not absolutely necessary, so, too, the same thing should be said about predestination. Hence, one should not say, in the composed sense, that it is possible for God even now not to predestine someone whom He has in fact predestined—even though, considering the matter absolutely, God is able to predestine him or not to predestine him. But this latter point does not undermine the certainty of predestination.

Article 7

Is the number of the predestined fixed?

It seems that the number of the predestined is not fixed:

Objection 1: A number to which an addition can be made is not fixed. But, it seems, an addition can be made to the number of the predestined; for Deuteronomy 1:11 says, “May the Lord our God add to this number many thousands,” and a Gloss adds, “that is, as determined by God, who knows those who are His own.” Therefore, the number of the predestined is not fixed.

Objection 2: No reason can be given for why God should preordain this particular number of men to salvation rather than some other number. But God does nothing without a reason. Therefore, the number of those whom God preordains to be saved is not fixed.

Objection 3: God’s action is more perfect than nature’s action. But in the works of nature the good is found in most cases, whereas defects and evils are found in fewer cases. Therefore, if the number of those to be saved were fixed by God, then there would be more who were going to be saved than were going to be damned. But Matthew 7:13-14 proves just the contrary, when it says, “Wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leads to destruction, and many there are who go in there. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leads to life, and few there are that find it!” Therefore, the number of those whom God preordains to be saved is not fixed.

But contrary to this: In *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine says, “The number of the predestined is fixed, and it can be neither increased nor decreased.”

I respond: The number of the predestined is fixed.

However, some have claimed that the number is fixed *formally*, but not *materially*; that is, they claimed it to be certain that, say, a hundred or a thousand are saved, but not that these *particular* hundred or thousand are saved. However, this position undermines the certainty of predestination, which we have already talked about (a. 6). Therefore, one must claim that the number of the predestined is fixed by God not only formally, but also materially.

Notice, though, that the number of the predestined is said to be fixed by God not only (a) by reason of His cognition, in the sense that He knows how many are to be saved—for even the number of drops of rain or of the sands of the sea are fixed by God in this sense—but also (b) by reason of His choice and determination.

To see this clearly, notice that every agent intends to produce something definite, as is clear from what was said above about the infinite (q. 7, a. 4). Now when someone intends a determinate measure in his effect, he thinks out fixed numbers for the essential parts that are required *per se* for the perfection of the whole. However, he does not choose *per se* any particular number for those things that are not required principally, but required only for the sake of something else; rather, he uses things of this sort in as great a number as is required for the sake of the other. For instance, a builder thinks out determinate measurements for the house, along with a determinate number of rooms that he wants to construct in the house, and determinate measurements for the walls and the roof. However, he does not choose a determinate number of stones, but instead uses as many as are sufficient to fill out such-and-such a measurement for the wall.

This, then, is how we should think about God’s relation to the whole of the universe, which is His effect. For He preordained what the measurement should be for the whole universe, and what particular numbers would be appropriate for the universe’s essential parts, i.e., those parts that contribute in some way to its perpetuity; more specifically, He preordained how many spheres there would be, and how many celestial bodies, and how many elemental bodies, and how many species of things. On the other

hand, corruptible individuals are ordered to the good of the universe not primarily but only, as it were, secondarily, insofar as the good of the species is preserved in them. Hence, even though God knows the exact number of all individuals, He did not preordain *per se* the number of cows or gnats or other things of this sort; rather, God's providence produced as many of these sorts of things as are sufficient for the conservation of the species.

Now among all creatures, the ones that are ordered most principally to the good of the universe are the rational creatures, who as such are incorruptible—and, most especially, those rational creatures who attain happiness, since they attain the ultimate end in a more immediate way. Hence, the number of the predestined is fixed by God not only through the mode of cognition, but also by way of a principal predetermination (*non solum per modum cognitionis sed etiam per modum cuiusdam principalis praefinitionis*). However, the same thing is not altogether true of the number of the reprobate, whom God seems to preordain for the good of the elect, for whom all things work together for good.

Now as regards the precise number of all the predestined men, some claim that as many men are saved as the number of angels who fell. But others claim that as many men are saved as the number of angels who remained faithful. And still others claim that as many men are saved as the number of fallen angels plus the number of angels that were created. But here it is better to say that “the number of the elect who will find the highest happiness is known to God alone.”

Reply to objection 1: This passage from Deuteronomy should be understood to be talking about those who were foreknown by God with respect to justification in the present life. For the number of these both increases and decreases—but not the number of the predestined.

Reply to objection 2: The explanation for the quantity of a given part must be taken from that part's proportion to the whole. For the reason why God made just this many celestial bodies or just this many species of things, and the reason why He predestined just this number, is derived from the proportion of the principal parts of the universe to the good of the universe.

Reply to objection 3: The good that is proportioned to the common condition of nature occurs in most cases, and the lapses from that good occur in fewer cases. However, a good that exceeds the common condition of nature is found in fewer cases, and the lapses from that good are found in most cases. For instance, it is clear that most men have sufficient knowledge to direct their own lives, whereas a few, who are said to be half-wits or foolish, lack this knowledge. However, there are very few, compared to the others, who attain to the possession of a deep knowledge of intelligible things.

Therefore, since eternal happiness, which consists in seeing God, exceeds the common condition of nature—especially given that grace was lost through the corruption of original sin—it follows that there are fewer who are saved. And God's mercy is especially apparent in the fact that He raises some to that salvation which the many fail to attain according to the common course and inclination of their nature.

Article 8

Can the prayers of the holy contribute to predestination?

It seems that the prayers of the holy (*sanctorum*) cannot assist in predestination:

Objection 1: Nothing eternal is preceded by anything temporal and, as a result, what is temporal cannot assist in anything that is eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the holy are temporal, they cannot assist in someone's being predestined. Therefore, the prayers of the holy cannot assist in predestination.

Objection 2: Just as nothing requires deliberation except because of a lack of knowledge, so too

nothing requires assistance except because of a lack of power. But neither of these belongs to God, who is the one who predestines; hence, Romans 11:34 says, “For who has assisted the Spirit of the Lord? Or who has been His counselor?” Therefore, the prayers of the holy cannot assist in predestination.

Objection 3: Whatever can be assisted can also be impeded. But predestination cannot be impeded by anything. Therefore, it cannot be assisted by anything.

But contrary to this: Genesis 25:21 says, “And Isaac besought the Lord for his wife . . . and He made Rebecca to conceive,” and from this conception was born Jacob, who was predestined. But his predestination would not have been brought to fulfillment if he had not been born. Therefore, the prayers of the holy assist in predestination.

I respond: On this question there have been widely divergent errors.

For some, concentrating on the certainty of divine predestination, have claimed that prayers—or, for that matter, any other things that might be done to attain eternal salvation—are superfluous, since the predestined will attain salvation, and the reprobate will not attain it, regardless of whether or not these things are done. But contrary to this position are all the admonitions in Sacred Scripture that exhort us to prayer and other good works.

Others have claimed that God’s predestination is changed by prayers. This is said to have been the opinion of the Egyptians, who held that God’s ordination, which they called fate, can be impeded by certain sacrifices and prayers. But the authority of Sacred Scripture is likewise contrary to this position. For 1 Kings 15:29 says, “The triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance.” And Romans 11:29 says, “The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance.”

Therefore, one must reply in a different way:

There are two things that have been taken into account with respect to predestination, viz., (a) God’s *very act* of predestining and (b) the *effect* of predestination.

As for the first, there is no way in which the prayers of the holy assist in predestination. For it is not because of the prayers of the holy that someone is predestined by God.

As for the second, the prayers of the holy, as well as other good works, are said to assist in predestination in the sense that providence, a part of which is predestination, does not eliminate secondary causes, but instead provides for their effects in such a way that even the order of secondary causes is subject to providence. Thus, just as natural effects are provided for in such a way that the natural causes without which the effects would not issue forth are ordered toward those natural effects, so, too, someone’s salvation is predestined by God in such a way that whatever falls within the order of predestination moves the man toward salvation—whether this be his own prayers, or the prayers of others, or other good works, or anything else of this sort, without which this particular individual would not attain salvation. Thus, those who are predestined must strive to pray and do good works because it is through things of this sort that the effect of predestination is infallibly brought to fulfillment. This is why 2 Peter 1:10 says, “Labor the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election.”

Reply to objection 1: This objection shows that the prayers of the holy do not assist in predestination in the sense of assisting in the very act of preordaining.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which someone is said to be assisted by another.

In the first way, he is assisted in the sense that he receives power from the other, and this is the way in which someone who is weak is assisted. Hence, God cannot be assisted in this way in predestination. And this is how to understand the passage, “For who has assisted the Spirit of the Lord?”

In the second way, someone is said to be assisted by another in the sense that his action is carried out by the other, in the way that a lord is assisted by his ministers. It is in this way that God is assisted by us to the extent that we carry out what He has ordained—this according to 1 Corinthians 3:9: “We are God’s coadjutors.” This is not because of any defect in God’s power, but rather because He makes use of

mediating causes in order to preserve the beauty of the order of things and in order to communicate even to His creatures the dignity of being causes (*et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis communicet*).

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 19, a. 6 and q. 22, a. 2), secondary causes cannot escape the order of a universal first cause; instead, they execute that order. And so predestination can be assisted by creatures, but cannot be impeded by them.

QUESTION 24

The Book of Life

Next we must consider the book of life. And on this topic there are three questions: (1) What is the book of life? (2) Whose life is it the book of? (3) Can anyone be erased from the book of life?

Article 1

Is the book of life the same as predestination?

It seems that the book of life is not the same as predestination:

Objection 1: Ecclesiasticus 24:32 says, “All these things are the book of life,” and a Gloss adds, “that is, the New and Old Testaments.” But this is not predestination. Therefore, the book of life is not the same as predestination.

Objection 2: In *De Civitate Dei* 20 Augustine says that the book of life is a certain divine force by which it will come about that “each one remembers all his own good or bad works.” But a divine force seems to pertain more to an attribute of God’s power than to predestination. Therefore, the book of life is not the same as predestination.

Objection 3: Reprobation is opposed to predestination. Therefore, if the book of life were predestination, then there would be a book of death as well as a book of life.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Psalm 68:29 (“Let them be blotted out of the book of the living”) says, “This book is the knowledge of God by which He has predestined to life those whom He foreknew.”

I respond: In the case of God, ‘the book of life’ is predicated metaphorically, according to a likeness taken from human affairs.

For it is customary among men that those who are chosen for some role should be recorded in a book, e.g., soldiers or advisors, who were at one time called ‘recorded fathers’ (*patres conscripti*). Now it is clear from what has been said (q. 23, a. 4) that all the predestined are elected by God to have eternal life. Therefore, the recording of the predestined is itself called ‘the book of life’.

However, something is metaphorically said to be recorded in one’s intellect when one holds it firmly in his memory—this according to Proverbs 3:1 (“Forget not my law, and let your heart keep my commandments,” and a little later, “Write them in the tables of your heart”). For things are likewise recorded in material books in order to aid the memory. Hence, God’s knowledge, by which He firmly retains the fact that He has predestined some to eternal life, is itself called the book of life. For just as the writing in the book is a sign of things that are to be done, so too God’s knowledge is a certain sign to Himself of those who are to be led to eternal life—this according to 2 Timothy 2:19 (“The sure foundation of God stands firm, having this seal: the Lord knows who are His”).

Reply to objection 1: ‘The book of life’ can have two meanings:

In one sense, the book of life is (a) the recording of those who have been elected to life, and this is the sense in which we are now talking about the book of life. In a second sense, ‘the book of life’ is the recording of those things that lead to life—and this in two ways: either (b) it is a recording of things that are yet to be done, and this is the sense in which the New and Old Testaments are called the book of life; or (c) else it is a recording of things that have already been done, and this is the sense in which the book of life is a divine force which brings it about that each one remembers what he himself has done.

In the same way, a book can be called ‘the book of war’ if it is either (a) a book in which those chosen for the military are recorded, or (b) a book in which the military arts are passed on, or (c) a book in which the deeds of the soldiers are recorded.

Reply to objection 2: The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said.

Reply to objection 3: It is customary that only those who are chosen should be recorded—and not those who are rejected. Hence, there is no book of death for reprobation corresponding to the book of life for predestination.

Reply to argument for the contrary: There is a conceptual distinction between the book of life and predestination. For the former implies a knowledge of predestination, as is also clear from the Gloss adduced here.

Article 2

Is the book of life only about the life of glory had by the predestined?

It seems that the book of life is not only about the life of glory had by the predestined:

Objection 1: The book of life is the knowledge of life. But it is through His own life that God knows every other life. Therefore, ‘the book of life’ is predicated principally with respect to God’s life and not just with respect to the life of the predestined.

Objection 2: Just as the life of glory is from God, so too is the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life, then the knowledge of the life of nature will likewise be called the book of life.

Objection 3: There are some who are elected to grace without being elected to the life of glory; this is clear from John 6:71: “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?” But as has been explained (a. 1), the book of life is the recording of God’s election. Therefore, the book of life is also about the life of grace.

But contrary to this: As has been explained (a. 1), the book of life is the knowledge of predestination. But predestination has to do with the life of grace only insofar as the life of grace is ordered toward glory. For those who have grace and yet fall short of glory are not predestined. Therefore, the book of life is only about the life of glory.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), ‘the book of life’ implies a certain recording or knowledge of those who have been elected to life. Now one is elected to what does not belong to him by his nature. Again, one is elected to what has the nature of an end; for instance, a soldier is elected or conscripted not for the sake of being armed, but for the sake of fighting. For this is the proper function to which soldiers are ordered.

Now as has been explained (q. 12, a. 4 and q. 23, a. 1), the life of glory is an end that lies beyond nature. Hence, the book of life has to do properly with the life of glory.

Reply to objection 1: God’s life, even insofar as it is a glorious life, is natural to God. Hence, with respect to God there is no election and, consequently, no book of life, either. For we do not say that a man is elected to have sensory powers or any of the other things that follow upon his nature.

Reply to objection 2: The answer to this objection is clear from what has just been said. For there is no election or book of life with respect to natural life.

Reply to objection 3: The life of grace does not itself have the nature of an end, but instead has the nature of a means to an end. Hence, one is not said to be elected to the life of grace except insofar as the life of grace is ordered toward glory. Because of this, those who have grace and yet fall short of glory are not said to be elected absolutely speaking; rather, they are elected only in a certain respect. Similarly, such persons are said to be written in the book of life not absolutely speaking, but only in a certain respect, viz., insofar as it is part of God’s knowledge and ordination that, because of their

participation in grace, they were to have a certain ordering toward eternal life.

Article 3

Is anyone erased from the book of life?

It seems that no one is erased from the book of life:

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 20 Augustine says, “The book of life is God’s foreknowledge, which cannot be mistaken.” But it is impossible for anything to be subtracted from God’s foreknowledge or, similarly, from His predestination. Therefore, no one can be erased from the book of life.

Objection 2: Whatever exists in a thing exists in it in the mode of the thing it exists in. But the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore, whatever exists in it exists there immutably and indelibly, and not temporarily.

Objection 3: Erasing is opposed to writing. But no one can be written into the book of life *de novo*. Therefore, no one can be erased from it, either.

But contrary to this: Psalm 68:29 says, “Let them be erased from the book of the living.”

I respond: Some claim that no one can be erased from the book of life *in reality*, but that someone can be erased from it *according to human opinion*. For often in Sacred Scripture something is said to be done when it becomes known. Accordingly, some are said to be inscribed in the book of life insofar as men believe them to be inscribed therein because of the righteousness they see in them at present. However, when it becomes clear—either in this life or in the future—that they have fallen from righteousness, then they are said to be erased from the book of life. This is also the way in which such deletions are explained in a Gloss on Psalm 68 (“Let them be erased from the book of the living”).

However, not being erased from the book of life is counted among the rewards of the just in Apocalypse 3:5 (“He that shall overcome shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot out his name from the book of life”), and what is thus promised to the saints does not exist just in human opinion. Thus, one can claim that being erased or not being erased from the book of life has to do not just with human opinion, but with reality as well. For the book of life is the record of those who have been ordered toward eternal life, and someone is ordered toward eternal life by two elements, viz., (a) by God’s predestination, and this is an ordination that never fails, and (b) by grace. For if anyone has grace, then by that very fact he is worthy of eternal life; and this ordination sometimes fails, since some who are ordered, by the grace they have, toward possessing eternal life fall short of eternal life because of mortal sin.

Therefore, those who are ordered *by God’s predestination* toward having eternal life are inscribed absolutely speaking in the book of life, since they are inscribed there as those who will have eternal life *in its own right*. And these will never be erased from the book of life.

By contrast, those who are ordered toward having eternal life not by God’s predestination, but *only by grace*, are said to be inscribed in the book of life not absolutely speaking, but only in a certain respect, since they are inscribed there as those who are going to have eternal life not in its own right, but *only in its cause*. And these can be erased from the book of life, where the deletion has to do not with God’s knowledge—as if God might foreknow something and afterwards not know it—but rather with the thing that is known. For God knows that someone is antecedently ordered toward eternal life and is afterwards not ordered toward it, because he falls from grace.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the deletion has to do with the book of life not on the part of God’s foreknowledge—as if there were some mutability in God—but rather on the part of the

things foreknown, which are mutable.

Reply to objection 2: Even though things exist in God in an immutable way, they are nonetheless mutable in themselves. And it is to this that the deletion from the book of life pertains.

Reply to objection 3: In the same way that someone is said to be erased from the book of life, so too someone can be said to be inscribed there *de novo*—either according to human opinion or insofar as he begins *de novo* to have an ordering toward eternal life through grace. This is also included in God's knowledge, though God does not know it *de novo*.

QUESTION 25

God's Power

Now that we have considered God's intellect and will and the things pertaining to them, we must next consider God's power. On this topic there are six questions: (1) Is there power in God? (2) Is God's power infinite? (3) Is God omnipotent? (4) Can God bring it about that past things have never existed? (5) Is God able to do things which He does not in fact do, or able not to do things which He in fact does? (6) As regards the things He makes, could God make them better than He does?

Article 1

Is there power in God?

It seems that there is no power (*potentia*) in God:

Objection 1: God, who is the first agent, is related to actuality as primary matter is related to potentiality (*potentia*). But primary matter, considered in itself, lacks all actuality. Therefore, the first agent, which is God, lacks potentiality.

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 9, the actuality of a thing is better than any potentiality; for instance, form is better than matter, and action is better than active power, since it is the latter's purpose. But nothing is better than that which exists in God, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 3), whatever exists in God is God. Therefore, there is no power in God.

Objection 3: Power is a principle of action. But God's action is His essence, since there are no accidents in God, and nothing is a principle of God's essence. Therefore, the concept of power does not apply to God (*Deo non convenit*).

Objection 4: As was shown above (q. 14, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 4), God's knowledge and His will are a cause of things. But a cause is the same as a principle. Therefore, one should ascribe only knowledge and will to God—and not power.

But contrary to this: Psalm 88:9 says, "You are powerful, O Lord, and Your truth is round about You."

I respond: There are two kinds of power or potentiality (*potentia*), viz., (a) *passive* power, which in no way exists in God, and (b) *active* power, which one must especially posit in God. For it is clear that each thing, insofar as it has actuality and perfection, is an active principle of something, whereas each thing is acted upon insofar as it is deficient and imperfect.

Now it was shown above (q. 3, a. 1 and q. 4, a. 1-2) that God is pure actuality, and that He is perfect absolutely speaking and in every way, and that imperfection has no place in Him. Hence, it especially belongs to Him to be an active principle and in no way to be acted upon. But the nature of an active principle belongs to an active power. For as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 5, an active power is a principle of acting upon another, whereas a passive power is a principle of being acted upon by another. Therefore, it follows that active power exists especially in God.

Reply to objection 1: Active power, far from being contrasted with actuality, is instead grounded in actuality. For each thing acts insofar as it is actual.

Passive power, on the other hand, is indeed contrasted with actuality, since a thing is acted upon insofar as it is in potentiality. Hence, passive power is excluded from God—but not active power.

Reply to objection 2: Whenever an actuality is distinct from a power, the actuality must be more noble than the power. But God's action is not distinct from His power; instead, both of them are God's essence, since His *esse* is not distinct from His essence. Hence, it is not the case that something has to be more noble than God's power.

Reply to objection 3: The power in created things is a principle not only of the action, but also of the effect. Therefore, the nature of power is salvaged in God with respect to its being a principle of the effect, though not with respect to its being a principle of the action, since God's action is just the divine essence.

Perhaps, though, God's power can be thought of as a principle of action according to our mode of understanding. For God's essence, which in itself possesses in a simple way whatever perfections exist in created things, can be thought of by us both under the concept of action and under the concept of power, just as He is also thought of by us both under the concept of a suppositum that has a nature and under the concept of a nature.

Reply to objection 4: Power is posited in God as something that differs from His knowledge and will not in reality, but only conceptually—viz., insofar as 'power' implies the nature of a principle that executes what the will commands it to do and what the knowledge directs it to do. All three of these coincide in God.

An alternative reply is that God's knowledge or will itself, insofar it is an efficient principle, has the nature of power. This is why a consideration of God's knowledge and will precedes a consideration of His power, in the way that a cause precedes its action and its effect.

Article 2

Is God's power infinite?

It seems that God's power is not infinite:

Objection 1: According to the *Philosopher* in *Physics* 3, everything infinite is imperfect. But God's power is not imperfect. Therefore, it is not infinite.

Objection 2: Every power is manifested by its effect; otherwise, it would be useless. Therefore, if God's power were infinite, then He could bring about an infinite effect. But this is impossible.

Objection 3: In *Physics* 8 the *Philosopher* proves that if a body had infinite power, it would effect an instantaneous movement. But God does not effect an instantaneous movement; instead, "He moves a spiritual creature through time and a corporeal creature through space and time," as Augustine puts it in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8. Therefore, His power is not infinite.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 8 Hilary says that God "is of immense power, living, and powerful." But everything immense is infinite. Therefore, God's power is infinite.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), active power is found in God insofar as He is actual. But His *esse* is infinite, since it is not limited by anything receiving it. This is clear from what was said above (q. 7) when we were discussing the infinity of God's essence. Hence, it must be the case that God's active power is infinite. For with all agents we find that the more perfectly the agent has the form through which it acts, the more power it has in acting. For instance, the hotter something is, the more power it has to produce heat; and it would have an infinite power to produce heat if its own heat were infinite. Hence, since, as was shown above (q. 7, a. 1), the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, it follows that His power is infinite.

Reply to objection 1: The *Philosopher* is talking about an infinity that exists on the part of a matter which is not terminated by a form, i.e., an infinity that has to do with quantity. But, as has been shown (q. 7, a. 1), God's essence is not infinite in this sense—and, consequently, neither is His power infinite in this sense. Hence, it does not follow that God's power is imperfect.

Reply to objection 2: The entire power of a univocal agent is manifested in its effect. For

instance, the generative power of a man can do no more than generate a man. However, the power of a non-univocal agent is not wholly manifested in the production of its effect. For instance, the sun's power is not wholly manifested in the production of an animal that is generated by putrefaction.

Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent, since, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 5), nothing can agree with him in either species or genus. Hence, it follows that His effect is always such that it falls short of His power. Therefore, God's infinite power does not have to be manifested by His producing an infinite effect.

And yet even if God were to produce no effect at all, His power would not be useless. For a power is useless when it does not attain the end toward which it is ordered. But God's power is not ordered toward any effect as an end; rather, it itself is the end of its own effect.

Reply to objection 3: In *Physics* 8 the Philosopher proves that if a body had infinite power, then it would effect a movement that takes no time at all. And yet he shows that the power of the mover of a celestial body is infinite because it can effect movement through an infinite stretch of time. It follows, then, that he intends to show that if there were an infinite *corporeal* power, it would effect movement that took no time at all, but that this does not hold for the power of an *incorporeal* mover. The reason is that a body which moves another body is a univocal agent, and thus all the agent's power would be manifested in the motion. Therefore, since the more power had by a body that effects movement, the faster the movement it effects, it has to be the case that if its power were infinite, then it would effect an immeasurably fast movement, which is just to effect a movement that takes no time at all. However, an incorporeal mover is a non-univocal agent. Hence, its entire power need not be manifested in the movement in such a way that it effects a movement that takes no time at all—especially in light of the fact that it effects movement according to the disposition of its will.

Article 3

Is God omnipotent?

It seems that God is not omnipotent (*non sit omnipotens*):

Objection 1: To be moved and acted upon is counted among all things (*aliquid omnium est*). But God is not able to be moved and acted upon, because, as was shown above (q. 9, a. 1), He is immutable. Therefore, He is not omnipotent.

Objection 2: To sin is to do something. But God cannot sin or “deny Himself,” as 2 Timothy 2:13 puts it. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

Objection 3: [In the Collect for the Tenth Sunday after Pentecost] it is said of God that “He manifests His omnipotence especially in pardoning and showing mercy.” Therefore, the ultimate effect of which God's power is capable is to pardon and to show mercy. But there are things much greater than pardoning and showing mercy, e.g., creating another world, or something of that sort. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

Objection 4: A Gloss on 1 Corinthians 1:20 (“Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?”) says, “God made the wisdom of this world foolish by showing to be possible what the wisdom of this world judged to be impossible.” Hence, it seems that one should judge something to be possible or impossible not according to lower causes, in the way that the wisdom of this world judges, but according to God's power. Therefore, if God is omnipotent, then all things will be possible. Therefore, nothing is impossible. But if the impossible is eliminated, then so too is the necessary, since *necessary to be* is the same as *impossible not to be*. Therefore, if God is omnipotent, then nothing will be necessary

among things. But this is impossible. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

But contrary to this: Luke 1:37 says, “No word shall be impossible with God.”

I respond: Everyone commonly confesses that God is omnipotent. But it seems difficult to formulate an account of omnipotence, since there can be doubts about what is included under the distribution of ‘all’ when one says that God is capable of all things (*cum dicitur omnia posse Deum*). However, if one considers the matter correctly, then since power is said in relation to possible things, it follows that when God is said to be capable of all things, the right way to understand this is that God is capable of all possible things and that this is why He is called omnipotent.

Now according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, there are two senses of ‘possible’:

In the first sense, ‘possible’ is said *with respect to some power*, in the way that what is subject to human power is said to be ‘possible for man’. However, one cannot claim that the reason why God is called omnipotent is that He is capable of all the things that are possible for a created nature. For God’s power extends to more things. On the other hand, if one claims that the reason why God is omnipotent is that He is capable of all the things that are possible for His own power, then there will be a circularity in the explication of omnipotence. For this will be just to say that the reason why God is omnipotent is that He is capable of all the things that He is capable of.

It follows, then, that the reason why God is called omnipotent is that He is capable of all the things that are possible *absolutely speaking*—which is the second sense of ‘possible’. Now something is said to be absolutely possible or absolutely impossible because of the relation between the terms. More specifically, something is called possible because the predicate is compatible with the subject, as with ‘Socrates is sitting’, whereas something is called absolutely impossible because the predicate is incompatible with the subject, as with ‘A man is a donkey’.

Now notice that since each agent effects what is similar to itself, there is something possible that corresponds as a proper object to each active power, in keeping with the nature of the actuality in which that active power is grounded. For instance, the power to produce heat has possibly-heated *esse* (*esse calfactibile*) as its proper object. Now divine *esse*, in which the nature of God’s power is grounded, is infinite *esse*—i.e., *esse* which is not limited to any particular genus of being, but which contains within itself the perfection of the totality of *esse*. Hence, whatever can have the nature of being is included among the things which are absolutely possible and with respect to which God is called omnipotent.

Now nothing except non-being is opposed to the nature of being. Therefore, that which implies within itself both being and non-being at the same time is incompatible with the nature of the absolutely possible, which is subject to God’s omnipotence. For it is not because of a defect in God’s power that this sort of thing is not subject to omnipotence; rather, it is because it cannot have the nature of something that is possible or able to be effected.

Therefore, whatever does not imply a contradiction is included among those possible things with respect to which God is called omnipotent. But those things that do imply a contradiction are not contained under God’s omnipotence, since they cannot have the nature of something possible. Hence, it is more fitting to say that they cannot be effected than to say that God cannot effect them. Nor is this contrary to what the angel asserted when he said, “No word shall be impossible with God.” For that which implies a contradiction cannot be a ‘word’, since no intellect can conceive it.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), God is called omnipotent because of His active power and not because of any passive power. Hence, it is not incompatible with His omnipotence that He cannot be moved or acted upon.

Reply to objection 2: To sin is to lapse from a perfect action; hence, to be able to sin is to be able to be defective in one’s acting—which is incompatible with omnipotence. Because of this, God, who is omnipotent, cannot sin.

To be sure, in *Topics* 4 the Philosopher says that God is able and eager to do evil things. But this

has to be understood in one of three ways:

Either (a) it is to be understood as a conditional, the antecedent of which is impossible, as if it meant ‘God can do evil things if He wills to’. For nothing prevents a conditional from being true if both its antecedent and its consequent are impossible. In the same way, one may assert ‘If a man is a donkey, then he has four feet’.

Or else (b) it should be taken to mean that God can do certain things that now appear evil but are such that if He were to do them, then they would be good.

Or else (c) the Philosopher is speaking in accord with the common opinion of the Gentiles, who claimed that men are transformed into gods, e.g., Jupiter and Mercury.

Reply to objection 3: The reason why God’s omnipotence is manifested especially in pardoning and showing mercy is that the fact that He freely forgives sins shows that He has the greatest power. For someone who is bound by a higher law may not freely forgive sins.

An alternative reply is that in forgiving men and showing them mercy, God leads them to participate in an infinite good, which is the ultimate effect of the divine power.

Yet another reply is that, as was explained above (q. 21, a. 4), the effect of God’s mercy is the foundation for all of God’s works. For nothing is owed to anything except in virtue of what has been given to it by God without being owed to it. And God’s omnipotence is especially manifested in the fact that it is responsible for the initial creation of all goods.

Reply to objection 4: It is with respect to itself—and not with respect to either higher or lower causes—that something is called absolutely possible.

On the other hand, something that is called possible with respect to a given power is called possible with respect to its proximate causes. Hence, those things that are apt to be effected immediately by God alone—e.g., creating, justifying, etc.—are called possible with respect to a higher cause, whereas those things that are apt to be effected by lower causes are called possible with respect to lower causes. For as was explained above (q. 14, a. 13), effects have contingency or necessity according to the status of their proximate causes. Now the wisdom of the world is counted as foolish because it judges that things which are impossible for nature are also impossible for God. And so it is clear that God’s omnipotence excludes neither impossibility nor necessity from things.

Article 4

Can God bring it about that past things have never existed?

It seems that God can bring it about that past things have never existed:

Objection 1: That which is impossible *per se* is more impossible than that which is impossible *per accidens*. But God can do that which is impossible *per se*, e.g., give sight to the blind or resuscitate the dead. Therefore, *a fortiori*, He can do that which is impossible *per accidens*. But it is impossible *per accidens* for past things not to have existed; for instance, Socrates’s not having run is impossible *per accidens*, because Socrates’s running is past. Therefore, God can bring it about that past things have not existed.

Objection 2: Whatever God was able to effect, He is even now able to effect; for His power does not diminish. But before Socrates ran, God was able to bring it about that he would not run. Therefore, after he has run, God can bring it about that he has not run.

Objection 3: Charity is a greater virtue than virginity. But God can restore lost charity. Therefore, He can also restore lost virginity. Therefore, He can bring it about that what was corrupted

has not been corrupted.

But contrary to this: Jerome says, “Even though God is capable of all things, He cannot make a woman uncorrupted after she has been corrupted.” Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot bring it about, with respect to any other past thing, that that thing has not existed.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), nothing that implies a contradiction falls under God’s omnipotence. But it implies a contradiction for past things not to have existed, since just as it implies a contradiction to assert that Socrates is both sitting and not sitting, so too it implies a contradiction to assert that Socrates both did and did not sit. For to assert that he did sit is to assert that his sitting is a past thing, whereas to assert that he did not sit is to assert that his sitting did not exist.

Hence, for past things not to have existed does not fall under God’s power. And this is why, in *Contra Faustum*, Augustine says, “Whoever says, ‘If God is omnipotent, then let Him bring it about that things which have been effected have not been effected’, does not see that he is saying, ‘If God is omnipotent, let Him bring it about that things that are true, by the very fact that they are true, are false.’” And in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says, “This alone is denied to God, that He should make undone that which has been done.”

Reply to objection 1: Even though it is impossible *per accidens* for past things not to have existed as long as one considers just the thing that is past, e.g., Socrates’s running, nonetheless, if one considers a past thing *as* a past thing, then it is not only impossible *per se*, but absolutely impossible, that this thing did not exist—for it implies a contradiction. And so this is more impossible than raising the dead, which does not imply a contradiction but is instead called impossible with respect to a certain kind of power, viz., a natural power. For things that are impossible in this sense are subject to God’s power.

Reply to objection 2: As far as the perfection of the divine power is concerned, God is capable of all things, and yet certain things are not subject to His power because they lack the nature of the possible. In the same way, given the immutability of God’s power, whatever God was capable of, He is even now capable of, and yet certain things once had the nature of the possible while they were yet to be effected, but lack the nature of the possible now that they have been effected. And so God is said not to be able to effect them, because they themselves are not now able to be effected.

Reply to objection 3: God can remove all mental and physical corruption from a woman who has been corrupted, but the fact that she was once corrupted cannot be removed from her. In the same way, God cannot remove from a sinner the fact that he once sinned and lost charity.

Article 5

Is God able to effect what He does not in fact effect?

It seems that God is not able to effect things other than those that He in fact effects (*Deus non possit facere nisi ea quae facit*):

Objection 1: It seems that God is not able to effect anything unless He foreknew and preordained that He would effect it. But He foreknew and preordained that He would effect only those things that He in fact effects. Therefore, He is not able to effect anything other than what He in fact effects.

Objection 2: God is not able to effect anything other than what He ought to effect and what it is just for Him to effect. But it is not the case that God ought to effect what He does not in fact effect; nor is it just for Him to effect what He does not in fact effect. Therefore, God is not able to effect anything other than what He in fact effects.

Objection 3: God is not able to effect anything except what is good and fitting for the things He

has made. But it is not good or fitting for the things God has made to be otherwise than they are. Therefore, God is not able to effect anything other than what He in fact effects.

But contrary to this: Matthew 26:53 says, “Think you that I cannot ask my Father, and He will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels?” But He did not ask for this, and neither did the Father aid Him in repelling the Jews. Therefore, God is able to effect what He does not in fact effect.

I respond: On this topic there have been two errors.

Some have claimed that God acts, as it were, *by a necessity of nature*, so that just as nothing other than what actually happens can issue forth from the action of natural things—e.g., nothing other than a man can come from a man’s semen, and nothing other than an olive tree can come from an olive seed—so too from God’s action there can flow no things, or order of things, other than what now exists.

However, we showed above (q. 19, a. 3-4) that God does not act by any necessity of nature, but that His will is a cause of all things and that His will is not itself determined naturally or by necessity to the particular things that now exist. Hence, there is no sense in which the present course of things issues forth by necessity from God in such a way that other things could not have issued forth.

Others, by contrast, have claimed that God’s power is determined to the present course of things *because of the order of God’s wisdom and justice*, without which God does nothing. For since God’s power, which is His essence, does not differ from God’s wisdom, one can appropriately claim that there is nothing in God’s power that does not also exist in the order of God’s wisdom. For God’s wisdom includes all that can be effected by His power.

However, as was explained above (q. 21, a. 4), the order which is imposed on things by God’s wisdom, and in which the nature of justice consists, does not exhaust God’s wisdom in such a way that the divine wisdom is limited to just this order. For it is clear that the whole nature of the order which someone who is wise imposes on the things he has made is taken from the end. Therefore, when an end is exactly proportioned to the things that have been made for the sake of that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some determinate order. But God’s goodness is an end that immeasurably exceeds created things. Hence, God’s wisdom is not determined to any particular order of things in such a way that no other course of things could flow from it.

Therefore, one must assert, absolutely speaking, that God is able to effect things other than the things He in fact effects.

Reply to objection 1: Our own power and essence are different from our will and intellect; and, again, our intellect is different from our wisdom, and our will is different from our justice. So with us there can be something which is within our power and yet which cannot exist in a just will or in a wise intellect. By contrast, God’s power and essence and will and intellect and wisdom and justice are all the same. Hence, there can be nothing which is within God’s power and yet which cannot exist in His just will or in His wise intellect.

Still, since (a) God’s will is not determined by necessity to these particular things or those particular things—except, perhaps on some assumption, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3)—and since, as has just been explained, (b) God’s wisdom and justice are likewise not determined to this particular order, nothing prevents it from being the case that there is something in God’s power which He does not will and which is not contained under the order that He has in fact established for things. And since the power is thought of as *executing* (whereas the will is thought of as *commanding*, and the intellect and wisdom as *directing*), whatever is attributed to the power considered in itself is such that God is said to be capable of it according to His *absolute power* (*potentia absoluta*). And, as was explained above (a. 3), this includes everything in which the nature of being can be preserved. On the other hand, whatever is attributed to God’s power insofar as it executes the command of His just will is such that God is said to be able to effect it by His *ordained power* (*potentia ordinata*).

Accordingly, then, one should claim that God is able by His absolute power to effect things other

than the things He foreknew and preordained that He would effect, even though it cannot be the case that He effects things which He did not foreknow and preordain that He would effect. For His *acting* is subject to His foreknowledge and preordination, but His *ability to act* is not, since it is natural. For God *effects* something because He wills it, but it is not the case that He *is able to effect* something because He wills it; rather, He is able to effect something because this ability lies within His nature.

Reply to objection 2: God owes nothing to anything except Himself. Hence, the claim that God cannot effect anything except what He ought to effect signifies nothing other than that God is able to effect only that which is fitting and just for Him to effect.

But what I am calling ‘just and fitting’ can be thought of in two ways:

In one way, what I am calling just and fitting is such that it is thought of as already coupled with the verb ‘is’, so that it is restricted to standing for present things and is related in this way to God’s power. On this reading, what is asserted in the objection is false, for its sense is this: ‘Only that which is now fitting and just is such that God is able to effect it.’

On the other hand, if ‘fitting and just’ is understood as being first coupled with the verb ‘is able to be’—which has the force of amplifying the description—and afterwards with the verb ‘is’, then what will be signified is a certain general present. And in that case the statement will be true, since it will have this sense: ‘God is able to effect only that which is such that, if He were to effect it, it would be fitting and just.’

Reply to objection 3: Even though the present course of things is limited to the things which now exist, it is nonetheless not the case that God’s wisdom and power are limited to this present course of things. Hence, even if no other course would be good and fitting for the things which now exist, it is still the case that God could make other things and impose a different order on them.

Article 6

Is God able to make the things that He makes better?

It seems that God is not able to make the things He makes better (*non possit meliora facere ea quae facit*):

Objection 1: Whatever God makes, He makes with the utmost power and wisdom. But He makes a thing better to the extent that He makes it with more power and wisdom. Therefore, God cannot make anything better than He makes it.

Objection 2: In *Contra Maximinum* Augustine argues as follows: “If God were able to and yet willed not to generate a Son equal to Himself, then He would be envious.” For the same reason, if God could have made things better than He has and yet willed not to do so, then He was envious. But envy is altogether foreign to God. Therefore, God has made each thing the best He can (*Deus unumquodque fecit optimum*). Therefore, God cannot make anything better than He has.

Objection 3: That which is maximally and utterly good cannot be made better, since there is nothing greater than the maximum. But, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, “Each one of the things God made is good, but taken together they are utterly good, since the admirable beauty of the whole is constituted from all of them.” Therefore, the good of the universe cannot be made better by God.

Objection 4: The man Christ is full of grace and truth and has the Spirit without measure, and so He cannot be better. Likewise, created happiness is said to be the highest good, and so it cannot be better. Again, the Blessed Virgin Mary is exalted above all the choirs of angels, and so she cannot be better. Therefore, not all the things that God has made are such that He can make them better.

But contrary to this: Ephesians 3:20 says that God “is able to make all things more abundantly than we desire or understand.”

I respond: There are two kinds of goodness in a thing:

The one kind is that which belongs to the thing’s essence, in the way that being rational belongs to the essence of a man. With respect to this sort of goodness, God cannot make anything better than it is, even though He could make some other thing that is better than that thing. In the same way, He cannot make the number four greater, since if it were greater, then it would be some other number and no longer four. For as *Metaphysics* 8 says, the addition of a substantial difference to a definition is like the addition of a unit to a number.

The second sort of goodness in a thing is that which lies outside the thing’s essence, in the way that a man’s good is to be virtuous or wise. And with respect to this kind of goodness, God is able to make the things made by Him better.

However, absolutely speaking, for anything that has been made by Him, God is able to make some other thing that is better.

Reply to objection 1: The claim that God can make something better than He does is true as long as the term ‘better’ is taken as a noun (*nomen*), because for any given thing, He is able to make some other thing that is better than that thing. On the other hand, as has been explained, one and the same thing is such that in one sense He is able to make it better and in another sense He is not able to make it better.

However, if ‘better’ is taken as an adverb and implies a mode on the part of the maker, then in that sense God is not able to make something better than He does, because He is not able to make anything with more wisdom and goodness on His part.

By contrast, if ‘better’ is taken as an adverb and implies a mode on the part of the thing made, then in that sense God is able to make things better, since He is able to give to the things He has made a better mode of being with respect to their accidental features, though not with respect to their essential features.

Reply to objection 2: It is part of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father when he comes to maturity, but it is not part of the nature of any creature that it should be better than it has been made by God. Hence, the two lines of reasoning are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: Given the things that actually exist, the universe cannot be better. This is because of the utter appropriateness of the order that God has established among the things that actually exist, and it is in this order that the good of the universe consists. If just one of these things were better, then the balance of the order would be upset, in just the same way that if one string of a harp were tightened more than it should be, then the sound of the harp would be ruined.

However, God could make other things, or add other things to those He has in fact made, and in that case this other universe would be better.

Reply to objection 4: From the fact that (a) Christ’s human nature (*humanitas*) is united to God, and that (b) created happiness is the enjoyment of God, and that (c) the Blessed Virgin is the mother of God, it follows that they have a certain infinite dignity that stems from the infinite goodness which is God. And in this respect nothing can be made that is better than they are, just as there cannot be anything that is better than God.

QUESTION 26

God's Beatitude

Now that we have considered what pertains to the oneness of the divine essence, we must lastly consider God's beatitude (*beatitudo*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Does beatitude belong to God? (2) Is it with respect to His act of intellect that God is said have beatitude? (3) Is God's beatitude by its essence the beatitude of everyone who is beatified? (4) Is every beatitude included in God's beatitude?

Article 1

Does beatitude belong to God?

It seems that beatitude does not belong to God (*beatitudo Deo non conveniat*):

Objection 1: According to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, "Beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods." But an aggregation of goods has no place in God, since there is no composition in God. Therefore, beatitude does not belong to God.

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, happiness or beatitude is the reward of virtue. But rewards are not fitting for God, and neither are merits. Therefore, neither is beatitude.

But contrary to this: In 1 Timothy 6:15 the Apostle says, "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed (*beatus*) and only Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords."

I respond: Beatitude belongs especially to God. For what is understood by the name 'beatitude' is nothing other than the perfect good of an intellectual nature, where an intellectual nature is one which (a) is capable of grasping its own satisfaction with the good that it possesses, (b) is capable of doing well or doing badly, and (c) is a master of its own actions.

Now both of these features, viz., being perfect and being intelligent, belong to God in the most excellent way. Hence, beatitude belongs especially to God.

Reply to objection 1: An aggregation of goods exists in God not in the mode of composition, but in the mode of simplicity. For as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2 and q. 13, a. 4), things that are multiplied in creatures preexist in God in a simple and unified manner.

Reply to objection 2: Being the reward of virtue is an accident that accompanies happiness or beatitude insofar as someone acquires beatitude. In the same way, being the terminus of an act of generation is an accident that accompanies an entity insofar as it goes from potentiality into actuality. Therefore, just as God has *esse* even though He has not been generated, so too He has beatitude even though He has not gained it through merit (*quamvis non mereatur*).

Article 2

Is it with respect to His act of intellect that God is said to have beatitude?

It seems that it is not with respect to His act of intellect that God is said to have beatitude:

Objection 1: Beatitude is the highest good. But 'good' is said of God with respect to His essence, since, according to Boethius in *De Hebdomadibus*, the good is related to being, i.e., something is good with respect to its essence. Therefore, 'beatitude' is likewise said of God with respect to His essence and not with respect to His act of intellect.

Objection 2: Beatitude has the nature of an end. But the end is the object of an act of will in the

same way that the good is. Therefore, 'beatitude' is said of God with respect to His act of will and not with respect to His act of intellect.

But contrary to this: In *Moralium* 32 Gregory says, "He is glorious who rejoices in himself and has no need of praise from the outside." But 'glorious' here signifies being happy. Therefore, since we ourselves will enjoy God with our intellect, and since (as Augustine puts it) "the vision [of God] is the whole of the reward," it seems that 'beatitude' is said of God with respect to His act of intellect.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), 'beatitude' signifies the perfect good of an intellectual nature. And from this it follows that just as each thing desires its own perfection, so an intellectual nature naturally desires to be beatified. But that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation by which it in some sense grasps all things. Hence, the beatitude of a created intellectual nature consists in an act of understanding (*in intelligendo*).

Now God's *esse* and His act of understanding do not differ in reality, but differ only with respect to the concept of an act of understanding. Therefore, beatitude should be attributed to God with respect to His act of intellect, just as it is in the case of other beatified beings, who are said to be beatified because of their assimilation to His beatitude.

Reply to objection 1: This argument proves that God has beatitude with respect to His essence, but not that beatitude belongs to Him under the concept of His essence. Rather, beatitude belongs to Him under the concept of His act of understanding (*secundum rationem intellectus*).

Reply to objection 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is an object of the will. But an object presupposes the act of a power. Hence, according to our mode of understanding, God's beatitude is prior to the act of will that rests in that beatitude, and this can only be the act of His intellect. Hence, His beatitude consists in the act of His intellect.

Article 3

Is God the beatitude of everyone who is beatified?

It seems that God is the beatitude of everyone who is beatified:

Objection 1: As has been shown above (q. 6, a. 2), God is the highest good. But, as is also clear from what was said above (q. 11, a. 3), it is impossible for there to be more than one highest good. Therefore, since it belongs to the nature of beatitude that it is the highest good, it seems that beatitude is nothing other than God.

Objection 2: Beatitude is the ultimate end of a rational nature. But it belongs to God alone to be the ultimate end of a rational nature. Therefore, the beatitude of everyone who is beatified is God alone.

But contrary to this: According to 1 Corinthians 15:41 ("Star differs from star in glory"), the beatitude of one person is greater than the beatitude of another. But nothing is greater than God. Therefore, beatitude is something other than God.

I respond: The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this act two things can be considered, viz., (a) the object of the act, which is the intelligible thing, and (b) the act itself, which is an act of understanding.

Thus, if beatitude is considered with respect to the object itself, then in this sense God alone is beatitude, since someone is beatified only in virtue of the fact that he understands God. Accordingly, in *Confessiones* 5 Augustine says, "He is happy who knows You, even if he does not know other things."

However, if beatitude is considered with respect to the act of understanding, then beatitude is something created that exists in the creatures who are beatified. In God, however, beatitude is something

uncreated in this respect as well.

Reply to objection 1: As far as its object is concerned, beatitude is the highest good absolutely speaking. However, as far as the act is concerned, in beatified creatures this act is not the highest good absolutely speaking, but the highest in that genus of goods that a creature can participate in.

Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says, there are two kinds of ends, an *end of which* (*finis cuius*) and an *end by which* (*finis quo*)—more specifically, the thing itself (*ipsa res*) and the possession of that thing (*usus rei*). For instance, in the case of someone who is avaricious, the one end is money and the other is the acquisition of money. Thus, a rational creature's ultimate end, *qua* thing, is God, whereas the ultimate end, *qua* possession (or, better, enjoyment) of the thing, is created beatitude.

Article 4

Does God's beatitude include every beatitude?

It seems that God's beatitude does not include every beatitude:

Objection 1: There are certain false types of beatitude. But in God there is nothing false. Therefore, God's beatitude does not include every beatitude.

Objection 2: According to some, a certain sort of beatitude consists in corporeal things such as sentient pleasures, riches, etc. But these things cannot belong to God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore, His beatitude does not include every beatitude.

But contrary to this: Beatitude is a certain perfection. But as was shown above (q. 4, a. 2), God's perfection includes every perfection. Therefore, God's beatitude includes every beatitude.

I respond: Whatever is desirable in any sort of beatitude—whether true beatitude or false beatitude—preexists as a whole more eminently in God's beatitude.

For with regard to contemplative beatitude, God's beatitude includes the continuous and most sure contemplation of both Himself and all other things, whereas with regard to active beatitude, God's beatitude includes the governance of the whole universe.

On the other hand, with regard to earthly beatitude—which, according to Boethius in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3, consists in sentient pleasure, riches, power, authority, and fame—God's beatitude includes (a) rejoicing in Himself and in all other things in the place of pleasure, (b) every type of sufficiency that riches promise in the place of riches, (c) omnipotence in the place of power, (d) ruling over all things in the place of authority, and (e) the admiration of all creatures in the place of fame.

Reply to objection 1: Certain sorts of beatitude, insofar as they are false, fall short of the nature of true beatitude and so are not found in God. However, whatever they have by way of similarity to true beatitude, no matter how tenuous that similarity might be, preexists as a whole in God's beatitude.

Reply to objection 2: The goods that exist corporeally in corporeal things exist in God in a spiritual way according to their own mode.

At this point we have said enough about what pertains to the oneness of God's essence (questions 2-26).

QUESTION 27

The Procession of the Divine Persons

Now that we have considered what pertains to the oneness of the divine essence (questions 2-26), what remains is to consider those things that pertain to the Trinity of persons in God (questions 27-43).

Because the divine persons are distinguished by their relations of origin, the order of teaching dictates that we should consider, first, the origin or procession (question 27); second, the relations of origin (question 28); and third, the persons themselves (questions 29-43).

On the topic of procession there are five questions: (1) Are there any processions in God? (2) Can any procession in God be called a generation? (3) Besides generation, can there be any other procession in God? (4) Can this other procession be called a generation? (5) Are there more than two processions in God?

Article 1

Are there any processions in God?

It seems that there cannot be any processions in God:

Objection 1: ‘Procession’ signifies an external movement. But there is nothing moveable in God, and there is nothing external in God. Therefore, neither is there any procession in God.

Objection 2: What proceeds is diverse from what it proceeds from. But within God there is no diversity at all, but instead the greatest simplicity. Therefore, there are no processions in God.

Objection 3: To proceed from another seems incompatible with the concept of a first principle. But, as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3), God is a first principle. Therefore, procession has no place in God.

But contrary to this: In John 8:42 our Lord says, “From God I proceeded.”

I respond: In speaking of God, divine Scripture uses names that pertain to procession. However, different thinkers have understood this sort of procession in different ways.

Some have understood this sort of procession in the manner of an effect proceeding from its cause. This is the way Arius understood it when he claimed that the Son proceeds from the Father as His first creature, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of them both. On this interpretation, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit would be true God. But this is contrary to what is said about the Son at 1 John 5:20 (“... that we may be in His true Son; this is the true God”). And as for the Holy Spirit, 1 Corinthians 6:19 says, “Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit?” But it belongs to God alone to have a temple.

Others have understood procession in the manner in which a cause is said to proceed into its effect, either because it moves its effect or because it imprints a likeness of itself on it. This is the way in which Sabellius was taking ‘procession’ when he claimed that God the Father is Himself called the Son insofar as He assumed flesh from the virgin. Again, he claimed that the same Father is the Holy Spirit insofar as He sanctifies rational creatures and moves them toward life. But this understanding is undermined by our Lord’s words about Himself at John 5:19, when He says, “The Son cannot do any thing of Himself,” and in many other passages that prove that it is not the Father Himself who is the Son.

Now if one considers the matter carefully, both these positions understand procession as directed toward something external, and hence neither of them posits a procession within God Himself. But since every procession involves an action, it follows that just as there is an external procession in the case of an action directed toward an external subject, so too there is an internal procession in the case of an action that remains within the agent itself. This is especially clear in the case of the intellect, whose action—viz., an act of intellectual understanding—remains within the one who understands. For when

anyone has an act of intellectual understanding, then by the very fact that he has the act of intellectual understanding, something proceeds within him—viz., a conception of what is understood (*conceptio rei intellectae*) that arises from the intellectual power and proceeds from the cognition of what is understood (*ex eius notitia procedens*). This conception is signified by the spoken word and is called the ‘word of the heart’ (*verbum cordis*), which is signified by the ‘word of the voice’ (*verbum vocis*).

Now since God surpasses all things, whatever is said of God is to be understood not according to the mode of lower creatures, which are bodies, but rather according to a likeness taken from the highest creatures, which are intellectual substances—though even a likeness so taken falls short as a representation of divine things. Therefore, procession is not to be understood as it exists in corporeal things—whether in the manner of a local movement or in the manner of a cause’s action on an external effect, e.g., heat proceeding from the thing that produces heat to the thing that is heated. Rather, procession is to be understood here in the sense of an intellectual emanation (*secundum emanationem intelligibilem*)—more specifically, the emanation of a meaningful word from a speaker, where the word remains within the speaker. This is the sense in which the Catholic Faith posits procession within God.

Reply to objection 1: This argument is talking about a procession which is a local movement or, at least, an action that is directed toward an exterior subject or exterior effect. But as has been explained, this is not the sort of procession that exists in God.

Reply to objection 2: What proceeds by a procession directed toward something exterior must indeed be diverse from what it proceeds from. However, what proceeds internally by an intellectual process (*ad intra processu intelligibili*) need not be diverse. In fact, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more united it is to what it proceeds from. For, clearly, the better something is understood, (a) the more intimate its intellectual conception (*conceptio intellectualis*) is to the one who understands, and (b) the more united it is to him; for the intellect has an actual understanding insofar as it comes to be united with the thing understood. So since, as was explained above (q. 14, a.1), God’s act of intellectual understanding has the ultimate in perfection, it must be the case that the divine Word is perfectly one with what it proceeds from, without any sort of diversity.

Reply to objection 3: To proceed from a principle as something external to and diverse from that principle is indeed incompatible with the concept of a first principle. But to proceed in an intellectual mode as something intimate and non-diverse is included in the concept of a first principle. For instance, when we say that the builder is a principle of the house, his conception of his craft is included in the concept of this principle—and it would be included in the concept of the first principle if the builder were the first principle. But God, who is the first principle of things, is related to created things as a craftsman is related to his artifacts.

Article 2

Can any procession in God be called a generation?

It seems that no procession in God can be called a generation (*non possit dici generatio*):

Objection 1: Generation is a transition from non-being to being (*mutatio de non esse ad esse*), the opposite of corruption; and matter is the subject of both generation and corruption. But none of this belongs to God. Therefore, there cannot be any generation in God.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1), procession in God has an intellectual mode. But in our case this sort of intellectual procession is not called a generation. Therefore, neither is it called a generation in the case of God.

Objection 3: Everything that is begotten receives its *esse* from the one who generates it. Therefore, the *esse* of whatever is begotten is received *esse*. But no received *esse* is subsistent *per se*. Therefore, since, as was proved above (q. 3, a. 4), God's *esse* is *esse* that subsists *per se*, it follows that the *esse* of anything that is begotten is not God's *esse*. Therefore, there is no generation in God.

But contrary to this: Psalm 2:7 says, "This day have I begotten you."

I respond: The procession of the Word in God is called a generation. To see this clearly, notice that we use the name 'generation' in two senses.

In one sense, we use it broadly for all generable and corruptible things, and in this sense generation is nothing other than a transition from non-being to being.

The other sense is proper to living things, and in this sense 'generation' signifies the origin of a living thing from a living principle that is conjoined with it. This is properly called 'nativity' (*nativitas*). Yet not everything of this sort is said to be 'begotten' (*genitum*); rather, what is begotten, properly speaking, is that which proceeds according to a type of likeness. Thus, a hair or a whisker does not satisfy the concept of a child (*filius*) or of what is begotten. Only something that proceeds by way of a likeness does—but not just any sort of likeness. For instance, worms of the sort generated inside of animals do not satisfy this concept of generation or filiation, even though there is a likeness with respect to the genus *animal*. Rather, what is required for this sense of 'generation' is that the thing proceed by way of a likeness with respect to the *same specific nature*, e.g., a man from a man, and a horse from a horse.

Now in the case of those living things which, like men and animals, proceed from potentiality into the act of living, the generation includes both of the above senses of 'generation'. However, if there is some living thing whose life does not pass from potentiality into actuality, then a procession found in this sort of living thing excludes the first sense of 'generation' altogether. Nonetheless, such a procession can still be a generation in the sense of 'generation' that is proper to living things. This, then, is the sense in which the procession of the Word in God satisfies the concept of generation. For the Word proceeds (a) in the manner of an *intellectual action*, which is a vital operation; (b) from a *conjoined principle*, as has already been explained above (a. 1); (c) according to a type of *likeness*, since the intellect's conception is a likeness of the thing understood; and (d) as something that has the *very same nature*, since, as was shown above (q. 14, a. 4), in God the act of understanding is the same as the *esse*. Hence, the procession of the Word in God is called a generation, and the Word Himself who proceeds is called the Son.

Reply to objection 1: This objection is talking about generation in the first sense, which implies a transition from potentiality to actuality. And, as has been explained, in God there is no generation in this sense.

Reply to objection 2: In our case the act of intellectual understanding is not the very substance of the intellect. Hence, the word that proceeds in us by way of an intellectual operation is not of the same nature as that from which it proceeds. Hence, the nature of generation does not belong to it properly and completely.

However, as was shown above (14, a. 4), God's act of understanding is the very substance of Him who understands. Hence, the Word that proceeds from it proceeds as something subsistent with the same nature. Because of this, the Word is properly said to be begotten and to be the Son. This is why Scripture uses terms that pertain to the generation of living things, viz., 'conception' (*conceptio*) and 'birth' (*partus*), in order to signify the procession of the divine Wisdom. For instance, Proverbs 8:24-25 says in the personage of the divine Wisdom, "The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived . . . before the hills, I was given birth."

Still, in the case of our intellect we do use the name 'conception', since in the word of our intellect there is a likeness of the thing understood, though not an identity of nature.

Reply to objection 3: Not everything that is received is received in a subject; otherwise, one could not claim that the total substance of a created thing is received from God, since there is no subject that receives the whole of the substance. Therefore, that which is begotten in God does not receive *esse* from the one who generates in the sense that this *esse* is received in some matter or subject—that would be incompatible with the subsistence of the divine *esse*. Instead, this *esse* is said to be received insofar as that which proceeds from the other has divine *esse* and does not exist as something distinct from the divine *esse*. For the very perfection of the divine *esse* contains both the Word that proceeds intellectually and the principle of the Word. For as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2), the divine *esse* contains everything that pertains to its perfection.

Article 3

Is there a procession in God other than the generation of the Word?

It seems that there is no procession in God other than the generation of the Word:

Objection 1: There would, for the same reason, be another procession from the second procession, and so there would be an infinite regress—which is absurd. Therefore, one should stop with the first procession, so that there is only a single procession in God.

Objection 2: For every nature, there is just one way of communicating that nature, and this is because operations are the same or different according to their termini. But a procession in God is nothing but a communication of the divine nature. Therefore, since, as was shown above (q. 11, a. 3), there is just a single divine nature, it follows that there is just a single procession in God.

Objection 3: If there were some other procession in God distinct from the intellectual procession of the Word, it would have to be a procession of love, which would involve an operation of the will. But such a procession could not be distinct from the intellect's intellectual procession, since, as was shown above (q. 19, a. 1), in God the will is not distinct from the intellect. Therefore, in God there is no procession other than the procession of the Word.

But contrary to this: As John 15:26 says, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. But the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son—this according to John 14:16 (“I will ask the Father, and He shall give you another Paraclete”). Therefore, there is in God another procession besides the procession of the Word.

I respond: In God there are two processions, viz., the procession of the Word and one other. To see this clearly, notice that in God a procession involves only an action which remains within the agent Himself and is not directed to anything external. But in an intellectual nature, the actions of this sort are the action of the intellect and the action of the will. The procession of the Word involves an action of the intellect. Now in our own case the other sort of procession, viz., the procession of love, involves an operation of the will, in which what is loved exists in the lover, just as through the conception of a word, the thing spoken or understood (*res dicta vel intellecta*) exists in the one who understands. Hence, in addition to the procession of the Word, another procession is posited in God, viz., the procession of the Love.

Reply to objection 1: There is no need to proceed to infinity in the divine processions. For the procession that is intrinsic to an intellectual nature is terminated in the procession that involves the will.

Reply to objection 2: As was shown above (q. 3, a. 3 and 4), whatever exists in God is God—something that is not true of other things. And so the divine nature, and no other nature, is communicated through any procession that is not directed toward something external.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the intellect and will are not distinct in God, nonetheless, it is part of the nature of an intellect and will that the processions that involve their actions have a certain ordering with respect to one another. For there is no procession of love except in relation to the procession of a word, since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived by the intellect. Therefore, just as the Word is ordered to the principle from which it proceeds, despite the fact that in God the substance of the intellect is the same as the intellect's conception, so, too, despite the fact that the intellect and will are the same in God, the procession of the Love has an ordering distinct from the procession of the Word in God, because it is part of the nature of love that it should proceed only from a conception of the intellect.

Article 4

Is the procession of the Love in God a generation?

It seems that the procession of the Love in God is a generation:

Objection 1: Among living things, that which proceeds with a likeness of nature is said to be 'generated' and 'born' (*generatum et nascens*). But in the case of God, that which proceeds in the mode of love proceeds with a likeness of nature—otherwise, it would be something external to the divine nature and the procession would thus be directed toward something external. Therefore, that which proceeds in God in the mode of love proceeds as something begotten and born.

Objection 2: Just as likeness belongs to the nature of a word, so too it belongs to the nature of love; this is why Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, "Every beast loves its like." Therefore, if it is by reason of a likeness that the Word which proceeds is generated and born, then it seems that the Love which proceeds is likewise generated.

Objection 3: Whatever belongs to a genus belongs to some species of that genus. Therefore, if there is a procession of the Love in God, then besides the common name 'procession', it must have some more specific name. But there is no name to give it other than 'generation'. Therefore, it seems that the procession of the Love in God is a generation.

But contrary to this: On this view it would follow that the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as the Love, would proceed as begotten. But this is contrary to the Athanasian creed, which says: "The Holy Spirit is not made or created or begotten by the Father and the Son, but proceeds from them."

I respond: The procession of the Love in God should not be called a generation. To see this clearly, note that the difference between the intellect and the will is that the intellect comes to have its act in virtue of the fact that what is understood exists in the intellect by means of its likeness, whereas the will comes to have its act not in virtue of the fact that a likeness of what is willed exists in the will, but rather in virtue of the fact that the will has an inclination toward what is willed. Therefore, a procession that takes place in accord with the nature of the intellect involves a type of likeness, and it can satisfy the concept *generation* because each generator generates what is similar to itself. By contrast, a procession that takes place in accord with the nature of the will is thought of not as involving a type of likeness, but rather as involving an impulse or movement toward something. And so that which proceeds in God in the mode of love does not proceed as something that is begotten or as a Son, but rather proceeds as Spirit, where the name 'Spirit' signifies a certain vital movement and impulse—in the way that someone is said to be moved or impelled by love to do something.

Reply to objection 1: Whatever exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence, one cannot construct on the basis of this oneness a special argument about this or that procession, according to which

the one is distinguished from the other. Instead, a special argument about this or that procession has to be based on the ordering of the one procession toward the other. But an ordering of this sort involves the nature of the will and the intellect. Hence, it is in accord with the proper nature of the intellect and the will that the two processions in God receive names that are imposed to signify the proper nature of the reality. And, for this reason, what proceeds in the mode of love receives the divine nature and yet is not said to be born.

Reply to objection 2: Likeness pertains in one way to the Word and in a different way to the Love. For it pertains to the Word insofar as the Word Himself is a likeness of what is understood, in the way that what is begotten is a likeness of the generator. On the other hand, likeness pertains to the Love not because the Love Himself is a likeness, but because likeness is a principle of loving. Hence, it follows not that the Love is begotten, but that what is begotten is a principle of the Love.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 13, a. 1), we cannot name God except from creatures. And since among creatures the communication of the nature occurs only through generation, procession in God does not have a proper or special name other than ‘generation’. Hence, the procession that is not a generation remains without a special name. Nonetheless, we can name it ‘spiration’, because it is the procession of the Spirit.

Article 5

Are there more than two processions in God?

It seems that there are more than two processions in God:

Objection 1: Just as knowledge and will are attributed to God, so, too, is power. Therefore, if there are two processions in God with respect to intellect and will, then it seems that there should be a third procession with respect to power.

Objection 2: Goodness seems especially apt to be a principle of procession, since the good is said to be diffusive of itself. Therefore, it seems that there should be a procession with respect to goodness in God.

Objection 3: The power of fecundity is greater in God than in us. But in us there are many processions of words and not just one, since in our case one word proceeds from another; and similarly, one love proceeds from another love. Therefore, in God there are likewise more than two processions.

But contrary to this: In God there are only two who proceed, viz., the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, there are only two processions in God.

I respond: Processions cannot exist in God except with respect to actions that remain within the agent. But there are just two such actions in an intellectual and divine nature, viz., understanding and willing. For sensing, which likewise seems to be an operation within sentient beings, lies outside of an intellectual nature and is not totally removed from the genus of actions that are directed toward the outside, since sensing is perfected by the action of the sensible thing on the senses themselves. Therefore, it follows that there can be no processions in God other than the procession of the Word and the procession of the Love.

Reply to objection 1: Power is a principle of acting on another, and so in the case of power it is action with respect to something external that is understood. Thus, with respect to the attribute of power there is no procession of a divine person, but only the procession of creatures.

Reply to objection 2: As Boethius says in *De Hebdomadibus*, good pertains to the essence and not to action—unless perhaps as the object of an act of will. Hence, since the divine processions necessarily

involve certain actions, it follows that with respect to goodness and other such attributes there are no other processions besides the procession of the Word and the procession of the Love. For it is these two processions by which God understands and loves His own essence, truth, and goodness.

Reply to objection 3: As was established above (q. 14, a. 7 and q. 19, a. 5), God understands all things by one simple act and, similarly, wills all things by one simple act. Hence, in Him there cannot be any procession of one word from another word or of one love from another love. Rather, in Him there exists just one perfect Word and one perfect Love. And it is in this that His perfect fecundity is manifested.

QUESTION 28

The Divine Relations

Now we have to consider the divine relations. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are there any real relations in God? (2) Are these relations the divine essence itself, or do they come from the outside? (3) Can there be a plurality of relations in God that are really distinct from one another? (4) How many of these relations are there?

Article 1

Are there any real relations in God?

It seems that there are no real relations in God (*in Deo non sint aliquae relationes reales*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “When one turns the [accidental] categories into divine predications, all the ones that can be predicated are changed to the category of substance, whereas relational predicates (*ad aliquid*) cannot be predicated at all.” But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore, real relations do not exist in God.

Objection 2: In the same book Boethius says, “In the Trinity, the relation of the Father to the Son is similar to the relation of both to the Holy Spirit, viz., the relation of what is the same to what is the same.” But a relation of this sort is merely a relation of reason, since every real relation requires two really distinct extremes. Therefore, the relations posited in God are not real relations, but only relations of reason.

Objection 3: The relation of paternity is a relation had by a principle. But when one says ‘God is a principle of creatures’, this implies merely a relation of reason and not a real relation. Therefore, neither is Paternity in God a real relation. And for the same reason, the other relations posited in God are not real relations, either.

Objection 4: In God the generation involves the procession of an intellectual Word (*est secundum intelligibilis verbi processionem*). But relations that follow upon an operation of the intellect are relations of reason. Therefore, Paternity and Filiation, which are predicated of God because of the generation, are only relations of reason.

But contrary to this: ‘Father’ is predicated only because of the Paternity, and ‘Son’ is predicated only because of the Filiation. Therefore, if Paternity and Filiation are not real relations in God, it follows that God is not really a Father or really a Son, but a Father and Son only according to our mode of understanding. But this is the Sabellian heresy.

I respond: There are real relations in God (*relationes quaedam sunt in divinis realiter*). To see this clearly, note that it is only among things that are predicated relationally that some are predicated just with respect to reason and not with respect to reality. This does not occur in the other genera [of accidents], because the other genera, e.g., *quantity* and *quality*, when taken according to their proper concept, signify something that inheres in an entity. By contrast, things that are predicated relationally, when taken according to their proper concept, signify only a connection to something else.

A relation sometimes exists in reality (*in ipsa natura rerum*)—as, e.g., when by their nature the things in question are ordered toward one another and have an inclination toward one another. Relations of this sort must be real. For instance, in a heavy body there is an inclination and ordering toward the center of the earth, and thus a relation to the center of the earth exists within the heavy body itself. And the same thing holds in other cases of this sort.

On the other hand, sometimes the relation signified by what is predicated relationally exists only in the apprehension of reason insofar as it connects one thing to another, and in such a case there is only a

relation of reason—as, for instance, when reason connects *man* to *animal* as a species to a genus.

However, when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature as itself, then both of them—viz., what proceeds and what it proceeds from—must belong to the same ordering, and so they must have real relations with respect to one another. Therefore, since, as has been shown (q. 27, a. 3), the processions in God involve an identity of nature, the relations associated with the divine processions must be real relations.

Reply to objection 1: The reason why what is predicated relationally, when taken according to the proper concept of what is predicated relationally, is “not predicated at all” of God is that the proper concept of what is predicated relationally is taken not from what the relation inheres in, but rather from that thing’s connection to another. Therefore, in this passage Boethius wished to claim not that no relation exists in God, but rather that, in accord with the proper concept of a relation, a relation would be predicated of God not in the manner of something that inheres, but rather in the manner of being connected to another (*non praedicaretur per modum inhaerentis ... sed magis per modum ad aliud se habentis*).

Reply to objection 2: The relation that is implied by the name ‘same as itself’ is merely a relation of reason, if ‘same’ is taken absolutely. For a relation of this sort cannot consist in anything but a certain ordering, formulated by reason, of a given thing to itself, insofar as there are two separate thoughts of that thing. However, it is different when the things in question are said to be the same not in number but in nature, i.e., one in genus or in species.

Therefore, Boethius is not assimilating the relations that exist in God to the relation of identity in every respect; rather, he is assimilating them to the relation of identity only to the extent that God’s substance is not diversified by these relations—just as a substance is not diversified by the relation of identity.

Reply to objection 3: Since a creature proceeds from God with a diverse nature, God is outside the order of all creatures and does not by His nature have a relation to creatures. For, as was explained above (q. 14, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 4), He produces creatures not by a necessity of nature, but through His intellect and will. And this is why in God there are no real relations to creatures. However, in the creatures there is a real relation to God, since creatures are contained under God’s ordering and by their nature depend on God.

By contrast, the divine processions are processions within the very same nature. Hence, the two lines of reasoning are not parallel.

Reply to objection 4: Relations which exist between things that are understood and which follow upon just the operation of the intellect are merely relations of reason, since it is reason that formulates these relations between the two things that are understood.

By contrast, the relations which follow upon the operation of the intellect and which exist between the word that proceeds intellectually and that from which it proceeds are not just relations of reason, but real relations. For the intellect, and reason itself, is a certain entity, and it has a real relation to that which proceeds from it intellectually—just as a corporeal entity has a real relation to that which proceeds from it corporeally. And it is for this reason that Paternity and Filiation are real relations in God.

Article 2

Is a relation in God the same as His essence?

It seems that a relation in God is not the same as His essence (*relatio in Deo non sit idem quod sua essentia*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine says, “Not everything that is predicated of God is predicated as substance. For some things, e.g., ‘the Father’ with respect to the Son, are predicated as relations, and these are not predicated as substance.” Therefore, a relation is not the divine essence.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “Everything that receives a relational predication is an entity independently of that relation (*est etiam aliquid excepto relativo*); for instance, it is a man who is a master and a man who is a servant.” Therefore, if there are relations in God, there must be something in God over and beyond the relations. But this can be nothing other than the essence. Therefore, the essence is distinct from the relations.

Objection 3: As is explained in the *Categories*, the *esse* of a relation is to be connected to another. Therefore, if a relation is God’s essence itself, it follows that the *esse* of God’s essence is to be connected to another. But this is incompatible with the perfection of God’s *esse*, which, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), is maximally absolute and subsistent *per se*. Therefore, it is not the case that a relation is the same as God’s essence itself.

But contrary to this: Every entity which is not God’s essence is a creature. But a real relation belongs to God. Therefore, if the relation is not God’s essence, then it will be a creature, and it will not be the case that the adoration of *latria* should be given to it. But this is contrary to what is sung in the Preface of the Mass [of the Holy Trinity], “Let the distinctness of the Persons (*in personis proprietates*) and their equality in majesty be adored.”

I respond: On this topic Gilbert de la Porrée is said to have erred and afterwards, at the Council of Rheims, to have recanted his error. For he had claimed that the relations in God are ‘bystanders’ (*assistantes*), i.e., extrinsically affixed (*extrinsecus affixae*) [to the divine essence].

To see this matter clearly, note that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two things to take into account:

(a) One of them is the *esse* that belongs to each accident insofar as it is an accident. The *esse* common to all of them is to exist in a subject (*inesse subjecto*). For the *esse* of an accident is *inesse*.

(b) The other thing that can be taken into account in each case is the proper concept of each of the things in those genera. Now in the genera other than *relation*, e.g., *quantity* and *quality*, the proper concept of the genus is also taken from its comparison with its subject. For *quantity* is called the measure of a substance, and *quality* is called the disposition of a substance. By contrast, the proper concept of a relation is taken not from its comparison with the subject in which it exists, but rather from a comparison with something outside that subject.

Thus, if, in the case of created things, we consider relations *insofar as they are relations*, then they are found to be ‘bystanders’ and not intrinsically affixed. They signify, as it were, a certain connection that touches the thing itself that is related and reaches out from that thing to another. By contrast, if we consider a relation *insofar as it is an accident*, then, so considered, it inheres in its subject and has accidental *esse* in it. Gilbert de la Porrée was thinking of a relation only in the former way.

However, anything that has accidental *esse* among created things has substantial *esse* when it is transferred to the case of God. For there is nothing that exists in God in the way that an accident exists in a subject; instead, whatever exists in God is His essence. Therefore, corresponding to the fact that among created things a relation has accidental *esse* in a subject, a real relation that exists in God will have the *esse* of the divine essence and will be altogether the same as the essence. On the other hand, because it is predicated relationally, what is signified is not its connection with the essence, but rather its connection with its relational opposite (*non significatur aliqua habitudo ad essentiam, sed magis ad suum oppositum*).

So it is clear that a real relation existing in God is the same in reality as His essence and differs from the essence only conceptually (*non differt nisi secundum rationem intelligentiae*), insofar as the

relation implies a connection with its relational opposite—something that is not implied by the name ‘essence’. Therefore, it is clear that in God the *esse* of the relation and the *esse* of the essence do not differ, but are instead one and the same.

Reply to objection 1: This passage from Augustine does not mean that the Paternity or any other relation that exists in God is not in its *esse* the same as God’s essence. Rather, it means that the relation is not predicated in the manner of a substance, i.e., as existing in the thing of which it is predicated, but is instead predicated as being connected to another.

It is for this reason that only two categories are said to exist in God. For the categories other [than substance and relation] imply a connection to that of which they are predicated, both (a) with respect to their *esse* and (b) with respect to the concept of their proper genus. But nothing that exists in God can have a connection other than the relation of identity to that in which it exists or to that of which it is predicated—and this because of God’s utter simplicity.

Reply to objection 2: Among created things, in what is predicated relationally one finds not only a connection to another but also some absolute entity. The same holds true in the case of God, though in a different way. For what is found in a creature over and beyond what is contained in the relational name’s signification is another entity; by contrast, in God there is no other entity, but one and the same entity—though that entity is not perfectly expressed by the name of the relation in the sense of being included in that name’s signification (*quasi sub significatione talis nominis comprehensa*). For as was explained above when we were talking about the divine names (q. 13, a. 2), more is contained in the perfection of God’s essence than can be signified by any name. Hence, it follows not that there is some other real entity (*aliquid aliud secundum rem*) in God besides the relation, but only that there is something more after the meaning of the [relational] names has been taken into account (*sed solum considerata nominum ratione*).

Reply to objection 3: If nothing were contained in God’s perfection over and beyond what a relational name signifies, then it would follow that His *esse* is imperfect, since He would have a connection to something else. In the same way, if nothing were contained in God’s perfection over and beyond what the name ‘wisdom’ signifies, then there would not be anything subsistent. However, from the fact that the perfection of God’s essence is greater than can be comprehended by the signification of any name, it does not follow that if a relational name (or any other name) predicated of God does not itself signify something perfect, then God’s essence has imperfect *esse*. For, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2), God’s essence includes within itself the perfection of every genus.

Article 3

Are the relations that exist in God distinct in reality from one another?

It seems that the relations that exist in God are not distinct in reality from one another (*realiter ab invicem non distinguantur*):

Objection 1: Things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another. But every relation that exists in God is the same in reality as God’s essence. Therefore, the relations are not distinct in reality from one another.

Objection 2: Just as Paternity and Filiation are distinct from God’s essence in the meaning of their names, so too are God’s goodness and power. But it is not the case that because of this distinctness in meaning there is a real distinction between God’s goodness and His power. Therefore, neither is there a real distinction between the Paternity and the Filiation.

Objection 3: In God there are no real distinctions except according to origin. But one relation does not seem to originate from another. Therefore, the relations are not distinct from one another in reality.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “*Substance* in God contains the oneness, whereas *relation* multiplies the Trinity.” Therefore, if the relations are not distinct in reality from one another, then only a conceptual Trinity, and not a real Trinity, will exist in God. But this belongs to the Sabellian error.

I respond: When one thing is attributed to another, then everything that is part of the concept of the former must be attributed to the latter. For instance, if *man* is attributed to someone, then *rational* must be attributed to him as well.

Now part of the concept of a relation is the connection of one thing to another, according to which the two things are relationally opposed (*opponitur relative*). Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), there are real relations in God, there must be real oppositions in Him. But a relational opposition includes within its concept the distinction [between the opposites]. Hence, it must be the case that there are real distinctions within God—not, to be sure, real distinctions within the absolute entity, viz., the essence, which has utter unity and simplicity, but rather real distinctions among the relations.

Reply to objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 3, the claim in question—viz., that things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another—holds for those things that are the same both in reality and conceptually, e.g., a tunic and a garment, but not for those things that differ conceptually. Hence, in the same place he claims that even though [in any given case] the action is the same as the movement, and likewise for the passion, it nonetheless does not follow that the action is the same as the passion. For ‘action’ implies the status of being that from which there is a movement in the moveable thing (*respectus ut a quo est motus in mobili*), whereas ‘passion’ implies the status of being something that comes from another (*respectus ut qui est ab alio*).

Similarly, even though the Paternity and the Filiation are the same in reality as the divine essence, nonetheless in their proper concepts they imply opposite relations. Hence, they are distinct from one another.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Power’ and ‘goodness’ do not imply in their concepts any sort of opposition. Hence, the two arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the relations do not, properly speaking, arise or proceed from one another, nonetheless, they are understood through the opposition that stems from the procession of one thing from another.

Article 4

Are there just four real relations in God, viz., the Paternity, the Filiation, the Spiration, and the Procession?

It seems that there are not just four real relations in God, viz., the Paternity, the Filiation, the Spiration, and the Procession (*paternitas, filiatio, spiratio et processio*):

Objection 1: In God one can think of the relation of the one who understands to what is understood and the relation of the one who wills to what is willed. These seem to be real relations and yet are not included among the ones just mentioned. Therefore, there are not just four real relations in God.

Objection 2: Real relations in God stem from the intellectual procession of the Word. But, as

Avicenna says, intellectual relations are multiplied to infinity. Therefore, there are infinitely many real relations in God.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 15, a. 2), the ideas exist in God from eternity. But as was said there, the ideas are distinguished from one another only by their relation to things. Therefore, in God there a great number of eternal relations.

Objection 4: Equality, similarity, and identity are relations, and they exist in God from eternity. Therefore, in God there are more relations that exist from eternity than those just mentioned.

But contrary to this: It seems that there are fewer than four relations. For according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 3, “The road from Athens to Thebes is the same as the road from Thebes to Athens.” Therefore, by parity of reasoning it seems that the relation of the Father to the Son, which is called Paternity, is the same as the relation of the Son to the Father, which is called Filiation. And so it is not the case that there are four relations in God.

I respond: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, every relation is based either (a) on quantity, e.g., *double* and *half*, or (b) on action and being acted upon (*passio*), e.g., *making* and *being made*, *father* and *son*, *master* and *servant*, etc. Now since there is no quantity in God (for, as Augustine puts it, He is great without quantity), it follows that there cannot be real relations in God unless they are based on action. However, they cannot be based on actions by which something external proceeds from God, since, as was explained above (a. 1 and q. 13, a. 7), the relations of God to creatures are not real relations in Him. Thus, it follows that there cannot be real relations in God except because of actions by which there is an internal—and not external—procession in God (*actiones secundum quas est processio in Deo non extra sed intra*).

Now, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 5), there are just two processions of this sort, one of which stems from the action of the intellect and is the procession of the Word, and the other of which stems from the action of the will and is the procession of the Love. But with respect to each of these processions there have to be two opposite relations, one of which belongs to what proceeds from the principle and the other of which belongs to the principle itself.

Now the procession of the Word is called a generation in keeping with the proper concept in accord with which generation belongs to living things. But the relation that belongs to the principle of generation among perfect living things is called *Paternity*, whereas the relation that belongs to what proceeds from the principle is called *Filiation*. On the other hand, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4), the procession of the Love does not have a fitting name, and so neither do the relations that are taken from it. However, the relation that belongs to the principle of this procession may be called *Spiration*, whereas the relation that belongs to what proceeds may be called *Procession*—even though these two names properly pertain to the processions or origins themselves and not to the relations.

Reply to objection 1: In those cases in which the act of intellect differs from what is understood and the act of will differs from what is willed there can be a real relation both of the knowledge to the thing known and of the willing to the thing willed. But in the case of God the act of intellect is wholly the same as what is understood, since it is in understanding Himself that He understands all other things, and the same holds for the act of willing and what is willed. Hence, in God relations of this type are not real relations, just as relations of the same thing to itself are not real relations.

However, the relation to the Word is a real relation, since the Word is thought of as proceeding by means of the intellectual action and not as the thing which is understood. For when we ourselves understand a stone, that which the intellect conceives on the basis of the thing that is understood is called a word (*id quod ex re intellecta concipit intellectus vocatur verbum*).

Reply to objection 2: In our own case intellectual relations are multiplied to infinity because by one act a man understands a stone, and by another act he understands that he understands the stone, and

by yet another act he understands this last act of understanding—and in this way acts of understanding are multiplied to infinity and, as a result, so are the intellectual relations. But there is no room for this sort of thing in God, since He understands all things by just a single act.

Reply to objection 3: The relations among the ideas exist insofar as they are understood by God. Hence, from the fact that there are many such relations it does not follow that there are many relations in God. All that follows is that God knows many relations.

Reply to objection 4: Equality and similarity are not real relations in God, but are instead merely relations of reason, as will become clear below (q. 42, a. 1).

Reply to argument for the contrary: Even though the path from the one terminus to the other is the same as the path from the latter to the former, it is still the case that the relations are diverse. Hence, from this premise one cannot conclude that the relation of the Father to the Son is the same as the relation of the Son to the Father. Rather, one could draw this conclusion only about something non-relational (*absolutum*), if it lay in between them.

QUESTION 29

The Divine Persons

Given these points about the processions and relations which it seemed we should have in mind beforehand, we must now consider the persons. First, we will consider them absolutely (questions 29-38), and then we will consider them in relation to one another (questions 39-43).

As for the absolute consideration of the persons, we will first consider them in general (questions 29-32) and then consider them one by one (questions 33-38). There seem to be four pertinent topics for the general consideration of the persons: (a) the signification of the name 'person' (question 29); (b) the plurality of persons (question 30); (c) the things that follow from the plurality of persons or stand in opposition to it, e.g., their diversity, 'aloneness', etc. (question 31); and (d) the things that pertain to our knowledge of the persons (question 32).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) What is the definition of 'person'? (2) How is a person related to an essence, a subsistent, and a hypostasis? (3) Does the name 'person' belong to God? (4) What does the name 'person' signify in God?

Article 1

What is the definition of 'person'?

In *De Duabus Naturis* Boethius formulates the following definition of 'person': 'A person is an individual substance with a rational nature' (*rationalis naturae individua substantia*). But this definition seems to be inadequate:

Objection 1: No singular thing is defined. But 'person' signifies something singular. Therefore, it is inappropriate to define 'person'.

Objection 2: As it occurs in the definition of 'person', 'substance' is being used either for 'primary substance' or 'secondary substance'. If it is being used for 'primary substance', then it is superfluous to add 'individual', since a primary substance is an individual substance. On the other hand, if it stands for 'secondary substance', then the terms are opposed to one another and it is wrong to add 'individual', since secondary substances are called 'genera' or 'species' [and not 'individuals']. Therefore, the definition is incorrectly formulated.

Objection 3: The name of a logical intention (*intentio*) should not occur in the definition of a real entity (*res*). For instance, it would not be well-formulated if one were to say, 'A man is a species of animal'; for 'man' is the name of a real entity and 'species' is the name of a logical intention. Therefore, since 'person' is the name of a real entity (for it signifies a substance with a rational nature), it is wrong for 'individual', which is the name of a logical intention, to occur in its definition.

Objection 4: As *Physics* 2 says, a nature is a principle of movement and rest in that in which it exists *per se* and not *per accidens*. But there are persons, e.g., God and the angels, who are immovable beings. Therefore, 'nature' should not be used in the definition of 'person'; instead, 'essence' should be.

Objection 5: A separated soul is an individual substance with a rational nature. But a separated soul is not a person. Therefore, this definition of 'person' is incorrect.

I respond: Even though universals and particulars are found in every genus, nonetheless, there is a special way in which individuals are found in the genus of substance. For a substance is individuated through itself. Accidents, on the other hand, are individuated by their subject, which is a substance; for instance, something is called *this* whiteness insofar as it exists in *this* subject. Hence, it is appropriate for individuals in the genus of substance to have a special name in preference to other things; so they are called 'hypostases' or 'primary substances'.

However, there is an even more special and perfect mode in which particulars and individuals are found among *rational* substances, which have dominion over their acts and which are not just acted upon like other substances, but act on their own. Now actions belong to singular things. And so among the other substances, singular substances with a rational nature likewise have a special name. And this name is ‘person’.

And so ‘individual substance’ occurs in the aforementioned definition of ‘person’ insofar as ‘person’ signifies a singular thing in the genus of substance, whereas ‘with a rational nature’ is added insofar as ‘person’ signifies a singular thing among the rational substances.

Reply to objection 1: Even though this or that singular thing cannot be defined, nonetheless, that which pertains to the common concept of singularity can be defined—and so it is that the Philosopher defines ‘primary substance’. And it is in this sense that Boethius is defining ‘person’.

Reply to objection 2: According to some, ‘substance’ is being used for ‘primary substance’—i.e., ‘hypostasis’—in the definition of ‘person’, and yet it is not superfluous to add ‘individual’. For the name ‘hypostasis’ or ‘primary substance’ excludes both the idea of a universal and the idea of a part (for we do not say that the universal *man* is a hypostasis or that a hand is a hypostasis, given that it is a part), whereas the addition of ‘individual’ excludes the notion of assumability from a person. For the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it has been assumed by a more dignified person, viz., the Word of God.

Nonetheless, a better reply is that in the definition ‘substance’ is being taken generically, insofar as it is divisible into *primary substance* and *secondary substance*, and that the addition of ‘individual’ restricts it to standing for a primary substance.

Reply to objection 3: Since substantial differences are not [always] known to us—or at least not named by us—it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in place of substantial ones. For instance, someone might say that fire is a simple hot and dry body. For proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms and reveal those forms. Similarly, the names of logical intentions can be used to define things insofar as these names are taken for certain unposited names of things. And so it is that the name ‘individual’ is used in the definition of ‘person’ to designate the mode of subsisting that belongs to particular substances.

Reply to objection 4: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, the name ‘nature’ (*natura*) is imposed in the first place to signify the generation of living things, which is called their nativity (*nativitas*). And since a generation of this sort comes from an intrinsic principle, the name ‘nature’ is extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any movement. And this is the way ‘nature’ is defined in *Physics* 2.

Since a principle of this sort is either formal or material, both matter and form are called ‘nature’ in general. And since the essence of each thing is completed through its form, the essence of each thing—which is what the thing’s definition signifies—is commonly called its nature. And this is the way in which ‘nature’ is being used in the present definition. Hence, in the same book Boethius says, “The nature is the specific difference informing each thing.” For the specific difference completes the definition and is taken from the thing’s proper form. And so in the definition of ‘person’, given that a person is a singular of a determinate genus, it was more appropriate to use the name ‘nature’ than the name ‘essence’, which is taken from ‘*esse*’ and is a more general term.

Reply to objection 5: A soul is a *part* of the human species, and so even if it is separated, it cannot be called an individual substance, i.e., a hypostasis or a primary substance, because it still retains the nature of a thing that can be united to something else—just as a hand, or any other part of a man, cannot be called an individual substance. And so neither the name ‘person’ nor its definition belongs to a separated soul.

Article 2

Is a person the same as a hypostasis, a subsistent, and an essence?

It seems that a person is the same as a hypostasis (*hypostasis*), a subsistent (*subsistentia*), and an essence (*essentia*):

Objection 1: In *De Duabus Naturis* Boethius says, “The Greeks called an individual substance with a rational nature by the name *hypostasis*.” But this is what the name ‘person’ likewise signifies for us. Therefore, a person is altogether the same as a hypostasis.

Objection 2: Just as we say that there are three persons in God, so too we say that there are three subsistents (*ita in divinis dicimus tres subsistentias*). But this would not be the case unless ‘person’ and ‘subsistent’ had the same signification. Therefore, ‘person’ and ‘subsistent’ have the same signification.

Objection 3: In commenting on the *Categories*, Boethius says that *ousia*, which is the same as ‘essence’ (*essentia*), signifies what is composed of matter and form. But that which is composed of matter and form is an individual substance and is also called a hypostasis and a person. Therefore, all these names seem to have the same signification.

But contrary to this:

1. In *De Duabus Naturis* Boethius says, “Genera and species only subsist, whereas individuals not only subsist (*subsistunt*) but also ‘stand under’ (*substant*).” But subsistents are so-called because of subsisting, just as substances or hypostases are so-called because of ‘standing under’. Therefore, since the *esse* of hypostases or persons does not belong to genera and species, hypostases or persons are not the same as subsistents.

2. In commenting on the *Categories*, Boethius says that the hypostasis is called ‘matter’, whereas the *ousia*, i.e., subsistent, is called ‘form’. But neither form nor matter can be called a person. Therefore, a person is different from a hypostasis and from a subsistent.

I respond: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, ‘substance’ is said in two ways:

In one sense, what is called a substance is a thing’s ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*), which is signified by the definition. It is in this sense that we say that the definition signifies the ‘substance’ of a thing. Substance in this sense is what the Greeks call ‘*ousia*’ and what we can call the ‘essence’.

In the second sense, what is called a substance is a subject or suppositum which subsists in the category of substance. Substance in this sense, taken generally, can likewise be denominated by a name signifying a logical intention, and in this way it is called a ‘suppositum’ (*suppositum*). It is also named by three names that signify a real entity—viz., ‘thing with a nature’ (*res naturae*), ‘subsistent’ (*subsistentia*), and ‘hypostasis’. These names correspond to the three ways of considering a substance in this second sense:

(a) A substance is called a ‘subsistent’ insofar as it exists in its own right and not in another (*per se existit et non in alio*). For things that exist in themselves (*in se*) and not in another are said to subsist.

(b) A substance is called a ‘thing with a nature’ insofar as it underlies a common nature (*supponitur alicui naturae communi*). For instance, this man is a thing with a human nature.

(c) A substance is called a ‘hypostasis’ or a ‘substance’ insofar as it underlies its accidents (*supponitur accidentibus*).

Moreover, what these three names signify generally within the whole genus of substance, the name ‘person’ signifies within the genus of rational substances.

Reply to objection 1: By its proper signification the Greek name ‘*hypostasis*’ signifies any individual in the genus of substance. However, in common usage it is taken for an individual with a

rational nature, by reason of the excellence of such a nature.

Reply to objection 2: Just as we say that there are three *persons* and three *subsistents* in God, the Greeks say that there are three *hypostases*. But since the name ‘substance’ corresponds to ‘hypostasis’ according to its proper signification, there is an ambiguity among us. For sometimes ‘substance’ signifies the essence and sometimes a hypostasis. So to prevent a possible occasion of error, it was deemed preferable to use ‘subsistent’, rather than ‘substance’, for ‘hypostasis’.

Reply to objection 3: The essence is, properly speaking, what is signified by the definition. But the definition includes the principles of the species and not the individual principles. Hence, in the case of things composed of matter and form, ‘essence’ does not signify just the form or just the matter, but instead signifies that which is composed of the *common* form and the *common* matter, since these are the principles of the species.

However, that which is composed of *this* matter and *this* form has the nature of a hypostasis and a person. So, for instance, soul and flesh and bone belong to the nature of man, but *this* soul and *this* flesh and *this* bone belong to the nature of *this* man.

Thus, ‘hypostasis’ and ‘person’ add the individual principles to the concept of the essence, and they are not the same as the essence in things composed of matter and form. This was explained above, when we were discussing God’s simplicity (q. 3, a. 3).

Reply to argument 1 for the contrary: Boethius says that genera and species subsist (*subsistere*) in the sense that subsisting belongs to individuals by reason of the fact that they are included under genera and species in the category of substance, and not because the species or genera themselves subsist—except according to the opinion of Plato, who claimed that the species of things subsist separately from the singulars.

On the other hand, to ‘stand under’ (*substare*) belongs to the same individuals in relation to their accidents, which fall outside the nature of the genera and species.

Reply to argument 2 for the contrary: An individual composed of form and matter is such that its ‘standing under’ its accidents derives from its matter. This is why, in *De Trinitate*, Boethius himself says, “A simple form cannot be a subject.”

But the fact that an individual subsists *per se* derives from its form, which does not ‘come to’ a subsistent thing from the outside, but instead gives actual *esse* to the matter in order that the individual might be able to subsist.

It is for this reason that Boethius attributes ‘hypostasis’ to the matter and ‘*ousia*’ (or ‘subsistent’) to the form. For the matter is the principle of ‘standing under’, and the form is the principle of subsisting.

Article 3

Should the name ‘person’ be used in the case of God?

It seems that the name ‘person’ should not be used in the case of God (*nomen personae non sit ponendum in divinis*):

Objection 1: At the beginning of *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, “In general one should not dare to say or think anything about the super-substantial and hidden divinity beyond those things which have been divinely expressed to us by the sacred declarations.” But the name ‘person’ is not expressed to us in the Sacred Scripture of either the Old Testament or the New Testament. Therefore, the name ‘person’ should not be used in the case of God.

Objection 2: In *De Duabus Naturis* Boethius says, “The name ‘person’ seems to derive from those

masks (*personae*) that were used to represent men in comedies and tragedies. For ‘person’ comes from ‘sounding through’ (*personare*), since a louder sound had to be shouted out through the cavity of the mask. Now the Greeks called these masks ‘*prosopa*’ from the fact that they are placed over (*pros*) the face (*ops*) and hide one’s visage from the onlookers.” But this cannot apply to the case of God except perhaps in accord with a metaphor. Therefore, the name ‘person’ is said of God only metaphorically.

Objection 3: Every person is a hypostasis. But as was explained above (a. 1), the name ‘hypostasis’ does not seem to belong to God, since, according to Boethius, it signifies that which is the subject of accidents, and there are no accidents in God. Likewise, Jerome says, “In the name ‘hypostasis’ poison lies hidden underneath the honey.” Therefore, the name ‘person’ should not be said of God.

Objection 4: If a definition is denied of something, then so is that which is defined. But the definition of ‘person’ formulated above (a. 1) does not seem to belong to God. For, first of all, ‘rational’ implies discursive cognition, which, as was shown above (q. 14, a. 7), does not belong to God—and so God cannot be said to have a rational nature. Again, God cannot be called an ‘individual’ substance, since the principle of individuation is matter, and God is immaterial. Again, He does not ‘stand under’ accidents, so that He might be called a ‘substance’. Therefore, the name ‘person’ should not be attributed to God.

But contrary to this: The Athanasian creed says, “The person of the Father, the person of the Son, and the person of the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another.”

I respond: ‘Person’ signifies that which is most perfect in all of nature, viz., that which subsists in a rational nature. Hence, since everything that involves perfection should be attributed to God—given that His essence contains within itself every perfection—it follows that the name ‘person’ is appropriately said of God.

However, it is not said of God in exactly the same way in which it is said of creatures; rather, it is said of God in a more excellent way—just like the other names which, having been imposed by us on creatures, are attributed to God. This was explained above when we were discussing the names of God (q. 13, a. 3).

Reply to objection 1: Even though the name ‘person’ is not said of God in the Scriptures of either the Old Testament or the New Testament, nonetheless, what the name signifies—viz., that God is maximally a *per se* being and utterly perfect in His understanding—is asserted of God in many places in Sacred Scripture.

Moreover, if it were necessary to predicate of God only those things that Sacred Scripture says word for word about God, it would follow that no one could ever speak about God in any language other than the languages in which the Scriptures of the Old Testament and the New Testament were originally written.

Again, the urgency of refuting the heretics necessitated finding new names to signify the ancient faith regarding God. Nor should this sort of novelty be avoided. For this is not a profane novelty that departs from the sense of the Scriptures; by contrast, it is *profane* novelties in terminology that the Apostle teaches us to avoid in 1 Timothy 6:20.

Reply to objection 2: Even though the name ‘person’ does not belong to God with respect to *that because of which* the name was imposed, nonetheless, it especially belongs to God with respect to *that which* the name is imposed to signify. For because famous men were being represented in the comedies and tragedies, the name ‘person’ was imposed to signify those who have dignity. Hence, in the churches it was customary to use the name ‘person’ for those who had some sort of dignity. For this reason, some define ‘person’ as follows: ‘A person is a hypostasis with a distinctive property pertaining to dignity’. Moreover, as has been explained (a. 1), it is because subsisting in a rational nature is a great dignity that every individual with a rational nature is called a person. But the dignity of God’s nature surpasses every

dignity, and, accordingly, the name ‘person’ belongs especially to God.

Reply to objection 3: The name ‘hypostasis’ does not belong to God with respect to that because of which the name was imposed, since God does not ‘stand under’ any accidents. However, the name does belong to Him with respect to the fact that it was imposed to signify a subsistent entity.

Now the reason why Jerome says that poison is hidden in this name is that before the signification of the name was fully known among the Latins, there were heretics deceiving simple people by using this name, with the result that the people were confessing belief in more than one essence by confessing belief in more than one hypostasis. This occurred because the name ‘substance’, which corresponds to the Greek ‘hypostasis’, is commonly taken among us for the essence.

Reply to objection 4: God can be said to have a rational nature insofar as ‘rational’ implies an intellectual nature in general—and not insofar as it implies discursive reasoning.

Again, ‘individual’ can belong to God not with respect to the fact that the principle of individuation is matter, but only with respect to the fact that ‘individual’ implies incommunicability.

Again, ‘substance’ is appropriately said of God insofar as it signifies that which exists *per se*.

Still, some claim that the definition formulated above by Boethius is not a definition of ‘person’ in the sense in which we say that there are persons in God. For this reason, Richard of St. Victor, wishing to correct this definition, claimed that ‘person’, as said of God, is “the incommunicable existence of the divine nature” (*est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia*).

Article 4

Does the name ‘person’ signify a relation in God?

It seems that the name ‘person’ signifies the substance, rather than a relation, in God (*nomen persona non significet relationem sed substantiam in divinis*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “When we say ‘the person of the Father’, we are saying nothing other than ‘the substance of the Father’. Indeed, ‘person’ is said with respect to Him Himself, not with respect to the Son.”

Objection 2: The question ‘What is it?’ is a query about the essence. But as Augustine says in the same place, “There are three who give testimony in heaven—the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. And someone asks, ‘Three what?’, and the reply is, ‘Three persons’.” Therefore, the name ‘person’ signifies the essence.

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 4, the definition of a name is what is signified by the name. But the definition of ‘person’ is ‘an individual substance with a rational nature’. Therefore, the name ‘person’ signifies the substance.

Objection 4: In the case of men and angels, the name ‘person’ signifies something absolute and not a relation. Therefore, if it signified a relation in God, then ‘person’ would be predicated equivocally of God and men and angels.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* Boethius says that every name pertaining to the persons signifies a relation. But no name pertains more to the persons than the name ‘person’. Therefore, the name ‘person’ signifies a relation.

I respond: The signification of the name ‘person’ presents a difficulty because (a) the name is predicated of the three in the plural, in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence, and also because (b) it is not predicated relationally in the way that names signifying a relation are.

Hence, it has seemed to some that, absolutely speaking and by force of the word itself, the name

‘person’ signifies the essence in God—just like the name ‘God’ and the name ‘wise’ do—but that because of the threat posed by heretics, the name has been adapted by conciliar decree in such a way that it can be used for the relations. And it is used mainly either in the plural, as when we say ‘three persons’, or with a partitive name, as when we say ‘The person of the Father is distinct from the person of the Son’. On the other hand, in the singular it can be used both for something absolute and for a relation.

However, this line of reasoning does not seem adequate. For if, by force of its own signification, the name ‘person’ were such that it signifies only God’s essence, then the misrepresentations of the heretics would not have been put to rest by the decree that there are three persons; indeed, the heretics would have been presented with an occasion for even greater misrepresentations.

For this reason, others have claimed that the name ‘person’, as used of God, signifies both the essence and a relation together.

Some of them have asserted that it signifies the essence directly (*in recto*) and a relation indirectly (*in obliquo*). For a person is said to be, as it were, one *per se*, and oneness pertains to the essence; on the other hand, what is said *per se* implies a relation indirectly, since the Father is understood to exist *per se* in the sense of being relationally distinct from the Son (*quasi relatione distinctus a filio*).

By contrast, others have claimed just the opposite, viz., that ‘person’ directly signifies a relation and indirectly signifies the essence. For ‘nature’ is used in an oblique grammatical case in the definition of ‘person’. And this claim is closer to the truth.

To understand the matter clearly, notice that what is less general in a given signification is not contained in what is more general in that signification. For instance, *rational* is included in the signification of ‘man’, but it is not part of the signification of ‘animal’. Hence, it is one thing to ask about the signification of ‘animal’ and another to ask about the signification of ‘animal which is a man’. Similarly, it is one thing to ask about the signification of ‘person’ in general and another to ask about the signification of ‘divine person’. For ‘person’ in general signifies an individual substance with a rational nature, as has been explained (a. 1). But an individual is that which is undivided in itself and distinct from others. Therefore, ‘person of such-and-such a nature’ signifies that which is distinctive in that nature; for instance, ‘person of a human nature’ signifies *this* flesh and *these* bones and *this* soul, which are the principles that individuate a man. These principles, even though they are not part of the signification of ‘person’, are nonetheless part of the signification of ‘human person’.

Now, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 3), the distinctions in God arise only from the relations of origin. However, a relation in God does not exist as an accident inhering in a subject, but is instead the divine essence itself, and thus it subsists in just the way that the divine essence subsists. Therefore, just as the divine essence (*deitas*) is God, so too the divine Paternity is God the Father, who is a divine person. Therefore, ‘divine person’ signifies a relation as subsistent. And this is just to signify, in the manner of a substance, a relation which is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature—though what subsists in the divine nature is not different from the divine nature itself.

In this sense it is true that the name ‘person’ signifies a relation directly and the essence indirectly (*nomen persona significat relationem in recto, et essentiam in obliquo*). However, it does not directly signify a relation insofar as it is a relation, but rather signifies a relation in the manner of a hypostasis. Likewise, it also signifies the essence directly and a relation indirectly, insofar as the essence is the same as a hypostasis (*etiam significat essentiam in recto, et relationem in obliquo*). However, a hypostasis is signified in God by a distinctive relation, and so a relation, signified in the manner of a relation, falls under the concept of a person indirectly.

Thus, it can also be said that this signification of the name ‘person’ was not perceived prior to the misrepresentations of the heretics, and hence at that prior time the name ‘person’ in this sense was not in use except as one among other absolute names. But afterwards this name was adapted to stand for a relation—though congruently with its signification, viz., in the sense that its standing for a relation does

not derive solely from [this new] usage, as the first opinion claimed, but derives also from its own signification.

Reply to objection 1: The name 'person' is predicated with respect to itself and not with respect to another. For it signifies a relation not in the manner of a relation, but in the manner of a substance that is a hypostasis. And this is the sense in which Augustine claims that it signifies the essence, since in God the hypostasis is the same as the essence. For in God *that which is* does not differ from *that by which it is*.

Reply to objection 2: The question 'What is it?' is sometimes a query about the nature that is signified by the definition, as when one asks, 'What is a man?'. And the response is, 'A mortal rational animal'.

On the other hand, 'What is it?' is sometimes a query about the suppositum, as when one asks, 'What is that swimming in the sea?' And the answer is, 'A fish'. And it is in this sense that 'Three persons' is the response to those who ask, 'Three what?'.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, in the case of God a relation is what is understood by the concept of an individual (i.e., distinctive or incommunicable) substance.

Reply to objection 4: A different concept of something less general does not create an equivocation in the more general concept. For even though the proper definition of a horse is different from the proper definition of a donkey, the name 'animal' is still used univocally for both a horse and a donkey, since the general definition of 'animal' belongs to both. Hence, it does not follow that the name 'person' is being used equivocally, even though it is the case that 'relation' is contained in the signification of 'divine person', whereas it is not contained in the signification of 'angelic person' or 'human person'.

On the other hand, the name 'person' is not used univocally of God and angels and men, either; for as was shown above (q. 13, a. 5), nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.

QUESTION 30

The Plurality of Persons in God

Next we ask about the plurality of persons in God.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is there a plurality of persons in God? (2) How many persons are there in God? (3) What do numerical terms signify in the case of God? (4) Is the name 'person' common to the three persons?

Article 1

Is there a plurality of persons in God?

It seems that one should not posit a plurality of persons in God:

Objection 1: A person is an individual substance with a rational nature. Therefore, if there are a plurality of persons in God, it follows that there are a plurality of substances—which seems heretical.

Objection 2: A plurality of absolute properties does not make for a distinction among persons, either in God or in us. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a plurality of relations does not do this, either. But, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 3), in God there is no plurality other than a plurality of relations. Therefore, one cannot claim that there is a plurality of persons in God.

Objection 3: In speaking about God, Boethius says that what is truly one is such that there is no number in it. But plurality implies number. Therefore, there is no plurality of persons in God.

Objection 4: Wherever there is number, there are parts and a whole. Therefore, if there are a number of persons in God, then it will be necessary to posit parts and a whole in God. But this is incompatible with God's simplicity.

But contrary to this: The Athanasian creed says, "The person of the Father, the person of the Son, and the person of the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another." Therefore, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are a plurality of persons.

I respond: From what has already been said it follows that there is a plurality of persons in God. For it was shown above (q. 29, a. 4) that in the case of God the name 'person' signifies a relation as a reality subsisting in the divine nature. But prior to that (q. 28, aa. 1 and 3 and 4) it was shown that there is a plurality of real relations in God. Hence, it follows that there is a plurality of realities subsisting in the divine nature. And this is what it is for there to be a plurality of persons in God.

Reply to objection 1: 'Substance' is used in the definition of 'person' not to signify an *essence*, but rather to signify a *suppositum*. This is clear from the fact that 'individual' is added to 'substance'. Now to signify the substance taken in this sense, the Greeks have the name '*hypostasis*', so that just as we say that there are three persons, so they say that there are three hypostases. But because of the ambiguity of the name 'substance', our custom has been not to say 'three substances', lest this be understood to mean 'three essences'.

Reply to objection 2: In God the absolute properties, e.g., goodness and wisdom, are not opposed to one another and are not distinct in reality from one another. Therefore, even though they subsist, they are nonetheless not a plurality of subsisting realities—which is what it is for there to be a plurality of persons.

Now in the case of created things, the absolute properties, e.g., whiteness and sweetness, do not subsist, though they are distinct in reality from one another. By contrast, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 3 and q. 29, a. 4), the relational properties in God (*proprietaes relativae in Deo*) are both (a) such that they subsist and (b) such that they are distinct in reality from one another. Hence, the plurality of such properties is sufficient for a plurality of persons in God.

Reply to objection 3: Every plurality of things predicated absolutely is excluded from God because of His utter oneness and simplicity, but not every plurality of relations is excluded. For relations are predicated of a thing with respect to something else, and so, as Boethius teaches in the same book, they do not imply composition in that of which they are predicated.

Reply to objection 4: There are two types of numbers, viz., (a) simple or absolute numbers, e.g., *two* and *three* and *four*, and (b) numbers which exist in the things that are numbered, e.g., *two men* and *two horses*.

Thus, if in the case of God number is taken absolutely, i.e., abstractly, then nothing prevents there being whole and part in Him, and in this sense they exist only in our intellect's understanding (*sic non est nisi in acceptione intellectus nostri*). For an absolute number, abstracted from the things that are numbered, exists only in the intellect.

On the other hand, if we take number as it exists in the things that are numbered, then in the case of created things *one* is a part of *two*, and *two* is a part of *three*, since *one man* is a part of *two men* and *two men* are a part of *three men*. But this is not the way it is in the case of God, since, as will be explained below (q. 42, a. 4), the Father is as great as the whole Trinity.

Article 2

Are there more than three persons in God?

It seems that there are more than three persons in God:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), the plurality of persons in God stems from the plurality of relational properties. But as was explained above (q. 28, a. 4), there are four relations in God, viz., the Paternity, the Filiation, the Common Spiration, and the Procession. Therefore, there are four persons in God.

Objection 2: In God the nature differs from the will no more than the nature differs from the intellect. But in God the person who proceeds as the Love in the manner of an act of will (*per modum voluntatis ut amor*) differs from the person who proceeds as the Son in the manner of a nature (*per modum naturae ut filius*). Therefore, it is likewise the case that the person who proceeds as the Word in the manner of an act of intellect (*per modum intellectus ut verbum*) differs from the person who proceeds as the Son in the manner of a nature. And so once again it follows that there are not just three persons in God.

Objection 3: Among created things, that which is more excellent has a greater number of intrinsic operations. For instance, beyond the other animals, man has intellectual understanding and willing. But God infinitely surpasses every creature. Therefore, in God persons proceed not only by way of the will and the intellect, but in infinitely many other ways. Therefore, there are infinitely many persons in God.

Objection 4: It is because of the infinite goodness of the Father that He communicates Himself in an infinite way by producing a divine person. But the Holy Spirit likewise has infinite goodness. Therefore, the Holy Spirit produces a divine person, and that person produces another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Objection 5: Anything contained within a determinate number is measured, since number is a certain sort of measure. But as is clear from the Athanasian creed ("The Father is unmeasured (*immensus*), the Son is unmeasured, the Holy Spirit is unmeasured"), the divine persons are unmeasured. Therefore, they are not contained within the number three.

But contrary to this: 1 John 5:7 says, "There are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father,

the Word, and the Holy Spirit.” But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 7, to those who ask ‘Three what?’, the answer is ‘Three persons’. Therefore, there are just three persons in God.

I respond: Given what has already been said, one must claim that there are just three persons in God. For it has been shown (a. 1) that the plurality of persons is a plurality of subsistent relations that are distinct in reality from one another.

Now the real distinction among the divine relations consists of nothing other than relational opposition. Therefore, two opposed relations must belong to two persons, while if certain relations are not opposed to one another, then they must belong to the same person.

Thus, since the Paternity and the Filiation are opposed relations, they must belong to two persons. Therefore, the subsistent Paternity is the person of the Father, and the subsistent Filiation is the person of the Son. Now the other two relations, [viz., the Spiration and the Procession], are not opposed either to the Paternity or to the Filiation, but are instead opposed to one another. Therefore, they cannot both belong to a single person. So it must be the case either that (a) one of them belongs to both the Father and the Son or that (b) one of them belongs to the Father and the other to the Son. But it is impossible for the Procession to belong to both the Father and the Son or to either one of them, since in that case it would follow that the intellectual procession, which is the generation in God and from which the Paternity and the Filiation stem, would itself come from the procession of the Love, from which the Spiration and Procession stem—if, that is, the generating person and the generated person proceeded from the spirating person, which is contrary to what has already been said (q. 27, a. 3). It follows, then, that it is the Spiration that belongs to both the person of the Father and the person of the Son, since it has no relational opposition either to the Paternity or to the Filiation. As a result, the Procession must belong to the other person, who is called the person of the Holy Spirit and proceeds in the manner of love, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4).

Therefore, it follows that there are just three persons in God, viz., the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 1: Even though there are four relations in God, one of them, viz., the Spiration, is not separate from the person of the Father and the person of the Son, but instead belongs to both of them. And so, even though the Spiration is a relation, nonetheless, (a) it is not called a *property*, since it does not belong to just a single person and (b) it is not a *personal relation*, i.e., a relation that constitutes a person. By contrast, the other three relations, viz., the Paternity, the Filiation, and the Procession, are called *personal properties* in the sense that they constitute persons. For the Paternity is the person of the Father, the Filiation is the person of the Son, and the Procession is the person of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds [from the Father and the Son].

Reply to objection 2: That which proceeds as the Word in the manner of an act of intellect proceeds by way of a likeness, just as that which proceeds in the manner of a nature does. This is why it was claimed above (q. 27, a. 2 and q. 28, a. 4) that the procession of the divine Word is itself a generation in the manner of a nature.

By contrast, the Love as such does not proceed as a likeness of that from which it proceeds (even though in God the Love is co-essential insofar as He is divine). This is why the procession of the Love is not called a generation in God.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as he is more perfect than the other animals, man has a greater number of intrinsic operations than do the other animals, because his perfection is in the mode of composition. Hence, in the angels, who are more perfect and more simple, there are fewer intrinsic operations than there are in man, since the angels do not have imagination, sensation, etc. But in God, according to reality, there is just a single operation, which is His essence. (The way in which there are nonetheless two processions was explained above (q. 27, a. 3 and 5).)

Reply to objection 4: This argument reasons as follows: If the Holy Spirit had a goodness which is numerically distinct from the Father's goodness, then just as the Father produces a divine person through His own goodness, so too the Holy Spirit would produce a divine person through His own goodness.

However, the Father's goodness is one and the same goodness as the Holy Spirit's goodness, and there is a distinction only because of the relations among the persons. For the goodness belongs to the Holy Spirit as derived from another, whereas it belongs to the Father as the one by whom it is communicated to another.

Moreover, the relational opposition does not permit there to be a principle with respect to another divine person together with the Holy Spirit's relation. For the Holy Spirit Himself proceeds *from* the other persons who are able to exist in God.

Reply to objection 5: If a determinate number is taken as a simple number, i.e., as a number that exists only in the intellect's understanding, then it is measured by the number *one*. However, if it is taken as the number of realities among the divine persons, then the notion of something's being measured has no place there. For as will be shown below (q. 42, a. 1 and 4), the greatness of the three persons is the same, and it is not the case that what is the same is measured by what is the same.

Article 3

Do numerical terms posit some reality in God?

It seems that numerical terms posit some reality in God:

Objection 1: God's oneness (*unitas divina*) is His essence. But every number is just a repeated oneness (*unitas repetita*). Therefore, in the case of God every numerical term signifies the essence. Therefore, it posits some reality in God.

Objection 2: Whatever is predicated of both God and creatures belongs to God in a more eminent way than it does to creatures. But numerical terms posit some reality in creatures. Therefore, *a fortiori*, they do so in God as well.

Objection 3: If numerical terms do not posit any reality in God but are instead used only to deny something of Him, with the result that oneness is denied by 'plurality' and plurality is denied by 'oneness', then it follows that the reasoning has a circularity that confounds the intellect and establishes nothing. But this is unacceptable. Therefore, it follows that numerical terms posit some reality in God.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, "The profession of a fellowship (*consortium*) [*read: the profession of plurality*] excludes the idea of singularity and aloneness (*solitudo*).” And in *De Fide* Ambrose says, "When we say 'one God', this oneness does not posit quantity in God, but instead excludes a plurality of gods." On the basis of these passages it seems that names of this sort are used to deny things of God and not to posit any reality.

I respond: In the *Sentences* the Master claims that numerical terms do not posit any reality in God, but only deny something of God. Others, however, hold the contrary position.

To see this matter clearly, notice that every plurality follows upon some sort of division. Now there are two kinds of division:

(a) One kind is *material* division and is effected by dividing a continuous thing. And the number that follows upon this kind of division is a species of quantity. Hence, this sort of number exists only in material things that have quantity.

(b) The second kind is *formal* division, which is effected through opposites or through diverse

forms. And the multitude that follows upon this kind of division is not found in any genus, but is instead a transcendental that derives from the division of *being* into *one* and *many*. This is the only sort of multitude that can exist among immaterial things.

Now some writers, focusing just on the *many* that is a species of discrete quantity and realizing that discrete quantity has no place in God, have claimed that numerical terms do not posit any reality in God, but instead only deny something of God. However, others, focusing on the same sort of *many*, have claimed that just as knowledge is posited in God according to the proper concept of knowledge but not according to the concept of its genus (for there are no qualities in God), so too number is posited in God according to the proper concept of number but not according to the concept of its genus, which is quantity.

However, we ourselves claim that to the extent that numerical terms enter into divine predication, they are not taken from the number which is a species of quantity—otherwise, they would be predicated of God only metaphorically, as are other properties of corporeal things, such as breadth, length, etc. Instead, they are taken from *many* insofar as it is a transcendental. But *many*, taken in this sense, is related to the many things of which it is predicated in the same way that *one*, taken as convertible with *being*, is related to a being. For as was explained above when we were discussing God's oneness (q. 11, a. 1), *one* in this sense adds to *being* only the negation of division, since *one* signifies undivided being. And so anything of which *one* is predicated is such that it is signified as an undivided entity. For instance, *one* as predicated of a man signifies the undivided nature or substance of the man. For the same reason, when things are called 'many', *many* taken in this sense signifies those things along with a negation of division with respect to each of them.

By contrast, the number which is a species of quantity posits an accident added to a being, and so does the *one* which is a principle of number.

Therefore, as has been explained, in the case of God numerical terms signify those things of which they are said and, beyond this, add nothing except a negation. On this score, what the Master said in the *Sentences* was true. Thus, when we say 'The essence is one', 'one' signifies the undivided essence. When we say 'The person is one', 'one' signifies the undivided person. When we say 'The persons are many', the persons are signified, along with a negation of division with respect to each one of them; for it is part of the nature of the many that it is made up of ones.

Reply to objection 1: *One*, taken as a transcendental, is common (a) to a substance and (b) to a relation and, likewise, (c) to the many. Hence, in the case of God 'one' can stand for either the substance or a relation, depending on what it is joined to. Yet, as has been explained, by their proper signification names of this sort add, over and beyond the essence or relation, a certain negation of division.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as *many* posits some reality in created things, it is a species of quantity and does not carry over into divine predication. Instead, it is only the transcendental *many* that carries over, and it adds nothing to the things of which it is predicated except a negation of division with respect to each of the singulars. This is the *many* that is predicated of God.

Reply to objection 3: *One* is a negation not of *many*, but of *division*, which is conceptually prior to both *one* and *many*. *Many* does not deny oneness, but instead denies division with respect to each of the things that make up the many. This was explained above when we were discussing God's oneness (q. 11, a. 2).

Reply to argument for the contrary: Notice that the passages adduced for the contrary position are not sufficient to prove that position. For even though (a) aloneness is excluded by the plurality and (b) a plurality of gods is excluded by the oneness, still, it does not follow that this is the only thing signified by the names 'one' and 'many'. By way of example, blackness is excluded by whiteness, but the exclusion of blackness is not the only thing signified by the name 'whiteness'.

Article 4

Can the name ‘person’ be common to the three persons?

It seems that the name ‘person’ cannot be common to the three persons:

Objection 1: Nothing except the essence is common to the three persons. But the name ‘person’ does not directly signify the essence. Therefore, it is not common to the three persons.

Objection 2: ‘Common’ is opposed to ‘incommunicable’. But it is part of the concept of a person that a person is incommunicable, as is clear from the definition of Richard of St. Victor cited above (q. 29, a. 3). Therefore, the name ‘person’ is not common to the three persons.

Objection 3: If ‘person’ is common to the three persons, then this commonality is either real or conceptual. But it is not real, since if it were, then the three persons would be one person. Nor, again, is it merely conceptual, since if it were, then *person* would be a universal, whereas in God, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 5), there is no universal and particular or genus and species. Therefore, the name ‘person’ is not common to the three persons.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says that when someone asks ‘Three what?’, the answer is ‘Three persons’. For being a person is common to them (*commune est eis id quod est persona*).

I respond: When we say ‘three persons’, our very way of speaking shows that the name ‘person’ is common to the three of them—just as when we say ‘three men’, we show that ‘man’ is common to the three of them. But it is clear that there is no real commonality in the latter case, in the way in which the one essence is common to the three persons. For if there were a real commonality, then it would follow that the person of the three is one in just the way that the essence is one.

However, those investigating this matter have talked in different ways about just what this commonality amounts to. Some have claimed that it is a commonality of *negation*, because ‘incommunicable’ occurs in the definition of ‘person’. Others have claimed that it is a commonality of *logical intention* (*intentio*), because ‘individual’ occurs in the definition of ‘person’—just as one might claim that being a species is common to *horse* and *ox*. But both of these claims are ruled out by the fact that the name ‘person’ is the name of a reality and not the name of a negation or the name of a logical intention.

So one should say that even in the case of human beings the name ‘person’ is common by a commonality of concept—not as a genus or species, but rather as a *vague individual*. For the names of genera and species, e.g., *animal* or *man*, are imposed to signify the common natures themselves and not the logical intentions of the common natures; the latter are signified by the names ‘genus’ and ‘species’. On the other hand, a vague individual such as ‘a man’ (*aliquis homo*) signifies the common nature along with the determinate mode of existing that belongs to a singular thing, viz., its subsisting *per se* as something distinct from other singulars. By contrast, the name of a *designated singular thing* signifies the determinate distinguishing factor, in the way that *this* flesh and *this* bone are signified in the name ‘Socrates’.

Now the difference between them is that ‘a man’ signifies a nature, i.e., what is individual on the part of the nature (*aliquis homo significat naturam vel individuum ex parte naturae*), along with the mode of existing that belongs to singular things, whereas the name ‘person’ is imposed not to signify what is individual on the part of the nature, but rather to signify a reality that subsists in such-and-such a nature (*ad significandum rem subsistentem in tali natura*). But this latter is conceptually common to all of the divine persons, since each of them subsists in the divine nature as distinct from the others. And so the name ‘person’ is conceptually common to all three divine persons.

Reply to objection 1: This argument has to do with a real commonality.

Reply to objection 2: Even though a person is incommunicable, the very mode of existing in an incommunicable way can itself be common to many.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the commonality is conceptual and not real, it does not follow that there is universal and particular or genus and species in God. For, first of all, even among human beings the commonality of personhood is not a commonality of genus or species. Second, the divine persons have a single *esse*, whereas a genus or a species—or any universal whatever—is predicated of many things that differ in *esse*.

QUESTION 31

Things Pertaining to the Oneness or to the Plurality in God

Next we have to inquire about the things that pertain to the oneness or to the plurality in God.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) What does the name ‘Trinity’ signify? (2) Can one say that the Son is other than the Father? (3) Can the exclusive expression [‘alone’], which seems to exclude others, be used to modify a name pertaining to God’s essence (*possit adiungi nomini essentiali in divinis*)? (4) Can the exclusive expression be used to modify a term pertaining to a divine person (*possit adiungi termino personali*)?

Article 1

Is there a Trinity in God?

It seems that there is not a Trinity in God:

Objection 1: In the case of God, every name signifies either the substance or a relation. But the name ‘Trinity’ does not signify the substance, since in that case it would be predicated of the individual persons. Nor does it signify a relation, since it is not a name that is predicated with respect to another. Therefore, the name ‘Trinity’ should not be used in the case of God.

Objection 2: The name ‘Trinity’ seems to be a collective name, since it signifies a multitude. But such a name is inappropriate in the case of God, since the oneness implied by a collective name is a minimal oneness, whereas in God there is maximal oneness. Therefore, the name ‘Trinity’ does not belong to God.

Objection 3: Every group of three is a triplet. But in God there is no tripleness (*triplicitas*), since tripleness is a species of inequality. Therefore, there is no Trinity in God.

Objection 4: Whatever exists in God exists in the oneness of the divine essence, since God is His essence. Therefore, if there is a Trinity in God, it will exist in the oneness of the divine essence. And so in God there will be three essential onenesses—which is heretical.

Objection 5: In everything said of God, the concrete term is predicated of the corresponding abstract term. For instance, the divinity (*deitas*) is God, and the Paternity is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be said to be three, since if it were, then there would be nine realities in God—which is erroneous. Therefore, the name ‘Trinity’ should not be used in the case of God.

But contrary to this: The Athanasian creed says, “Oneness in Trinity and Trinity in Oneness is to be revered.”

I respond: In the case of God, the name ‘Trinity’ signifies a determinate number of persons. So given that a plurality of persons is posited in God, one should use the name ‘Trinity’, since this name signifies determinately the same thing that ‘plurality’ signifies indeterminately.

Reply to objection 1: According to the etymology of the word, the name ‘Trinity’ seems to signify the single essence of the three persons. For a trinity (*trinitas*) is, as it were, the oneness of three (*trium unitas*). However, according to the proper meaning of the word, it signifies instead the number of persons with a single essence. Because of this, we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity; for He is not three persons.

Moreover, ‘Trinity’ does not signify the relations that belong to the persons; rather, it signifies the number of persons who are related to one another. For this reason, the name does not itself make reference to another.

Reply to objection 2: A collective name implies two things, viz., (a) a plurality of supposita and (b) a oneness with respect to some ordering. For instance, a people is a multitude of men collected under

some ordering. On the first point, the name ‘Trinity’ is consistent with other collective names. However, it differs on the second point, since in the divine Trinity there is not only a oneness with respect to an ordering but, along with this, a oneness of essence as well.

Reply to objection 3: ‘Trinity’ is predicated absolutely [and not relationally], since it signifies the number of persons, viz., three. But as is clear from Boethius in the *Arithmetica*, the term ‘tripleness’ signifies a proportion of inequality, since it is a species of unequal proportion. And so in God there is a trinity, but no tripleness.

Reply to objection 4: ‘Divine Trinity’ conveys both the number and the persons who are numbered. Therefore, when we say ‘Trinity in Oneness’, we are not positing a number in the oneness of the essence, as if the one essence were being taken three times. Rather, we are positing the numbered persons in the oneness of the nature, in the sense in which the supposita of a given nature are said to exist ‘in’ that nature. By contrast, we say ‘Oneness in Trinity’ in the sense in which a nature is said to exist ‘in’ its supposita.

Reply to objection 5: When one says, ‘The Trinity is three’, what is signified, because of the number implied [in ‘Trinity’], is the multiplication of the same number by itself. For when I say ‘three’, it implies a distinction within each of the supposita that belongs to what ‘three’ is predicated of. And so one cannot say that the Trinity is three, since if the Trinity were three, then it would follow that there are three supposita that are Trinities. In the same way, when one says ‘God is three’, it follows that there are three supposita that are divinities (*deitates*).

Article 2

Is the Son other than the Father?

It seems that the Son is not other than the Father (*filius non sit alius a patre*):

Objection 1: ‘Other’ is a relational term indicating a diversity of substance. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, then it seems that He is diverse from the Father. But this is contrary to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 7, where he claims that when we say ‘three persons’, we do not intend to imply a diversity.

Objection 2: If two things are ‘other’ than one another, then they differ from one another in some way. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, then it follows that He differs from the Father. But this is contrary to Ambrose in *De Fide* 1, where he says, “The Father and the Son are one in divinity (*deitas*); nor is there a difference of substance or any other sort of diversity.”

Objection 3: ‘Alien’ (*alienum*) comes from ‘other’ (*aliud*). But the Son is not alien to the Father; for in *De Trinitate* 7 Hilary says that among the divine persons nothing is diverse, nothing is alien, and nothing is separable. Therefore, the Son is not other than the Father.

Objection 4: ‘Other [person]’ (*alius*) and ‘other [thing]’ (*aliud*) signify the same thing and differ only in their co-signification of grammatical gender. Therefore, if the Son is a person other (*alius*) than the Father, it seems to follow that He is a thing other (*aliud*) than the Father.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, “The essence of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one, and in that essence it is not the case that the Father is one [thing] (*aliud*) and the Son another [thing] (*aliud*) and the Holy Spirit yet another [thing] (*aliud*)—even though, speaking of the persons, the Father is one [person] (*alius*) and the Son is another [person] (*alius*) and the Holy Spirit is yet another [person] (*alius*).”

I respond: Since, as Jerome puts it, heresy arises from words that are used incorrectly, it follows

that when we speak of the Trinity, we must proceed with caution and moderation. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 1, “There is no other place where error is more dangerous, where questions are asked more rigorously, or where anything more fruitful is found.”

In what we say about the Trinity, there are two opposed errors we must avoid by steering carefully between them, viz., (a) the error of Arius, who claimed that there is a trinity of substances along with the trinity of persons, and (b) the error of Sabellius, who claimed that there is a oneness of person along with the oneness of essence.

Now to escape the error of Arius, we should avoid the name ‘diverse’ (*nomen diversitatis*) and the name ‘different’ (*nomen differentiae*) in speaking of God, so as not to deny the oneness of the essence. We can, however, use the name ‘distinct’ (*nomen distinctionis*) because of the relational oppositions. Hence, wherever we find ‘diverse’ or ‘different’ applied to the persons in some authoritative text, ‘diverse’ or ‘different’ is being used for ‘distinct’. Again, so as not to deny the simplicity of God’s essence, we should avoid the name ‘separate’ (*nomen separationis*) and the name ‘divided’ (*nomen divisionis*), which suggest the parts in a whole. Again, so as not to deny the equality of the persons, we should avoid the name ‘disparate’ (*nomen disparitatis*). Again, so as not to deny the similarity of the persons, we should avoid the names ‘alien’ (*alienus*) and ‘discrepant’ (*discrepans*). For in *De Fide* Ambrose says that there is no discrepancy between the Father and the Son, but a single divinity. And according to Hilary, as quoted above, in God there is nothing alien and nothing separable.

On the other hand, to escape the error of Sabellius, we should avoid the name ‘singular’ (*singularitas*), so as not to deny the communicability of the divine essence. Thus, in *De Trinitate* 7 Hilary says, “It is a sacrilege to say that the Father or the Son is the singular God.” We should also avoid the name ‘unique’ (*unicus*), so as not to deny the number of persons. Hence, in the same book Hilary says that the meanings of ‘singular’ and ‘unique’ are excluded from God. Still, we say ‘the unique Son’, since there are not many Sons in God. Yet we do not say ‘the unique God’, since the divinity (*deitas*) is common to a plurality. We should also avoid the name ‘mixed together’ (*confusus*), lest the ordering of the nature be denied of the persons. Thus, in *De Fide* 1 Ambrose says, “What is one is not mixed together, nor can what is indifferent be multiple.” Again, we should avoid the name ‘solitary’ (*solitarius*), so as not to deny the fellowship of the three persons. For in *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “We must confess that God is neither solitary nor diverse.”

Now the name ‘other [person]’ (*alius*), taken in the masculine, implies only a distinction of suppositum. Hence, it is appropriate for us to say that the Son is other (*alius*) than the Father. For He is another suppositum of the divine nature, just as He is another person and another hypostasis.

Reply to objection 1: Since ‘other’ (*alius*) is a particular name, it has to do with the suppositum, and so a distinction of substance, in the sense of hypostasis or person, is sufficient for its meaning. By contrast, diversity requires a distinction of substance in the sense of essence. And so we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, even though He is other than the Father.

Reply to objection 2: Difference (*differentia*) implies a distinction among forms. But there is just one form in God, as is clear from Philippians 2:6 (“Who being in the form of God . . .”). And so the name ‘differing’ (*nomen differentis*) does not properly belong to ‘God’, as is clear from the adduced passage.

Still, Damascene uses the name ‘different’ (*nomen differentiae*) in speaking of the divine persons, insofar as a relational property is signified in the manner of a form. Hence, he says that the hypostases differ from one another not according to substance, but according to determinate properties. However, as has been explained, ‘different’ is being used here for ‘distinct’.

Reply to objection 3: What is alien is extraneous and dissimilar. But this is not what is implied by ‘other’. And so we say that the Son is other than the Father, even though we do not say that the Son is alien from the Father.

Reply to objection 4: The neuter (*aliud*) is indeterminate (*informe*), whereas the masculine (*alius*), and likewise the feminine (*alia*), are determinate and distinct. And so it is appropriate that the common essence should be signified by the neuter (*aliud*), while a determinate suppositum in a common nature is signified by the masculine (*alius*) and the feminine (*alia*). Hence, even in human affairs, if someone asks ‘Who is he?’, the answer is ‘Socrates’, which is the name of a suppositum. On the other hand, if someone asks ‘What is he?’, the answer is ‘A rational and mortal animal’.

And so since in God the distinction is according to the persons and not according to the essence, we say that the Father is [a person] other (*alius*) than the Son, but not that He is [a thing] other (*aliud*) than the Son. Conversely, we say that the Father and the Son are one [essence] (*unum*), but not that they are one [person] (*unus*).

Article 3

Can the exclusive expression ‘alone’ be used to modify a term pertaining to God’s essence?

It seems that the exclusive expression ‘alone’ (*dictio exclusiva solus*) should not be used to modify a term pertaining to God’s essence (*non sit addenda termino essentiali in divinis*):

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Sophistical Refutations* 2, “He is alone who is not with another.” But God is with the angels and the souls of the blessed. Therefore, we cannot say that God is alone.

Objection 2: Whatever modifies a term pertaining to God’s essence can be predicated of each of the persons *per se* and of all of them together. For instance, since it is appropriate to say ‘wise God’, we can also say ‘The Father is a wise God’ and ‘The Trinity is a wise God’. But in *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “We should give heed to the position that says that it is not the case that the Father is true God alone.” Therefore, one cannot say ‘God alone’.

Objection 3: If the expression ‘alone’ modifies a subject term pertaining to the essence, then the predicate will pertain either to a person or to the essence. But it does not pertain to a person, since ‘God alone is Father’ is false, given that men are also fathers. Nor does it pertain to the essence. For if ‘God alone creates’ were true, then it would follow, so it seems, that ‘The Father alone creates’ is also true, since whatever is said of God can be said of the Father. But this proposition is false, since the Son is also a creator. Therefore, in the case of God the expression ‘alone’ cannot modify a term pertaining to the essence.

But contrary to this: 1 Timothy 1:17 says, “To the king of ages, immortal, invisible, who is God alone.”

I respond: The expression ‘alone’ can be taken either categorematically or syncategorematically.

Now an expression is called *categorematic* when it posits the signified thing in an absolute way with respect to some suppositum, e.g., ‘white’ with respect to a man, when one says ‘a white man’. If the expression ‘alone’ is taken in this sense, then it cannot modify any term at all in the case of God. For it would posit solitariness (*solitudo*) with respect to the term it modified, and so it would follow that God is all alone by Himself (*solitarius*)—which is contrary to what was said above (a. 2).

On the other hand, an expression is called *syncategorematic* when it implies an ordering of the predicate to the subject, e.g., the expression ‘all’ or ‘none’, and, similarly, the expression ‘alone’, which excludes every other suppositum from association with the predicate. For instance, when one says ‘Socrates alone is writing’, the meaning is not that Socrates is all alone by himself, but rather that no one is joining him in writing—even if there are many others with him. And in this sense nothing prevents the

expression ‘alone’ from modifying a term pertaining to God’s essence, insofar as it excludes all things other than God from association with the predicate. For instance, we say ‘God alone is eternal’, because nothing besides God is eternal.

Reply to objection 1: Even though the angels and the souls of the blessed are always with God, still, if there were no plurality of persons in God, it would follow that God is all alone or by Himself. For solitariness is not negated by association with something that is extraneous to one’s nature. For instance, someone is said to be alone in the garden, even if there are many plants and animals there. Similarly, God would be said to be all alone or by Himself if there were no plurality of persons in God—even if angels and men existed along with Him. Therefore, the companionship of angels and souls does not rule out absolute solitariness on the part of God, and, *a fortiori*, it does not rule out relative solitariness with respect to some predicate.

Reply to objection 2: Properly speaking, the expression ‘alone’ is not posited as part of the predicate, which is taken formally. For ‘alone’ has to do with the subject (*suppositum*) insofar as it excludes another suppositum from that to which it is joined. By contrast, when the adverb ‘only’ (*tantum*) is used as an exclusive expression, it can be posited as part of either the subject or the predicate. For instance, we say both (a) ‘Only (*tantum*) Socrates is running’, i.e., no one else is running, and (b) ‘Socrates is only (*tantum*) running’, i.e., he is doing nothing else.

Hence, one cannot properly say ‘The Father is God alone’ or ‘The Trinity is God alone’—unless, perhaps, something implicit is being understood on the part of the predicate, so that the meaning is ‘The Trinity is the God who is God alone’. Accordingly, ‘The Father is the God who is God alone’ could also be true, if the relative pronoun were referring back to the predicate and not to the subject.

Now when Augustine says that it is not the case that the Father is God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he is speaking expositively, as if to say that when [the Apostle] says ‘to the king of ages, the invisible, who is God alone’, one should explain this as referring not to the person of the Father, but to the Trinity alone.

Reply to objection 3: The expression ‘alone’ can be joined in both ways to a term pertaining to the essence, since the proposition ‘God alone is Father’ has two readings.

For ‘Father’ can serve to predicate the *person* of the Father, and in this sense the proposition is true, since no man is that person.

Alternatively, ‘Father’ can predicate just the *relation*, and in this sense the proposition is false, since the relation of paternity is also found among other beings, even if not univocally.

Similarly, ‘God alone creates’ is true, but ‘therefore, the Father alone creates’ does not follow from this. For, as the logicians put it, the exclusive expression ‘immobilizes’ the term it modifies, so that one cannot descend from it to a suppositum. For this is invalid: ‘Man alone is a rational mortal animal; therefore, Socrates alone is a rational mortal animal’.

Article 4

Can the exclusive expression ‘alone’ be used to modify a term pertaining to a person?

It seems that the exclusive expression ‘alone’ can be used to modify a term pertaining to a person, even if the predicate is a common term:

Objection 1: At John 17:3, speaking to the Father, our Lord says, “That they may know You, the only true God.” Therefore, the Father alone is true God.

Objection 2: Matthew 11:27 says, “No one knows the Son but the Father.” This signifies the

same thing as ‘The Father alone knows the Son’. But ‘knows the Son’ is a common term. Therefore, we reach the same conclusion as before.

Objection 3: The exclusive expression does not exclude anything that pertains to our understanding of the term to which it is joined. Hence, it does not exclude a part or a universal. For this is invalid: ‘Socrates alone is white; therefore, his hand is not white.’ Nor is this valid: ‘Socrates alone is white; therefore, no man is white’. But one person is understood in the other; for instance, ‘the Father’ is understood in ‘the Son’, and vice versa. Therefore, the fact that someone says ‘The Father alone is God’ does not exclude the Son or the Holy Spirit. And so it seems that this sentence is true.

Objection 4: [In the *Gloria*] the Church sings, “You alone are the most high, Jesus Christ.”

But contrary to this: The sentence ‘The Father alone is God’ has two exponents, viz., ‘The Father is God’ and ‘No one other than the Father is God’. But this second exponent is false, since the Son, who is God, is other than the Father. Therefore, ‘The Father alone is God’ is false. And the same holds for the other similar cases.

I respond: When we say ‘The Father alone is God’, this proposition can have several readings.

For if the proposition is positing solitariness with respect to the Father, then it is false, since ‘alone’ is being taken categorically.

On the other hand, if ‘alone’ is being taken syncategorematically, then once again the proposition can have more than one reading.

For if ‘alone’ is excluding others from the subject’s form, then it is true, since it has the sense, ‘The lone Father is God’, i.e., ‘He, along with whom no one else is the Father, is God’. This is the way Augustine expounds it *De Trinitate* 6 when he says, “We do not say ‘the Father alone’ by reason of the fact that He is separated from the Son or the Holy Spirit; rather, when we say this, we signify that they are not the Father along with Him.” Still, this reading does not reflect the normal way of speaking unless something implicit is being understood, so that the meaning is ‘He who alone is called the Father is God’.

However, the proper sense of the proposition excludes others from association with the predicate. So taken, the proposition is false if it excludes another (*alius*) in the masculine, whereas it is true if it excludes another (*aliud*) only in the neuter. For the Son is [a person] other (*alius*) than the Father, but not [a thing] other (*aliud*) than the Father—and the same holds for the Holy Spirit.

However, since, as has been explained (a. 3), the expression ‘alone’ properly modifies the subject, it is more prone toward excluding another [person] (*alius*) than another [thing] (*aliud*). Hence, the meaning of a sentence such as ‘The Father alone is God’ should not be stretched. Instead, the sentence should be expounded piously whenever it is found in the authoritative writings.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine explains, when we say ‘You alone are true God’, this is understood to mean not the person of the Father, but the whole Trinity.

An alternative reply is that if it is understood to mean the person of the Father, then because of the oneness of the essence the other persons are not excluded as long as ‘alone’ is being taken to exclude just another [thing] (*aliud*), as has been explained.

Reply to objection 2: A similar reply holds for this objection. When something pertaining to the essence is said of the Father, then in virtue of the oneness of the essence it is not the case that the Son and the Holy Spirit are excluded.

Still, notice that in the cited passage the expression ‘no one’ (*nemo*) is not the same as ‘no man’ (*nullus homo*), despite the fact that ‘no one’ might seem to have this signification. (For if it did, then the person of the Father could not be the object of the exception.) Instead, ‘no one’ is being taken, according to common usage, as distributed over every rational nature.

Reply to objection 3: The exclusive expression does not exclude things, e.g., parts and universals, that belong to the meaning of the term to which it is joined, as long as these things do not differ from it in suppositum. However, the Son differs from the Father in suppositum, and so the arguments are not

parallel.

Reply to objection 4: [In the *Gloria*] we do not say absolutely speaking that the Son alone is the most high, but rather that He is the most high “with the Holy Spirit, in the glory of God the Father.”

QUESTION 32

Our Cognition of the Divine Persons

The next thing we have to inquire about is our cognition of the divine persons.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Can the divine persons be known by natural reason? (2) Should certain 'notions' (*notiones*) be attributed to the divine persons? (3) How many notions are there? (4) Are different opinions about the notions permissible?

Article 1

Can the Trinity of divine persons be known by natural reason?

It seems that the Trinity of divine persons can be known by natural reason:

Objection 1: The philosophers came to the cognition of God only through natural reason, and yet we find the philosophers saying many things about the Trinity of persons.

For instance, in *De Caelo et Mundo* 1 Aristotle says, "Through this number [*read*: the number three] we bring ourselves to glorify the one God, who surpasses the properties of the things that have been created."

Likewise, in *Confessiones* 7 Augustine says, "I read there [*read*: in the books of the Platonists]—not in these exact words, but altogether the same thing, supported by many complex arguments—that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"—and other things of this sort that follow in the same place. But these are the very words in which the distinction among the divine persons is taught.

Again, Glosses on Romans 1 and Exodus 8:19 say that Pharaoh's magicians failed in the third sign, i.e., in their knowledge of the third person, viz., the Holy Spirit; and so they must have known at least two of the persons.

Again, Trismegistus said, "Monad begot monad, and in Himself He reflected His own ardor." This seems to be an intimation of the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Therefore, a cognition of the divine persons can be had through natural reason.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* Richard of St. Victor says, "I believe without hesitation that not only probable explanations, but even necessary explanations, are available for any articulation of the truth." Hence, in order to prove the Trinity of persons, some have produced an argument from the infinity of God's goodness; for this goodness communicates itself in an infinite way in the procession of the divine persons. On the other hand, some have argued from the fact that "the delightful possession of a good is impossible without fellowship." Again, Augustine proceeds to explain the Trinity of persons on the basis of the procession of the word and of the love in our own minds—a path that we ourselves followed above (q. 27, a. 1 and 3). Therefore, the Trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.

Objection 3: It seems unnecessary (*superfluum*) to hand down to men what cannot be known by human reason. But one should not claim that the divine teaching about the cognition of the Trinity is unnecessary. Therefore, the Trinity of persons can be known by human reason.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 2 Hilary says, "Let no man think that by his own intelligence he can grasp the sacred mystery of the generation." Likewise, Ambrose says, "It is impossible to know the secret of the generation. The mind falls short, the voice is silent." But as is clear from what was said above (q. 30, a. 2), it is through origin, i.e., generation and procession, that the three divine persons (*trinitas in divinis personis*) are distinguished. Therefore, since man cannot know or grasp with his intelligence that for which a necessary argument cannot be had, it follows that the Trinity of persons cannot be known by natural reason.

I respond: It is impossible to arrive at the cognition of the Trinity of divine persons by natural reason. For it was shown above (q. 12, a. 4 and 11 and 12) that by natural reason man cannot arrive at a cognition of God except on the basis of creatures. But creatures lead us to a cognition of God in the way that an effect leads us to a cognition of its cause. Therefore, what we can know about God by natural reason is only what must belong to Him insofar as He is the origin of all beings; and this is the foundation we used above (q. 12, a. 12) in our consideration of God. But God's creative power is common to the whole Trinity and thus pertains to the oneness of the essence, not to the distinction among the persons. Therefore, what can be known about God by natural reason are those things that pertain to the oneness of the essence, but not those things that pertain to the distinction among the persons.

In fact, one who tries to prove the Trinity of persons by natural reason damages the Faith in two ways.

First of all, he detracts from the dignity of the Faith itself, since it has this dignity insofar as it is about invisible things that surpass human reason. This is why the Apostle says at Hebrews 11:1 that faith is about things that are not evident. And in 1 Corinthians 2:6 the Apostle says, "We speak wisdom among the perfect—yet not the wisdom of this world or of the princes of this world. But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden."

Second, he undermines the possibility of drawing others to the Faith. For when, in an attempt to prove the Faith, he adduces arguments that are not cogent, he exposes the Faith to the ridicule of non-believers. For they come to think that we rely on arguments of this sort and that we hold the Faith because of them.

Therefore, one should attempt to prove matters of Faith only through the authoritative writings and only to those who accept the authoritative writings. As for the others, it is enough to show them that what the Faith teaches is not impossible. Thus, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says, "If there is someone who completely resists the writings, then he is far from our philosophy; but if he accepts the writings [*read*: the sacred writings] as the truth, then we likewise make use of the canonical writings."

Reply to objection 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the Trinity of divine persons through their properties, i.e., through the Paternity, the Filiation, and the Procession. This is why the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 2:6, "We speak the wisdom of God, which none of the princes of this world knew"—i.e. (according to a Gloss), "which none of the philosophers knew."

However, they did come to know certain of the attributes which pertain to the essence and which, as will become clear below (q. 39, a. 7), are *appropriated* to the persons, e.g., the power appropriated to the Father, the wisdom appropriated to the Son, and the goodness appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

What Aristotle said ("Through this number we bring ourselves . . .") should not be taken to mean that he is positing the number three in God. Rather, he means to say that the ancients used the number three in their sacrifices and prayers because of a certain perfection associated with the number three.

Again, in the books of the Platonists one finds "In the beginning was the Word," not because 'the Word' signifies the divine person who is generated, but rather because 'the Word' means the ideal pattern (*ratio idealis*) through which God created all things and which is appropriated to the Son.

And even though they knew of things that are appropriated to the three persons, they are nonetheless said to fail in the third sign, i.e., in their knowledge of the third person, because they deviated from the goodness that is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. For as Romans 1:21 puts it, "Knowing God, they did not glorify Him as God."

An alternative reply is that, as Macrobius reports in *Super Somnium Scipionis*, the Platonists posited a single first being, whom they also asserted to be the father of the whole universe, and as a result they claimed that there was another substance subordinate to him, whom they called the father's Mind or Intellect and in whom existed the ideas of all things—though they did not posit a separate third substance

which, it seems, would have corresponded to the Holy Spirit. However, we do not think of the Father and Son in this way, as differing in substance; rather, this was the error of Origen and Arius, who followed the Platonists in this.

As for what Trismegistus said, viz., “Monad begot monad, and in Himself He reflected His own ardor,” this should be taken to refer not to the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, but rather to the production of the world. For the one God produced the one world because of His love for Himself.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which an explanation is adduced for a given subject matter:

In the first way, it is adduced to provide *a sufficient proof of some fundamental thesis (radix)*. For instance, in natural science a sufficient explanation is adduced to prove that a celestial body’s movement always has a uniform velocity.

In the second way, instead of being adduced in order to give a sufficient proof of a fundamental thesis, the explanation is adduced in order to show that *certain ensuing effects make sense once the thesis is posited (iam positae ostendat congruere consequentes effectus)*. For instance, in astronomy an explanation for eccentrics and epicycles is adduced from the fact that, once eccentrics and epicycles are posited, one can save the sensible appearances of celestial movements. However, this argument is not itself a sufficient proof for eccentrics and epicycles, since those appearances might also be able to be saved by some other hypothesis.

Thus, in the first way one can adduce an explanation proving that there is one God, along with other similar theses. By contrast, it is in the second way that an explanation is adduced to make the Trinity known—viz., because once the Trinity is posited, then certain considerations make sense, yet not in such a way that the Trinity of persons is sufficiently proved by those considerations.

This is clear from the examples.

God’s infinite goodness is manifested even in the production of creatures, since it takes an infinite power to produce something *ex nihilo*. For in order for God to communicate Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that something infinite should proceed from Him; rather, all that is necessary is that what proceeds from Him should receive the divine goodness according to its own mode.

Similarly, there is room for the claim that “the delightful possession of a good is impossible without fellowship” in the case of a person who does not by himself have perfect goodness. For such a person thus needs the good of someone else’s associating with him for the full goodness of delight.

Again, the similarity with our intellect does not sufficiently prove anything about God, since the intellect is not found univocally in God and in us. And this is why in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says that it is through faith that one comes to knowledge, and not vice versa.

Reply to objection 3: Knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us in two ways.

First, it was necessary in order for us think correctly about the creation of things. For by holding that God made all things by His Word, we exclude the error of those who claim that God produced things by a necessity of nature. And by positing the procession of the Love in God, we show that God produced creatures not because of any need on His part or because of any other extrinsic cause, but because of the love of His own goodness. Hence, after Moses had said, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” he added, “God said, ‘Let there be light’” in order to make known the divine Word; and afterwards he said, “God saw that the light was good” in order to make manifest the approval of God’s Love. And the same holds for His other works.

Second, and more importantly, knowledge of the divine persons was necessary in order for us to think correctly about the salvation of the human race, which is perfected through the Incarnate Son and through the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Article 2

Should notions be posited in God?

It seems that notions (*notiones*) should not be posited in God:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, “No one should dare to say anything about God beyond those things that are expressed to us in the sacred writings.” But there is no mention of the notions in the writings of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, notions should not be posited in God.

Objection 2: Whatever is posited in God pertains either to the oneness of the essence or to the Trinity of persons. But the notions pertain neither to the oneness of the essence nor to the Trinity of persons. For what belongs to the essence is not predicated of the notions; for instance, we do not say that the Paternity creates or that the Paternity is wise. Nor, again, is what belongs to the persons predicated of the notions; for instance, we do not say that the Paternity generates or that the Filiation is generated. Therefore, notions should not be posited in God.

Objection 3: Abstract entities that are principles of knowing should not be posited in simple beings, since simple beings are known in themselves. But the divine persons are the most simple of beings. Therefore, notions should not be posited in the divine persons.

But contrary to this: John Damascene says, “We recognize the difference among the hypostases [*read: the persons*] in the three properties, i.e., in the paternal, filial, and processional properties.” Therefore, we should posit properties and notions in God.

I respond: Praepositivus, focusing on the simplicity of the persons, claimed that properties and notions should not be posited in God, and so whenever they are mentioned, he explains the abstract form in terms of the concrete form. For instance, just as we are accustomed to saying ‘I beg your kindness’ for ‘I beg you, who are kind’, so too when someone says ‘Paternity’ in the case of God, what is understood is ‘God the Father’.

However, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 3 and q. 13, a. 1), the fact that we use both concrete and abstract names for God does not undermine God’s simplicity. For we name in accord with the way in which we understand. But our intellect cannot attain to God’s simplicity, considered in itself, and so it apprehends and names divine realities according to its own mode, i.e., to the extent that those realities are found in the sensible things from which our intellect takes its cognition. In the case of sensible things, we use abstract names to signify simple forms, whereas we use concrete names to signify subsistent entities. Hence, as was explained above (*ibid.*), we signify divine realities both with abstract names because of God’s simplicity and also with concrete names because of God’s subsistence and completeness.

However, it is not only the names that pertain to God’s essence that we must signify in the abstract and the concrete—as when we say ‘divinity’ (*deitas*) and ‘God’, or ‘wisdom’ and ‘wise’—but also the names that pertain to the persons, as when we say ‘Paternity’ and ‘Father’.

There are two main considerations that compel us to do this.

The first consideration is the threat posed by heretics. For when we confess that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God and three persons, to those who ask us for that by which they are one God and for that by which they are three persons, just as we respond that they are one by their essence, i.e., by their divinity (*deitas*), so, too, we had to have certain abstract names by reference to which we could respond that the persons are distinguished. And the properties and notions signified abstractly, e.g., ‘Paternity’ and ‘Filiation’, are abstract names of this sort. So the essence in God is signified as a ‘what’ (*ut quid*), a person is signified as a ‘who’ (*ut quis*), and a property is signified as a

‘that by which’ (*ut quo*).

The second consideration is that one of the persons in God is related to two persons—viz., the person of the Father is related to the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Spirit—but not by just a single relation. For if the Father were related to them by just a single relation, then it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit are likewise related to the Father by one and the same relation; and thus, since in God it is only the relations that multiply the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not two persons.

Nor can one claim, as Praepositivus did, that just as God is related in a single way to creatures even though creatures are related in diverse ways to Him, so too the Father is related by a single relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit even though they are related by two relations to the Father. For since the specific nature of a relation consists in its reference to another, one must claim that two relations do not differ in species if there is just a single opposed relation corresponding to both of them. For instance, *being a master* (*esse dominus*) and *being a father* (*esse pater*) are relations of different species because of the difference between [the opposed relations] *being a servant* (*servitudo*) and *being a son* (*filiatio*).

Moreover, all creatures are related to God by a single species of relation because they are His creatures, whereas the Son and the Holy Spirit are not related to the Father by relations of a single kind. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Again, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 1), no real relation to creatures is required in God, and there is no absurdity involved in multiplying relations of reason in God. By contrast, it has to be by real relations that the Father is related to the Son and the Holy Spirit, and so corresponding to the two relations by which the Son and the Holy Spirit are related to the Father, we must understand two relations in the Father by which He is related to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. Hence, since there is just one person of the Father, these relations had to be signified in the abstract, and it is these abstract designations that are called properties and notions.

Reply to objection 1: Even though no mention is made of the notions in Sacred Scripture, mention is made of the persons, in whom the notions are understood as something abstract contained in something concrete.

Reply to objection 2: The notions are signified in God not as entities (*res*) but as certain characteristics (*rationes*) by which the persons are known—even though, as noted above (q. 28, a. 1), the notions or relations themselves exist in reality in God. And so that which is ordered toward an act pertaining to the essence or toward a person cannot be predicated of the notions, since this conflicts with their [abstract] mode of signification. This is why we do not say that the Paternity generates, or that the Paternity creates, or that the Paternity is wise or intelligent.

On the other hand, that which pertains to the essence and is not ordered toward any act, but simply denies some creaturely condition of God, can be predicated of the notions. For instance, we can say that the Paternity is eternal or unmeasured (*immensa*) or other things of this sort.

Similarly, because of the identity of the realities, substantial names pertaining to the essence or the persons can be predicated of the notions. For instance, we can say that the Paternity is God and that the Paternity is the Father.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the persons are simple, nonetheless, as has been explained, the proper characteristics (*rationes*) of the persons can be signified in the abstract without undermining this simplicity.

Article 3

Are there five notions?

It seems that there are not five notions:

Objection 1: The proper notions of the persons are the relations by which they are distinguished. But as was explained above (q. 28, a. 4), there are only four relations in God. Therefore, there are likewise only four notions.

Objection 2: Because there is one essence in God, God is called one, whereas because there are three persons, God is called three. Therefore, if there were five notions in God, God would be called five—which is absurd.

Objection 3: If there are three persons in God and five notions, then in some of the persons there are two or more notions. For instance, in the person of the Father there is Innascibility and Paternity and Common Spiration. Therefore, either these three notions differ in reality or they do not. If they do differ in reality, then it follows that the person of the Father is composed of more than one reality. On the other hand, if they differ only conceptually, then it follows that one of them can be predicated of another—so that we can say that just as God's goodness is His wisdom because of the undifferentiated character of the reality, so too the Common Spiration is the Paternity. But this is not admissible. Therefore, there are not five notions.

But contrary to this: It seems that there are more than five notions:

1. Just as the Father is such that He is not from any person, from which stems the notion that is called Innascibility, so too the Holy Spirit is such that no other person is from Him. Accordingly, there must be a sixth notion.

2. Just as it is common to the Father and the Son that the Holy Spirit proceeds from them, so too it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit that they proceed from the Father. Therefore, just as a notion is posited that is common to the Father and the Son, so a notion should be posited that is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit.

I respond: What is called a *notion* is a proper characteristic (*ratio*) for knowing a divine person. Now the divine persons are multiplied according to their origin, and what pertains to origin is (a) *being such that another is from you (a quo alius)* and (b) *being such that you are from another (qui ab alio)*. Accordingly, there are two ways in which a person can be known.

Thus, the person of the Father can be known not from His being from another, but from the fact that He is from no one, and so in this respect His notion is Innascibility. However, insofar as someone is from Him, He is known in two respects. On the other hand, insofar as the Son is from Him, He is known by the notion of Paternity, while insofar as the Holy Spirit is from Him, He is known by the notion of Common Spiration.

The Son, on the other hand, can be known (a) from the fact that He is from another who begets Him, in which respect He is known by Filiation, and (b) from the fact that another, viz., the Holy Spirit, is from Him, and in this respect He is known in the same way as the Father, viz., by Common Spiration.

The Holy Spirit can be known from the fact that He is from another or, better, from the others, and in this respect He is known by Procession. However, He is not known through another's being from Him, since no divine person proceeds from Him.

Thus, there are five *notions* in God, viz., Innascibility, Paternity, Filiation, Common Spiration, and Procession. But only four of these are *relations*, since, as will be explained below (q. 33, a. 4), Innascibility is not a relation except by reduction. Moreover, only four of the notions are *properties*; for Common Spiration is not a property, since it belongs to two persons. On the other hand, three of the

notions are *personal*, i.e., constitutive of persons, viz., Paternity, Filiation, and Procession. For as will be explained in more detail below (q. 40, a. 1), Common Spiration and Innascibility are called ‘notions of persons’, but not ‘personal notions’ (*dicuntur notiones personarum, non autem personales*).

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, it is necessary to posit one other notion beyond the four relations.

Reply to objection 2: In God the essence is signified as a sort of entity (*res quaedam*) and, similarly, the persons are signified as certain entities (*res quaedam*). The notions, however, are signified as characteristics (*rationes*) that make the persons known. And so even though God is called one because of the oneness of the essence and three because of the Trinity of persons, it is nonetheless not the case that God is called five because of the five notions.

Reply to objection 3: Since a single relational opposition makes for a real plurality in God, it follows that a plurality of properties for one person, when they are not relationally opposed to one another, do not differ in reality. Yet neither are they predicated of one another, since they are signified as diverse characteristics (*rationes*) of the persons. In the same way, neither do we say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge, even though we do say that God’s knowledge is His power.

Reply to argument 1 for the contrary: Since, as was explained above (q. 29, a. 3), ‘person’ implies dignity, there is no notion for the Holy Spirit stemming from the fact that no person is from Him. For this does not pertain to His dignity in the way that it does pertain to the Father’s authorship (*auctoritas*) that He is from no one.

Reply to argument 2 for the contrary: The Son and the Holy Spirit do not share one specific way of being from the Father (*non conveniunt in uno speciali modo existendi a patre*)—in the way that the Father and the Son do share one specific way of producing the Holy Spirit. But a principle of cognition has to be something specific. And so the arguments are not parallel.

Article 4

Are contrary opinions about the notions permissible?

It seems that contrary opinions about the notions are not permissible:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says that nowhere is error more dangerous than on the topic of the Trinity, to which the notions are certainly relevant. But contrary opinions cannot exist without error. Therefore, contrary opinions about the notions are impermissible.

Objection 2: As has been explained, the persons are known through the notions. But contrary opinions about the persons are impermissible. Therefore, so are contrary opinions about the notions.

But contrary to this: There are no articles of the Faith concerning the notions. Therefore, different opinions on the one side and the other about the notions are permissible.

I respond: There are two ways in which something can pertain to the Faith:

First of all, something can pertain to the Faith *directly*, as with the principal things that are divinely revealed to us, e.g., that God is one and three, that the Son of God is incarnate, etc. Having a false opinion about these things by its very nature involves heresy, especially if it is accompanied by stubbornness.

Second, things that pertain to the Faith *indirectly* are such that something contrary to the Faith follows from them. For instance, if someone were to claim that Samuel was not the son of Elkanah, then from this it would follow that divine Scripture is false. Someone could hold a false opinion about this sort of thing without the danger of heresy—at least prior to its being discovered or determined that

something contrary to the Faith follows from it, and especially if he did not adhere to it obstinately. However, once it has been made clear that something contrary to the Faith follows from it—and especially if this has been determined by the Church—then one would no longer be able to err in this matter without heresy.

Because of this, there are many views which are now considered heretical but which were not considered heretical in previous times. The reason is that it is now more clear just what follows from these views.

So, then, concerning the notions one should say that there were those who held contrary views without the danger of heresy and who did not intend to hold anything contrary to the Faith. But if someone were to hold a false opinion about the notions even while acknowledging that something contrary to the Faith followed from that opinion, then he would fall into heresy.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 33

The Person of the Father

Next we have to consider the persons in particular—and, first, the person of the Father.

On this topic there are four questions: (1) Does it belong to the Father to be a principle? (2) Is the person of the Father properly signified by the name ‘Father’? (3) Is ‘Father’ said of God as it pertains to a person prior to its being said of God as it pertains to the essence? (4) Is it proper to the Father to be unbegotten?

Article 1

Can the Father be called a principle of the Son or of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that the Father cannot be called a principle (*principium*) of the Son or of the Holy Spirit:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher, a principle is the same as a cause. But we do not say that the Father is a cause of the Son. Therefore, we should not say that He is a principle of the Son.

Objection 2: ‘Principle’ is said with respect to that which is begun (*principiatum*). Therefore, if the Father is a principle of the Son, it follows that the Son is such that He is begun and, consequently, created. But this seems to be erroneous.

Objection 3: The name ‘principle’ comes from the name ‘priority’. But as the Athanasian creed says, in God “there is nothing prior or posterior.” Therefore, in the case of God we should not use the name ‘principle’.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “The Father is the principle of the whole divinity (*deitas*).”

I respond: The name ‘principle’ signifies nothing other than that from which something proceeds. For anything from which something proceeds in any way at all is such that we call it a principle, and vice versa. Therefore, since the Father is such that another proceeds from Him, it follows that the Father is a principle.

Reply to objection 1: The Greeks use the name ‘cause’ (*aitia*) and the name ‘principle’ (*arche*) indifferently in the case of God, whereas the Latin doctors use only the name ‘principle’ and not the name ‘cause’. The reason for this is that ‘principle’ is more general than ‘cause’, just as ‘cause’ is more general than ‘element’. For the first beginning point (*terminus*) of a thing, as well as the first part of a thing, is called a principle, but not a cause.

Now, as was explained above (q. 13, a. 2), the more general a name is, the more appropriate it is to use it in the case of God. For the more specific a name is, the more it is tied to a mode that belongs to creatures. Hence, the name ‘cause’ seems to imply a diversity of substance and a dependence of one thing on another—which the name ‘principle’ does not imply. For with every type of cause there is always a distance in perfection or power between the cause and what it is a cause of. By contrast, we use the name ‘principle’ even in cases where there is no difference of this sort, but only a difference in ordering—as when we say that a point is the principle or beginning of a line or, again, when we say that the first part of a line is a principle or beginning of the line.

Reply to objection 2: Among the Greeks it is customary to say that the Son and the Holy Spirit are such that they are begun (*principari*). However, this is not common usage among our doctors. For even though we attribute a certain authorship (*auctoritas*) to the Father in virtue of His being a principle, nonetheless, in order to avoid an occasion of error, we do not in any way attribute subordination or inferiority to the Son or the Holy Spirit. As Hilary puts it in *De Trinitate* 9, “The Father is the greater because of the honor attached to giving, but the Son is not the lesser in virtue of being the one to whom

the gift is given.”

Reply to objection 3: Even though with respect to *that because of which* it is imposed to signify, the name ‘principle’ is taken from ‘priority’, it nonetheless does not signify priority, but instead signifies origin. For as was explained above (q. 13, aa. 2 and 8), *that which* a name signifies is not the same as *that because of which* it is imposed to signify.

Article 2

Is the name ‘Father’ properly speaking the name of a divine person?

It seems that the name ‘Father’ is not properly speaking the name of a divine person:

Objection 1: The name ‘Father’ signifies a relation. But a person is an individual substance. Therefore, the name ‘Father’ is not properly speaking a name that signifies a person.

Objection 2: ‘One that generates’ (*generans*) is more general than ‘father’, since every father is one that generates, but not vice versa. But as has been explained (a. 1), the more general name is the one that is more properly said of God. Therefore, ‘One that generates’ or ‘Begetter’ (*genitor*) is a more appropriate name for a divine person than ‘Father’ is.

Objection 3: Nothing that is said metaphorically can be the name of anything properly speaking. But in our case, a word is metaphorically said to be begotten or to be an offspring and, as a result, the one who utters the word is metaphorically called its ‘father’. Therefore, the principle of the Word in God cannot properly speaking be called ‘Father’.

Objection 4: Everything that is properly said of God is said of God in a way that is prior to its being said of creatures. But ‘generation’ seems to be said of creatures prior to its being said of God. For a generation seems to be more genuine when that which proceeds from the other is distinct from that other not only with respect to a relation but with respect to its essence as well. Therefore, the name ‘father’, which is taken from generation, does not properly speaking seem to be the name of any divine person.

But contrary to this: Psalm 88:27 says, “He shall cry out to me: You are my Father.”

I respond: The proper name of a person signifies that by which the person in question is distinguished from all others. For according to *Metaphysics* 7, just as soul and body belong to the nature of man, so *this* soul and *this* body belong to our understanding of *this* man, and they are what distinguish this man from all others. But that by which the person of the Father is distinguished from all other persons is the Paternity. Hence, the proper name of the person of the Father is the name ‘Father’, which signifies the Paternity.

Reply to objection 1: Among us a relation is not a subsistent person, and so among us the name ‘father’ signifies not a person but a relation belonging to a person. But, contrary to the false opinion held by some, this is not the way it is with God. For in God the relation that the name ‘Father’ signifies is a subsistent person. Hence, it was explained above (q. 29, a. 4) that in God the name ‘person’ signifies a relation as subsisting in the divine nature.

Reply to objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 2, the designation of a thing should be derived especially from its perfection and completion. But ‘generation’ signifies a thing as coming into being (*fieri*), whereas ‘paternity’ signifies the completion of a generation. And so the name ‘Father’ is a better name for a divine person than is ‘One that generates’ or ‘Begetter’.

Reply to objection 3: In a human nature a word is not something subsistent, and this is why it cannot properly be said to be begotten or to be a son. By contrast, in the divine nature the divine Word is

something that subsists. Thus, He is properly, and not metaphorically, called the Son, and His principle is properly, and not metaphorically, called the Father.

Reply to objection 4: With respect to the thing that is signified, though not with respect to their mode of signifying, the names ‘generation’ and ‘paternity’, like the other names that are properly said of God, are said of God in a way prior to their being said of creatures. This is why the Apostle says at Ephesians 3:14-15, “For this cause I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named.”

This is evident as follows. It is clear that generation takes its species from its terminus, which is the form of the thing that is generated. And the closer this form is to the form of the one that generates, the more genuine and more perfect the generation is (*quanto haec fuerit propinquior formae generantis, tanto verior et perfectior est generatio*). For instance, a univocal generation is more perfect than a non-univocal generation, since it belongs to the nature of the thing that generates that it should generate something similar to itself in form. Hence, the very fact that in the divine generation the one who generates and the one who is generated have numerically the same form—whereas in created things the form is the same only in species and not numerically—shows that generation and thus paternity exist in God in a way that is prior to their existing in creatures. Hence, the very fact that in God the distinction between the one who generates and the one who is generated is only relational pertains to the genuineness of the divine generation and the divine paternity.

Article 3

Is the name ‘Father’ said of God in the first place with respect to a person?

It seems that the name ‘Father’ is not said of God in the first place with respect to a person:

Objection 1: What is conceptually common is prior to what is conceptually proper. But insofar as the name ‘Father’ is taken for a [divine] person, it is proper to the person of the Father, whereas insofar as it is taken for the essence, it is common to the whole Trinity, since we say ‘Our Father’ to the whole Trinity. Therefore, the name ‘Father’ is taken for the essence prior to its being taken for a person.

Objection 2: There is no prior or posterior predication in the case of names that have the same definition. But paternity and filiation seem to be predicated with the same definitions in (a) ‘A divine person is the Father of the Son’ and (b) ‘The whole Trinity is our Father, i.e., the Father of creatures’. For according to Basil, to receive something is common to both the Son and creatures. Therefore, ‘Father’ is not predicated of God with respect to the essence prior to its being predicated with respect to a person, [or vice versa].

Objection 3: There can be a comparison only between names that are predicated with a single definition. But according to Colossians 1:15 (“... who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature”), the Son is comparable to creatures in the concepts of filiation and generation. Therefore, ‘paternity’ is not taken for a person in God prior to being taken for the essence; rather, it is taken with the same definition in both cases.

But contrary to this: The eternal is prior to the temporal. But from eternity God is the Father of the Son, whereas it is from a given point in time that God is the Father of creatures. Therefore, ‘paternity’ is said of God with respect to the Son prior to its being said with respect to creatures.

I respond: A name is predicated of something in which the whole meaning of the name is perfectly preserved prior to its being predicated of something in which the meaning is preserved only in a certain respect (*secundum aliquid*). For it is predicated of the latter because of a certain likeness to that

in which the meaning is perfectly preserved, since everything imperfect is taken from what is perfect. Thus it is that the name 'lion' is said of the animal in which the whole meaning of 'lion' is preserved and which is properly called a lion prior to its being said of a man in whom something of the nature of a lion is found, e.g., audacity or courage, etc. For it is said of the man because of a likeness.

Now it is clear from what was said above (q. 27, a. 2 and q. 28, a. 4) that the *perfect meaning* of paternity and filiation is found in God the Father and God the Son, since the Father and the Son are one in nature and in glory.

By contrast, the filiation with respect to God that is found in a creature is not in keeping with this perfect meaning, but only in keeping with a certain likeness, since the creator and the creature are not one in nature. And the more perfect the likeness is, the more closely it approaches the genuine nature of filiation.

For instance, according to Job 38:28 ("Who is the father of rain? Or who begot the drops of dew?"), God is said to be the Father of certain creatures, viz., non-rational creatures, only because of a certain *vestigial likeness*.

By contrast, according to Deuteronomy 32:6 ("Is not He your father, that has possessed you, and made you, and created you?"), He is the Father of certain other creatures, viz., rational creatures, according to a *likeness of image*.

Moreover, according to Romans 8:16-17 ("For the Spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also"), He is the Father of some according to a *likeness of grace*; these are called His adopted children insofar as they are ordered to the inheritance of eternal glory through the gift of grace they have received.

Finally, according to Romans 5:2 ("We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God"), He is the Father of some according to a *likeness of glory*, insofar as they already possess the inheritance of glory.

So, then, it is clear that 'paternity' is predicated of God insofar as it implies the relation of one person to another prior to its being predicated of Him insofar as it implies a relation of God to creatures.

Reply to objection 1: According to the order of our intellect, common names, predicated absolutely, are prior to proper names, since common names are included in our understanding of proper names, but not vice versa. For instance, our concept of the person of the Father includes the concept *God*, but is not convertible with it.

However, common names that imply a relation to creatures are predicated of God posterior to the predication of proper names that imply the relations among the [divine] persons, since a person who proceeds in God proceeds as a principle for the production of creatures. For just as a word conceived in the mind of the craftsman is understood to proceed from the craftsman prior to the procession of the artifact, which is produced as a likeness of the word conceived in the mind, so too the Son proceeds from the Father prior to the procession of creatures, of whom the name 'filiation' is predicated insofar as they have some participation in a likeness of the Son. This is clear from Romans 8:29, "Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son."

Reply to objection 2: To receive is said to be common to creatures and to the Son not univocally, but according to a certain remote likeness by reason of which the Son is called the firstborn of creatures. Hence, in the passage cited [in objection 3] it is added that He is the firstborn among many brothers, after [the Apostle] had already said that some have been conformed to image of the Son of God.

However, the Son of God has by nature a singular status over the others, viz., having *by His nature* that which He receives, as Basil himself says. Accordingly, as is clear from John 1:18 ("The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him"), He is called the 'Only-begotten'.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to this objection is clear from what has already been said.

Article 4

Is it proper to the Father to be unbegotten?

It seems that it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten (*ingenitum*):

Objection 1: Every property posits some reality in that of which it is the property. But ‘unbegotten’ merely denies something of the Father and does not posit anything in Him. Therefore, it does not signify a property of the Father.

Objection 2: ‘Unbegotten’ is predicated either as a privation or as a negation. If it is predicated as a negation, then whatever is not begotten can be called ‘unbegotten’. But the Holy Spirit is not begotten, and neither is the divine essence. Therefore, to be unbegotten belongs to them as well and so is not proper to the Father. On the other hand, if ‘unbegotten’ is predicated as a privation, then since every privation signifies an imperfection in the thing that has the privation, it follows that the person of the Father is imperfect—which is impossible.

Objection 3: In the case of God, ‘unbegotten’ does not signify a relation, since it is not predicated relationally. Therefore, it signifies the substance. Therefore, what is unbegotten differs in substance from what is begotten. But the Son, who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore, the Father should not be said to be unbegotten.

Objection 4: What is proper belongs to just one person. But in God since there is more than one person who proceeds from another, it seems that nothing prevents it from being the case that there should be more than one person who is not from another. Therefore, it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten.

Objection 5: Just as the Father is a principle of the person who is begotten, so too He is a principle of the person who proceeds. Therefore, if one should claim that being unbegotten is proper to the Father because of the [relational] opposition that He has to the begotten person, then one should likewise claim that it is proper to Him that He does not proceed.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “One is from One, i.e., the begotten One is from the unbegotten One, viz., by the property in each, respectively, of Innascibility and Origin.”

I respond: Just as, among creatures, there are first principles and secondary principles, so too, among the divine persons, in whom there is no prior or posterior, there is a *principle-not-from-a-principle*, which is the Father, and a *principle-from-a-principle*, which is the Son.

Now among created things a first principle is known in two ways: (a) in one way, insofar as it is a first principle in virtue of having a relation to those things that are from it; and (b) in a second way, insofar as it is a first principle in virtue of its not itself being from another. So, then, the Father is likewise known by the Paternity and the Common Spiration in virtue of His relation to the persons who proceed from Him, whereas insofar as He is a *principle-not-from-a-principle*, He is known in virtue of the fact that He is not from another—which pertains to the property of Innascibility and which is signified by the name ‘unbegotten’.

Reply to objection 1: Some claim that insofar as Innascibility, which is signified by the name ‘unbegotten’, is a property of the Father, it is not just predicated as a negation, but instead either (a) signifies both things at the same time, viz., that the Father is from no one and that He is a principle of the others, or else (b) signifies [just] universal authorship (*universalis auctoritas*) or, again, originating fullness (*fontalis plenitudo*).

But this does not seem true. For if it were so, then Innascibility would not be a property different from Paternity and [Common] Spiration, but would instead include them in the way that what is common

includes what is proper. For ‘origination’ (*fontalitas*) and ‘authorship’ (*auctoritas*) signify nothing in God other than the principle of origin.

Thus, one should say instead, with Augustine in *De Trinitate* 5, that ‘unbegotten’ implies the negation of passive generation; for Augustine says, “‘Unbegotten’ means exactly what ‘not the Son’ means.” Nor does it follow from this that ‘unbegotten’ should not be posited as a proper notion of the Father. For first things and simple things are known through negations; for instance, we say that a point is that which has no parts.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Unbegotten’ is sometimes taken just as a negation. This is the sense in which Jerome says that the Holy Spirit is unbegotten, i.e., not begotten.

Alternatively, ‘unbegotten’ can in some sense be predicated as a privation, though not as a privation that implies an imperfection. For ‘privation’ has several meanings:

In one sense, there is a privation when a thing lacks something that another thing is apt to have, even if it itself is not apt to have it—as, for instance, if a rock were said to be a dead thing because it lacks life, which certain other things are apt to have.

In a second sense, there is a privation when a thing lacks something that is apt to be had by some member of its own genus—as, for instance, if moles were said to be blind.

In a third sense, there is a privation when a thing lacks something that it itself is apt to have, and this is the sense in which ‘privation’ implies an imperfection.

Now ‘unbegotten’ is not predicated as a privation of the Father in this third sense, though it may be predicated of Him in the second sense, viz., insofar as one suppositum of the divine nature is not begotten, whereas some other suppositum of that nature is begotten. But on this meaning ‘unbegotten’ can likewise be predicated of the Holy Spirit.

Hence, in order for ‘unbegotten’ to be proper to the Father alone, we must understand something further in the name ‘unbegotten’, viz., that it belongs to a divine person who is a principle of another person; and in this sense the name is understood to imply a negation in the genus *principle* insofar as it is predicated of God with respect to a person.

Alternatively, we might understand in the name ‘unbegotten’ that what is unbegotten is such that it is *in no way* from another—and not just that it is not from another *through generation*. In this sense it does not belong to the Holy Spirit to be unbegotten, since the Holy Spirit is from another as a subsistent person through the Procession. Neither does it in this sense belong to the divine essence to be unbegotten, since the divine essence can be said to be in the Son from another or in the Holy Spirit from another, viz., from the Father.

Reply to objection 3: According to Damascene, in one sense ‘unbegotten’ is the same as ‘uncreated’, and in this sense it is predicated of the [divine] substance. For it is through this that a created substance differs from an uncreated substance.

In a second sense, ‘unbegotten’ signifies what is not begotten. And in this sense it is predicated relationally, in the way that a negation is reduced to the genus of its corresponding affirmation—as ‘non-man’ is reduced to the genus of substance and ‘non-white’ is reduced to the genus of quality. Hence, since ‘begotten’ implies a relation in God, ‘unbegotten’ likewise pertains to a relation. And so it does not follow that the unbegotten Father is distinct in substance from the begotten Son; rather, all that follows is that they are distinct with respect to a relation, viz., insofar as the Son’s relation is denied of the Father.

Reply to objection 4: Just as it necessary to posit a first element in any genus, so too in the divine nature it is necessary to posit one principle which is not from another and which is called ‘unbegotten’. Therefore, to posit two innascible elements is to posit two gods and two divine natures. Hence, in *De Synodis* Hilary says, “Since God is one, there cannot be two innascibles.” This is mainly because if there were two innascibles, it would not be the case that one of them is from the other, and so they would not

be distinguished by a relational opposition; therefore, they would have to be distinguished by a diversity of nature.

Reply to objection 5: The property of the Father insofar as He is not from another is signified by the negation of the Son's begottenness (*nativitas*) rather than by the negation of the Holy Spirit's procession. This is because, first of all, as was remarked above (q. 27, a. 4), the procession of the Holy Spirit does not have a special name. Second, in the order of nature the procession of the Holy Spirit presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, once being begotten is denied of the Father, since He is nonetheless a principle of the generation, it follows as a consequence that He does not proceed by the procession of the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit is not a principle of generation, but is instead the one who proceeds from Him who has been begotten.

QUESTION 34

The Person of the Son: The Name 'Word'

Next we have to consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son, viz., 'Son', 'Word', and 'Image'. But the concept *Son* is taken from the concept *Father*. So it is 'Word' (question 34) and 'Image' (question 35) that remain to be considered.

As regards the name 'Word', there are three questions: (1) Is the name 'Word' said of God with respect to the divine essence or with respect to a person? (2) Is 'Word' a proper name of the Son? (3) Does the name 'Word' imply a relation to creatures?

Article 1

Is 'Word' the name of a person in God?

It seems that the name 'Word' is not the name of a person in God:

Objection 1: The names of the persons in God, e.g., 'Father' and 'Son', are predicated properly [and not metaphorically]. But as Origen says in *Super Ioannem*, 'Word' is predicated metaphorically of God. Therefore, 'Word' is not the name of a person in God.

Objection 2: According to Augustine in *De Trinitate*, "A word is a cognition (*notitia*) with love." And according to Anselm in the *Monologion*, "For the Highest Spirit, to speak is nothing other than to see by thinking (*cogitando*).” But cognition and thinking and seeing are said of God with respect to His essence. Therefore, 'Word' is not predicated of God with respect to a person.

Objection 3: It is part of the concept of a word that it should be spoken. But according to Anselm, just as the Father is intelligent and the Son is intelligent and the Holy Spirit is intelligent, so too the Father speaks and the Son speaks and the Holy Spirit speaks. And, similarly, each of them is spoken. Therefore, the name 'Word' is said of God with respect to the divine essence and not with respect to a person.

Objection 4: No divine person is a deed to be done (*factum*). But the Word of God is a deed to be done; for instance, Psalm 148:8 says, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which do His Word." Therefore, 'Word' is not the name of a person in God.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, "A word is related to that whose word it is in the same way that the Son is related to the Father." But 'Son' is the name of a person, since it is predicated relationally. Therefore, so is 'Word'.

I respond: As long as the name 'Word' is being used properly of God, it is the name of a person and in no way the name of the essence.

To see this clearly, notice that among us there are three senses in which the name 'word' is predicated properly and a fourth sense in which it is predicated improperly or figuratively.

In our case, what is most clearly and commonly called a word is that which is uttered vocally. This spoken word proceeds from within us with respect to the two aspects that are found in an exterior word, viz., (a) the sound itself and (b) the signification of that sound. For according to the Philosopher in *Perihermenias* 1, the sound signifies what is conceived by the intellect and, again, as he puts it in *De Anima* 2, the sound proceeds from the imagination. However, a sound that does not signify anything cannot be called a word. Thus, an exterior sound is called a word in virtue of the fact that it signifies something conceived interiorly by the mind (*quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum*).

So, then, (a) what is *first* and principally called a word is what is interiorly conceived by the mind, and (b) what is called a word in the *second* place is the sound that signifies what is interiorly conceived, and (c) what is called a word in the *third* place is the imagining of the sound. These are the three senses

of ‘word’ that Damascene posits in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 1, chap. 13, when he says, “What is called a word is the natural movement of the intellect in accord with which it moves and understands and thinks, like a light and shining beam”—this is the *first* of the above senses. “Second, a word is not what is uttered by the voice, but what is pronounced in the heart”—this is the *third* of the above senses. “Third, there is also the word that is an angel [*read*: a messenger] of the intelligence”—this is the *second* of the above senses. In the fourth sense, (d) what is called a word figuratively is what is either signified by a word or effected by a word. Thus, we customarily say, ‘This is the word I have spoken to you’, or ‘This is the word that the king has commanded’, indicating some deed that has been signified by the word of a mere herald or even of the one who is doing the commanding.

Now ‘Word’ is predicated properly of God insofar as ‘Word’ signifies what is conceived by the divine intellect. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “Whoever is able to conceive of a word not only before it is sounded, but even before the image of its sound is seized upon by thought, can grasp a likeness of that Word of whom it is said, ‘In the beginning was the Word’.” But what is conceived in the heart is by its nature such that it proceeds from another, viz., from the cognition of the one who conceives it (*ipse conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet a notitia concipientis*). Hence, insofar as ‘Word’ is said properly of God, it signifies something that proceeds from another, and this pertains to the nature of those names that are predicated of God with respect to a person. For as has been explained (q. 32, a. 3), the divine persons are distinguished by origin.

Hence, the name ‘Word’, insofar as it is used properly in the case of God, must be taken only as the name of a person and not as a name of the essence.

Reply to objection 1: The Arians, whose source is found in Origen, claimed that the Son is distinct from the Father by a diversity of substance. Hence, they tried to maintain that when the Son is called the Word of God, the term ‘Word’ is not being predicated properly—lest, by reason of the fact that the Word proceeds from the Father, they should be forced to admit that the Son of God does not exist outside the substance of the Father. For an interior word proceeds from the speaker in such a way that it remains within him.

However, even if one claims that ‘Word of God’ is predicated metaphorically, it must also be claimed that ‘Word of God’ is predicated properly. For nothing can be called a word metaphorically except by reason of a manifestation, since either (a) it makes something manifest like a word does, or else (b) it is itself made manifest by a word. Now if it is made manifest by a word, then one must posit a word by which it is made manifest. On the other hand, if it is called a word because it makes something manifest exteriorly, note that what makes something manifest exteriorly is called a word only insofar as it signifies something which is conceived interiorly by the mind and which one then makes manifest by means of exterior signs. Therefore, even if ‘Word’ is sometimes predicated metaphorically in the case of God, it is still necessary to claim that ‘Word’ is predicated properly, i.e., predicated with respect to a person.

Reply to objection 2: With the sole exception of the name ‘Word’, nothing that pertains to the intellect in God is predicated with respect to a person. For it is only ‘Word’ that signifies something that emanates from another, since a word is what the intellect forms when it conceives something.

By contrast, insofar as the intellect itself is made to act by an intelligible species, it is being considered absolutely [and not relationally]—and the same holds for an act of understanding, which is related to an acting intellect in the way that existing (*esse*) is related to an actual being (*similiter intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu sicut esse ad ens in actu*). For ‘to understand’ does not signify an action that *proceeds from* the one who is understanding, but instead signifies an action that *remains within* the one who is understanding. Therefore, when it is claimed that a word is a cognition (*notitia*), ‘cognition’ is not being taken for the knower’s act of understanding or for any habit of his; instead, it is being taken for what the intellect conceives in having a cognition (*sed pro eo quod*

intellectus concipit cognoscendo). This is why Augustine himself says that a word is “wisdom begotten,” which is nothing other than what is conceived by one who is wise, and which can also in a parallel manner be called a ‘cognition begotten’ (*notitia genita*).

This is also the way to understand the claim that for God to speak is for Him to “see by thinking”—viz., insofar as the Word of God is conceived by the vision of God’s thinking (*inquantum intuitu cogitationis divinae concipitur verbum Dei*). Still, the name ‘thinking’ does not properly apply to the Word of God. For in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “The name ‘Word of God’ is not predicated in the way that ‘thinking’ is predicated—lest one believe that in God there is something unstable, as it were, which at one time takes the form of the Word of God and then can lose that form and in some way wallow around without a form.” For thinking properly consists in inquiry after the truth, which has no place in God. But when the intellect has already attained to the form of truth, it is no longer thinking, but is instead contemplating the truth in a perfect manner. Hence, Anselm is taking ‘think’ in an improper sense for ‘contemplate’.

Reply to objection 3: Just as ‘Word’, properly speaking, is predicated of a person in God and not of the divine essence, so too it is with ‘speak’. Hence, just as ‘Word’ is not common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, so neither is it true that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one speaker. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “The one who speaks by that coeternal Word is understood as not being alone in God.”

On the other hand, ‘to be spoken’ belongs to each of the persons. For it is not only a word that is spoken, but also the thing that is understood or signified by the word. Therefore, it belongs to one person alone in God to be spoken in the way in which a word is spoken, but it belongs to each of the persons to be spoken in the way that the thing understood is spoken by a word. For it is in understanding Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and all the other things contained in His knowledge that the Father conceives the Word, with the result that the whole Trinity, and every creature as well, is spoken in that Word—just as a man’s intellect ‘speaks’ a rock with the word it conceives when it understands a rock.

Now Anselm is taking ‘speak’ in an improper sense for ‘understand’, though the two differ. For ‘understand’ implies just the relation of the one understanding to the thing understood, and this relation does not imply any sort of origin, but merely implies that our intellect has a form, since our intellect is made to act by the form of the thing that is understood. However, as was shown above (q. 14, a. 2 and 4), in God ‘understand’ implies complete identity, since in God the intellect is altogether the same as the thing understood. On the other hand, ‘speak’ principally implies a relation to the word that is conceived, since to speak is nothing other than to utter a word; however, by the mediation of the word, ‘speak’ also implies a relation to the thing understood, which is made manifest by the uttered word to someone who understands that word.

And so only the person who utters the Word is speaking in God, even though each of the persons both understands and is understood—and, as a consequence, is spoken by the Word.

Reply to objection 4: In this passage ‘Word’ is being taken figuratively, since what is being called a ‘Word’ is that which is signified or effected by a word. For creatures are said to do the word of God insofar as they bring about an effect to which they are ordained by the conceived Word of divine wisdom. In the same way, someone is said to do the word of a king when he does some deed to which he has been prompted by the king’s word.

Article 2

Is ‘Word’ a proper name of the Son?

It seems that ‘Word’ is not a proper name of the Son:

Objection 1: The Son is a subsistent person in God. But ‘Word’ does not signify a subsistent thing, as is clear in our own case. Therefore, ‘Word’ cannot be a proper name of the person of the Son.

Objection 2: A word proceeds from the speaker by way of an utterance. Therefore, if the Son is, properly speaking, the ‘Word’, then He proceeds from the Father only by means of an utterance. But as is clear from Augustine in *De Haeresibus*, this is the heresy of Valentinus.

Objection 3: Every name that is proper to a [divine] person signifies some property of His. Therefore, if ‘Word’ is a proper name of the Son, then it will signify some property of His. And so there will more properties in God than those enumerated above (q. 32, a. 3).

Objection 4: If anyone understands, then he conceives a word in his understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore, there is a Word with respect to the Son (*filius est aliquod verbum*). And so ‘Word’ is not proper to the Son.

Objection 5: Hebrews 1:3 says of the Son, “He upholds all things by the word of his power.” Basil infers from this that the Holy Spirit is a Word with respect to the Son (*Basilus accepit quod spiritus sanctus sit verbum filii*). Therefore, it is not proper to the Son to be a Word.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “‘Word’ means the Son alone.”

I respond: In God the name ‘Word’, properly speaking, is taken with respect to a person, and it is a proper name of the person of the Son. For ‘Word’ signifies what emanates from the intellect, and, as was shown above (q. 27, a. 2), in God the person who proceeds by an emanation of the intellect is called the Son, and the relevant procession is called the generation. Hence, it follows that in God the Son alone is properly called the Word.

Reply to objection 1: In our case, to be (*esse*) and to understand (*intelligere*) are not the same, and so that which has intelligible *esse* in us does not pertain to our nature. But God’s *esse* is the same as His act of understanding, and so the Word of God is not an accident in Him or an effect of His; rather, it pertains to His very nature. And so it must be the case that the Word of God is something subsistent, since whatever exists in God’s nature is subsistent. This is why Damascene says, “The Word of God is substantial and a being in a hypostasis, whereas other words [*read: our words*] are powers of the soul.”

Reply to objection 2: As Hilary notes in *De Trinitate* 6, Valentinus was condemned not because—as the Arians misrepresented the matter—he claimed that the Son was begotten by an utterance, but rather, as is clear from Augustine in *De Haeresibus*, because of the various modes of utterance that he posited.

Reply to objection 3: The name ‘Word’ implies the same property implied by the name ‘Son’, and this is why Augustine says, “‘Word’ says the same thing as ‘Son’.” For the begottenness of the Son, which is His personal property, is signified by different names that are attributed to the Son in order to express the diverse aspects of His perfection. For the fact that He is connatural with the Father is expressed by the name ‘Son’; the fact that He is coeternal with the Father is expressed by the name ‘Splendor’; the fact that He is altogether similar to the Father is expressed by the name ‘Image’; and the fact that He is begotten in an immaterial mode is expressed by the name ‘Word’. And it was impossible to find any one name to designate all of these aspects.

Reply to objection 4: The Son understands in virtue of being God, since, as has been explained (a. 1), to understand is predicated of God with respect to the divine essence. However, the Son is God Begotten and not God Begetting. Hence, He understands not insofar as He produces the Word but

insofar as He is the Word that proceeds. For in God the Word that proceeds does not differ in reality from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the Word's source (*principium*) only by a relation.

Reply to objection 5: When it is said of the Son that "He upholds all things by the word of his power," the name 'word' is being taken figuratively for the effect of a word. Hence, a Gloss on this passage says that 'word' here means 'command', viz., insofar as it is because of the effect of the word's power that things are conserved in being, just as it is because of the word's power that things are brought into being.

Now when Basil interprets 'word' here as the Holy Spirit, he is speaking improperly and figuratively. For everything that is revelatory of someone can be called his word, and so the Holy Spirit is called the word of the Son by reason of the fact that He makes the Son manifest.

Article 3

Does the name 'Word' imply a relation to creatures?

It seems that the name 'Word' does not imply a relation to creatures:

Objection 1: Every effect that connotes a relation to creatures is predicated of God with respect to the divine essence. But, as has been explained (a. 1), 'Word' is predicated of God with respect to a person and not with respect to the essence. Therefore, 'Word' does not imply a relation to creatures.

Objection 2: Names that imply a relation to creatures, e.g., 'lord' and 'creator', are predicated of God from a given point in time. But 'Word' is predicated of God from eternity. Therefore, 'Word' does not imply a relation to creatures.

Objection 3: 'Word' implies a relation to that from which it proceeds. Therefore, if it implies a relation to creatures, then it follows that the Word proceeds from a creature.

Objection 4: There are many divine ideas, corresponding to the diverse relations to creatures. Therefore, if 'Word' implies a relation to creatures, it follows that in God there are many Words and not just one Word.

Objection 5: If 'Word' implies a relation to creatures, then this is only because creatures are known by God. But God knows not only beings, but also non-beings. Therefore, 'Word' will imply a relation to non-beings—which seems false.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "The name 'Word' signifies not only a relation to the Father, but also a relation to those things that are made through the Word by means of the operative power."

I respond: 'Word' implies a relation to creatures. For in knowing Himself, God knows every creature. But a word conceived in the mind represents each thing that is actually being understood. Hence, in our case there are different words corresponding to the different things that we understand. But since God understands Himself and all things by a single act, His single Word expresses not only the Father but all creatures as well. And just as God's knowledge of God is merely speculative (*cognoscitiva*) whereas His knowledge of creatures is both speculative and creative (*cognoscitiva et factiva*), so too the Word of God is merely expressive (*expressiva*) of that which is in God the Father, but is both expressive of and operative with respect to creatures. It is because of this that Psalm 32:9 says, "He spoke and they were made." For the Word implies a creative idea of the things that God makes.

Reply to objection 1: The name 'person' includes 'nature' in an oblique grammatical case, since a person is an individual substance with a rational nature. Therefore, the name of a divine person does not imply a relation to creatures as far as the personal relation is concerned, but instead implies only that

which pertains to the divine nature. However, nothing prevents it from implying a relation to creatures insofar as it includes the divine essence in its signification. For just as it is proper to the Son to be the Son, so too it is proper to Him to be God Begotten, i.e., the Creator Begotten. And it is in this way that a relation to creatures is implied by the name ‘Word’.

Reply to objection 2: Since relations follow upon actions, some names implying a relation of God to creatures—e.g., ‘create’, ‘govern’, and others of this sort—follow upon God’s action with respect to an exterior *transeunt* effect. Such names are predicated of God from a given point in time. On the other hand, some names—e.g., ‘know’, ‘will’, and others of this sort—imply a relation which follows upon an action that remains within the agent and does not pass into an exterior effect. And names of this sort are not predicated of God from a given point in time. It is a relation to creatures of this latter sort that is implied by the name ‘Word’.

Moreover, it is not true that names implying a relation of God to creatures are all predicated from a given point in time. Instead, the only names that are predicated of God from a given point in time are those which imply a relation that follows upon God’s action with respect to a *transeunt* exterior effect.

Reply to objection 3: Creatures are known by God through His essence and not by a knowledge that is taken from the creatures. Hence, it is not necessary for the Word to proceed from creatures, even though the Word expresses creatures.

Reply to objection 4: The name ‘idea’ is imposed mainly to signify a relation to creatures, and so it is used in the plural of God and does not pertain to a person. By contrast, the name ‘Word’ is imposed mainly to signify (a) a relation to the speaker of the Word and, as a consequence, (b) a relation to creatures insofar as God understands every creature in understanding Himself. For this reason, there is in God just a single Word, and the name ‘Word’ is predicated with respect to a person.

Reply to objection 5: God’s Word is of non-beings in just the way that God’s knowledge is of non-beings. For, as Augustine puts it, there is nothing less in God’s Word than in God’s knowledge.

Still, the Word both expresses and produces beings, but [merely] expresses and manifests non-beings.

QUESTION 35

The Person of the Son: The Name 'Image'

Next we have to consider the name 'Image'. On this topic there are two questions: (1) Is the name 'Image' said of God with respect to a person? (2) Is 'Image' a proper name of the Son?

Article 1

Is the name 'Image' said of God with respect to a person?

It seems that 'Image' is not said of God with respect to a person:

Objection 1: In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, "The divinity of the Holy Trinity is the same as the Image to which man was made." Therefore, 'Image' is predicated with respect to the essence and not with respect to a person.

Objection 2: In *De Synodis* Hilary says, "An image is an exactly similar species of the thing which is imaged." But 'species', i.e., 'form', is predicated of God with respect to the divine essence. Therefore, the same holds for 'Image'.

Objection 3: 'Image' derives from 'imitate' and so implies something prior and something posterior. But there is nothing prior or posterior in God. Therefore, 'Image' cannot be the name of a person in God.

But contrary to this: Augustine says, "What is more ridiculous than to predicate 'image' of oneself?" Therefore, 'Image' is predicated relationally in God, and so it is the name of a person.

I respond: It is part of the concept of an image that it is a likeness. But not just any likeness is sufficient for the concept of an image. Rather, an image is a likeness that exists within the same species as the thing [imaged], or at least has the appearance (*signum*) of the same species. Now among corporeal things, the appearance of the species seems especially to involve their shape (*figura*). For we see that it is different shapes, and not different colors, that correspond to animals differing in species. Hence, if the color of a thing is depicted on a wall, it is not said to be an image of that thing unless the thing's shape is also depicted. Still, even a likeness of species or shape is not itself sufficient. What is further required for the concept of an image has to do with its origin, since, as Augustine puts it in 83 *Quaestiones*, "One egg is not the image of another, because it does not come from the latter." Therefore, in order for something to be truly an image, it must proceed from another thing that is similar to it in species or that, at least, appears like it in species. But those things that imply procession or origin in God pertain to the persons. Hence, the name 'Image' is the name of a person.

Reply to objection 1: An image, properly speaking, proceeds in the likeness of the other. But that in whose likeness something proceeds is properly called an exemplar and only improperly an image. Still, it is in the latter sense that Augustine uses the name 'image' when he says that the divinity of the Holy Trinity is the image to which man was made.

Reply to objection 2: As it is used by Hilary in the definition of 'image', 'species' means a form in one thing that is derived from another thing. For an image is said to be the 'species' of a thing in the sense that what is made similar to a thing is called its 'form', because it has a form similar to that thing.

Reply to objection 3: Among the divine persons, 'imitating' does not signify 'being posterior to'. Rather, it means only 'being made similar to'.

Article 2

Is 'Image' a proper name of the Son?

It seems that the name 'Image' is not proper to the Son:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, the Holy Spirit is the Image of the Son. Therefore, 'Image' is not proper to the Son.

Objection 2: As Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, an image is a likeness together with derivation. But this belongs to the Holy Spirit, since He proceeds from another in a mode of likeness. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is an Image. And so it is not proper to the Son to be an Image.

Objection 3: According to 1 Corinthians 11:7 ("A man (*vir*) indeed ought not to cover his head: because he is the image and glory of God"), man (*homo*), too, is said to be the image of God. Therefore, it is not proper to the Son to be the Image of God.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, "The Son alone is the Image of the Father."

I respond: The Greek doctors generally claim that the Holy Spirit is the Image of the Father and the Son. By contrast, the Latin doctors attribute the name 'Image' only to the Son, since in the canonical Scriptures it is attributed only to the Son. For Colossians 1:15 says, "He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature," and Hebrews 1:3 says, "He is the brightness of His glory and the figure of His substance."

Some claim that the explanation for this is that the Son agrees with the Father not only in nature, but also in the notion *principle*, whereas the Holy Spirit does not agree in any of the notions with either the Father or the Son.

But this explanation does not seem adequate. For in the same way that, as Augustine puts it, there is no equality or inequality with respect to the relations in God, so too with respect to the relations there is no likeness of the sort that is required for the concept of an image.

Hence, others claim that the reason why the Holy Spirit cannot be called the Image of the Son is that there is no image of an image. Nor is the Holy Spirit the Image of the Father, since an image is related directly to that of which it is an image, whereas the Holy Spirit is related to the Father through the Son. Again, the Holy Spirit is not the Image of the Father and the Son together, since if He were, then there would be one image of two [persons]—which seems impossible. Hence, it follows that the Holy Spirit is in no way an image.

But this argument comes to naught. For as will be explained below (q. 36, a. 4), the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, and so given that they are a single principle, nothing prevents the Father and the Son from having an image. After all, a man is a single image of the whole Trinity.

So we must reply in a different way: Just as the Holy Spirit is not said to be begotten even though He receives the nature of the Father by a procession just as the Son does, so too He is not called an Image even though He receives a species similar to that of the Father. For the Son proceeds as the Word, and it is of the very nature of a word to be a likeness of the species with respect to that from which it proceeds. However, this does not belong to the nature of love—even though it does belong to the Love, who is the Holy Spirit, insofar as He is the divine Love.

Reply to objection 1: Damascene and the other Greek doctors generally use the name 'image' to mean 'perfect likeness'.

Reply to objection 2: Even though the Holy Spirit is similar to the Father and the Son, it still does not follow that He is their Image—and this for the reason already explained.

Reply to objection 3: There are two ways in which an image of something may be found in a given thing. In one way, it exists in a thing which has the same nature with respect to its species—in the way, for instance, that the image of a king exists in his own son. In the second way, it exists in a thing with a different nature—in the way that the image of the king exists on a coin.

It is in the first way that the Son is the Image of the Father, whereas it is in the second way that a man is called an image of God. This is why, in order to signify the imperfection of the image in a man, the man is not only called an image (*imago*) but is said to be ‘to the image’ (*ad imaginem*) [of God], where this indicates a certain movement of something that is tending toward perfection. By contrast, it cannot be said of the Son of God that He is ‘to the image’ of the Father, since He is the perfect image of the Father.

QUESTION 36

The Person of the Holy Spirit: The Name 'Holy Spirit'

Next we have to consider the things that pertain to the person of the Holy Spirit (questions 36-38), who is called not only the Holy Spirit (question 36), but also the Love of God (question 37) and the Gift of God (question 38).

On the topic of the name 'Holy Spirit' there are four questions: (1) Is the name 'Holy Spirit' a proper name of a divine person? (2) Does the divine person who is called the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son? (3) Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father through the Son? (4) Are the Father and the Son a single principle of the Holy Spirit?

Article 1

Is the name 'Holy Spirit' a proper name of a divine person?

It seems that the name 'Holy Spirit' is not a proper name of any divine person (*hoc nomen spiritus sanctus non sit proprium nomen alicuius divinae personae*):

Objection 1: No name that is common to the three persons is proper to any one person. But the name 'Holy Spirit' is common to the three persons. For in *De Trinitate* 8 Hilary shows that 'Spirit of God' (a) sometimes signifies the Father, as when it is said, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me" [Luke 4:18], (b) sometimes signifies the Son, as when the Son says, "It is in the Spirit of God that I cast out demons" [Matthew 12:18], indicating that by the power of His nature He casts out demons, and (c) sometimes signifies the Holy Spirit, as when it is said, "I pour out my Spirit over all flesh" [Joel 2:28]. Therefore, the name 'Holy Spirit' is not a proper name of any divine person.

Objection 2: As Boethius says in *De Trinitate*, the names of the divine persons are predicated relationally. But the name 'Holy Spirit' is not relational (*non dicitur ad aliquid*). Therefore, this name is not a proper name of a divine person.

Objection 3: Since 'Son' is the name of a divine person, the Son cannot be called 'the Son of this man' or 'the Son of that man'. But 'spirit of this man' or 'spirit of that man' does occur. For Numbers 11:17 says, "The Lord said to Moses . . . 'I will take of your Spirit, and will give to them'." And 4 Kings 2:15 says, "The spirit of Elijah has rested upon Elisha." Therefore, 'Holy Spirit' does not seem to be the proper name of a divine person.

But contrary to this: 1 John 5:7 says, "There are Three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." But as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 7, if someone asks, 'Three what?', we reply, 'Three persons'. Therefore, 'Holy Spirit' is a name of a divine person.

I respond: As was pointed out above (q. 27, a. 4), even though there are two processions in God, the one that is in the mode of love does not have a proper name, and so, as was also pointed out above (q. 28, a. 4), the relations that derive from a procession of this sort are likewise unnamed. Because of this, the divine person who proceeds in this way likewise does not have a proper name.

However, just as certain names are adapted by the usage of speakers to signify the relations just alluded to—for we call them by the names 'Procession' and 'Spiration', which, according to their strict meaning, seem to signify the notional acts rather than the relations—so, too, the name 'Holy Spirit' has been adapted by the usage of Scripture to signify the divine person who proceeds in the mode of love.

There are two reasons why this is appropriate.

First of all, He is called the Holy Spirit by reason of the fact that He is common to [the other two persons]. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, "Because the Holy Spirit is common to both of them, it is proper to call Him what both of them have in common. For the Father is a spirit and the Son is a

spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy.”

Second, He is called the Holy Spirit because of the proper signification of the two names. For among corporeal things the name ‘spirit’ seems to signify a certain impulse and movement; for instance, we call breath and wind by the name ‘spirit’. And it is a property of love that it moves and impels the will of the lover toward the beloved. By the same token, holiness is attributed to those things that are ordered toward God. Therefore, since a divine person proceeds in the mode of the Love by which God is loved, He is appropriately named the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 1: The expression ‘holy spirit’, taken in effect as two words, is common to the whole Trinity. For the name ‘spirit’ signifies the immateriality of the divine substance, since a spirit is an invisible body and has almost no matter. That is why we attribute this name to all immaterial and invisible substances. By the same token, the name ‘holy’ signifies the purity of God’s goodness.

However, when the expression ‘Holy Spirit’ is taken to have the force of a single word, then, for the reason explained above, it has been adapted by the usage of the Church to signify just one of the three persons, viz., the one who proceeds in the mode of the Love.

Reply to objection 2: Even though the expression ‘Holy Spirit’ is not predicated relationally, it is nonetheless used in place of a relational name insofar as it has been adapted to signify a person who is distinguished from the others only by a relation.

Still, a relation can also be understood in the name itself if ‘Spirit’ is taken for ‘one who is spirated’.

Reply to objection 3: What one grasps by the name ‘Son’ is just the relation to a principle on the part of the one who is from that principle. By contrast, what one grasps by the name ‘Father’ is the relation *being a principle of*, and the same holds for the name ‘spirit’ insofar as it implies a certain moving force. Now it does not belong to any creature to be a principle of a divine person, but it does belong to a creature to have a divine person as a principle. And so one can say ‘our Father’ and ‘our Spirit’, but one cannot say ‘our Son’.

Article 2

Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son?

It seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son (*non procedat a filio*):

Objection 1: According to Dionysius, “No one should dare to say anything about God beyond those things that are divinely expressed to us in the sacred writings.” But Sacred Scripture does not say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but says only that He proceeds from the Father. This is clear from John 15:26 (“... the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father”). Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 2: The creed of the Council of Constantinople says, “We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son He is to be worshiped and glorified.” Therefore, it should in no way be added to our creed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Rather, those who would add this seem to deserve condemnation.

Objection 3: Damascene says, “We say that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and we name Him the Spirit of the Father, but we do not say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, even though we name Him the Spirit of the Son.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 4: Nothing proceeds from that in which it comes to rest. But the Holy Spirit comes to rest in the Son. For the legend of St. Andrew says, “Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one

God the Father, and in His one Son, our only Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and abides in the Son.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 5: The Son proceeds as the Word. But, in our own case, our spirit does not seem to proceed from our word. Therefore, neither does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son.

Objection 6: The Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore, it is superfluous to claim that He proceeds from the Son.

Objection 7: As *Physics* 3 says, in the case of things that are everlasting, *is* (*esse*) does not differ from *can be* (*posse*), and so they differ all the less in God. But the Holy Spirit can be distinguished from the Son even if He does not proceed from the Son. For in *De Processione Spiritus Sancti* Anselm says, “The Son and the Holy Spirit do, to be sure, have *esse* from the Father, but in different ways; for the one has it by being begotten and the other has it by proceeding, so that they are distinct from one another because of this.” And later on he adds, “Even if the Son and the Holy Spirit were not distinct for any other reason, they would be distinct solely for this reason.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son without being from Him.

But contrary to this: The Athanasian creed says, “The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, neither made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding.”

I respond: It is necessary to say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. For if He were not from the Son, then there could be no way of distinguishing them as persons.

This is clear from what was said above (q. 28, a. 3 and q. 30, a. 2). For it is impossible to claim that the divine persons are distinct from one another by something absolute [and not relational], since it would follow that there is no single essence common to the three persons. For whatever is predicated absolutely in God pertains to the oneness of the divine essence. Therefore, it follows that the divine persons are distinct from one another only by relations.

But the relations cannot make the persons distinct except insofar as they are opposed relations. This is clear from the fact that the Father has two relations, one of which relates Him to the Son and the other of which relates Him to the Holy Spirit. However, since these two relations are not opposed to one another, they do not constitute two persons but instead pertain just to the one person of the Father. Therefore, if in the Son and the Holy Spirit there were just the two relations by which each is related to the Father, then those relations would not be opposed to one another, just as the two relations by which the Father is related to them are not opposed to one another. Hence, just as the person of the Father is one, so it would follow that the person of the Son is one with the person of the Holy Spirit, and that this one person has two relations opposed to the two relations had by the Father. But this is heretical, since it undermines our faith in the Trinity.

Therefore, it must be the case that the Son and the Holy Spirit are related to one another by opposed relations. But as was shown above (q. 28, a. 4), the only opposed relations that there can be in God are relations of origin. Now opposed relations of origin involve a principle and that which is from the principle. Therefore, it follows that one must say either that (a) the Son is from the Holy Spirit—which no one says—or that (b) the Holy Spirit is from the Son—which is what we confess.

The nature of the two processions is consonant with this conclusion. For it was explained above (q. 27, aa. 2 and 4 and q. 28, a. 4) that the Son proceeds as the Word in the mode of the intellect, whereas the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love in the mode of the will. Now it is necessary that the Love should proceed from the Word, since we do not love something except insofar as we apprehend it by the mind’s conception. Hence, in keeping with this, it is likewise clear that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Again, the very way things are ordered teaches us this. For we never find many things proceeding from a single thing without some ordering. The sole exception has to do with things which differ solely in matter; for instance, a single blacksmith produces many knives that differ in matter from one another

and have no ordering with respect to one another. But in the case of things in which there is more than just a distinction of matter, we always find some ordering among the many things produced. Hence, the beauty of God's wisdom is revealed even in the ordering of the creatures that are produced. Therefore, if two persons, viz., the Son and the Holy Spirit, proceed from the single person of the Father, then there must be some ordering they have with respect to one another. But the only conceivable ordering here is an ordering of nature by which the one comes from the other (*quo alius est ex alio*). Nor can one claim that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father in such a way that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless he posits a distinction of matter in them—which is impossible.

This is why even the Greeks themselves understand the procession of the Holy Spirit as having some ordering to the Son. For they admit that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son and that He is from the Father *through* the Son. What's more, some of them are said to concede that He *is from* the Son, or that He *flows from* the Son, but *not* that He *proceeds* from the Son. But they say this, it would seem, either out of ignorance or out of stubbornness. For if one considers the matter correctly, he will find that the word 'procession' is the most general of all the words that pertain to an origin, since we use it to designate any sort of origin at all. For instance, we say that a line proceeds from a point, that a ray proceeds from the sun, that a river proceeds from its source, and so on for all the other types of origin.

Hence, on the basis of everything else that pertains to origins, one can conclude that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Reply to objection 1: We should not say about God anything that is not found in Sacred Scripture either word-for-word or implicitly. Now even though we do not find it said word-for-word in Sacred Scripture that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, it is nonetheless found implicitly in Sacred Scripture, and especially when the Son, at John 16:14, says of the Holy Spirit: "He shall glorify me, because He shall receive of me."

In addition, with Sacred Scripture we should follow the rule that whatever is said of the Father must also be understood of the Son, even if an exclusive expression is added—with the sole exception of those things in which the Father and the Son are distinguished by opposed relations. For instance, when our Lord says at Matthew 11:27, "No one knows the Son except the Father," this does not rule out the Son's knowing Himself. So, too, when the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, then even if it were added that He proceeds from the Father alone, this would still not exclude the Son. For the Father and the Son are not opposed with respect to being a principle of the Holy Spirit; rather, they are opposed only insofar as the one is the Father and the other is the Son.

Reply to objection 2: Every Council formulated a creed in light of some error that was condemned at that Council. Hence, subsequent Councils did not formulate a creed different from the first one; rather, what was implicitly contained in the first creed was made explicit by certain additions aimed at heresies which were gaining ground at that later time.

Hence, the determination of the Council of Chalcedon declares that those who met at the Council of Constantinople handed down a doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit, and that they did this not by implying that their own predecessors, who had met at Nicea, had left something out, but rather "by making the meaning of their predecessors clear against the heretics." Therefore, since at the time of the ancient Councils the error of asserting that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son had not yet arisen, it was unnecessary to make an explicit pronouncement on this matter. But later on, because of an error that had arisen among some, and in a Council that met in the West, the teaching in question was declared explicitly by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority the ancient councils had themselves been convened and confirmed. Nonetheless, the teaching was already contained implicitly in the very fact that the Holy Spirit had already been declared to proceed from the Father.

Reply to objection 3: The Nestorians first introduced the claim that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, as is clear from a Nestorian creed condemned at the Council of Ephesus. This

error was espoused by Theodoric the Nestorian and by many after him, among whom we find even Damascene. Hence, on this matter Damascene's position does not hold good. Still, some point out that even though Damascene does not confess that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, neither do his words strictly speaking deny this.

Reply to objection 4: The fact that the Holy Spirit is said to 'rest in' or 'abide in' the Son does not rule out His proceeding from the Son, since the Son is likewise said to abide in the Father, even though He nonetheless proceeds from the Father.

Again, the Holy Spirit is said to 'rest in' the Son either (a) in the sense that the love of the lover rests in the beloved or (b) insofar as this applies to Christ's human nature, and this because of John 1:33 ("He upon whom you shall see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizes)."

Reply to objection 5: 'Word', as said of God, does not come from a likeness to a *spoken* word, from which no spirit proceeds, since this is said only metaphorically. Rather, it derives from a likeness to a *mental* word, from which love proceeds.

Reply to objection 6: The fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father not only does not make it superfluous to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but in fact makes it altogether necessary to say this. For the power of the Father is the same as the power of the Son, and whatever is from the Father is necessarily from the Son as well, unless it is something incompatible with the property of Filiation—for instance, it is not the case that the Son is from Himself, even though He is from the Father.

Reply to objection 7: The Holy Spirit is distinguished as a person from the Son by the fact that the origin of the one is distinct from the origin of the other. However, this difference of origin itself stems from the fact that the Son is from just the Father, whereas the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. Otherwise, as was shown above, the two processions would not be distinct from one another.

Article 3

Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father *through* the Son?

It seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father *through* (*per*) the Son:

Objection 1: What proceeds from someone through another does not proceed from the first one immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, then He does not proceed immediately from the Father—which seems wrong.

Objection 2: If the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, then He does not proceed from the Son except because of the Father. But if a thing is such-and-such because of something else, then the latter is more such-and-such. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father more than from the Son.

Objection 3: The Son has *esse* through generation. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the Son is generated first and that the Holy Spirit proceeds afterwards. And so the procession of the Holy Spirit is not eternal—which is heretical.

Objection 4: When someone is said to operate through someone else, the converse can likewise be said. For instance, just as we say that the king operates through the magistrate, so too we can say that the magistrate operates through the king. But there is no sense in which we can say that the Son spirates the Holy Spirit through the Father. Therefore, there is no sense in which we can say that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit through the Son.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* Hilary says, "Preserve, I beg of you, this religion of my faith,

that I may always possess the Father, viz., you, and adore the Son along with you, and be deserving of your Holy Spirit, who is through your Only-begotten.”

I respond: In all the expressions in which someone is said to operate through someone else, the preposition ‘through’ (*per*), as a causal expression, designates some cause or principle of the act in question.

Now since an action lies between the doer and the thing done, sometimes the causal [element] to which the preposition ‘through’ is joined is a cause of the action *insofar as the action goes forth from the agent*. And in such a case it is a cause of the agent’s acting, whether this be (a) a final cause or (b) a formal cause or (c) an efficient, i.e., moving, cause—(a) a *final* cause, as when we say that it is through the craftsman’s desire for money that he works, or (b) a *formal* cause, as when we say that it is through his craft that he works, or (c) a *moving* cause, as when we say that it is through the command of someone else that he works.

On the other hand, sometimes the causal [element] to which the preposition ‘through’ is joined is a cause of the action *insofar as the action is terminated in the thing done*, as when we say that it is through the craftsman’s hammer that he acts. For this does not mean that the hammer is a cause of the craftsman’s acting, but rather that (a) it is a cause of the artifact’s proceeding from the craftsman and that (b) its being a cause is itself a feature it has from the craftsman. This is why some claim that the preposition ‘through’ (a) sometimes takes the source (*auctoritas*) of the action in the nominative case, as in ‘The king operates through the magistrate’, and (b) sometimes takes it in an oblique case, as in ‘The magistrate operates through the king’. Therefore, since the Son has from the Father the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him, one can say that it is through the Son that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit or—what amounts to the same thing—that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.

Reply to objection 1: In every action there are two things to consider, viz., (a) the *suppositum* that acts and (b) the *power* by means of which the suppositum acts. So, for instance, a fire gives warmth by means of its heat.

Therefore, if we consider the *power* by which the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit, then there is no mediation here, since this power is one and the same power [for both of them].

On the other hand, if we consider the *persons themselves* who spirate the Holy Spirit, then, even though the Holy Spirit proceeds in common from the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father (a) *immediately* insofar as He is from Him and (b) *mediately* insofar as He is from the Son (*immediate a patre procedere inquantum est ab eo et mediate inquantum est a filio*). And this is the sense in which He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. In the same way, Abel proceeded from Adam (a) *immediately* insofar as Adam was his father and (b) *mediately* insofar as Eve was his mother, because Eve had proceeded from Adam—though this material example of procession seems inadequate for signifying the immaterial procession of the divine persons.

Reply to objection 2: If the Son had received from the Father a numerically distinct power for spirating the Holy Spirit, then it would follow that the Son is a secondary and instrumental cause and that the Holy Spirit proceeds more from the Father than from the Son. However, numerically one and the same spirating power exists in the Father and the Son, and so the Holy Spirit proceeds equally from both of them. Still, He is sometimes said to proceed ‘principally’ or ‘properly’ from the Father by reason of the fact that the Son has this power from the Father.

Reply to objection 3: Just as the generation of the Son is coeternal with the one who generates Him, so that the Father did not exist prior to begetting the Son, so too the procession of the Holy Spirit is coeternal with His principle. Hence, the begotten Son did not exist prior to the Holy Spirit’s proceeding from Him. Instead, both are eternal.

Reply to objection 4: When someone is said to operate through something, the converse does not

always hold true. For instance, we do not say that the hammer operates through the craftsman. On the other hand, we do say that the magistrate operates through the king. For it belongs to the magistrate to act, since he is the master of his own actions. By contrast, it does not belong to the hammer to act; instead, what belongs to the hammer is only to be acted upon. This is why it is designated only as an instrument.

Now the reason why the magistrate is said to operate through the king, even though the preposition ‘through’ denotes a means, is that to the extent that a suppositum is prior in acting, its power is more immediate to the effect. For the first cause’s power conjoins the secondary cause to the first cause’s effect, and this is why in the demonstrative sciences first principles are said to be ‘immediate’. So, then, insofar as the magistrate is intermediate in the order of *acting supposita*, the king is said to operate through the magistrate, whereas in the order of *power* the magistrate is said to act through the king, since the king’s power makes the magistrate’s action attain to its effect.

Now the ordering that exists between the Father and the Son is not an ordering of power, but only an ordering of supposita. And this is why the Father is said to spirate the Holy Spirit through the Son, but not vice versa.

Article 4

Are the Father and the Son a single principle of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that the Father and the Son are not a single principle of the Holy Spirit (*non sint unum principium spiritus sancti*):

Objection 1: The Holy Spirit does not seem to proceed from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one—i.e., either (a) insofar as they are one in *nature*, since if that were so, the Holy Spirit would also proceed from Himself, given that He is one in nature with them, or, again, (b) insofar as they are one in some *property*, since, as is evident, it cannot be the case that one property belongs to two supposita. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are many. Therefore, it is not the case that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 2: When it is claimed that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, this cannot mean a oneness of *person*, since in that case the Father and the Son would be a single person. Nor can it mean a oneness of *property*, since if it were due to a single property that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, then, by parity of reasoning, the Father, it seems, would be two principles of the Son and the Holy Spirit in virtue of the two corresponding properties—which is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 3: The Son’s oneness with the Father is no greater than the Holy Spirit’s oneness with the Father. But the Holy Spirit and the Father are not a single principle with respect to any divine person. Therefore, neither are the Father and the Son.

Objection 4: If the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, then either this single principle is the Father or it is not the Father. But neither of these alternatives is possible. For if the single principle is the Father, then it follows that the Son is the Father, whereas if the single principle is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore, one should not say that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 5: If the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, then it seems, conversely, that the single principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son. But this seems false,

since the expression ‘principle’ must supposit either for the person of the Father or for the person of the Son. And either way, the proposition is false. Therefore, ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit’ is likewise false.

Objection 6: Oneness in substance makes for sameness. Therefore, if the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, it follows that they are the same principle. But many deny this. Therefore, one should not concede that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 7: Because the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are a single principle of creatures, they are said to be a single creator. But the Father and the Son are not a single Spirator; instead, as many insist, they are two Spirators. This is also consonant with the words of Hilary, who says in *De Trinitate* 2 that the Holy Spirit should be confessed to be “from the Father and the Son as sources (*auctoribus*).” Therefore, it is not the case that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine says that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit and not two principles.

I respond: The Father and the Son are one in all things in which no relational opposition makes for a distinction between them. Hence, since they are not relationally opposed in being a principle of the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit.

However, some claim that the proposition ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit’ is improper. For when the name ‘principle’ is taken in the singular, it signifies a property rather than a person, and so they claim that here it must be taken adjectivally. And since an adjective is not determined by another adjective, it cannot be appropriate to say that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, unless the term ‘single’ is understood as if it were posited adverbially, in which case the meaning of ‘are a single principle’ would be that they are principles in a single way.

However, one could reply along the same lines that the Father is two principles of the Son and the Holy Spirit, i.e., that He is a principle of them in two ways.

Therefore, one should reply that even though the name ‘principle’ signifies a property, it nonetheless signifies it in a substantival mode—just as the names ‘father’ and ‘son’ do even among created things. Hence, the grammatical number is taken from the form that is signified, just as with other substantival expressions. Therefore, just as the Father and the Son are a single God because of the oneness of the form that is signified by the name ‘God’, so too they are a single principle of the Holy Spirit because of the oneness of the property signified by the name ‘principle’.

Reply to objection 1: If one considers the *spirative power*, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one in the spirative power, where, as will be explained below (q. 41, a. 5), ‘spirative power’ signifies the divine nature in a certain way along with a property. Nor is it absurd that one property should exist in two supposita that share a single nature.

On the other hand, if one considers the *supposita* involved in the spiration, then the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are many. For He proceeds from them as the Love who unites the two of them (*ut amor unitivus duorum*).

Reply to objection 2: When one says, ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit’, a single property is designated, viz., the form signified by the name ‘principle’. However, it does not follow that the Father can be called more than one principle because of the plurality of principles. For this would imply that He is a plurality of supposita.

Reply to objection 3: In God, likeness and unlikeness have to do not with the relational properties, but with the divine essence. Hence, just as the Father is not more similar to Himself than He is to the Son, so too the Son is not more similar to the Father than the Holy Spirit is.

Reply to objection 4: The two propositions ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle that is the Father’ and ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle that is not the Father’ are not opposed as

contradictories. Hence, it is not necessary to grant either one of them. For when we say, ‘The Father and the Son are a single principle’, the expression ‘principle’ does not have determinate supposition, but instead has confused supposition for both of the persons together. Hence, the inference [to one of the two propositions just mentioned] commits the fallacy of a figure of speech, since it goes from confused supposition to determinate supposition.

Reply to objection 5: The proposition ‘The single principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son’ is in fact true. For the term ‘principle’ does not supposit for just one person; instead, as was just explained, it supposits indeterminately for two persons.

Reply to objection 6: It is appropriate to say that the Father and the Son are the same principle, as long as ‘principle’ is suppositing confusedly and indeterminately for the two persons together.

Reply to objection 7: Some claim that even though the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, they are nonetheless two spirators, and this because of the distinction between the supposita. Likewise, they are two who are spirating, since acts are attributed to supposita. The same line of reasoning does not hold in the case of the name ‘creator’. For, as has been explained, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are two distinct persons. By contrast, creatures proceed from the three persons not insofar as they are distinct persons, but insofar as they are one in essence.

However, it seems better to reply as follows: Because ‘spirating’ is an adjective, whereas ‘spirator’ is a noun (*substantivum*), we can say that the Father and the Son are two who are spirating, and this because of the plurality of supposita, but that they are not two spirators, because there is just a single spiration. For adjectival names derive their grammatical number from the number of supposita, whereas nouns derive it from themselves in accord with the form that is signified.

Now as for the claim made by Hilary, viz., that “the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son as sources,” he should be interpreted as using a noun in place of an adjective (*exponendum est quod ponitur substantivum pro adiectivo*).

QUESTION 37

The Person of the Holy Spirit: The Name ‘Love’

Next we have to consider the name ‘Love’ (*amor*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Is ‘Love’ a proper name of the Holy Spirit? (2) Do the Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit?

Article 1

Is ‘Love’ a proper name of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that ‘Love’ (*amor*) is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “I do not know why, just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are called Wisdom and are all together not three Wisdoms but one Wisdom, it should not also be the case that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are called Love (*caritas*) and should all together be one Love.” But no name that is predicated of each person and of all of them together in the singular is a proper name of any one person. Therefore, the name ‘Love’ (*amor*) is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 2: The Holy Spirit is a subsistent person. But ‘love’ (*amor*) does not signify a subsistent person; rather, it signifies a certain action that passes from the lover to the beloved. Therefore, ‘Love’ is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 3: Love is a bond between lovers, since according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, it is a certain unitive force. But a bond lies between the things that it connects and is not something that proceeds from them. Therefore, since, as has been shown (q. 36, a. 2), the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, it seems that He is not the Love, i.e., the bond, between the Father and the Son.

Objection 4: Every lover is such that some act of love belongs to him. But the Holy Spirit is a lover. Therefore, there is an act of love that belongs to Him. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is the Love, then there will be a Love that belongs to the Love, and a Spirit from the Spirit—which is absurd.

But contrary to this: In his homily on the feast of Pentecost Gregory says, “The Holy Spirit Himself is Love.”

I respond: In God the name ‘Love’ (*amor*) can be taken both with respect to the essence and with respect to a person.

Insofar as it is taken with respect to a person, it is a proper name of the Holy Spirit in the same way that ‘Word’ is a proper name of the Son. To see this clearly, note that, as has been shown (q. 27, aa. 1 and 3-5), there are two processions in God—one in the mode of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and the other in the mode of the will, which is the procession of the Love. Since the first procession is better known to us, there are more available proper names to signify each of the aspects that can be considered in it. But this is not the case with the procession that involves the will. Hence, we use certain circumlocutions to signify the person who proceeds, as well as to signify the relations that stem from this procession. And so, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 4), we designate the relations by the names ‘Procession’ and ‘Spiration’, even though these are, strictly speaking, names of origin rather than names of relations.

And yet we must consider both of the processions in a similar manner. For just as from the fact that someone understands something, a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood—called a ‘word’—comes to exist in the one who understands, so, too, from the fact that someone loves something, a certain impression, so to speak, of the thing loved comes to exist in the affective part of the lover, so

that the thing loved is said to exist in the one who loves it in the way that the thing understood exists in the one who understands it. The result is that when someone understands himself and loves himself, he exists within himself not only through his real identity with himself, but also in the way that something understood exists within the one who understands it and in the way that something loved exists within the one who loves it.

Now as for the intellect, there are words available to signify the relation of the one who understands to the thing understood, as is clear with the expression ‘to understand’; and there are likewise other words available to signify the process of conceiving something intellectually, viz., ‘to speak’ and ‘word’. Hence, in God ‘to understand’ is predicated only of the essence, since it does not imply a relation to the word that proceeds, whereas (a) ‘word’ is predicated of a person, since it signifies that which proceeds, and (b) ‘to speak’ is predicated as a notion, since it implies a relation between the principle of the word and the word itself.

On the part of the will, by contrast, besides ‘to have affection for’ (*diligere*) and ‘to love’ (*amare*), which imply a relation of the lover to the thing loved, there are no other available words that imply the relation that the very impression of or affection for the thing loved, which arises in the lover because of his love, bears to the principle of this love, or vice versa. And so, because of this shortage of words, we signify these relations by the words ‘love’ (*amor*) and ‘affection’ (*dilectio*)—in a way analogous to that in which we call the Word the Conceived Understanding or the Begotten Wisdom.

So then, insofar as ‘love’ and ‘affection’ imply only the relation of the lover to thing loved, ‘love’ and ‘to have affection for’ are predicated of the divine essence, just as ‘an understanding’ (*intelligentia*) and ‘to understand’ are. However, insofar as we use these words to express the relation that the reality which proceeds in the mode of love bears to its principle and vice versa—so that by ‘Love’ we mean ‘Love as proceeding’ and by ‘to have affection for’ we mean ‘to spirate the Love that proceeds’—‘Love’ is in this sense the name of a person and ‘to have affection for’ or ‘to love’ is the name of a notion in the way in which ‘to speak’ or ‘to generate’ is.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about love (*caritas*) insofar as it is predicated of the essence in God, in the way just explained.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 14, a. 2), even though to understand and to will and to love are signified in the manner of *transeunt* actions on objects, they are nonetheless actions that remain with the agent—yet in such a way that they imply a relation to the object within the agent himself. Hence, even in our own case, love is something that remains within the lover, and the interior word (*verbum cordis*) is something that remains within the speaker—yet with a relation to the thing loved or to the thing expressed by the word.

However, since there are no accidents in God, it is true in addition that both the Word and the Love are subsistent. Therefore, when the Holy Spirit is said to be the Love of the Father for the Son or for anything else, what is signified by ‘Love’ is not something that passes into another, but simply the relation of the Love to the thing loved, just as ‘Word’ implies a relation of the word to the thing expressed by the word.

Reply to objection 3: The Holy Spirit is said to be the bond between the Father and the Son insofar as He is the Love. For since the Father loves both Himself and the Son by a single love (and vice versa), what is implied in the Holy Spirit as the Love is the relation that the Father bears to the Son (and vice versa) as a lover to His beloved. But from the very fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it follows that their mutual love, which is the Holy Spirit, must proceed from them both.

Therefore, as far as His origin is concerned, the Holy Spirit is not a medium between the Father and the Son, but rather a third person in the Trinity. But according to the relation just mentioned, He is a bond between the two of them who proceeds from them both.

Reply to objection 4: Even though the Son understands, it nonetheless does not belong to Him to

produce the Word, since to understand belongs to Him insofar as He is the Word that proceeds. So, too, even though the Holy Spirit loves insofar as 'loves' is predicated of the divine essence, nonetheless it does not belong to Him to spirate the love, which is to love insofar as 'to love' is taken as a notion. For insofar as 'to love' is predicated of the essence, the Holy Spirit loves as the Love which proceeds and not as that from which the Love proceeds.

Article 2

Do the Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit?

It seems that the Father and the Son do not love one another by the Holy Spirit (*pater et filius non diligant se spiritu sancto*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine proves that it is not the case that the Father is wise by the Begotten Wisdom. But, as was explained above (a. 1), just as the Son is the Begotten Wisdom, so the Holy Spirit is the Love that Proceeds. Therefore the Father and the Son do not love one another by the Love that Proceeds, i.e., by the Holy Spirit.

Objection 2: When one says 'The Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit', the word 'love' is being taken either for the essence or for a notion. But the proposition cannot be true if 'love' is being taken for the essence, since by parity of reasoning the Father could be said to understand by the Son. Nor, again, can it be true if 'love' is taken for a notion, since by parity of reasoning one could claim that the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Spirit or that the Father generates by the Son. Therefore, there is no sense in which the proposition 'The Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit' is true.

Objection 3: It is by the same love that the Father loves the Son, Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Spirit, since no notional act is reflected back on to the principle of that act. For instance, one cannot claim that the Father generates Himself or that He spirates Himself. Therefore, one likewise cannot claim that He loves Himself by the Holy Spirit, insofar as 'loves' is taken for a notion. Likewise, the love by which the Father loves us does not seem to be the Holy Spirit, since this love implies a relation to creatures and so pertains to the divine essence. Therefore, the proposition 'The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit' is also false.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, "The Holy Spirit is He by whom the Begotten is loved by the one who generates Him, and He by whom the Begotten loves His Begetter."

I respond: On this question the difficulty arises from the fact that when one says 'The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit', if the ablative construction 'by the Holy Spirit' is taken as standing for some sort of cause, it seems that the Holy Spirit is the principle of loving for the Father and the Son—which is altogether impossible.

For this reason some have claimed that the proposition 'The Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit' is false. And they further claim that this proposition was retracted by Augustine when he retracted the similar proposition 'The Father is wise by the Begotten Wisdom'.

By contrast, there are those who claim that the proposition is improper and that 'The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit' should be expounded as 'The Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, i.e., by the love which belongs to the essence and which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit'.

On the other hand, some have claimed that the ablative construction 'by the Holy Spirit' is to be taken as standing for a sign [rather than a cause], so that the sense of the proposition is 'The Holy Spirit is the sign that the Father loves the Son insofar as He proceeds from them as the Love'.

Still others have claimed that the ablative construction is to be taken as standing for a formal cause, since the Holy Spirit is the Love by which the Father and the Son formally love one another.

Finally, some have claimed that the ablative construction is to be taken as standing for a formal effect, and they are the ones who have come closer to the truth. To see this clearly, note that since things are commonly named from their forms, e.g., a white thing from its whiteness, and a man from his human-ness, everything from which something is named has to that extent the status of a form. For instance, if I say ‘He is clothed by a garment’, the ablative construction ‘by a garment’ is taken to stand for a formal cause, even though it is not a form. Now something can be named on the basis of what proceeds from it—not just in the way that an agent is named by its action, but also in the way that an agent is named by the very terminus of the action, which is the effect, when that effect is itself included in our understanding of the action. For instance, we say that a fire produces warmth by heating, even though heating is not itself the heat which is the form of the fire, but is instead the action that proceeds from the fire. Again, we say that a tree flowers by flowers, even though the flowers are not the form of the tree, but are instead certain effects that proceed from it.

Accordingly, we should respond that ‘to love’ is taken in two ways in the case of God, viz., (a) with respect to the essence and (b) for a notion.

Insofar as ‘to love’ is taken with respect to the essence, the Father and the Son love one another not by the Holy Spirit, but by their essence. This is why Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, “Who would dare to claim that the Father loves neither Himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit except through the Holy Spirit?” And the first set of opinions proceeds on this understanding.

However, insofar as ‘to love’ is taken for a notion, to love is in this sense nothing other to spirate the Love, just as to speak is to produce a word, and just as to flower is to produce flowers. So in the sense in which a tree is said to flower by flowers, the Father is said to speak Himself and creatures by the Word (or by the Son), and the Father and the Son are said to love one another and us by the Holy Spirit, i.e., by the Love that Proceeds.

Reply to objection 1: In God, ‘to be wise’ or ‘to be intelligent’ is taken only with respect to the essence, and so it cannot be said that the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son. However, ‘to love’ is taken not only with respect to the essence, but also for a notion. Accordingly, in the sense explained above, we can say that the Father and the Son love one another by the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 2: When a determinate effect is implied in our understanding of a given action, the principle of that action can be named both from the action and from the effect. For instance, we can say that the tree flowers by a flowering and that it flowers by flowers. However, when a determinate effect is not included in [our understanding of] the action, then the principle of the action cannot be named from an effect, but instead can be named only from the action. For instance, we do not say that the tree produces a flower by a flower; instead, we say that it produces a flower by the production of a flower.

Therefore, since the expressions ‘spirate’ and ‘generate’ imply only a notional action, we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Spirit or that He generates by the Son. However, we can say that the Father speaks by the Word (as by a person who proceeds), and that the Father speaks by a speaking (as by a notional act). For ‘to speak’ implies a determinate person who proceeds, since to speak is just to produce the Word. Similarly, ‘to love’, insofar as it is taken for a notion, is just to produce the Love. And so one can say that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit as by a person who proceeds, and that the Father loves the Son by the loving itself as by a notional act.

Reply to objection 3: The Father loves not only the Son but also Himself and us by the Holy Spirit. For insofar as the expression ‘to love’ is taken for a notion, it not only implies the production of a divine person but also implies a person produced in the mode of love, where love has a relation to the thing loved. Hence, just as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by the Word which He begets,

insofar as the begotten Word adequately represents the Father and every creature, so too the Father loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Spirit, insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love of the first goodness according to which the Father loves Himself and every creature. And so it is also clear that a relation to creatures is implied—secondarily, as it were—both in the Word and in the Love that proceeds, insofar as the divine truth and goodness constitute the principle for understanding and loving every creature.

QUESTION 38

The Person of the Holy Spirit: The Name ‘Gift’

Next we consider the name ‘Gift’ (*donum*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Can ‘Gift’ be a name of a person? (2) Is ‘Gift’ a proper name of the Holy Spirit?

Article 1

Is ‘Gift’ the name of a person?

It seems that ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person (*donum non sit nomen personale*):

Objection 1: Every name of a person implies some distinction in God. But the name ‘Gift’ does not imply any distinction in God, since in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “The Holy Spirit is given as God’s gift in such a way that He also gives Himself as God.” Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person.

Objection 2: No name of a person belongs to the divine essence. But as is clear from Hilary in *De Trinitate* 9, the divine essence is a gift that the Father gives to the Son. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person.

Objection 3: According to Damascene, among the divine persons there is no subjection or servitude. But ‘gift’ implies a certain subjection both to the one to whom the gift is given and to the one by whom the gift is given. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person.

Objection 4: ‘Gift’ implies a relation to creatures, and so it seems to be predicated of God from a given point in time. But the names of the persons, e.g., ‘Father’ and ‘Son’, are predicated of God from eternity. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not the name of a person.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “Just as a body of flesh is nothing other than the flesh, so too the Gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing other than the Holy Spirit.” But ‘Holy Spirit’ is a name of a person. Therefore, so is ‘Gift’.

I respond: The name ‘Gift’ implies an aptness for being given. Now what is given has a relation both to the one by whom it is given and to the one to whom it is given. For a gift is given by someone only if it belongs to him, and it is given to someone in order that it might belong to him.

Now a divine person is said ‘to belong to someone’ (*esse alicuius*) either (a) according to His origin, in the way that the Son belongs to the Father, or (b) insofar as He is possessed by someone, where we are said to possess what we can in freedom use or enjoy as we wish. A divine person cannot be possessed in this second sense by anything except a rational creature who is conjoined to God. Other creatures can, to be sure, be moved by a divine person, but not in such a way that it is within their power to enjoy the divine person or to make use of some effect of His. By contrast, rational creatures attain to this in some cases—as, for instance, when someone participates in the divine Word and in the Love that proceeds in such a way that he can in freedom know God truly and love God rightly. Hence, only rational creatures can possess a divine person. But they cannot attain to possessing a divine person in this way by their own power. Hence, it is necessary that this be given to them from above; for it is what we have from elsewhere that is said to be given to us. Hence, in this sense it belongs to a divine person to be given and to be a Gift.

Reply to objection 1: The name ‘Gift’ implies a personal distinction insofar as the Gift is said to belong to someone through His origin. And yet the Holy Spirit gives Himself insofar as He belongs to Himself as one who is able to use Himself or, better, to enjoy Himself—in the same sense in which a free man is said to belong to himself. This is why in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, “What is more yours than yourself?”

An alternative, and better, reply is this: A gift must belong in some way to the giver. But ‘to belong to someone’ has several meanings:

In one sense, one belongs to oneself in the mode of identity, as Augustine says in *Super Ioannem*, and in this sense there is no distinction between the gift and the giver, but only a distinction between the gift and the one to whom the gift is given. And in this sense the Holy Spirit is said to give Himself.

In a second sense, something is said to belong to someone as a possession or as a servant, and in this sense the gift must be distinct in essence from the giver. According to this sense, the gift of God is something created.

In a third sense, something is said to belong to someone just through its origin, and this is the sense in which the Son belongs to the Father and in which the Holy Spirit belongs to both of them. Thus, insofar as a gift is said to belong to the giver in this sense, the gift and the giver are distinct persons, and thus ‘Gift’ is a name of a person.

Reply to objection 2: The essence is called a gift of the Father in the first sense, since the essence belongs to the Father in mode of identity.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as ‘Gift’ is a name of a person in God, it does not imply subjection, but implies only origin in relation to the giver. However, in relation to the one to whom the Gift is given, it implies free use or enjoyment, as has been explained.

Reply to objection 4: Something is called a ‘gift’ not from the fact that it is actually given, but rather insofar as it has an aptness for being possibly given. Hence, a divine person is called a Gift from eternity, even if He is given from a certain point in time.

Nor does it follow from the fact that ‘Gift’ implies a relation to creatures that it is predicated of the essence. All that follows is that something pertaining to the essence is included in our understanding of ‘Gift’, in just the same way that, as was explained above (q. 34, a. 3), the essence is included in our understanding of a person.

Article 2

Is ‘Gift’ a proper name of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that ‘Gift’ is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit:

Objection 1: ‘Gift’ comes from ‘that which is given’. But Isaiah 9:6 says, “A Son is given to us.” Therefore, the name ‘Gift’ belongs to the Son as well as to the Holy Spirit.

Objection 2: Every proper name of a person signifies some property of His. But the name ‘Gift’ does not signify any property of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 3: As was pointed out above (q. 36, a. 1), the Holy Spirit can be called the ‘Spirit’ of a man. By contrast, He cannot be called the ‘Gift’ of any man, but only God’s Gift. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “Just as for the Son to be begotten is for Him to be from the Father, so for the Holy Spirit to be the Gift of God is for Him to proceed from the Father and the Son.” But the Holy Spirit is given proper names insofar as He proceeds from the Father and the Son. Therefore, ‘Gift’ is a proper name of the Holy Spirit.

I respond: Insofar as ‘Gift’ is taken for a person in God, it is a proper name of the Holy Spirit. To see this clearly, note that, according to the Philosopher, a gift is properly speaking an unreturnable offering. That is, a gift is not given with the intention of being repaid, and so ‘gift’ implies a gratuitous

donation. But the reason for the gratuitous donation is love. For we give something gratuitously to another because we will his good. Therefore, the first thing we give him is the love by which we will his good. Thus it is clear that love has the character of a primary gift through which all of our gratuitous gifts are given. Hence, since, as has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4 and q. 37, a. 1), the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love, He proceeds with the character of the First Gift (*procedit in ratione doni primi*). Thus, in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “Through the Gift which is the Holy Spirit, the many particular gifts are parceled out to the members of Christ.”

Reply to objection 1: Because the Son proceeds in the manner of a Word, which by its very nature is a likeness of its principle, He is properly speaking called the Image—even though the Holy Spirit is also similar to the Father. In like manner, because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as the Love, He is properly speaking called the Gift—even though the Son is also given. For the very fact that the Son is given stems from the Father’s love—this according to John 3:16: “For God so loved the world that He gave His Only-begotten Son.”

Reply to objection 2: The name ‘Gift’ implies that the Gift belongs to the giver through origin. And so it is that ‘Gift’ implies the property of the Holy Spirit’s origin, viz. the Procession.

Reply to objection 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but after it is given, it belongs to the one to whom it is given. Therefore, since ‘Gift’ does not imply the actual giving, He cannot be said to be the Gift of a man. Instead, He is the Gift of God as giver. However, once He has been given, He is then the Spirit or the Gift of a man.

QUESTION 39

The Persons in Comparison to the Essence

Now that we have discussed the divine persons taken absolutely, we must consider the persons in comparison to the essence (question 39), to the properties (question 40), and to the notional acts (question 41), and then we must compare the persons with one another (questions 42 and 43).

With respect to the first of these topics there are eight questions: (1) Is the essence in God the same as a person? (2) Should one say that the three persons are ‘of one essence’? (3) Should the names of the essence be predicated of the persons in the singular or the plural? (4) Can the notions in their adjectival forms—whether verbs or participles—be predicated of the names of the essence taken in their concrete forms? (5) Can the notions in their adjectival forms be predicated of the names of the essence taken in their abstract forms? (6) Can the names of the persons be predicated of the names of the essence in their concrete forms? (7) Should the attributes of the essence be appropriated to the persons? (8) Which attributes should be appropriated to which persons?

Article 1

Is the essence in God the same as a person?

It seems that in God the essence is not the same as a person:

Objection 1: If the essence is the same as a person or suppositum (*persona seu suppositum*) in any given thing, then there must be just one suppositum per nature—as is clear in the case of all separated substances. For when things are the same in reality, the one cannot be multiplied without the other also being multiplied. But it is clear from what has been said above (q. 28, a. 3 and q. 30, a. 2) that in God there is a single essence and three persons. Therefore, the essence is not the same as a person.

Objection 2: An affirmation and corresponding negation are not true of the same thing at one and the same time. But an affirmation and corresponding negation are true of the essence and the persons. For there are distinct persons, but not distinct essences. Therefore, a person is not same as the essence.

Objection 3: Nothing is a subject of itself. But a person is a subject of the essence, and this is why it is called a suppositum or hypostasis. Therefore, a person is not the same as the essence.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “When we say ‘the person of the Father’, we are not saying anything different from ‘the substance of the Father’.”

I respond: To anyone who considers God’s simplicity, the truth regarding this question is evident. For it was shown above (q. 3, a. 3) that God’s simplicity requires that in God the essence is the same as a suppositum, which in intellectual substances is nothing other than a person.

But a difficulty seems to arise because the essence retains its oneness even though the divine persons are multiplied. And since, as Boethius says, “it is the relations that multiply the Trinity of persons,” some have claimed that the essence differs from a person in God in such a way that they called the relations ‘bystanders’ (*assistantes*), taking into account only that they exist with respect to another and not that they are themselves realities (*res*).

However, as was shown above (q. 28, a. 2), just as relations exist as accidents in created things, so in God they are the divine essence itself. From this it follows that (a) in God the essence does not differ as a thing (*secundum rem*) from a person, and yet that (b) the persons are really distinct from one another. For as was explained above (q. 29, a. 4), ‘person’ signifies a relation as subsisting in the divine nature (*persona significat relationem prout est subsistens in natura divina*). Now when compared to the essence, a relation differs from it not as a thing but only conceptually, whereas when compared to an opposed relation, it has a real distinction from that relation by reason of the opposition. And so it follows

that there is one essence and three persons.

Reply to objection 1: In creatures there cannot be a distinction among supposita that derives from relations (*non potest esse distinctio suppositorum per relationes*); instead, a distinction among supposita must derive from the principles of the essence, since in creatures relations are not subsistent. By contrast, in God the relations are subsistent and so, insofar as the relations are opposed to one another, they can make for distinct supposita (*possunt distinguere supposita*). And yet there are not distinct essences (*neque tamen distinguitur essentia*), since it is not by reason of their being the same in reality as the essence that the relations themselves are distinct from one another.

Reply to objection 2: From the fact that in God the essence and a person differ conceptually, it follows that something can be affirmed of the one and denied of the other. Consequently, the one is a subject [of a given predicate] without the other being a subject [of that predicate].

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 13, aa. 1 and 3), we impose names on divine realities according to the mode of created things. And the reason why created individuals are called subjects or supposita or hypostases is that the natures of created things are individuated by matter, which serves as the subject of the nature of the species. It is for this reason that the divine persons are likewise called supposita or hypostases—and not because there really is in God any such thing as being an underlying suppositum or subject (*aliqua suppositio vel subiectio*).

Article 2

Should one say that the three persons are ‘of one essence’?

It seems that one should not say that the three persons are ‘of one essence’ (*unae essentiae*):

Objection 1: In *De Synodis* Hilary says that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit “are three in substance, though one in harmony.” But God’s substance is His essence. Therefore, the three persons are not of one essence.

Objection 2: As is clear from Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, one should not affirm anything of God unless it is explicitly expressed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. But Sacred Scripture nowhere says explicitly that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one essence. Therefore, this should not be asserted.

Objection 3: The divine nature is the same as the divine essence. Therefore, it should be enough to say that the three persons are ‘of one nature’.

Objection 4: It is customary to say that an essence is ‘the essence of a person’ rather than that a person is ‘the person of an essence’. Therefore, it does not seem appropriate to say that the three persons are of one essence.

Objection 5: Augustine explains that we do not say that the three persons are *from* one essence (*ex una essentia*), lest someone should think that the essence and a person are different in God. But just as prepositions [such as ‘*ex*’] are grammatically transitive (*transitivae*), so too are oblique cases [such as the genitive]. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, we should not say that the three persons are *of* one essence.

Objection 6: We should not say anything about God that can be an occasion of error. But when someone says that the three persons are of one essence or substance, an occasion for error arises. For as Hilary says in *De Synodis*, “‘One substance’, predicated of the Father and the Son, signifies either that (a) one subsistent thing has two names, or that (b) one substance has been divided and become two imperfect substances, or that (c) there is a third and prior substance which has been taken over and assumed by the two of them.” Therefore, one should not say that the three persons are of one substance.

But contrary to this: In *Contra Maximinum* 2 Augustine says that the name ‘*homoousion*’, which the Council of Nicea confirmed in opposition to the Arians, signifies that the three persons are of one essence.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 13, aa. 1 and 3), our intellect does not name divine realities according to their own mode, since we cannot have cognition of them as such; instead, it names them according to the mode found among created things. Now among sensible things, from which our intellect takes its knowledge, the nature of any given species is individuated by matter, so that the nature has the character of a form and the individual has the character of a suppositum of that form. So likewise in God, as far as the mode of signifying is concerned, the essence is signified as the form of the three persons.

Now among created things we say that a form is ‘of’ that whose form it is, e.g., the health ‘of’ a man or the beauty ‘of’ a man. But we do not say that the thing that has the form is ‘of’ the form, unless an adjective is added that modifies the form. For instance, we say ‘This is a woman of handsome figure’ or ‘This is a man of perfect virtue’. Similarly, since in God the essence is not multiplied despite the fact that the persons are multiplied, we say that there is one essence ‘of the three persons’; and we also say that there are three persons ‘of one essence’, since the genitive construction ‘of one essence’ (*unius essentiae*) is understood as designating a form.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage ‘substance’ is being taken for ‘hypostasis’ and not for ‘essence’.

Reply to objection 2: Even though Sacred Scripture does not say in these exact words that the three persons are of one essence, this is nonetheless the meaning of passages such as “The Father and I are one” [John 10:30], and “I am in the Father and the Father is in me” [John 10:38]. And the same thing can be shown by appeal to many other passages.

Reply to objection 3: Since ‘nature’ designates a principle of *action*, whereas ‘essence’ is taken from *being*, there are some things that can be said to be of one nature because they agree in some act—e.g., all things which produce warmth—but cannot be said to be of one essence if they do not share the same *esse*. And so God’s oneness is better expressed by saying that the three persons are of one essence than by saying that they are of one nature.

Reply to objection 4: A form, taken absolutely, is normally signified as being ‘of’ that whose form it is—as, for instance, the virtue ‘of’ Peter.

By contrast, a thing that has a form is not normally signified as being ‘of’ the form. This happens only when we wish to determine, i.e., to modify, the form in question. And in such a case what is required is either (a) two genitives, one of which signifies the form and the other of which signifies the modification of the form—as, for instance, when we say ‘Peter is someone of great virtue’ (*magnae virtutis*)—or (b) one genitive that has the force of two genitives—as, for instance, when we say ‘He is a man of blood’ (*sanguinis*), i.e., a spiller of much blood (*multi sanguinis*).

Therefore, since God’s essence is signified as a form in relation to the persons, one can appropriately say ‘the essence of a person’. But the converse does not hold, unless something is added to modify the essence—as, for instance, when someone says that the Father is a person of the divine essence (*divinae essentiae*), or that the three persons are of one essence (*unius essentiae*).

Reply to objection 5: The preposition ‘from’ (*ex* or *de*) does not signify the character of a formal cause, but instead signifies the character of an efficient or material cause. The latter are in all cases distinct from the things of which they are causes. For nothing is its own matter; nor is anything its own active principle. However, there are things that are their own forms, as is clear in the case of all immaterial things. And so when we say that the three persons are ‘of’ one essence, thus signifying the essence as having the character of a formal cause, this does not show that the essence is different from a

person—as it would if we were to say that the three persons are ‘from’ (*ex*) the same essence.

Reply to objection 6: As Hilary puts it in *De Synodis*, “It would be prejudicial to holy things if the fact that some do not hold them to be holy meant that they should not be held as holy . . . So if someone understands ‘*homoousion*’ incorrectly, what is that to me, as long I understand it correctly? . . . Therefore, there is the one substance proper to the generated nature (*sit una substantia ex naturae genitae proprietate*), but it is not one by being a part or by union or by communion.”

Article 3

May the names of the essence be predicated in the singular of the three persons?

It seems that the names of the essence, e.g., the name ‘God’, may be predicated in the plural of the three persons, but not in the singular:

Objection 1: Just as ‘man’ signifies *one having human-ness* (*habens humanitatem*), so ‘God’ signifies *one having divinity* (*habens divinitatem*). But the three persons are three who have divinity. Therefore, the three persons are three Gods.

Objection 2: In Genesis 1:1, when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the Hebrew text has ‘Elohim’, which can be translated as ‘gods’ or ‘judges’. And it says this because of the plurality of persons. Therefore, the three persons are three Gods and not one God.

Objection 3: When the name ‘thing’ (*res*) is taken absolutely, it seems to pertain to substance. But this name is predicated in the plural of the three persons. For instance, in *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, “The things which are to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.” Therefore, the other names of the essence can likewise be predicated in the plural of the three persons.

Objection 4: Just as the name ‘God’ signifies *one having divinity*, so the name ‘person’ signifies *one subsisting in an intellectual nature*. But we say ‘three persons’. Therefore, for the same reason we can say ‘three Gods’.

But contrary to this: Deuteronomy 6:4 says, “Listen, Israel, the Lord your God is one God.”

I respond: Some names of the essence signify the essence substantively (*substantive*), while others signify it adjectively (*adjective*). The names that signify the substance substantively are predicated of the three persons only in the singular and not in the plural, whereas those that signify the essence adjectively are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason for this is that substantival names signify a thing in the mode of a substance, whereas adjectival names signify a thing in the mode of an accident that inheres in a subject. Now just as a substance has *esse per se*, so too it has oneness or manyness *per se*, and so the form signified by a substantival name determines whether it is singular or plural. By contrast, just as accidents have *esse* in a subject, so too they take their oneness and manyness from their subject, and so the supposita determine whether adjectival names are singular or plural.

Now in creatures it is not the case that a single form exists in more than one suppositum except in virtue of a unity of order, i.e., as the form of an ordered multitude. Hence, if the names that signify such a form are substantival, then they are predicated of many in the singular—but not if they are adjectival. For instance, we say that many men are a college or an army or a people, but we say that several men are collegians.

By contrast, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 7 and q. 11, a. 4), in God the divine essence is signified in the mode of a form which, as was explained above (a. 2), is simple and maximally one. Hence, names that signify the divine essence substantively are predicated of the three persons in the singular and not in

the plural. Thus, the reason why we say that Socrates and Plato and Cicero are three men, but that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God and not three Gods, is that there are three humanities in the three supposita with a human nature, whereas there is a single divine essence in the three persons. On the other hand, the names that signify the divine essence adjectivally are predicated in the plural of the three persons because of the plurality of supposita. For instance, we call them three existents, or three who are wise, or three who are eternal and uncreated and unmeasured (*dicimus tres existentes vel tres sapientes aut tres aeternos et increatos et immensos*), as long as these names are taken adjectivally. By contrast, if the names are taken substantivally instead, then we say “the uncreated, unmeasured, and eternal one,” as the Athanasian creed puts it.

Reply to objection 1: Even though ‘God’ signifies *one having divinity*, it is nonetheless the case that the two expressions have different modes of signifying. For ‘God’ is said substantivally, whereas ‘one having divinity’ is said adjectivally. Hence, even though there are three who have divinity, it does not follow that there are three Gods.

Reply to objection 2: Different languages have different ways of speaking. Hence, just as the Greeks say ‘three hypostases’ because of the plurality of the supposita, so too in Hebrew ‘Elohim’ is said in the plural. We, however, do not say either ‘Gods’ or ‘substances’ in the plural, lest this plurality be referred to the substance.

Reply to objection 3: The name ‘thing’ (*res*) is a transcendental. Hence, insofar as it pertains to a relation, it is predicated in the plural of God, whereas insofar as it pertains to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. Thus, in the same place Augustine says, “The same Trinity is a certain highest thing.”

Reply to objection 4: The form signified by the name ‘person’ is not the essence or the nature but instead personhood (*personalitas*). Hence, since in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit there are three personhoods, i.e., three personal properties, ‘person’ is predicated of the three in the plural and not in the singular.

Article 4

Can the concrete names of the essence supposit for a person?

It seems that the concrete names of the essence cannot supposit for a person in such a way that the proposition ‘God begot God’ is true:

Objection 1: As logicians put it, a singular term signifies and supposits for the same thing. But the name ‘God’ seems to be a singular term, since, as has been explained (a. 3), it cannot be predicated in the plural. Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it seems to supposit for the essence and not for a person.

Objection 2: A term in the subject position is not restricted by a term in the predicate position in virtue of the latter’s signification; rather, it is restricted only in virtue of the co-signified tense. But when I say “God creates”, the name ‘God’ is suppositing for the essence. Therefore, when one says, ‘God begot’, the term ‘God’ cannot supposit for a person just because of the notional predicate.

Objection 3: If ‘God begot’ is true because the Father generates, then by parity of reasoning ‘God does not generate’ is true because the Son does not generate. Therefore, there is a generating God and a non-generating God. And so it seems to follow that there are two Gods.

Objection 4: If God begot God, then either He begot Himself as God or else He begot another God. But He did not beget Himself as God, since as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 1, “No entity

generates itself.” Nor did He beget another God, since there is just one God. Therefore, ‘God begot God’ is false.

Objection 5: If God begot God, then either He begot a God who is God the Father or He begot a God who is not God the Father. If He begot a God who is God the Father, then God the Father is begotten. If He begot a God who is not God the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father—which is false. Therefore, one cannot say that God begot God.

But contrary to this: The creed says, “God from God.”

I respond: Some have claimed that, by their nature, the name ‘God’ and similar names properly supposit for the essence, but that they are drawn into suppositing for a person when a notional term is joined to them. This opinion seems to have arisen from a consideration of God’s simplicity, which requires that in God the one who has is the same as what is had, and so the one who has divinity, which is signified by the name ‘God’, is the same as the divinity.

However, among the properties of locutions, one must pay attention not only to the thing signified, but also to the mode of signifying. And so, since the name ‘God’ signifies the divine essence as existing in one who has that essence—just as the name ‘man’ signifies human-ness in a suppositum—others have claimed more correctly that, because of this mode of signifying, the name ‘God’ is such that it can properly supposit for a person in the same way that the name ‘man’ can.

Therefore, the name ‘God’ sometimes supposits for the essence, as when one says, ‘God creates’, since the predicate ‘creates’ belongs to the subject by reason of the form that is signified, i.e., the divinity. Sometimes, however, ‘God’ supposits for a person—either (a) just one of the persons, as when one says, ‘God generates, or (b) for two persons, as when one says, ‘God spirates’, or (c) for three persons, as when one says with 1 Timothy 1:17, “To the king of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God . . .”

Reply to objection 1: Even though the name ‘God’ agrees with singular terms in the fact that the form signified by it is not multiplied, it nonetheless agrees with common terms in the fact that it is found in more than one suppositum. Hence, it need not always supposit for the essence that it signifies.

Reply to objection 2: This objection has force against those who claimed that the name ‘God’ does not naturally supposit for a person.

Reply to objection 3: The name ‘God’ and the name ‘man’ supposit for a person in different ways.

Since the form signified by the name ‘man’, i.e., human-ness, is in reality divided into diverse supposita, the name ‘man’ supposits *per se* for a person even if nothing is added to determine it to a person that is a distinct suppositum. On the other hand, human nature’s being one or being common is not something real but only something conceptual, and so the term ‘man’ does not supposit for the common nature except because of the demands of something added to it, as when one says, ‘*Man* is a species’.

By contrast, the form signified by the name ‘God’, viz., the divine essence, is both one and common in reality. Hence, ‘God’ supposits *per se* for the common nature, whereas its supposition is delimited to a person by something added to it. Hence, when one says ‘God generates’, the name ‘God’ supposits for the person of the Father by reason of the notional act. By contrast, when one says ‘God does not generate’, nothing is added that delimits this name to the person of the Son, and so the proposition entails that generation is incompatible with the divine nature. However, if something pertaining to the person of the Son is added, then the proposition will be true—as, for instance, if one were to say ‘The God who is begotten does not generate’. Hence, it is also the case that ‘There is a generating God and a non-generating God’ does not follow unless something pertaining to the persons is posited—as, for instance, if we were to say ‘The Father is a generating God and the Son is a non-generating God’. And

so it does not follow that there is more than one God, since the Father and the Son are one God, as has been explained (a. 3).

Reply to objection 4: ‘The Father generated Himself as God’ is false, since ‘Himself’ is a reflexive pronoun and refers to the same suppositum [as ‘Father’ does]. Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says in *Ad Maximinum*, viz., that the Father begot another self. For either (a) ‘self’ is in the ablative case, and then the meaning is ‘He begot someone other than Himself’ (*alterum a se*) or (b) ‘self’ induces a simple relation and thus refers to an identity of nature, in which case the proposition is improper or emphatic and has the following sense: ‘He generated another exactly similar to Himself’.

Similarly, ‘The Father generated another God’ is false. For as was explained above (q. 31, a. 2), even though the Son is other than the Father (*alius a patre*), it must not be said that He is another God (*alius Deus*). For ‘another God’ would be understood in such a way that the adjective ‘another’ adds its own entity (*res*) to the substantival term ‘God’, and so it would signify that there are distinct divinities. To be sure, some concede ‘The Father begot another God’, as long as ‘another’ is the substantival term and ‘God’ is taken as apposite to it. But this is an improper way of speaking and should be avoided, lest it provide an occasion for error.

Reply to objection 5: ‘God begot a God who is God the Father’ is false. For since ‘Father’ is taken as apposite to ‘God’, it restricts ‘God’ to standing for the person of the Father. As a result, the meaning would be ‘The Father begot a God who is Himself the Father’, and so the Father would be begotten—which is false. Hence, this negative proposition is true: ‘The Father begot a God who is not God the Father’.

On the other hand, if the construction ‘who is God the Father’ were understood not as being apposite but as interposing something, then, conversely, the affirmative proposition would be true and the negative proposition would be false. For the meaning of the affirmative proposition would be this: ‘The Father begot a God who is the God who is the Father’. However, this reading [of the original proposition] is strained. Hence, it is better simply to deny the affirmative proposition and concede the negative proposition.

By contrast, Praepositinus maintained that both the affirmative proposition and the negative proposition are false, since the relative pronoun ‘who’ can refer to a suppositum in the affirmative proposition, whereas in the negative proposition it refers both to the thing signified and to a suppositum. On this reading, the implication of the affirmative proposition is that being God the Father belongs to the person of the Son, and the implication of the negative proposition is that being God the Father is denied not only of the person of the Son but also of His divinity. However, this position seems unreasonable. For according to the Philosopher, if anything is such that there is an affirmation with respect to it, then there can also be a negation with respect to that very same thing.

Article 5

Can the names of the essence, taken in their abstract forms, supposit for a person?

It seems that the names of the essence, taken in their abstract forms, can supposit for a person, so that ‘The essence generates the essence’ is true:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine says, “The Father and the Son are one wisdom, since they are one essence, and, taken singly, wisdom is from wisdom, just as essence is from essence.”

Objection 2: When we are generated and corrupted, the things that exist in us are generated and corrupted. But the Son is generated. Therefore, since the divine essence exists in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.

Objection 3: As is clear from what was said above (q. 3, a. 3), God is the same as the divine essence. But as has been explained (a. 4), ‘God generates God’ is true. Therefore, ‘The essence generates the essence’ is true.

Objection 4: Everything is such that whatever is predicated of it can supposit for it. But the divine essence is the Father. Therefore, ‘essence’ can supposit for the person of the Father. And so the essence generates.

Objection 5: The essence is a thing that generates, since the essence is the Father, who generates. Therefore, if the essence does not generate, the essence will be a thing that both generates and does not generate—which is impossible.

Objection 6: In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “The Father is the source (*principium*) of the whole divinity.” But He is not the source except by generating and spirating. Therefore, the Father generates (or spirates) the divinity.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 1 Augustine says, “Nothing generates itself.” But if the essence generates the essence, then it generates nothing other than itself, since there is nothing in God that is distinct from the divine essence. Therefore, it is not the case that the essence generates the essence.

I respond: Abbot Joachim was mistaken on this question when he asserted that just as one says ‘God begets God’, so too one can say ‘The essence generates the essence’; he was thinking that because of God’s simplicity, God is not other than the divine essence.

However, he was deceived in this, since, as has been pointed out (a. 4), for the truth of a proposition one must take into account not only the things signified but also the mode of signifying. Even though in reality God is the same as the divine essence (*deitas*), nonetheless, the mode of signifying is not the same in the two cases. For since the name ‘God’ signifies the divine essence as existing in one who has it, its mode of signification is by nature such that it can supposit for a person; and so the things that are proper to the persons can be predicated of the name ‘God’, as when one says ‘God is begotten’ or ‘God generates’, as has been explained (a. 4). By contrast, the name ‘essence’, given its mode of signification, is not such that it supposits for a person, since it signifies the essence as an abstract form. And so the things which are proper to the persons and by which they are distinguished from one another cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would mean that there are distinct divine essences in the same way that there are distinct divine supposita.

Reply to objection 1: In order to express the oneness of the essence and the persons, the holy doctors sometimes put things more strongly than the strict meaning of their phrases would allow. Hence, those phrases should not be given an extended sense, but should instead be understood in such a way that the concrete terms, or even the names of the persons, are substituted for the abstract terms. So, for instance, when someone says ‘essence from essence’ or ‘wisdom from wisdom’, the meaning is ‘The Son, who is the essence and wisdom, is from the Father, who is the essence and wisdom’. However, a certain order must be observed with these abstract names. For those that pertain to acts are more closely tied to the persons, since the acts belong to the supposita. Hence, ‘nature from nature’ or ‘wisdom from wisdom’ is less improper than ‘essence from essence’.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of creatures, what is generated does not have numerically the same nature had by the one who generates, but instead has a numerically distinct nature that begins to exist in it *de novo* through generation and ceases to exist through corruption. And so the nature as such is generated and corrupted *per accidens*. By contrast, the Begotten God receives numerically the same nature had by the one who generates. And so the divine nature is not generated in the Son, either *per se* or *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 3: Even though God is the same as the divine essence in reality, still, because

of the differing modes of signifying, one must speak in different ways of the two of them.

Reply to objection 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father in the mode of identity because of the divine simplicity. However, it does not follow that ‘divine essence’ can supposit for the Father, and this because of the different modes of signifying.

Still, the objection does go through in those cases in which one thing is predicated of another as a universal of a particular.

Reply to objection 5: The difference between the substantival names and the adjectival names is that the substantival names carry with them their own suppositum, whereas the adjectival names do not. Instead, the adjectival names posit the thing they signify with respect to a substantival name. Hence, logicians say that substantival names have ‘supposition’, whereas adjectival names have ‘copulation’ and not supposition.

Therefore, because of a real identity of the persons with the essence, the substantival names of the persons can be predicated of the essence. Nor does it follow that each personal property makes for a distinct essence; rather, such a name is posited with respect to the suppositum implied by the substantival name.

By contrast, adjectival names of the notions and persons cannot be predicated of the essence unless a substantival name is joined to them. Hence, we cannot say that the essence generates. But we can say that the essence is a thing (*res*) that generates or that the essence is the God who generates, as long as ‘thing’ and ‘God’ are suppositing for a person—though not if they are suppositing for the essence. Hence, there is no contradiction involved in saying that the essence is a thing that generates and a thing that does not generate. For in the first conjunct ‘thing’ is being taken for a person, whereas in the second conjunct it is being taken for the essence.

Reply to objection 6: Insofar as the divinity is one thing in many supposita, it agrees with the form of a collective name. Hence, when one says ‘The Father is the source of the whole divinity’, this can be taken for the collection of persons, viz., insofar as He is the source in every divine person. Nor does this require that He be the source of Himself; in the same way, someone who is one of the people is said to be the ruler of all the people, but not the ruler of himself.

An alternative reply is that the Father is the source of the whole divinity not because He generates it and spirates it, but rather because He communicates the divinity by generating and spirating.

Article 6

Can the names of the persons be predicated of the names of the essence in their concrete forms?

It seems that the [names of the] persons cannot be predicated of the names of the essence in their concrete forms, as by saying ‘God is three persons’ or ‘God is a Trinity’.

Objection 1: ‘A man is every man’ is false, since there cannot be a suppositum for which it is true. For Socrates is not every man, and Plato is not every man, and no other man is every man. But the same holds for ‘God is a Trinity’, since there cannot be a suppositum with a divine nature for which it is true. For the Father is not a Trinity, and the Son is not a Trinity, and the Holy Spirit is not a Trinity. Therefore, ‘God is a Trinity’ is false.

Objection 2: A logical inferior cannot be predicated of its logical superior except by a *per accidens* predication, as when I say, ‘An animal is a man’. For it is accidental that an animal should be a man. But, as Damascene says, the name ‘God’ is related to the three persons as a common name to its

logical inferiors. Therefore, it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of the name ‘God’ except accidentally.

But contrary to this: In the sermon *De Fide* Augustine says, “We believe that the one God is a Trinity with the divine name.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 5), even though the adjectival names of the persons and notions cannot be predicated of the essence, their substantival counterparts can be—and this because of the real identity of the essence with a person. But the divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but also really the same as the three persons. Hence, one person or two persons or three persons can be predicated of the essence, as by saying ‘The essence is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit’. And since, as has been explained (a. 4), the name ‘God’ is *per se* such that it supposits for the essence, it follows that just as ‘The essence is three persons’ is true, so too ‘God is three persons’ is true.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 4), the name ‘man’ is *per se* such that it supposits for a person, but when something else is joined to it, it is such that it stands for the common nature. And this is why ‘A man is every man’ is false. For there is no suppositum for which it can be true.

By contrast, the name ‘God’ is *per se* such that it stands for the essence. Hence, even though there is no suppositum with a divine nature for whom ‘God is a Trinity’ is true, the proposition is nonetheless true for the essence. It is because he did not pay attention to this point that Gilbert de la Porrée denied the proposition.

Reply to objection 2: When one says ‘God is the Father’ or ‘The divine essence is the Father’, there is a predication through identity, but not in the sense that a logical inferior is being predicated of a logical superior. For in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, just as ‘The Father is God’ is a *per se* predication, so too is ‘God is the Father’, and it is in no sense *per accidens*.

Article 7

Should the names of the essence be appropriated to the persons?

It seems that the names of the essence should not be appropriated to the persons:

Objection 1: Anything that can verge on an error from the perspective of the Faith should be avoided with respect to God. For as Jerome says, “Heresy arises from words that are used incorrectly.” But to appropriate to one person the things that are common to the three persons can verge on an error from the perspective of the Faith, since it can be taken to mean either that (a) those things belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that (b) they belong to that person more than to the others. Therefore, the attributes of the essence should not be appropriated to the persons.

Objection 2: The attributes of the essence, signified in the abstract, signify in the mode of a form. But it is not the case that one person is related to another as a form, since a form is not distinct in suppositum from that of which it is the form. Therefore, the attributes of the essence, especially when signified in the abstract, ought not to be appropriated to the persons.

Objection 3: What is proper is prior to what is appropriated, since what is proper is part of the nature of what is appropriated. But according to our mode of understanding, the attributes of the essence are prior to the persons in the way that what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore, the attributes of the essence should not be appropriated.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 1:24 the Apostle says, “Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God.”

I respond: In order to make the Faith manifest, it was fitting for the attributes of the essence to be appropriated to the persons. For even though, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 1), the Trinity of persons cannot be proved by a demonstration, it is nonetheless fitting for it to be clarified by means of certain more manifest things. But the attributes of the essence are more manifest to us according to reason than are the properties of the persons, since on the basis of creatures, from which we take our cognition, we can arrive with certitude at the cognition of the attributes of the essence—though not, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 1), at the cognition of the properties of the persons. Therefore, just as we use the likeness of a vestige or an image found among creatures to make the divine persons more manifest, so too we can make use of the attributes of the essence in the same way. And this manifestation of the persons through the attributes of the essence is called *appropriation*.

Now there are two ways in which the divine persons can be made manifest through the attributes of the essence.

The first way is the *way of likeness (via similitudinis)*. For instance, things that have to do with the intellect are appropriated to the Son, who proceeds as the Word in an intellectual mode.

The second way is the *way of unlikeness (via dissimilitudinis)*. For instance, as Augustine points out, the fathers among us are often weak because of old age, and so, lest we suspect something like this in the case of God, power is appropriated to the Father.

Reply to objection 1: As was just explained, the attributes of the essence are appropriated to the persons not in order to assert that they are proper to the persons, but rather in order to make the persons manifest through the ways of likeness and unlikeness. Hence, no error follows from the perspective of the Faith; instead, this is a manifestation of the truth of the Faith.

Reply to objection 2: If the attributes of the essence were appropriated to the persons in such a way that they were proper to the persons, then it would follow that one person is related to another in the manner of a form. In *De Trinitate* 7 Augustine excludes this view, showing that the Father is not wise by the wisdom He has begotten—as if the Son alone were wise, in which case the Father and the Son could be called wise together, but not the Father without the Son.

However, the Son is called the wisdom of the Father because He is wisdom from the Father who is wisdom, and both are wisdom *per se*, and together are both one wisdom. Hence, the Father is not wise by the wisdom He has begotten; instead, He is the wisdom which is His essence.

Reply to objection 3: Even though, according to our mode of understanding, an attribute of the essence is by its proper nature prior to a person, nonetheless, insofar as an attribute has the character of being appropriated, there is nothing to prevent what is proper to a person from being prior to what is appropriated. In the same way, *color* is posterior to *body qua body*, but *color* is naturally prior to *white body qua white*.

Article 8

Have the holy doctors correctly assigned the attributes of the essence to the persons?

It seems that the holy doctors have not correctly assigned the attributes of the essence to the persons:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 2 Hilary says, “*Eternity* is in the Father, *species* is in the Image, and *use* is in the Bounty (*munus*).” With these words he uses three proper names of the persons, viz., the name ‘Father; the name ‘Image’, which is proper to the Son, as was explained above (q. 35, a. 2); and the name ‘Bounty’, i.e., ‘Gift’ (*donum*), which is proper to the Holy Spirit, as was also explained above

(q. 38, a. 2). He also posits three appropriated attributes. For he appropriates *eternity* to the Father, *species* to the Son, and *use* to the Holy Spirit. But it seems that he does so unreasonably. For eternity implies a duration of being, species is a principle of being, and use seems to pertain to operation. But the essence and the operation are not appropriated to any person. Therefore, these attributes seem to be appropriated incorrectly to the persons.

Objection 2: In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “In the Father there is *oneness*, in the Son *equality*, and in the Holy Spirit the *harmony* of oneness and equality.” But this seems incorrect. For one person is not formally denominated by that which is appropriated to another person. For instance, it is not the case that the Father is wise by a begotten wisdom, as has already been explained (a. 7). Yet Augustine adds in the same place, “The three are all one because of the Father, they are all equal because of the Son, and they are all connected because of the Holy Spirit.” Therefore, these attributes are not correctly appropriated to the persons.

Objection 3: According to Augustine, *power* is attributed to the Father, *wisdom* to the Son, and *goodness* to the Holy Spirit. But this seems incorrect. For strength (*virtus*) pertains to power (*potentia*). Yet according to 1 Corinthians 1:24 (“Christ, the strength of God”), strength is appropriated to the Son, and according to Luke 6:19 (“Strength went forth from Him, and He healed everyone”), strength is attributed to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, power should not be appropriated to the Father.

Objection 4: In *De Trinitate* Augustine says, “One should not interpret in a conflated way (*confuse*) what the Apostle says, viz., ‘*From Him*, and *through Him*, and *in Him*’. He says ‘*from Him*’ because of the Father, and ‘*through Him*’ because of the Son, and ‘*in Him*’ because of the Holy Spirit.” But this seems incorrect. For ‘*in Him*’ seems to imply the character of a final cause, which is the first among causes. Therefore, this sort of cause should be appropriated to the Father, who is the principle who is not from a principle.

Objection 5: According to John 14:6 (“I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life”), *truth* is appropriated to the Son. And so is the *book of life*, according to Psalm 39:8, “At the head of the book it is written of me,” where a Gloss says, “That is, with the Father, who is my head.” The name ‘*He Who Is*’ is likewise appropriated to the Son, since a Gloss on Isaiah 65:1 (“... ‘Here I am’ to a nation ...”) says, “The one speaking is the Son, who said to Moses, ‘I am who am’.”

But all of these seem to be *proper* to the Son and not *appropriated* to Him. For according to Augustine in *De Vera Religione*, “Truth is the highest likeness of the principle, without any unlikeness at all.” And so it seems that truth belongs properly to the Son, who has a principle. Likewise, the book of life seems to be something proper to the Son, since ‘book of life’ signifies a being that is from another, since every book is written by someone. Again, the name ‘He Who Is’ seems to be proper to the Son. For if it had been the Trinity speaking when it was said to Moses, “I am who am”, then Moses could have said, “He who is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit has sent me to you.” Therefore, further, he could have said, “He who is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit has sent me to you,” pointing to one of the persons. But this is false, since no person is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, this name is not common to the whole Trinity, but is instead proper to the Son.

I respond: Our intellect, which is led from creatures to the cognition of God, must consider God according to the mode it takes from creatures. Now in our consideration of a creature, there are four steps that occur in order: (a) first, we consider the thing itself absolutely speaking, insofar as it is a *being*; (b) second, we consider it insofar as it is *one*; (c) third, we consider the thing insofar as it has the *power* to act and to be a cause; and (d), fourth, we consider *its relation to what it has caused*. Hence, this fourfold consideration also occurs to us in the case of God.

(a) Thus, on the basis of the first consideration, by which God is considered absolutely with respect to His *esse*, we get Hilary’s appropriation [see Objection 1], according to which *eternity* is appropriated

to the Father, *species* to the Son, and *use* to the Holy Spirit.

For insofar as *eternity* designates *esse* that is not derived from any principle, it bears a likeness to what is proper to the Father, who is a principle that is not from a principle.

Again, *species*, i.e., *beauty*, has a likeness to what is proper to the Son. For three elements are required for beauty. The first is *integrity* or *perfection*, since things which are impaired are by that very fact ugly. The second is *due proportion* or *consonance*. And the third is *clarity*, so that things with bright colors are said to be beautiful. As for the first element, it has a likeness to what is proper to the Son, insofar as He is the Son who has the Father's nature truly and perfectly in Himself. Hence, to intimate this, Augustine says in his exposition, "Where [*read: in the Son*] there is the highest and first life . . ." As for the second element, it agrees with what is proper to the Son insofar as He is the expressed Image of the Father. Hence, we see that an image is said to be beautiful if it represents a thing perfectly, even an ugly thing. Augustine touches on this when he says, "Where there is such great agreement, and first equality . . ." As for the third element, it agrees with what is proper to the Son insofar as He is the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene puts it. Augustine, too, touches on this when he says, ". . . as the perfect Word to whom nothing is lacking, and as the art of the omnipotent God . . ."

Use, on the other hand, has a likeness to what is proper to the Holy Spirit, taking 'use' (*usus*) in a broad sense to include enjoyment as well—so that, as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 10, to use something is to take it up into the faculty of will, and to enjoy it is to use it with joy. Therefore, the use by which the Father and the Son enjoy one another agrees with what is proper to the Holy Spirit insofar as He is the Love. And this is why Augustine says, "[Hilary] calls that love, pleasure, and happiness (or beatitude) by the name 'use'." On the other hand, the use by which we ourselves enjoy God bears a likeness to what is proper to the Holy Spirit insofar as He is the Gift. Augustine shows this when he says, "The Holy Spirit exists within the Trinity, the sweetness of the Begetter and the Begotten, filling us with His enormous generosity and wealth."

And so it is clear why *eternity*, *species*, and *use* are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not the essence or the operation. For since the essence and the operation are by their nature common to all the persons, they have no likeness to what is proper to the persons.

(b) The second consideration of God is to consider Him as *one*. On this score, Augustine appropriates *oneness* to the Father, *equality* to the Son, and *harmony* or *connection* to the Holy Spirit [see Objection 2]. It is clear that all three of these imply oneness, but in different ways.

For '*oneness*' is predicated absolutely and does not presuppose anything else. And so it is appropriated to the Father, who does not presuppose any other person, since He is a principle who does not have a principle.

Equality, on the other hand, implies oneness with respect to another, since the equal is that which is of one quantity with another. And so equality is appropriated to the Son, who is a principle from a principle.

Now *connection* implies the oneness of two things. Hence, it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit insofar as He is from the other two.

It is on this basis that one can understand Augustine when he says, "The three are all one because of the Father, they are all equal because of the Son, and they are all connected because of the Holy Spirit." For it is clear that each thing is attributed to that in which it is first found; for instance, all lower things are said to live because of the vegetative soul, in which the nature of life is first found among lower things. But oneness would be found without mediation in the person of the Father even if, *per impossible*, the other persons were removed. And so the other persons have oneness from the Father. However, if the other persons were removed, then there would be no equality in the Father; but as soon as the Son is posited, then there is equality. And so they are all called 'equal' because of the Son—not

because the Son is the principle of the Father's equality, but rather because if the Son were not equal to the Father, then the Father could not be called 'equal'. For the Father's equality is first considered with respect to the Son, and the very fact that the Holy Spirit is equal to the Father is something He has from the Son. Similarly, if the Holy Spirit, who is the union of the Father and the Son, were excluded, then one could not understand the oneness of the connection between the Father and the Son. And so all of them are said to be connected because of the Holy Spirit. For once the Holy Spirit is posited, the Father and the Son can be said to be connected.

(c) The third appropriation—viz., of *power*, *wisdom*, and *goodness*—follows upon the third consideration, by which one considers God's power as sufficient for causing [see Objection 3]. This appropriation is derived both from the way of likeness, if one considers it within the divine persons, and from the way of unlikeness, if one considers it within creatures.

For *power* has the character of a principle. Hence, it bears a likeness to the heavenly Father, who is the principle of the whole divinity. However, it is sometimes found lacking in an earthly father because of his old age.

Wisdom bears a likeness to the heavenly Son insofar as He is the Word, which is nothing other than the conception of wisdom. However, it is sometimes found lacking in an earthly son because of his youthfulness.

Since, on the other hand, *goodness* is the reason for and object of love, it bears a likeness to the divine Spirit, who is the Love. But it seems incompatible with an earthly spirit, insofar as the latter implies a violent impulse—in keeping with Isaiah 25:4, "For the spirit of the mighty is like a whirlwind beating against a wall."

Now *strength* (*virtus*) is appropriated to the Son and the Holy Spirit, not insofar as strength is called the very power of a thing, but rather insofar as that which proceeds from the power of a thing is sometimes called its strength, in the way that we say that a strong deed is the strength of the agent.

(d) The appropriation of *from Him*, *through Him*, and *in Him* derives from the fourth consideration, according to which God is considered in relation to His effects [see Objection 4].

The preposition '*from*' sometimes implies the character of a material cause, which has no place in the case of God. However, sometimes it implies the character of an efficient cause, which belongs to God by reason of His active power, and in this sense *from Him* is appropriated to the Father in the same way that *power* is.

The preposition '*through*' sometimes designates an intermediate cause; for instance, we say that the blacksmith operates through his hammer. And so *through Him* is sometimes not *appropriated* to the Son but is *proper* to Him in accord with John 1:3 ("All things were made through Him")—not because the Son is an instrument, but because He is a principle from a principle. Sometimes, however, '*through*' designates the character of a form through which an agent acts, as when we say that the craftsman operates through his art. In this sense, *through Him* is appropriated to the Son in the same way that *wisdom* and *art* are.

The preposition '*in*' properly designates the character of a container. Now God is a container in two ways. In one way, with respect to His likenesses, i.e., in the sense in which all things are said to exist in God insofar as they exist in His knowledge. And in this sense the expression *in Him* is appropriated to the Son. However, in the second way, things are contained in God insofar as God conserves them and governs them with His goodness, by leading them to their appropriate ends. And in this sense *in Him* is appropriated to the Holy Spirit in the same way that *goodness* is.

Moreover, even though the final cause is the first among causes, it need not be appropriated to the Father, who is a principle that is not from a principle. For the divine persons, of whom the Father is the source, do not proceed as if proceeding to an end, since each of them is the ultimate end. Rather, they proceed by a natural procession, which seems to have to do more with the character of a natural power.

As for Objection 5, which raises other questions, one should reply that since, as was explained above (q. 16, a. 1), *truth* pertains to the intellect, it is *appropriated* to the Son and is not *proper* to him. For as was explained in the same place, truth can be considered either insofar as it exists in the intellect or insofar as it exists in things. Therefore, just as ‘intellect’ and ‘thing’ are taken with respect to the essence and not with respect to the persons, so too the same holds for ‘truth’. And the definition introduced from Augustine is intended to be a definition of *truth* insofar as it is appropriated to the Son.

‘*Book of life*’ implies knowledge in the nominative case and life in an oblique case. For as was explained above (q. 24, a. 1), the book of life is God’s knowledge of those who will have eternal life. Hence, *book of life* is appropriated to the Son—even though *life* (a) is appropriated to the Holy Spirit insofar as it implies a certain interior movement and (b) is proper to the Holy Spirit insofar as He is the Love. Moreover, being written by another is not part of the concept of a book *qua* book; rather, it is part of the concept of a book only insofar as the book is an artifact. Hence, *book of life* does not imply origin and so is not the name of a person, but is instead appropriated to a person.

Now *He Who Is* is appropriated to the person of the Son not according to its proper meaning, but rather by reason of something added to it, viz., that the liberation of the human race, which is accomplished through the Son, is prefigured in what God says to Moses. Still, insofar as ‘Who’ is taken as a relative pronoun, it could sometimes refer to the person of Son and so be taken for a person—as, for instance, if one were to say, ‘The Son is the Begotten Who Is’, in the same way that ‘God Begotten’ is the name of a person. However, ‘He Who Is’, taken without modification, is a name of the essence.

Furthermore, even though the pronoun ‘that [person]’ (*iste*) seems, grammatically speaking, to pertain to a determinate person, still, any demonstrable thing can, grammatically speaking, be called a person, even a thing that is not by its nature a person. For instance, we say ‘that rock’ (*iste lapis*) and ‘that donkey’ (*iste asinus*). Hence, grammatically speaking, even the divine essence, insofar as the name ‘God’ signifies and supposits for it, can be pointed to by the pronoun ‘that [person]’ (*iste*)—this according to Exodus 15:2 (“That (*iste*) is my God, and I will glorify Him”).

QUESTION 40

The Persons in Comparison to the Relations or Properties

Next we ask about the persons in comparison to the relations or properties. There are four questions: (1) Is a relation the same as a person? (2) Do the relations distinguish and constitute the persons? (3) If the relations are intellectually abstracted from the persons, do distinct hypostases still remain? (4) Do the relations conceptually presuppose the acts of the persons, or vice versa?

Article 1

Is a relation the same as a person?

It seems that in God a relation is not the same as a person:

Objection 1: If things are the same, then if one of them is multiplied, the other is likewise multiplied. But it is possible for there to be more than one relation in one person; for instance, the Paternity and the Common Spiration exist in the person of the Father. Again, it is possible for there to be one relation that exists in two persons; for instance, the Common Spiration is in the Father and in the Son. Therefore, a relation is not the same as a person.

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 4, nothing exists within itself. But a relation exists in a person. And one cannot claim that the relation exists in the person by reason of identity, since if that were so, then the relation would exist in the essence as well. Therefore, a relation or property is not the same as a person in God.

Objection 3: If things are the same, then they are such that whatever is predicated of the one is likewise predicated of the other. But it is not the case that whatever is predicated of a person is predicated of His property. For instance, we say that the Father generates, but we do not say that the Paternity generates. Therefore, a property is not the same as a person in God.

But contrary to this: As Boethius puts it in *De Hebdomadibus*, in God *that which is (quod est)* does not differ from *that by which it is (quo est)*. But the Father is the Father by the Paternity. Therefore, the Father is the Paternity. And, for the same reason, the other properties are the same as the persons.

I respond: On this matter there have been different opinions.

Some have claimed that the properties neither *are* the persons nor are *in* the persons. They were motivated to say this by the mode of signifying had by relational names, since such names signify a thing not as being *in* something (*in aliquo*), but rather as being *with respect to* something (*ad aliquid*). Hence, as was explained above (q. 28, a. 2), they called the relations ‘bystanders’ (*assistantes*).

However, since (a) insofar as a relation is a certain thing in God, it is the essence itself, and since (b), as is clear from what has been said (q. 39, a. 1), the essence is the same as a person, it must be the case that a relation is the same as a person.

Thus, others, taking this identity into account, claimed that, to be sure, the properties *are* the persons, but they are not *in* the persons. For, as was noted above (q. 32, a. 2), they posited the properties in God only as a manner of speaking.

However, as was explained above in the same place, one must say that the properties are *in* God and that they are signified in the abstract as the forms of the persons. Hence, since it is part of the nature of a form that it exists *in* that of which it is the form, one must say that the properties are *in* the persons and yet that they *are* the persons. In the same way, we say that the essence is *in* God and yet that the essence *is* God.

Reply to objection 1: A person and a property are the same in reality, but they differ conceptually.

Hence, it need not be the case that if the one is multiplied, the other is also multiplied.

Still, note that because of God's simplicity, there are two types of real identity in God among things that differ from one another in creatures:

(a) Since God's simplicity excludes a composition of *form* and *matter*, it follows that in God the *abstract* is the same as its *concrete* counterpart; for instance, the divinity is the same as God.

(b) Since God's simplicity excludes a composition of *subject* and *accident*, it follows that whatever is attributed to God is His essence. Because of this, wisdom and power are the same in God, since both exist in the divine essence.

It is because of this twofold character of identity that a property in God is the same as a person:

(a) The properties that constitute the persons (*properitates personales*) are the same as the persons by reason of the fact that the *abstract* is the same as the *concrete*. For the properties are the subsistent persons themselves; in particular, the Paternity is the Father Himself, and the Filiation is the Son, and the Procession is the Holy Spirit.

(b) On the other hand, the properties that do not constitute the persons are the same as the persons by the second type of identity, in virtue of which everything that is attributed to God is His essence. So, then, the Common Spiration is the same as the person of the Father and the person of the Son, not because the Common Spiration is a single person subsisting *per se*, but because just as the one essence exists in the two persons, so too the one property exists in the two persons—as was explained above (q. 30, a. 2).

Reply to objection 2: The properties are said to be in the *essence* only in the mode of identity. However, they are said to be in the *persons* in the mode of identity not only with respect to their reality, but also with respect to their mode of signifying, viz., the mode of signifying something as a form in a suppositum. This is why the properties determine the persons and make for distinct persons, but do not make for distinct essences.

Reply to objection 3: Participles and verbs pertaining to the notions signify the notional acts, and acts belong to supposita. The properties, however, are signified not as supposita, but as the forms of supposita; and so the properties' mode of signifying prevents the participles and verbs pertaining to the notions from being predicated of the properties.

Article 2

Do the relations constitute the persons and make them distinct?

It seems that the persons are not made distinct by the relations:

Objection 1: Simple things are distinct through themselves. But the divine persons are maximally simple. Therefore, they are made distinct through themselves and not by the relations.

Objection 2: A form is distinct only with respect to its own genus; for instance, *white* is distinct from *black* only with respect to the genus *quality*. But 'hypostasis' signifies an individual in the genus *substance*. Therefore, the hypostases are not made distinct by the relations.

Objection 3: What is absolute is prior to what is relational. But the distinction among the divine persons is a primary distinction. Therefore, the divine persons are not made distinct by the relations.

Objection 4: That which presupposes a given distinction cannot be the primary source of that distinction. But a relation presupposes a distinction among the persons, since the definition of 'relation' posits that the *esse* of a relation is *to be with respect to another*. Therefore, a relation cannot be the primary source of a distinction in God.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* Boethius says that the relations alone multiply the Trinity of divine persons.

I respond: When something is common to a plurality of things, it is necessary to look for something distinctive. Hence, since the three persons agree in oneness of essence, it is necessary to look for something by which they are made distinct in such a way as to be a plurality.

Now there are two things in which the divine persons differ from one another, viz., their origins and their relations. Even though these two things do not differ in reality, they nonetheless differ in their mode of signifying. For origins are signified in the mode of an act, e.g., generation, whereas relations are signified in the mode of a form, e.g., Paternity.

Thus, there have been some who, noticing that a relation follows upon an act, have claimed that the hypostases in God are made distinct from one another by their origins, and that the reason we say that the Father is distinct from the Son is that the one generates and the other is begotten. On the other hand, the distinctions among the hypostases (or persons) are made manifest after the fact by the relations (or properties)—in much the same way that the distinctions among individual creatures are effected by their material principles and are then made manifest by their properties.

However, there are two reasons why this position cannot be maintained.

First, in order for two things to be understood as distinct from one another, it is necessary that the distinction between them be understood through something intrinsic to them both—in the way that, among created things, the distinctions among them are understood through their matter or through their form. However, the origin of a thing is not signified as something intrinsic to it, but is instead signified as a certain path (*via*) from a thing or to a thing. For instance, generation is signified as a certain path that leads to the thing that is generated and that proceeds from the thing that generates it. Hence, it cannot be the case that the generated thing is made distinct from the generating thing by the act of generation alone; instead, one must grasp within both the generating thing and the generated thing those features in virtue of which they are distinct from one another. Now within a divine person one can grasp only the essence and the relation (or property). Hence, since the divine persons agree in the essence, it follows that it is through the relations that the persons are made distinct from one another.

Second, the distinction among the divine persons is not to be understood in such a way that something common is divided among them. For their common essence remains undivided. Instead, the distinguishing elements must themselves constitute the distinct things. But it is the relations (or properties) that so constitute the hypostases (or persons) and make them distinct from one another as subsistent persons. Thus, the Paternity is the Father and the Filiation is the Son, since in God the abstract does not differ from the concrete. By contrast, it is contrary to the notion of an origin that it should constitute a hypostasis (or person). For since an origin is signified as an action, it is signified as proceeding from a subsisting person, and hence it presupposes that person. On the other hand, when an origin is signified passively, as in the case of ‘being begotten’, it is signified as a path (*via*) to a subsistent person and not yet as constituting it. Hence, it is better to say that it is by the relations, rather than by their origins, that the persons (or hypostases) are made distinct from one another. For even though they are distinct from one another in both these ways, nonetheless, in our manner of understanding they are distinct in a prior and more principal way through the relations.

Hence, the name ‘Father’ signifies not only the property but also the hypostasis, whereas the name ‘Begetter’ or ‘One that generates’ signifies only the property. For the name ‘Father’ signifies the relation that constitutes the hypostasis and makes it distinct, whereas names such as ‘One that generates’ and ‘Begotten’ signify origins, which do not constitute the hypostases or make them distinct from one another.

Reply to objection 1: The persons are the subsistent relations themselves. Hence, it is not incompatible with the simplicity of the divine persons that they should be made distinct from one another

through the relations.

Reply to objection 2: The persons are distinct not in the *esse* in which they subsist or in anything absolute, but only in that which is *with respect to another*. Hence, the relations are sufficient to make them distinct from one another.

Reply to objection 3: To the extent that a distinction is prior, it is closer to oneness and so should be a minimal distinction. Thus, the distinctions among the persons should derive only from that which makes them minimally distinct, viz., the relations.

Reply to objection 4: It is when a relation is an accident that it presupposes a distinction among the supposita. However, if the relation in question is subsistent, then it does not presuppose a distinction among the supposita but brings that distinction with it. For when it is claimed that the *esse* of a relation is to be related to another, it is the correlative thing that is understood by the word ‘another’, and the correlative thing is not prior in nature to its counterpart, but is instead simultaneous in nature with it.

Article 3

If the properties or relations are intellectually abstracted from the persons, do distinct hypostases still remain?

It seems that if the properties or relations are intellectually abstracted from the persons, distinct hypostases still remain:

Objection 1: That to which something is related by an addition can still be understood even if that which is added to it has been removed. For instance, *man* is related to *animal* by an addition, and *animal* can still be understood if *rational* is removed. But *person* is related to *hypostasis* by an addition, since a person is a hypostasis with a distinguishing property pertaining to dignity. Therefore, when the property pertaining to a person is removed from *person*, *hypostasis* is still understood.

Objection 2: The fact that the Father is the *Father* and the fact that the Father is *someone* (*aliquis*) do not derive from the same thing. For given that He is the *Father* by the Paternity, if He were also *someone* by the Paternity, then it would follow that the Son, in whom the Paternity does not exist, is not *someone*. Therefore, if the Paternity is intellectually removed from the Father, then it still remains true that He is *someone*—i.e., that He is a hypostasis. Therefore, even if the property is removed from the person, the hypostasis still remains.

Objection 3: In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine says, “To say ‘unbegotten’ is not the same as saying ‘Father’, since even if He had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent His being called unbegotten.” By contrast, if He had not begotten the Son, then the Paternity would not exist in Him. Therefore, even if the Paternity is removed, the hypostasis of the Father still remains as unbegotten.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “The Son has nothing other than being begotten (*natum*).” But it is by being begotten (*nativitate*) that He is the Son. Therefore, if the Filiation is removed, the hypostasis of the Son does not remain. And the same line of reasoning holds for the other persons.

I respond: There are two kinds of intellectual abstraction. The first involves a universal’s being abstracted from a particular, in the way that *animal* is abstracted from *man*. The other involves a form’s being abstracted from matter, in the way that the figure of a circle is intellectually abstracted from all sensible matter. The difference between these two kinds of abstraction is that in the kind of abstraction that involves universals and particulars, that from which the abstraction is made does not remain; for instance, when the difference *rational* is removed from *man*, only *animal*—and not *man*—remains in the

intellect. By contrast, in the abstraction that involves form and matter, both of them remain in the intellect; for instance, when the figure of a circle is abstracted from bronze, the concept *circle* and the concept *bronze* remain separately in our intellect.

Now even though in God there is in reality no universal or particular and no matter or form, nonetheless, there is a likeness of them in God because of the mode of signifying. It is in accord with this mode that Damascene says, “What is common is the substance, and what is particular is the hypostasis.”

Thus, if we are talking about the kind of abstraction that involves universals and particulars, then when the properties are removed, what remains in our intellect is the common essence but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is a sort of particular.

On the other hand, if we are talking about the abstraction of form from matter, then when the properties that do not constitute the persons (*proprietates non personales*) are removed, the concepts of the hypostases (or persons) remain. For instance, if the fact that He is unbegotten or spirating is intellectually removed from the Father, then the hypostasis (or person) of the Father remains.

However, when a property that constitutes a person (*proprietas personalis*) is intellectually removed, then the concept of the hypostasis is removed as well. For the properties that constitute the persons are not thought of as coming to the divine hypostasis in the way that a form comes to a preexistent subject; instead, these properties bring their supposita along with them, since they are the subsisting persons themselves, in the way that the Paternity is the Father Himself. For ‘hypostasis’ signifies something distinct [from other hypostases] in God, since a hypostasis is an individual substance. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 2), it is the relations which make the hypostases distinct from one another and which constitute them, it follows that if the relations that constitute the persons are intellectually removed, then the hypostases do not remain.

However, as was explained above (a. 2), some claim that the hypostases in God are made distinct from one another not by their relations, but solely by their origins, with the result that the Father is understood to be a certain hypostasis by the fact that He is not from another, and the Son by the fact that He is from another through generation. By contrast, the relations that come [to the hypostases] as properties pertaining to dignity constitute the nature of a person and so are called personhoods (*personalitates*). Hence, when relations of this sort are intellectually removed, the hypostases remain, but not the persons.

But there are two reasons why this view cannot be true. First, as has been shown (a. 2), the relations constitute the hypostases and make them distinct from one another. Second, every hypostasis with a rational nature just is a person; this is clear from Boethius’s definition, according to which a person is an individual substance with a rational nature. Hence, in order for something to be a hypostasis and not a person, one would have to abstract the rationality of the nature and not the property constituting the person.

Reply to objection 1: *Person* does not add just *distinguishing property* to *hypostasis*; instead it adds *distinguishing property that pertains to dignity*, since this whole phrase must assume the place of the specific difference. Now a distinguishing property pertains to dignity insofar as it is understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, when *distinguishing property* is removed from *person*, *hypostasis* does not remain—though *hypostasis* would remain if the rationality of the nature were removed. For a person, like a hypostasis, is an individual substance, and so in God the distinguishing relation is part of both concepts.

Reply to objection 2: By the Paternity the Father is not only the Father but also a person and a *someone*, i.e., a hypostasis. Nor it does not follow from this that the Son is not a *someone*, i.e., a hypostasis—just as it does not follow that He is not a person.

Reply to objection 3: Augustine’s intent was not to claim that the hypostasis of the Father would

remain as unbegotten if the Paternity were removed—as if Innascibility constituted the hypostasis of the Father and made Him distinct [from the other persons]. For this is impossible, since ‘unbegotten’ does not posit anything, but is instead predicated negatively, as Augustine himself explains.

Rather, Augustine is here making the general point that not everything that is unbegotten is a father. Therefore, when the Paternity is removed, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God in such a way that He is distinct from the other *persons*. Rather, it remains insofar as He is distinct from *creatures*, in the way that the Jews understood Him.

Article 4

Are the notional acts presupposed by the properties?

It seems that the notional acts are presupposed by the properties:

Objection 1: In 1 *Sentences*, dist. 27, the Master says, “The Father always exists because He has always begotten the Son.” And so it seems that the generation conceptually precedes the Paternity.

Objection 2: Every relation conceptually presupposes that which it is founded on, in the way that equality presupposes quantity. But the Paternity is a relation founded on the action that is the generation. Therefore, the Paternity presupposes the generation.

Objection 3: The nativity is related to the Filiation in the same way that the active generation is related to the Paternity. But the Filiation presupposes the nativity; for the Son is the Son because He is begotten. Therefore, the Paternity likewise presupposes the generation.

But contrary to this: The generation is an operation of the person of the Father. But the Paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore, the Paternity is conceptually prior to the generation.

I respond: According to those who claim that the properties do not constitute the hypostases and make them distinct, but merely make manifest the hypostases as already constituted and distinct, it is absolutely necessary to claim that the relations are, according to our mode of understanding, posterior to the notional acts—so that it can simply be said that the Father is the Father because He generates.

However, if we assume that it is the relations that constitute the hypostases in God and make them distinct, then we must draw a distinction. For the origins in God are signified both actively and passively: (a) *actively*, in the way that the act of generating (*generatio*) is attributed to the Father and that the act of spirating (*spiratio*), taken as a notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; and (b) *passively*, in the way that being begotten (*nativitas*) is attributed to the Son and that proceeding (*processio*) is attributed to the Holy Spirit.

The origins as *passively* signified are conceptually prior in an absolute sense to the properties of the persons who proceed, even those properties that constitute them. For an origin, passively signified, is signified as a path (*via*) to the person who is constituted by the property.

Similarly, the origins as *actively* signified are conceptually prior to any relation which is had by the originating person but which is not constitutive of that person. For instance, the notional act of spirating conceptually precedes the unnamed relational property that is common to the Father and the Son.

However, the property that constitutes the person of the Father can be thought of in two ways:

(a) In one way, it is thought of insofar as it is a relation, and here, once again, it conceptually presupposes the notional act. For a relation as such is founded on an act.

(b) In the second way, it is thought of as constitutive of the person, and in this sense it must be the case that the relation is presupposed by the notional act, in the way that a person who is an agent is presupposed by his action.

Reply to objection 1: When the Master says that the Father is the Father because He generates, he is taking the name 'Father' insofar as it designates just the relation, but not insofar as it signifies the subsistent person. For when it is taken in the latter way, we must say, conversely, that the Father generates because He is the Father.

Reply to objection 2: This objection goes through with respect to the Paternity insofar as it is a relation, but not with respect to the Paternity insofar as it is constitutive of the person of the Father.

Reply to objection 3: Being begotten (*nativitas*) is a path to the person of the Son, and so it is conceptually prior to the Filiation, even insofar as the Filiation is constitutive of the person of the Son. However, the active generation is signified as proceeding from the person of the Father, and so it presupposes the personal property that constitutes the Father.

QUESTION 41

The Persons in Comparison to the Notional Acts

Next we must consider the persons in comparison to the notional acts (*actus notionales*). On this topic there are six questions: (1) Should the notional acts be attributed to the persons? (2) Are the notional acts necessary or voluntary? (3) In these acts, does the person proceed from nothing or from something? (4) Should one posit in God a power with respect to the notional acts? (5) What does this sort of power amount to? (6) Could a notional act terminate in more than one person?

Article 1

Should the notional acts be attributed to the persons?

It seems that the notional acts should not be attributed to the persons:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “When one turns to divine predication, all the genera, with the exception of *relation*, are changed to *substance* in God.” But *action* is one of the ten genera. Therefore, if an action is attributed to God, it will pertain to His essence and not to a notion.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 5 Augustine claims that everything said of God is predicated either with respect to the substance or with respect to a relation. But things that pertain to the substance are signified by the attributes of the essence, whereas things that pertain to the relations are signified by the names of the persons and the names of the properties. Therefore, the notional acts should not be attributed to the persons over and beyond these things.

Objection 3: It is proper to an action that a passion should be inferred from it. But we do not posit passions in God. Therefore, neither should the notional acts be posited there.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, “It is proper to the Father that He begot the Son.” But generation is a certain act. Therefore, the notional acts should be posited in God.

I respond: The distinctions among the divine persons derive from their origins. But origins cannot be correctly designated except by certain acts. Therefore, to designate the order of origins among the divine persons, it was necessary to attribute the notional acts to the persons.

Reply to objection 1: Every origin is designated by an act. Now there are two orders of origin that can be attributed to God.

The one has to do with the procession of creatures from God, and this order is common to the three persons. So the actions that are attributed to God in order to designate the procession of creatures from Him pertain to the essence.

The other order of origin in God has to do with the procession of person from person. Hence, the acts that designate the order of this sort of origin are called notional acts. For as is clear from what has been said (q. 32, a. 2-3), the notions belonging to the persons are relations that the persons bear to one another.

Reply to objection 2: The notional acts differ from the relations had by the persons only in their mode of signifying, and they are altogether the same as the relations in reality. Thus, in 1 *Sentences*, dist. 26, the Master says that ‘generating’ and ‘being begotten’ (*nativitas*) are just other names for the Paternity and the Filiation.

To see this clearly, notice that it was through movement that we were first able to guess the origin of one thing from another. For if a thing changed its disposition through movement, it was clear that this happened because of some cause. And so according to its primary imposition, the name ‘action’ implies an origin of movement. For just as a movement is called a passion insofar as it exists in a thing moved by another, so too the origin of the movement is itself called an *action* insofar as the movement begins

from another and terminates in that which is moved. Therefore, if the movement is excluded, then ‘action’ implies nothing other than an order of origin, insofar as the action proceeds from some cause or principle to that which is from the principle.

Thus, since there is no movement in God, the personal action of producing a person is nothing other than the relationship of the principle to the person who is from the principle—and this is just the relation or notion itself. However, we ourselves cannot talk about divine and super-sensible (*intelligibilia*) things except according to the mode of sensible things, from which we take our cognition and among which actions and passions, insofar as they imply movement, are distinct from the relations that follow upon those actions and passions; and so we had to signify the relationships of the persons to one another in the mode of acts separately from signifying their relationships to one another in the mode of relations. This makes it clear that the acts are the same as the relations in reality, and that they differ only in the mode of signifying.

Reply to objection 3: It is insofar as ‘action’ signifies the origin of a movement that a passion is inferred from it. But it is not the case that an action in this sense is posited in the divine persons. Hence, passions are not posited there except grammatically speaking, because of the mode of signifying, in the way that we attribute *generating* to the Father and *being generated* to the Son.

Article 2

Are the notional acts voluntary?

It seems that the notional acts are voluntary:

Objection 1: In *De Synodis* Hilary says, “Not induced by natural necessity, the Father begot the Son.”

Objection 2: In Colossians 1:13 the Apostle says, “He has translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love.” But love belongs to the will. Therefore, the Son is begotten by the Father through His will.

Objection 3: Nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the Love. Therefore, He proceeds in a voluntary way (*voluntarie*).

Objection 4: The Son proceeds in the mode of the intellect as the Word. But every word proceeds from someone who is speaking by his will. Therefore, the Son proceeds from the Father by His will and not by nature.

Objection 5: What is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore, if the Father did not beget the Son by His will, then it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in *Ad Orosium*.

But contrary to this: In the same book Augustine says, “The Father begot the Son neither by His will nor by necessity.”

I respond: There are two ways to understand the claim that something exists or is done by the will.

In one way, the ablative construction ‘by the will’ designates *mere concomitance*. For instance, I can say that I am a man by my will, i.e., that I will myself to be a man. In this sense, one can say that the Father begot the Son by His will—so that just as He is God by His will because He wills Himself to be God, so too He wills Himself to generate the Son.

In the second way, the ablative construction implies the status of a *cause*. For instance, a craftsman is said to work by his will, since his will is a principle of his work. Given this sense, one must say that

God the Father did not beget the Son by His will, though He did produce creatures by His will. Hence, *De Synodis* says, “If anyone claims that the Son is made as one among the creatures by the will of God, let him be anathema.” The reason for this is that nature and will differ in their causality by virtue of the fact that nature is determined to a single effect, whereas the will is not determined to a single effect. This is because an effect is assimilated to the form through which the agent acts. But it is clear that each thing has a single natural form through which it has *esse*, and so it effects things that are like itself. By contrast, the will acts not through just a single form, but through many forms, insofar as there are many intellectual conceptions. And so the will’s effect is not similar to the agent, but instead conforms to what the agent wills it to be and understands it to be. Therefore, the will is a principle of what can be one way or another, whereas nature is a principle of what cannot be other than the way it is.

Now that which can be one way or another is far removed from the divine nature, but pertains instead to the nature of creatures. For God is *per se* a necessary being, whereas creatures are made *ex nihilo*. And so when the Arians tried to prove that the Son is a creature, they claimed that the Father begot the Son by His will, in the sense in which ‘will’ designates a causal principle. We, on the other hand, must say that the Father begot the Son by nature and not by His will. Hence, in *De Synodis* Hilary says, “The will of God conferred substance on all creatures, but a perfect nativity gave to the Son a nature from the impassible and unbegotten substance. For all creatures have been created in the way that God willed them to be, but the Son, begotten of God, subsists as one who is just like God.”

Reply to objection 1: This passage is aimed against those who exclude even concomitance from the Father’s will in the generation of the Son, claiming that He begot the Son by nature in such a way that He did not even will to generate the Son—in just the way that we suffer against our will many things that occur by natural necessity, e.g., death, old age, and other defects of this sort. This interpretation is clear from what precedes and what follows the words in question. For the whole passage reads, “It is not the case that the Father willed not to beget the Son, or that He was forced to beget the Son, or that He was induced by natural necessity to beget Him even though He did not want to.”

Reply to objection 2: The Apostle calls Christ “the Son of God’s love” because He is loved superabundantly by God, and not because love is the principle of the generation of the Son.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as it is a certain nature, even the will wills something by nature. For instance, the human will naturally tends toward beatitude. Similarly, God wills and loves Himself by nature. However, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3), with respect to things other than Himself, God’s will is open in a certain way to both contraries.

Now the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love insofar as God loves Himself. Hence, the Holy Spirit proceeds by nature, even though He proceeds in the mode of the will.

Reply to objection 4: Among intellectual conceptions there is likewise a reduction to primary things that are understood by nature. But God understands Himself by nature. Accordingly, the conception of the divine Word is natural.

Reply to objection 5: A thing can be said to be necessary either through itself (*per se*) or through another (*per aliud*).

There are two ways for a thing to be necessary through another (*per aliud*).

In one way, the thing is necessary because of some cause that acts on it and coerces it; and what is necessary in this sense is the violent.

In the second way, it is necessary because of a final cause—as when something is said to be necessary as a means to an end because without it the end cannot exist, or cannot exist in the best way. The divine generation is not necessary in either of these two ways. For God does not exist for the sake of any end, and there is no coercion in God.

A thing is called necessary through itself (*per se*) when it is such that it is impossible for it not to

exist. It is in this sense that God's existing is necessary, and it is also in this sense that the Father's generating the Son is necessary.

Article 3

In the notional acts, do the persons proceed from something or from nothing?

It seems that the notional acts are not from anything (*non sint de aliquo*):

Objection 1: If the Father generates the Son from (*de*) something, then it is either from Himself or from something else.

If it is from something else, then since that from which something is generated exists in that which is generated, it follows that something other than the Father is in the Son. But this is contrary to Hilary in *De Trinitate* 7, where he says, "There is nothing diverse or different in them."

Suppose, on the other hand, that the Father generates the Son from Himself. Now if that from which something is generated is a permanent being, then what is generated is predicated of it. For instance, since a man is a permanent being, we say that a man is white when he goes from being non-white to being white. Therefore, it follows either that (a) the Father is not a permanent being when the Son is begotten or else that (b) the Father is the Son, which is false.

Therefore, the Father generates the Son from nothing (*de nihilo*) and not from something.

Objection 2: That from which something is generated is a principle of that which is generated. Therefore, if the Father generates the Son from His essence or nature, it follows that the Father's essence or nature is a principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, since matter has no place in God. Therefore, it is some sort of active principle, in the sense that what generates is an active principle of what is generated. And so it follows that the essence generates—which was disproved above (q. 39, a. 5).

Objection 3: Augustine says that the three persons are not from (*ex*) the same essence, since the essence is not something other than the persons. But the person of the Son is not something other than the essence of the Father. Therefore, the Son is not from (*de*) the essence of the Father.

Objection 4: Every creature is from nothing (*ex nihilo*). But in Sacred Scripture the Son is called a creature; for instance, Ecclesiasticus 24:5 says in the person of Begotten Wisdom, "I came out of the mouth of the most High, the firstborn before all creatures," and afterwards (24:14) says in the person of that same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the world, was I created." Therefore, the Son is begotten from nothing and not from something.

Similarly, the same objection can be made concerning the Holy Spirit in light of the fact that (a) Zacharias 12:1 says, "Thus says the Lord, who stretches forth the heavens, and lays the foundations of the earth, and creates the spirit of man in him," and that (b) Amos 4:13 says (according to the alternate version), "I who form the mountains and create the spirit."

But contrary to this: In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, "From the beginning, God the Father begot from His nature a Son equal to Himself."

I respond: The Son is generated not from nothing (*de nihilo*) but from the substance of the Father. For it was shown above (q. 27, a. 2 and q. 33, aa. 2-3) that 'Paternity' and 'Filiation' and 'Nativity' are truly and properly predicated of God.

However, there is a difference between a *true generation*, through which someone proceeds as a son, and a *making*, where the maker makes something from some external matter; for instance, a craftsman makes a bench from wood, whereas a man generates a son from himself.

Now as will be shown below (q. 45, a. 2), in the same way that a created craftsman makes something from matter, so God makes something from nothing (*ex nihilo*)—not because nothingness enters into the substance of the thing, but because the total substance of the thing is produced by God without presupposing anything else. Therefore, if the Son proceeded from the Father in such a way that He was from nothing, then He would be related to the Father as an artifact is related to a craftsman, and it is clear that this relation could bear the name ‘filiation’ only according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. Hence, it follows that if the Son of God proceeded from the Father in such a way that He was from nothing, He would not be truly and properly a son. But 1 John 5:20 (“That we might be in His true Son, Jesus Christ”) asserts the contrary of this. Therefore, the true Son of God is not from nothing, nor is He made; rather, He is simply begotten.

Moreover, if anyone who is created by God *ex nihilo* is called a son of God, this will be a metaphorical predication, insofar as that creature is in some way assimilated to the one who is truly the Son. Hence, it is because He is the only true and natural Son of God that He is called ‘the only-begotten’, in accord with John 1:18 (“The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him”). However, insofar as others are called adoptive sons by assimilation to Him, He is metaphorically called ‘the firstborn’, according to Romans 8:29 (“For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son: that He might be the firstborn among many brethren”). Therefore, it follows that the Son of God is generated from the substance of the Father.

However, it is otherwise with the son of a man. For it is a part of the substance of the man who generates that passes into the substance of the one who is begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be divided into parts (*est impartibilis*). Hence, it must be the case that in generating the Son, the Father did not transfer a part of His nature to Him but instead communicated the whole of His nature to Him, whereas the distinction between them remained only according to origin—as is clear from what has been said (q. 40, a. 2)

Reply to objection 1: When one says ‘The Son is begotten of the Father’, the preposition ‘of’ (*de*) signifies a consubstantial generating principle and not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter is made through a transmutation of that from which it is produced into some form. The divine essence, however, is not transmutable and not susceptible to another form.

Reply to objection 2: According to the Master’s explanation in 1 *Sentences*, dist. 5, the proposition ‘The Son is begotten of (*de*) the essence of the Father’ designates some sort of active principle. The Master expounds the proposition as ‘The Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, i.e., the Father-essence’. This is why, in *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says, “I say ‘of the Father-essence’, as if to say ‘of the essence of the Father’ in a more expressive way.”

However, this does not seem to capture the meaning of the sort of locution in question. For we can likewise say that a creature is from (*ex*) the God-essence, and yet it is not the case that a creature is from the essence of God.

Hence, we must reply along other lines that the preposition ‘of’ (*de*) always denotes consubstantiality. Hence, we do not say that a house is of the builder, since the builder is not a consubstantial cause of the house. However, we can say that one thing is ‘of’ another if the latter is in some way signified as a consubstantial principle—whether it be (a) an *active* principle, in the sense in which a son is said to be ‘of’ his father, or (b) a *material* principle, in the sense in which a knife is said to be ‘of’ iron, or (c) a *formal* principle, as in the case of things in which the forms themselves are subsistent and do not come to inhere in another; for instance, we can say that an angel is ‘of’ an intellectual nature. And it is in this last way that we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, since the essence of the Father, communicated to the Son through generation, subsists in him.

Reply to objection 3: When one says ‘The Son is begotten of the essence of the Father’, one is adding something with respect to which the distinction between them can be preserved. But when one

says ‘The three persons are of the divine essence’, nothing is posited with respect to which the distinction signified by the preposition ‘of’ can be conveyed. And so the two cases are not parallel.

Reply to objection 4: The proposition ‘Wisdom is created’ can be interpreted as referring not to the Wisdom that is the Son of God, but to the created wisdom that God pours into creatures. For Ecclesiasticus 1:9-10 says, “He created her [*read: wisdom*] in the Holy Spirit and He poured her out upon all His works.” Nor is it inappropriate that in one and the same context Sacred Scripture should speak of both begotten Wisdom and created wisdom, since created wisdom is a participation in uncreated Wisdom.

An alternative interpretation is that the proposition refers to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that its meaning is, ‘I was created from the beginning and before all ages, i.e., I was foreseen as united to a creature’.

On yet another interpretation, the fact that created wisdom and begotten Wisdom are mentioned together intimates to us the mode of divine generation. For in generation, what is generated receives the nature of what generates, and this bespeaks perfection, whereas in creation the creator does not change and what is created does not receive the nature of the creator. Therefore, the Son is both created and begotten, so that on the basis of creation we grasp the Father’s immutability, and on the basis of generation we grasp the oneness of nature in the Father and the Son. And that is how, in *De Synodis*, Hilary explains the meaning of this passage from Sacred Scripture.

Now the other passages that are adduced speak not of the Holy Spirit, but of a created spirit, where ‘spirit’ is the name sometimes given to the wind, sometimes to the air, sometimes to human breath, and sometimes even to the soul or some other invisible substance.

Article 4

Is there power in God with respect to the notional acts?

It seems that there is no power in God with respect to the notional acts:

Objection 1: Every power is either active or passive. But neither type can fit in this case. For as was shown above (q. 25, a. 1), there is no passive power in God. And no active power can belong to one person with respect to another, since, as has been shown (a. 3), the divine persons are not made. Therefore, in God there is no power with respect to the notional acts.

Objection 2: ‘Power’ is predicated with respect to what is possible. But the divine persons are numbered among the things that are necessary and not among the things that are possible. Therefore, one should not posit power in God with respect to the notional acts by which the divine persons proceed.

Objection 3: The Son proceeds as the Word, i.e., as a conception of the intellect, whereas the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Love, which pertains to the will. But as was shown above (q. 25, a. 1), ‘power’ is predicated of God with respect to His effects, and not with respect to His act of understanding and willing. Therefore, one should not claim that there is a power in God with respect to the notional acts.

But contrary to this: In *Contra Maximinum Haereticum* Augustine asks, “If God the Father was unable to generate a Son equal to Himself, then where is the omnipotence of God the Father?” Therefore, there is a power in God with respect to the notional acts.

I respond: Just as the notional acts are posited in God, so too it is necessary to posit in God a power with respect to acts of this type, since ‘power’ signifies nothing other than the principle of some act. Hence, since we understand the Father to be the principle of the generation, and the Father and the Son to be the principle of the spiration, we must attribute to the Father the power to generate, and we

must attribute to the Father and the Son the power to spirare. For ‘power to generate’ signifies that by which the one who generates generates, and everything that generates generates by something. Hence, the power to generate must be posited in anything that generates, and the power to spirare must be posited in anything that spirates.

Reply to objection 1: Just as none of the persons proceeds as *made* in a notional act, so too neither is power with respect to the notional acts in God a power with respect to a person who is *made*. Rather, it is merely a power with respect to a person who *proceeds*.

Reply to objection 2: The possible, insofar as it is *opposed to* the necessary, follows upon a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, there is nothing in God that is possible in that sense. Rather, whatever is possible in God is possible only in the sense in which the possible is *included under* the necessary. In this latter sense, one can say that just as it is possible for God to exist, so too it is possible for the Son to be generated.

Reply to objection 3: ‘Power’ signifies a principle. But a principle implies a distinction from that which it is a principle of.

Now there are two kinds of distinction among those things that are predicated of God, viz., (a) a distinction in reality (*distinctio secundum rem*) and (b) a merely conceptual distinction (*distinctio secundum rationem tantum*).

By a distinction in reality, God is distinct in His essence from those things whose principle He is through creation, and one person is distinct from another whose principle He is through a notional act. However, within God an action is not distinct from its agent except by a merely conceptual distinction, since otherwise actions would be accidents in God.

Thus, with respect to those actions by which real things proceed as distinct from God’s essence or from a divine person, power can be attributed to God in the proper sense of a principle. And so just as we posit in God the power to create, so too we posit the power to generate or to spirare.

By contrast, understanding (*intelligere*) and willing (*velle*) are not acts of the sort that mark the procession of a real thing distinct from God’s essence or from a divine person. Hence, with respect to these acts the nature of power can be preserved in God only according to our mode of understanding and mode of signifying, i.e., insofar as in God the intellect (*intellectus*) and the act of understanding are signified in different ways, despite the fact that God’s act of understanding is in reality His essence and thus has no principle.

Article 5

Do ‘power to generate’ and ‘power to spirare’ signify a real relation or instead God’s essence?

It seems that ‘power to generate’, or ‘power to spirare’, signifies a real relation in God and not God’s essence:

Objection 1: As is obvious from its definition, ‘power’ signifies a principle, since, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 5, an active power is a principle of acting. But in God ‘principle’ is predicated of a person in virtue of a notion. Therefore, in God ‘power’ signifies a relation and not the essence.

Objection 2: In God, *having the power to act (posse)* does not differ from *acting (agere)*. But ‘act of generating’ (*generatio*) signifies a relation in God. Therefore, so does ‘power to generate’.

Objection 3: Names that signify the essence in God are common to the three persons. But ‘power to generate’ is proper to the Father and not common to the three persons. Therefore, ‘power to generate’

does not signify the essence.

But contrary to this: Just as God is able to generate a Son, so too He wills to generate a Son. But ‘wills to generate’ signifies the essence. Therefore, so does ‘power to generate’.

I respond: Some have claimed that ‘power to generate’ signifies a relation in God. But this cannot be true. For what is properly called a power in any agent is that by which the agent acts. But anything that produces something by its action produces something similar to itself with respect to the form by which it acts. For instance, a man who is begotten is similar to the one who begets him with respect to human nature, by the power of which the father is able to generate a man. Therefore, the generative power in that which generates is the power by which what is generated is made similar to what generates it.

Now it is with respect to the divine nature that the Son of God is assimilated to the Father who begets Him. Hence, it is the divine nature in the Father which is His power to generate. This is why Hilary says in *De Trinitate* 5, “The nativity of God cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He does not subsist from any source other than God, and He does not subsist as anything other than God.” Therefore, one must claim, as the Master does in 1 *Sentences*, dist. 7, that ‘power to generate’ principally signifies the divine essence and not just a relation.

Nor does ‘power to generate’ signify the essence just insofar as the essence is the same as the relation, as if it signified both of them on a par. For instance, even though the Paternity is signified as the form of the Father, it is nonetheless a property that pertains to the person and is related to the person of the Father in the way that an individual form is related to a created individual. But among created things, even though an individual form constitutes the *person* who generates, it is not *that by which* he generates; otherwise, Socrates would generate Socrates. Hence, the Paternity cannot be understood as that by which the Father generates. Instead, the Paternity is understood as that which constitutes the person of the one who generates; otherwise, the Father would generate the Father. Rather, that by which the Father generates is the divine nature, with respect to which the Son is assimilated to Him. Accordingly, Damascene says that generation is a work of the nature—not insofar as the nature is the one who generates, but insofar as the nature is that by which He generates. And so ‘power to generate’ signifies the divine nature directly and the relation indirectly.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Power’ does not signify the very relation *principle of*; otherwise, it would be in the genus *relation*. Instead, it signifies that which is a principle—not in the sense in which an agent is called a principle, but rather in the sense in which that by which an agent acts is called a principle. Now even though an agent is distinct from what is effected, and even though that which generates is distinct from what it generates, still, *that by which* an agent (*generator*) generates is common both to that which generates and that which is generated—and the more perfect it is, the more perfect the act of generating is. Hence, since the divine act of generating is the most perfect of all, that by which the generator generates is common both to what is generated and to the one who generates, and it is *numerically* the same in them—and not just the same in *species*, as in the case of created things. Therefore, when we say that the divine essence is the principle by which the generator generates, it does not follow that there is more than one divine essence—in the way that it would follow if one claimed that the divine essence itself generates.

Reply to objection 2: In God the power to generate is the same as the act of generating in the sense in which the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of generating and as the Paternity. However, they are not conceptually the same.

Reply to objection 3: In the expression ‘the power to generate’, the power is signified directly and the act of generating is signified indirectly—just as if we were to say ‘the essence of the Father’. Hence, with respect to the essence that is signified, the power to generate is common to all three persons, but

with respect to the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father.

Article 6

Could a notional act terminate in more than one person?

It seems that a notional act could terminate in more than one person, so that in God there could be more than one person who is begotten or more than one person who is spirated:

Objection 1: Everything in which the power to generate exists is able to generate. But the power to generate exists in the Son. Therefore, the Son is able to generate. But He cannot generate Himself. Therefore, He is able to generate another Son. Therefore, there can be more than one Son in God.

Objection 2: In *Contra Maximinum* Augustine says, “The Son did not beget the creator. It was not that He was unable to, but that He did not need to.”

Objection 3: God the Father has a greater power to generate than does a created father. But one man is able to generate more than one son. Therefore, God can, too—especially given that the Father’s power is not diminished by the fact that one Son has already been generated.

But contrary to this: In God, the possible (*posse*) does not differ from the actual (*esse*). Therefore, if it were possible for there to be more than one Son in God, then there would be more than one Son. And so there would be more than three persons in God—which is heretical.

I respond: As the Athanasian creed says, “In God there is only one Father, one Son, and one Holy Spirit.” Four reasons can be given for this:

The first reason is based on the relations, which alone distinguish the persons: Since the divine persons are themselves subsistent relations, there cannot be more than one Father or Son in God unless there is more than one Paternity and more than one Filiation. But this could not be the case except because of a material distinction among the things, since the forms of a given species are multiplied only by matter—which does not exist in God. Hence, in God there can be just one subsistent Filiation, just as there could be only one subsistent whiteness.

The second reason is based on the manner of the processions: God understands and wills all things by a single simple act. Hence, there can be just one person who proceeds in the manner of a word, viz., the Son, and just one person who proceeds in the manner of a love, viz., the Holy Spirit.

The third reason is taken from the mode of proceeding: As has been explained (a. 2), the persons themselves proceed by nature. But nature is determined to a single effect.

The fourth reason is based on the perfection of the divine persons: The Son is perfect because the entire divine Filiation is contained in Him and because there is only one Son. And the same must be said about the other two persons.

Reply to objection 1: Even though it should be conceded without qualification that the Son has the power that the Father has, still, it should not be conceded that the Son has the power of generating, if ‘of generating’ is the gerundive of an active verb, so that the meaning is that the Son has the power to generate. Similarly, even though the same *esse* belongs to the Father and the Son, it nonetheless does not belong to the Son to be (*esse*) the Father—and this because of the added notional term ‘Father’.

However, if the expression ‘of generating’ is the gerundive of a passive verb, then the power of generating is in the Son, i.e., the power of being generated. The same holds if ‘of generating’ is the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that ‘power of generating’ means the power by which some person is generated.

Reply to objection 2: In this passage Augustine wants to claim not that the Son was able to

generate a Son, but that it is not because of the Son's impotence that He did not generate. This will be explained below (q. 42, a. 6).

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, God's immateriality and perfection require that there cannot be more than one Son in God. Hence, the fact that there is not more than one Son does not stem from the Father's inability to generate.

QUESTION 42

The Equality and Likeness of the Divine Persons in Comparison to One Another

Next we must consider the persons in comparison to one another: first, with respect to their equality and likeness (question 42) and, second, with respect to their missions (question 43).

On the first topic there are six questions: (1) Does equality have a place among the divine persons? (2) Is a person who proceeds equal from eternity to the person from whom He proceeds? (3) Is there any ordering among the divine persons? (4) Are the divine persons equal in greatness? (5) Does one divine person exist in another? (6) Are the divine persons equal in power?

Article 1

Does equality belong to the divine persons?

It seems that equality does not belong to the divine persons:

Objection 1: As is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, equality stems from oneness in quantity. But among the divine persons one finds neither (a) intrinsic continuous quantity, which is called magnitude (*magnitudo*), nor (b) extrinsic continuous quantity, which is called place and time. Moreover, there is no equality among the divine persons with respect to discrete quantity, since two persons are more than one person. Therefore, equality does not belong to the divine persons.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 39, a. 2), the divine persons are of one essence, and an essence is signified in the manner of a form. But agreement in form makes for likeness and not for equality. Therefore, we should speak of the likeness—and not the equality—of the divine persons.

Objection 3: Whenever equality is found among things, those things are equal to one another, since what is equal is said to be equal to its equal. But the divine persons cannot be called equal to one another. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 6, “If an image answers perfectly to that of which it is an image, then the image is made equal to that thing, but the thing itself is not made equal to its own image.” But the Son is the Image of the Father, and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore, there is no equality among the divine persons.

Objection 4: Equality is a certain relation. But no relation is common to the three persons, since it is by their relations that the persons are made distinct from one another. Therefore, equality does not belong to the divine persons.

But contrary to this: The Athanasian creed says, “The three persons are coeternal and coequal with one another.”

I respond: It is necessary to posit equality among the divine persons. For according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 10, ‘equal’ expresses, as it were, a negation of both greater and less. But we cannot posit anything greater or less among the divine persons. For as Boethius says in *De Trinitate*, “Differences [*read: within God*] are forced on those who add or subtract, as the Arians do when they break up the Trinity by assigning varying degrees of worthiness and thus produce a plurality.” The reason for this is that unequals cannot share numerically the same quantity. But in God there is no quantity other than His essence. Hence, it follows that if there were an inequality among the divine persons, then they would not share one essence, and so the three persons would not be one God—which is impossible. Therefore, one must posit equality among the divine persons.

Reply to objection 1: There are two kinds of quantity. The one is called the *quantity of mass* (*quantitas molis*) or *dimensive quantity*, and this kind exists only in corporeal things and so has no place among the divine persons. The other is *quantity of force* (*quantitas virtutis*), which is proportioned to the perfection of a nature or form. This is the sort of quantity that is involved when something is said to be

more or less hot to the extent that it is more or less perfect in heat.

Now this quantity of force is found in the *first* place in its *root*, i.e., in the very perfection of the form or nature, and as such it is called ‘spiritual greatness’ (*magnitudo spiritualis*), in the way that heat is called ‘great’ (*magnus*) because of its intensity and perfection. Thus, in *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “In those things that are great without mass, the greater *esse* is the better *esse*.” For it is the more perfect that is being called ‘better’ here.

In the *second* place, quantity of force is found in a form’s *effects*. Now the first effect of a form is *esse*, since every entity has *esse* according to its own form, whereas the second effect of a form is its operation, since every agent acts through its own form. Therefore, quantity of force is involved both in *esse* and in operation—(a) in *esse*, because things of a more perfect nature have a greater duration, and (b) in operation, because things of a more perfect nature have a greater power to act.

Thus, as Augustine puts it in *De Fide ad Petrum*, equality is found in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit “insofar as none of the three either precedes the others in eternity or exceeds them in greatness or surpasses them in power.”

Reply to objection 2: Where there is equality with respect to quantity of force, the equality includes within itself likeness plus something else, since it excludes excess. For when given things share in one form, they can be said to be like one another even if they participate unequally in that form. For instance, air is said to be like fire with respect to heat, but they cannot be called equals as long as the one participates more perfectly in the form of heat than the other does. And it is because the nature of the Father and the Son is not only one, but also equally perfect in the two of them, that we claim not only that the Son is *like* the Father, so as to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that they are *equal*, so as to exclude the error of Arius.

Reply to objection 3: In God, there are two ways in which equality or likeness can be signified, viz., by *names* and by *verbs*.

Insofar as it is signified by *names*, mutual equality and likeness are predicated of the divine persons. For the Son is equal to and like the Father, and vice versa. This is because the divine essence belongs no more to the Father than to the Son, and so just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, i.e., He is equal to the Father, so too the Father has the greatness of the Son, i.e., He is equal to the Son. By contrast, as far as creatures are concerned, “in their case equality and likeness are not convertible,” as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9. For things that are caused are like their causes to the extent that they have the form of their causes, but the converse does not hold, since the form exists principally in the cause and [only] secondarily in the thing that is caused.

Verbs, on the other hand, signify equality along with movement. And even though there is no movement in God, there is nonetheless reception there (*est tamen ibi accipere*). Therefore, since the Son receives from the Father that by which He is equal to the Father, and not vice versa, we say that the Son is made equal to the Father, but not that the Father is made equal to the Son (*filius coaequatur patri et non e converso*).

Reply to objection 4: Among the divine persons the only things to consider are the *essence*, in which they share, and the *relations*, by which they are distinguished. Equality implies both of these. It implies the distinction among the persons, because nothing is said to be equal to itself; and it implies the oneness of the essence, since the persons are equal to one another because they have a single greatness and a single essence.

Now it is clear that the same thing is not related to itself by any real relation. Nor, again, is one relation related to another by any further relation; for instance, when we say that the Paternity is opposed to the Filiation, the opposition is not itself a relation that mediates between the Paternity and the Filiation. For in both of these ways, the relations would be multiplied to infinity. And so the equality and likeness among the divine persons are not real relations distinct from the relations that constitute the

persons, but instead include within their concepts both the relations that distinguish the persons and the oneness of the essence. This is why in 1 *Sentences*, dist. 31, the Master says that in these cases the relations are merely names.

Article 2

Is a person who proceeds coeternal with His principle?

It seems that a person who proceeds is not coeternal with His principle, e.g., the Son is not coeternal with the Father:

Objection 1: Arius lays out twelve modes of generation. The first mode is the flowing of a line from a point, where equality of simplicity is lacking. The second mode is the emission of rays from the sun, where equality of nature is lacking. The third mode is the character or impression left by a seal, where consubstantiality and efficacy of power are lacking. The fourth mode is the infusion by God of a good act of will, where consubstantiality is lacking. The fifth mode is the emanation of an accident from its substance, where the accident lacks subsistence. The sixth mode is the abstraction of a species from matter in the way that the senses receive a species from a sensible thing, and here equality of spiritual simplicity is lacking. The seventh mode is the stimulation of the will by thought, which is a temporal stimulation. The eighth mode is transformation, as when an image is made from brass, and this transformation is material. The ninth mode is movement from a mover, and this is likewise effect and cause. The tenth mode is the eduction of a species from a genus, which has no place in God, since the Father is not predicated of the Son as a genus of a species. The eleventh mode is the realization of an idea, as when an external box is made from one that exists in the mind. The twelfth mode is birth, in the way that a man is from his father, and here there is temporal priority and posteriority.

Therefore, it is clear that in every mode in which one thing comes from another, there is either no equality of nature or no equality of duration. Therefore, if the Son is from the Father, then one must say that He is either less than the Father or posterior to the Father, or both.

Objection 2: Everything that is from another has a beginning. But nothing eternal has a beginning. Therefore, neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is eternal.

Objection 3: Everything that is corrupted ceases to exist. Therefore, everything that is generated begins to exist, since it is generated in order that it might exist. But the Son is begotten by the Father. Therefore, He begins to exist and is not coeternal with the Father.

Objection 4: If the Son is begotten by the Father, then either He is always being generated or else there is some instant of His generation. If He is always being generated, then given that a thing is imperfect while it is in the process of being generated—as is clear in the case of successive entities like time and movement, which are always in the state of coming to be—then it follows that the Son is always imperfect. But this is unacceptable. Therefore, there is some instant of the Son's generation. Therefore, before that instant the Son did not exist.

But contrary to this: The Athanasian creed says, “All three persons are coeternal with one another.”

I respond: One must claim that the Son is coeternal with the Father. To see this clearly, note that there are two ways in which something that comes from a principle can be posterior to its principle, viz., either (a) because of the agent or (b) because of the action.

As for the agent, this happens in one way with voluntary agents and in a different way with natural agents. In the case of voluntary agents, it happens because of the choice of time. For just as it is within a

voluntary agent's power to choose the form that he will confer on the effect—this was explained above (q. 41 a. 2)—so too it is within his power to choose the time at which he will produce the effect. On the other hand, in the case of natural agents, it happens because some agents do not possess from the beginning the entire power required to act by nature; instead, this power accrues to them after some time. For instance, a man does not possess from the beginning the power to generate.

As for the action, when an action is a successive entity, that which comes from the principle is prevented from existing at all the same times as its principle. Hence, if a given agent began to act by a successive action as soon as it itself came into existence, its effect would not exist immediately at the same instant, but would instead exist at the instant at which the action was terminated.

Now it is clear from what has been previously said (q. 41, a. 2) that (a) the Father generates the Son by nature and not by His will, and, again, that (b) the Father's nature was perfect from eternity, and, again, that (c) the action by which the Father produces the Son is not a successive entity, since in that case the Son of God would be generated successively and His generation would be a material generation involving movement—which is impossible. Therefore, it follows that the Son existed whenever the Father did. And so the Son is coeternal with the Father and, similarly, the Holy Spirit is coeternal with both of them.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in *De Verbis Domini*, there is no mode of procession among creatures that perfectly represents the divine generation, and so it is necessary to gather likenesses from many modes in order that what is lacking in one might in some way be supplied by another. This is why the Council of Ephesus says, “Let the Splendor announce to you that the Son coexists always as coeternal with the Father; let the Word show you the impassibility of His nativity; let the name of the Son intimate His consubstantiality.” However, among all of these modes it is the procession of a word from the intellect that provides the clearest representation. But a word is not posterior to that from which it proceeds, unless the intellect in question is such that it goes from potentiality into actuality—which cannot be said in the case of God.

Reply to objection 2: Eternity rules out a beginning of duration, but not a principle of origin.

Reply to objection 3: Every instance of corruption involves a change, and so everything that is corrupted begins not to exist and ceases to exist. But as was explained above (q. 27, a. 2), the divine generation is not a change. Hence, the Son is always being generated, and the Father is always generating.

Reply to objection 4: In the case of time, that which is indivisible, viz., an instant, is different from that which has duration, viz., time. But as was explained above (q. 10, aa. 2 and 4), in the case of eternity, the indivisible *now* always abides. Now the generation of the Son takes place not in the temporal *now* or in time, but rather in eternity. And so in order to signify the presentness and permanence of eternity, one can say, as Origen did, that the Son is always ‘being born’ (*nascitur*). However, as Gregory and Augustine reply, it is better to say that He is always ‘already born’ (*natus*), where ‘always’ designates the permanence of eternity and ‘already born’ designates the perfection of the one who has been begotten. Therefore, the Son is not imperfect and, contrary to what Arius claimed, it was never the case that He did not exist.

Article 3

Is there a natural ordering among the divine persons?

It seems that there is no natural ordering (*ordo naturae*) among the divine persons:

Objection 1: Whatever exists in God is either the essence or a person or a notion. But ‘natural ordering’ does not signify the essence, and there is no ordering of the persons or of the notions. Therefore, there is no natural ordering in God.

Objection 2: Whenever things are ordered naturally, one of them is prior to another, at least conceptually and according to nature. But as the Athanasian creed says, among the divine persons there is nothing prior or posterior. Therefore, there is no natural ordering among the divine persons.

Objection 3: If things are ordered, then they are distinct from one another. But there is no distinction within God’s nature (*natura in divinis non distinguitur*). Therefore, there is no ordering. Therefore, neither is there any natural ordering there.

Objection 4: God’s nature is His essence. But one does not speak of an essential ordering in God. Therefore, neither is there a natural ordering.

But contrary to this: Wherever there is a plurality of things without order, there is conflation (*confusio*). But as the Athanasian creed says, there is no conflation among the divine persons. Therefore, there is an ordering there.

I respond: An ordering always involves a comparison to some principle. Hence, just as ‘principle’ is said in many ways—viz., (a) with respect to *position*, as in the case of a point, (b) with respect to *understanding*, as in the case of a principle of demonstration, and (c) with respect to *singular causes*—so, too, ‘ordering’ is said in many ways.

Now as was explained above (q. 33, a. 1), in the case of God, ‘principle’ is predicated with respect to *origin* and without any priority. Hence, in this case there must be an ordering with respect to origin, but without priority. And this is called a *natural ordering* (*ordo naturae*), in keeping with what Augustine says: “Not an ordering whereby one is *prior to* another, but an ordering whereby one is *from* another.”

Reply to objection 1: ‘Natural ordering’ signifies the notion of an origin in general, though not in particular.

Reply to objection 2: Among created things, even when that which is from a principle is coeval in duration with its principle, the principle is nonetheless conceptually prior to it and prior to it in nature, as long as we are considering the thing itself which is a principle.

By contrast, if the relations *cause of* and *caused by*, and *principle of* and *from a principle*, are themselves being considered, then it is clear that the opposed relations are simultaneous both naturally and conceptually, since each occurs in the definition of the other. But in God the relations are themselves subsistent persons in a single nature. Hence, one person cannot be prior to another—naturally or conceptually—either with respect to the nature or with respect to the relations.

Reply to objection 3: There is a natural ordering not because the nature itself is ordered, but rather because there is an ordering among the divine persons with respect to their natural origin.

Reply to objection 4: ‘Nature’, but not ‘essence’, in some sense implies the character of a principle. And so the ordering of origin is better called a *natural* ordering than an *essential* ordering.

Article 4

Is the Son equal to the Father in greatness?

It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness (*secundum magnitudinem*):

Objection 1: At John 14:28 the Son Himself says, “The Father is greater than I.” And at 1 Corinthians 15:28 the Apostle says, “The Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things

under Him.”

Objection 2: The Paternity pertains to the dignity of the Father. But the Paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore, it is not the case that the Son has whatever dignity the Father has. Therefore, the Son is not equal in greatness to the Father.

Objection 3: Whenever there is a whole and parts, many parts are something greater than one part or a few parts; for instance, three men are something greater than two men or one man. But in God there seems to be a universal whole along with parts. For more than one notion is contained under a relation or notion. Therefore, since there are three notions in the Father and only two in the Son, it seems that the Son is not equal to the Father.

But contrary to this: Philippians 2:6 says, “He thought it not robbery to be equal with God.”

I respond: It is necessary to claim that the Son is equal to the Father in greatness. For God’s greatness is nothing other than the perfection of the divine nature itself. But it is part of the concepts of the Paternity and of the Filiation that through His generation the Son attains to having the perfection of the nature that is in the Father, just as the Father does.

By contrast, since among men generation is a certain change in something that goes from potentiality into actuality, a human son is not from the beginning equal to the father who generates him. Rather, he must attain to equality by growing in the normal way, unless things turn out otherwise because of some defect in the principle of generation.

However, it is clear from what has been said (q. 27, a. 2 and q. 33, aa. 2-3) that in God Paternity and Filiation exist truly and properly. Nor can one claim that God the Father’s power was defective in generating, or that the Son of God reached perfection step by step and through changes. Hence, one must say that from eternity the Son was equal to the Father in greatness. Thus, in *De Synodis* Hilary says, “If one removes the infirmities of the bodies, and removes the beginning of conception, and removes the sorrows and all human necessity, then every son has equality with his father because of his natural birth, since there is a likeness of nature.”

Reply to objection 1: These words are understood of Christ with respect to His human nature, in which He is less than the Father and subject to the Father. But with respect to His divine nature, He is equal to the Father. And this is just what the Athanasian creed says: “Equal to the Father with respect to His divinity, less than the Father with respect to His human-ness.”

Here is an alternative reply given by Hilary in *De Trinitate* 9: “The Father is greater by the authority of the giver, but the one to whom *esse* is given is not lesser.” And in *De Synodis* Hilary says, “The subjection of the Son’s nature is His piety [*read*: His recognition of the Father’s authority], whereas the subjection of other sons is the infirmity of creatures.”

Reply to objection 2: Equality has to do with greatness. But as has been explained (a. 1), in God ‘greatness’ signifies the perfection of the nature and pertains to the essence. And so in God equality and likeness stem from the attributes of the essence, whereas inequality and unlikeness cannot be predicated with respect to the distinction among the relations. Hence, in *Contra Maximinum* Augustine says, “The question about origin is ‘What is from what?’, whereas the question about equality is, ‘What qualities does it have?’ or ‘How great is it?’” Therefore, the Paternity is the dignity of the Father because it is the essence of the Father. For dignity is something absolute and thus pertains to the essence. Thus, just as the same essence that is the Paternity in the Father is the Filiation in the Son, so too the same dignity that is the Paternity in the Father is the Filiation in the Son. Therefore, it is true to say that the Son has whatever dignity the Father has. Still, ‘The Father has the Paternity, therefore the Son has the Paternity’ is invalid, since here relational names have replaced a substantival name (*mutatur enim quid ad aliquid*). For the essence is the same as the dignity of the Father and the Son, but it is in the Father according to the relation *giving*, whereas it is in the Son according to the relation *receiving*.

Reply to objection 3: In God a relation is not a universal whole, even if it is predicated of more than one relation. For all the relations are one in essence and *esse*, and this is incompatible with the nature of a universal whole, whose parts are distinct in *esse*. Similarly, as was explained above (q. 30, a. 4), ‘person’ is not a universal in God. Nor is it the case that all the relations are something greater than just one relation; nor are all the persons something greater than just one person. For the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each of the persons.

Article 5

Is the Son in the Father, and vice versa?

It seems that the Son is not in the Father, or vice versa (*filius non sit in patre et e converso*):

Objection 1: In *Physics* 4 the Philosopher lays out eight ways in which one thing is in another and, as is clear to anyone who goes through them one by one, in none of these ways is the Son in the Father, or vice versa. Therefore, the Son is not in the Father, or vice versa.

Objection 2: Nothing that goes forth from a thing is in that thing. But according to Micah 5:2 (“His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity”), the Son goes forth from the Father from eternity. Therefore, the Son is not in the Father.

Objection 3: One of two opposites is not in the other. But the Father and the Son are relational opposites. Therefore, one cannot be in the other.

But contrary to this: John 14:10 says, “I am in the Father, and the Father is in me.”

I respond: There are three things to consider in the case of the Father and the Son, viz., the *essence*, the *relations*, and *origin*. And with respect to each of these the Son is in the Father, and vice versa.

With respect to the *essence*, the Father is in the Son, since the Father is His own essence and communicates His essence to the Son—but not through any sort of change. Hence, it follows that since the essence of the Father is in the Son, the Father is in the Son. Similarly, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He is in the Father, because His own essence is in the Father. Accordingly, in *De Trinitate* 5 Hilary says, “The immutable God follows His nature, so to speak, in begetting an immutable God. We understand that the nature of God subsists in [the Son], since He is God in God.”

With respect to the *relations*, it is clear that one of two relational opposites is in the other conceptually.

With respect to *origin*, it is likewise clear that the procession of the intelligible Word is not external to the speaker, but instead remains within the speaker. Also, that which is said by means of the Word is contained by the Word.

And the same line of reasoning applies to the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 1: The things that are in creatures do not adequately represent the things that belong to God. And so the Son is in the Father, and vice versa, in none of those ways that the Philosopher enumerates. However, the closest of those ways is the one according to which a thing is said to be in its originating principle—except that oneness of essence between the principle and what is from the principle is not found among created things.

Reply to objection 2: The Son’s going forth from the Father is in the manner of an interior procession, in the way a word goes forth from the heart and yet remains within the heart. Hence, this ‘going forth’ in God involves just a distinction among relations and not any distance between essences.

Reply to objection 3: The Father and the Son are opposed relationally and not with respect to

their essence. And yet, as has been explained, one relational opposite is in the other.

Article 6

Is the Son equal to the Father in power?

It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in power:

Objection 1: John 5:19 says, “The Son cannot do anything by Himself (*a se*), but what He sees the Father doing.” But the Father is able to do things by Himself. Therefore, the Father is greater in power than the Son.

Objection 2: The one who commands and teaches is greater in power than one who obeys and listens. But according to John 14:31 (“As the Father has given me commandments, so do I . . .”), the Father commands the Son, and according to John 5:20 (“For the Father loves the Son and shows Him all things which He Himself does”), the Father also teaches the Son. Similarly, according to John 5:30 (“As I hear, so I judge”), the Son listens to the Father. Therefore, the Father is greater in power than the Son.

Objection 3: It pertains to the Father’s omnipotence that He is able to generate a Son equal to Himself; for in *Contra Maximinum* Augustine says, “If God the Father was unable to generate a Son equal to Himself, then where is the omnipotence of God the Father?” But as was shown above (q. 41, a. 6), the Son is unable to generate a Son. Therefore, it is not the case that the Son is able to do whatever pertains to the Father’s omnipotence. And so the Son is not equal to the Father in power.

But contrary to this: John 5:19 says, “For whatever things the Father does, these the Son also does in like manner.”

I respond: It is necessary to claim that the Son is equal to the Father in power, since the power to act follows upon the perfection of the nature. For among creatures we see that a thing has more power to act to the extent that it has a more perfect nature. But it was shown above (a. 4) that the very character of the divine Paternity and Filiation demands that the Son be equal to the Father in greatness, i.e., in the perfection of the nature. Hence, it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power. And the same line of reasoning holds for the Holy Spirit with respect to both the Father and the Son.

Reply to objection 1: The claim that the Son cannot do anything by Himself (*a se*) does not take away from the Son any power had by the Father. For He adds immediately that whatever the Father does, the Son does in like manner. Instead, this shows that the Son has His power from the Father, from whom He has His nature. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 9 Hilary says, “The oneness of the divine nature is such that the Son does *through* Himself (*per se*) what He does not do *by* Himself (*a se*).”

Reply to objection 2: By the Father’s teaching and the Son’s listening, all that is meant is that the Father communicates His knowledge to the Son in the same way that He communicates His essence to Him. And the Father’s command can be interpreted in the same way, viz., that in generating the Son, the Father gave to Him from eternity His knowledge and will with respect to the things that were to be done.

An alternative, and perhaps better, reply is that this should be taken to refer to Christ with respect to His human nature.

Reply to objection 3: Just as it is the same essence that is the Paternity in the Father and the Filiation in the Son, so too it is the same power by which the Father generates and the Son is generated. Hence, it is clear that the Son is able to do whatever the Father is able to do.

However, it does not follow that the Son is able to generate. Rather, a relational name (*ad aliquid*) has here replaced a substantival name (*quid*), since ‘generation’ signifies a relation in God. Therefore, the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with a different relation. For the Father has the omnipotence as the one who *gives* it, and this is what is meant by saying that He is able to generate. The

Son, on the other hand, has the omnipotence as one who *receives* it, and this is what is meant by saying that He is able to be generated.

QUESTION 43

The Missions of the Divine Persons

Next we must consider the missions (*missiones*) of the divine persons. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is it fitting for a divine person to be sent on mission? (2) Is a mission eternal or only temporal? (3) In what sense is a divine person sent on mission invisibly? (4) Is it fitting for each person to be sent on mission? (5) Are both the Son and the Holy Spirit sent on mission invisibly? (6) To whom is an invisible mission made? (7) What about visible missions? (8) Does any person send Himself on a mission, be it visible or invisible?

Article 1

Is it fitting for a divine person to be sent on mission?

It seems that it is not fitting for a divine person to be sent on mission (*personae divinae non conveniat mitti*):

Objection 1: The one who is sent on mission is of lesser status than the one who sends him. But it is not the case that one divine person is of lesser status than another. Therefore, it is not the case that one divine person is sent on mission by another.

Objection 2: Everything that is sent is separated from the one who sends it, and this is why in *Super Ezechielem* Jerome says, “That which is connected and conjoined in one body cannot be sent.” But as Hilary puts it, “there is nothing separable” in the divine persons. Therefore, it is not the case that one person is sent by another.

Objection 3: Whoever is sent on mission leaves one place and goes anew to some other place. But this is unfitting in the case of a divine person, since He is everywhere. Therefore, it is not fitting for a divine person to be sent on mission.

But contrary to this: John 8:16 says, “I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me.”

I respond: There are two things implied by the concept of a mission. The one is the relation that the one who is sent bears to the one by whom he is sent, and the other is the relation that the one who is sent bears to the terminus toward which he is sent.

Now someone’s being sent involves a certain procession of what is sent by what sends it, and this procession takes place either (a) by a *command*, as when a master sends his servant, or (b) by *counsel*, as when an advisor is said to send his king into war, or (c) by *origin*, as when a flower is said to be sent forth by a tree. Likewise, someone’s being sent bears a relation to the terminus toward which he is sent, so that he begins to be present there in some way—either because (a) he was previously not present in any way where he is now being sent, or because (b) he begins to be present there in some way in which he was not previously present.

Therefore, a mission can belong to a divine person insofar as this implies, on the one hand, a procession of *origin* from the one who sends Him, and, on the other hand, a *new mode of existing* in something. It is in this way that the Son is said to have been sent by the Father into the world. For He began to exist visibly in the world through His assumed flesh, and yet, as John 1:10 says, He had previously been present in the world.

Reply to objection 1: A mission implies a lesser status in the one who is sent when it implies a procession from the sending principle either by a command or by counsel. For one who commands is greater, and the one who counsels is wiser. However, in the case of God the only thing implied is a procession of *origin*, which—as was explained above (q. 42, a. 4 and 6)—preserves equality.

Reply to objection 2: That which is sent in such a way that it begins to be present where it had in

no way been previously present undergoes local motion because of its mission, and so it is necessary that it be separated from the one who sent it. However, this does not happen with the sending of a divine person, since a divine person who is sent does not begin to be present where He was not previously present, and He does not cease to be present where He was previously present. Hence, such a sending occurs without separation, but is instead characterized only by a distinction of origin.

Reply to objection 3: This objection goes through in the case of a mission that is accomplished by local motion—which has no place in the case of God.

Article 2

Can a mission be eternal?

It seems that a mission can be eternal:

Objection 1: Gregory says that the Son is sent on mission by the very fact that He is generated. But the generation of the Son is eternal. Therefore, so is His mission.

Objection 2: If someone has something temporally (*temporaliter*), then he undergoes change. But a divine person does not undergo change. Therefore, the mission of a divine person is eternal and not temporal.

Objection 3: ‘Mission’ implies procession. But the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore, so are their missions.

But contrary to this: Galatians 4:4 says, “When the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son.”

I respond: Among the names that imply the origin of the divine persons, there is a certain distinction that must be taken into account. For in their signification some of these names, e.g., ‘procession’ and ‘going forth’, imply only a relation to the principle, whereas other names specify a terminus of the procession in addition to the relation to the principle.

Among these latter names, some, e.g., ‘generation’ and ‘spiration’, specify an eternal terminus. For instance, a generation is the procession of a divine person into the divine nature, and ‘spiration’, taken passively, implies the procession of the subsistent Love. However, some of these names, e.g., ‘mission’ and ‘giving’ (*datio*), imply a temporal terminus in addition to the relation to the principle. For a thing is sent on mission in order that it might be present in something, and a thing is given in order that it might be had. But for a divine person to be had by some creature—that is, for a divine person to exist in a creature with a new mode of existing—is something temporal.

Hence, ‘mission’ and ‘giving’ are predicated of God only from a given point in time, whereas ‘generation’ and ‘spiration’ are predicated of God only from eternity. On the other hand, ‘procession’ and ‘going forth’ are predicated of God both from eternity and temporally. For instance, the Son processes from eternity so as to be God, whereas He processes temporally (a) so as to be a man as well, in keeping with His visible mission, and (b) so as also to exist within men, in keeping with His invisible mission.

Reply to objection 1: Gregory is talking about the temporal generation of the Son from His mother, and not about the generation from His Father.

An alternative reply is that by the very fact that He was begotten from eternity, the Son has the possibility of being sent on mission (*habet quod possit mitti*).

Reply to objection 2: The fact that a divine person exists in a new way in something, or that He is had by someone in time, stems not from any change in the divine person, but from a change in the creature—in just the way that God is called ‘Lord’ from a given point in time because of a change

involving creatures.

Reply to objection 3: ‘Mission’ not only implies the procession from a principle, but also specifies the temporal terminus of the procession. Hence, a mission is exclusively temporal.

An alternative reply is that ‘mission’ includes the eternal procession and adds something else, viz., a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to His principle is exclusively eternal. Hence, the procession may be called a ‘twin procession’, both eternal and temporal, not because the relation to the principle is twofold, but because there is a double terminus, one temporal and one eternal.

Article 3

Is a divine person sent on mission invisibly only through the gift of sanctifying grace?

It seems that it is not the case that a divine person is sent on mission invisibly only through the gift of sanctifying grace (*non sit solum secundum donum gratiae gratum facientis*):

Objection 1: For a divine person to be sent on mission is for Him to be given. Therefore, if a divine person is sent only through the gifts of sanctifying grace, it will not be the divine person Himself who is given, but only His gifts. But this is the error of those who claim that it is not the Holy Spirit who is given, but rather His gifts.

Objection 2: The preposition ‘through’ (*secundum*) denotes the character of some type of cause. But according to Romans 5:5 (“The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us”), a divine person is a cause of someone’s having sanctifying grace, and not vice versa. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that a divine person is sent through the gifts of sanctifying grace.

Objection 3: In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “The Son is said to be sent on mission because He is perceived in time by the mind.” But the Son is known not only through sanctifying grace, but also through gratuitous grace (*gratia gratis data*), e.g., through faith and knowledge. Therefore, it is not the case that a divine person is sent only through sanctifying grace.

Objection 4: Rabanus says that the Holy Spirit was given to the Apostles for the working of miracles. But this is a gift of gratuitous grace and not of sanctifying grace. Therefore, it is not the case that a divine person is given only through sanctifying grace.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 15 Augustine says that the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally in order to sanctify creatures. But a mission is a temporal procession. Therefore, since the sanctification of creatures occurs only through sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of a divine person occurs only through sanctifying grace.

I respond: A divine person is *sent on mission* insofar as He exists in a new way in something, and a divine person is *given* insofar as He is had by someone. Neither of these occurs except through sanctifying grace.

There is the common mode in which God exists in all things through His essence, power, and presence as a cause existing in the effects that participate in His goodness (cf. q. 8). But over and beyond this common mode, there is a special mode that belongs to rational creatures, in whom God is said to exist in the way that what is known exists in the knower and what is loved exists in the lover. And since in knowing and loving, rational creatures attain to God Himself by their own operation, God is said not only to exist in a special mode in rational creatures, but also to live in them as in His temple.

So, then, there is no effect other than sanctifying grace that can be the explanation for the fact that a divine person exists in a new way in rational creatures. Hence, it is through sanctifying grace alone that a divine person proceeds temporally and is sent on mission.

Similarly, the only things we are said to have are those that we can freely use and enjoy. But it is only through sanctifying grace that we have the power to enjoy a divine person, and it is precisely in the gift of sanctifying grace that the Holy Spirit is had by and inhabits a man. Hence, it is the Holy Spirit Himself who is given and sent.

Reply to objection 1: Through sanctifying grace rational creatures are perfected not only in order that they might use this created gift, but also in order that they might enjoy the divine person Himself. And so the invisible mission is accomplished through the gift of sanctifying grace, but it is the divine person Himself who is given.

Reply to objection 2: Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to have the divine person, and this is what is meant by saying that the Holy Spirit is given through the gift of grace. Yet the gift of grace itself comes from the Holy Spirit, and this is what is meant by saying that the charity of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the Son can be known by us through certain effects, it is not through those effects that He inhabits us or is had by us.

Reply to objection 4: The working of miracles, like the gift of prophecy and all the other types of gratuitous grace, makes sanctifying grace manifest. Thus in 1 Corinthians 12:7 gratuitous grace is called a manifestation of the Spirit. So, then, the reason why the Holy Spirit is said to have been given to the apostles for the working of miracles is that sanctifying grace was given to them along with a sign that made it manifest.

However, if only the sign of sanctifying grace were given without the sanctifying grace itself, the Holy Spirit would not be said to be given absolutely speaking—unless, that is, there were some qualification according to which one might say that a prophetic spirit or a spirit of miracles is given to someone to the extent that he has from the Holy Spirit the power to prophesy or to work miracles.

Article 4

Is it fitting for the Father to be sent on mission?

It seems fitting for even the Father to be sent on mission (*etiam patri conveniat mitti*):

Objection 1: For a divine person to be sent on mission is for Him to be given. But the Father gives Himself, since He cannot be possessed unless He Himself gives Himself. Therefore, one can say that the Father sends Himself.

Objection 2: A divine person is sent through the indwelling of grace. But according to John 14:23 (“We will come to him and will make our abode with him”), the whole Trinity dwells in us through grace. Therefore, each of the divine persons is sent on mission.

Objection 3: Except for the notions and the persons themselves, whatever belongs to one person belongs to them all. But ‘mission’ does not signify any person in particular or even any notion, since there are just five notions, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 3). Therefore, it belongs to each divine person to be sent on mission.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 2 Augustine says, “The Father alone is never said to have been sent on mission.”

I respond: The concept *mission* implies a procession from another, and as applied to the divine persons, it implies procession from another through *origin*, as was explained above (a. 1). Hence, since the Father does not proceed from another, it does not belong to Him in any way to be sent on mission. Rather, this belongs only to the Son and the Holy Spirit, to whom it belongs to proceed from another.

Reply to objection 1: If ‘to give’ implies someone’s generous sharing, then in that sense the Father gives Himself, because He generously communicates Himself to creatures in order that they might enjoy Him. However, if ‘to give’ implies the authorship (*auctoritas*) of the giver with respect to that which is given, then in this sense nothing in God is given—just as nothing is sent on mission—except a divine person who proceeds from another.

Reply to objection 2: Even though the effect of grace is also from the Father, who dwells in us through grace just as the Son and the Holy Spirit do, nonetheless, because He does not proceed from another, He is not said to be sent on mission. This is the point Augustine is making in *De Trinitate* 4 when he says, “Even though the Father is known in time by someone, He is not said to have been sent on mission, since there is no one from whom He exists or from whom He proceeds.”

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as ‘mission’ implies a procession from the sender, it includes a notion in its signification—not a specific notion, but a notion in general, since ‘being from another’ is common to two of the notions.

Article 5

Does it belong to the Son to be sent on mission invisibly?

It seems that it does not belong to the Son to be sent on mission invisibly (*filio non conveniat invisibiliter mitti*):

Objection 1: The invisible mission of a divine person takes place through the gifts of grace. But according to 1 Corinthians 12:11 (“But all these things, one and the same Spirit does”), all the gifts of grace pertain to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, only the Holy Spirit is sent on mission invisibly.

Objection 2: The mission of a divine person is accomplished through sanctifying grace. But gifts that pertain to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be had without charity—this according to 1 Corinthians 13:2 (“If I should have prophecy and should know all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing”). Therefore, since the Son proceeds from the Father as the Word of the intellect, it seems that it does not belong to Him to be sent on mission invisibly.

Objection 3: As has been explained (aa. 1 and 4), the mission of a divine person is a certain sort of procession. But the procession of the Son is different from the procession of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, their missions would be different if both of them were sent. And so one of these missions would be superfluous, since a single mission is sufficient to sanctify creatures.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 9:10 says of divine Wisdom, “Send her out of Your holy heaven, and from the throne of Your majesty.”

I respond: According to John 14:23 (“We will come to him and will make our abode with him”), it is the whole Trinity that dwells in the mind through sanctifying grace. But a divine person’s being sent to someone through invisible grace implies (a) a new mode of dwelling for that divine person and (b) His origin from another. Hence, since it belongs to both the Son and the Holy Spirit to dwell in someone through grace and to proceed from another, it belongs to both of them to be sent on mission invisibly. By contrast, even though it belongs to the Father to dwell in someone through grace, it does not belong to Him to proceed from another and, as a result, it does not belong to Him to be sent on mission.

Reply to objection 1: All the gifts *qua* gifts are attributed to the Holy Spirit, since, as was explained above (q. 38, a. 2), He has the character of being the first Gift insofar as He is the Love. Nonetheless, because of their specific character, some gifts, viz., those pertaining to the intellect, are

attributed by a certain appropriation to the Son, and the Son's mission involves those gifts. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, "The Son is sent invisibly to someone when He is known and perceived by that person."

Reply to objection 2: Through grace the soul is conformed to God. Hence, in order for a divine person to be sent to someone through grace, there must be an assimilation on his part to the divine person who is sent through the gift of grace.

Since the Holy Spirit is the Love, it is through the gift of charity that the soul is assimilated to the Holy Spirit, and so the mission of the Holy Spirit involves the gift of charity. The Son, on the other hand, is the Word—not just any sort of word, but the Word who spirates the Love. Thus, in *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, "The Word which we have in mind is knowledge with love." Therefore, the Son is sent not through every perfection of the intellect, but through the sort of formation (*instructio*) of the intellect by which one breaks forth into the affection of love. Thus, John 6:45 says, "Everyone who has listened to the Father and learned, come to me," and Psalm 38:4 says, "In my meditation a fire shall flame out." And this is why Augustine says in plain words that the Son is sent whenever He is known and perceived by someone; for 'perceive' signifies a sort of experiential knowledge. And according to Ecclesiasticus 6:23 ("The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name"), this is properly called wisdom (*sapientia*) or, so to speak, wise knowledge (*sapida scientia*).

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (aa. 1 and 3), 'mission' implies (a) the origin of the person who is sent, along with (b) indwelling through grace.

So if we are speaking of the missions as far as *origin* is concerned, then the mission of the Son is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Spirit in the same way that the Generation is distinguished from the Procession.

On the other hand, if we are speaking of the missions as far as the effect of *grace* is concerned, then the two missions share the fact that they are both rooted in grace, but they are distinguished in the effects of grace, viz., the illumination of the intellect and the inflaming of the affections. And in this sense it is clear that the one effect cannot exist without the other, since neither occurs without sanctifying grace, and the one person is not separated from the other.

Article 6

Is an invisible mission made to everyone who participates in grace?

It seems that an invisible mission is not made to everyone who participates in grace:

Objection 1: The patriarchs of the Old Testament participated in grace. But the invisible missions do not seem to have been made to them. For John 7:39 says, "For as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." Therefore, the invisible missions are not made to everyone who participates in grace.

Objection 2: Progress in virtue occurs only through grace. But an invisible mission does not seem to seem to have anything to do with progress in virtue. For progress in virtue seems to be continuous, since charity is always either increasing or decreasing, and so the mission would be continuous in the same way. Therefore, an invisible mission is not made to everyone who participates in grace.

Objection 3: Christ and the blessed in heaven have grace to the fullest extent. But a mission does not seem to be made to them, since a mission is made to something distant, whereas Christ, insofar as he is a man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore, it is not the case that an invisible mission is made to all who participate in grace.

Objection 4: The sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and yet an invisible mission is not said to be made to them. Therefore, it is not the case that an invisible mission is made to all things that have grace.

But contrary to this: According to Augustine, an invisible mission is made in order to sanctify creatures. But every creature who has grace is sanctified. Therefore, an invisible mission is made to every creature of this sort.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), the concept *mission* implies that the one who is sent either (a) begins to exist where he previously did not exist, as happens with created things, or (b) begins to exist, but in a new mode, where he previously existed—and it is in this latter sense that missions are attributed to the divine persons. So there are two elements to consider in the one to whom the mission is made, viz., the indwelling of grace and a certain renewal through grace. Therefore, an invisible mission is made to everyone in whom these two elements are found.

Reply to objection 1: An invisible mission was made to the patriarchs of the Old Testament, and this is why in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says that insofar as the Son is sent invisibly, “He comes to exist in men or with men; however, this had been done beforehand in the patriarchs and prophets.” Therefore, the statement that the Spirit had not yet come has to do with the giving of the Spirit along with a visible sign, which was done on the day of Pentecost.

Reply to objection 2: An invisible mission is also accomplished through progress in virtue or an increase in grace. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “The Son is sent to someone when He is known or perceived by someone to the extent that He can be known or perceived through the understanding of a rational soul that is either progressing toward God or already perfected in God.”

However, an invisible mission involves an increase of grace especially when someone progresses to a new sort of act or to a new state of grace—as, for instance, when someone progresses to the grace of miracles or prophecy, or when someone, out of the fervor of charity, progresses to the point of exposing himself to martyrdom or of renouncing his possessions or of undertaking some arduous task.

Reply to objection 3: An invisible mission was made to the blessed in heaven at very beginning of their beatitude. Afterwards, an invisible mission is made to them not through the intensification of grace, but by the fact that more and more mysteries are revealed to them, right up to judgment day. This increase constitutes an extension of grace as it reaches more and more things.

However, an invisible mission was made to Christ at the very beginning of His conception, but not afterwards. For from the beginning of His conception He was full of all wisdom and grace.

Reply to objection 4: Grace exists instrumentally in the sacraments of the New Law, in the way that the form of an artifact exists in the craftsman’s tools as the action proceeds from the agent to the patient. A mission, however, is said to be made only with respect to its terminus. Hence, the mission of a divine person is made not to the sacraments, but rather to those who receive grace through the sacraments.

Article 7

Does it belong to the Holy Spirit to be sent on mission visibly?

It seems that it does not belong to the Holy Spirit to be sent on mission visibly:

Objection 1: Insofar as the Son was sent visibly into the world, He is said to be less than the Father. But we never read that the Holy Spirit is less than the Father. Therefore, it does not belong to the Holy Spirit to be sent on mission visibly.

Objection 2: A visible mission involves the assumption of some visible creature, like the mission of the Son according to the flesh. But the Holy Spirit has not assumed any visible creature. Hence, it cannot be said that He exists in some visible creatures differently from the way He exists in other visible creatures—except, perhaps, in the manner of a sign, in the way He exists in the sacraments or in all the figures of the Old Law (*figurae legales*). Therefore, either the Holy Spirit is not sent visibly, or else one must claim that His mission is visible through *all* the things just mentioned.

Objection 3: Every creature is a visible effect that shows forth the whole Trinity. Therefore, it is not the case that the Holy Spirit is sent through visible creatures more than the other divine persons are.

Objection 4: The Son is sent on mission visibly through the most worthy of visible creatures, viz., a human nature. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is sent on mission visibly, He ought to be sent through rational creatures.

Objection 5: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, things that are done visibly by God are dispensed through the ministry of the angels. Therefore, if there have been any visible appearances, then this has been done through the angels. And so it is the angels themselves who are sent on mission, and not the Holy Spirit.

Objection 6: If the Holy Spirit were sent on mission visibly, this would be done only in order to make His invisible mission manifest, since invisible things are made manifest through visible things. Therefore, a visible mission should not have been made to anyone to whom an invisible mission had not been made; and a visible mission should have been made to anyone—whether in the New Testament or the Old Testament—to whom an invisible mission had been made. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that the Holy Spirit is sent on mission visibly.

But contrary to this: Matthew 3:16 says that when the Lord was baptized, the Holy Spirit descended upon Him under the appearance of a dove.

I respond: God provides for everything according to its mode. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 12, a. 12), the mode that is connatural to men is to be led to invisible things through visible things, and so the invisible things of God had to be made manifest to men through visible things. Therefore, just as God in some sense revealed (*demonstravit*) to men His own self, along with the eternal processions of the divine persons, through visible creatures according to certain intimations, so too it was fitting that the invisible missions of the divine persons should be made manifest through certain visible creatures.

However, the Son and the Holy Spirit were made manifest in different ways. For it belongs to the Holy Spirit, insofar as He proceeds as the Love, to be the gift of sanctification, whereas it belongs to the Son, insofar as He is a principle of the Holy Spirit, to be the author of this sanctification. And so the Son was sent visibly as the author of sanctification, whereas the Holy Spirit was sent visibly as the sign of sanctification.

Reply to objection 1: The visible creature in which the Son appeared is such that He assumed it into the unity of His person, so that what is said of that creature can be said of the Son of God. And so it is by reason of His assumed nature that the Son is said to be less than the Father. By contrast, the Holy Spirit did not assume any visible creature in which He appeared into the unity of His person in such a way that whatever belongs to that creature is predicated of Him. Hence, the Holy Spirit cannot be called less than the Father because of a visible creature.

Reply to objection 2: The visible mission of the Holy Spirit does not involve imaginative visions, i.e., prophetic visions. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 2, “A prophetic vision is not exhibited to bodily eyes through corporeal forms, but is instead exhibited in the spirit through spiritual images of bodies. Yet everyone who was looking saw the dove and the fire with their own eyes. Again, the Holy Spirit was not related to any appearance in the way that the Son was related to the rock—for it is written, ‘The rock was Christ’ (1 Corinthians 10:4). For that rock had already existed as a creature, and because

of its mode of acting was given the name of Christ, whom it typified, whereas the dove and the fire came into existence suddenly just in order to signify the things in question. Rather, the dove and the fire seem to be like the flames that appeared to Moses in the bush, or the column that the people followed in the desert, or the lightning and thunder that occurred while the Law was being given on the mountain. For the corporeal appearance of these things came into existence in order to signify something and then disappeared.”

So, then, it is clear that the visible mission involves neither prophetic visions, which existed in the imagination and were not corporeal, nor the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testaments, in which certain preexisting things are taken up in order to signify something. Rather, the Holy Spirit is said to be sent on mission visibly insofar as He showed Himself—as in signs—in certain creatures that were made specifically for this purpose.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the whole Trinity operated through these visible creatures, they were nonetheless specifically made in order to reveal this or that person. For just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are signified by diverse names, so also they were able to be signified by diverse things—even though there is no separation or diversity among the persons themselves.

Reply to objection 4: As has been explained, the Son had to be made known as the author of sanctification, and so the Son’s visible mission had to be accomplished through a rational nature, whose function it is to act and to which the act of sanctifying can belong. By contrast, any other creature whatsoever could have served as a *sign* of sanctification. Nor did a visible creature made for this purpose have to be assumed by the Holy Spirit into the unity of His person. For such a creature was assumed not in order to do anything, but only in order to be a sign. Because of this, the creature in question did not need to last any longer than the time during which it played its role.

Reply to objection 5: The visible creatures in question were formed by the ministry of the angels, but they were formed in order to signify the person of the Holy Spirit and not in order to signify the person of an angel. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit existed in those visible creatures in the way that the thing signified exists in a sign, it follows that it was the Holy Spirit—and not an angel—who was visibly sent on mission through those things.

Reply to objection 6: As it says in 1 Corinthians 12:7 (“And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man for its usefulness [*read: to the Church*]”), it is not necessary that an invisible mission should always be manifested through some visible exterior sign. This usefulness consists in the fact that the Faith is confirmed and propagated through visible signs of the sort in question. According to Hebrews 2:3 (“Which, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed to us by them that heard Him”), this has been done mainly through Christ and the Apostles. And so the visible mission of the Holy Spirit had to be made especially to Christ and the apostles and certain early saints, on whom the Church was in one way or another founded. And yet a visible mission made to Christ was to reveal the invisible mission that had been made to Him not at that time, but at the very beginning of His conception.

Now a visible mission was made to Christ at His Baptism—under the appearance of a dove, which is a fertile animal—in order to show forth in Christ His authority to give grace through spiritual regeneration. Hence, the voice of the Father said, “This is my beloved Son” (Matthew 3:17), in order that others might be regenerated in the likeness of the Only-begotten.

A visible mission was made to Christ at His Transfiguration—under the appearance of a bright cloud—in order to show the abundance of His teaching. Hence, the voice said, “Listen to Him” (Matthew 17:5).

A visible mission was made to the Apostles under the appearance of breathing in order to show forth the power of the ministry under the dispensation of the sacraments. Hence, they were told, “Whose sins you will remit, they are remitted them” (John 20:23).

Again, a visible mission was made to the Apostles under the tongues of fire in order to show forth

the office of teaching. Hence, it is said, “They began to speak in various tongues” (Acts 2:4).

On the other hand, it was not proper for a visible mission of the Holy Spirit to be made to the Patriarchs of the Old Testament, since the visible mission of the Son had to be made before the visible mission of the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit made the Son known in just that way that the Son made the Father known. Still, visible appearances of the divine persons were made to the patriarchs of the Old Testament. But these cannot be called visible *missions*, because, according to Augustine, they were made not to designate the indwelling of a divine person through grace, but instead to make something else manifest.

Article 8

Is a divine person sent on mission only by a person from whom He eternally proceeds?

It seems that a divine person is sent on mission only by a person from whom He eternally proceeds:

Objection 1: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 4, “The Father is sent on mission by no one because He proceeds from no one.” Therefore, if one divine person is sent on mission by another, He must proceed from that person.

Objection 2: The one who sends has authority over the one who is sent. But authority cannot be had over a divine person except because of origin. Therefore, a divine person who is sent must proceed from the person who sends Him.

Objection 3: If a divine person could be sent on mission by a person He does not proceed from, then nothing would prevent the Holy Spirit from being given by a man, even though He does not proceed from that man. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15. Therefore, a divine person can be sent on mission only by a person that He proceeds from.

But contrary to this: According to Isaiah 48:16 (“And now the Lord God and His Spirit have sent me”), the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit. But the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit. Therefore, a divine person is sent by a person He does not proceed from.

I respond: Authors have talked in different ways about this topic.

According to some, a divine person is sent on mission only by a person from whom He proceeds eternally. According to this view, when the Son of God is said to be sent on mission by the Holy Spirit, this should be taken to refer to His human nature, according to which He was sent to preach by the Holy Spirit.

On the other hand, in *De Trinitate* 2 Augustine says that the Son is sent on mission both by Himself and by the Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit is likewise sent on mission both by Himself and by the Son, with the result that, in God, *being sent on mission* does not belong to every person, but instead belongs only to a person who proceeds from another, whereas *sending on mission* belongs to every person.

Both of these positions are in some sense true. For when a person is said to be sent on mission, what is being designated are both (a) the person Himself who proceeds from another and (b) the visible or invisible effect that the divine person’s mission involves.

Therefore, if the one who sends a person on mission is designated as the principle of the person who is sent, then it is not the case that each person sends another on mission; instead, this belongs only to Him who is a principle of the person sent. In this sense, the Son is sent on mission only by the Father, and the Holy Spirit is sent on mission by the Father and the Son.

However, if ‘person who sends’ is taken to mean the principle of the effect that the mission

involves, then the whole Trinity sends the person who is sent. However, this does not mean that a man might give the Holy Spirit, since a man cannot cause the effect of grace.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 44

The Procession of Creatures from God, and the First Cause of All Beings

Now that we have considered the divine persons, we will next consider the procession of creatures from God. This treatment will be divided into three parts. We will deal, first, with the production of creatures (questions 44-46); second, with the different kinds of creatures (questions 47-102); and, third, with the conservation and governance of creatures (questions 103-119).

As for the production of creatures, there are three things to consider, viz., (a) what the first cause of beings is (question 44), (b) the way in which creatures proceed from the first cause (question 45), and (c) the principle of duration for things (question 46).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is God an efficient cause of all things? (2) Is primary matter created by God, or is it instead a coordinate principle on equal footing with Him (*principium ex aequo coordinatum ei*)? (3) Is God the exemplary cause of things, or are there other exemplars besides Him? (4) Is God a final cause of things?

Article 1

Is it necessary for every being to be created by God?

It seems that it is not necessary for every being (*ens*) to be created by God.

Objection 1: Nothing prevents a being from existing without that which does not belong to its definition (*ratio*), e.g., a man without whiteness. But the relation of what is caused to its cause does not seem to belong to the definition of *being*, since some beings can be understood without it. Therefore, they can exist without that relation. Therefore, nothing prevents it from being the case that some beings are not created by God.

Objection 2: It is in order to exist that a thing needs an efficient cause. Therefore, that which is not able not to exist does not need an efficient cause. But no necessary being is able not to exist, since what has to exist is not able not to exist (*quia quod necesse est esse non potest non esse*). Therefore, since there are many necessary beings among the things that exist, it seems that not all beings are from God.

Objection 3: Anything that has a cause is such that there can be a demonstration with respect to it through that cause. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 3, no demonstrations about mathematical entities are made through agent causes. Therefore, not all beings are from God as an agent cause.

But contrary to this: Romans 11:36 says: “For of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things.”

I respond: One must affirm that anything which exists in any way at all is from God.

For any feature that is found in a thing through participation must be caused in that thing by something which has the feature through its essence; for instance, iron is made red-hot by fire. But it was shown above, when we were discussing God’s simplicity (q. 3, a. 4), that God is *esse* itself subsisting *per se*. Again, it was shown (q. 7, aa. 1 and 2) that there can be only one subsistent *esse*—just as if whiteness were subsistent, then there could be only one such whiteness, since whitenesses are multiplied because of the things that receive them. Therefore, it follows that all things other than God are not their own *esse*, but instead participate in *esse*.

Hence, it must be the case that all things which are diversified through diverse participations in *esse*—so that they exist in more and less perfect ways—are caused by a single first being, which itself exists in an absolutely perfect way. This is why Plato claimed that oneness must be posited prior to any multitude. And according to Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 2, that which is maximally a being and maximally

true is a cause of every entity and of every true thing, just as that which is maximally hot is a cause of all hotness.

Reply to objection 1: Even though its relation to its cause does not enter into the definition of a being that is caused, this relation nonetheless follows from those things that do belong to its definition. For from the fact that something is a being through participation it follows that it is caused by another. Hence, a being of this sort cannot exist without being caused, just as a man cannot exist without being capable of laughing. On the other hand, *being caused* does not belong to the definition of *being* absolutely speaking, and this is why there is a being that is not caused.

Reply to objection 2: As *Physics* 8 explains, some have been moved by this objection to claim that whatever is necessary does not have a cause. But this is obviously false in the demonstrative sciences, in which necessary principles are causes of necessary conclusions. That is why Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* 5 that some necessary things have a cause of their necessity. Thus, the reason why an agent cause is required is not just that the effect is able not to exist, but rather that the effect would not exist if the cause did not exist. And this conditional is true regardless of whether its antecedent and consequent are possible or impossible.

Reply to objection 3: Mathematical entities are taken as abstract with respect to reason, even though they are not abstract with respect to their *esse*. And each thing has an agent cause insofar as it has *esse*. Thus, even though mathematical entities have an agent cause, still, they do not come under the mathematician's consideration with respect to the relation that they have to their agent cause. And this is why in the mathematical sciences nothing is demonstrated through an agent cause.

Article 2

Is primary matter created by God?

It seems that primary matter is not created by God:

Objection 1: As *Physics* 1 says, everything that comes to exist is composed of a subject plus something else. But there is no subject of primary matter. Therefore, primary matter cannot be made by God.

Objection 2: Action and passion are opposed to one another. But just as the first active principle is God, so the first passive principle is matter. Therefore, God and primary matter are two principles that are opposed to one another, and neither of them is from the other.

Objection 3: Every agent effects what is similar to itself, and so since every agent acts insofar as it is actual, it follows that everything that is made is in some sense actual. But primary matter, as such, exists only in potentiality. Therefore, it is contrary to the nature of primary matter that it should be made.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says, "Lord, you have made these two things, the one close to Yourself [viz., the angel], and the other close to nothingness [viz., primary matter]."

I respond: Little by little and, as it were, step by step, the ancient philosophers came to a realization of the truth. Being rather immature, so to speak, at the beginning, they believed that the only beings were sensible bodies, and those among them who posited motion in those bodies considered such motion only with respect to certain accidents, e.g., density and rarity, or combining and separating. And taking it for granted that the very substance of the bodies was uncreated, they ascribed to these accidental transmutations causes such as love or strife or intelligence or something of the sort.

Proceeding further, however, they made a reasoned distinction between substantial form and matter, which they thought of as uncreated, and they saw that there are transformations among bodies

with respect to their essential forms. And to these transformations they ascribed more general causes such as the elliptic circle (Aristotle) or the ideas (Plato).

Notice, however, that it is to a determinate species that matter is contracted by form, and in the same way a substance of a given species is contracted to a determinate mode of being by an accident that accrues to it, in the way that *man* is contracted by *white*. In both of these ways, then, they subjected *being* (*ens*) to a more particularized consideration, viz., insofar as it is *this-being* (*hoc ens*) and insofar as it is *such-being* (*tale ens*). And in accord with this they ascribed particular agent causes to things.

And some of them elevated themselves to the further point of considering *being* insofar as it is *being*, and these philosophers considered the causes of things not only insofar as the things are *these-beings* or *such-beings*, but insofar as the things are *beings*. Therefore, that which is a cause of things insofar as they are *beings* must be a cause of things not just insofar as they are *such-beings* through their accidental forms, or just insofar as they are *these-beings* through their substantial forms; rather, it must be a cause of things with respect to *everything* that pertains to their *esse* in any way at all. And it is for this reason that one must claim that even primary matter is created by the universal cause of beings.

Reply to objection 1: In *Physics* 1 the Philosopher is talking about particularized coming-to-be, which goes from one form to another form, be it accidental or substantial. Here, however, we are talking about things with respect to their emanation from the universal principle of being. And not even matter is excluded from this latter sort of emanation, despite the fact that it is excluded from the first sort of making.

Reply to objection 2: A passion is the effect of an action. Hence, it stands to reason that the first passive principle should be an effect of the first active principle. For everything that is imperfect is caused by something perfect. Therefore, as Aristotle puts it in *Metaphysics* 12, the first principle must be absolutely perfect.

Reply to objection 3: This objection does not prove that matter is not created; rather, it proves that matter is not created without form. For even though each created thing is actual, it is nonetheless not *pure* actuality. Hence, even that which lies on the side of potentiality must be created if the whole that involves its *esse* is created.

Article 3

Is the exemplar cause of creatures something other than God?

It seems that the exemplar cause [of creatures] is something other than God (*praeter Deum*):

Objection 1: A copy bears a likeness to its exemplar. But creatures are hardly at all like God. Therefore, God is not their exemplar cause.

Objection 2: As has already been explained (a. 1), each thing that exists through participation is traced back to something that exists *per se*; for instance, what is red-hot is traced back to fire. But whatever exists among sensible things exists only through participation in some species. This is clear from the fact that there is no sensible thing in which one finds only what pertains to the nature of the species; instead, there are individuating principles joined to the principles of the species. Therefore, one must claim that the species themselves exist *per se*, e.g., *man per se* and *horse per se*, etc. And these are called exemplars. Therefore, certain things outside of God (*extra Deum*) are exemplars.

Objection 3: Definitions and scientific knowledge are about the species themselves and not about the species as they exist in particulars, since there is no definition or scientific knowledge with respect to

particulars. Therefore, some beings are such that they are beings—more specifically, species—without existing in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore, we reach the same conclusion as above.

Objection 4: This same point seems to be made by Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5, where he says: “*Esse* itself *per se* is prior to that which is *life per se* and to that which is *wisdom per se*.”

But contrary to this: An exemplar is the same as an idea. But according to Augustine in 83 *Quaestiones*, ideas “are the principal forms contained in God’s understanding.” Therefore, the exemplars of things do not exist outside of God.

I respond: God is the first exemplar cause of all things. To see this clearly, notice that the reason why an exemplar is required for the production of a thing is in order that the effect might receive a determinate form. For a craftsman produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar to which he looks—regardless of whether it is an exemplar that he sees exteriorly or an exemplar that is conceived interiorly by the mind.

Now it is clear that the things that come to exist naturally receive determinate forms. But the determinateness of the forms has to be traced back to God’s wisdom as a first principle which devised the order of the universe that consists in the differences among things. And so one should say that within God’s wisdom there are concepts (*rationes*) of all things, which we called ideas (*ideae*) above (q. 15, a. 1), i.e., exemplary forms existing in God’s mind. Even though these ideas are multiplied in relation to the things, they are in reality nothing other than God’s essence insofar as a likeness of His essence can be participated in by diverse things in diverse ways. So, then, God Himself is the first exemplar of all things.

Among created things, one thing can be called an exemplar of another to the extent that it bears a likeness to that other either with respect to the same species or with respect to an analogy based on some type of imitation.

Reply to objection 1: Even though creatures do not reach the point of being like God with respect to His nature by a likeness of species—in the way that a generated man is like the man who generates him—nonetheless, they do reach the point of being a likeness of God by representing a conception which is understood by God, in the way that the house which exists in matter is like the house which exists in the mind of the craftsman.

Reply to objection 2: It is part of the nature of a man that he should exist in matter, and so there cannot be a man without matter. Therefore, even though *this* man exists by participating in the species, this cannot be traced back to anything in the same species that exists *per se*. Rather, it is traced back to a higher species (*ad speciem superexcedentem*) such as a separated substance. And the same line of reasoning holds for other sensible things.

Reply to objection 3: Even though all definition and scientific knowledge is only about beings, the things need not have the same mode in being that the intellect has in understanding them. For by virtue of the agent intellect we abstract universal likenesses from particular conditions, but the universals do not have to subsist over and above the particulars as exemplars of those particulars.

Reply to objection 4: As Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 11, ‘*life per se*’ and ‘*wisdom per se*’ sometimes name God and sometimes name powers that are given to things themselves, but they do not name subsistent entities, as the ancients had posited.

Article 4

Is God a final cause of all things?

It seems that God is not a final cause of all things:

Objection 1: To act for the sake of an end seems to belong to something that stands in need of that end. But God does not stand in need of anything. Therefore, it does not belong to Him to act for the sake of an end.

Objection 2: As *Physics 2* says, the end of the act of generating, the form of the thing generated, and the agent of the act of generating do not all coincide in numerically the same thing, because the end of the act of generating is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent of all things. Therefore, He is not a final cause of all things.

Objection 3: All things desire their own end. But not all things desire God, since not all things have a cognition of Him. Therefore, God is not an end of all things.

Objection 4: The final cause is the first of causes. Therefore, if God is both an agent cause and a final cause, it follows that there is something prior and something posterior in Him. But this is impossible.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 16:4 says: “The Lord has made all things for Himself.”

I respond: Every agent acts for the sake of an end; otherwise, it would only be by chance that one thing rather than another follows from the agent’s action. Now the agent’s end is the same as the end of the patient *qua* patient, though in a different way. For what the agent has a tendency to give (*intendit imprimere*) is one and the same as what the patient has a tendency to receive (*tendit recipere*).

Now there are certain things which act and are acted upon at the same time. These are imperfect agents, and in acting they also intend to acquire something. By contrast, the first agent, who is just an agent [and not a patient], does not act for the sake of acquiring any end; instead, He intends only to communicate His own perfection, which is His goodness. And each creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is a likeness of God’s perfection and goodness. It is in this sense, then, that God’s goodness is an end of all things.

Reply to objection 1: It is only an imperfect agent, which is apt both to act and to be acted upon, that acts for the sake of what it needs. But this does not hold true of God. And the reason why God alone is maximally generous is that He does not act for the sake of His own advantage, but instead acts just for the sake of His own goodness.

Reply to objection 2: The form of the generated thing is the end of the act of generating only insofar as it is a likeness of the form of the generating thing, which intends to communicate its own likeness. Otherwise, the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the thing that generates, since the end is more noble than those things that are ordered to the end.

Reply to objection 3: Each thing desires God as an end by desiring any sort of good whatsoever, regardless of whether it does this by means of an intellective desire or by means of a sentient desire or by means of a natural desire not involving cognition. For nothing has the nature of the good and the desirable except insofar as it participates in a likeness of God.

Reply to objection 4: Since God is an efficient cause, an exemplar cause, and a final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is in reality just one in number. However, nothing prevents us from considering in Him many aspects, some of which come before others in our understanding.

QUESTION 45

The Mode of the Emanation of Things from the First Principle

Next we ask about the mode of the emanation of things from the first principle; this mode is called creation. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) What is creation? (2) Can God create something? (3) Is the act of creating a real entity (*aliquid ens in rerum natura*)? (4) What things does *being created* belong to? (5) Does the act of creating belong to God alone? (6) Is the act of creating common to the whole Trinity, or is it instead proper to a person? (7) Does some trace (*vestigium*) of the Trinity exist in created things? (8) Is the work of creating involved in the works of nature and of will?

Article 1

Is creating the same as making something from nothing?

It seems that creating (*creare*) is not the same as making something from nothing (*ex nihilo aliquid facere*):

Objection 1: In *Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum* Augustine says, “To make (*facere*) pertains to something that did not exist at all, whereas to create (*creare*) is to constitute something by educating it from what already exists.”

Objection 2: The nobility of an action or change stems from its [two] termini. Therefore, an action is more noble if it is from one good into another good, or from one being into another being, than if it is from nothing into something. But creation seems to be the most noble action and the first among all actions. Therefore, creation is not from nothing into something, but is instead from one being into another being.

Objection 3: The preposition ‘from’ (*ex*) implies a relation to some cause—and especially to a material cause, as when we say that a statue is made from bronze. But nothingness cannot be the matter of a being; nor can it be a cause of a thing in any way. Therefore, creating is not the same as making something from nothing (*ex nihilo*).

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Genesis 1:1 (“In the beginning God created heaven,” etc.) says that creating is the same as making something from nothing.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 44, a. 2), one must take into account not only the emanation of a particular entity from a particular agent, but also the emanation of the totality of an entity from the universal cause, viz., God. And it is this latter sort of emanation that we designate by the name ‘creation’.

Now what proceeds by means of a particular emanation is not presupposed by that emanation. For instance, if a man is generated, then the man did not previously exist. Rather, the man comes from (*ex*) what is not a man, and a white thing comes from (*ex*) what is not white. Hence, if we are thinking about the complete emanation of the totality of an entity (*emanatio totius entis universalis*) by the agency of the first principle, then it is impossible that any entity at all should be presupposed by this emanation. But *nothing* is the same as *no entity*. Therefore, just as the generation of a man is from non-being in the sense of what is not a man, so too creation, which is the emanation of the totality of *esse*, is from non-being in the sense of nothing.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is here using the name ‘creation’ in a different sense (*aequivoce*) according to which things that are changed into something better are said to be created—as, for instance, when someone is said to be ‘created’ a bishop. This is not the sense in which we are talking about creation here; rather, we are speaking of creation in the sense just explained.

Reply to objection 2: Changes take their species and dignity not from their terminus *a quo*, but

from their terminus *ad quem*. Thus, a change has a greater perfection and priority to the extent that the change's terminus *ad quem* has a greater nobility and priority—even if the terminus *a quo* corresponding to that terminus *ad quem* is more imperfect. For instance, a generation has more nobility and priority, absolutely speaking, than does an alteration, since a substantial form is more noble than an accidental form—despite the fact that the privation of a substantial form, which is the terminus *a quo* of a generation, is more imperfect than a contrary [accident], which is the terminus *a quo* of an alteration. Similarly, an act of creation has more perfection and priority than either a generation or an alteration, because its terminus *ad quem* is the whole substance of the thing, whereas what is conceived of as its terminus *a quo* is non-being absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 3: When a thing is said to be made from nothing (*ex nihilo*), the preposition 'from' (*ex*) does not designate a material cause, but instead designates only an ordering—as when one says that midday comes from morning, i.e., after the morning comes midday.

Still, notice that [in 'It is made from nothing'] the preposition 'from' can either (a) include within its scope the negation implied by the term 'nothing' or (b) be included within the scope of that negation. If the preposition includes the negation, then a certain ordering is being affirmed, and it is displayed as an ordering of what now exists to previous non-being. On the other hand, if the negation includes the preposition, then an ordering is being denied, and the sense of 'It is made from nothing' is 'It is not made from anything'—just as if one were to say 'He is talking about nothing' in virtue of the fact that he is not talking about anything. The proposition is true on both readings, since in both cases what is being said is that from nothing something comes to be. On the first reading the preposition 'from' connotes an ordering, as has been explained, whereas on the second reading it connotes a relation to a material cause, which is then denied [by the proposition].

Article 2

Can God create anything?

It seems that God cannot create anything:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 1, the ancient philosophers took it as a common deliverance of reason that nothing is made from nothing. But God's power does not extend to the contraries of first principles in the sense that God might make it the case that a whole is not greater than its part, or that an affirmation and corresponding negation are both true at the same time. Therefore, God is unable to make something from nothing, i.e., to create something.

Objection 2: If to create is to make something from nothing, then for something to be created (*creari*) is for it to be made (*fieri*). But every instance of *being made* is an instance of *being changed* (*mutari*). Therefore, creation is a change. But as is clear from the definition of motion, every change is from (*ex*) some subject, since motion is the actuality of a thing that exists in potentiality. Therefore, it is impossible for anything to be made by God from nothing.

Objection 3: If something has been made (*factum est*), then at some time it must have been the case that it was being made (*fit*). But one cannot claim that what is created is simultaneously being made (*fit*) and such that it has been made (*factum*). For in the case of permanent entities, that which is being made does not yet exist, whereas that which has been made exists already—and so something would both exist and not exist at the same time. Therefore, if something is made, then its *being made* precedes its *having been made*. But this can be the case only if there is a pre-existing subject that underlies the *being made* itself. Therefore, it is impossible for something to be made from nothing.

Objection 4: An infinite distance cannot be traversed. But there is an infinite distance between being and nothingness. Therefore, it is impossible for something to be made from nothing.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

I respond: As has already been established (q. 44, a. 1), not only is it not impossible for something to be created by God, but it is necessary to claim that all things have been created by God.

For if someone makes something from something, than what he makes it from is presupposed by his action and is not itself produced by that very action. For instance, a craftsman works from natural things such as wood and bronze, which are themselves caused not by the craftsman’s action but by nature’s action. But nature itself likewise causes natural things with respect to their form while presupposing their matter. Therefore, if God acted only on some presupposed thing, it would follow that this presupposed thing is not caused by Him. But it was shown above (q. 44, a. 1 and 2) that there can be nothing in entities that is not caused by God, who is the universal cause of all *esse*. Hence, one must claim that God brings things into existence from nothing.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 44, a. 2), the ancient philosophers considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which must presuppose something in their action. Accordingly, it was the common opinion of the ancient philosophers that nothing is made from nothing. But this view has no place in the case of the first emanation by the agency of the universal principle of things.

Reply to objection 2: Creation is a change only in our mode of understanding it. For it is part of the concept of a change that one and the same thing is different now from the way it was before. Sometimes it is the same *actual* being that is different now from the way it was before, as in changes with respect to quantity, quality, and place; and sometimes it is only the same being *in potentiality*, as in changes with respect to substance, where the subject is [primary] matter.

By contrast, in creation, through which the entire substance of things is produced, it cannot be the case that one and the same thing is different now from the way it was before—except only in our understanding, as when we conceive of an entity as not existing in any of its parts (*totaliter*) beforehand and then existing afterwards. However, since, as *Physics* 3 says, an action and a passion coincide in the substance of a change and differ from one another only in their diverse relations, it must be the case that if we subtract the change, then nothing remains in the creator and the thing created except their diverse relations. But since, as has been explained (q. 13, a. 1), the mode of signifying follows the mode of understanding, creation is signified in the manner of a change, and because of this we say that to create is to make something from nothing. However, ‘to make’ and ‘to be made’ are more appropriate here than ‘to effect change’ and ‘to be changed’, because ‘to make’ and ‘to be made’ imply the relation of a cause to its effect and of an effect to its cause, whereas they imply change [only] as a consequence of this relation.

Reply to objection 3: In the case of things that are made without any motion, their *being made* (*fieri*) is simultaneous with their *having been made* (*factum esse*)—regardless of whether (a) their *being made* is the terminus of a motion, as in the case of illumination (for a thing is simultaneously being illuminated and such that it has been illuminated) or (b) their *being made* is not the terminus of a motion, as when an interior word (*verbum in corde*) is simultaneously being formed and such that it has been formed. In the case of these things, what is being made already exists; and when one says that they are ‘being made’, what is signified is that they have *esse* from another and that they did not previously exist. Hence, since creation occurs without motion, a thing is simultaneously being created and such that it has been created.

Reply to objection 4: This objection is based on a misleading picture according to which there is some infinite medium between being and nothingness—which is obviously false. And this false picture

stems from the fact that creation is signified as a certain change that stands between two termini.

Article 3

Is the act of creation an entity that exists in the creature?

It seems that an act of creation (*creatio*) is not an entity that exists in the creature (*non sit aliquid in creatura*):

Objection 1: Just as creation understood passively is attributed to the creature, so too creation understood actively is attributed to the creator. But creation understood actively is not an entity that exists in the creator, since if it were, then it would follow that something temporal exists in God. Therefore, creation understood passively is not an entity that exists in the creature.

Objection 2: Nothing stands as a medium between the creator and the creature. But an act of creation is signified as a medium between them. For an act of creation is not the creator, since it is not eternal; and it is not the creature, since for the same reason one would have to posit an act of creation by which that first act of creation is itself created, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, an act of creation is not an entity.

Objection 3: If an act of creation were an entity over and beyond the substance that is created, then it would have to be an accident of that substance. But every accident exists in a subject. Therefore, the created thing would have to be the subject of an act of creation. And so one and the same thing would be both the subject of an act of creation and its terminus. But this is impossible, since a subject is prior to its accident and conserves it, whereas a terminus is posterior to the action and passion whose terminus it is, and once the terminus exists, the action and passion cease to exist. Therefore, the act of creation is not itself an entity.

But contrary to this: For a thing to be made with respect to its whole substance is greater than for it to be made with respect to its substantial form or with respect to an accidental form. But an absolute act of generation by which a thing is made with respect to its substantial form, and a relative act of generation by which a thing is made with respect to an accidental form, are both entities in the thing that is generated. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an act of creation, by which a thing is made with respect to its whole substance, is an entity that exists in the thing that is created.

I respond: An act of creation posits only a relation in the thing that is created, since what is created is not made through any motion or change. For what is made through a motion or change is made from a preexistent thing. To be sure, this occurs in the particular production of some entities, but it cannot occur in the production of the entire *esse* of a thing by the universal cause of all entities, i.e., God. In creating, then, God produces things in the absence of motion. But, as was explained above (a. 2), once motion is subtracted from action and passion, all that remains is a relation. Hence, it follows that, in the creature, the act of creation is nothing other than a certain relation to the creator as the principle of its *esse*—just as in the passion that accompanies a motion there is a relation to the principle of the motion.

Reply to objection 1: Creation as signified actively signifies a divine action, which is God's essence plus a relation to the creature. But in God this relation to the creature is only a conceptual relation and not a real relation. By contrast, the creature's relation to God is a real relation, as was explained above when we were discussing the names of God (q. 13, a. 7).

Reply to objection 2: Since, as has been explained (a. 2), creation is signified as a change, and since a change is in some sense a medium between the mover and what is moved, it follows that an act of creation is likewise signified as a medium between the creator and the creature.

Yet an act of creation understood passively exists in the creature and is itself a creature. However, this act does not have to be created by means of another act of creation. For since the very reality of relations is to be said with respect to something (*ad aliquid*), they are themselves related not through any further relations, but through themselves—as was explained above when we were discussing the equality of the divine persons (q. 42, a. 1).

Reply to objection 3: The creature is the terminus of an act of creation insofar as the act of creation (*creatio*) is signified as a change. However, insofar as the act of creation is in reality (*vere*) a relation, the creature is its subject and is prior to it in *esse*, in the way that a subject is prior to its accident.

On the other hand, the act of creation has a certain type of priority on the part of the object of which it is predicated, viz., the source (*principium*) of the creature.

Moreover, it is not necessary to say that a creature is being created for as long as it exists. For ‘creation’ implies the relation of the creature to the creator along with a newness or beginning of existence.

Article 4

Is being created proper to composite things and subsistent things?

It seems that *being created* is not proper to composite things and subsistent things:

Objection 1: The *Liber de Causis* says, “*Esse* is the first among created things.” But the *esse* of a created thing is not a subsistent thing. Therefore, creation does not properly speaking belong to subsistent things and composite things.

Objection 2: What is created is out of nothing (*quod creatur est ex nihilo*). But composite things are not out of nothing (*composita non sunt ex nihilo*); rather, they are out of their components. Therefore, it does not belong to composite things to be created.

Objection 3: What is properly produced in the first emanation is what is presupposed in the second emanation. For instance, natural things are produced through natural generation, which is presupposed by the operation of a craft. But it is the matter that is presupposed in natural generation. Therefore, it is the matter—and not the composite thing—that is properly speaking created.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” But heaven and earth are subsistent composite things. Therefore, creation belongs, properly speaking, to composite things and subsistent things.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 2), *being created* is a certain sort of *being made*. But a thing’s *being made* is ordered to its *esse*. Hence, the things to which *being made* and *being created* belong properly speaking are those things to which *esse* belongs properly speaking. But *esse* belongs properly speaking to subsistent things, regardless of whether they are simples, as in the case of separated substances, or composites, as in the case of material substances. For *esse* belongs properly speaking to that which has *esse*—and this is a thing that subsists in its own *esse*.

By contrast, forms and accidents and other such things are called entities not because they themselves exist, but rather because it is *by* them that something exists. For example, whiteness is called an entity because it is that *by which* a subject is white. Hence, according to the Philosopher, an accident is more properly said to be *of a being* than *a being*. Therefore, just as accidents and forms and other such things that do not subsist are *co-existents* rather than *existents*, so too they should be said to be *co-created* rather than *created*. Instead, it is subsistent things that are properly speaking created.

Reply to objection 1: When it is said that the first among created things is *esse*, ‘*esse*’ does not connote a created subject, but instead connotes the proper nature of the object of an act of creating (*importat propriam rationem obiecti creationis*). For something is said to be created by virtue of the fact that it is *a being* and not by virtue of the fact that it is *this being*—since, as has been explained (a. 1), creation is the emanation of the totality of *esse* from the universal Being. There is a similar manner of speaking when one says that *color* is the first visible thing, even though, properly speaking, what is seen is a colored thing.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Creation’ does not express the constitution of a composite thing out of pre-existing principles. Rather, a composite thing is said to be created in the sense that it is brought into existence simultaneously with all of its principles.

Reply to objection 3: This objection does not prove that matter alone is created; instead, it proves that matter does not exist except by creation. For creation is the production of the totality of the *esse* and not just the production of the matter.

Article 5

Does it belong to God alone to create?

It seems that it does not belong to God alone to create:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher, the perfect is that which can make something similar to itself. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than those material creatures that can make something similar to themselves in the way that a fire generates a fire and a man generates a man. Therefore, an immaterial substance can make a substance similar to itself. But an immaterial substance can be made only through creation, since it does not have any matter from which it can be made. Therefore, some creatures are able to create.

Objection 2: The more resistance there is on the part of the thing that is being made, the greater the power that is required in the maker. But a contrary puts up more resistance than does nothingness. Therefore, greater power is required to make something from a contrary—though creatures do this—than is required to make something from nothing. Therefore, *a fortiori*, some creatures can do the latter.

Objection 3: The power of a maker is measured by what is made. But as was proved above when we were discussing God’s infinity (q. 7, a. 2), a created being is finite. Therefore, only a finite power is required in order to produce a created thing through an act of creation. But it is not contrary to the nature of a creature to have a finite power. Therefore, it is not impossible for a creature to create.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that neither good angels nor bad angels can be the creators of any entity. Therefore, *a fortiori*, no other creatures can create, either.

I respond: Given what has already been said (a. 1), it is obvious enough at first glance that creating cannot be the proper action of any being other than God. For effects that are more universal must be traced back to causes that are prior and more universal. But the most universal of all effects is *esse* itself. Hence, *esse* must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, viz., God. This is why the *Liber de Causis* says that neither an intelligence nor a noble soul gives *esse* except insofar as it acts by God’s action. But to give *esse* absolutely speaking—and not just insofar as it is *this-esse* or *such-esse*—pertains to the nature of creation (see q. 44, a. 1). Thus, it is clear that creation is the proper action of God Himself.

However, it is possible for one thing to participate in another’s proper action not by its own proper power but rather instrumentally, insofar as it acts in that other’s power. For instance, air ignites and

gives warmth through the power of fire. Accordingly, some have suggested that even though creation is the proper action of the universal cause, certain lower causes can nonetheless create insofar as they act in the power of the first cause. Thus, Avicenna claimed that (a) the first separated substance, having been created by God, creates another separated substance after itself, along with the substance of the heavens and its soul, and that (b) the substance of the heavens creates the matter of lower bodies. And in the same manner, in *Sentences* 4, dist. 5, the Master says that God can communicate to a creature the power to create in such a way that it creates as God's minister and not by its own power.

But this is impossible. For a secondary instrumental cause participates in the action of a higher cause only insofar as it contributes dispositively, through something proper to itself, to the principal agent's effect. Therefore, if in a given case it did nothing through what is proper to itself, then it would be pointless to put it to work; nor would there have to be determinate instruments for determinate actions. For instance, we see that, by cutting wood, a saw, which has this power as something proper to its own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the principal agent's proper effect. But the proper effect of God *qua* creator is that which is presupposed for every other effect, viz., *esse* absolutely speaking. Hence, nothing can contribute dispositively and instrumentally to the effect of creation, since creation is not from any presupposed thing that could be disposed by an instrumental agent's action.

So, then, it is impossible that it should belong to any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally, i.e., ministerially. And the claim that a creature can create is especially absurd in the case of a body, since a body does not act except by touching something or moving it. And so a body requires for its action some pre-existent thing that can be touched or moved. But this is contrary to the nature of creation.

Reply to objection 1: A perfect entity that participates in a nature makes something similar to itself not by producing its own nature absolutely speaking, but rather by applying that nature to something. For instance, this man cannot be a cause of human nature absolutely speaking, since in that case he would be a cause of his own self. Rather, he is a cause of human nature's existing in *this* generated man. And so in his action he presupposes the determinate matter through which *this* man exists. But in the same way that this man participates in human nature, so every created entity participates, as I put it, in the nature of being (*essendi*)—since, as was explained above (q. 7, aa. 1 and 2), only God is His own *esse*. Therefore, no created entity can produce any entity absolutely speaking except insofar it causes *esse* in *this* [subject], and so the action by which it produces an entity similar to itself presupposes that through which that entity is a *this*.

However, in an immaterial substance there is nothing presupposed through which it is a *this*. For since it is a subsistent form, it is a *this* through its form, by which it has *esse*. Therefore, an immaterial substance cannot make another immaterial substance similar to itself with respect to its *esse*, but can make it similar to itself [only] with respect to certain superadded perfections, as when we say, following Dionysius, that a higher angel illuminates a lower angel. And it is in this same way that there is 'paternity' among the celestial bodies, as is clear from the words of the Apostle in Ephesians 3:15: "From whom all paternity in the heavens and on the earth receives its name."

From what has been said it is evident that no created entity can cause anything unless something is presupposed. But this is incompatible with the nature of creation.

Reply to objection 2: As *Physics* 1 puts it, something is made *per accidens* from the relevant contrary, whereas it is made *per se* from the subject, which is in potentiality. Thus, the contrary resists the agent to the extent that it blocks the potentiality off from the actuality into which the agent intends to lead it. For instance, the fire intends to bring the matter of the water to an actuality similar to itself, but it is impeded by the contrary form and dispositions by which the water's potentiality is, as it were, constrained from being led into actuality. And the more this potentiality is constrained, the more the power that is required in the agent in order to lead the matter into actuality. Hence, a much greater power

is required in the agent if there is no pre-existent potentiality at all. So, then, it is clear that it takes a much greater power to make something from nothing than it does to make something from a contrary.

Reply to objection 3: A maker's power is assessed not only on the basis of the *substance* of the thing that is made, but also on the basis of the *manner* of the making. For a high degree of heat not only effects a higher degree of heat, but also effects it more quickly. Therefore, even though creating a finite effect does not [by itself] demonstrate an infinite power, creating a finite effect from nothing does indeed demonstrate an infinite power. This is clear from what has been said. For if it is true that the further away a potentiality is from actuality, the greater the power that is required in the agent, then it must be the case that the power to act from no presupposed potentiality—which is the sort of acting involved in creation—is infinite. For there is no proportion between no potentiality and some potentiality, which is what a natural agent's power requires, just as there is no proportion between non-being and being. And since no creature has an absolutely infinite power—just as, in keeping what was proved above (q. 7, a. 2), no creature has infinite *esse*—it follows that no creature is able to create.

Article 6

Is creating proper to some divine person?

It seems that creating is proper to some divine person (*proprium alicuius personae*):

Objection 1: What is prior is a cause of what is posterior, and the perfect is a cause of the imperfect. But the procession of a divine person is prior to, and more perfect than, the procession of a creature. For a divine person proceeds with a perfect likeness of its principle, whereas a creature proceeds with an imperfect likeness. Therefore, the processions of the divine persons are causes of the procession of [created] things. And so creating is proper to a person.

Objection 2: The divine persons are distinguished from one another only by their processions and relations. Therefore, if any feature is attributed to the divine persons in different ways, this feature belongs to them because of the processions of the persons and their relations. But the causing of creatures is attributed in different ways to the divine persons. For, in the creed, it is attributed to the Father that He is the “creator of all things, visible and invisible,” while to the Son it is attributed that “through Him all things were made,” and to the Holy Spirit it is attributed that He is “the Lord and Giver of life.” Therefore, the causing of creatures belongs to the persons because of the processions and relations.

Objection 3: If someone replies that the causing of creatures involves attributes of the essence that are appropriated to the persons, this does not seem adequate. For each of God's effects is caused by each attribute of the essence, viz., power, goodness, and wisdom, and so each effect pertains as much to one of these attributes as to the others. Therefore, a determinate manner of causing should not be attributed to one person rather than another unless, in creating, the persons are distinguished from one another by the relations and processions.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says that all causal attributions are common to the whole divine essence.

I respond: To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the *esse* of things. Now since every agent effects what is similar to itself, the principle of action can be inferred from the action's effect. For instance, fire is that which generates fire. And so creating belongs to God according to His *esse*, i.e., His essence, which is common to the three persons. Hence, creating is not proper to any of the persons, but is instead common to the whole Trinity.

Still, the divine persons have causality with respect to the creation of things in accord with the nature of their processions. For as was shown above when we were discussing God's knowledge and will (q. 14, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 4), God is a cause of things through His intellect and will in the way that a craftsman is a cause of his artifacts. But a craftsman acts through the word conceived in his intellect and through the love of his will as directed toward something. In the same way, God the Father effects creatures through His Word, which is the Son, and through His Love, which is the Holy Spirit. And so to the extent that the processions of the divine persons include the attributes of the essence, viz., knowledge and will, they are causes (*rationes*) of the production of creatures.

Reply to objection 1: In the way that has just been explained, the processions of the divine persons are a cause of creation.

Reply to objection 2: Just as the divine nature, though common to the three persons, nonetheless belongs to them in a certain order—insofar as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Spirit receives it from them both—so, too, the power to create, though common to the three persons, nonetheless belongs to them in a certain order. For the Son has this power from the Father, and the Holy Spirit has it from them both. Hence, “the creator” is attributed to the Father as one who has this power from no one else. On the other hand, “through Him all things were made” is said of the Son insofar as He has this power, but from another. For the preposition ‘through’ (*per*) normally denotes a mediate cause, i.e., a principle-from-a-principle. Again, it is attributed to the Holy Spirit, who has that same power from both the Father and the Son, that He rules by being “the Lord” and that He “gives life” to the things that are created by the Father through the Son.

The general explanation for these attributions can also be taken from an appropriation of the properties of God's essence. For as was explained above (q. 39, a. 8), *power*, which is especially manifested in creation, is appropriated to the Father, and so it is attributed to the Father that He is “the creator.” On the other hand, *wisdom*, through which an intellectual agent acts, is appropriated to the Son, and it is thus said of the Son that “through Him all things were made.” Again, to the Holy Spirit is attributed *goodness*, which is the source of (a) the sort of governance that leads things to their appropriate ends and of (b) the giving of life. For life consists in a certain interior movement, whereas the first mover is the end and the good.

Reply to objection 3: Even though each of God's effects proceeds from each of the attributes, each effect is nonetheless traced back to that attribute with which it has a special consonance because of the attribute's proper definition. For instance, the ordering of all things is traced back to *wisdom*, and the justification of the wicked is traced back to *mercy* and *goodness*, which overflow in abundance. On the other hand, creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is traced back to *power*.

Article 7

Must a trace of the Trinity be found in creatures?

It seems that a trace (*vestigium*) of the Trinity need not be found in creatures:

Objection 1: Each thing can be discovered through its traces. But as was established above (q. 32, a. 1), the Trinity of persons cannot be discovered on the basis of creatures. Therefore, there are no traces of the Trinity in creatures.

Objection 2: Whatever exists in creatures is created. Therefore, if a trace of the Trinity exists in a creature with respect to certain of its properties, and if every created thing has a trace of the Trinity, then there must also be a trace of the Trinity in each of these traces, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Objection 3: An effect represents nothing other than its cause. But the causing of creatures pertains to the common [divine] nature and not to the relations by which the persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore, in creatures there are no traces of the Trinity, but only traces of the oneness of God's essence.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, "A trace of the Trinity is evident in creatures."

I respond: All effects somehow represent their causes, but in diverse ways.

Some effects represent only the causality of their cause and not its form, in the way that smoke represents fire. Such a representation is said to be the representation had by a *trace* (*vestigium*). For a trace displays the motion of something that is passing by, but not its intrinsic character (*quale*).

On the other hand, some effects represent their cause by being like it in form, in the way that a generated fire represents the fire that generates it, and in the way that a statue of Mercury represents Mercury. This is the sort of representation had by an *image* (*imago*).

Now the processions of the divine persons have to do with acts of intellect and will, as was explained above (q. 27). For the Son proceeds as the intellect's Word, and the Holy Spirit proceeds as the will's Love. Therefore, in rational creatures, in whom there is intellect and will, there is a representation of the Trinity in the manner of an *image*, to the extent that in these creatures we find a word conceived and a love that proceeds.

However, in all creatures there is a representation of the Trinity in the manner of a *trace*, insofar as we find in each creature certain things that have to be traced back to the divine persons as a cause. For each creature (a) subsists in its own *esse*, (b) has a form by which it is determined to a species, and (c) is ordered to something else. Therefore, insofar as it is a created substance, it represents its cause and principle, and in this way it points to the person of the Father, who is a principle-not-from-a-principle. Again, insofar as it has a certain form and species, it represents the Word in the sense that the form of the artifact comes from the craftsman's conception. Again, insofar as it has an ordering, it represents the Holy Spirit insofar as He is the Love, since the ordering of an effect to some further thing comes from the creator's will.

Accordingly, Augustine claims in *De Trinitate* 6 that a trace of the Trinity is found in each creature, in that each creature (a) "is some one entity," (b) "is formed by a species," and (c) "has a certain ordering." Again, these three features are the basis for the other three posited by Wisdom 11:21, viz., number (*numerus*), weight (*pondus*), and measure (*mensura*). For measure has to do with the substance of a thing delimited by its principles, number has to do with the species, and weight has to do with order. Likewise, these same three features are the basis for the other three posited by Augustine, viz., mode (*modus*), species (*species*), and order (*ordo*). The same holds for the features posited by Augustine in 83 *Quaestiones*, viz., that a thing exists (*constat*), that it is distinct (*discernitur*), and that it fits in (*congruit*). For it exists as something through its substance, it is distinct because of its form, and it fits in because of its ordering. And any other features invoked in this way can easily be traced back to these same features.

Reply to objection 1: The representation of a trace has to do with the appropriated [attributes of the essence], and, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 1), this is the manner in which one can arrive at the Trinity of persons on the basis of creatures.

Reply to objection 2: A creature is an entity which subsists, properly speaking, and in which the three aforementioned features are found. These three features do not have to be found in everything that *inheres in* the creature; rather, it is because of them that a trace [of the Trinity] is attributed to the subsistent thing.

Reply to objection 3: In a certain sense, as was explained above (a. 6), even the processions of the persons are a cause of and explanation for creation.

Article 8

Is creation involved in the works of nature and art?

It seems that creation is involved in the works of nature and art:

Objection 1: A form is produced in each work of nature and art. But a form is not produced from anything, since it does not have the matter as part of itself. Therefore, it is produced from nothing. And so there is an act of creating in every operation of nature and art.

Objection 2: An effect is not more powerful than its cause. But among natural things there are no agents except accidental forms, which are active or passive forms. Therefore, no substantial form is produced by an operation of nature. Therefore, it follows that substantial forms exist through creation.

Objection 3: A nature effects what is similar to itself. But some of the things generated in nature are not generated by anything similar to themselves, as is clear in the case of animals that are generated through putrefaction. Therefore, the forms of these animals are produced by creation and not by nature. And the same line of reasoning holds for other forms as well.

Objection 4: What is not created is not a creature. Therefore, if creation is not involved in the case of things that are produced by nature, then it follows that things produced by nature are not creatures. But this is heretical.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.

I respond: This question arises because of forms.

Some, claiming that forms are latent, have asserted that forms do not begin to exist through nature's action, but existed beforehand in the matter. They fell into this position because of their ignorance of matter. For they did not know how to distinguish potentiality from actuality, and given that forms pre-exist in the matter in potentiality, they claimed that the forms pre-exist absolutely speaking.

Again, others have claimed that forms are bestowed or caused by a separated agent in the mode of creation. On their view, an act of creation is joined to every natural operation. They fell into this position because of their ignorance of form. For they did not take into account the fact that the natural form of a body is not itself subsistent, but is instead that *by which* something exists. And so, since, as was explained above (a. 4), *being made* and *being created* belong properly only to subsistent things, the forms are neither made nor created, but are instead co-created.

Now that which is, properly speaking, made by a natural agent is the composite, which is made from the matter. Hence, creation is not *involved in* the works of nature but is instead *presupposed by* the operation of nature.

Reply to objection 1: Forms begin to exist in actuality when the composites have been made. And the forms themselves are not made directly (*per se*), but are instead made coincidentally (*per accidens*).

Reply to objection 2: The active qualities in a nature act in the power of the substantial forms. And so a natural agent produces something similar to itself not only with respect to qualities but also with respect to its species.

Reply to objection 3: A universal agent, i.e., a celestial power, suffices for the generation of imperfect animals. The animals are assimilated to this power not with respect to their species, but according to a certain analogy. Nor does one have to say that their forms are *created* by a separated agent.

By contrast, a universal agent is not sufficient for the generation of perfect animals; instead, what is required is a proper agent, i.e., a univocal generator.

Reply to objection 4: A natural operation occurs only when created principles are presupposed, and this is why the things that are made by nature are called creatures.

QUESTION 46

The Beginning of Duration for Created Things

The next thing to consider is the beginning of duration for created things. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Have creatures always existed? (2) Is it an article of the Faith that creatures began to exist? (3) In what sense is God said to have created heaven and earth ‘in the beginning’?

Article 1

Has the universe of creatures always existed?

It seems that the universe of creatures (*universitas creaturarum*), which goes by the name ‘the world’ (*mundum*), did not begin to exist, but has instead existed from eternity:

Objection 1: Everything that began to exist is such that before it existed, it was possible for it to exist; otherwise, it would have been impossible for it to come into existence. Therefore, if the world began to exist, then before it began to exist, it was possible for it to exist. But that which is such that it is possible for it to exist is matter, which is in potentiality both to existing (which occurs through form) and also to not existing (which occurs through privation). Therefore, if the world began to exist, then matter existed before the world did. But matter cannot exist without form, and the matter of the world with form just *is* the world. Therefore, the world existed before it began to exist—which is impossible.

Objection 2: Nothing that has the power to exist at all times is such that it exists at one time and not at some other time; for the power of a given thing [to exist] is as extensive as the length of time for which it does exist. But every incorruptible thing has the power to exist at all times, since it does not have a power to exist that is for a set length of time. Therefore, nothing incorruptible is such that it exists at one time and not at some other time. But everything that begins to exist is such that it exists at one time and not at some other time. Therefore, nothing incorruptible begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, e.g., the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore, the world did not begin to exist.

Objection 3: Nothing that is ungenerated began to exist. But in *Physics* 1 the Philosopher proves that matter is ungenerated, and in *De Caelo et Mundo* 1 he proves that celestial bodies are ungenerated. Therefore, it is not the case that the whole universe of things began to exist.

Objection 4: A vacuum is a place where a body does not exist but where it is possible for a body to exist. But if the world began to exist, then the place where the body of the world now exists is such that a body did not exist there beforehand. And yet a body was able to exist there; otherwise, it would not exist there now. Therefore, before the world existed, there was a vacuum—which is impossible.

Objection 5: Nothing begins to move anew except because some mover or some movable thing is now different from the way it was before. But what is now different from the way it was before is such that it is moving. Therefore, before any motion that begins anew, there was some previous motion. Therefore, motion has always existed. Therefore, it has likewise always been the case that a movable thing exists, since motion exists only in a movable thing.

Objection 6: Every mover is either a natural mover or a voluntary mover. But neither of these begins to effect motion unless some previous motion has existed.

For nature always operates in the same way, and so unless some change has previously occurred either in the nature of the mover or in the thing moved, no motion that did not previously exist will begin to exist by the agency of a natural mover.

On the other hand, in the absence of any change within itself, the will puts off doing what it plans to do; but this change within itself occurs only because of some imagined change, at least on the part of

time itself. For example, if someone wills to build a house tomorrow and not today, he expects that something will be the case tomorrow that is not the case today. At the very least, he expects that today will pass and tomorrow will come—which does not occur in the absence of change, since time is a measure of motion (*numerus motus*).

Therefore, it follows that before any motion that begins anew, there was some other motion. And so we reach the same conclusion as before.

Objection 7: If something is always at its own beginning (*semper in principio*) and always at its own end (*semper in fine*), it can neither begin to exist nor cease to exist. For that which begins to exist is not at its own end, and that which ceases to exist is not at its own beginning. But time is always at its own beginning and always at its own end, since none of time exists except the *now*, which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore, time can neither begin to exist nor cease to exist. And, consequently, motion, of which time is a measure, likewise cannot begin to exist or cease to exist, either.

Objection 8: God is either (a) prior to the world only in nature or (b) prior in duration as well. If He is prior to the world only in nature, then, since God exists from eternity, the world likewise exists from eternity. On the other hand, if He is prior to the world in duration, then since the prior and posterior in duration constitute time, it follows that time existed before the world did—which is impossible.

Objection 9: Once a sufficient cause is posited, its effect is posited; for a cause that is not followed by its effect is an incomplete cause that stands in need of something else in order for its effect to follow. But, as is clear from what was said above (q. 44, aa. 1 and 3 and 4), God is a sufficient cause of the world: He is a sufficient *final* cause by reason of His goodness; He is a sufficient *exemplar* cause by reason of His wisdom; and He is a sufficient *efficient* cause by reason of His power. Therefore, since God exists from eternity, the world likewise existed from eternity.

Objection 10: A thing whose action is eternal is such that its effect is likewise eternal. But God's action is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore, the world is likewise eternal.

But contrary to this: John 17:5 says, “Glorify me, Father, with Yourself, with the glory which I had before the world was made.” And Proverbs 8:22 says: “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything at the beginning.”

I respond: Nothing except God existed from eternity. And this claim is not impossible to uphold.

For it was shown above (q. 19, a. 4) that God's will is a cause of things. Therefore, a thing exists necessarily to the extent that it is necessary for God to will it, since, as *Metaphysics* 5 says, the necessity of an effect depends on the necessity of its cause. But it was shown above (q. 19, a. 3) that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary for God to will anything except Himself. Therefore, it is not necessary for God to will that the world should have always existed. Rather, the world exists for the length of time that God wills it to exist for, since the world's existence depends on God's will as its cause. Therefore, it is not necessary that the world should always exist. Hence, it cannot be demonstratively proved that the world has always existed.

Nor is it the case that the arguments Aristotle adduced for this conclusion are absolutely demonstrative; instead they are demonstrative only relatively speaking, viz., as refutations of the arguments of those ancients who held that the world began to exist in certain ways that are in fact impossible. This is apparent from three considerations:

First, in *Physics* 8, and again in *De Caelo* 1, Aristotle lays out certain opinions, e.g., those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato, and adduces contrary arguments against them.

Second, whenever he talks about this topic, he adduces the testimony of the ancients—something that is characteristic not of one who is giving a demonstration (*non demonstratoris*), but of one who is giving a persuasive probabilistic argument (*sed probabiliter persuadentis*).

Third, in *Topics* 1 he expressly says that there are certain dialectical problems that we do not have answers (*rationes*) for, such as whether the world is eternal.

Reply to Objection 1: Before the world existed, it was possible that the world should exist, not because of any passive potentiality (*potentia*), i.e., matter, but rather because of God's active power (*potentia*).

The world was also possible in the sense in which something is said to be *absolutely* possible—i.e., possible not because of any sort of potentiality [or power] (*non secundum aliquam potentiam*), but solely because of the relationship between the terms (*ex sola habitudine terminorum*), which are not incompatible with one another. As is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5, it is in this sense that the possible is opposed to the impossible.

Reply to Objection 2: That which has the power to exist at all times is such that, once it has this power, it does not exist at some times and not at other times. However, before it had this power, it did not exist. Hence, this argument, which Aristotle proposes in *De Caelo* 1, does not prove the simple conclusion that incorruptible entities did not begin to exist; rather, it proves that they did not begin to exist in the natural way in which generable and corruptible things begin to exist.

Reply to Objection 3: In *Physics* 1 Aristotle argues that matter is ungenerated by appealing to the fact that matter does not have a subject from which to be made. On the other hand, in *De Caelo et Mundo* 1 he argues that a celestial body is ungenerated by appealing to the fact that a celestial body does not have a contrary from which to be generated. Hence, it is clear that the two arguments establish only that matter and the celestial bodies did not begin to exist through generation—as some had claimed, mainly in the case of the celestial bodies. By contrast, as is clear from what was said above (q. 45, a. 2), we ourselves are claiming that matter and the celestial bodies were brought into existence through creation.

Reply to Objection 4: A vacuum is not just that in which nothing exists. Rather, as is clear from Aristotle in *Physics* 4, a vacuum must be a space that is capable of holding a body but in which there is no body. We ourselves, however, are claiming that neither place (*locus*) nor space (*spatium*) existed before the world did.

Reply to Objection 5: The first mover is always in the same state, whereas the first movable thing is not always in the same state, since it begins to exist after not having previously existed. However, this occurs not through change but instead through creation—which, as was explained above (q. 45, a. 2), is not a change. Hence, it is clear that the present argument, which Aristotle puts forth in *Physics* 8, is effective against those who—as is clear from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles—had posited an eternal movable thing but not an eternal motion. We, on the other hand, are claiming that motion has always existed from the moment at which movable things began to exist.

Reply to Objection 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent, and even though He had an eternal volition to produce an effect, He did not produce an eternal effect.

Nor is it necessary to presuppose any [previous] motion—not even a motion that invokes imaginary time. For a *particular* agent, which presupposes one thing and causes something else, must be thought of differently from a *universal* agent, which produces the totality. Because a particular agent produces a form while presupposing the matter, it must induce a form that is properly proportioned to the matter. Hence, in the case of a particular agent it makes sense to think that it induces a form in this sort of matter and not in another sort because of the difference of the one matter from the other. But it does not make sense to think this way in the case of God, who produces the form and the matter at the same time. Rather, in the case of God it makes sense to think that He produces a matter that is suitable for the form and for the end.

Now a particular agent presupposes time in the same way that it presupposes matter. Hence, in the

case of a particular agent it makes sense to think of it as acting at a later time and not at an earlier time, invoking the imagined succession of one time after another. By contrast, in the case of a universal agent, which produces both the entity and time itself, one ought not to think of Him as acting now after not having acted, invoking the imaginary succession of one time after another—as if His action presupposed the existence of time. Instead, in His case one must say that He gave His effect the temporal extent He wanted to (*dedit effectui suo tempus quantum voluit*), and that He did this in a way that was appropriate for demonstrating His power—since the world leads us more clearly to a cognition of God’s creative power if it has not always existed than it would if it had always existed. For it is manifestly clear that everything that has not always existed has a cause, whereas this would not be as clear in the case of something that had always existed.

Reply to Objection 7: As *Physics* 4 puts it, the earlier and the later exist in time in the way that the earlier and the later exist in motion. Hence, the beginning and the end in the case of time should be thought of in the same way they are thought of in the case of motion.

Now if we assume that a motion is eternal, then each moment of that motion must be thought of as the beginning of one motion and the end of another, whereas this is not necessary if the motion begins to exist. And this same line of reasoning holds for the temporal *now*. So it is clear that the stated conception of the present instant, according to which it is always the beginning of a time and always the end of a time, presupposes that time and motion are eternal. Hence, in *Physics* 8 Aristotle uses this argument against those who had claimed that time is eternal but had denied that motion is eternal.

Reply to Objection 8: God is prior to the world in duration. But ‘prior’ here designates the priority of eternity and not a temporal priority.

An alternative reply is that ‘prior’ here designates an eternity of imagined time and not an eternity of really existing time—just as, when someone says, “There is nothing above the heavens,” the word ‘above’ designates only an imagined place, insofar as it is possible to imagine further dimensions added to the dimensions of the body of the heavens.

Reply to Objection 9: As is clear from what was said above (q. 19, a. 4 and q. 41, a. 2), just as an effect follows from a naturally acting cause in a way consonant with the cause’s form, so too an effect follows from a cause that acts through its will in a way consonant with the form that has been preconceived and decided upon by the agent. Therefore, even though God was from eternity a sufficient cause of the world, the world produced by Him does not have to be posited except in the way that His will predetermined it—so that, namely, it would have existence after non-existence in order to point more clearly to its author.

Reply to Objection 10: Once an action is posited, its effect follows according to the demands of the form that serves as the principle of the action. But in the case of agents who act by their will, what the agent conceives of and predetermines is thought of as the form that serves as the principle of the action. Therefore, from the fact that God’s action is eternal it does not follow that His effect is eternal. Rather, the effect is as God willed it to be—so that, namely, it would have existence after non-existence.

Article 2

Is it an article of the Faith that the world began to exist?

It seems that it is not an article of the Faith, but instead a demonstrable conclusion, that the world began to exist:

Objection 1: Each thing that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be

demonstratively proved that God is an efficient cause of the world, and, indeed, the best philosophers have asserted this. Therefore, it can be demonstratively proved that the world began to exist.

Objection 2: If it is necessary to claim that the world was made by God, then it was made either from nothing or from something. But it was not made from something, since in that case the matter of the world would have preceded the world—a claim against which Aristotle argued effectively when he showed that the celestial bodies are ungenerated. Therefore, it must be the case that the world was made from nothing. And so the world had existence after non-existence. Therefore, it must be the case that the world began to exist.

Objection 3: As is clear in the case of all artifacts, everything that is done through an intellect is done from a starting point (*a quodam principio*). But God acts through His intellect. Therefore, He acts from a starting point. Therefore, the world, which is His effect, has not always existed.

Objection 4: It is manifestly obvious that certain crafts, along with the inhabitation of certain regions, began at a determinate time. But this would not be the case if the world had always existed. Therefore, it is manifestly obvious that the world has not always existed.

Objection 5: It is certain that nothing is God's equal. But if the world had always existed, then it would be God's equal in duration. Therefore, it is certain that the world has not always existed.

Objection 6: If the world has always existed, then infinitely many days have preceded this present day. But it is impossible to traverse infinitely many things. Therefore, we would never have arrived at this present day—which is manifestly false.

Objection 7: If the world were eternal, then generation would likewise have occurred from eternity. Therefore, one man would have been generated by another *ad infinitum*. But as *Physics* 2 says, a father is an efficient cause of his child. Therefore, it is possible to proceed to infinity among efficient causes. But this is disproved in *Metaphysics* 2.

Objection 8: If the world and generation had always existed, then infinitely many men would have preceded us. But the human soul is immortal. Therefore, infinitely many souls would now actually exist. But this is impossible.

Therefore, it can be known with certainty that the world began to exist, and this is not held by faith alone.

But contrary to this: The articles of the Faith cannot be demonstratively proved, since “faith is of things that are not apparent,” as Hebrews 11:1 puts it. But it is an article of the Faith that God is the creator of the world in such a way that the world began to exist. For [in the creed] we say, “I believe in one God, etc.”

Again, in *Homilia 1 in Ezechiel* Gregory says that Moses prophesied about the past when he said that “in the beginning God created heaven and earth”—a verse in which the world's newness (*novitas*) is taught. Therefore, the world's newness is had only through revelation. And so it cannot be demonstratively proved.

I respond: That the world has not always existed is held by faith alone and cannot be proved demonstratively—just as was explained above about the mystery of the Trinity (q. 32, a. 1).

The reason is that the world's newness does not admit of a demonstration from the side of the world itself. For the principle of a demonstration is what a thing is (*quod quid est*). But as far as the concept of its species is concerned, each thing abstracts from the here and now, and it is for this reason that universals are said to exist always and everywhere. Hence, it cannot be demonstrated that men or celestial bodies or rocks have not always existed.

Similarly, the world's newness does not admit of a demonstration from the side of an agent cause who acts through his will. For God's will cannot be ascertained except with respect to those things which are such that it is absolutely necessary for God to will them. But, as has been explained (q. 19,

a. 3), what He wills with respect to creatures is not of this sort.

However, God's will can indeed be made known to man through revelation, which the Faith depends on. Hence, that the world had a beginning is something to be held on faith (*credibile*), and is neither demonstrable (*demonstrabile*) nor scientifically knowable (*scibile*). Moreover, it is advantageous to dwell on this point, lest someone, presuming to demonstrate what belongs to the Faith, should put forth unconvincing arguments (*rationes non necessarias*) that would present non-believers with an occasion for ridiculing us if they thought that it is because of arguments of this sort that we believe the things that belong to the Faith.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 11, there were two opinions among the philosophers who claimed that the world is eternal.

Some of them claimed that the substance of the world is not from God. The error of these philosophers is unsupportable, and so it is refuted by a compelling argument.

However, others held that the world is eternal while still claiming that the world was made by God: "They want the world to have a beginning not of time, but of its creation, so that in some scarcely intelligible way the world is made at all times." And as the same Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 10, "They have discovered a way to understand this: 'If a foot', they say, 'had always been planted in the dust from eternity, there would always have been a footprint underneath it, which no one would doubt was made by someone treading on the dust. In the very same way, the world has always existed, just as the one who made it has always existed.'" To understand this, note that an efficient cause that acts through motion must temporally precede its effect, since the effect exists only at the end of the action, whereas every agent has to exist at the beginning of the action. However, if the action is instantaneous and not successive, then the maker need not be prior in duration to what is made; this is clear in the case of the act of illumination. Hence, they claim that it does not necessarily follow that if God is an active cause of the world, He is prior in duration to the world. For as was explained above (q. 45, a. 2), creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change.

Reply to objection 2: Those who claim that the world is eternal would assert that the world was made by God *from* nothing—not in the sense that it was made *after* nothing (which is what we ourselves understand by the name 'creation'), but in the sense that it was not made from anything. And it is even the case that some of them do not shy away from the name 'creation', as is clear from Avicenna in his *Metaphysica*.

Reply to objection 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras that is set forth in *Physics* 3. But it does not prove its point except in the case of an intellect that inquires about what to do by deliberating, which is similar to a motion. However, even though the human intellect is like this, God's intellect is not—as was shown above (q. 14, a. 7).

Reply to objection 4: Those who claim that the world is eternal assert that any given region has changed infinitely many times from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable, and vice versa. Similarly, they claim that because of various catastrophes and accidents, the crafts have been discovered and then lost infinitely many times. Hence, in *Meteorologia* Aristotle says that it is ridiculous to base one's opinion about the newness of the whole world on particular changes of this sort.

Reply to objection 5: As Boethius says at the end of *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, even if the world had always existed, it would not be on a par with God in its eternity, since God's *esse* is an *esse* that is a simultaneous whole, without succession, whereas this does not hold for the world.

Reply to objection 6: A traversal (*transitus*) is always understood as being from one terminus to another. But given any designated past day, there are finitely many days from that day to this present day, and so they could have been traversed. The objection, by contrast, proceeds on the assumption that once the [two] termini are posited, there are infinitely many items between them.

Reply to objection 7: It is impossible to proceed to infinity *per se* among efficient causes, i.e., it is impossible for causes that are required *per se* for a given effect to be multiplied to infinity—as, for instance, if a rock were being moved with a stick, and the stick were being moved by a hand, and so on *ad infinitum*.

By contrast, it is not impossible to proceed to infinity *per accidens* among agent causes, i.e., it is not impossible if all the causes that are multiplied to infinity belong to a single order (*ordinem*) of causes and if their multiplication is incidental (*per accidens*)—as, for instance, if a craftsman were to use many hammers incidentally, because one after another kept breaking. In such a case, it is incidental to any given hammer that it acts after the action of a given one of the other hammers. In the same way, it is incidental to this man, insofar as he generates, that he himself was generated by another. For he generates insofar as he is a man and not insofar as he is the son of some other man, since all the men who generate belong to the same order (*gradum*) of efficient causality, viz., the order of a particular generating cause. In this sense, it is not impossible for man to be generated by man *ad infinitum*.

However, it would indeed be impossible for the generation of *this* man to depend upon *that* man, and upon an elemental body, and upon the sun, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Reply to objection 8: Those who claim that the world is eternal try to evade this objection in various ways.

Some do not think it impossible that there should be infinitely many souls in actuality. This is clear in the *Metaphysica* of Al-Ghazali, who claims that this is a *per accidens* infinity. But this claim was disproved above (q. 7, a. 4).

Again, some claim that the soul is corrupted with the body. And others claim that only a single one of all the souls remains. Finally, as Augustine reports, to avoid this objection others claimed that there is a recirculation of souls, so that after a set interval of time, souls that have been separated from bodies once again return to bodies. All of these positions will be discussed in what follows (q. 75, a. 6 and q. 76, a. 2 and q. 118, a. 6).

Note, however, that the objection in question is a particular argument. Hence, someone could reply that the world has always existed or, at least, that some creature such as an angel has always existed, but that men have not always existed. For we ourselves mean to be asking *in general* whether some creature might have existed from eternity.

Article 3

Did the creation of things occur at the beginning of time?

It seems that the creation of things did not occur at the beginning of time:

Objection 1: That which does not exist in time does not exist at any time. But the creation of things did not exist in time, since it is the substance of things that was brought into existence through creation, whereas time does not measure the substance of things, especially incorporeal things. Therefore, creation did not occur at the beginning of time.

Objection 2: The Philosopher proves that everything that is made was once being made, and so every instance of *being made* has a *before* and an *after*. But in the case of the beginning of time there is no *before* or *after*, since the beginning of time is an indivisible. Therefore, since *being created* is a certain sort of *being made*, it seems that things were not created at the beginning of time.

Objection 3: Time itself is also created. But it cannot be created at the beginning of time, since time is divisible, whereas the beginning of time is an indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things did

not occur at the beginning of time.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

I respond: This passage from Genesis 1 (“In the beginning God created heaven and earth”) is given three readings in order to rule out three errors.

Some have held that the world has always existed and that time does not have a beginning. To rule out this error, “in the beginning” is interpreted to mean “at the beginning of time.”

On the other hand, some have claimed that there are two principles of creation, one a principle of good things and the other a principle of evil things. To rule out this error, “in the beginning” is interpreted to mean “in the Son.” For just as being an efficient principle is appropriated to the Father because of His power, so being an exemplary principle is appropriated to the Son because of His wisdom, so that when it is said, “You have made all things in wisdom” [Psalm 103:24], this is understood to mean that God has made all things in the beginning, i.e., in the Son. Accordingly, in Colossians 1:16 the Apostle says, “In Him (*read: the Son*) were all things created.”

Finally, others have claimed that corporeal entities were created by God through the mediation of spiritual creatures. In order to rule out this error, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” is interpreted to mean that God created them *before* all things. In other words, four things are claimed to be created simultaneously, viz., (a) the empyrean heaven (*caelum empyreum*), (b) corporeal matter (which is called ‘earth’ here), (c) time, and (d) angelic nature.

Reply to objection 1: Things are said to have been created at the beginning of time not in the sense that the beginning of time is the measure of creation, but rather in the sense that heaven and earth were created together with time.

Reply to objection 2: The passage cited from the Philosopher has to do with the sort of *being made* which occurs through motion, i.e., which is the terminus of a motion. For since in the case of every motion there is a *before* and an *after*, it follows that prior to any designated point within a designated motion—i.e., as long as the thing is in the process of being moved or being made—there is a *before*; and likewise there is something *after* the *being moved* or the *being made*. For what exists either at the beginning of the motion or at its end is not in the process of being moved.

However, as was explained above (q. 45, aa. 2 and 3), creation is neither a motion nor the terminus of a motion. Hence, a thing is created in such a way that it was not previously in the process of being created.

Reply to objection 3: Nothing is made except in a way consonant with what it is. But nothing of time exists except the *now*. Hence, time cannot come into existence except with respect to some *now*—not because time *consists in* that first *now*, but rather because time *begins from* that *now*.

QUESTION 47

The Diversity among Things in General

After the production of creatures in *esse*, the next thing to consider is the diversity among them. This discussion will have three parts. First, we will consider the diversity among things in general (question 47); second, the distinction between good and evil (questions 48 and 49); and, third, the distinction between spiritual creatures and corporeal creatures (question 50).

On the first topic we will ask about three things: (1) the very multiplicity or diversity of things, (2) the inequality among things, and (3) the oneness of the world.

Article 1

Is God the source of the multiplicity and diversity among things?

It seems that God is not the source of the multiplicity and distinction among things:

Objection 1: One single agent is always apt to effect just one thing. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 11, a. 4), God is maximally one. Therefore, He produces just one effect.

Objection 2: An exemplifier is similar to its exemplar. But as was explained above (q. 44, a. 3), God is an exemplar cause of His effect. Therefore, since God is one, His effect is just one and not multiple (*distinctus*).

Objection 3: Things that are ordered to an end are proportioned to that end. But as was shown above (q. 44, a. 4), the end of creatures is one thing, viz., God's goodness. Therefore, God's effect is just one thing.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:4-7 says, "God separated the light from the darkness . . . and He divided the waters . . . from the waters . . ." Therefore, God is the source of the diversity and multiplicity among things.

I respond: Different writers have assigned different causes to the diversity among things.

Some have attributed it to *matter*, either by itself or along with some agent. For instance, Democritus and all the ancient natural philosophers attributed it to matter alone, positing only a material cause in virtue of which the diversity of things happens by chance because of the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, on the other hand, attributed the diversity and multiplicity among things to matter along with an agent. For he posited Mind (*Intellectus*), which distinguished things by extracting what had been mixed together in the matter.

However, there are two reasons why this position cannot be sustained. First, it was shown above (q. 44, a. 2) that even matter itself was created by God. Hence, if there is any diversity on the part of the matter, it must likewise be traced back to a higher cause. Second, matter exists for the sake of form, and not vice versa. But the diversity among things derives from their proper forms. Therefore, it is not the case that diversity occurs among things because of the matter; just the opposite, differentiation was created in the matter in order that it might be accommodated to diverse forms.

Again, some have attributed the diversity among things to *secondary agents*. For instance, Avicenna claimed that in understanding Himself, God produced the first intelligence, in which—as will become clear below (q. 50, a. 2)—there is necessarily a composition of potentiality and actuality, since it is not its own *esse*. So, then, insofar as the first intelligence understands the first cause, it produced the second intelligence; on the other hand, insofar as it understands itself with respect to what it has of potentiality, it produced the body of the heavens, which it moves; and insofar as it understands itself with respect to what it has of actuality, it produced the soul of the heavens.

However, there are two reasons why this position cannot be sustained. First, it was shown above

(q. 45, a. 5) that it belongs to God alone to create. Hence, things that cannot be caused except through creation are produced by God alone, and these include all the things that are not subject to generation and corruption. Second, according to this position the totality of things comes about not by the first agent's intention, but rather by the coincidence of many agent causes. But this is what we call coming about by chance. Hence, the perfection (*complementum*) of the universe, which consists in the diversity among things, would exist by chance—which is impossible.

Instead, one should claim that the diversity and multiplicity among things comes about by the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into existence in order to communicate His goodness to creatures and to represent His goodness through them. And since His goodness cannot be adequately represented by any one creature, He produced many diverse creatures, so that what was lacking in one's representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For the goodness that exists in a simple and uniform way in God exists in a multiple and divided way among creatures. Hence, the universe as a whole participates in and represents God's goodness in a more perfect way than any other creature does. And it is because the reason for the diversity of things lies in God's wisdom that Moses says that things are divided by God's Word, which is the conception of His wisdom. Thus it is that Genesis 1:3-4 says, "God said, 'Let there be light' . . . and He separated the light from the darkness."

Reply to objection 1: That which acts through its nature acts through the form by which it exists, and there is just one form for each thing. That is why such an agent effects just one thing. But as was shown above (q. 19, a. 4), a voluntary agent like God acts through a conceived form. Therefore, since, as was shown above (q. 15, a. 2), the fact that God understands many things is not incompatible with His oneness and simplicity, it follows that even though He is one, He is able to make many things.

Reply to objection 2: This objection would hold good in the case of an exemplifier that represents its exemplar perfectly and is multiplied only materially. Hence, there is just a single uncreated Image, which is perfect. But no creature is a perfect representation of the first exemplar, which is God's essence, and so God's essence can be represented through many things.

Still, to the extent that ideas are called exemplars, there is a plurality of ideas in God's mind corresponding to the plurality of things.

Reply to objection 3: In speculative matters, there is just one middle term of demonstration that perfectly demonstrates the conclusion, though there are many middle terms for probable proofs. Similarly, in practical matters, when the means, as I will put it, measure up fully (*adaequat*) to the end, then all that is required is a single means. But creatures are not related in this way to the end which is God. Hence, it was necessary for creatures to be multiplied.

Article 2

Is God the source of the inequality among things?

It seems that God is not the source of the inequality among things:

Objection 1: It belongs to the best to bring about the best. But among things that are the best, it is not the case that one is greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, who is the best, to make all things equal.

Objection 2: As *Metaphysics* 5 says, equality is an effect of oneness. But God is one. Therefore, He made all things equal.

Objection 3: It is part of justice to treat unequals unequally. But God is just in all of His operations. Therefore, since the operation by which He communicates *esse* to things does not presuppose

any inequality among the things, it seems that He made all things equal.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 33:7-8 says, “Why does one day surpass another, and one light another light, and one year another year, and one sun another sun? It is by the Lord’s knowledge that they were distinguished.”

I respond: Wishing to rule out the position of those who claimed that the diversity of things comes from the opposition between a principle of good and a principle of evil, Origen claimed that in the beginning all things were created equal by God. For he asserts that at first God created only rational creatures, all of whom were equal and among whom inequality first arose because of free choice, with some turning toward God to greater and lesser degrees and others turning away from God to greater and lesser degrees. Thus, those rational creatures who had turned toward God through their free choice were promoted to the different orders of angels in proportion to the differences among their merits, whereas those who had turned away from God were tied to different bodies according to the differences among their sins. And Origen claims that this is the reason for the creation of bodies and their diversity.

However, according to this view, the totality of corporeal creatures would exist not for the sake of communicating God’s goodness to creatures, but in order to punish sin—which is contrary to Genesis 1:31 (“God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good”). Moreover, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 11, “What claim could be more stupid than that the craftsman God did not choose this sun, as the one sun in the one world, for the embellishment of the world’s beauty or for the well-being of corporeal things, but that instead it came to exist because some soul sinned in a given way? On this account, if a hundred souls had sinned in the same way, this world would have had a hundred suns.”

One should reply instead that just as God’s wisdom is the cause of the diversity of things, so too it is the cause of their inequality. This is made clear as follows:

There are two kinds of diversity among things—(a) *formal* diversity among things that differ in species and (b) *material* diversity among things that differ only in number. Now since matter exists for the sake of form, material diversity exists for the sake of formal diversity. For we see that among incorruptible things there is just one individual to a species, since the species is sufficiently conserved in the one individual; by contrast, among generable and corruptible things there are many individuals belonging to the same species, and this for the sake of conserving the species. From this it is clear that formal diversity is more central than material diversity. But formal diversity always requires inequality, since, as *Metaphysics* 8 says, the forms of things are like numbers, in which the species are differentiated by the addition or subtraction of a unit. Hence, among natural things the species seem to be ordered step by step, so that mixed bodies are more perfect than the elements, and plants are more perfect than minerals, and animals are more perfect than plants, and men are more perfect than the other animals; and within each of these divisions, one species is found to be more perfect than another.

Therefore, just as God’s wisdom is the cause of the diversity among things for the sake of the perfection of the whole universe, so too it is the cause of the inequality among things. For the universe would not be perfect if just one grade of goodness were found among things.

Reply to objection 1: It belongs to the best agent to produce his best *overall* effect—not to make each part of the whole the best absolutely speaking, but rather to make each part the best in its proportion to the whole. By way of example, an animal’s goodness would be destroyed if each of its parts had the dignity that belongs to the eyes. So too, then, God made the universe the best it can be as a whole, given its status as a creature. But He did not make each creature the best; instead, He made one better than another. Thus, it is of *each* creature that Genesis 1:4 says, “God saw the light, that it was good,” and so on for each individual, but it is of *all of them together* that Genesis 1:31 says, “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.”

Reply to objection 2: The first thing that comes from oneness is equality, and then comes

multiplicity. And so the Son, to whom equality is appropriated, proceeds from the Father, to whom oneness is appropriated, according to Augustine. And then comes the creature, to which inequality belongs. Still, creatures participate in a certain kind of equality, viz., an equality of proportion.

Reply to objection 3: This is the argument that moved Origen, but it has a place only in the giving of rewards, where unequal rewards are owed for unequal merits. By contrast, in the very establishment of things it is not the case that the inequality among the parts derives from a prior inequality of merits or even from a prior inequality in the disposition of the matter; rather, the inequality exists for the sake of the perfection of the whole. This is clear from the works of a craft. For the roof of a house does not differ from the foundation because they are made out of diverse materials. To the contrary, it is in order to make a perfect house from diverse parts that the craftsman looks for diverse materials—and he would make those materials himself if he were able to.

Article 3

Is there just one world?

It seems that there is not just one world, but many worlds:

Objection 1: As Augustine says in 83 *Quaestiones*, it is ridiculous to claim that God created things for no reason. But He could have created many worlds for the same reason that He created one world; for His power is not limited to the creation of just one world, but is instead infinite, as was shown above (q. 25, a. 2). Therefore, God has produced more than one world.

Objection 2: Nature does what is better and, *a fortiori*, God does, too. But it would be better for many worlds to exist rather than just one, since more good things are better than fewer good things. Therefore, more than one world was made by God.

Objection 3: Everything that has a form in matter can be numerically multiplied while remaining the same in species, since numerical multiplication is based on matter. But the world has a form in matter. For just as when I say ‘man’, I signify a form, whereas when I say ‘this man’, I signify a form in matter, so too when I say ‘world’, I signify a form, whereas when I say ‘this world’, I signify a form in matter. Therefore, nothing prevents there from being more than one world.

But contrary to this: John 1:10 says, “The world was made by Him,” where ‘the world’ names in the singular, as if only one world exists.

I respond: The order that exists among the things created by God is such that it makes manifest the oneness of the world. For this world is called one by a oneness of order, insofar as some things are ordered to others. But as was shown above (q. 11, a. 3 and q. 21, a. 1), all the things that come from God have an ordering both with respect to one another and with respect to God. Hence, it is necessary that all of them belong to a single world.

For this reason, those who were able to posit many worlds were the ones who claimed that chance—and not any ordering wisdom—is the cause of the world, e.g., Democritus, who said that this world and infinitely many others had been made from the convergence of atoms.

Reply to objection 1: The reason why the world is one is that all things are duly ordered by a single ordering and to a single end. Thus, in *Metaphysics* 12 Aristotle infers the oneness of God as governor from the oneness of the ordering that exists among things. And Plato proves the oneness of the world as an exemplifier from the oneness of the exemplar.

Reply to objection 2: No agent intends material plurality itself as an end. For material multiplicity has no set terminus and of itself tends toward unlimitedness (*de se tendit in infinitum*), where

unlimitedness is incompatible with the notion of an end. Now when the objection claims that many worlds are better than just one world, it is talking about material multiplicity. But such multiplicity is not better in the case of God's intention as an agent. For by the same line of reasoning one could assert that if He had made two worlds, it would have been better if there were three worlds, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Reply to objection 3: The world consists of the totality of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be an earth other than this one, since every 'earth', wherever it might be, would naturally tend toward this central earth. And the same line of reasoning holds for the other bodies that are parts of the world.

QUESTION 48

The Distinction between Good and Evil

The next thing to consider is the diversity among things in particular: first, the distinction between good and evil (questions 48 and 49), and then the distinction between spiritual creatures and corporeal creatures (question 50). As for the former, we must inquire first into evil (question 48) and then into the cause of evil (question 49)

On the first of these topics there are six questions: (1) Is evil a sort of nature (*natura aliqua*)? (2) Is evil found in things? (3) Is the good the subject of evil? (4) Does evil totally corrupt the good? (5) Is evil divided into the evil of punishment and the evil of sin? (6) Which of the two, punishment or sin, has more of the character of evil?

Article 1

Is evil a sort of nature?

It seems that evil is a sort of nature (*natura quaedam*):

Objection 1: Every genus is a sort of nature. But evil is a genus, since according to the *Categories*, “Good and evil are not in a genus, but are instead the genera of other things.” Therefore, evil is a sort of nature.

Objection 2: Every difference that constitutes a species is a sort of nature. But evil is a constitutive difference in morals, since a bad habit (e.g., stinginess) differs in species from a good habit (e.g., generosity). Therefore, ‘evil’ signifies a sort of nature.

Objection 3: Two contraries are such that each is a sort of nature. But good and evil are opposed as contraries—and not as a habit and a privation. The Philosopher proves this in the *Categories* from the fact that there is a middle ground between good and evil, and also from the fact that a return can be made from being evil to being good. Therefore, ‘evil’ signifies a sort of nature.

Objection 4: What does not exist does not act. But evil acts, since it corrupts the good. Therefore, evil is a sort of entity and thus a sort of nature.

Objection 5: Only that which is a being and a sort of nature contributes to the perfection of the totality of things. But evil contributes to the perfection of the totality of things. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, “The admirable beauty of the totality consists in everything; indeed, even that which is called evil, when it is rightly ordered and kept in its place, makes the good stand out more prominently.” Therefore, evil is a sort of nature.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Evil is neither a being nor a good.”

I respond: One of two opposites is grasped through the other, e.g., darkness through light. Hence, one must come to understand what evil is on the basis of the notion of the good. Now we said above (q. 5, a. 1) that the good is whatever is desirable. And so, since every nature desires its own *esse* and its own perfection, one must claim that the *esse* and perfection of each nature has the character of the good. Hence, it cannot be the case that ‘evil’ signifies any sort of *esse* or form, i.e., any sort of nature. It follows that the name ‘evil’ signifies an absence of the good. Moreover, evil is said to be “neither a being nor a good” by reason of the fact that since a being as such is good, the denial of ‘being’ is the same as the denial of ‘good’.

Reply to objection 1: In the place cited, Aristotle is talking in accord with the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who thought that evil is a sort of nature and so posited good and evil as genera. For, especially in his logical books, Aristotle often used examples that in his day were plausible in the opinion

of certain philosophers.

An alternative reply, in keeping with what the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 10, is that “the first sort of contrariety is between a habit and its privation.” For this sort of contrariety is preserved in all pairs of contraries, since it is always the case that one of the contraries is imperfect in relation to the other—in the way that *black* is imperfect in relation to *white*, and *bitter* in relation to *sweet*. And it is in this sense that *good* and *evil* are called genera—not genera absolutely speaking, but rather genera of contraries. For just as every form has the character of the good, so too every privation as such has the character of evil.

Reply to objection 2: Good and bad are constitutive differences only in the case of morals, since moral [acts and habits] take their species from the end, which is the object of the will, on which moral matters depend. It is because the good has the character of an end that good and evil are specific differences in moral matters—the good *per se*, and evil insofar as it is the negation of a fitting end. Yet the negation of a fitting end constitutes a species in moral matters only insofar as it is accompanied by some unfit end—just as, in natural things, the privation of a substantial form is found only when it is conjoined with some other form. So, then, the evil that is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good conjoined with the privation of some other good. For instance, the end of an intemperate man is not to lack the good of reason, but instead to have some sensual delight outside the order of reason. Hence, it is not evil *qua* evil that is a constitutive difference; rather, evil is a constitutive difference by reason of some good that is conjoined with it.

Reply to objection 3: The last reply makes clear the reply to this third objection. For in the place cited, the Philosopher is talking about good and evil insofar as they are found in morals. In this sense there is a middle ground between good and evil, since the good is that which is well-ordered and the evil is that which is not only disordered but also harmful to another. Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says that a spendthrift is vain, but not evil.

In addition, it is from this sort of evil, viz., moral evil—and not from just any evil—that a return can be made to the good. For there is no return to being sighted from being blind, even though blindness is a sort of evil.

Reply to objection 4: There are three ways in which something is said to act.

First, something is said to act *formally*, in the manner of speaking in which whiteness is said to make a thing white. And in this sense evil, by reason of the privation itself, is likewise said to corrupt the good because it is itself a corruption, i.e., privation, of the good.

Second, something is said to act *effectively*, in the way that a painter is said to make a wall white.

Third, something is said to act in the manner of a *final cause*, in the sense that an end is said to make something happen by moving an efficient cause.

In neither of these last two ways does evil do anything *per se*, i.e., insofar as it is a privation; rather, it acts in these two ways only insofar as some good is conjoined with it. For every action begins from some form, and everything that is desired as an end is a perfection. This is why in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil neither acts nor is desired except in virtue of some good that is conjoined with it, whereas by itself (*per se*) it is indeterminate (*infinitem*) and lies beyond the will and beyond intention.

Reply to objection 5: As was explained above (q. 44, a. 3), the parts of the universe are ordered to one another to the extent that (a) one acts on another and that (b) one is an end of and exemplar for another. But as has been explained, these ways of acting cannot belong to evil except by reason of some good that is conjoined with it. Hence, it is only *per accidens*, i.e., by reason of a conjoined good, that evil pertains to the perfection of the universe and is included under the order of the universe.

Article 2

Is evil found in things?

It seems that evil is not found in things:

Objection 1: Whatever is found in things is either a being or the privation of a being, i.e., a non-being. But in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil is far from a being (*existens*) and even further from a non-being. Therefore, there is no way in which evil is found in things.

Objection 2: *Being (ens)* and *thing (res)* are convertible. Therefore, if evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a sort of thing—which is contrary to what was said above (a. 1).

Objection 3: As Aristotle says in *Topics* 3, “What is whiter is that which has less black mixed in with it.” Therefore, what is better is that which has less evil mixed in with it. But God—even more than nature—always makes what is better. Therefore, no evil is found in the things made by God.

But contrary to this: If these objections were correct, then there would be no prohibitions or punishments, since prohibitions and punishments have to do only with evils.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 47, a. 2), the perfection of the universe requires that there be inequality among things, so that all the grades of goodness might be filled in.

Now one grade of goodness is for a thing to be good in such a way that it can never fail with respect to its goodness, whereas another grade of goodness is for a thing to be good in such a way that it is able to fail with respect to its goodness. These two grades are found in *esse* itself. For there are some things—e.g., incorporeal things—that cannot lose their *esse*, whereas there are other things—e.g., corporeal things—that can lose their *esse*.

Therefore, just as the perfection of the totality of things requires that there be not only incorruptible entities but also corruptible entities, so too the perfection of the universe requires that there be some things that can fail with respect to their goodness—from which it follows that they sometimes do so fail. Now the notion of evil consists in something’s failing with respect to the good. Hence, it is clear that evil is found in things, in the same way that corruption is. For corruption itself is a certain sort of evil.

Reply to objection 1: Evil is far both from being, absolutely speaking, and from non-being, absolutely speaking, since it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but is instead a privation.

Reply to objection 2: As *Metaphysics* 5 asserts, *being (ens)* is said in two ways.

In one way, it signifies the positive being (*entitas*) of a thing (*res*), as divided by the ten categories, and is thus convertible with *thing*. In this sense no privation is a being, and hence in this sense evil is not a being, either.

In the second way, *being* signifies the truth of a proposition, which consists in a composition whose characteristic mark is the verb ‘is’, and it is this sense of *being* with which one replies to the question ‘Is there ____?’. This is the sense in which we say that there is blindness in the eye—and so on for any other privation. And it is in this sense that evil is likewise called a being.

Now it is because they did not understand this distinction that certain writers, noting that some things are called evil or that there is said to be evil in things, came to believe that evil is a sort of positive thing (*res*).

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 47, a. 2), God or nature (or any other agent, for that matter) effects what is best overall, but not what is best in each part—except in the sense of what is best in its ordering to the whole. But the whole that is the totality of creatures is better and more perfect if it contains some things that are able to lose their good and do in fact lose their good when God does not prevent it. There are two reasons for this.

First, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, it belongs to providence to preserve

nature rather than to destroy it, and the nature of things is such that things that are able to lose their good sometimes do lose their good.

Second, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, God is so powerful that He is able to do well even with evil. Hence, many goods would be destroyed if God did not permit evil. For fire would not be generated if air were not corrupted; and the lion's life would not be preserved if the ass were not killed; and if there were no wickedness, then vindicating justice and long-suffering patience would not be praised.

Article 3

Does evil have what is good as its subject?

It seems that evil does not have what is good as its subject:

Objection 1: All good things are existent things (*existentia*). But in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil is neither an existent thing nor in an existent thing. Therefore, evil does not have what is good as its subject.

Objection 2: Evil is not a being (*ens*), whereas the good is a being. But a non-being does not require a being in which to exist as in a subject. Therefore, evil does not require a good in which to exist as in a subject.

Objection 3: One of two contraries is not the subject of the other contrary. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil does not have what is good as its subject.

Objection 4: That which whiteness has as its subject is said to be white. Therefore, that which evil has as its subject is likewise evil. Therefore, if evil has what is good as its subject, it follows that what is good is evil—which is contrary to Isaiah 5:20, “Woe to you who call evil good and good evil.”

But contrary to this: In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says that evil does not exist except in what is good.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), ‘evil’ implies the negation of a good. However, not just any negation of a good is called evil. For the negation of a good can be understood either *privatively* or *negatively*.

The negation of a good, as understood *negatively*, does not have the character of evil, since otherwise it would follow that things which do not exist in any way at all are evil or, again, that each entity is evil by reason of the fact that it does not have some good that belongs to another thing—for instance, a man would be evil because he does not have the swiftness of a deer or the strength of a lion.

By contrast, the negation of a good, as understood *privatively*, is called evil in the way that the privation of sight is called blindness. Now there is one and the same subject for both the privation and the form, viz., a being in potentiality, regardless of whether it is (a) a being in potentiality absolutely speaking, viz., primary matter, which is the subject both of the substantial form and of the opposed privation, or (b) a being in potentiality relatively speaking and in actuality absolutely speaking, e.g., a transparent body, which is the subject of both darkness and light.

Now it is clear that the form through which something exists in actuality is a certain perfection and good. And so every actual entity is a certain good. Similarly, every being in potentiality is, as such, a certain good insofar as it is ordered to a good. For just as it is a being in potentiality, so too it is a good in potentiality. It follows, then, that the subject of evil is what is good.

Reply to objection 1: What Dionysius means is that evil is not in existent things either as a part of an existent thing or as a natural property of an existent thing.

Reply to objection 2: Non-being, as understood *negatively*, does not require a subject. But as *Metaphysics* 4 puts it, a *privation* is a negation-in-a-subject, and this is the sort of non-being that evil is.

Reply to objection 3: An evil has as its subject not the good that is opposed to it, but instead some other good. For instance, the subject of blindness is not the power of sight, but the animal.

As Augustine points out, however, this might seem to violate the logical rule that contraries cannot exist together. However, our meaning has to do with ‘good’ and ‘evil’ taken in general and not insofar as they are taken specifically for *this* good and *this* evil. Now contraries such as ‘white’ and ‘black’, and ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter’, are taken only in this specific way, since they are in determinate genera. By contrast, *good* encompasses all genera, and in this sense one good can exist together with the privation of another good.

Reply to objection 4: The prophet calls down woe on those who say that what is good is, as such, evil. But this does not follow from the claims made above, as is clear from the explanation that has been given.

Article 4

Does evil totally corrupt the good?

It seems that evil totally corrupts the good:

Objection 1: One of two contraries is totally corrupted by the other. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is able to corrupt the whole good.

Objection 2: In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says that an evil is harmful to the extent that it “takes away the good.” But the good is undifferentiated (*simile sibi*) and uniform. Therefore, it is totally destroyed by evil.

Objection 3: As long as an evil exists, it causes harm and takes away the good. But that from which something is always being taken away is at some point consumed, unless it is infinite—which cannot be said in the case of any created good. Therefore, evil totally consumes the good.

But contrary to this: In the *Enchiridion* Augustine says that evil cannot totally consume the good.

I respond: Evil cannot totally consume the good. To see this clearly, note that there are three sorts of goods.

One sort of good is totally destroyed by evil, and this is the good that is the opposite of a given evil. For instance, light is totally destroyed by darkness, and the power of sight is totally destroyed by blindness.

The second sort of good is neither totally destroyed nor even diminished by evil, viz., the good that serves as the subject of a given evil. For instance, nothing of the substance of the air is destroyed by darkness.

The third sort of good is diminished by evil, but not totally destroyed, viz., the good that is the subject’s capacity for some actuality. The diminishment of this sort of good should be thought of not as occurring through *subtraction*, in the way that diminishment occurs in quantities, but rather as occurring through *remission*, in the way that diminishment occurs in qualities and forms. Now the remission of this sort of capacity is to be understood as the contrary of its intensification. For a capacity of this sort is intensified through the dispositions by which the matter is prepared for the relevant actuality, so that the more these dispositions are increased in the subject, the more capable it is of receiving its perfection and form. Conversely, such a capacity is diminished through contrary dispositions, so that the more these contrary dispositions are increased in the matter and the more intense they are, the more the matter’s

potentiality for the relevant actuality is reduced.

Thus, if these contrary dispositions cannot be increased and intensified *ad infinitum*, but instead can be increased and intensified only to a set limit, then the capacity in question is not diminished or reduced *ad infinitum*. This is clear in the case of the active and passive qualities of the elements. For instance, coldness and wetness, through which the matter's capacity for the form of fire is diminished or reduced, cannot be increased *ad infinitum*.

On the other hand, if the contrary dispositions are able to be increased *ad infinitum*, then the capacity in question can likewise be diminished or reduced *ad infinitum*—and yet it is not totally destroyed, since it always remains in its root, which is the substance of the subject. For instance, if opaque bodies were interposed *ad infinitum* between the sun and the air, the air's capacity for light would be diminished *ad infinitum*, and yet it would not be totally destroyed as long as the air remained, since air by its nature is transparent. Similarly, there can be addition *ad infinitum* in the case of sins, through which the soul's capacity for grace is always being more and more diminished, so that the sins become, as it were, an obstacle interposed between God and us, in accord with Isaiah 59:2 ("Our iniquities have set up a division between us and God"). And yet the capacity for grace is not totally taken away from the soul, since it follows upon the soul's nature.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the sort of good that is the opposite of a given evil is totally destroyed, but the other sorts of good are not totally destroyed.

Reply to objection 2: The sort of capacity discussed above falls in between the subject and the actuality. Hence, as far as attaining the actuality is concerned, the capacity is diminished by evil, but as far as its being rooted in the subject is concerned, the capacity remains. Therefore, even though the good is undifferentiated in itself, still, because of its relation to these diverse things, it is destroyed only in part and not totally.

Reply to objection 3: Some writers, imagining that the diminishment of the good in question is similar to the diminishment of a quantity, have claimed that just as a continuum is divided *ad infinitum* by means of a division made with the same ratio (e.g., a half of a half, or a third of third), so too it happens in the case under discussion.

However, this line of reasoning has no place in the present case. For in a division in which the same ratio is always preserved, less and less is always being subtracted, since half of a half is less than half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the capacity in question by less than the preceding sin. Instead, it might diminish it either equally or even more.

Therefore, one should reply that even though this capacity is a certain finite thing, it is nonetheless diminished *ad infinitum*—not *per se*, but *per accidens*, i.e., insofar as the contrary dispositions are also increased *ad infinitum* in the way that has been explained.

Article 5

Is evil adequately divided into the evil of punishment and the evil of sin?

It seems that evil is not adequately divided into the evil of punishment (*poena*) and the evil of sin (*culpa*):

Objection 1: Every defect seems to be some sort of evil. But every creature has the defect of not being able to conserve itself in *esse*, and yet this defect is neither a punishment nor a sin. Therefore, evil is not adequately divided into punishment and sin.

Objection 2: There is neither punishment nor sin in the case of non-rational creatures. But they

nonetheless have defects and corruption, which pertain to the character of evil. Therefore, not every evil is a punishment or a sin.

Objection 3: Temptation is a certain evil. Yet it is not a sin, since a temptation that is not consented to is not a sin, but is instead an occasion for exercising a virtue, according to a Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12:7. Nor is temptation a punishment, since it precedes a sin, whereas punishment follows a sin. Therefore, evil is not adequately divided into punishment and sin.

But contrary to this: The division in question is unnecessary. For as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, something is called evil because it is harmful. But that which does harm is related to punishment (*poenale*). Therefore, every evil falls under punishment.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), evil is a privation of the good, which consists principally and *per se* in perfection and actuality. Now there are two sorts of actuality, viz., *first* actuality and *second* actuality. First actuality is the form and integrity of a thing, whereas second actuality is its operation. Therefore, evil occurs in two ways.

Evil occurs in the first way through the subtraction of a form or of some part that is required for the thing's integrity—in the way that blindness is an evil, or in the way that lacking an arm or a leg is an evil.

Evil occurs in the second way through the subtraction of a fitting operation, either by virtue of the fact that the operation does not exist at all or by virtue of the fact that it does not have the manner and order it ought to have.

However, since the good is, absolutely speaking, the object of the will, it follows that evil, which is a privation of the good, is found in a special way among rational creatures who have a will. Thus, in their case, the evil that occurs through the subtraction of the form or integrity of a thing has the character of punishment—especially, as was shown above (q. 22, a. 2), on the assumption that all things are subject to God's justice and providence. For it is part of the nature of punishment that it is contrary to the will. On the other hand, among voluntary beings, the evil that consists in the subtraction of a fitting operation has the character of sin. For a sin is imputed to someone when he falls short of perfection in an action over which he has dominion through his will. So, then, every evil in beings with a will (*in rebus voluntariis*) is considered either a punishment or a sin.

Reply to objection 1: Since, as was explained above (a. 3), evil is a privation of the good and not a pure negation, it follows that not every lack of good is evil, but that instead an evil is a lack of a good that is apt to be had and should be had. For instance, a lack of vision is an evil not in a rock but in an animal, since it is contrary to the rock's nature that it should have sight. Similarly, it is contrary to the nature of a creature that it should conserve itself in *esse*, since it is the same agent who both gives *esse* and conserves it. Hence, this defect is not an evil for a creature.

Reply to objection 2: Punishment and sin do not divide evil absolutely speaking. Rather, they divide the evil found in beings with a will.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as temptation implies an incitement to evil, there is always a sinful evil (*malum culpae*) in anyone who is doing the tempting. However, in the one who is tempted there is no sin, properly speaking, except insofar as he is changed in some way, since an agent's action exists in the patient. However, to the extent that the one who is tempted is turned toward evil by the tempter, he falls into sin.

Reply to argument for the contrary: It is part of the nature of punishment that it does harm to the agent in himself. But it is part of the nature of sin that it harms the agent in his very action. And so both of them are contained under evil insofar as they both have the character of a harm.

Article 6

Does punishment have more of the character of evil than sin does?

It seems that punishment has more of the character of evil than sin does:

Objection 1: Sin is related to punishment as merit is related to reward. But reward has more of the character of the good than merit does, since it is the terminus of merit. Therefore, punishment has more of the character of evil than sin does.

Objection 2: An evil is worse to the extent that it is opposed to a greater good. But as has been explained (a. 5), punishment is opposed to the good of the agent, whereas sin is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is a greater good than his action, it seems that punishment is a greater evil than sin.

Objection 3: That particular privation of an end which is called the absence of the vision of God is a certain punishment. But the evil of sin stems from the privation of a fitting order to that end. Therefore, punishment is a worse evil than sin.

But contrary to this: The wise craftsman induces a lesser evil in order to avoid a greater evil. For instance, a physician amputates a limb in order that the body not be corrupted. But God's wisdom inflicts punishment in order to prevent sin. Therefore, sin is a greater evil than punishment.

I respond: Sin has more of the character of evil than punishment does—not only more than sensible punishment, which consists in being deprived of corporeal goods and which is the sort of punishment most people think of, but also more than punishment taken in the most general sense, in which being deprived of grace or of glory is a punishment. There are two reasons for this.

The first is that someone becomes evil because of the evil of sin, but not because of the evil of punishment—this according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4: “It is not evil to be punished; rather, it is evil to become deserving of punishment.” The reason for this is that since the good consists, absolutely speaking, in an actuality and not in a potentiality, and since the last actuality is an operation, viz., the use of whatever things are possessed, it follows that the good of man, absolutely considered, is a good operation, viz., the good use of things that are possessed. But we use all things through our will. Hence, it is because of a good will, by which a man makes good use of the things he possesses, that a man is called good; and it is because of a bad will that he is called evil. For it is possible for someone with a bad will to make bad use even of the good which he possesses—as, for instance, if a grammarian were voluntarily to speak ungrammatically. Therefore, since sin consists in a disordered act of the will, whereas punishment consists in someone's being deprived of the things his will makes use of, it follows that sin has the character of evil in a more complete way than punishment does.

The second reason is based on the fact that God is the author of the evil of punishment, but not of the evil of sin. The reason for this is that the evil of punishment deprives a creature of some good—whether the creature's good is taken as something created, as when blindness deprives one of sight, or whether instead it is an uncreated good, as when an uncreated good is removed from a creature through the absence of the vision of God. The evil of sin, on the other hand, is properly opposed to the uncreated good itself, since it is contrary to the fulfillment of God's will, as well as contrary to the divine love by which God's good is loved for itself and not just insofar as the creature participates in it.

It is clear, then, that sin has more of the character of evil than punishment does.

Reply to objection 1: Even though a sin terminates in punishment in the way that merit terminates in a reward, the sin is nonetheless not intended for the sake of the punishment in the way that merit is intended for the sake of the reward. Just the opposite, the punishment is inflicted in order that sin might

be avoided. And so sin is worse than punishment.

Reply to objection 2: Since it is a second perfection, an action's ordering that is removed through sin is a more perfect good of the agent than is the good removed through punishment, which is a first perfection.

Reply to objection 3: Sin is not related to punishment in the way that what is ordered to an end is related to that end. For both sin and punishment can in some way involve either a privation of the end or a privation of the ordering to the end. Punishment can do this insofar as the man himself is removed by punishment either from the end or from the ordering to the end, whereas sin can do it to the extent that the relevant privation involves an action that is not ordered to a fitting end.

QUESTION 49

The Cause of Evil

The next thing to ask about is the cause of evil. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Can what is good be a cause of evil? (2) Can the greatest good, viz., God, be a cause of evil? (3) Is there a greatest evil that is the first cause of all evils?

Article 1

Can what is good be a cause of evil?

It seems that what is good cannot be a cause of evil:

Objection 1: Matthew 7:18 says, “A good tree cannot bear bad fruit.”

Objection 2: One of a pair of contraries cannot be a cause of the other. But *evil* is contrary to *good*. Therefore, what is good cannot be a cause of evil.

Objection 3: A defective effect proceeds only from a defective cause. But evil, assuming that it has a cause, is a defective effect. Therefore, it has a defective cause. But everything defective is evil. Therefore, only what is evil is a cause of evil.

Objection 4: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that evil does not have a cause. Therefore, it is not the case that what is good is a cause of evil.

But contrary to this: In *Contra Julianum* Augustine says, “There was nothing at all from which evil could arise except what is good.”

I respond: One must hold that every evil has a cause in some way or other. For evil is the lack of a good that is apt to be had and should be had. But the fact that a thing falls short of its natural and fitting disposition can arise only from a cause that draws the thing away from that disposition. For instance, a heavy thing is moved upward only by something that impels it, and an agent fails in its action only because of something that impedes it. But only what is good can be a cause, since nothing can be a cause except insofar as it is a being, and every being as such is good.

Moreover, when we consider the specific types of causes, the *agent* and the *form* and the *end* all imply some sort of perfection, which pertains to the notion of the good; and even the *matter*, insofar as it is a potentiality for the good, has the character of goodness. In fact, it is already clear from what has been said that what is good is a cause of evil in the manner of a *material cause*; for it was shown above (q. 48, a. 3) that what is good is the subject of evil. On the other hand, evil does not have a *formal cause*, but is rather the privation of a form. Similarly, it does not have a *final cause*, but is rather the privation of the ordering to a fitting end; for it is not only the end that has the nature of the good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end.

However, evil does have a cause in the manner of an *agent* (*per modum agentis*), though it has such a cause *per accidens* rather than *per se*. To see this clearly, note that evil is caused in one way in an *action* and in another way in an *effect*.

In the *action*, evil is caused because of a defect in one of the principles of the action—either in the principal agent or in an instrumental agent. For instance, a defect in an animal’s motion can happen either because of a weakness in the moving power, as in young children, or solely because of some ineptitude on the part of an instrument, as in the case of those who are lame.

On the other hand, the evil in a given *thing*, though not in the agent’s proper effect, is sometimes caused by the agent’s power and sometimes by the thing’s own defectiveness or that of its matter.

It is caused by the agent’s power or perfection when the privation of another form necessarily follows upon the form aimed at by the agent—in the way that the privation of the form of air or of water

follows upon the form of fire. Therefore, just as a fire imprints its form more perfectly to the extent that it is more perfect in power, so also it corrupts the contrary form more perfectly. Hence, the evil and corruption that belong to the air or the water derive from the perfection of the fire. However, this happens *per accidens*, since the fire does not aim at depriving the water of its form, but instead aims at inducing its own proper form—and yet in doing the latter, it also does the former incidentally (*per accidens*).

On the other hand, if the defect is in the fire's *proper effect*—viz., if the fire falls short in its heating—then this is either (a) because of a defect in the action, which, as has already been explained, results from a defect in one of the principles of the action, or (b) because of a lack of disposition (*indispositio*) in the matter, which does not receive the action of the acting fire. But the very fact that the effect is deficient is likewise incidental to the good thing which is acting *per se*.

Hence, it is true that evil does not in any way have a cause except *per accidens*, and so it is in this sense that what is good is a cause of evil.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine puts it in *Contra Julianum*, “The Lord is calling a bad act of will (*voluntas*) a bad tree and a good act of will a good tree.” Now a morally evil act is not produced by a good act of will, since an act is judged to be morally good because of the good act of will itself. On the other hand, the very movement of a bad act of will is caused by the rational creature, who is good. And it is in this way that it is a cause of evil.

Reply to objection 2: What is good does not cause the evil which is contrary to itself, but instead causes some other evil, in the way that the fire's goodness causes what is bad for the water, and in the way that a man, who is good by his nature, causes a morally bad act. And this itself is *per accidens* in the way just explained. (It even happens that one of two contraries causes the other contrary *per accidens*, as when an exterior surrounding coldness gives warmth insofar as the interior heat is trapped by it.)

Reply to objection 3: The way in which evil has a defective cause in the case of natural beings is different from the way it has a defective cause in the case of voluntary beings.

For a natural agent produces an effect that is such as itself is, unless it is impeded by something extrinsic, and this very thing is a kind of defect in it. Hence, evil never results in the effect unless some other evil previously existed either in the agent or in the matter, as was explained above.

By contrast, in the case of voluntary beings, a defect in the action proceeds from an actualized defect in the will, insofar as the will, in its acting, fails to subject itself to its own rule. This latter defect is not yet itself a sin, but a sin results from the fact that the will operates in the presence of such a defect.

Reply to objection 4: As has been explained, evil has a cause only *per accidens* and not *per se*.

Article 2

Is the greatest good, viz., God, a cause of evil?

It seems that the greatest good, viz., God, is a cause of evil:

Objection 1: Isaiah 45:6-7 says, “I am the Lord, and there is no other God who forms the light and creates darkness, who makes peace and creates evil.” Further, Amos 3:6 says, “Shall there be evil in a city which the Lord has not done?”

Objection 2: The effect of a secondary cause is traced back to the first cause. But as has been explained (a. 1), it is what is good that is a cause of evil. Therefore, since, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 1), God is a cause of every good, it follows that every evil is likewise from God.

Objection 3: As *Physics* 2 says, the cause of the ship's salvation is the same as the cause of its

peril. But God is a cause of the salvation of all things. Therefore, He is likewise a cause of all perdition and evil.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “God is not an author of evil because He is not a cause of anything’s tending toward non-being.”

I respond: As is clear from what has been said (a. 1), the sort of evil that consists in a defective action is always caused by a defect in the agent. However, as was shown above (q. 4, a. 1), in God there is no defect, but only the greatest perfection. Hence, the sort of evil that consists in a defective action or is caused by a defect in the agent is not traced back to God as a cause.

By contrast, the sort of evil that consists in the corruption of various things is indeed traced back to God as a cause. This is clear both in the case of natural beings and in the case of voluntary beings. For it has already been explained (a. 1) that insofar as an agent produces by its own power a form upon which corruption and defectiveness follow, it is a cause by its own power of that corruption and defectiveness. But it is clear that the form that God principally intends in created things is the good of the order of the universe. Yet, as was explained above (a. 48, a. 2), the order of the universe requires that certain things are able to fail and sometimes do in fact fail. And so in causing the good of the order of the universe among things, God consequently and, as it were, *per accidens*, causes the corruption of things—this in accord with 1 Kings 2:6 (“The Lord kills and gives life”). And when Wisdom 1:13 says, “God has not made death,” this means that He does not intend death *per se*.

Now the order of justice, which requires that punishment be inflicted on sinners, is also relevant to the order of the universe. Accordingly, God is the author of the evil which is punishment, though He is not—for the reason explained above (q. 48, a. 6)—an author of the evil which is sin.

Reply to objection 1: The cited passages are talking about the evil of punishment and not about the evil of sin.

Reply to objection 2: The effect of a defective secondary cause is traced back to a non-defective first cause with respect to what that effect has of being and perfection, but not with respect to its defectiveness. For instance, in an act of limping the motion is caused by the moving power, whereas the lameness in the act is caused not by the moving power, but instead by the curvature of the leg. Similarly, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action is traced back to God as a cause, but whatever is defective in the act is caused by the defective secondary cause and not by God.

Reply to objection 3: The reason why the sinking of the ship is attributed to the sailor as its cause is that he does not do what is required to save the ship. By contrast, God does not fail to do what is necessary for salvation. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

Article 3

Is there one greatest evil which is a cause of every evil?

It seems that there is one greatest evil which is a cause of every evil:

Objection 1: Contrary effects have contrary causes. But according to Ecclesiasticus 33:15 (“Good is set against evil, and life against death: so also is the sinner against a just man”), contrariety is found among things. Therefore, there are contrary principles, the one a principle of good and the other a principle of evil.

Objection 2: As *De Caelo et Mundo* 2 says, if one of two contraries exists in reality, then so does the other contrary. But as was shown above (q. 2, a. 3 and q. 6, a. 2), the greatest good, which is a cause of all good, exists in reality. Therefore, there is likewise a greatest evil opposed to it which is a cause of

every evil.

Objection 3: Just as the good and the better are found in reality, so too are the bad and the worse. But *good* and *better* are predicated relative to the best. Therefore, *bad* and *worse* are predicated relative to some greatest evil.

Objection 4: Everything that is such-and-such through participation is traced back to what is such-and-such through its essence. But things that are evil among us are evil through participation and not through their essence. Therefore, something is the greatest evil through its essence and is a cause of every evil.

Objection 5: Everything that is such-and-such *per accidens* is traced back to what is such-and-such *per se*. But what is good is a *per accidens* cause of evil. Therefore, we must posit some greatest evil that is a *per se* cause of evils.

Nor can one reply that evil has only a *per accidens* cause and not a *per se* cause, since then it would follow that evil does not exist in most things (*ut in pluribus*), but only in a few (*ut in paucioribus*).

Objection 6: The evil of an effect is traced back to the evil of its cause, since, as was explained above (a. 1), a defective effect comes from a defective cause. But there can be no infinite regress here. Therefore, one must posit a first evil being that is the cause of every evil.

But contrary to this: As was shown above (q. 2, a. 4 and q. 6, a. 2), the greatest good is a cause of all being. Therefore, there cannot be a principle opposed to it which is a cause of evil things.

I respond: It is clear from what has already been said that there is no single first principle of evils in the way that there is a single first principle of good things.

For first of all, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 3), the first principle of good things is good through its essence. But nothing can be evil through its essence; for it was shown above (q. 48, a. 3) that (a) every being, insofar as it is a being, is good, and that (b) evil does not exist except in a subject that is good.

Second, as was shown above (q. 6, a. 2), the first principle of good things is a greatest and perfect good that contains within itself every sort of goodness. But there cannot be a greatest evil because, as has been shown (q. 48, a. 4), even if an evil continually diminishes a good, it can nonetheless never totally consume it. And so since some good always remains, there cannot be anything that is wholly and perfectly evil. For this reason the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4 that if there were something completely evil, it would destroy itself, since if the entire good were destroyed (which is what is required for the completeness of the evil), the evil itself would also be removed, given that its subject is something good.

Third, the notion (*ratio*) of evil is incompatible with the notion of a first principle. For, first of all, as was shown above (a. 1), every evil is caused by what is good. Second, evil cannot be a cause except *per accidens* and so it cannot be a first cause, since, as is clear from *Physics* 2, a *per accidens* cause is posterior to a *per se* cause.

Now those who posited two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error by virtue of the same root cause that also gave rise to other peculiar positions held by the ancients—viz., they did not take into account the universal cause of all being, but instead considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For this reason, if they found a thing to be harmful to another because of the power of its nature, they thought that the nature of that thing was evil—as, for instance, if someone were to call the nature of a fire evil because it had burned down a poor man's house.

However, a judgment about the goodness of a thing should not be based on the way it is ordered to a given particular thing; rather, as has been shown (q. 47, a. 2), it should be based on the thing itself and on the way it is ordered to the entire universe, within which each thing has its own perfectly ordained place.

Again, when they discovered two particular contrary causes of two particular contrary effects, they did not know how to trace the particular contrary causes back to a common universal cause. And so they judged that contrariety among causes holds all the way back to the first principles.

However, since all contraries agree in some one common thing, they must have, over and beyond their contrary proper causes, some one common cause—in the way, for instance, that the power of a celestial body is something over and beyond the contrary qualities of the elements. Similarly, as has been shown (q. 2, a. 3), over and beyond all the things that exist in any way, there is one first principle of being.

Reply to objection 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being. And so, even though they have contrary particular causes, we must arrive in the end at a single common first cause.

Reply to objection 2: A privation and the corresponding disposition are apt to be effected with respect to the same [subject]. Now as has been explained (q. 48, a. 3), the subject of a privation is a being in potentiality. Hence, since, as is clear from what has been said, evil is a privation of the good, it is opposed to a good that is conjoined with potentiality—and not to the greatest good, which is pure actuality.

Reply to objection 3: Each thing is intensified in accord with its proper nature. But just as a form is a sort of perfection, so a privation is a sort of negation. Hence, every form and perfection and good is intensified by approaching a perfect terminus, whereas a privation or evil is intensified by receding from that terminus. Hence, a thing is not called bad and worse by approaching the greatest evil, in the way that a thing is indeed called good and better by approaching the highest good.

Reply to objection 4: No being is called evil through participation; rather, a being is called evil through a privation of participation. Hence, an evil does not need to be traced back to something that is evil through its essence.

Reply to objection 5: As was shown above (a. 1), evil can have only a *per accidens* cause. Hence, it cannot be traced back to something that is a *per se* cause of evil.

However, the claim that evil exists in most things is simply false. For generable and corruptible things, in which only an evil of nature can exist, are only a relatively small part of the whole universe. Again, within each species defects of nature do not occur in most cases. In men alone does evil seem to occur in most cases. For the good of man with respect to the senses is not the good of man *qua* man, i.e., the good with respect to reason, and yet most men follow their senses rather than reason.

Reply to objection 6: One cannot proceed to infinity among the causes of evil; instead, one can trace every evil back to some good cause from which that evil follows *per accidens*.

QUESTION 50

The Substance of Angels Considered Absolutely

The next thing to consider is the distinction between the corporeal creature and the spiritual creature. We will consider, first, the purely spiritual creature, which is called an angel in Sacred Scripture (questions 50-64); second, the purely corporeal creature (questions 65-74); and, third, the creature composed of the spiritual and the corporeal, viz., man (questions 75-102).

On the topic of angels, we must first consider what pertains to their substance (questions 50-53); second, what pertains to their intellect (questions 54-58); third, what pertains to their will (questions 59-60); and, fourth, what pertains to their creation (questions 61-64).

As for the substance of angels, we must consider it both absolutely (question 50) and in relation to corporeal things (questions 51-53).

On the topic of the substance of angels considered absolutely, there are five questions: (1) Is there any creature that is wholly spiritual and completely incorporeal? (2) On the assumption that an angel is wholly spiritual, is he composed of matter and form? (3) How many angels are there? (4) How do they differ from one another? (5) Are angels immortal, i.e., incorruptible?

Article 1

Is an angel wholly incorporeal?

It seems that an angel is not wholly incorporeal:

Objection 1: That which is incorporeal only with respect to us and not with respect to God is not incorporeal absolutely speaking. But in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “An angel is called incorporeal and immaterial with respect to us, but as compared to God, he is corporeal and material.” Therefore, an angel is not incorporeal absolutely speaking.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 6 proves, nothing is moved except a body. But in the same place Damascene says, “An angel is an ever movable intellectual substance.” Therefore, an angel is a corporeal substance.

Objection 3: In *De Spiritu Sancto* Ambrose says, “Every creature is circumscribed by the set limits of its nature.” But being circumscribed is something proper to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. But as is clear from Psalm 148:2 (“Praise the Lord, all you His angels ... For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created”), angels are creatures of God. Therefore, angels are corporeal.

But contrary to this: Psalm 103:4 says, “He makes His angels spirits.”

I respond: It is necessary to hold that some creatures are incorporeal. For what God principally intends in the case of created things is the good, which consists in an assimilation to God. But the perfect assimilation of an effect to its cause occurs when the effect imitates its cause with respect to that through which the cause produces the effect. For instance, what is hot effects what is hot. But as was shown above (q. 14, a. 8 and q. 19, a. 4), God produces creatures through His intellect and will. Hence, the perfection of the universe requires that there be some intellectual creatures. But an act of understanding is not an act of a body or of any corporeal power, since each body is limited to the here and now. Hence, in order for the universe to be perfect, it is necessary to hold that some creatures are incorporeal.

However, the ancients, who did not appreciate the power of understanding and failed to distinguish sensing from understanding, thought that there was nothing in the world except what could be apprehended by sensation and imagination. And since only bodies fall under the power of imagining, they thought that the only beings were bodies, as the Philosopher points out in *Physics* 4. The error of

the Sadducees, who claimed that there are no spirits, originated from these premises.

Nonetheless, the very fact that understanding is superior to (*altior*) sensing is a plausible proof that there are some incorporeal beings that are comprehensible only by the understanding.

Reply to objection 1: Incorporeal substances stand in the middle between God and corporeal creatures. But when what is in the middle is compared to one of the endpoints, it looks like the other endpoint; for instance, what is lukewarm, when compared to what is hot, seems cold. It is for this reason that angels, when compared to God, are said to be ‘material’ and ‘corporeal’—and not because anything of a corporeal nature exists in them.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Movement’ is here being taken in the sense that acts of understanding and willing are called movements. Thus, an angel’s substance is said to be ‘ever movable’ because he is always understanding in actuality and not, like us, sometimes understanding in actuality and sometimes in potentiality. Hence, it is clear that the objection involves an equivocation.

Reply to objection 3: It is proper to bodies to be circumscribed by the limits of their place, but it is common to all creatures, whether corporeal or spiritual, to be circumscribed by the limits of their essence. This is why Ambrose says in *De Spiritu Sancto* that even though certain creatures are not contained by corporeal places, they are nonetheless not without circumscription as far as their substance is concerned.

Article 2

Is an angel composed of matter and form?

It seems that an angel is composed of matter and form:

Objection 1: Everything contained under any genus is composed of a *genus* and a *difference*, where the difference constitutes the species when added to the genus. But as is clear from *Metaphysics* 8, the genus is taken from the matter, while the difference is taken from the form. Therefore, everything that is in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore, an angel is composed of matter and form.

Objection 2: Matter is found in anything in which the properties of matter are found. But the properties of matter are *being receptive* (*recipere*) and *being a subject* (*substare*); this is why Boethius says in *De Trinitate* that a simple form cannot be a subject. But these properties are found in an angel. Therefore, an angel is composed of matter and form.

Objection 3: Form is an actuality (*actus*). Therefore, whatever is just a form is pure actuality. But an angel is not pure actuality, since this belongs to God alone. Therefore, an angel is not just a form, but instead has a form in matter.

Objection 4: A form is properly limited (*limitatur*) and made finite (*finitur*) by matter. Therefore, a form that does not exist in matter is infinite. But an angel’s form is not infinite, since every creature is finite. Therefore, an angel’s form exists in matter.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The first creatures are understood to be incorporeal and immaterial.”

I respond: Some claim that angels are composed of matter and form. This is the opinion that Avicenna tries to establish in *Fons Vitae*. For he assumes that things that are distinguished intellectually likewise exist as distinct in reality (*in rebus*). But in the case of an incorporeal substance our intellect apprehends something by which it is distinguished from a corporeal substance and something in which it agrees with a corporeal substance. Hence, from this he wants to infer that (a) that by which an

incorporeal substance differs from a corporeal substance is, as it were, its form, and that (b) what is common, as it were, and serves as the subject of this distinguishing form is its matter. For this reason he claims that the same ‘universal’ matter belongs to both spiritual and corporeal beings, so that the form of an incorporeal substance is thought of as being impressed on the matter of spiritual beings in the same way that the form of quantity is impressed on the matter of corporeal beings.

However, it is obvious at first glance that it is impossible for there to be a single matter for both spiritual beings and corporeal beings. After all, it is impossible that a spiritual form and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, since in that case numerically one and the same thing would be both corporeal and spiritual. Hence, it follows that one part of the matter would receive the corporeal form and another part would receive the spiritual form. But matter cannot be divided into parts except insofar as it is understood to be the subject of quantity—so that, as *Physics* 1 explains, if the quantity were removed, then an indivisible substance would remain. So, then, it follows that the matter of spiritual beings would be the subject of quantity—which is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible that there should be a single matter for both spiritual beings and corporeal beings.

But beyond this, it is impossible that an intellectual substance should have *any* kind of matter at all. For the operation of any given entity corresponds to the mode of its substance. But an act of understanding is a completely immaterial operation. This is clear from its object, since every act takes its species and nature from its object. For a thing is understood insofar as it is abstracted from matter, since forms in matter are individual forms, which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence, it follows that every intellectual substance is completely immaterial.

Moreover, it is not necessary for things that are distinguished intellectually to exist as distinct things in reality, since the intellect apprehends things not according to the mode of the things but according to its own mode. Hence, material entities, which are lower than our intellect, exist in our intellect in a more simple way than they exist in themselves. By contrast, angelic substances are higher than our intellect. Hence, our intellect cannot attain to an apprehension of them as they are in themselves. Rather, it apprehends them in its own mode, according to which it apprehends them as composite things. And, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 3), it is in this same way that our intellect apprehends God.

Reply to objection 1: It is the *difference* that constitutes the species. But each thing is constituted in a species insofar as it is limited to some specific grade of being (*gradus in entibus*). For as *Metaphysics* 8 says, the species of things are like numbers, which differ through the addition and subtraction of the unit.

Now in the case of material things, that which determines the specific grade, viz., the form, is distinct from that which is so determined, viz., the matter, and this is why the genus is taken from the one and the difference from the other.

By contrast, in the case of immaterial things, that which does the determining is not distinct from that which is determined. Instead, each immaterial being possesses through its very self a determinate grade of being. And so in the case of immaterial things, the genus and the difference are taken not from different sources, but from one and the same source.

Still, there are different sources as far as our own understanding is concerned. For insofar as our intellect considers an immaterial being *indeterminately*, the concept of a genus is apprehended in it, whereas insofar as it considers an immaterial being *determinately*, the concept of a difference is apprehended in it.

Reply to objection 2: This objection is put forth in *Fons Vitae*. And the argument would reach its conclusion with necessity if the mode in which an intellect receives [a form] were the same as the mode in which matter receives [a form]. But this is clearly false.

For matter receives a form in order to be constituted by it in the *esse* of some species, such as air or

fire or any other. By contrast, an intellect does not receive a form in this way; if it did, then this would validate the opinion of Empedocles, who claimed that we know earth by means of earth and fire by means of fire. Instead, an intelligible form exists in an intellect with the very nature of a form; for this is how it is known by an intellect. Hence, this sort of reception is not the sort of reception that belongs to matter, but is instead the sort of reception that belongs to an immaterial substance.

Reply to objection 3: Even though there is no composition of form and matter in an angel, nonetheless, both actuality and potentiality exist in him. This can be made clear by considering material things, in which there are two types of composition.

The first type is the composition of the form and the matter out of which a given nature is constituted.

However, a nature composed in this way is not its own *esse*; instead, its *esse* is its actuality. Hence, the nature itself is related to its own *esse* as potentiality is related to actuality. Therefore, even if the matter were subtracted and we assumed that the form itself subsisted without the matter, the form would still be related to its *esse* as potentiality is related to actuality. This latter is the sort of composition that should be understood to exist in angels.

This is the point being made by those who say that an angel is composed of *that by which it is* (*quo est*) and *that which is* (*quod est*) or, as Boethius puts it, that an angel is composed of *esse* and *that which is*. For *that which is* is a subsistent form, whereas the *esse* itself is *that by which the substance is*, in the sense in which an act of running (*cursus*) is that by which a runner runs.

By contrast, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), in God the *esse* is not distinct from *that which is*. Hence, God alone is pure actuality.

Reply to objection 4: Every creature is finite absolutely speaking, insofar as its *esse* is not an absolute subsistent thing but is instead limited to the given nature that it comes to. However, nothing prevents a creature from being unlimited (*infinita*) in a relative sense.

Now material creatures have unlimitedness on the part of their matter and limitedness on the part of their form, which is limited by the matter in which it is received. Immaterial substances, on the other hand, are limited with respect to their very *esse*, but unlimited in the sense that their forms are not received in something else. It would be like saying that a whiteness existing as separate [from any subject] is unlimited with respect to the nature of whiteness because it is not restricted to any subject; yet its *esse* would still be limited, since that *esse* is determined to a specific nature.

This is why the *Liber de Causis* says that an intelligence is a *higher finite* being, viz., insofar as it receives *esse* from its superior, whereas it is a *lower infinite* being insofar as its *esse* is not received in any matter.

Article 3

Do angels exist in great numbers?

It seems that angels do not exist in great numbers (*non sint in aliquo magno numero*):

Objection 1: Number is a species of quantity, and it follows upon the division of a continuum. But this cannot be the case with angels, since, as was shown above (a. 1), they are incorporeal. Therefore, angels cannot exist in great numbers.

Objection 2: As is clear in the case of numbers, the closer something is to one, the less it is multiplied. But compared to the other created natures, angelic nature is closer to God. Therefore, since God is maximally one, it seems that a minimal multitude is found within angelic nature.

Objection 3: The proper effect of the separated substances seems to be the movements of the

celestial bodies. But the movements of the celestial bodies have some small determinate number that we can comprehend. Therefore, angels are not more numerous than the movements of the celestial bodies.

Objection 4: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “All intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of God’s goodness.” But rays are multiplied only according to the diversity of their recipients. Now one cannot claim that it is the matter of the intellectual substances that receives an intelligible ray, since, as was shown above (a. 2), the intellectual substances are immaterial. Therefore, it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can occur only because the first bodies, viz., the celestial bodies, need them in order for the procession of the aforementioned rays to be terminated by those bodies in those ways. And so we reach the same conclusion as before.

But contrary to this: Daniel 7:10 says, “Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him.”

I respond: As far as the number of separated substances is concerned, different authors have gone their different ways.

For instance, Plato held that the separated substances are the species of sensible things, as if to say that human nature itself is a separated substance. Accordingly, he had to claim that the separated substances are as numerous as the species of sensible things.

However, Aristotle disproves this position by appealing to the fact that matter is part of the nature of the species of these sensible things. Hence, separated substances cannot be the exemplary species of such sensible things; instead, separated substances have higher natures than the natures of sensible things. Yet Aristotle claimed that these more perfect natures are related to those sensible natures as their movers and ends. And so he tried to discover the number of the separated substances by appealing to the number of primary movements.

However, since this appears to be incompatible with the teaching of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses, himself a Jew, wishing to reconcile Aristotle and Sacred Scripture, claimed that (a) insofar as the angels are called *immaterial substances*, they are multiplied according to the number of movements or the number of celestial bodies, as Aristotle held, but that (b) in Scripture even men who announce divine tidings are called angels, as are the powers of natural things, since they manifest God’s omnipotence.

However, it is foreign to the usage of Scripture for the powers of non-rational things to be called angels.

Hence, one should reply that even insofar as they are immaterial substances, angels have a certain maximal multitude, exceeding every material multitude. As Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 14, “There are many holy armies of the higher minds, exceeding the feeble and limited measure of our material numbers.” The reason for this is that since the perfection of the universe is what God principally intends in the creation of things, to the extent that certain things are more perfect, they are created by God in greater abundance. But just as there is abundance in *magnitude* in the case of bodies, so too there is abundance in *multitude* in the case of incorporeal things. For we notice that incorruptible bodies, which are the most perfect bodies, exceed corruptible bodies beyond measure in their magnitude, since the whole sphere of active and passive things is very small compared with the celestial bodies. Hence, it is reasonable to think that immaterial substances exceed material substances beyond measure in their multitude.

Reply to objection 1: The sort of number that is a discrete quantity and is caused by the division of a continuum does not exist among angels. Instead, as was explained above (q. 11, a. 2 and q. 30, a. 3), the sort of number that exists among the angels is caused by a distinction among forms, and it corresponds to the sense in which *many* (*multitudo*) belongs to the transcendentals.

Reply to objection 2: The fact that angelic nature is close to God means that it must have a minimum of multiplicity in its [intrinsic] composition, and not that it must be preserved in just a few entities.

Reply to objection 3: This argument is drawn from Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 12, and it would establish its conclusion with necessity if separated substances existed for the sake of corporeal substances. For in that case immaterial substances would be superfluous unless certain movements among corporeal things occurred because of them.

However, it is not true that immaterial substances exist for the sake of corporeal substances, since an end is more noble than the things that are ordered to that end. Hence, even Aristotle himself says in the same place that the argument in question is a probable rather than necessary argument. However, he was forced to use this argument because we cannot reach a cognition of intelligible things except through sensible things.

Reply to objection 4: This argument finds its source in the opinion of those who held that matter is the cause of the distinctions among things. But this has already been disproved (q. 47, a. 1).

Hence, the multiplicity of angels is to be taken neither from matter nor from bodies, but instead from God's wisdom insofar as it devises the various orders of immaterial substances.

Article 4

Do angels differ from one another in species?

It seems that angels do not differ from one another in species:

Objection 1: Since the *difference* is more noble than the *genus*, things that agree with respect to what is most noble in themselves agree in the ultimate constitutive difference, and so they are the same in species. But all angels agree in that which is most noble in themselves, viz., their intellectuality. Therefore, all angels belong to a single species.

Objection 2: Species are not diversified by the greater and the lesser. But angels seem to differ from one another only with respect to the greater and the lesser, insofar as one is more simple than another, and insofar as one has a more perspicacious intellect than another. Therefore, angels do not differ from one another in species.

Objection 3: The human soul and an angel are divided as corresponding opposites. But all human souls belong to the same species. Therefore, so do all angels.

Objection 4: The more perfect something is in its nature, the more it ought to be multiplied. But this would not be the case if there were just a single individual in a given species. Therefore, many angels belong to a given species.

But contrary to this: As *Metaphysics* 3 says, among the things that belong to the same species there is no prior and posterior. But as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 10, among angels—even among those belonging to a single order of angels—there are those who are first, those who are in the middle, and those who are last. Therefore, it is not the case that angels belong to the same species.

I respond: Some have claimed that all spiritual substances, including human souls, belong to a single species. Others, leaving aside human souls, have claimed that all angels belong to a single species. And still others have claimed that all angels in the same hierarchy or in the same order belong to a single species.

However, this is impossible. For things that agree in species while differing in number agree in their form and are distinct in their matter. Therefore, if, as was argued above (a. 2), angels are not composed of matter and form, it follows that it is impossible for two angels to belong to the same species—just as it would likewise be impossible to claim that there are many separated whitenesses or

many separated humanities. For whitenesses are many only insofar as they exist in many substances.

Yet even if angels had matter, it would still be impossible for many angels to belong to one species. For if they had matter, the principle by which one angel is distinct from another would have to be matter—not, to be sure, matter in accord with a division of quantity, since angels are incorporeal, but instead matter in accord with a diversity of powers. But this sort of diversity of matter makes for a diversity not only of species, but even of genus.

Reply to objection 1: The *difference* is more noble than the *genus* in the sense that what is determinate is more noble than what is indeterminate, and in the sense that what is proper is more noble than what is common. But this is not the sense in which one nature is more noble than another. Otherwise, either all non-rational animals would have to belong to one species or else they would all have to have another form more perfect than the sentient soul. Thus, non-rational animals differ in species according to diverse determinate grades of sentient nature. And, similarly, angels differ in species according to diverse grades of intellectual nature.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as the greater and the lesser are caused by the intensification and remission of a single form, they do not diversify species. Rather, they diversify species insofar as they are caused by forms of diverse grades, in the way that we say that fire is more perfect than air. And it is in this way that angels are diversified according to greater and lesser.

Reply to objection 3: The good of the species takes precedence over the good of the individual. Hence, it is much better that the species of angels should themselves be multiplied than that individuals should be multiplied within a single species.

Reply to objection 4: As was explained above (q. 47, a. 3), since numerical multiplication can be carried on to infinity, it is not intended by an agent—only the multiplication of species is so intended. Hence the perfection of angelic nature requires a multiplication of species and not a multiplication of individuals within a single species.

Article 5

Are angels incorruptible?

It seems that angels are not incorruptible:

Objection 1: Damascene says of the angel, “He is an intellectual substance who receives immortality by grace and not by nature.”

Objection 2: In the *Timaeus* Plato says, “O gods of the gods, whose maker and father I am, you are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I will it.” But by ‘gods’ he may mean nothing other than the angels. Therefore, angels are corruptible by their nature.

Objection 3: According to Gregory, “All things would fall into nothingness if the hand of the Almighty did not conserve them.” But whatever is able to fall into nothingness is corruptible. Therefore, since angels are made by God, it seems that they are corruptible by their nature.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Intellectual substances have unfailing life and are free from all corruption, death, matter, and generation.”

I respond: One must claim that angels are by their nature incorruptible. The reason for this is that nothing is corrupted except in virtue of the fact that its form is separated from its matter. Hence, since, as is clear from what has been said (aa. 1 and 2), an angel is a subsistent form, it is impossible for his substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to a thing with respect to its very self (*secundum se*) can never be separated from it, whereas what belongs to it through something else (*per aliud*) can be

separated from it when that in virtue of which that thing belongs to it is itself separated. For instance, roundness cannot be separated from a circle, since roundness belongs to the circle with respect to its very self, whereas a bronze circle can lose its roundness by virtue of the circular shape's being separated from the bronze.

Now *esse* belongs to a form *with respect to its very self*, since each thing is a being in actuality insofar as it has a form. Matter, by contrast, is a being in actuality *through* its form. Therefore, that which is composed of matter and form can cease to exist in actuality by virtue of the fact that its form is separated from its matter. But if the form itself subsists in its own *esse*—which, as has been explained (a. 2), is the case with angels—then it cannot lose its *esse*.

Therefore, the very immateriality of an angel is the reason why an angel is incorruptible by his nature. And an indication of this incorruptibility can be taken from the angel's intellectual operation. For since each thing operates insofar as it is actual, a thing's operation indicates the mode of its *esse*. Now the species and nature of an operation is grasped through its object. But an intelligible object, since it lies beyond time, is everlasting (*sempiternum*). Hence, every intellectual substance is incorruptible by its nature.

Reply to objection 1: Damascene has in mind *perfect* immortality, which includes every type of immutability, since, as Augustine puts it, every change is a sort of death. But as will be explained below (q. 62, a. 2), angels attain perfect immutability only through grace.

Reply to objection 2: By 'gods' here Plato means the celestial bodies, which he took to be composed of the elements and thus dissoluble by their nature, though always conserved in *esse* by God's will.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 44, a. 1), there are some necessary beings that have a cause of their necessity. Hence, it is not impossible for a necessary or incorruptible being to have its *esse* depend on another as its cause. Thus, the claim that all things, even angels, would fall into nothingness if they were not maintained by God should be understood to imply not that there is some principle of corruption within angels, but rather that the *esse* of an angel depends on God as its cause. For something is said to be corruptible not because God can reduce it to non-being by withdrawing His act of conserving it, but rather because it has within itself a principle of corruption, either some sort of contrariety or at least the potentiality of matter.

QUESTION 51

The Relation of Angels to Bodies

The next thing to ask about is the relation of angels to corporeal things. We ask, first, about the relation of angels to bodies (question 51); second, about the relation of angels to places (question 52); and, third, about the relation of angels to local motion (question 53).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Do angels have bodies that are naturally united to them? (2) Do angels assume bodies? (3) Do angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies?

Article 1

Do angels have bodies that are naturally united to them?

It seems that angels have bodies that are naturally united to them:

Objection 1: In *Peri Archon* Origen says, “Only God—that is, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—is such that it is proper to His nature that He is understood to exist without a material substance and without any commerce with a corporeal appendage.” Again, in *Homilia Super Canticum Canticorum* 6 Bernard says, “Let us grant incorporeality, as we do immortality, only to God, whose nature alone is in no need of the help of a corporeal instrument either for His own sake or for the sake of another. By contrast, it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal assistance.” Again, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says, “The demons are called animals of air (*animalia aëria*) because by nature they are like airy bodies.” But the nature of the demons is the same as the nature of the angels. Therefore, angels have bodies that are naturally united to them.

Objection 2: In his homily for the feast of the Epiphany Gregory calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of a body and a soul. Therefore, angels have bodies that are naturally united to them.

Objection 3: Life is had more perfectly by angels than by souls. Yet the soul is not only living, but also gives life to the body. Therefore, angels give life to bodies that are naturally united to them.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Angels are understood to be incorporeal.”

I respond: Angels do not have bodies that are naturally united to them. For what happens incidentally to a nature is not found always and everywhere in that nature. For instance, *having wings* does not belong to every animal because it is not part of the nature *animal*. But since, as will become clear below (q. 75, a. 2), an act of intellective understanding (*intelligere*) is not the act of a body or of any corporeal power, *having a body united to itself* is not part of the nature *intellectual substance* as such, but rather accrues to some intellectual substances for the sake of something else. For instance, *being united to a body* belongs to the human soul because the human soul is imperfect and exists in potentiality within the genus *intellectual substance*, not having the fullness of knowledge within its nature, but instead, as will be explained below (q. 84, a. 6 and q. 89, a. 1), acquiring knowledge from sensible things through the corporeal senses.

Now if in a given genus there is something imperfect, then something perfect must exist in that same genus. Therefore, within the genus *intellectual nature* there are some perfect intellectual substances that do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Therefore, not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; instead, some of them are separate from bodies. And these are the intellectual substances we call angels.

Reply to objection 1: As was noted above (q. 50, a. 1), some have held the opinion that every entity is a body. And this belief seems to have led others to think that there are no incorporeal substances

unless they are united to bodies—so much so that, as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 7, some even claimed that God is the soul of the world. However, since this is incompatible with the Catholic Faith, which claims that God is exalted above all things, in keeping with Psalm 8:2 (“Your magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens”), Origen, refusing to make this claim about God, followed the opinion of the others about substances other than God. Here, as in many other matters, he was deceived in following the opinions of the ancient philosophers.

Now the passage from Bernard can be understood to be claiming not that created spirits need a corporeal instrument that is naturally united to them, but that instead, as will be explained below (a. 2), they need a corporeal instrument that is assumed for some purpose.

On the other hand, Augustine is not speaking assertively here; rather, he is making use of the opinion of the Platonists, who posited certain airy animals that they called ‘demons’ (*daemones*).

Reply to objection 2: Here Gregory is calling an angel a rational animal metaphorically, because of the angel’s likeness to reason.

Reply to objection 3: To give life as an efficient cause is an absolute perfection. Hence, it belongs especially to God, according to 1 Kings 2:6 (“The Lord kills and gives life”).

However, to give life as a formal cause belongs to a substance that is part of some nature and does not have the whole nature of the species within itself. Hence, an intellectual substance that is not united to a body is more perfect than one that is united to a body.

Article 2

Do angels assume bodies?

It seems that angels do not assume bodies:

Objection 1: There is nothing superfluous in an angel’s work, just as there is nothing superfluous in a work of nature. But it would be superfluous for angels to assume bodies, since an angel does not need a body, given that his power exceeds every corporeal power. Therefore, angels do not assume bodies.

Objection 2: Every instance of assuming a thing (*assumptio*) terminates in some sort of union, since to assume (*assumere*) means ‘to take up to oneself’ (*ad se sumere*). But as has been explained (a. 1), a body is not united to an angel in the sense that the angel is the form of the body. Moreover, a body’s being united to an angel in the sense that the angel moves the body is not the same as the body’s being assumed by an angel; otherwise, it would follow that all the bodies moved by angels are assumed by them. Therefore, angels do not assume bodies.

Objection 3: Angels do not assume bodies made of earth or water, since then they would not disappear suddenly. Nor, again, do angels assume bodies made of fire, since then they would burn things that they touched. Nor, yet again, do angels assume bodies made of air, since air cannot have a shape or a color. Therefore, angels do not assume bodies.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 16 Augustine says that angels in assumed bodies appeared to Abraham.

I respond: Some have claimed that angels never assume bodies, but that instead all the things we read in the divine Scriptures about the apparitions of angels have occurred in prophetic visions, i.e., in the imagination.

However, this view is incompatible with the intent of the Scriptures. For that which is seen in an imaginative vision exists just in the imagination of the one who has the vision and so is not seen

generally by everyone. But the divine Scriptures sometimes introduce the appearances of angels in such a way that the angels are seen by everyone. For instance, the angels who appeared to Abraham (Genesis 18-19) were seen by him, by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom. Similarly, the angel who appeared to Tobias (Tobit 5ff.) was seen by everyone. Hence, it is clear that occurrences of this sort involved corporeal vision, in which what one sees is something existing outside of the seer, and so it can be seen by everyone. But only a body is seen by such a vision. Therefore, since, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1 and q. 50, a. 1), angels are not bodies and do not have bodies naturally united to them, it follows that they sometimes assume bodies.

Reply to objection 1: Angels need an assumed body not for their own sake, but rather for our sake, so that by living on familiar terms with men, they might indicate the sort of intellectual companionship that men expect to have with them in the life to come.

In addition, the fact that angels assumed bodies in the Old Testament was a sort of figurative indication that the Word of God would assume a human body. For all their appearances in the Old Testament were ordered toward that appearance by which the Son of God appeared in the flesh.

Reply to objection 2: An assumed body is united to an angel not in such a way that the angel is its form or even just its mover, but rather in such a way that the angel is a mover who is represented through the assumed movable body. For just as the properties of intelligible things are described in Sacred Scripture by likenesses drawn from sensible things, so too, by God's power, sensible bodies are formed by angels in such a way as to represent the intelligible properties of an angel. And this is what it is for an angel to assume a body.

Reply to objection 3: Even though air does not have a shape or a color as long as it remains rarified, nonetheless, when it is condensed, it can have a shape and a color, as is clear in the case of clouds. And so angels assume a body made of air by condensing it through God's power as much as is necessary for forming the body that is going to be assumed.

Article 3

Do angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies?

It seems that angels exercise life functions (*opera vitae*) in their assumed bodies.

Objection 1: Deception does not befit angels of truthfulness. But it would be a deception if the body which they have assumed and which seems to be alive and to have life functions did not have functions of this sort. Therefore, angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies.

Objection 2: There is nothing without a purpose in the works of an angel. But the eyes and ears and other sensory instruments would be formed without purpose in the body assumed by an angel if the angel did not sense anything through them. Therefore, an angel senses through his assumed body, and this is an especially characteristic life function.

Objection 3: As is clear from *De Anima 2*, one of the life functions is to move around. But angels clearly move around in their assumed bodies. For Genesis 18:16 says that "Abraham walked along with them," giving directions to the angels who had appeared to him. And when Tobias asked, "Do you know the way to the city of the Medes?" the angel responded, "I do know the way, and I have often walked all its streets." Therefore, angels often exercise life functions in their assumed bodies.

Objection 4: Speaking is a life function, since it is done by means of the voice, which is a sound enunciated by the mouth of an animal, as *De Anima 2* puts it. But it is clear from many places in Scripture that angels spoke in their assumed bodies. Therefore, they exercise life functions in their

assumed bodies.

Objection 5: To eat is a function proper to an animal. Thus, as the last chapter of Luke tells us, the Lord ate with his disciples after the resurrection as a proof of His resumed life. But the angels who appeared in assumed bodies ate, and Genesis 18:2 says that Abraham offered them food after he had bowed down (*adoraverat*) before them. Therefore, angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies.

Objection 6: To generate a man is a life function (*actus vitae*). But this action belongs to angels in their assumed bodies. For Genesis 6:4 says, “After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, they brought forth children, and these are the mighty men of old, men of renown.” Therefore, angels exercise life functions in their assumed bodies.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (a. 2), the bodies assumed by angels are not alive. Therefore, the angels cannot exercise life functions through those bodies.

I respond: Certain life functions have something in common with other kinds of operations. For instance, speaking, which is a life function, has something in common with other sounds that are made by inanimate things insofar as it is a sound, and walking has something in common with other movements insofar as it is a movement. Therefore, with respect to what is common to both sorts of operations, life functions can be exercised by angels through their assumed bodies. However, this is not the case with respect to what is proper to living things, since, according to the Philosopher in *De Somno et Vigilia*, an action belongs to that which has the power for it. Hence, nothing can have a life function if it does not have life, which is the principle of power for such an action.

Reply to objection 1: It is not contrary to truthfulness that intelligible things are described in Scripture by sensible figures. For this is not done in order to suggest that the intelligible things are sensible things; rather, it is through figures drawn from the sensible things that the properties of the intelligible things are understood by way of a certain likeness.

So, too, it is not incompatible with the truthfulness of the holy angels that the bodies assumed by them should seem to be living men even though they are not. For these bodies are assumed only in order that the angels’ spiritual properties and their spiritual operations might be depicted by means of human properties and human operations. This would not be done as appropriately if they assumed real men, since the properties of those men would lead us to think of the men themselves and not of the angels.

Reply to objection 2: Sensation is exclusively a life function, and hence one cannot in any way claim that angels have sensation through the organs of their assumed bodies. And yet it is not the case that these assumed bodies are formed for no purpose. For they are formed not in order for the angels to sense through them, but rather in order for the spiritual powers of the angels to be depicted by means of organs of the sort in question. For instance, as Dionysius teaches in the last chapter of *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, an angel’s cognitive power is depicted by means of the eye, and his other powers are depicted by means of other parts of the assumed body.

Reply to objection 3: Movement that has a conjoined mover as its source is a proper life function. But this is not the way in which the bodies angels assume are moved by them, since angels are not the forms of those bodies. Still, the angels are moved *per accidens* when their assumed bodies are moved, since the angels exist in the bodies as movers in movable things, and so they are here [where the bodies are] and nowhere else—something that cannot be said of God. Hence, even though God is not moved when the things in which He exists are moved (for He is everywhere), angels are moved *per accidens* with the movement of their assumed bodies.

However, angels are not moved with the movement of the celestial bodies, even if they exist in them as movers in movable things. The reason is that the celestial bodies do not completely leave a place, and the spirit who moves a sphere does not have a place (*locus*) in any determinate part of the

substance of the sphere, given that any such determinate part is now in the east and now in the west; rather, the spirit has a set position (*situm*), since, as *Physics* 8 says, the moving power is always in the east.

Reply to objection 4: Strictly speaking, angels do not speak through their assumed bodies. However, there is something like speech insofar as they produce sounds in the air that are similar to human words.

Reply to objection 5: Again, angels do not eat, properly speaking. For eating implies the ingestion of food that can be converted into the substance of the eater. And even though food was not converted into the body of Christ after His resurrection, but was instead resolved into its preexisting matter, still, Christ had a body of such a nature that food could be converted into it, and so His was a true eating. By contrast, the food taken by the angels was not converted into the assumed body, and the assumed body was not of such a nature that food could be converted into it. Hence, theirs was not a true eating, but was instead a depiction of spiritual eating. And this is just what the angel said at Tobit 12:18-19: “When I was with you ... I seemed indeed to eat and to drink with you, but I use an invisible meat and drink.” Again, Abraham offered [the angels] food, thinking them to be men; and yet he venerated God in them, “as God is wont to be in the prophets,” according to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 16.

Reply to objection 6: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 15, “Many affirm that they know by experience—or have heard from those who know by experience—that Silvans and Fauns, whom common people call ‘Incubi’, have often presented themselves improperly to women and have sought and procured sexual intercourse with them. Hence, it smacks of impudence to deny this. But the holy angels of God could not have fallen in this way before the flood. Hence, ‘the sons of God’ means the sons of Seth, who were good, whereas Scripture calls ‘the daughters of men’ those women who had been born of the race of Cain. It is no surprise that giants could have been born of them, since even though not all of them were giants, there were more of them before the flood than after it.”

However, if some of them were sometimes born from intercourse with demons, this was not through semen that came from the demons or from their assumed bodies; rather, it was through semen that was taken from some man for this purpose, so that the same demon who was a ‘Succubus’ to the man became an ‘Incubus’ to the woman—in the way that, according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 3, they likewise took the seeds of other things in order to generate those other things. The upshot is that the one who is born is not the demon’s son, but instead the son of the man whose semen was taken.

QUESTION 52

The Relation of an Angel to Places

The next thing to ask about is an angel's place. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Does an angel exist in a place? (2) Can an angel be in more than one place at the same time? (3) Can more than one angel be in the same place?

Article 1

Does an angel exist in a place?

It seems that an angel does not exist in a place.

Objection 1: In *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius says, "Among the wise, the common view of the soul is that incorporeal things do not exist in a place." And in *Physics* 4 Aristotle says, "Not everything that exists exists in a place, but only movable bodies do." But as was shown above (q. 50, a. 1), an angel is not a body. Therefore, an angel does not exist in a place.

Objection 2: A place is a quantity that has a position (*positio*). Therefore, everything that exists in a place has some position (*situm*). But *having a position* cannot belong to angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, a proper difference of which is *having a position*. Therefore, an angel does not exist in a place.

Objection 3: As is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 4, to exist in a place is to be measured by the place and to be contained by the place. But an angel can be neither measured nor contained by a place, since, as *Physics* 4 says, that which contains is more form-like (*formalius*) than that which is contained, in the sense in which air is more form-like than water. Therefore, an angel does not exist in a place.

But contrary to this: A Collect [at Compline] says, "May Your holy angels, who live in this dwelling, preserve us in peace."

I respond: It belongs to angels to exist in a place, though an angel and a body are said to exist in a place in different senses. For a body exists in a place in virtue of being applied to the place through the contact had by its dimensional quantity (*quantitas dimensiva*). This is not so in the case of angels; instead, they have quantity of power (*quantitas virtutis*). Thus, it is through the application of an angel's power in some way or other to a given place that the angel is said to exist in a corporeal place.

Accordingly, it is clear that an angel should not be said to be measured by his place or to have a position within a continuum, since these features belong to a located body insofar as it is a quantum through its dimensional quantity.

Again, an angel should likewise not be said to be contained by his place. For an incorporeal substance that touches a corporeal thing by its power contains that corporeal thing and is not contained by it. For instance, the soul exists in the body as something that contains the body and not as something that is contained by the body. Similarly, an angel is said to exist in a corporeal place not as a thing contained by the place, but rather as a thing that in some sense contains the place.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

Article 2

Can an angel be in more than one place at the same time?

It seems that an angel can be in more than one place at the same time:

Objection 1: An angel does not have less power than a soul does. But the soul is able to be in more than one place at the same time, since, as Augustine says, it exists as a whole in each part of the body. Therefore, an angel can be in more than one place at the same time.

Objection 2: An angel exists in a body that he assumes, and when he assumes a continuous body, he seems to exist in each part of it. But diverse places are thought of as corresponding to the parts of the body. Therefore, an angel exists in more than one place at the same time.

Objection 3: Damascene says that angels exist where they operate. But as is clear in the case of the angel who destroyed Sodom (Genesis 19:25), sometimes an angel operates in more than one place at the same time. Therefore, an angel can exist in more than one place at the same time.

But contrary to this: Damascene says that when angels are in heaven, they are not on earth.

I respond: An angel has finite power and a finite essence. By contrast, God's power and essence are infinite, and He is a universal cause of all things; and so He touches all things by His power, and He exists not just in more than one place, but everywhere. By contrast, since an angel's power is finite, it extends only to a single determinate thing and not to all things. For whatever is related to a single power must be related to it as a single thing. Therefore, just as the totality of being is related to God's universal power as a single thing, so too a particular being is related as a single thing to an angel's power. Hence, since an angel exists in a place through the application of his power to that place, it follows that he is in just one place and not everywhere or even in more than one place.

However, certain authors have made a mistake about this. For some, unable to transcend the imagination, thought that an angel's indivisibility is like the indivisibility of a point, and hence they believed that an angel could exist only in a point-sized place (*in loco punctuali*).

However, they were manifestly mistaken. For a point is an indivisible that has a position, whereas an angel is an indivisible that is outside the genus of quantity and the genus of position. Hence, it is not necessary for an angel to be limited to a single indivisible place as far as his position is concerned; instead, his place may be either divisible or indivisible and either greater or smaller, depending upon whether he voluntarily applies his power to a bigger body or a smaller one. And so the whole body to which he is applied through his power is related to him as a single place.

And even if a given angel moves a celestial body, it is not necessary for him to be everywhere. For, first of all, his power is applied only to that which is primarily moved by him, and there is just one part of a celestial body, viz., the eastern part, in which the motion primarily exists. Hence, in *Physics* 8 the Philosopher likewise attributes the power of the mover of a celestial body to the eastern part. Second, philosophers do not hold that a single separated substance is an immediate mover of all the spheres. Thus, it is not necessary that the angel should be everywhere.

So, then, it is clear that place belongs in different ways to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body exists in a place *circumscriptively* (*circumscriptive*), since it is measured by the place. An angel, on the other hand, does not exist in a place circumscriptively, since he is not measured by the place; instead, an angel exists in a place *definitively* (*definitive*), since he exists in one place in such a way that he does not exist in some other place. Finally, God exists in a place neither circumscriptively nor definitively, since He exists everywhere.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The reply to the objections is easily seen from what has been said. For the whole to which an angel's power is immediately applied counts as his

single place, even if that whole is a continuum.

Article 3

Can more than one angel be in the same place at the same time?

It seems that more than one angel can be in the same place at the same time:

Objection 1: The reason that not more than one body can be in the same place at the same time is that bodies fill their place. But angels do not fill their place, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 4, only a body fills a place in such a way that the place is not empty. Therefore, more than one angel can be in the same place at the same time.

Objection 2: An angel differs from a body more than two angels differ from one another. But an angel and a body can both be in the same place at the same time, since, as *Physics* 4 proves, there is no place that is not filled with a sensible body. Therefore, *a fortiori*, two angels can be in the same place.

Objection 3: According to Augustine, the soul exists in every part of the body. But demons, even if they do not penetrate minds, do sometimes penetrate bodies, and in such a case the soul and the demon are in the same place at the same time. By the same line of reasoning, then, any other spiritual substances can be in the same place at the same time.

But contrary to this: It is not the case that two souls exist in the same body. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it is not the case that two angels are in the same place.

I respond: It is not the case that two angels are in the same place at the same time. The reason for this is that it is impossible for there to be two complete and immediate causes of one and the same thing. This is clear in every genus of cause. For instance, there is a single proximate form of a single thing; and there is a single proximate mover, even though there can be more than one remote mover. Nor is the case of several men dragging a boat a counterexample, since none of the men is a complete mover, given that the power of each of them is insufficient to move the boat. Rather, all of them together take the place of a single mover insofar as all their powers are brought together to produce a single movement.

Hence, since, as has been explained (a. 1), an angel is said to exist in a place by virtue of the fact that his power immediately touches the place in the manner of something that completely contains the place, there can be only one angel in a single place.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, what prevents there from being more than one angel in the same place has to do with something other than the filling of the place.

Reply to objection 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way, and thus the argument does not go through.

Reply to objection 3: A demon and a soul are not related to a body by the same causal relation. For the soul is the form of the body, but the demon is not. Hence, the argument does not go through.

QUESTION 53

An Angel's Local Motion

The next thing to consider is the local motion of angels. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Can an angel have local motion? (2) Does an angel move from one place to another by passing through the middle? (3) Does an angel's motion take time (*est in tempore*) or is it instantaneous (*est in instanti*)?

Article 1

Can an angel have local motion?

It seems that an angel cannot have local motion (*moveri localiter*):

Objection 1: As the Philosopher proves in *Physics* 6, nothing without parts is moved. For when a thing is at a *terminus a quo*, it is not being moved; and, likewise, when it is at a *terminus ad quem*, it is not being moved but has by that time already been changed. Hence, it follows that everything that is moved is such that while it is being moved, it is partly at a *terminus a quo* and partly at a *terminus ad quem*. But an angel is without parts. Therefore, an angel cannot have local motion.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 3 explains, movement is an act of what is imperfect. But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Therefore, a beatified angel does not have local motion.

Objection 3: Movement exists only because of some need. But the holy angels have no such need. Therefore, the holy angels do not have local motion.

But contrary to this: A beatified angel's being moved is the same in nature as a beatified soul's being moved. But one must say that a beatified soul has local motion, since it is an article of the Faith that Christ descended into hell with respect to his soul. Therefore, a beatified angel has local motion.

I respond: A beatified angel can have local motion. However, just as *being in a place* belongs in different ways to a body and to an angel, so too with *being moved with respect to place*.

For a body exists in a place insofar as it is contained by that place and is measured by it. Hence, the local motion of a body must likewise be measured by place and satisfy its requirements. This is why the continuity of movement derives from the continuity of magnitude, and also why, as *Physics* 4 puts it, *before* and *after* in a body's local motion stems from *before* and *after* in a magnitude.

By contrast, an angel exists in a place not as a thing measured and contained by the place, but rather as a thing that contains the place. Hence, an angel's local motion need not be measured by its place, and it does not have to satisfy the requirements of place in the sense of deriving continuity from its place; instead, it is a non-continuous movement. For since, as has been explained (q. 52, a. 1), an angel exists in a place only by a contact of power, the angel's movement in place must be nothing other than his having diverse contacts with diverse places successively rather than simultaneously—for, as was explained above (q. 52, a. 2), an angel cannot be in more than one place at the same time—and successive contacts of this sort need not be continuous.

Still, it is possible for a sort of continuity to be found in these contacts. For, as has been explained (q. 52, a. 2), nothing prevents an angel from having a divisible place through contact with his power, just as a body has a divisible place through contact with its magnitude. Hence, just as a body leaves a place it previously occupied successively and not all at once, and just as there is continuity in its local motion because of this, so too an angel can successively leave a divisible place he previously occupied, and in that case his local motion will be continuous. Yet he is also able to leave the entire place all at once and apply himself all at once to some entirely different place, and in that case his movement will not be continuous.

Reply to objection 1: There are two respects in which this argument fails in what it intends to do.

First of all, Aristotle's demonstration has to do with a *quantitative* indivisible, and what corresponds to a quantitative indivisible is necessarily an indivisible place—something that cannot be said of an angel.

Second, Aristotle's demonstration has to do with continuous movement. For if the movement were not continuous, then one could claim that a thing is being moved both when it is at a *terminus a quo* and when it is at a *terminus ad quem*, since the very succession of diverse places with respect to the same thing would be called a movement (*quia ipsa successio diversorum ubi circa eandem rem motus diceretur*). Hence, whichever of the places the thing existed in, one could say that it was being moved. However, the continuity of the movement prevents this, since, as is obvious, nothing continuous exists in its terminus; for instance, a line does not exist in its endpoint (*linea non est in puncto*). And so that which is being moved must not be totally in either terminus while it is being moved; rather, it must be partly in the one terminus and partly in the other.

Therefore, to the extent that an angel's movement is non-continuous, Aristotle's demonstration does not prove what it intends to. On the other hand, to the extent that a given movement of an angel is posited as continuous, one can concede that while the angel is moving, he is partly in a *terminus a quo* and partly in a *terminus ad quem* (though the partialness in question has to do with the angel's place and not with his substance). For at the beginning of his continuous movement, the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to move, whereas when he is in the very condition of moving, he is in a part of the first place, which he is leaving, and in a part of the second place, which he is taking possession of. And the reason why it belongs to the angel to be able to occupy parts of two places is that he is able to occupy a divisible place through the application of his power in just the way that a body is able to do so through the application of its magnitude. Hence, it follows in the case of a body movable with respect to place that it is divisible with respect to its magnitude, whereas it follows in the case of an angel that his power can be applied to something divisible.

Reply to objection 2: It is the movement of what exists in potentiality that is the act of what is imperfect. But a movement that occurs by an application of power belongs to what exists in actuality, since the power of a thing exists insofar as that thing is actual.

Reply to objection 3: The movement of what exists in potentiality occurs because of its own need, whereas the movement of what exists in actuality occurs not because of its own need, but because of the need of another. And in this sense an angel has local motion because of our need—this according to Hebrews 1:14 (“Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?”).

Article 2

Does an angel pass through the middle in moving from one place to another?

It seems that an angel does not pass through the middle (*transeat per medium*) in moving from one place to another:

Objection 1: Everything that passes through the middle passes through a place equal to itself before passing through a greater place. But the place equal to an angel, who is indivisible, is a point-sized place. Therefore, if in his movement the angel passes through the middle, then he must number infinitely many points by his movement—which is impossible.

Objection 2: An angel is a more simple substance than our soul is. But our soul can pass in

thought from one endpoint to another without passing through the middle. For instance, I can think of France and afterwards of Syria without thinking at all about Italy, which lies between them. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel can pass from one endpoint to the other without passing through the middle.

But contrary to this: If an angel moves from one place to another, then when he is at the *terminus ad quem*, he is not moving but has already been changed. But every instance of having-being-changed is preceded by an instance of being-changed. Therefore, there was some place such that he was moving when he was there. But he was not moving when he was at the *terminus a quo*. Therefore, he was moving when he was in the middle. And so it must be that he passes through the middle.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), an angel's local motion can be either continuous or non-continuous.

If his motion is continuous, then the angel cannot move from one endpoint to the other without passing through the middle. For as *Physics* 5 says, the middle is what a continuously changing thing arrives at before arriving at the last terminus (*ultimum*) into which it is changing. And, as *Physics* 4 says, the ordering of *before* and *after* in a continuous movement corresponds to the ordering of *before* and *after* in a magnitude.

On the other hand, if the angel's movement is non-continuous, then it is possible for him to pass from one endpoint to the other without having passed through the middle. This is clear as follows:

Between any two end-places there are infinitely many places in the middle, regardless of whether these places are thought of as divisible or indivisible.

This is obvious in the case of *indivisible* places. For given any two points, there are infinitely many points in between them, since, as *Physics* 6 proves, no two points follow one another without there being points in between them.

Moreover, it is still necessary to say this even in the case of *divisible* places. This is proved from the continuous motion of a given body. For a body does not move from one place to another unless this takes time. But in the whole time that measures the movement of the body one cannot designate two *nows* at which the moving body is not in two different places, since if it were in one and the same place at two *nows*, then it would be at rest in that place. For to be at rest is nothing other than to be in the same place both now and before now. Therefore, since there are infinitely many *nows* between the first *now* and the last *now* of the time that measures the motion, there must be infinitely many places between the first place, from which the movement begins, and the last place, at which the movement is terminated.

This is obvious even to the senses. For instance, let there be a body the size of the palm of one's hand, and let there be a path through which it passes that is the size of the two palms together. It is clear that the first place, from which the movement begins, is the size of the one palm, and that the place at which the movement is terminated is the size of the other palm. Now it is clear that when the body begins to move, it leaves the first palm little by little and enters the second palm. Therefore, to the extent that the palm's magnitude is divided, the places in the middle are multiplied, since any designated point in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a determinate point in the magnitude of the other palm is the terminus of that same place. Hence, since the magnitude is divisible *ad infinitum*, and since, likewise, infinitely many points exist in potentiality in any magnitude, it follows that between any two places there are infinitely many places in the middle.

Now a movable thing completely covers (*consumit*) the infinitely many places in the middle only through the continuity of its movement. For just as the places in the middle are infinitely many in potentiality, so, too, in a continuous movement there is a certain infinity [of parts] in potentiality. Therefore, if the movement is not continuous, then all the parts of the motion will be numbered in actuality. Therefore, if any movable thing is moved by a non-continuous movement, it follows either that (a) it does not pass through all the places in the middle or that (b) it numbers the infinitely many middle places in actuality—which is impossible.

So, then, insofar as an angel's movement is non-continuous, he does not pass through all the places in the middle. Now this feature, viz., moving from one terminus to the other without passing through the middle, can befit an angel, but not a body. For a body is measured and contained by its place, and so it must follow the 'laws of place' in its movement (*oportet quod sequatur leges loci in suo motu*). By contrast, an angel's substance is not subject to a place as something contained by that place; instead, it is superior to a place as something that contains that place. Hence, it is within an angel's power to apply himself to a place in whichever way he wishes, either by passing through the middle or without passing through the middle.

Reply to objection 1: An angel's place is understood as equal not with respect to magnitude, but with respect to a contact of power, and so an angel's place can be divisible and is not always point-sized. Still, as has been explained, the places in the middle, even if they are divisible, are infinitely many—although, as is clear from what has been said, they are completely covered because of the continuity of the movement.

Reply to objection 2: When an angel moves in place, his essence is applied to diverse places. By contrast, the soul's essence is not applied to the things it thinks of; just the opposite, the things that are thought of exist in the soul. And so the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to argument for the contrary: In a continuous movement, the having-been-changed is not a part of the being-moved, but is instead the terminus of the being-moved. Hence, the being-moved must precede the having-been-changed. And so such a movement must go through the middle.

By contrast, in a non-continuous movement, the having-been-changed counts as a part of the being-moved, in the way that *one* counts as a number (*sicut unitas est pars numeri*). Hence, such a movement is constituted by the very succession of diverse places, even without the middle.

Article 3

Is an angel's movement instantaneous?

It seems that an angel's movement is instantaneous (*in instanti*):

Objection 1: The stronger the mover's power is, and the less resistant the movable thing is to the mover, the faster the movement is. But the power of an angel who is moving himself exceeds any power that moves a body in such a way that there is no proportion between them. Now the proportion among velocities has to do with a decrease in the time, and every time has a proportion to every other time. Therefore, if a body's movement takes time (*movetur in tempore*), then an angel moves instantaneously (*movetur in instanti*).

Objection 2: An angel's movement is more simple than any corporeal change. But some corporeal changes are instantaneous—e.g., illumination, both because a thing is not illuminated progressively (*successive*) in the way that a thing becomes hotter progressively, and also because a ray of light does not reach what is closer prior to reaching what is farther away. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel's movement is instantaneous.

Objection 3: If an angel takes time to move from place to place, then it is clear that at the last instant of that time he is at the *terminus ad quem*, whereas for the whole of the preceding time he is either (a) in the immediately preceding place, which we are taking to be the *terminus a quo*, or (b) partly in the one place and partly in the other. But if he is partly in the one place and partly in the other, then it follows that he has parts—which is impossible. Therefore, in the whole of the preceding time he is at the *terminus a quo*. Therefore, he is at rest there, since, as was explained above (a. 2), to be at rest is to be in

the same place now and before now. And so it follows that he is moving only at the last instant of the time in question.

But contrary to this: In every change there is a *before* and an *after*. But the *before* and *after* of a movement are numbered by time. Therefore, every movement—even an angel's movement—takes time, since there is a *before* and an *after* in that movement.

I respond: Some have claimed that an angel's local motion is instantaneous. For they maintained that when an angel moves from one place to another, the angel is at the *terminus a quo* for the whole preceding time, whereas he is at the *terminus ad quem* at the last instant of that time. And there does not have to be any middle between the two termini, just as there is no middle between the preceding time and the terminus of that time. However, between any two *nows* of time, there is time in the middle, and so they claim that there is no last *now* at which the angel was at the *terminus a quo*—just as in illumination (or in the substantial generation of a fire) there is no last instant at which the air was dark (or at which the matter had the privation of the form of fire), but instead there is a last temporal interval (*ultimum tempus*) such that at the last instant of that temporal interval (*in ultimo illius temporis*) there is light in the air (or the form of fire in the matter). And it is in this sense that illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements.

However, this example is out of place in the present discussion. This is shown as follows:

It is part of the nature of rest that what is at rest is in the same condition now as it was before now, and so a thing at rest is in the same condition at every *now* of the time that measures the rest, whether it be the first *now* of that time, a *now* in the middle, or the last *now*. By contrast, it is part of the nature of movement that what is moving is different now from the way it was before now, and so at each of the *nows* of the time that measures the movement, the movable thing is in a different condition (*in alia et alia dispositione*), and so at the last *now* it must have a form that it did not have before that *now*. And so it is clear that to be at rest for the whole time in a given condition, e.g., the condition of being white, is to be in that condition at each instant of that time; and thus it is not possible for something to be at rest in one terminus for the whole preceding time and then to be in the other terminus at the last instant of that time. On the other hand, this is indeed possible in the case of a movement, since to be moved for some entire time is not to be in the same condition in any [two] instants of that time. Therefore, every instantaneous change of the sort in question is the terminus of a continuous movement. For instance, generation is the terminus of the alteration of the matter, and illumination is the terminus of the local motion of the illuminating body.

By contrast, an angel's local motion is not the terminus of any other continuous movement, but exists on its own (*per seipsum*) without depending on any other movement. Hence, it is impossible to claim that the angel is in one place for the whole time and in another place at the last *now*. Instead, one must designate a *now* at which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many *nows* succeeding one another, there must be time, since time is nothing other than the numbering of *before* and *after* in a movement. Hence, it follows that an angel's movement takes time—a continuous time if his movement is continuous, and a non-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous. (As has been explained (a. 1), an angel's movement can be of either type.) For as *Physics* 4 says, the continuity of time derives from the continuity of movement. But the time in question, regardless of whether or not it is continuous, is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens and by which all corporeal things that have mutability because of the movement of the heavens are themselves measured. For an angel's movement does not depend on the movement of the heavens.

Reply to objection 1: If the time of the angel's movement is not continuous, but is instead a certain succession of the *nows* themselves, then it will not be proportionate to the time that measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous. For the time of the angel's movement will not be of the same nature (cf. q. 10, a. 5).

On the other hand, if the time of the angel's movement is continuous, then it is, to be sure, proportionate, not because of a proportion between the mover and what is moved, but rather because of a proportion between the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Furthermore, the velocity of the angel's movement does not stem from the quantity of his power; instead, it stems from the determination of his will.

Reply to objection 2: Illumination is the terminus of a movement. Moreover, it is an alteration—and it is not a local motion in which the light might be thought of as moving to what is closer before moving to what is farther away. By contrast, an angel's movement is a local motion and is not the terminus of any movement. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: This objection proceeds on the assumption that time is continuous. However, the time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. And so it is possible for an angel to be in one place at one instant and in another place at another instant without there being any time in the middle (cf. q. 10, a. 5).

On the other hand, if the time of the angel's movement is continuous, then, as was explained above (a. 2), in the whole of the time preceding the last *now*, the angel goes through infinitely many places. And yet he is partly in one of the continuous places and partly in the other—not because his substance can have parts, but because, as was also explained above (a. 1), his power is applied to a part of the first place and a part of the second place.

QUESTION 54

An Angel's Cognition

Now that we have considered what pertains to an angel's substance, we must proceed to his cognition. This consideration will have four parts: we must consider, first, an angel's cognitive power (question 54); second, those matters that have to do with the medium of his knowing (question 55); third, the things known by him (questions 56-57); and, fourth, the mode of his cognition (question 58).

On the first topic there are five questions: (1) Is an angel's act of understanding the same as his substance? (2) Is an angel's *esse* the same as his act of understanding? (3) Is an angel's substance the same as his intellective power? (4) Is an angel's intellect both active and passive? (5) Is there any cognitive power in angels besides the intellect?

Article 1

Is an angel's act of understanding the same as his substance?

It seems that an angel's act of understanding (*intelligere*) is his substance:

Objection 1: An angel is more sublime and more simple than the soul's active intellect. But as is clear from Aristotle and his Commentator in *De Anima* 3, the substance of the active intellect is its own action. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel's substance is his own action, viz., his act of understanding.

Objection 2: In *Metaphysics* 12 the Philosopher says that the intellect's action is its life. But since, as *De Anima* 2 puts it, to live (*vivere*) is what it is to be (*esse*) for living things, it seems that their life is their essence. Therefore, the intellect's action is the essence of the angel who is doing the understanding.

Objection 3: If the termini are the same, then what is in the middle between them does not differ from them, since the one terminus is more distant from the other terminus than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect is the same as what is understood, at least insofar as he understands his own essence. Therefore, the act of understanding, which lies in the middle between the intellect and the thing understood, is the same as the substance of the angel who is doing the understanding.

But contrary to this: A thing's action differs from its substance more than its *esse* itself differs from its substance. But no created entity is such that its *esse* is its substance, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 3, a. 4 and q. 44, a. 1), this is proper to God alone. Therefore, it is not the case for an angel, or for any other creature, that its action is its substance.

I respond: It is impossible for the action of an angel or of any other creature to be its substance.

For an action is, properly speaking, the actualization of a power (*actualitas virtutis*), just as *esse* is the actualization of a substance or essence (*actualitas substantiae vel essentiae*). But it is impossible for anything which has an admixture of potentiality and which is not pure actuality to be its own actualization, since actualization is incompatible with potentiality. But God alone is pure actuality. Hence, it is only in the case of God that His substance is His *esse* and His acting (*agere*).

Furthermore, if an angel's act of understanding (*intelligere*) were his substance, then the angel's act of understanding would have to be subsistent. But there can be only one subsistent act of understanding, just as there could be only one abstract subsistent [whiteness] (cf. q. 7, a. 1 and q. 41, a. 6). Hence, an angel's substance would not be distinct either (a) from God's substance, which is His subsistent act of understanding itself, or (b) from the substance of any other angel.

Again, if an angel himself were his own act of understanding, then there could not be gradations with respect to more perfect and less perfect understanding, since these gradations occur because of the diverse degrees of participation had by the act of understanding itself.

Reply to objection 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own action, the predication is not an essential predication (*per essentiam*), but one of concomitance (*per concomitantiam*). For when the active intellect's substance exists in actuality, then insofar as it exists in itself, its action is immediately concomitant with it. This is not the case with the passive intellect, since it has actions only after it has been brought into act.

Reply to objection 2: The relation between *a life* (*vita*) and *to live* (*vivere*) is not like the relation between *an essence* (*essentia*) and *to be* (*esse*), but it is rather like the relation between *a run* (*cursus*) and *to run* (*currere*), the former signifying the relevant act abstractly and the latter signifying it concretely. Hence, it does not follow that if to live is what it is to be for some entity, then its life is its essence.

However, 'life' is sometimes used for an essence, as when Augustine says in *De Trinitate* that "memory and intelligence and will are one essence, one life." But this is not what the Philosopher means when he says that the intellect's action is its life.

Reply to objection 3: An action that passes into an extrinsic thing is in reality a middle ground between the agent and the subject that receives the action. By contrast, an action that remains in the agent is not in reality a middle ground between the agent and the object; instead, it is a middle ground only in the mode of signifying, whereas in reality it *follows upon* the union of the object with the agent. For from the fact that the thing understood is one with that which understands it, the act of understanding follows like an effect that differs from them both.

Article 2

Is an angel's act of understanding the same as his *esse*?

It seems that an angel's act of understanding is his *esse*:

Objection 1: As *De Anima* 2 says, to live (*vivere*) is what it is to be (*esse*) for living things. But as it says in the same place, to understand intellectually (*intelligere*) is a certain way of living. Therefore, an angel's act of understanding is his *esse*.

Objection 2: One effect is related to another in the way that the cause of the one is related to the cause of the other. But the form through which an angel exists is the same as the form through which he understands at least himself. Therefore, his act of understanding is the same as his *esse*.

But contrary to this: As is clear from *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, an angel's act of understanding is his motion (*motus*). But *esse* is not a motion. Therefore, an angel's *esse* is not his act of understanding.

I respond: The action of an angel is not his *esse*; nor is the action of any other creature its *esse*.

For as *Metaphysics* 9 says, there are two kinds of action. The first kind of action is that which passes into something external, bringing with it an instance of being acted upon (*passio*)—e.g., setting fire to something or cutting something. The second kind of action is that which does not pass into an external thing but remains within the agent himself—e.g., sensing, intellectual understanding, and willing. In this kind of action nothing external is changed; rather, everything takes place within the agent himself.

It is clear, then, that the first kind of action cannot be the agent's very *esse*. For the agent's *esse* is signified as being within the agent, whereas this kind of action is the agent's flowing forth into the thing that is acted upon.

On the other hand, the second kind of action has by its nature a certain unlimitedness (*infinitas*),

either absolutely speaking or relatively speaking:

(a) The act is unlimited, *absolutely speaking*, in the case of an act of understanding, whose object is the true, or an act of willing, whose object is the good, where both *true* and *good* are convertible with *being*. And so an act of understanding or an act of willing, taken just by itself, is related to all things, and it receives its species from its object.

(b) The act is unlimited, *relatively speaking*, in the case of an act of sensing, which is related to all sensible things; for instance, the act of seeing is related to all visible things.

However, the *esse* of each creature is limited to a single genus and species. It is the *esse* of God alone that is absolutely unlimited (*infinitum*), comprehending all things within itself, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5. Hence, it is only God's *esse* that is His act of understanding and His act of willing.

Reply to objection 1: 'To live' is sometimes taken for the very *esse* of a living thing and sometimes taken for an operation associated with life, i.e., an operation through which it is demonstrated that something is alive. It is in this latter sense that the Philosopher says that to understand is a certain way of living. For in that place he is distinguishing the different grades of living things according to the different life functions.

Reply to objection 2: An angel's essence itself exhausts the nature of his entire *esse*, but does not itself exhaust the nature of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand all things through his essence. And so it is according to his proper nature, i.e., insofar as his essence is such-and-such, that he is related to the *esse* itself of an angel, whereas he is related to his act of understanding according to the nature of a more universal object, viz., *true* or *being*.

From this it is clear that even though the form is the same in both cases, it is not a principle of being in the same way in which it is a principle of understanding. For this reason, it does not follow that in an angel the *esse* is the same as the act of understanding.

Article 3

Is an angel's intellectual power or potentiality distinct from his essence?

It seems that an angel's intellectual power or potentiality is not distinct from his essence:

Objection 1: 'Mind' and 'intellect' are names of the intellectual power. But in many places in his books Dionysius calls the angels themselves minds and intellects. Therefore, an angel is his own intellectual potentiality.

Objection 2: If an angel's intellectual potentiality is something over and beyond his essence, then it has to be an accident; for what we call an accident of a thing is something over and beyond its essence. But as Boethius says in *De Trinitate*, a simple form cannot be a subject. Therefore, an angel would not be a simple form—which is contrary to what was established above (q. 50, aa. 1 and 2).

Objection 3: In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says that God made the angelic nature close to Himself, whereas He made primary matter close to nothingness. From this it seems to follow that an angel is more simple than primary matter is, given that he is closer to God. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel is his own intellectual potentiality.

But contrary to this: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 11, Dionysius says that angels "are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore, the substance in them is one thing, the power or potentiality another thing, and the operation still another thing.

I respond: It is not true either of an angel or of any other creature that its operative power or

potentiality is the same as its essence. This is clear as follows:

Since ‘power’ or ‘potentiality’ is predicated with respect to an act, there must be a diversity of potentialities with respect to diverse acts, and because of this it is said that a thing’s proper act corresponds to its proper potentiality. Now as is clear from what was said above (a. 1 and 2, and q. 3, a. 4, and q. 44, a. 1), every created thing is such that its essence differs from its *esse* and is related to its *esse* as potentiality is related to actuality. But the act to which an operative potentiality is related is an operation. Now the act of understanding in an angel is not the same as his *esse*; nor is any other operation, either in an angel or in any other created thing, the same as the thing’s *esse*. Hence, an angel’s essence is not his intellective potentiality; nor is the essence of any created thing its operative potentiality.

Reply to objection 1: The reason that an angel is called an intellect or a mind is that all of its cognition is intellective cognition. By contrast, the [human] soul’s cognition is partly intellective and partly sentient.

Reply to objection 2: A simple form that is pure actuality cannot be the subject of any accident, since a subject is related to its accidents as potentiality is related to actuality. God alone is a simple form of this first sort, and it is this sort of form that Boethius is talking about in the cited passage.

By contrast, a simple form which is not its own *esse*, but which instead is related to its *esse* as potentiality is related to actuality, can be the subject of an accident—especially of an accident that follows upon its species, since this type of accident pertains to the form (whereas an accident that belongs to an individual and does not follow upon the whole species follows upon the matter, which is the principle of individuation). An angel is a simple form of this second sort.

Reply to objection 3: The potentiality of primary matter is a potentiality for substantial *esse* itself. However, an operative potentiality is a potentiality for accidental *esse* and not substantial *esse*. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

Article 4

Is an angel’s intellect both active and passive?

It seems that in an angel the intellect is both active (*agens*) and passive (*possibilis*):

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “Just as in every nature there is something by which it can become all things and something by which it can constitute all things, so too it is with the soul.” But an angel is a certain nature. Therefore, in an angel the intellect is both active and passive.

Objection 2: As is clear from *De Anima* 3, to receive is proper to the passive intellect, whereas to illuminate is proper to the active intellect. But an angel receives illumination from a higher angel and illuminates a lower angel. Therefore, in him the intellect is both active and passive.

But contrary to this: In us the intellect is active and passive in relation to phantasms, which, as is clear from *De Anima* 3, are related (a) to the *passive* intellect in the way that colors are related to sight and (b) to the *active* intellect in the way that colors are related to light. But this is not the case with an angel. Therefore, in an angel the intellect is not both active and passive.

I respond: It was necessary to posit a *passive* intellect in us because we are sometimes understanding in potentiality and not in actuality. Hence, there must be a power which (a) is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things before the act of intellective understanding itself and which (b) is actualized with respect to those things when it comes to apprehend (*sciens*) them and, further, when it comes to inquire into (*considerans*) them. This power is called the passive intellect.

On the other hand, it was necessary to posit an *active* intellect in us because the natures of the material things that we understand intellectually do not subsist outside the soul as *actually* immaterial and intelligible; rather, they exist outside the soul only as *potentially* intelligible. And so there had to be a power that would render those natures actually intelligible. This power is called the active intellect in us.

Neither of these necessities is present in the angels. For it is not the case that they sometimes understand only in potentiality the things that they naturally understand, and it is not the case that the things they understand are intelligible only in potentiality and not in actuality. For as will become clear below (q. 56), they principally and primarily understand immaterial things. And so in angels there cannot be an active intellect or passive intellect, except by equivocation.

Reply to objection 1: As the words themselves clearly indicate, the Philosopher means that these two features exist in every nature in which it is possible for something to be generated or effected. However, in an angel knowledge is not generated (*non generatur scientia*), but is instead naturally present. Hence, it is not necessary to hold that the intellect is active and passive in them.

Reply to objection 2: The role of the agent intellect is not to illuminate another being who himself has understanding; rather, it is to 'illuminate' *things* that are potentially intelligible, and it does this by rendering them actually intelligible through abstraction. On the other hand, it is the role of the passive intellect (a) to be in potentiality with respect to things that are naturally knowable (*respectu naturalium cognoscibilium*) and (b) sometimes to be brought into act.

Hence, the fact that one angel illuminates another has nothing to do with the notion of the active intellect. Nor is it relevant to the notion of the passive intellect that an angel is illuminated about supernatural mysteries which he at some point is in potentiality to knowing. Still, if someone insists on calling this an active and passive intellect, then he will be speaking equivocally and we should not fuss over the names.

Article 5

Is there just intellective cognition in angels?

It seems that there is not just intellective cognition in angels:

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 8 Augustine says angels have a life of understanding and sensing. Therefore, there is a sentient power in angels.

Objection 2: Isidore says that angels have learned many things through experience. But as *Metaphysics* 1 says, experience comes from many memories. Therefore, there is also a power of memory in angels.

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that in the demons there are perverted fantasies. But fantasies pertain to the power of imagination. Therefore, there is a power of imagination in the demons, and for the same reason in the angels, since they have the same nature as the demons.

But contrary to this: In his homily for the feast of the Ascension Gregory says that man senses with the brutes and thinks with the angels.

I respond: In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised through corporeal organs, and powers of this sort are acts of certain parts of the body; for instance, the act of seeing is in the eye, and the act of hearing is in the ear. On the other hand, there are powers of our soul, e.g., intellect and will, whose operations are not exercised through corporeal organs, and these are not acts of any part

of the body.

Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 51, a. 1), angels do not have bodies naturally united to them. Hence, the only powers of the soul that can belong to them are intellect and will. The Commentator likewise says in *Metaphysics* 12 that separated substances are divided into intellect and will. Furthermore, it befits the order of the universe that the highest intellectual creature should be completely intellective—and not just partly intellective, as our soul is. As was pointed out above (a. 3), this is why angels are called intellects and minds.

Reply to the objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: There are two possible replies to the objections in support of the contrary position.

First, one can reply that these passages are talking in accord with the opinion of those who had claimed that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books, even though he does not mean to assert it. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 21 he says that one should not spend much effort on this inquiry.

Second, one can reply that these and similar passages are to be interpreted according to certain likenesses.

For instance, since the senses apprehend their proper sensibles with certitude, we are likewise commonly said to ‘have a strong feeling’ (*sentit*) about what is apprehended with certitude by the intellect. This is also called ‘a strong sentiment’ (*sententia*).

Again, ‘experience’ can be attributed to the angels because of a likeness in the things that are known, even if not because of a likeness in the relevant cognitive power. For we ourselves have experience when we know singular things through sensation, whereas Angels likewise know singular things, though not through sensation, as will become clear below (q. 57, a. 2). And yet memory can be posited in the angels to the extent that Augustine posits memory in the mind—even though memory cannot belong to them insofar as it is posited as a part of the sentient soul.

Similarly, one should say that ‘perverted fantasies’ are attributed to the demons in virtue of the fact that they have a false practical estimation of the true good, while in our case deception properly arises from the imagination, because of which we sometimes cling to the likenesses of things as if they were the things themselves, as is clear in the case of people who are dreaming or hallucinating.

QUESTION 55

The Medium of Angelic Cognition

The next thing to ask about is the medium of angelic cognition. On this topic there are three questions: (1) Do angels have cognition of all things through their own substance or through intelligible species? (2) If they have cognition through intelligible species, are these species connatural to them, or are they instead received from the things themselves? (3) Do higher angels have cognition through species that are more universal than those of lower angels?

Article 1

Do angels have cognition of all things through their own substance?

It seems that angels have cognition of all things through their own substance:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says that angels know the things that exist on earth through the proper nature of their mind. But an angel's nature is his essence. Therefore, an angel has cognition of these things through his own essence.

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12 and *De Anima* 3, in things which exist without matter, the intellect is the same as that which is understood. But that which is understood is the same as the one who understands it by reason of that by which it is understood. Therefore, in things, like the angels, which exist without matter, that by which things are understood is the very substance of the one who understands.

Objection 3: Everything that exists in another exists in it according to the mode of that in which it exists. But an angel has an intellective nature. Therefore, whatever exists in an angel exists in him in an intelligible mode (*per modum intelligibilem*). But all things exist in an angel, since among beings the lower ones exist in the essence of the higher ones, whereas the higher ones exist in the lower ones by participation; this is why Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, that God gathers together the whole within the whole, i.e., all things in all things. Therefore, an angel has cognition of all things in his own substance.

But contrary to this: In the same chapter Dionysius says that angels are illuminated by the notions of things (*rationes rerum*). Therefore, they have cognition of things through these notions and not through their own substance.

I respond: That by which an intellect understands is related to the understanding intellect as its form, since a form is that by which an agent acts. But in order for a power to be brought to complete fulfillment by a form, all the things to which that power extends must be contained under that form. Hence, the reason why among corruptible things the form does not bring the matter's potentiality to complete fulfillment is that the matter's potentiality extends to more things than are contained under this or that form.

Now an angel's intellective power extends to the understanding of all things, since the object of an intellect is *being* or *true* in general. But an angel's essence does not include all things within itself, since it is an essence limited to a genus and a species. Rather, it is proper to God's essence, which is unlimited, that it should perfectly comprehend all things within itself, absolutely speaking. And so God alone has cognition of all things through His essence. By contrast, an angel cannot have cognition of all things through his essence; rather, his intellect must be brought to fulfillment by intelligible species in order for him to have cognition of things.

Reply to objection 1: When it is said that an angel has cognition of things through his own nature, the word 'through' is referring not to the medium of cognition, which is a likeness of the thing known,

but rather to the cognitive power that belongs to an angel by his nature.

Reply to objection 2: Just as, according to *De Anima* 3, a sense organ in act is the sensible thing in act—not in the sense that the sentient power is itself the very likeness of the sensible thing that exists in the sense organ, but rather in the sense that something unified is fashioned from the likeness and the organ as from an actuality and a potentiality—so, too, the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act—not because the substance of the intellect is itself the very likeness through which it understands, but because that likeness is the form of the intellect. Now to say that in those things which exist without matter, the intellect is the same as what is understood is just to say that the intellect in act is the thing understood in act, since it is by virtue of being immaterial that a given thing is actually being understood.

Reply to objection 3: Both the things that stand lower than an angel and the things that stand higher than him exist in some sense in his essence—not, to be sure, perfectly or according to their proper notion (*secundum propriam rationem*), since an angel's essence is limited and thus distinct from other things through its proper notion, but rather according to a certain general notion (*secundum quandam rationem communem*).

By contrast, in God's essence all things exist perfectly and according to their proper notion (*sunt omnia perfecte et secundum propriam rationem*) as in the first and universal operative power from which proceeds whatever exists, be it proper or common, in any entity. And so God has a proper cognition of all things through His essence, but an angel has only a common cognition of all things through his essence and not a proper cognition.

Article 2

Do angels understand things through intelligible species received from the things themselves?

It seems that angels understand things through intelligible species received from the things themselves:

Objection 1: Everything that is understood is understood by means of some likeness of itself that exists in the one who understands. But a thing's likeness existing in another exists in that other either (a) in the manner of an *exemplar* (*per modum exemplaris*), so that the likeness is a cause of the thing in question, or (b) in the manner of an *image* (*per modum imaginis*), so that it is caused by that thing. Therefore, all the knowledge had by the one who understands must either be a cause of the thing that is understood or be caused by that thing. But an angel's knowledge is not a cause of the things that exist in nature; only God's knowledge is (cf. q. 14, a. 8). Therefore, the intelligible species by means of which the angelic intellect understands things must be received from the things themselves.

Objection 2: An angel's intellectual light is stronger than the light of the active intellect in the soul. But the active intellect's light abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore, the light of an angel's intellect can likewise abstract intelligible species from sensible things themselves. And so there is nothing to prevent one from claiming that an angel understands things through intelligible species received from the things themselves.

Objection 3: The intelligible species that exist in the intellect are related in exactly the same way to what is present and to what is distant, except to the extent that they are being received from the sensible things themselves. Therefore, if an angel did not understand things by means of intelligible species received from the things themselves, then his cognition would be related in exactly the same way both to nearby things and to distant things, and so local motion would be utterly pointless for him.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “The angels do not gather their divine knowledge from divisible or sensible things.”

I respond: The intelligible species by which angels understand things are not received from the things themselves; instead, they are connatural to the angels.

For the distinction and ordering among spiritual substances must be thought of in the same way as the distinction and ordering among corporeal substances. Now the highest bodies have a potentiality in their nature that is brought to total fulfillment by their form. By contrast, among lower bodies the potentiality of the matter is not brought to total fulfillment by the form; instead, the matter receives now one form from an agent and now another form. Similarly, the lower intellectual substances, viz., human souls, have an intellectual potentiality that is not naturally fulfilled, but is instead brought to fulfillment gradually in them by their reception of intelligible species from the things themselves. By contrast, the intellectual potentiality of the higher spiritual substances, i.e., angels, is naturally fulfilled through their intelligible species because they have connatural intelligible species for understanding all the things that they can have natural knowledge of.

This same point is also clear from the very mode of being had by substances of these types. For the lower spiritual substances, viz., souls, have *esse* that has an affinity for a body, since they are the forms of bodies. And so because of their mode of being they attain their intellectual fulfillment from bodies and through bodies; otherwise, it would be pointless for them be united to bodies. By contrast, the higher substances, i.e., angels, are totally unconnected with bodies, since they subsist immaterially and in intelligible *esse*. And so they attain their intellectual fulfillment from the intelligible outpouring through which they receive from God, along with their intellectual nature, intelligible species of the things they have cognition of. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 Augustine says, “The other beings that are lower than the angels are created in such a way that they first come to exist in a rational creature’s cognition and then come to exist in their own nature.”

Reply to objection 1: The likenesses of creatures in the mind of an angel are received not from the creatures themselves, but from God, who is the cause of creatures and in whom the likenesses of things primarily exist. Hence, in the same book Augustine says, “Just as the idea through which a creature is made exists in the Word of God before the creature itself is made, so too a cognition of that same idea first exists in an intellectual creature, and then there is the creation itself of the creature.”

Reply to objection 2: In going from one endpoint to the other, one must pass through the middle. The *esse* of forms in the imagination, which is without matter but not without material conditions, lies in the middle between (a) the *esse* of the forms that exist in matter and (b) the *esse* of the forms that exist in the intellect through abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Hence, however powerful an angel’s intellect might be, it could not give material forms intelligible *esse* unless it first gave them the *esse* of forms in the imagination. But this is impossible, since, as was explained above (q. 54, a. 5), an angel does not have imagination.

And even if we granted that an angel could abstract intelligible species from material things, he would not abstract them in any case, since he would not need them, given that he has connatural intelligible species.

Reply to objection 3: An angel’s cognition is related in exactly the same way to things that are distant with respect to place and to things that are nearby. But it does not follow that an angel’s local motion is pointless. For he moves to a place not in order to find something out, but in order to do something in that place.

Article 3

Do higher angels understand things through intelligible species that are more universal than those had by lower angels?

It seems not to be the case that higher angels understand things through intelligible species that are more universal than those had by lower angels:

Objection 1: A universal, it seems, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand things through intelligible species abstracted from the things themselves. Therefore, one cannot claim that the intelligible species of an angel's intellect are either more or less universal.

Objection 2: What is known in a specific way (*in speciali*) is known more perfectly than what is known in a universal way (*in universali*), since to know in a universal way in some sense lies between potentiality and actuality. Therefore, if higher angels have cognition of things through forms that are more universal than those had by lower angels, it follows that higher angels have a knowledge that is more imperfect than that of lower angels—which is absurd.

Objection 3: One and the same thing cannot be a proper notion (*propria ratio*) of many diverse things. But if a higher angel knows through a single universal form (*per unam formam universalem*) diverse things that a lower angel knows through several more specific forms (*per plures formas speciales*), then it follows that the higher angel is using a single universal form to know diverse things. Therefore, he could not have a proper cognition of both things—which seems absurd.

But contrary to this: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 12, Dionysius says that higher angels have a greater participation in universal knowledge than lower angels do. And the *Liber de Causis* says that higher angels have forms that are more universal.

I respond: The reason that some beings are higher is that they are closer and more similar to the one first being, viz., God. But in God the whole plenitude of intellectual cognition is contained in a single thing, viz., the divine essence, through which God knows all things. Now in created intellects this sort of intellectual plenitude is found in an inferior and less simple way. Hence, what God knows through one thing, lower intellects must know through many; and the lower the intellect is, the more things it knows them through. So, then, to the extent that an angel is higher, he is able to apprehend the universe of intelligible things through fewer intelligible species. And so his forms must be more universal, with each of them extending, as it were, to many intelligible things.

An example of this can be seen to some extent in our own case. For there are some people who cannot grasp an intelligible truth unless it is explained to them piece by piece through separate steps, and this is so because of the weakness of their intellect. By contrast, others who have a stronger intellect can grasp many things on the basis of a few.

Reply to objection 1: It is accidental to a universal that it should be abstracted from singulars; this happens insofar as the intellect that knows it receives its cognition from the things themselves. However, if there is an intellect that does not receive its cognition from the things themselves, then the universal as known by that intellect will not be abstracted from the things, but will in some way exist prior to the things—either (a) prior in the order of *causality*, in the way that the universal notions of things are contained in the Word of God, or at least (b) prior in the order of *nature*, in the way that the universal notions of things exist in the angelic intellect.

Reply to objection 2: There are two senses of 'to know something in a universal way (*in universali*)'.

The first sense, which has to do with *the thing that is known*, is that only the universal nature of that thing is known. And to know something in a universal way in this sense is less perfect. For instance,

someone would know a man less perfectly if all he knew about him was that he is an animal.

The second sense has to do with *the medium of knowing*. And in this sense it is more perfect to know something in a universal way. For if an intellect is able to know proper singulars through a single universal medium, then it is more perfect than an intellect that cannot do this.

Reply to objection 3: One and the same thing cannot be a *precisely equal* proper notion (*propria ratio adaequata*) of many things. However, if it *exceeds* them, then one and the same thing can be taken as a proper notion and likeness of many things.

For instance, in man there is such a thing as universal prudence (*universalis prudentia*) with respect to *all* acts of virtue, and this universal prudence can be taken as a proper notion and likeness of the particular sort of prudence that exists in a lion with respect to acts of magnanimity and of the particular sort of prudence that exists in a fox with respect to acts of caution, etc.

In the same way, because of its excellence, God's essence is taken as a proper notion of each thing, since it contains within itself that by reason of which each thing is assimilated to it in keeping with its proper notion. In the same way, one should say about a universal notion that exists in the mind of an angel that, because of its excellence, many things can be known through it by a proper cognition.

QUESTION 56

An Angel's Cognition of Immaterial Things

The next thing to ask about is the cognition of angels as regards the things that they have cognition of. We ask, first, about their cognition of immaterial things (question 56) and, second, about their cognition of material things (question 57).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Does an angel have cognition of himself? (2) Does one angel have cognition of another? (3) Does an angel have cognition of God through his natural powers (*per sua naturalia cognoscat Deum*)?

Article 1

Does an angel have cognition of himself?

It seems that an angel does not have cognition of himself (*seipsum non cognoscat*):

Objection 1: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 6, Dionysius says that angels “are unaware of their own powers.” But when a substance is known, its powers are known. Therefore, an angel does not have cognition of his own essence.

Objection 2: An angel is a certain sort of singular essence; otherwise, he would not act, since actions belong to singular subsistent things. But no singular thing is intelligible. Therefore, it cannot be understood intellectually (*non potest intelligi*). And so, since an angel has only intellectual cognition, no angel can have cognition of himself.

Objection 3: An intellect is moved by an intelligible thing, since, as *De Anima* 3 puts it, to understand intellectually is a certain way of being acted upon. But nothing is moved or acted upon by itself, as is clear in the case of corporeal things. Therefore, an angel cannot understand himself intellectually.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 Augustine says that an angel “had cognition of himself as soon as he was fashioned, i.e., illuminated by the truth.”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 14, a. 2 and q. 54, a. 2), the object of an action that remains within the agent differs from the object of an action that passes into something external to the agent.

For in an action that passes into something external, the object or matter into which the act passes is separate from the agent; for instance, that which is heated is separate from that which gives it heat, and that which is built is separate from the builder.

By contrast, in an action that remains within the agent, the object must be united to the agent in order for the action to proceed; for instance, the sensible object must be united to the sense organ in order for an actual sensing to occur. And so in this sort of action the object is united to the relevant power like the form which serves as the principle of action in other agents. For just as in a fire the heat is the formal principle of giving heat, so too the sensible species of the thing that is seen is the formal principle of an act of seeing in the eye.

Now notice that this sort of species of an object sometimes exists only in potentiality in the relevant cognitive power, and in that case the power has cognition only in potentiality. In order for this cognitive power to be having an actual cognition, it must be brought into the act of the species. However, if it always has this species in actuality, then it can have cognition through it without any preceding change or receptivity. From this it is clear that being moved by the object is not part of the nature of one who has cognition insofar as he has cognition, but only part of his nature insofar as he has cognition in potentiality.

Moreover, in order for a form to be a principle of action, it is irrelevant whether the form itself inheres in another or whether it instead subsists *per se*. For example, an instance of heat would not give any less heat if it existed as subsistent *per se* than it does when it inheres [in a substance]. So, then, if something that belongs to the genus of intelligible things is a subsistent intelligible form, then it will understand itself. But given that an angel is immaterial, he is a certain sort of subsistent form and thereby actually intelligible. Hence, it follows that he understands himself intellectually through this form, which is his substance.

Reply to objection 1: The cited passage is from the old translation and is corrected by the new translation, which has “and, furthermore, they, viz., the angels, had cognition of their own powers” instead of “and still they were unaware of their own powers,” which appears in the other translation.

Still, even the old translation can be salvaged with respect to one point, viz., that angels do not have a perfect cognition of their own power insofar as that power flows from the order of God’s wisdom, which cannot be comprehended by the angels.

Reply to objection 2: We ourselves have no intellectual understanding of the singulars that exist among corporeal things—not because of their singularity, but because of their matter, which is the principle of individuation in them. Hence, if there are singular things which, like the angels, subsist without matter, then nothing prevents them from being actually intelligible.

Reply to objection 3: To be moved and to be acted upon belong to an intellect insofar as it is in potentiality. Hence, being moved and being acted upon have no place in the case of the angelic intellect, especially with respect to an angel’s understanding of himself.

Also, the intellect’s action is not of the same type as the sort of action that is found among corporeal things, since the latter sort of action passes into another matter.

Article 2

Does one angel have cognition of another?

It seems that one angel does not have cognition of another (*alium non cognoscat*):

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that if the human intellect had within itself a nature from among the sensible things, then that nature existing within it would prevent external natures from being apprehended by the intellect—just as, if the pupil of the eye were itself colored, then the eye would not be able to see all the colors. But the angelic intellect is related to the cognition of immaterial things in just the way that the human intellect is related to the cognition of corporeal things. Therefore, since the angelic intellect has within itself a determinate nature from among the immaterial natures, it seems that it cannot have cognition of other immaterial natures.

Objection 2: The *Liber de Causis* says, “Every intelligence is such that he knows (a) what is above him insofar as he is caused by it and (b) what is below him insofar as he is a cause of it.” But it is not the case that one angel is a cause of another angel. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel has cognition of another.

Objection 3: One angel cannot have cognition of another through the essence of the angel who is having the cognition, since every cognition is in accord with some likeness, while, as is clear from what was said above (q. 50, a. 4 and q. 55, a. 1), the essence of the angel who has the cognition is similar only in its genus to the essence of the angel of whom the cognition is had. Hence, it would follow that one angel has only a general cognition of another and not a proper cognition.

Again, it cannot be claimed that one angel has cognition of another through the essence of the angel

of whom the cognition is had, since that by which the intellect understands something is intrinsic to the intellect, whereas only the Trinity penetrates the mind.

Again, it likewise cannot be claimed that one angel has cognition of another through an intelligible species, since the species in question would not differ from the understood angel, given that both are immaterial.

Therefore, there seems to be no way in which one angel could understand another.

Objection 4: If one angel understands another, this occurs either (a) through an innate intelligible species, in which case it would follow that if God were now to create an angel *de novo*, this new angel could not be known by the angels that now exist; or (b) through an intelligible species acquired from the things themselves, in which case it would follow that higher angels would not be able to have cognition of lower angels, since they acquire nothing from lower angels. Therefore, there seems to be no way in which one angel has cognition of another.

But contrary to this: The *Liber de Causis* says, “Every intelligence knows the things that are not corrupted.”

I respond: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, the things that pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God flowed from Him in two ways: (a) first, into the angelic intellect, and (b) second, as subsisting in their own proper natures.

Now the things in question proceeded into the angelic intellect by virtue of God’s impressing on an angel’s mind likenesses of the things He produced with their natural *esse*. But the Word of God contained from eternity the notions (*rationes*) not only of corporeal things, but also of all spiritual creatures. Therefore, all the notions of all things, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God on each spiritual creature. And yet they were impressed in such a way that the notion of his own species was impressed on each angel both with respect to its natural *esse* and with respect to its intelligible *esse*, so that he might subsist in the nature of his own species and through that species understand himself. On the other hand, the notions of the other natures, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed on him only with respect to their intelligible *esse*, so that through impressed intelligible species of this sort he might have cognition of both corporeal creatures and spiritual creatures.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 50, a. 4), the spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another by a certain ordering. And so the nature of a given angel does not prevent his intellect from having cognition of the other angelic natures, since both higher and lower angels have an affinity with his nature, whereas the differences among them stem only from diverse grades of perfection.

Reply to objection 2: The notions of causing and being caused do not contribute to one angel’s having cognition of another except by reason of a likeness, i.e., insofar as a cause is similar to what it causes. And so as long as there is a likeness without causality among the angels, each will retain his cognition of the others.

Reply to objection 3: One angel has cognition of another through an intelligible species which exists in his own intellect and which differs from the angel whose likeness it is—not in the way that immaterial *esse* differs from material *esse*, but rather in the way that intentional *esse* (*esse intentionale*) differs from natural *esse* (*esse naturale*). For an angel is himself a form that subsists with natural *esse*, whereas the intelligible species of him that exists in the intellect of another angel is not a subsistent form, but has only intelligible *esse* there—just as the form of a color has natural *esse* in a wall, but only intentional *esse* in the medium that conveys it [to the eye] (*in medio deferente*).

Reply to objection 4: God made each creature proportionate to that whole which He decided to create. And so if God had resolved to create more angels or more natures of things, then He would have impressed more intelligible species on the minds of the angels—just as, if the builder had wished to make

a bigger house, he would have laid a bigger foundation. Hence, God's adding some creature to the whole is of a piece with His adding another intelligible species to an angel.

Article 3

Can angels have cognition of God by their natural powers?

It seems that angels cannot have cognition of God by their natural powers (*per sua naturalia Deum cognoscere non possint*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says that God “is situated above all the heavenly minds with His incomprehensible power.” And afterwards he adds, “For He is above every substance and removed from all cognition.”

Objection 2: God is infinitely far removed from an angel's intellect. But what is infinitely far removed cannot be reached. Therefore, it seems that an angel cannot have cognition of God by his natural powers.

Objection 3: 1 Corinthians 13:12 says, “We see now through a mirror in a dark manner, but then face to face.” From this it seems to follow that there are two kinds of cognition of God, one by which He is seen through His essence, and this is the sense in which it is said that He is seen “face to face”; and, second, insofar as He is seen in the “mirror” of creatures. But as was shown above (q. 12, a. 4), angels could not have had the first sort of cognition of God by their natural powers. On the other hand, a mirror-like vision does not belong to the angels, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, they do not receive their cognition of God from sensible things. Therefore, angels cannot have cognition of God by their natural powers.

But contrary to this: Angels are cognitively more powerful than men. But men can have cognition of God by their natural powers—this according to Romans 1:19 (“Because that which is known of God is manifest in them”). Therefore, *a fortiori*, so can the angels.

I respond: Angels can have a certain sort of cognition of God by their natural powers. To see this clearly, note that there are three ways in which cognition can be had of something:

(a) through the presence of its essence in the one who has the cognition—in the way that light is seen in the eye—and this is the way, as was explained above (a. 1), in which an angel understands himself;

(b) through the presence of a likeness of itself in the cognitive power—in the way that a rock is seen by the eye because of the likeness of itself that arises in the eye;

(c) not by virtue of the fact that a likeness of it is received immediately from the very thing that the cognition is of, but rather by virtue of the fact that a likeness of it is received from some other thing in which it occurs—in the way that we see a man in a mirror.

Thus, the cognition of God by which He is seen through His essence is like the first type of cognition. And, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 4), this cognition of God cannot be present in any creature by the creature's natural powers.

On the other hand, the cognition of God by which we know God in this life, through the likeness of Him that occurs in creatures, is like the third type of cognition—this according to Romans 1:20 (“For the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made”). This is why we are said to see God in a mirror.

Now the cognition by which an angel knows God through his natural powers lies between these two types of cognition, and it is like the type of cognition by which a thing is seen by means of a likeness

received from it. For since the image of God is stamped on the very nature of an angel through his essence, an angel knows God insofar as he himself is a likeness of God. Yet he does not see the very essence of God, since no created likeness suffices to represent God's essence. Hence, this type of cognition is more like looking into a mirror, since an angel's very nature is itself a sort of mirror representing the likeness of God.

Reply to objection 1: Dionysius is talking here about a cognition that involves comprehension, as his words explicitly indicate. And God is not known in this way by any created intellect.

Reply to objection 2: Because an angel's intellect and essence are indeed infinitely far removed from God, it follows that an angel cannot comprehend God or see God's essence by his nature. However, it does not thereby follow that he cannot have any cognition of God at all. For just as God is infinitely far removed from the angel, so too the cognition that God has of Himself is infinitely far removed from the cognition that an angel has of Him.

Reply to objection 3: The cognition of God that an angel has by his nature lies between the two types of cognition mentioned in the objection—and yet, as was just explained above, it is more like the one of them [than the other].

QUESTION 57

An Angel's Cognition of Material Things

Next we ask about the material things that angels have cognition of. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Do angels have cognition of the natures of material things? (2) Do angels have cognition of singulars? (3) Do angels have cognition of future things? (4) Do angels have cognition of the thoughts of hearts? (5) Do angels have cognition of all the mysteries of grace?

Article 1

Do angels have cognition of material things?

It seems that angels do not have cognition material things (*non cognoscant res materiales*):

Objection 1: What is understood is a perfection of the one who is understanding it. But material things cannot be perfections of the angels, since they are lower than the angels. Therefore, angels do not have cognition of material things.

Objection 2: As a Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12:2 says, an intellective vision is of things that exist in the soul through their essence. But material things cannot exist through their essences in the soul of a man or in the mind of an angel. Therefore, there cannot be a cognition of them by an intellective vision; instead, there can be a cognition of them only by either (a) a vision of the imagination, by which likenesses of corporeal things are apprehended, or (b) a sentient vision, which is of the corporeal things themselves. But neither imaginative vision nor sentient vision exist in the angels; only intellective vision does. Therefore, angels cannot have cognition of material things.

Objection 3: Material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable only by the apprehension of the senses and of the imagination, which do not exist in angels. Therefore, angels do not have cognition of material things.

But contrary to this: A higher power is capable of whatever a lower power is capable of. But a man's intellect, which is lower than an angel's intellect in the order of nature, can have cognition of material things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so can an angel's intellect.

I respond: The order among things is such that (a) the higher entities are more perfect than the lower entities, and that (b) what is contained in the lower entities in a deficient and partial and fragmented way (*deficienter et partialiter et multipliciter*) is contained in the higher entities in a preeminent way and with a certain completeness and simplicity. Thus, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, in God, the summit of things, all things pre-exist 'supersubstantially' in the manner of His own simple *esse*.

Now among all creatures it is the angels who are closest to and most similar to God, and hence, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, they participate in more aspects of God's goodness and participate in them more perfectly. So, then, all material things pre-exist within the angels themselves in a more simple and immaterial way than they exist in themselves, though in a more fragmented and imperfect way than they exist in God.

Now everything that exists in a thing exists in it according to the mode of that in which it exists. But angels are intellectual beings by their nature. And so just as God knows material things through His own essence, so too angels know these things in virtue of the fact that they exist in the angels through their intelligible species.

Reply to objection 1: What is understood is a perfection of the one who is understanding it as regards the intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And so the intelligible species that exist in an angel's intellect are perfections of, and acts of, the angelic intellect.

Reply to objection 2: The senses do not apprehend the essences of things, but instead apprehend only certain exterior accidents. Similarly, the imagination does not apprehend the essences of things, but instead apprehends only likenesses of corporeal things. It is the intellect alone that apprehends the essences of things. Hence, according to *De Anima* 3, the object of the intellect is the ‘what-ness’ of a thing, and the intellect cannot err with respect to this, just as the senses cannot err with respect to a proper sensible. So, then, the essences of material things do indeed exist in the intellect of a man or an angel—not, to be sure, with their own real *esse*, but rather in the way that what is understood exists in the one who is understanding it. On the other hand, there are some things that exist in the intellect or in the soul with both sorts of *esse*, and there is intellective vision with respect to both.

Reply to objection 3: If an angel received his cognition of material things from the material things themselves, then he would have to make those things actually intelligible by abstracting them. But he does not receive his cognition of them from the material things themselves; instead, he has knowledge of material things through the actually intelligible species of those things that are connatural to him—just as our intellect has cognition of them through the species that it makes intelligible by abstraction.

Article 2

Does an angel have cognition of singulars?

It seems that an angel does not have cognition of singulars (*singularia non cognoscat*):

Objection 1: In *Physics* 1 the Philosopher says that sensation is of singulars, whereas reason (or understanding) is of universals. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 54, a. 5), the only cognitive power in angels is an intellective power. Therefore, they do not have cognition of singulars.

Objection 2: Every type of cognition occurs through the assimilation of the knower to what is known. But it seems impossible for there to be any assimilation of an angel to a singular thing *qua* singular. For, as was explained above (q. 50, a. 2), an angel is immaterial, whereas the principle of singularity is matter. Therefore, an angel cannot have cognition of singulars.

Objection 3: If an angel knows singulars, then he knows them either through singular intelligible species or through universal intelligible species. He does not know them through singular intelligible species, since in that case he would have to have infinitely many such species. Nor does he know them through universal intelligible species, since a universal is not a sufficient principle for having cognition of a singular *qua* singular; for singulars are known only potentially in a universal. Therefore, an angel does not have cognition of singulars.

But contrary to this: No one can exercise guardianship over what he has no cognition of. But according to Psalm 90:11 (“He has given his angels charge over you, etc.”), angels exercise guardianship over individual human beings. Therefore, angels have cognition of singulars.

I respond: Some have completely denied the cognition of singulars to angels.

First of all, however, this position detracts from the Catholic Faith, which claims, in accord with Hebrews 1:14 (“Are they not all ministering spirits?”), that lower things here below are ministered to by the angels. But if angels did not have knowledge of singulars, then they would not be able to exercise providence over the things that are done in this world, since acts belong to singular things—and this is contrary to Ecclesiastes 5:5 (“Say not before the angel: ‘There is no providence’”).

Second, this position also detracts from the teachings of philosophy, which claims that angels are the movers of the celestial spheres and that they move the spheres by their intellect and will.

And so others have maintained that angels do indeed have cognition of singulars, but that they have

this cognition in the universal causes which all particular effects are traced back to—in the way, for instance, that an astronomer might judge that an eclipse will occur by appeal to the arrangement of the celestial motions.

However, this position does not evade the difficulties alluded to above. For to have cognition of a singular in this way in its universal causes is not to have cognition of it *as* a singular, i.e., as existing here and now. For when an astronomer comes to know that an eclipse will occur by computing the celestial motions, he knows the eclipse in general; and he does not know it as existing here and now unless he perceives it through his senses. But ministration and providence and motion all belong to singulars insofar as they exist here and now.

So we have to reply in an alternative way: Just as a man has cognition of all the genera of things by diverse cognitive powers—viz., universals and immaterial things by the intellect, and singulars and corporeal things by the senses—so an angel knows both sorts of things through a single intellective power. For the order among things is such that to the extent that a thing is higher in that order, its power is more unified and extends to more things. For instance, in man himself it is clear that even though the common sensory power, which is higher than the proper sensory powers, is a single power, it knows all the things known by the five exterior senses as well as other things that none of the exterior senses knows, e.g., the difference between whiteness and sweetness. Something similar can be seen in other cases as well. Thus, since an angel is higher than a man in the order of nature, it is ridiculous to claim that a man has cognition of something by some power of his that an angel does not have cognition of through his own single cognitive power, viz., his intellect. This is why, as is clear from *De Anima* 1 and *Metaphysics* 3, Aristotle thinks it absurd that God should not know about discord, which we know about.

Now the mode by which an angel's intellect has cognition of singulars can be gathered from the fact that just as things flow forth from God in such a way as to subsist in their own proper natures, so too they flow forth from God in such a way as to exist in angelic cognition. But, clearly, what flows forth from God in things is not only that which pertains to their universal natures, but also those things that serve as their individuating principles. For God is a cause of the whole substance of a thing, with respect to both its matter and its form. And He knows things insofar as He is a cause, since, as was shown above (q. 14, a. 8), His knowledge is a cause of things. So, then, just as God is a likeness of all things by His essence, through which He causes all things, and just as He knows all things through His essence—not only what pertains to their universal natures, but also what pertains to their singularity—so, too, through the intelligible species that flow into the angels from God, the angels have cognition of things not only with respect to their universal natures but also with respect to their singularity, insofar as those species are multiple representations of the unified and simple divine essence.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking here about our intellect, which understands things only by abstracting; and it is through this abstraction from material conditions that what is abstracted becomes universal. But as was explained above (q. 55, aa. 2 and 3), this mode of understanding does not belong to the angels, and so the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 2: Angels are not by their nature assimilated to material things in the way that one thing is assimilated to another by an agreement in genus or species or accident. Rather, angels are assimilated to material things in the way that a higher entity bears a likeness to a lower entity, e.g., in the way that the sun is like a fire. And it is also in this manner that a likeness of all things exists in God, both with respect to their form and with respect to their matter, since whatever is found among things pre-exists in Him as its cause. For the same reason, the intelligible species in an angel's intellect, which are certain likenesses derived from God's essence, are likenesses of things not only with respect to their form, but also with respect to their matter.

Reply to objection 3: Angels have cognition of singulars through universal forms, and yet these forms are likenesses of the things both with respect to their universal principles and with respect to their

principles of individuation. It has already been explained above (q. 55, a. 3) how it is that many things can be known through the same intelligible species.

Article 3

Do angels have cognition of future things?

It seems that angels have cognition of future things (*cognoscant futura*):

Objection 1: Angels are much more powerful in their cognition than men are. But some men have cognition of many future things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so do the angels.

Objection 2: *Present* and *future* are specific differences within time. But an angel's intellect lies beyond time, since, as the *Liber de Causis* puts it, "An intelligence ranks with eternity," in the sense of aeviternity (*aevum*). Therefore, the past and the future do not differ as far as an angel's understanding is concerned; instead, he has cognition of both of them in exactly the same way.

Objection 3: An angel has cognition of things not through intelligible species that are received from the things themselves, but rather through innate universal intelligible species. But universal species are related in the same way to the present, the past, and the future. Therefore, it seems that angels have cognition of present things, past things, and future things in exactly the same way.

Objection 4: Something can be said to be distant in place just as something can be said to be distant in time. But angels have cognition of things that are distant in place. Therefore, they likewise have cognition of things that are distant in future time.

But contrary to this: That which is a proper indicator of divinity does not belong to the angels. But according to Isaiah 41:23 ("Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods"), to have cognition of future things is a proper indicator of divinity. Therefore, angels do not have cognition of future things.

I respond: There are two ways in which something future can be known:

First, a future thing can be known *in its cause*. Future things that proceed by necessity from their causes can be known in this way with certitude, e.g., that the sun will rise tomorrow, whereas future things that proceed from their causes in most instances can be known by an educated guess (*per coniecturam*) but not with certitude, in the way that a physician foresees the health of someone who is sick. Now this is the way in which angels know future things, and they know them better than we do to the extent that they know the causes of things in a more universal and perfect way—just as a physician who sees the causes of an illness more accurately is better able to predict its future course. Finally, those things that proceed from their causes only in a few instances, i.e., random (*casualia*) or fortuitous (*fortuita*) events, are completely unknown.

Second, a future thing can be known *in itself*. And only God knows future things in this way—not only those future things which proceed from their causes by necessity or in most instances, but even random and fortuitous things. For God sees all things in His eternity, which, since it is simple, is present to the whole of time and includes the whole of time. And so God's single glance (*unus Dei intuitus*) reaches to all things occurring throughout all of time as things that are present, and He sees all things as they are in themselves. This was explained above when we were discussing God's knowledge (q. 14, a. 13). By contrast, the angelic intellect—along with every created intellect whatsoever—falls short of God's eternity. Hence, the future, as existing in its own *esse*, cannot be known by any created intellect.

Reply to objection 1: Men do not have cognition of future things except in their causes or else because God reveals them. And angels have cognition of future things in this same way, though much

more accurately (*multo subtilius*).

Reply to objection 2: Even though an angel's intellect lies beyond the sort of time that measures corporeal movements, time exists in an angel's intellect with respect to the succession of his intelligible conceptions. It is in this sense that Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 that God moves spiritual creatures through time. And so, since there is succession in an angel's intellect, it is not the case that all the things that occur throughout the whole of time are present to him.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the intelligible species (*species*) that exist in an angel's intellect, taken just in themselves, are related in exactly the same way to present things, past things, and future things, still, it is not the case that present things, past things, and future things themselves are related to the species (*rationes*) in exactly the same way. For things that are present have a nature through which they are assimilated to the intelligible species that exist in an angel's mind, and so they can be known through those intelligible species. By contrast, things that are future do not yet have a nature through which they are assimilated to the intelligible species, and so they cannot be known through them.

Reply to objection 4: Distances with respect to place already now exist in reality and participate in a species whose likeness exists in the angel. This is not true of future things, as has already been explained. And so there is no parallel between the two cases.

Article 4

Do angels have cognition of the thoughts of hearts?

It seems that angels have cognition of the thoughts of hearts (*cognoscant cogitationes cordium*):

Objection 1: In *Moralia*, section on Job 28:17 ("Gold or crystal cannot equal it"), Gregory says, "At that time [*read*: after those who rise from the dead are beatified] one will be transparent to another in the same way that he is transparent to himself, and as soon as the intellect of anyone is attended to, his knowledge (*conscientia*) will be immediately penetrated." But as Matthew 22:30 says, those who rise from the dead will be like the angels. Therefore, one angel can see what is in the knowledge of another angel.

Objection 2: A shape is to a body what an intelligible species is to the intellect. But when a body is seen, its shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, any intelligible species that exists in it is seen. Therefore, when an angel sees another angel or even a human soul, it seems that he can see what each is thinking (*possit videre cogitationem utriusque*).

Objection 3: Things that exist in our intellect are more similar to an angel than things that exist in our imagination, since the former are actually understood, whereas the latter are only potentially understood. But things that exist in the imagination can be known by an angel in the same way that he knows corporeal things, since the imagination is a corporeal power. Therefore, it seems that an angel can know an intellect's thoughts (*cogitationes intellectus*).

But contrary to this: What is proper to God does not belong to the angels. But according to Jeremiah 17:9-10 ("The heart of a man is perverse above all things, and unsearchable, who has cognition of it? I the Lord search hearts"), to know the thoughts of hearts is proper to God. Therefore, angels do not know the secrets of hearts.

I respond: There are two ways in which thoughts of the heart can be known:

First, they can be known *in their effects*. A thought of the heart can be known in this way not only by an angel, but also by a man; and the more hidden an effect of this sort is, the more insightful the

cognition is. For a thought is sometimes known not only through an exterior act, but also through a change in facial expression; and physicians can sometimes know certain affections of the soul even through the pulse. Angels, as well as demons, can know these affections all the more, given that they examine hidden bodily changes of this sort with more subtlety. Hence, in *De Divinatione Daemonum* Augustine says that the demons sometimes discover men's dispositions with great ease—not only their spoken words, but even their conceived thoughts—when certain signs of those dispositions are expressed by the soul in the body. However, in the *Retractationes* Augustine cautions that we should not make assertions about how this takes place.

Second, thoughts can be known *as they exist in the intellect*, and affections *as they exist in the will*. God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and the affections of wills in this way. The reason for this is that a rational creature's will is subject to God alone, and He alone can operate on the will, given that He is, as the ultimate end, the will's principal object. And so what exists in the will or depends on the will alone is known only to God; this will become clearer below (q. 63, a. 1 and q. 105, a. 5). Now, clearly, it depends on the will alone that someone should actually be thinking about certain things, since when one has certain intelligible species or the habit of a science existing within him, he makes use of them whenever he wills to. This is why the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 2:11, "No man knows the things of a man, except the spirit of a man that is in him."

Reply to objection 1: There are two obstacles which now prevent the thoughts of one man from being known to another, viz., the body's density (*grossities*) and the fact that the will hides its secrets. The first of these obstacles will be removed at the resurrection and is not found among the angels, whereas the second obstacle will remain after the resurrection and is now found among the angels. Yet after the resurrection the body's splendor (*claritas*) will represent the quality of the mind as far as its quantity of grace and glory are concerned. And in this sense one will be able to see the mind of another.

Reply to objection 2: Even if one angel sees another angel's intelligible species in the sense that the mode of the intelligible species—i.e., their greater or lesser universality—is proportionate to the nobility of the substances, it still does not follow that one knows how the other is making use of those intelligible species in his actual thinking.

Reply to objection 3: A brute animal's appetite is not the master of its own acts, but instead follows the impression of another corporeal or spiritual cause. Therefore, since angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, through these things they can know what is in a brute animal's appetite or what its imagination apprehends. And they can likewise know what is in a man's sentient appetite or what his imagination apprehends to the extent that the sentient appetite in men sometimes proceeds into act by following a corporeal impression in the way that this always occurs in brute animals.

However, to the extent that the sentient appetite and imagination are moved by the will and reason, one must not claim that angels know the movements of the sentient appetite or the apprehensions of the imagination. For even the lower part of the soul participates in some sense in the rational part, in the way that one obeys his commander, as *Ethics* 1 puts it. Nor does it follow that if an angel knows what is in a man's sentient appetite or imagination, then he knows what the man is thinking or willing. For the intellect and will are not subject to the sentient appetite and imagination, but are instead able to make use of them in various ways.

Article 5

Do angels have cognition of the mysteries of grace?

It seems that angels have cognition of the mysteries of grace (*mysteria gratiae cognoscant*):

Objection 1: Of all the mysteries of grace, the most excellent is the mystery of Christ's Incarnation. But the angels knew of this mystery from the beginning; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5 Augustine says, "This mystery, hidden from the ages in God, was such that He nonetheless made it known to the Principalities and Powers in heaven." And in 1 Timothy 3:16 the Apostle says, "This great mystery of piety was apparent to the angels." Therefore, angels know the mysteries of grace.

Objection 2: The reasons for all the mysteries of grace are contained in God's wisdom. But angels see God's wisdom itself, since it is His essence. Therefore, angels know the mysteries of grace.

Objection 3: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, the prophets are instructed by the angels. But the prophets knew the mysteries of grace; for as Amos 3:7 says, "The Lord will not carry out His word without revealing His secret to His servants, the prophets." Therefore, the angels know the mysteries of grace.

But contrary to this: No one learns what he already knows. But the angels—even the highest ones—ask about the divine mysteries of grace and come to learn of them. For *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, says that Sacred Scripture "describes certain heavenly essences as putting questions to Jesus himself and learning the divine wisdom of His actions on our behalf, and it describes Jesus as teaching them directly." This is clear from Isaiah 63:1, where to the angels who ask "Who is He who comes up from Edom?" Jesus replies, "It is I, who speak justice." Therefore, the angels do not know the mysteries of grace.

I respond: There are two types of cognition in the angels:

One type is *natural*. By this type of cognition angels know things both through their essence and also through their innate intelligible species. Angels cannot know the mysteries of grace by this type of cognition. For these mysteries depend on God's simple will (*ex pura voluntate*), and if one angel cannot know the thoughts of another angel that depend on the latter's will, then he will all the less be able to know things that depend just on God's will. The Apostle reasons along these same lines at 1 Corinthians 2:11: "No man knows the things of a man, except the spirit of a man that is in him. So the things also that are of God, no one knows, but the Spirit of God."

The second type of angelic cognition is that which makes the angels *beatified* and by which they see the Word and all things in the Word. By this type of vision they do indeed know mysteries of grace—not all of them or all of them equally, but to the extent that God has willed to reveal the mysteries to them. This is in accord with what the Apostle says at 1 Corinthians 2:10, "But God has revealed them to us through His Spirit." Yet He reveals them in such a way that the higher angels, who contemplate God's wisdom more insightfully, know more and deeper mysteries in the very vision of God, and they then make these mysteries known to the lower angels by illuminating those angels. And some of these mysteries they knew from the beginning of their creation, whereas others they learn afterwards insofar as this knowledge is appropriate for their assigned roles.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible ways to speak about the mystery of Christ's Incarnation:

First, one can speak about it *in general*, and in this sense it was revealed to all the angels at the beginning of their beatification. The reason is that this mystery is a certain general principle to which all of the angels' assigned roles are ordered. For all of them are ministers of the Spirit, according to Hebrews 1:14 ("Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?"), and this inheritance occurs through the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence, from the beginning all the angels had to be taught about this mystery in general.

Second, we can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation *with respect to its specific circumstances*. And in this sense not all the angels were taught about all these circumstances from the beginning. Indeed, as is clear from the passage cited from Dionysius, even some of the higher angels learned about

them afterwards.

Reply to objection 2: Even though the beatified angels *contemplate* God's wisdom, they nonetheless do not *comprehend* it. And so it is not necessary that they should know whatever is hidden in it.

Reply to objection 3: Whatever the prophets knew through divine revelation about the mysteries of grace was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And even though the angels revealed in general to the prophets the things that God would do concerning the salvation of the human race, still, on this matter the apostles knew certain specific things that the prophets had not known—this according to Ephesians 3:4-5 ("You who are reading can perceive my understanding in the mystery of Christ, which was not known to other generations as it has now been revealed to His holy apostles").

Again, even among the prophets themselves, the later ones knew things that the earlier ones had not known—this according to Psalm 118:100 ("I have understood beyond the ancients"). And Gregory says that the knowledge of divine things increased as time went on.

QUESTION 58

The Mode of an Angel's Cognition

The next thing to consider is the mode of an angel's cognition. On this topic there are seven questions: (1) Is an angel sometimes thinking in potentiality and sometimes in actuality? (2) Can an angel understand many things at once? (3) Does an angel understand by means of discursive reasoning? (4) Does an angel understand by composing and dividing? (5) Can there be falsity in an angel's intellect? (6) Can an angel's cognition be called 'morning knowledge' and 'evening knowledge'? (7) Are morning knowledge and evening knowledge the same, or are they distinct from one another?

Article 1

Is an angel's intellect sometimes in a state of potentiality?

It seems that an angel's intellect is sometimes in a state of potentiality:

Objection 1: As *Physics* 3 says, movement is the act of something that exists in a state of potentiality. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the minds of angels are moved when they think. Therefore, the minds of angels are sometimes in a state of potentiality.

Objection 2: Since desire is directed toward a thing that is not had but is able to be had, whoever desires to understand something is now in potentiality with respect to understanding that thing. But 1 Peter 1:12 talks of "things into which angels desire to look." Therefore, an angel's intellect is sometimes in a state of potentiality.

Objection 3: The *Liber de Causis* says that an intelligence understands in a way that accords with the mode of his substance. But an angel's substance has an admixture of potentiality. Therefore, an angel sometimes understands in potentiality.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 Augustine says of the angels that "from the moment they were created, they thoroughly enjoyed the very eternity of the Word with holy and pious contemplation." But a contemplating intellect understands in actuality and not in potentiality. Therefore, an angel's intellect is not in a state of potentiality.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3 and *Physics* 8, there are two ways for the intellect to be in a state of potentiality: (a) in the first way, it is said to be in potentiality before it learns or discovers something, i.e., before it has the habit of a given science; and (b) in the second way, it is said to be in potentiality when it already has the habit of a science, but is not actually considering that science.

As for the first way, an angel's intellect is never in potentiality with respect to the things its natural cognition can extend to. For just as the higher bodies, i.e., the celestial bodies, do not have any potentiality for *esse* which has not already been brought to completion through their actuality, so the celestial intellects, viz., the angels, do not have any intellectual potentiality which has not already been brought to total completion through the intelligible species that are connatural to them. On the other hand, nothing prevents the intellects of angels from being in potentiality with respect to the things revealed to them by God—just as the celestial bodies are likewise sometimes in potentiality with respect to being illuminated by the sun.

As for the second way, an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with respect to the things it knows by its natural cognition, since it is not always actually considering all the things that it knows by its natural cognition. However, an angel's intellect is never in potentiality in this way with respect to its cognition of the Word and of the things it sees in the Word, since an angel's intellect is always actually viewing the Word and the things it sees in the Word. For it is this vision that the angels' beatitude consists in and, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, beatitude consists in an act and not in a habit.

Reply to objection 1: In the cited passage, ‘movement’ is not being taken for the act of something imperfect, i.e., of something that is in a state of potentiality. Rather, it is being taken for the act of something perfect, i.e., of something that is in a state of actuality. For as *De Anima* 3 says, this is the sense in which acts of understanding and acts of sensing are called movements.

Reply to objection 2: This particular desire on the part of the angels does not rule out possession of the thing desired, but rules out only weariness of it.

An alternative reply is that the angels are said to desire the vision of God in the sense of new revelations, which they receive from God in order to make them fit for their assigned roles.

Reply to objection 3: There is in an angel’s substance no potentiality that is wholly bereft of actuality. And, similarly, an angel’s intellect is not in potentiality in such a way that is without its act.

Article 2

Can an angel understand many things at once?

It seems that an angel cannot understand many things at once:

Objection 1: In *Topics* 2 the Philosopher says that it is possible to know (*scire*) many things at once, but it is possible to be understanding (*intelligere*) only one thing at a time.

Objection 2: Nothing is understood except insofar as the intellect is formed by an intelligible species in the way in which a body is formed by its shape. But a single body cannot be formed by different shapes. Therefore, a single intellect cannot understand diverse intelligible things all at once.

Objection 3: To understand is a certain movement. But no movement is terminated at diverse endpoints. Therefore, it is not possible to understand many things at once.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4 Augustine says, “The spiritual power of an angel’s mind easily comprehends at once all the things that the angel wants to.”

I respond: Just as the oneness of a movement requires the oneness of its endpoint, so too the oneness of an operation requires the oneness of its object. However, it can happen that several things are taken either as many or as one, in the way that the parts of a continuum are taken as one.

For if each of them is taken by itself (*per se*), then they are many, and as such they cannot be grasped by the senses or the intellect all at once in a single operation.

In the second way, they are grasped as a single whole and in this way, as *De Anima* 3 says, they are known by the senses or the intellect all together and in a single operation as long as the whole continuum is being considered. So even our own intellect understands the subject and the predicate together insofar as they are parts of a single proposition; and it understands the two in comparison with one another insofar as they come together in a single comparison.

From this it is clear that many things cannot be understood all at once insofar as they are distinct from one another, but that they are understood all at once insofar as they are united in a single intelligible object.

Now each thing is actually intelligible insofar as its likeness exists in the intellect. Therefore, if several things can be known through a single intelligible species, then they are known as a single intelligible object, and so they are known all at once. On the other hand, things that are known through diverse intelligible species are grasped as diverse intelligible objects.

Therefore, in the cognitive act by which angels understand things through the Word, they know all things through a single intelligible species, viz., God’s essence. And so as far as this cognitive act is concerned, they know all things at once—just as, according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 15, “In heaven

our own thoughts will not be changeable, going from one thing to another, but we will see all our knowledge together at a single glance.” By contrast, in the cognitive act by which angels know things through their innate intelligible species, they can understand simultaneously whatever things are known through a single intelligible species, but they cannot understand simultaneously things that are known by diverse intelligible species.

Reply to objection 1: To understand many things as one is in a sense to understand a single thing.

Reply to objection 2: The intellect is formed by an intelligible species that it now has present to itself. And so through a single intelligible species it can see many intelligible things all at once, in the way that through a single shape a given body can be similar to many bodies at the same time.

Reply to objection 3: The reply here is the same as the reply to objection 1.

Article 3

Does an angel gain knowledge through discursive reasoning?

It seems that an angel gains knowledge through discursive reasoning (*cognoscat discurrendo*):

Objection 1: Discursive understanding takes place to the extent that one thing is known through another. But an angel knows one thing through another, since he knows creatures through the Word. Therefore, an angel’s intellect gains knowledge through discursive reasoning.

Objection 2: A higher power can do whatever a lower power can do. But the human intellect can reason through syllogisms, and it can know causes in their effects—both of which involve discursive reasoning. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel’s intellect, which is higher in the order of nature, can do this.

Objection 3: Isidore says that the demons know many things from experience. But experiential cognition is discursive, since an experience is made up of many memories and since, as it says at the end of the *Posterior Analytics* and the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, a single universal is fashioned from many experiences. Therefore, angels have discursive cognition.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “Angels do not collect divine cognition from diffuse lines of thought, nor do they go from something general to something specific.”

I respond: As has already been explained several times (a. 1 and q. 50, a. 3, and q. 55, a. 2), angels occupy the status among spiritual substances that celestial bodies occupy among corporeal substances. For this reason, Dionysius calls them ‘celestial minds’. Now the difference between celestial bodies and terrestrial bodies is that terrestrial bodies attain their ultimate perfection through change and movement, whereas celestial bodies attain their ultimate perfection immediately through their very nature. So, then, lower intellects, i.e., human intellects, attain the perfection of intellectual operation in their cognition of the truth through a certain kind of movement and discourse, viz., as they proceed from the cognition of one thing to the cognition of another. But if in their cognition of a known principle they immediately perceived, as it were, all the knowable conclusions that follow from that principle, then discursive reasoning would have no place in them.

And this is the way it is with the angels. For in the things that the angels know first by their natural knowledge they perceive immediately anything whatever that can be known in those first things. And angels are called ‘intellectual’ (*intellectuales*) beings because, even among us, things that are naturally apprehended in an unmediated way are said to be understood (*intelligi*). This is why *understanding* (*intellectus*) is called a habit with respect to first principles.

By contrast, human souls, which acquire knowledge of the truth through a certain sort of discursive

reasoning, are called ‘rational’. This condition stems from the weakness of the intellectual light in human souls. For if human souls had the fullness of intellectual light, as the angels do, then in their first glance at the principles they would immediately comprehend the entire power of those principles by intuiting whatever could be derived from them by means of syllogisms.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Discursive reasoning’ names a certain sort of movement. But all movement is from one thing that is prior to something else that is posterior. Hence, discursive reasoning involves going from something previously known to the cognition of something else that is then later known and was not previously known. However, if that something else were seen as soon as the first thing was seen—in the way that the image of a thing and the thing itself are seen together in a mirror—then because of this there would be no discursive cognition. And it is in this way that angels know things in the Word.

Reply to objection 2: Angels can reason by syllogisms in the sense that they know the syllogisms. And they see effects in their causes and causes in their effects, but not in such a way that they acquire knowledge of an unknown truth by reasoning syllogistically from the causes to what is caused or from what is caused to the causes.

Reply to objection 3: In the case of angels and demons, ‘experience’ is predicated according to a certain likeness, viz., insofar as they know sensible things as present—though without any sort of discursive reasoning.

Article 4

Do angels understand by composing and dividing?

It seems that angels understand by composing and dividing (*intelligent componendo et dividendo*):

Objection 1: As *De Anima* 3 says, there is a composition of thoughts where there is a multitude of thoughts. But there is a multitude of thoughts in an angel’s intellect, since he understands diverse things through diverse intelligible species, and he does not understand the diverse things all at once. Therefore, there is composition and division in an angel’s intellect.

Objection 2: Negation is more distant from affirmation than any two opposed natures are distant from one another, since the first distinction is that between affirmation and negation. But as is clear from what was said above (a. 2), there are certain natures, distant from one another, that an angel understands through diverse intelligible species and not through just one species. Therefore, he must know affirmation and negation in diverse ways. And so it seems that an angel understands by composing and dividing.

Objection 3: Speech is a sign of what is understood. But as is clear from many places in Sacred Scripture, angels who speak to men use affirmative and negative propositions, which are signs of composition and division in their own understanding. Therefore, it seems that angels understand by composing and dividing.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “The intellectual power of the angels reflects the clear simplicity of God’s thoughts.” But as *De Anima* 3 says, simple understanding (*simplex intelligentia*) occurs without composition and division. Therefore, angels understand without composition and division.

I respond: A predicate is related to its subject in an intellect that is composing and dividing in just the way that a conclusion is related to its principle in an intellect that is reasoning discursively (*in intellectu ratiocinante*). For if the intellect immediately saw the truth of the conclusion in the principle

itself, then it would never come to understand by means of discursive reasoning or ratiocination. Similarly, if in apprehending the subject's 'what-ness' (*quidditas*), the intellect immediately knew everything that can be attributed to the subject or denied of it, then it would never come to understand by means of composing and dividing. Instead, it would understand everything by understanding what the subject is. Therefore, the fact that our intellect understands by composing and dividing clearly has the same source as the fact that it understands by reasoning discursively—viz., that it cannot in its initial apprehension of some first thing see whatever is virtually contained in that thing. And this is so, as has been pointed out (a. 3), because of the weakness of the intellectual light in us.

Hence, since the intellectual light is perfected in an angel—for an angel is, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a pure and absolutely clear mirror—it follows that just as an angel does not understand by means of discursive reasoning, so too he does not understand by composing and dividing. However, he does understand the composition and division involved in propositions, just as he likewise understands the reasoning involved in syllogisms. For he understands in a simple way that which is composed, and he understands in a motionless way that which is in motion, and he understands in an immaterial way that which is material.

Reply to objection 1: It is not just any sort of multitude of thoughts that causes a composition, but rather a multitude of thoughts which is such that one is attributed to the other or denied of the other. Now in understanding the 'what-ness' of a given thing, an angel understands all at once whatever can be attributed to that thing or denied of it. Hence, in understanding what the thing is, he understands by his one simple thought whatever we ourselves are able to understand by composing and dividing.

Reply to objection 2: The different 'what-nesses' of things differ less from one another with respect to the nature of existence than an affirmation differs from a negation. Nonetheless, with respect to the nature of cognition, an affirmation and negation agree more with one another, because by the very fact that the truth of an affirmation is known, the falsity of the opposite negation is immediately known.

Reply to objection 3: The fact that an angel speaks with affirmative and negative propositions shows that angels know *about* composition and division, but not that they know *by means of* composing and dividing. Instead, they know what something is in a simple way.

Article 5

Can there be falsity in an angel's understanding?

It seems that there can be falsity in an angel's understanding (*in intellectu angeli possit esse falsitas*):

Objection 1: Perversity pertains to falsity. But as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the demons have a perverted imagination. Therefore, it seems that there can be falsity in an angel's understanding.

Objection 2: Ignorance is a cause of false judgment. But as Dionysius says in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, chap. 6, there can be ignorance in angels. Therefore, it seems that there can be falsity in them.

Objection 3: Everyone who falls away from the truth of wisdom and has a depraved nature has falsity and error in his understanding. But this is what Dionysius attributes to the demons in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7. Therefore, it seems that there can be falsity in an angel's understanding.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, "Understanding is always true." Also, in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Nothing except what is true is understood." But the angels

have no type of cognition other than understanding. Therefore, there cannot be deception or falsehood in an angel's cognition.

I respond: The truth regarding this matter depends to some extent on what has already been said. For it has already been explained (a. 4) that an angel understands something by understanding what the thing is and not by composing and dividing. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the intellect is always accurate (*verus*) with respect to what a thing is, just as the senses are with respect to their proper objects.

However, deception and falsehood do occur *per accidens* in our understanding of what a thing is, viz., within a composition, when either (a) we take the definition of one thing as the definition of some other thing, or (b) the parts of a given definition do not cohere with one another—as, for instance, if *four-footed flying animal* were taken to be the definition of something (for there is no such animal). And this happens in the case of *composite* things, whose definitions are taken from diverse sources, one of which is material with respect to the other. By contrast, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, there is no falsity in our understanding of *simple* 'what-nesses', because either they are not grasped at all, in which case we understand nothing about them, or else they are understood as they are.

So, then, neither falsity nor error nor deception can exist *per se* in any angel's understanding, but they can occur *per accidens*—though in a way different from the way they occur in us. For we ourselves sometimes arrive at an understanding of the 'what-ness' of a thing by composing and dividing, as when we discover a definition by dividing or demonstrating. This does not happen in the case of angels; for through a given thing's 'what-ness' they know all the propositions that pertain to that thing (*cognoscunt omnes enuntiationes ad illam rem pertinentes*).

Now it is clear that a thing's 'what-ness' can be a principle of cognition with respect to what *naturally* belongs to it or is denied of it, but not with respect to what depends on God's *supernatural* ordination. Therefore, the good angels, who have an upright will, do not through their cognition of a thing's 'what-ness' make any judgment about what naturally pertains to the thing except in light of God's ordination. Hence, in the good angels there cannot be falsity or error. By contrast, the demons, who have withdrawn their intellect from God's wisdom through their perversity of will, sometimes make absolute judgements about a thing on the basis of its natural condition. And while they are not deceived in matters that pertain naturally to the thing, they can be deceived with respect to matters that are supernatural. For instance, considering that man is mortal, a demon might judge that he will not rise from the dead; or seeing the man Christ, a demon might judge that He is not God.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The reply to the objections on both sides is clear from what has been said. For the perversity of the demons stems from the fact that they do not subject themselves to God's wisdom. Still, ignorance is found in the angels not with respect to what is naturally knowable, but with respect to what is knowable [only] supernaturally.

Again, it is clear that an angel's understanding of a thing's 'what-ness' is always true except *per accidens*, when it is ordered in an inappropriate way toward some composition or division.

Article 6

Does an angel have both evening knowledge and morning knowledge?

It seems that an angel has neither evening knowledge (*cognitio vespertina*) nor morning knowledge (*cognitio matutina*):

Objection 1: Both evening and morning have an element of darkness. But there is no darkness in an angel's cognition, since there is no error or falsity in it. Therefore, an angel's cognition should not be called either 'morning knowledge' or 'evening knowledge'.

Objection 2: Night falls between evening and morning, and noontime falls between morning and evening. Therefore, if there is morning knowledge and evening knowledge in angels, then by parity of reasoning there should be noontime knowledge and nocturnal knowledge in them as well.

Objection 3: Cognitions are distinguished by differences in the objects known, and this is why in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “The sciences are divided in the same way that things are.” Now as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, things have three types of existence (*esse*), viz., (a) existence in the Word, (b) existence in their own proper nature, and (c) existence in the angelic mind (*in intelligentia angelica*). Therefore, if morning knowledge and evening knowledge are posited in the angels because of the existence of things in the Word and because of their existence in their own proper nature, then a third type of knowledge should also be posited in the angels because of the existence of things in the angelic mind.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, and again in *De Civitate Dei* 11, Augustine distinguishes between the morning knowledge of angels and their evening knowledge.

I respond: Talk about morning knowledge and evening knowledge in the angels was introduced by Augustine, who claimed that the six days in which God is said in Genesis 1 to have made all things are to be thought of not as ordinary days lasting for one circuit of the sun (for we read that the sun was made on the fourth day), but as a single day—more specifically, as the angelic cognition presented with six kinds of things.

Now just as the morning is the beginning of a normal day and the evening its end, so too the cognition of the primordial existence of things is called ‘morning knowledge’, and this is knowledge of things insofar as they exist in the Word. On the other hand, what is called ‘evening knowledge’ is the cognition of the very *esse* of a created thing insofar as it exists in its own proper nature. For the *esse* of things flows from the Word as from a primordial principle, and this outflow is terminated in the *esse* that things have in their own proper nature.

Reply to objection 1: In the case of angelic cognition, ‘evening’ and ‘morning’ are used not because of their likeness in having an element of darkness, but because of their likeness to a beginning and an end.

An alternative reply is that, as Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, nothing prevents a thing from being called ‘light’ in comparison to one thing and ‘darkness’ in comparison to something else. For instance, in keeping with Ephesians 5:8 (“You were once darkness, but now light in the Lord”), the life of those who are faithful and just is called ‘light’ in comparison to the wicked, whereas, in keeping with 2 Peter 1:19 (“You have the prophetic word, which you do well to attend to as a light that shines in a dark place”), the life of those who are faithful is said to be dark in comparison to the light of glory. So, then, the angelic cognition by which an angel knows things in their own proper nature is like day in comparison to ignorance or error, but it is dark in comparison to the angel’s vision of the Word.

Reply to objection 2: Morning and evening knowledge pertain to the day, i.e., to the illuminated angels, who are distinct from the darkness, i.e., the bad angels. Now in knowing a creature, the good angels do not cling to it, which would be to turn to darkness and become as night; instead, they turn their knowledge into praise of God, in whom they know all things as in the source of all things. And so after evening comes morning, and not night, in the sense in which morning is the end of the preceding day and the beginning of the next day, because the angels turn their knowledge of the previous work into the praise of God.

On the other hand, noontime is included under the name ‘day’ as a midpoint between two extremes. Alternatively, noontime can refer to their knowledge of God Himself, who has no beginning or end.

Reply to objection 3: The angels are themselves creatures, and so the existence of things in the angelic understanding is itself included under evening knowledge, in just the way that the existence of things in their own proper nature is.

Article 7

Is evening knowledge the same as morning knowledge?

It seems that evening knowledge is the same as morning knowledge:

Objection 1: Genesis 1:5 says, “And there came evening and morning one day.” But as Augustine says, ‘day’ refers here to angelic cognition. Therefore, in angels the morning knowledge and the evening knowledge are one and the same.

Objection 2: It is impossible for one power to have two operations at the same time. But angels are always actually having morning knowledge, since, according to Matthew 18:10 (“Their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father ...”), they always see God and other things in God. Therefore, if his evening knowledge were distinct from his morning knowledge, then an angel could not in any way actually be having evening knowledge.

Objection 3: In 1 Corinthians 13:10 the Apostle says, “When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away with.” But if evening knowledge is distinct from morning knowledge, then it is related to it as something imperfect to something perfect. Therefore, evening knowledge will not be able to exist together with morning knowledge.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4 Augustine says, “There is a huge difference between knowing a thing in the Word of God and knowing it in its own nature, so that the former is properly like daytime and the latter like evening.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 6), the knowledge by which an angel knows things in their own proper nature is called evening knowledge. But this cannot be understood in such a way that angels receive their cognition from the proper natures of things, so that the preposition ‘in’ would be indicating the status of a source [of cognition]; for as was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), angels do not receive their cognition from the things themselves. Therefore, it follows that the phrase ‘in their own proper nature’ is being taken for the thing known insofar as it is subject to the cognition—so that, namely, knowledge is called ‘evening knowledge’ in the angels insofar as they know the existence that the things have in their own proper nature.

Now the angels know this through two mediums, viz., (a) through their innate intelligible species and (b) through the ideas of things that exist in the Word. For it is not the case that in seeing the Word they know only the existence that the things have in the Word; rather, they [also] see the existence that the things have in their own proper nature—just as God, in seeing Himself, knows the existence that things have in their own proper nature. Therefore, if their knowledge is called ‘evening knowledge’ because in seeing the Word they know the existence that things have in their own proper nature, then evening knowledge and morning knowledge are one and the same in essence, differing only with respect to what is known. On the other hand, if their knowledge is called ‘evening knowledge’ because they know the existence that things have in their own proper nature by means of their innate intelligible forms, then their evening knowledge is distinct from their morning knowledge. And Augustine seems to understand the matter in this latter way, since he claims that the one sort of knowledge is imperfect in comparison to the other.

Reply to objection 1: Just as the number of the six days, as understood by Augustine, is taken

from the six kinds of things that are known by the angels, so the oneness of the day is taken from the oneness of the thing known, and yet this one thing can be known by diverse types of cognition.

Reply to objection 2: Two operations of the same power can exist at the same time as long as the one is referred back to the other. This is clear in a case in which the will simultaneously wills (a) an end and (b) what is ordered to that end, as well as in a case in which the intellect, once it has acquired knowledge (*scientia*), simultaneously understands (a) the principles and (b) the conclusion through the principles. Now as Augustine explains, the evening knowledge in angels is referred back to the morning knowledge. Hence, nothing prevents both of them from existing in the angels simultaneously.

Reply to objection 3: When the perfect has come, the imperfect that is opposed to it is done away with. For instance, faith, which is of things that are not seen, is done away with when the vision [of God] comes.

However, the imperfection of evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of morning knowledge. For the fact that a thing is known in its own self is not opposed to its being known in its cause. Again, there is nothing incoherent about a thing being known through two mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other of which is less perfect; for instance, we can have both a demonstrative middle term and a dialectical middle term with respect to the same conclusion. Similarly, the same thing can be known by an angel both through the Uncreated Word and through an innate intelligible species.

QUESTION 59

An Angel's Will

We next have to consider what pertains to an angel's will. We will first consider the will itself (question 59) and then the movement of the will, which is love (*amor*) or affection (*dilectio*) (question 60).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Do angels have a will? (2) Is an angel's will his very nature or, again, his very intellect? (3) Do angels have free choice? (4) Do angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite?

Article 1

Do angels have a will?

It seems that angels do not have a will (*in angelis non sit voluntas*):

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3, "The will exists in the reason." But in the angels there is no reason (*ratio*); instead, there is something higher than reason. Therefore, in the angels there is no will; instead, there is something higher than the will.

Objection 2: As is clear from the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, the will is a type of desire (*appetitus*). But desire belongs to what is imperfect, since a desire is for something that is not yet had. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels—especially the beatified angels—it seems that they do not have a will.

Objection 3: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the will is a moved mover, since it is moved by a desirable thing *qua* understood. But angels are not moveable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore, angels do not have a will.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says that the image of the Trinity is found in the mind with respect to memory, intelligence, and will. But the image of God is found in the angelic mind and not just in the human mind, since the angelic mind is likewise capable of seeing God. Therefore, angels have a will.

I respond: One must posit a will in the angels. To make this clear, notice that since all things proceed from God's will, they are all in their own way inclined toward the good through appetite (*appetitus*), though in different ways.

For certain things, e.g., plants and inanimate bodies, are inclined toward the good only through a natural disposition and without any cognition. This sort of inclination toward the good is called a *natural appetite*.

Other things are inclined toward the good with some sort of cognition, not in the sense that they understand the very concept of the good (*ratio boni*), but in the sense that they know some particular good—as, for instance, the senses, which know the sweet and the white and other things of this sort. The inclination that follows upon this type of cognition is called a *sentient appetite*.

Finally, certain things are inclined toward the good with a cognition by which they know the very concept of the good, and this is proper to an intellect. These things are inclined toward the good in the most perfect way—not, as it were, directed toward the good only by another, as are things that lack cognition, and not directed toward a merely particular good, as are things that have only sentient cognition, but inclined, as it were, toward the universal good itself. And this sort of inclination is called a *will*.

Hence, since angels through their intellect have cognition of the universal concept of the good (*cognoscant ipsam universalem rationem boni*), it is clear that they have a will.

Reply to objection 1: Reason (*ratio*) transcends the sensory power (*sensus*) in a way different from that in which intellective understanding (*intellectus*) transcends reason. For reason transcends the sensory power because of a diversity in the *objects of cognition* (*secundum diversitatem cognitorum*), since the sensory power has to do with particulars, whereas reason has to do with universals. And so an appetite that tends toward the universal good, which corresponds to reason, is different from an appetite that tends toward a particular good, which corresponds to the sensory power. By contrast, intellective understanding and reason differ in their *mode of cognition* (*quantum ad modum cognoscendi*). For intellective understanding has cognition by simply looking (*simplici intuitu*), whereas reason has cognition by going discursively (*discurrendo*) from one thing to another. Still, by means of discursive reasoning, reason arrives at a cognition of what intellective understanding has cognition of without discursive reasoning, viz., the universal. Therefore, the very same object is proposed to the appetitive power by both reason and intellective understanding. Hence, in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will.

Reply to objection 2: Even though the *name* of the appetitive part of the soul is taken from the seeking out (*appetendo*) of what is not yet possessed, the appetitive part nonetheless extends not only to this sort of thing, but also to many other things. In the same way, the name ‘rock’ (*lapis*) is taken from the hurting of the foot (*laesio pedis*), and yet this is not the only thing that belongs to a rock. Similarly, the irascible power is named from anger, and yet there are in the irascible power passions other than anger, e.g., hope, audacity, and others of this sort.

Reply to objection 3: The will is called a moved mover in the sense that willing, along with intellective understanding, is a certain sort of movement. Nothing prevents a movement in this sense from existing in angels, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, this sort of movement is the act of what is perfect.

Article 2

Does an angel’s will differ from his intellect or his nature?

It seems that an angel’s will does not differ from his intellect or his nature (*non differat voluntas ab intellectu et natura*):

Objection 1: An angel is more simple than a natural body. But through its form a natural body is inclined toward its end, which is its good. Therefore, *a fortiori*, an angel is inclined toward his end through his form. But ‘angel’s form’ refers either (a) to the very nature in which he subsists, or else (b) to an intelligible species that exists in his intellect. Therefore, an angel is inclined toward the good both through his nature and through his intelligible species. But this inclination toward the good pertains to the will. Therefore, an angel’s will is not distinct from his nature or his intellect.

Objection 2: The intellect’s object is the true, whereas the will’s object is the good. But the good and the true differ only conceptually and not in reality. Therefore, the will and the intellect do not differ from one another in reality.

Objection 3: Powers are not differentiated by a distinction between the common and the proper; for instance, the power of vision is directed both toward color [in general] and toward whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be related as the common and the proper, since the true is a certain good, viz., the good of the intellect. Therefore, the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.

But contrary to this: An angel’s will is directed only toward good things, whereas his intellect is directed toward both good and bad things, since it has cognition of both. Therefore, an angel’s will is

distinct from his intellect.

I respond: An angel's will is a certain power (*virtus*) or potentiality (*potentia*) that is neither his very nature nor his intellect.

The claim that an angel's will is not his nature is obvious from the fact that a thing's nature or essence is included within the thing itself, and so anything that extends to what exists outside a thing is not that thing's essence. Hence, in the case of natural bodies we see that the inclination toward their own *esse* is not something added to the essence, but derives (a) from the thing's matter, which desires the *esse* before it has it, and (b) from its form, which keeps the thing in existence once it exists. By contrast, an inclination for what is extrinsic derives from something added to the essence. For instance, a body's inclination to a given place derives from its heaviness or lightness, while its inclination to effect what is similar to itself derives from its active qualities. Now a will is naturally inclined toward the good. Hence, the only case in which the essence and the will are the same is where the good is totally contained within the essence of the one who is willing—i.e., in the case of God, who wills nothing outside Himself except for the sake of His own goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, since the infinite good lies outside the essence of every created thing. Hence, an angel's will—or any other creature's will—cannot be the same as his essence.

Similarly, an angel's will—or a man's will—cannot be the same as his intellect. For cognition occurs in virtue of the fact that the object of cognition exists within the one having the cognition (*cognitum est in cognoscente*), and so the intellect extends to what exists outside itself insofar as what exists outside the intellect is by its essence capable of existing in some sense within the intellect. By contrast, the will extends itself to what exists outside itself insofar as it in some way tends toward an exterior thing by a certain inclination. But the power by which a creature has within itself something that exists outside itself is distinct from the power by which it tends toward an exterior thing. And so in any creature the intellect must be distinct from the will.

However, this is not so with God, who has both universal being and universal good within Himself. So both His will and His intellect are His essence.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, a natural body is inclined toward its own *esse* through its substantial form, whereas it is inclined toward what is exterior to itself through something added to itself.

Reply to objection 2: Powers are differentiated not by a material distinction among their objects, but rather by a formal distinction, which involves the concept (*ratio*) of the power's object. And so the difference between the concepts *true* and *good* is sufficient for a distinction between the intellect and the will.

Reply to objection 3: The true and the good are convertible in reality, and this is why the good is understood by the intellect under the concept *true*, and why the true is desired by the will under the concept *good*. And yet, as has been explained, the diversity of the concepts is sufficient to differentiate the powers.

Article 3

Do angels have free choice?

It seems that angels do not have free choice (*liberum arbitrii*):

Objection 1: The act of free choice is to choose (*eligere*). But the act of choosing cannot exist in angels, because the act of choosing is a desire for something which has been deliberated about

beforehand and, as *Ethics* 3 says, deliberation is a certain sort of inquiry. But angels do not come to have cognition through inquiry, since inquiry involves discursive reasoning. Therefore, it seems that angels do not have free choice.

Objection 2: Free choice is open to both parts of a contradiction (*habet se ad utrumlibet*). But there is nothing in an angel's intellect that is open to both parts of a contradiction, since, as has been explained (q. 58, a. 5), an angel's intellect cannot be mistaken with respect to its natural intelligible objects. Therefore, an angel's appetite cannot have free choice.

Objection 3: Things that are natural in angels belong to them in greater or lesser degrees, since the intellectual nature in higher angels is more perfect than in lower angels. But free choice does not admit of greater and lesser degrees. Therefore, angels do not have free choice.

But contrary to this: Free choice belongs to the dignity of man. But angels have more dignity than men do. Therefore, since free choice exists in men, *a fortiori* it exists in angels.

I respond: Some things do not act from free choice, but instead act insofar as they are acted upon and moved by others, in the way that an arrow is moved to its target by an archer. On the other hand, some things, e.g., non-rational animals, act by a sort of choice, but not by free choice; for instance, a sheep flees from a wolf in virtue of a certain sort of judgment by which it takes the wolf to be harmful to itself. However, this judgment is not free for the sheep, but is instead instilled in it by nature.

Only that which has intellective understanding (*intellectus*) can act in virtue of a free judgment, since it has cognition of the universal concept of the good (*cognoscit universalem rationem boni*) and on this basis can judge that this thing or that thing is good. Hence, wherever there is intellective understanding, there is free choice. And so it is clear that angels have free choice in an even more excellent way than men do, just as they have intellective understanding in a more excellent way as well.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is talking here about choice as it exists in man. But just as a man's judgment about speculative matters (*speculativa*) differs from an angel's in that the latter occurs without inquiry, whereas the former occurs through inquiry, so it is with practical matters (*operabilia*). Hence, angels have choice in virtue of their direct reception of truth and in the absence of the deliberative inquiry of counsel.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained (a. 2), cognition occurs in virtue of the fact that the object of cognition exists in the one having the cognition. Now a thing is imperfect when what is apt by nature to exist in it does not exist in it. Hence, an angel would not be perfect in his nature if his intellect were not determinate with respect to every truth that he can have cognition of by nature.

By contrast, an act of an appetitive power occurs in virtue of the fact that the affections are inclined toward an exterior thing. Now the perfection of a thing does not depend on every entity toward which it is inclined, but depends only on what is higher. And so it is not an imperfection on the part of an angel if he does not have a determinate will with respect to those things that are lower than himself. However, it would be an imperfection on his part if he had an indeterminate will with respect to what is higher than himself.

Reply to objection 3: Free choice exists in a more noble way in the higher angels than it does in the lower angels, just as the judgment of the intellect exists in a more noble way in the higher angels. Yet it is true that freedom itself, to the extent that it is thought of as involving a certain absence of coercion, does not admit of greater and lesser degrees. For privations and negations are not intensified or remitted *per se*, but are intensified or remitted only through their causes or in light of an adjoined affirmation.

Article 4

Do angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite?

It seems that angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite (*in angelis sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that in the demons “there is irrational fury and insane concupiscence.” But demons have the same nature as angels, since their sin did not alter their nature. Therefore, angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite.

Objection 2: Love and joy exist in the concupiscible appetite, whereas anger, hope, and fear exist in the irascible appetite. But all of these are attributed to good and bad angels in Sacred Scripture. Therefore, angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite.

Objection 3: Certain virtues are said to exist in the irascible and concupiscible appetites; for instance, charity and temperance seem to exist in the concupiscible appetite, whereas hope and fortitude exist in the irascible appetite. But these virtues exist in angels. Therefore, angels have an irascible appetite and a concupiscible appetite.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the irascible and concupiscible appetites exist in the sentient part of the soul. But angels do not have a sentient part. Therefore, they do not have an irascible appetite or a concupiscible appetite.

I respond: Only a sentient appetite, and not an intellective appetite, is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible. The reason for this is that since powers are differentiated only by the formal concept of their objects and not by a material distinction among their objects, it follows that if a given object corresponds to a power under some common concept, then there will not be a distinction of powers corresponding to the diversity of the proper concepts contained by that common concept. For instance, if the proper object of the visual power is color under the concept *color*, then there will not be two distinct visual powers corresponding to the difference between *black* and *white*. However, if *white* as *white* were the proper object of some power, then the power that sees white would be distinct from the power that sees black.

Now it is clear from what has been said (a. 1 and q. 16, a. 1) that the object of the intellective appetite (or will) is the good under the common concept of the good, and there cannot be any desire that is not a desire for the good. Hence, in the intellective part [of our soul] the appetite is not divided in a way that corresponds to the distinction among particular goods—unlike the sentient appetite, which is divided in virtue of the fact that its objects are certain particular goods and not the good under the common concept of the good. Hence, since angels have only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible, but instead remains undivided and is called the will.

Reply to objection 1: Fury and concupiscence are predicated of the demons metaphorically, in just the way that anger is sometimes attributed to God, because of a likeness in the effects.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as love and joy are passions, they exist in the concupiscible appetite, but insofar as ‘love’ and ‘joy’ name simple acts of will, these acts exist in the intellective part. For instance, to love is to will the good for someone, and to rejoice is for the will to rest in some good that is now possessed. And, more generally, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 9, none of these names is used for a passion in the case of the angels.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as charity is a virtue, it exists in the will and not in the concupiscible appetite. For the object of the concupiscible appetite is a good that is pleasurable to the senses. But the divine good, which is the object of charity, is not a good of this sort.

For the same reason, one should claim that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite. For the

object of the irascible appetite is some arduous sensible good. But this is not what the hope which is a virtue has to do with; instead, it has to do with an arduous divine good.

Now insofar as temperance is a human virtue, it has to do with desires for sensible pleasures, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Similarly, fortitude has to do with acts of daring and fear, which exist in the irascible power. And so temperance, insofar as it is a human virtue, exists in the concupiscible power, and fortitude exists in the irascible power. But temperance and fortitude do not exist in the angels in this way. For in the angels there are no passions of sense desire or of fear and daring, which are the passions that have to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. Rather, temperance is said to exist in the angels to the extent that they employ their will with moderation in keeping with the rule of God's will. And fortitude is said to exist in them to the extent that they carry out God's will steadfastly. But all of this is done through their will and not through an irascible or concupiscible appetite.

QUESTION 60

An Angel's Love or Affection

We next have to consider the act of the will, which is love, i.e., affection (*amor sive dilectio*). For every act of an appetitive power stems from love, i.e., affection. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Do angels have natural love? (2) Do angels have elective love? (3) Is it with natural love or elective love that an angel loves himself? (4) Does an angel love another angel as himself with natural love? (5) Does an angel love God more than himself with natural love?

Article 1

Do angels have natural love or affection?

It seems that angels do not have natural love or affection:

Objection 1: As is clear from Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, natural love is contrasted with intellectual love. But an angel's love is intellectual love. Therefore, it is not natural love.

Objection 2: Things that love with a natural love do not so much act as they are acted upon, since nothing has control over its own nature. But angels act and are not acted upon, since, as has been shown (q. 59, a. 3), they have free choice. Therefore, angels do not have natural love or affection.

Objection 3: Every affection is either upright or not upright. Now upright affection involves charity, whereas affection that is not upright involves wickedness. But neither charity nor wickedness pertains to nature; for charity is supernatural, whereas wickedness is contrary to nature. Therefore, angels do not have natural affection.

But contrary to this: Love follows upon cognition, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, nothing is loved unless it is known. But angels have natural cognition. Therefore, they also have natural love.

I respond: One must posit a natural love in the angels. To see this clearly, notice that what is prior is always preserved in what is posterior to it. But nature is prior to intellect, since the nature of each thing is its essence. Hence, that which belongs to nature has to be preserved even in entities that have an intellect.

Now it is common to every nature to have a certain inclination that constitutes its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found in diverse ways in diverse natures and in each according to its own mode. Hence, in an intellectual nature there is a natural inclination in the will, whereas in a sentient nature there is a natural inclination in the sentient appetite, and in a nature that lacks cognition there is only the nature's being ordered toward something.

Hence, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.

Reply to objection 1: Intellectual love is distinguished from a natural love that is *merely* natural in the sense that merely natural love belongs to a nature that does not have, over and beyond the notion of a nature, the additional perfection of the senses or the intellect.

Reply to objection 2: All the things that exist in the whole world are acted upon by something—except the first agent, which acts in such a way that it is not in any sense acted upon by another and in which nature and will are the same. And so there is nothing inappropriate about an angel's being acted upon, given that his natural inclination is instilled in him by the author of his nature. And yet he is not acted upon in such a way that he does not also act. For he has free will.

Reply to objection 3: Just as a natural cognition is always true, so too a natural affection is always upright. For natural love is nothing other than an inclination instilled in the nature by the author of the nature. Therefore, to say that a natural inclination is not upright is to disparage the author of the nature.

However, the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue, since the latter rectitude is perfective of the former. It is likewise in this same way that the truth of a natural cognition is different from the truth of an infused or acquired cognition.

Article 2

Do angels have elective love?

It seems that the angels do not have elective love (*dilectio electiva*):

Objection 1: Elective love seems to be rational love (*amor rationalis*), since the act of choosing (*electio*) follows upon deliberation, which, as *Ethics* 3 says, consists in inquiry. But rational love is contrasted with intellectual love, which, as *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4 says, is proper to the angels. Therefore, angels do not have elective love.

Objection 2: Over and beyond infused cognition, the angels have only natural cognition, since they do not reason from principles in order to reach conclusions. And so they are related to all the things that they can have cognition of naturally in just the way that our intellect is related to the first principles that we ourselves can have cognition of naturally. But, as has been pointed out (a. 1), love follows upon cognition. Therefore, over and beyond the love that stems from grace, angels have only natural love. Therefore, they do not have elective love.

But contrary to this: We neither gain merit nor lose merit by what is natural. But angels gain or lose merit by their love. Therefore, they have elective love.

I respond: Angels have both natural love and elective love. Their natural love is the principle of their elective love, since that which pertains to what is prior always has the nature of a principle. Hence, since the nature is what is first in each thing, what belongs to the nature must be the principle in each thing.

This is obvious in man both with respect to his intellect and with respect to his will. For the intellect has cognition of the principles naturally, and this cognition is a cause of a man's knowledge (*scientia*) of the conclusions, which the man does not have cognition of naturally but comes to have cognition of through discovery or teaching. Similarly, as *Physics* 2 points out, the end plays the same role in the case of the will that the principles play in the case of the intellect. Hence, the will naturally tends toward its own ultimate end. For every man naturally desires beatitude. And this natural act of will is a cause of all other acts of will, since a man wills whatever he wills for the sake of the end. Thus, a man's *natural love* is the love of that good which he naturally wills as his end, whereas his *elective love*, derived from this natural love, is the love of a good that is loved for the sake of that end.

However, there is a difference here between the intellect and the will. For as was explained above (q. 59, a. 2), the intellect's cognition occurs insofar as what the cognition is of exists in the one who has the cognition. And because of the imperfection of man's intellectual nature, his intellect does not by nature immediately possess all of its intelligible objects, but instead has only some of them immediately and from these it moves in some way to the others. By contrast, the act of an appetitive power involves the ordering of the one who desires toward the things themselves. Certain of these things are good in themselves (*secundum se*) and so are desirable in themselves, whereas others have the nature of goodness because of their relation to something else and are desirable because of that something else. Hence, it is not because of any imperfection on the part of the one who desires that he should desire one thing naturally as his end and another thing by choice insofar as it is ordered toward that end. Therefore, since angels have a perfect intellectual nature, they have only natural cognition and not discursive cognition, and yet they have both natural love and elective love.

Now what has been said so far leaves out things that are supernatural to the angels, since their nature is not a sufficient principle of those things. More will be said below (q. 62) about such things.

Reply to objection 1: Not every sort of elective love is rational love in the sense in which rational love is contrasted with intellectual love. For love is called rational when it follows upon discursive cognition and, as was explained above when we were discussing free choice (q. 59, a. 3), not every act of choosing follows upon discursive reasoning; only a man's act of choosing does. Hence, the objection does not go through.

Reply to objection 2: The reply to the second objection is clear from what has been said.

Article 3

Does an angel love himself with both natural love and elective love?

It seems that an angel does not love himself with both natural love and elective love:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 2), natural love is directed toward the end itself, whereas elective love is directed toward what is ordered toward the end. But the same thing cannot, in the same respect, be both the end and what is ordered toward the end. Therefore, natural love and elective love cannot be directed toward the same thing.

Objection 2: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "Love is a uniting and bonding power." But uniting and bonding apply to diverse things that are made one. Therefore, an angel cannot love himself.

Objection 3: Love is a certain movement. But every movement tends toward another. Therefore, it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural love or elective love.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, "Friendship with another stems from friendship with oneself."

I respond: Since, as is clear from *Ethics* 1, love is directed toward a good, and since a good is either a substantial good or an accidental good, it follows that something may be loved in one of two ways: either (a) as a subsistent good or (b) as an accidental or inhering good. What is loved as a subsistent good is loved in such a way that someone wills the good for it, whereas what is loved as an accidental or inhering good is loved in such a way that it is desired for the other, in the way that knowledge is loved not in order that it itself might be good, but rather in order that it might be possessed by someone. This second type of love is called the *love of concupiscence* by some, whereas the first type is called the *love of friendship*.

Now it is clear that each thing that lacks cognition desires naturally to attain what is good for itself; for instance, fire seeks a higher place. Hence, an angel or a man naturally desires his own good and his own perfection; and this is what it is to love oneself. Hence, an angel or a man loves himself by nature, since he desires some good for himself by a natural desire.

On the other hand, to the extent that an angel or a man desires some good for himself by choice, he loves himself with elective love.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, it is not in the same respect, but rather in diverse respects, that an angel or a man loves himself with natural love and loves himself with elective love.

Reply to objection 2: Just as being one with something is more than simply being united with it, so there is more oneness in love directed toward oneself than there is in love directed toward other things that are united to oneself.

However, the reason why Dionysius used the names 'uniting' and 'bonding' was in order to show

that love for other things derives from love for oneself, just as being united is derived from being one.

Reply to objection 3: Just as love is an action that remains within the agent, so too it is a movement that remains within the lover. Moreover, this movement does not necessarily tend toward something else, but can instead be reflected back on the lover in order that he might love himself. In the same way, cognition is also reflected back on the one having the cognition in order that he might have cognition of himself.

Article 4

Does an angel love another angel as himself with natural love?

It seems that an angel does not love another angel as himself with natural love:

Objection 1: Love follows upon cognition. But one angel does not have cognition of another angel as of himself, since, as was explained above, (q. 56, aa. 1 and 2), he has cognition of himself through his own essence, whereas he has cognition of another angel through a likeness of that angel. Therefore, it seems that one angel does not love another angel as himself.

Objection 2: A cause is more powerful than what it causes, and a principle is more powerful than what is derived from that principle. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9, a love that is directed toward another is derived from the love that is directed toward oneself. Therefore, an angel does not love another angel as himself; instead, he loves himself more.

Objection 3: Natural love is directed toward something as an end, and it cannot be removed. But it is not the case that one angel is the end of another angel; in addition, the love of one angel for another can be removed, as is clear in the case of the demons, who do not love the good angels. Therefore, one angel does not love another angel as himself with natural love.

But contrary to this: What is found in all things, even in things that lack reason, seems to be natural. But Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, “Every beast loves its like.” Therefore, one angel naturally loves another angel as himself.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), an angel or a man naturally loves himself. Now what is one with a thing is that very thing itself, and so each thing loves that which is one with it. If that thing is one with it through a natural union, then it loves it with natural love, whereas if it is one with it through a non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. For instance, a man loves his fellow citizen with the love that is a political virtue, whereas he loves his blood relative with natural love, since he is one with his blood relative in the principle of natural generation.

Now it is clear that what is one with something in species or genus is one with him in nature. And so each thing loves with natural love that which is one with him in species, since it loves its own species. This is obvious even in the case of things that lack cognition; for instance, a fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another—which communication is its good—in just the same way that it has a natural inclination to seek its own good, viz., being high up.

So, then, one should claim that one angel loves another angel with natural love insofar as he shares a nature with him. However, it is not the case that he loves another angel with natural love insofar as he shares other things with him or, again, insofar as he differs from him in other things.

Reply to objection 1: In one sense, the phrase ‘as himself’ can modify the cognition (or the love) with respect to the thing that the cognition is of (or that is loved). And in this sense an angel knows another as himself because he knows that the other exists, just as he knows that he himself exists.

In a second sense, the phrase ‘as himself’ modifies the cognition (or love) with respect to the one

who has the cognition (or who is loving). And in this sense it is not the case that one angel knows another angel as himself, since he knows himself through his own essence, whereas he does not know the other through the other's own essence. Similarly, he does not love the other as himself, since he loves himself through his own will, whereas he does not love the other through the other's own will.

Reply to objection 2: The particle 'as' implies similarity and not equality. For since natural love is based upon natural oneness, that which is one with him to a lesser degree is such that he naturally loves it less. Hence, he naturally loves that which is numerically one with him to a greater degree than he loves what is one with him only in species or in genus. On the other hand, it is natural that he should have a love for the other that is similar to his love for himself in the sense that just as he loves himself insofar as he wills the good for himself, so he loves the other insofar as he wills the other's good.

Reply to objection 3: Natural love is said to be directed toward the end itself not in the sense that one wills the good for the end, but in the sense that he wills the end as a good for himself and, consequently, as a good for another insofar as that other is one with him.

Moreover, this natural love cannot be removed even from the bad angels in the sense that it would not be the case that they have a natural love for other angels insofar as they share their nature with them. However, they do hate the good angels insofar as they differ from them with respect to uprightness (*iustitia*) and wickedness (*iniustitia*).

Article 5

Does an angel love God more than himself with natural love?

It seems that an angel does not love God more than himself with natural love:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 4), natural love is based on natural union. But God's nature is maximally distant from an angel's nature. Therefore, an angel loves God less than himself with natural love—and even less than he loves another angel.

Objection 2: That for the sake of which each thing is such-and-such is itself more such-and-such. But it is for his own sake that each one loves another with natural love, since everything is such that it loves a thing insofar as that thing is good for it. Therefore, an angel does not love God more than himself with natural love.

Objection 3: Nature reflects back on itself; for we see that every agent acts naturally to conserve itself. But nature would not reflect back on itself if it tended toward another more than it tends toward itself. Therefore, an angel does not love God more than himself with natural love.

Objection 4: It seems proper to charity that someone should love God more than himself. But the love of charity is not natural in angels; instead, as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 12, the love of charity is "poured into their hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to them." Therefore, angels do not love God more than themselves with natural love.

Objection 5: Natural love always remains as long as the nature remains. But to love God more than oneself does not remain in an angel or a man who sins. For as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, "The two loves created two cities. Specifically, the love of oneself even to the point of contempt for God created the earthly city, whereas the love of God even to the point of contempt for oneself created the heavenly city." Therefore, it is not natural to love God above oneself (*supra seipsum*).

But contrary to this: All the moral precepts of the Law belong to the natural law. But the precept to love God above oneself is a moral precept of the Law. Therefore, it belongs to the natural law. Therefore, an angel loves God above himself with natural love.

I respond: Some have claimed that (a) by natural love an angel loves God more than himself both with a love of concupiscence, since he desires the divine good for himself more than his own good, and in some sense with a love of friendship, insofar as an angel naturally wills for God a greater good than he wills for himself, since he naturally wills that God should be God and that he himself should have his own proper nature, but that (b), *absolutely speaking*, by natural love an angel loves himself more than God in the sense that he loves himself more intensely and more principally than he loves God.

However, the falsity of this opinion is obvious if one considers, in the case of natural things, what such things are naturally moved toward. For the natural inclination of the things that lack reason is an indication of the natural inclination of an intellectual nature's will. Now among natural things, each thing that by its very nature belongs to another is such that it is inclined more principally and more intensely toward that to which it belongs than toward itself. This natural inclination is clear from things that are naturally acted upon. For as *Physics* 2 says, each thing is acted upon in just the way that it is naturally apt to be acted upon. For instance, we see that a part naturally exposes itself for the sake of conserving the whole, in the way that a hand is exposed to a blow without deliberation for the sake of conserving the whole body. And since reason imitates nature, we also find an inclination of this sort among the political virtues. For a virtuous citizen exposes himself to the danger of death for the sake of conserving the whole polity; and if a man were a natural part of this [earthly] city, then this inclination would be natural to him.

Therefore, since God Himself is the universal good, and since this good contains within itself angels and men and all creatures (for every creature is naturally such that, given what it is, it belongs to God), it follows that even by natural love an angel or man loves God to a greater degree and more principally than himself. Otherwise, if he naturally loved himself more than God, it would follow that his natural love is perverted and that it would be destroyed, rather than perfected, by charity.

Reply to objection 1: This argument is talking about those things which are divided from one another as equals and which are not such that one of them is the reason for the existence and goodness of the other. For among such things, each one loves itself by nature more than the other, since it is more one with itself than with the other.

By contrast, if the one has the other as the whole reason for its existence and goodness, then by nature it loves this sort of other more than itself—in the way that, as was explained above, a part naturally loves the whole more than itself, and in the way that each particular thing naturally loves the good of its species more than its own particular good. But God is not only the good of each species but also the universal good itself, absolutely speaking. Hence, each thing in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.

Reply to objection 2: When one says that God is loved by an angel insofar as He is good for that angel, if the expression 'insofar as' expresses the *end* [of the love], then the claim is false. For an angel naturally loves God not for the sake of his own good, but for the sake of God Himself.

On the other hand, if 'insofar as' expresses the *explanation* for the love (*amoris ratio*) on the part of the lover, then the claim is true. For it would not be natural to anything that it should love God, if it were not the case that each thing depends on the good which is God.

Reply to objection 3: Nature is reflected back on itself not only with respect to what is particular in it, but even more with respect to what is common. For each thing is inclined to conserve not only itself as an individual, but also its own species. And, *a fortiori*, each thing has a natural inclination toward that which is the universal good, absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 4: It is insofar as God is the universal good on which every natural good depends that He is loved by each thing with a natural love. However, it is insofar as He is the good who naturally beatifies everyone with a supernatural beatitude that He is loved with the love of charity.

Reply to objection 5: Since God's substance and the common good are one and the same, everyone who sees God's very essence is moved with the very same movement of love toward God's essence itself both (a) insofar as it is distinct from other things and also (b) insofar as it is the common good. And since a good is naturally loved by all things insofar as it is common, everyone who sees God through His essence is such that he cannot but love Him.

However, those who do not see His essence have cognition of Him through His particular effects, which are sometimes contrary to their will. And so it is in this sense that they are said to hold God in contempt. And yet, insofar as God is the common good of all things, everything still loves God naturally more than itself.

QUESTION 61

The Production of Angels with Their Natural *Esse*

Given what has already been said about the nature of angels and about their cognition and willing, what remains to be considered is their creation or, more generally, their origin. This inquiry has three parts. First, we will consider the way in which angels were produced with their natural *esse* (question 61); second, the way in which angels were perfected in grace and glory (question 62); and, third, the way in which some of them became bad (questions 63 and 64).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Do angels have a cause of their *esse*? (2) Do angels exist from eternity? (3) Were angels created before corporeal creatures? (4) Were angels created in the empyrean heaven?

Article 1

Do angels have a cause of their *esse*?

It seems that angels do not have a cause of their *esse*:

Objection 1: Genesis 1 talks about the things that were created by God. But no mention of angels is made there. Therefore, angels were not created by God.

Objection 2: In *Metaphysics* 8 the Philosopher says that if a given substance is a form without matter, then it has being and oneness immediately through itself, and it does not have a cause which makes it an entity or makes it one. But as was shown above (q. 50, a. 2), angels are immaterial forms. Therefore, they do not have a cause of their *esse*.

Objection 3: Everything that is made by an agent is such that by the very fact that it is made, it receives its form from that agent. But since angels are forms, they do not receive their form from any agent. Therefore, angels do not have an agent cause.

But contrary to this: Psalm 148:2 says, "Praise Him, all you His angels." And afterwards it adds, "For He spoke, and they were made."

I respond: It is necessary to assert that angels, as well as everything else other than God, was made by God. For God alone is His own *esse*, whereas in all other things, as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), the essence of the thing differs from its *esse*. From this it is clear that God alone is a being through His essence, whereas all other things are beings by participation. But everything that is such-and-such by participation is caused by that which is such-and-such through its essence; for instance, fire is a cause of everything that is on fire. Hence, it is necessary for angels to have been created by God.

Reply to objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 11 Augustine claims that the angels were not left out in the first creation of things, but that they are signified by the name 'heaven' or even by the name 'light'. Now the reason why they were either left out or signified by the names of corporeal things is that Moses was speaking to an uneducated people who were not yet able to comprehend an incorporeal nature. And if he had told them that there were certain things above every corporeal nature, this would have been for them an occasion of idolatry, which they were already prone to and which Moses wanted especially to call them back from.

Reply to objection 2: Substances that are subsistent forms do not have any formal cause of their *esse* or their oneness; nor do they have an agent cause that transforms their matter from potentiality to actuality. But they do have a cause that produces their whole substance.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to objection 3 is clear from what has just been said.

Article 2

Were the angels produced by God from eternity?

It seems that the angels were produced by God from eternity (*ab aeterno*):

Objection 1: God is a cause of an angel through His own *esse*, since He does not act through anything that is added to His essence. But His *esse* is eternal. Therefore, He produced angels from eternity.

Objection 2: Anything that exists at some times and not at others is subject to time. But as the *Liber de Causis* says, an angel is beyond time. Therefore, an angel is not such that he exists at some times and not at others; instead, he always exists.

Objection 3: Augustine proves the incorruptibility of the soul from the fact that the soul is able through its intellect to know truth. But truth is eternal in the same way that it is incorruptible. Therefore, the intellectual nature of souls and angels is not only incorruptible, but also eternal.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 8:22 says in the person of Begotten Wisdom, “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything at the beginning.” But as has been shown (a. 1), angels were made by God. Therefore, there was a time at which angels did not exist.

I respond: God alone—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—exists from eternity. This is what the Catholic Faith firmly holds, and any contrary opinion is to be rejected as heretical. For God produced creatures in such a way that He made them from nothing (*ex nihilo*), i.e., He made them after there was nothing.

Reply to objection 1: God’s *esse* is His very act of willing. Therefore, the fact that God produced angels and other creatures through His *esse* does not rule out His having produced them by His act of will. But as was explained above (q. 19, a. 3 and q. 46, a. 1), God’s will does not produce creatures by necessity. And so He produced the things He wanted to, and He produced them when He wanted to.

Reply to objection 2: An angel is beyond that time which numbers the movement of the heavens, since an angel is above all the movements of corporeal nature. Yet an angel is not beyond that time which numbers the succession of his own *esse* after non-*esse*, or that time which numbers the succession of his own operations. This is why Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 that God moves the spiritual creature through time.

Reply to objection 3: Angels and intellective souls are incorruptible by the very fact that they have a nature through which they are capable of knowing truth. But they did not have this nature from eternity; instead, it was given to them by God when He willed to give it to them. Hence, it does not follow that the angels existed from eternity.

Article 3

Were the angels created before the corporeal world?

It seems that the angels were created before the corporeal world:

Objection 1: In *Super Epistolam ad Titum* Jerome says, “Six thousand years of our time have not yet been completed. How much time, and how many beginnings of ages, must we think there have been in which the angels—the Thrones, Dominations, and the rest of the orders—have served God?” And in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “Some claim that the angels were born before all of creation; for instance, the theologian Gregory says, ‘God first thought of the angelic and heavenly powers, and this

thought was His work.””

Objection 2: Angelic nature lies between God’s nature and corporeal nature. But God’s nature exists from eternity, whereas corporeal nature exists from the onset of time. Therefore, angelic nature was made before the creation of time and after eternity.

Objection 3: Angelic nature is more distant from corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another; this is why the beginning of Genesis describes six days of the production of things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, angelic nature was made before every corporeal nature.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” But this would not be true if He had created something before this. Therefore, angels were not created before corporeal nature.

I respond: On this matter the holy doctors hold two opinions, but it seems that the more probable opinion is that the angels were created at the same time that corporeal creatures were. For the angels are a certain part of the universe, since they do not by themselves constitute a universe, but instead come together with corporeal creatures to constitute a single universe. This is clear from the ordering of one creature toward another, since the ordering of things toward one another is the good of the universe. But no part is perfect when separated from its whole. Therefore, it is not probable that God, “whose works are perfect” (Deuteronomy 32:4), would have created angelic creatures separately before other creatures.

However, the contrary position should not be labeled ‘erroneous’—mainly because it is the opinion of Gregory Nazianzus. For as Jerome says, Gregory’s authority in Christian doctrine is so great that, as in the case of Athanasius’s writings, no one has ever presumed to impugn his teaching.

Reply to objection 1: Jerome is here relating the position of the Greek doctors, who all agree that the angels were created before the corporeal world.

Reply to objection 2: God is not a part of the universe, but instead stands above the whole universe, containing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way. Angels, by contrast, are a part of the universe. Therefore, the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal creatures are all one in matter, whereas angels do not share in matter with corporeal creation. Hence, once the matter of corporeal creatures has been created, all of them have in some sense been created, whereas it is not the case that once angels are created, the universe itself has been created.

Still, if one maintains the contrary position, then the words of Genesis 1:1, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” have to be interpreted in such a way that ‘in the beginning’ means ‘in the Son’ or, alternatively, ‘at the beginning of time’. But ‘in the beginning’ would not mean a beginning before which there was nothing, except in the sense that it was a beginning before which there was nothing in the genus of corporeal creatures.

Article 4

Were the angels created in the empyrean heaven?

It seems that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven:

Objection 1: Angels are incorporeal substances. But an incorporeal substance does not depend on a body for its *esse* and, as a result, it does not depend on a body for its being-made (*fieri*), either. Therefore, angels were not created in a corporeal place.

Objection 2: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 3 Augustine says that the angels were created in the

highest part of the air. Therefore, they were not created in the empyrean heaven.

Objection 3: The empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. Therefore, if the angels had been created in the empyrean heaven, then it would not have been possible for them to ascend to a higher heaven. But this is contrary to what Isaiah 14:13 (“I will ascend into heaven”) says in the person of a sinful angel.

But contrary to this: In commenting on the passage, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” Strabo says, “What he is here calling ‘heaven’ is not the visible firmament, but the empyreum, i.e., the fiery or intellectual heaven, which is named not from its heat but from its splendor and which was filled with angels as soon as it was made.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), corporeal creatures and spiritual creatures together constitute a single universe. Hence, spiritual creatures were created in such a way that they have some ordering toward corporeal creatures and preside over the whole of corporeal creation. Thus, it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest body in order that they might preside over the whole of corporeal nature—whether we call this the empyrean heaven or use some other name for it. Hence, in *Super Deuteronomium* 10:14 (“Behold heaven belongs to the Lord your God, and the heaven of heavens”) Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels.

Reply to objection 1: The angels were not created in a corporeal place in the sense that they depended on a body for their *esse* or for their being-made. For God could have created the angels before the whole of corporeal creation, as many doctors maintain He did. Rather, the angels were made in a corporeal place in order to exhibit their relation to corporeal nature and to show that they have contact with bodies by their power.

Reply to objection 2: Perhaps by ‘the highest part of the air’ Augustine means the highest part of the heavens, with which air has a certain agreement because of its subtle and diaphanous nature. Or perhaps he is talking not about all the angels, but about only those who had sinned, since, according to some authors, the ones who sinned belonged to the lower orders of angels.

However, nothing prevents one from saying that the higher angels, who have an elevated and universal power over all bodies, were created in the highest of corporeal creatures, whereas other angels, who have a more particularized power, were created among the lower bodies.

Reply to objection 3: The passage in question is talking not about any corporeal heaven, but rather about the heaven of the Holy Trinity, to which the sinful angel wanted to ascend when he willed to be in some sense equal to God. This will become clear below (q. 63, a. 3).

QUESTION 62

The Perfection of Angels in the *Esse* of Grace and Glory

Next we have to investigate how the angels were brought into the *esse* of grace and glory. On this topic there are nine questions: (1) Were the angels beatified at their creation? (2) Did the angels need grace in order to turn toward God? (3) Were the angels created in grace? (4) Did the angels merit their beatitude? (5) Did the angels attain beatitude immediately upon meriting it? (6) Did the angels receive grace and glory in proportion to their natural gifts? (7) Did natural love and natural cognition remain in the angels after they attained glory? (8) Were the angels able to sin after attaining glory? (9) Were the angels able to make progress in beatitude after attaining glory?

Article 1

Were the angels created in beatitude?

It seems that the angels were created in beatitude (*angeli fuerint creati beati*):

Objection 1: *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “The angels who persevered in the beatitude in which they were created do not by nature possess the good which they have.” Therefore, the angels were created in beatitude.

Objection 2: Angelic nature is more noble than a corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature was created as formed and perfect from the very beginning of its creation and, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1, its being unformed was only naturally, and not temporally, prior to its being formed. Therefore, God did not create the angelic nature as unformed and imperfect, either. But an angel is formed and perfect to the extent that he enjoys God through beatitude. Therefore, the angels were created in beatitude.

Objection 3: According to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, the things made in the work of the six days of creation were made all at once, and so all six of those days must have existed immediately at the very beginning of creation. But according to Augustine’s interpretation, the morning knowledge of the angels existed in those six days insofar as they knew the Word and knew [created] things in the Word. Therefore, immediately from the beginning of their creation they knew the Word and [created] things in the Word. But the angels are beatified by the very fact that they see the Word. Therefore, the angels were beatified at the very beginning of their creation.

But contrary to this: Stability in the good—i.e., being confirmed in the good—is part of the nature of beatitude. But as the fall of some of the angels demonstrates, the angels were not confirmed in the good immediately upon being created. Therefore, the angels were not beatified at their creation.

I respond: By the name ‘beatitude’ we mean the ultimate perfection of a rational or intellectual nature. Thus, beatitude is what such a nature naturally desires, since each thing naturally desires its own ultimate perfection.

Now there are two sorts of ultimate perfection for a rational or intellectual nature:

One of them is the perfection that it can attain by the power of its own nature, and this is called beatitude or happiness in a certain respect (*quodammodo*). Hence, Aristotle says that ultimate human happiness is the most perfect type of human contemplation by which a man is able in this life to contemplate the best intelligible object, viz., God.

However, beyond this happiness there is another sort of happiness, which we ourselves look forward to in the future and by which “we will see God as He is” (1 John 3:2). As was explained above (q. 12, a. 4), this sort of happiness lies beyond the nature of any created intellect.

So, then, one should claim that as regards the first sort of beatitude, which an angel was able to

attain by the power of his own nature, he was created in beatitude. For an angel did not acquire this sort of perfection by any kind of discursive movement, in the way that a man does; instead, as was explained above (q. 58, aa. 3 and 4), this sort of beatitude was immediately present to him because of the dignity of his nature.

However, at the very beginning of their creation the angels did not have the sort of ultimate beatitude that exceeds the power of their nature. For this sort of beatitude is not part of their nature, but is instead the end of their nature. And so it was not right for them to have it immediately at the very beginning.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage ‘beatitude’ is being used for the sort of natural perfection that the angels had in the state of innocence.

Reply to objection 2: A corporeal creature could not at the very beginning of its creation have the perfection that it is led to by its own operation. Hence, according to Augustine, the germination of plants from the earth did not occur immediately at the time of the first works, when only the power to germinate plants was given to the earth. Similarly, the angelic creature had the perfection of his own nature at the beginning of his creation, but he did not have the perfection at which he was supposed to arrive through his own operation.

Reply to objection 3: An angel has two types of knowledge of the Word, one a natural knowledge and the other a glorified knowledge. The natural knowledge is the knowledge by which he knows the Word through the likeness of the Word that shines forth in the angel’s own nature. The glorified knowledge, on the other hand, is the knowledge by which an angel knows the Word through the Word’s own essence.

Furthermore, it is in both of these ways that an angel knows created things in the Word. He knows them imperfectly through his natural cognition and perfectly through his glorified cognition. Therefore, the first sort of cognition of created things in the Word was present to the angel at the very beginning of his creation, whereas the second sort of cognition was not. Instead, the second sort of cognition became present to him when he was beatified through his turning toward the good; and it is this cognition that is properly called ‘morning knowledge’.

Article 2

Did an angel need grace in order to turn toward God?

It seems that an angel did not need grace in order to turn toward God (*ad hoc quod converteretur in Deum*):

Objection 1: We do not need grace for what we are naturally able to do. But an angel is naturally turned toward God, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 60, a. 5), he loves God with natural love. Therefore, an angel did not need grace in order to turn toward God.

Objection 2: We ourselves seem to need assistance only for things that are difficult. But it was not difficult for an angel to turn toward God, since there was nothing in him that would militate against such a conversion. Therefore, an angel did not need the assistance of grace in order to turn toward God.

Objection 3: To turn toward God is to prepare oneself for grace. Hence, Zachariah 1:3 says, “Turn toward me, and I will turn toward you.” But we ourselves do not need grace in order to prepare for grace, since otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Therefore, an angel did not need grace in order to turn toward God.

But contrary to this: It is through turning toward God that an angel arrives at beatitude.

Therefore, if he did not need grace in order to turn toward God, it would follow that he does not need grace in order to have eternal life. But this is contrary to what the Apostle says at Romans 6:23 (“The grace of God is eternal life”).

I respond: The angels needed grace to turn toward God insofar as He is the object of beatitude. For as was explained above (q. 60, a. 2), the will’s natural movement is the source (*principium*) of all the things we will. But the will’s natural inclination is toward what is naturally fitting for it. And so if something lies beyond its nature, then the will cannot be moved toward it without the assistance of some other principle that lies beyond its nature (*ab aliquo alio principio supernaturali*). For instance, it is clear that fire has a natural inclination to produce heat and to generate fire; however, it lies beyond fire’s natural power to generate flesh, and so fire does not have an inclination toward generating flesh except insofar as it is moved as an instrument by the nutritive soul.

Now it was shown above, in the discussion of our knowledge of God (q. 12, aa. 4 and 5), that to see God through His essence—which is what the ultimate beatitude of a rational creature consists in—lies beyond the nature of any created intellect. Hence, no rational creature can have a movement of will that is ordered toward this sort of beatitude unless he is moved by a supernatural agent; this is what we call the assistance of grace. And so one has to claim that an angel could not have turned with his will toward this sort of beatitude except through the assistance of grace.

Reply to objection 1: An angel has natural love for God insofar as God is the source of his natural *esse*. But here we are talking about the angel’s turning toward God insofar as God beatifies him through the vision of His essence.

Reply to objection 2: The difficult is that which exceeds a given power. But this can happen in two ways:

In one way, a thing is difficult because it exceeds the relevant power with respect to the power’s own natural ordering. And in such a case, if the power can attain that thing with some sort of assistance, then the thing is called ‘difficult’, whereas if it cannot be attained in any way at all, then it is called ‘impossible’ in the sense in which it is impossible for a man to fly.

In the second way, the thing in question exceeds the relevant power not with respect to the power’s natural ordering, but rather because of some impediment that is conjoined with the power. For instance, to ascend is not contrary to the natural ordering of the soul’s moving power, since the soul, taken just by itself, is apt to move to any place at all; rather, the soul is impeded from doing this by the body’s heaviness (*gravitas*), and this is why it is difficult for a man to ascend.

Now to turn toward ultimate beatitude is difficult for a man both because it exceeds his nature and also because he has impediments stemming from the corruption of the body and the infection of sin. By contrast, turning toward ultimate beatitude is difficult for an angel solely because it exceeds his nature.

Reply to objection 3: Every movement of the will toward God can be called a ‘turning toward’ Him (*conversio ad ipsum*). So there are three types of turning toward God:

One type is through perfect love, which is had by a creature who is already enjoying God. What is required for this type of turning toward God is *consummated grace* (*gratia consummata*).

The second type is that turning toward God which merits beatitude. And what is required for this is *habitual grace* (*habitualis gratia*), which is the principle of merit.

The third type is that turning toward God through which someone prepares himself to have grace. And what is needed for this is not habitual grace, but rather *the action of God* turning the soul toward Himself, in accord with Lamentations 5:21 (“Convert us, O Lord, to You, and we shall be converted”).

Hence, it is clear that there is no infinite regress here.

Article 3

Were the angels created in grace?

It seems that the angels were not created in grace (*non sit creati in gratia*):

Objection 1: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 Augustine says that angelic nature was first created in an unformed way and called ‘heaven’, and that afterwards it was formed and called ‘light’. But this formation occurs through grace. Therefore, the angels were not created in grace.

Objection 2: Grace inclines a rational creature toward God. Therefore, if the angels had been created in grace, then no angel would have turned away from God.

Objection 3: Grace lies between nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified at their creation. Therefore, it seems that they were not created in grace, either. Rather, first they were created only in their nature, and afterwards they attained grace, and finally they were beatified.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 12 Augustine says, “Who else fashioned the good will in the angels other than He who created them with His will—i.e., with the pure love by which they adhered to Him—which simultaneously produced their nature and bestowed grace on them?”

I respond: There are diverse opinions on this matter, with some claiming that the angels were created just with their natural powers and others claiming that they were created in grace. Still, the opinion which, it seems, should be held as most probable and which is more consonant with the writings of the saints is that the angels were created in habitual grace (*in gratia gratum faciente*).

For in this way we see that all the things, e.g., trees and animals and other such things, which were produced by a temporal process through the work of divine providence, with the creature operating in subordination to God, were produced in the first condition of things as certain ‘seminal reasons’ (*seminales rationes*), as Augustine calls them in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*. But it is clear that habitual grace is related to beatitude in just the way that a seminal reason in nature is related to a natural effect. This is why in 1 John 3:9 grace is called “the seed of God.” Therefore, following Augustine’s opinion, just as he claims that the seminal reasons of all natural effects were instilled in the very first creation of corporeal creation, so, too, from the very beginning the angels were created in grace.

Reply to objection 1: This ‘unformedness’ of an angel should be understood either (a) in relation to the formation effected by *glory*, in which case the ‘unformedness’ precedes the formation in time, or (b) in relation to the formation effected by *grace*, in which case it preceded the formation only in the order of nature and not in the order of time—in keeping with what Augustine likewise claims about corporeal formation.

Reply to objection 2: Every form inclines its subject in a way that accords with the mode of the subject’s nature. But the natural mode of an intellectual nature is that it should tend freely toward the things that it wills. And so the inclination of grace does not impose necessity; instead, one who has grace is able not to use it and to sin.

Reply to objection 3: Even though grace lies between nature and glory in the order of nature, nonetheless, as far as the order of time is concerned, it is not fitting for the nature and the glory to have existed from the same moment (*simul*) in a created nature. For glory is the end of the nature’s operation as assisted by grace. By contrast, grace is not the end of an operation, since it does not stem from works; rather, it is the beginning of operating well. And so it was appropriate for God to give grace immediately along with the nature.

Article 4

Did a beatified angel merit his own beatitude?

It seems that a beatified angel did not merit his own beatitude:

Objection 1: Merit stems from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But an angel had no difficulty in acting well. Therefore, his good act was not meritorious for him.

Objection 2: We ourselves do not merit by what is natural to us. But it was natural for an angel to turn toward God. Therefore, he did not merit beatitude by doing this.

Objection 3: If a beatified angel merited his beatitude, then he did this either before he had the beatitude or after he had it. But he did not merit his beatitude before he had it, since, as many hold, he did not have grace beforehand, and without grace there is no merit. Nor, again, did he merit his beatitude after he had it, since in that case he would be gaining merit even now—which seems false, since a lesser angel would by his merit be able to attain to the level of a higher angel, and so there would not be stable distinctions among the levels of grace. But this is absurd. Therefore, a beatified angel did not merit his own beatitude.

But contrary to this: Apocalypse 21:17 says that “the measure of an angel” in the heavenly Jerusalem is “the measure of a man.” But a man cannot attain beatitude except through merit. Therefore, neither can an angel.

I respond: Perfect beatitude is natural to God alone, since His *esse* is the same as His being happy. By contrast, being beatified is the ultimate end, and not the nature, of every [intellectual] creature. But each entity attains its ultimate end through its operation. And the operation that leads to the end is such that either (a) it *effects* the end, when the end does not exceed the power of that which is operating for the sake of the end, as when medicine effects health, or else (b) it *merits* the end, when the end exceeds the power of that which is operating for the end, and so the end is expected as a gift from another.

Now as is clear from what has been said (aa. 1 and 2, and q. 12, aa. 4 and 5), ultimate beatitude exceeds both angelic nature and human nature. Hence, it follows that both men and angels have merited their own happiness. And if an angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit, then we can say that it was without difficulty that he merited his beatitude—and the same holds as long as one concedes that he had grace in some way or other before he had glory.

By contrast, if he did not have grace before he was beatified, then one would have to claim that he had beatitude without merit, in the way that we ourselves have grace without merit. But this is contrary to the notion of beatitude, which has the nature of an end and which is, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 1, the reward of virtue. Or, alternatively, one would have to claim, as certain others have, that the angels merit their beatitude by the things they do in their divine ministries once they have already been beatified. But this is contrary to the notion of merit, since merit has the nature of a pathway (*via*) to the end, whereas it is absurd for someone who is already at the terminus to be moved toward the terminus; and so no one merits what he already has. Or, alternatively, one would have to say that one and the same act of turning toward God is both (a) *meritorious* insofar as it proceeds from free choice and (b) *a fruit of beatitude* insofar as it attains its end. But this, too, seems absurd. For free choice is not a sufficient cause of merit, and so an act cannot be meritorious *qua* proceeding from free choice except to the extent that the act is informed by grace; but it cannot simultaneously be informed both by *imperfect grace*, which is a principle of merit, and by *perfect grace*, which is a principle of the enjoyment of beatitude. Hence, it does not seem possible for someone to be enjoying beatitude at the same time that he is meriting that enjoyment.

And so it is better to say that an angel had grace before he was beatified, and that he merited beatitude through that grace.

Reply to objection 1: The angels have difficulty in acting well not because of any contrariety or because of any impediment to their natural power, but rather because there is a certain good work that exceeds the power of their nature.

Reply to objection 2: An angel merits beatitude not by his natural turning toward God, but rather by his turning toward God with charity, which occurs through grace.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to this objection is clear from what has been said.

Article 5

Did an angel have beatitude immediately after just one meritorious act?

It seems that an angel did not have beatitude immediately after just one meritorious act:

Objection 1: It is more difficult for a man to act well than for an angel. But a man is not rewarded immediately after just one act. Therefore, neither is an angel.

Objection 2: An angel could have had some act instantaneously at the very beginning of his creation; for even natural bodies begin to be moved at the very instant of their creation, and if a body's movement could be instantaneous, as acts of intellect and will are, then a body would have movement at the very first instant of its generation. Therefore, if an angel merited beatitude through a single movement of his will, then he merited beatitude at the first instant of his creation. Therefore, if the beatitude of angels is not delayed, then they were beatified at the very first instant.

Objection 3: Things that are far distant from one another are such that there have to be many things that mediate between them. But an angel's state of beatitude is far distant from his state of nature, and it is meritorious action that mediates between the two of them. Therefore, an angel had to go through many such mediating acts in order to arrive at beatitude.

But contrary to this: An angel and a human soul are ordered toward beatitude in similar ways, and thus the saints are promised equality with the angels at Luke 20:36. But if a soul which is separated from its body has merited beatitude, then it immediately receives beatitude unless there is some other impediment. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the same holds for an angel. But an angel merited beatitude immediately upon his first act of charity. Therefore, since there was no impediment in him, he arrived at beatitude immediately through just one meritorious act.

I respond: An angel was beatified immediately after the first act of charity by which he merited beatitude. The reason for this is that grace perfects nature in accord with the mode of that nature, just as every perfection is received in a perfectible thing in accord with the thing's own mode. But as was shown above (a. 1, and q. 58, a. 3 and 4), it is proper to an angelic nature to have its natural perfection immediately through its nature rather than to acquire it through a process. But an angel is ordered to glory by his merit in the same way that he is ordered to natural perfection by his nature. And so an angel received beatitude immediately after he merited it.

Now the meriting of beatitude—not only in the case of an angel, but even in the case of a man—can come through a single action, since a man merits beatitude by each act that is informed by charity. Hence, it follows that an angel was beatified immediately after just one act informed by charity.

Reply to objection 1: A man is not apt by his nature, in the way that an angel is, to attain ultimate perfection immediately. And so a man is given a longer pathway for meriting beatitude than an angel is.

Reply to objection 2: An angel exists outside the time of corporeal things, and so different instants in matters pertaining to angels are taken only from the successiveness of their acts.

Still, in the case of angels, the act that merits beatitude could not have been simultaneous with the act of beatitude, i.e., the act of enjoyment (*fruitio*), since the one is an act of imperfect grace, whereas the other is an act of consummated grace. Hence, it follows that there had to be distinct instants, at one of which the angel merited beatitude and at the other of which he was beatified.

Reply to objection 3: It is part of an angel's nature that he immediately attains the perfection toward which he is ordered. And so all that is required is a single meritorious act, and it can be called a mediating act in the sense that the angel is ordered toward beatitude through it.

Article 6

Do angels receive grace and glory in a quantity proportionate to their natural gifts?

It seems that angels do not receive grace and glory in a quantity proportionate to their natural gifts (*secundum quantitatem suorum naturalium*):

Objection 1: Grace is given by God's will alone. Therefore, the quantity of grace likewise depends on God's will and not on the quantity of natural gifts.

Objection 2: A human act seems closer to grace than human nature does, since a human act is a preparation for grace. But as Romans 11:6 explains, grace does not come from works. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the quantity of grace in angels is not proportionate to the quantity of natural gifts.

Objection 3: A man and an angel are ordered toward beatitude or grace in the same way. But grace is not given to men in proportion to the level of their natural gifts (*homini non datur plus de gratia secundum gradum naturalium*). Therefore, neither is grace given to angels in proportion to the level of their natural gifts.

But contrary to this: In *Sentences* 2, dist. 3, the Master says, "Those angels who by nature were created more subtle and insightful in their wisdom were likewise given greater gifts of grace."

I respond: It is reasonable to hold that angels are given gifts of grace, along with the perfection of beatitude, in proportion to the level of their natural gifts. There are two possible explanations for this:

The first lies on the side of God, who by the order of His wisdom established the diverse grades of angelic nature. Now just as the angelic nature was made by God to attain grace and beatitude, so too the diverse grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordered toward diverse levels of grace and glory—in the way, for instance, that when a builder is smoothing stones in constructing a house, by the very fact that he makes some of them more comely and attractive, he seems to be ordering them to a more ornate part of the house. So, then, it seems that the angels to whom God gave a higher nature are such that He ordered them toward greater gifts of grace and toward a more ample beatitude.

Second, the same conclusion is evident on the side of the angel himself. For an angel is not composed of diverse natures in such a way that the inclination of the one nature might impede or restrain the impulse of the other—as happens in the case of a man, in whom the movement of the intellectual part of the soul is restrained or impeded by the inclination of the sentient part. But when there is nothing to restrain or impede a nature, it moves with all its strength. And so it is reasonable to hold that those angels who had a better nature also turned to God more firmly and efficaciously. Now it happens even in the case of men that they are given greater grace and glory in proportion to the intensity of their conversion to God. Hence, it seems that the angels who had better natures had more of grace and glory.

Reply to objection 1: Just as grace comes from God's will alone, so also does an angel's nature.

And just as God's will ordered this nature toward grace, so too God's will ordered the diverse grades of this nature toward diverse levels of grace.

Reply to objection 2: A rational creature's act comes from himself, but his nature comes directly from God. Hence, it seems that grace is given in proportion to the grade of nature rather than because of works.

Reply to objection 3: The diversity of natural gifts is one thing among angels, who differ from one another in species, and another thing among men, who differ from one another only in number. For a difference in species stems from the end, whereas a numerical difference stems from the matter.

Also, in a man—but not in the angels—there is something that can impede or restrain the movement of the intellective nature. Hence, the line of reasoning is not the same in the two cases.

Article 7

Do natural cognition and love remain in the beatified angels?

It seems that natural cognition and love do not remain in the beatified angels:

Objection 1: As 1 Corinthians 13:10 says, "When what is perfect comes, what is partial will pass away." But natural love and cognition are imperfect in relation to beatific cognition and love. Therefore, natural cognition and love cease with the advent of beatitude.

Objection 2: Where one thing suffices, anything else is superfluous. But glorified love and cognition suffice in the beatified angels. Therefore, it would be superfluous for natural cognition and love to remain in them.

Objection 3: The same power cannot simultaneously have two acts, just as a single line is not terminated by two points in the same direction. But the beatified angels always have an act of beatified cognition and love, since, as *Ethics* 1 says, happiness is an act and not a habit. Therefore, there can never be natural cognition or love in the angels.

But contrary to this: As long as a given nature remains, its operation remains. But beatitude does not destroy the nature, since it is the perfection of the nature. Therefore, it does not destroy natural cognition and love.

I respond: Natural cognition and love remain in the beatified angels. For operations are themselves related to one another in the way that the principles of those operations are related to one another. But it is clear that the nature is related to beatitude in the way that what is first is related to what is second, since beatitude adds something to the nature. But what is first must always be preserved in what is second. Hence, the nature must be preserved in beatitude. And, similarly, the act of the nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude.

Reply to objection 1: When a perfection is achieved, it destroys any imperfection that is opposed to it. However, the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude. Rather, the imperfection of nature underlies the perfection of beatitude in the way that the imperfection of a potentiality underlies the perfection of the corresponding form. For it is not the potentiality that is removed by the form; instead, it is the privation opposed to the form that is removed by the form.

In the same way, the imperfection of natural cognition is not opposed to the perfection of glorified cognition. For nothing prevents one from having a cognition of something through diverse middle terms simultaneously; for instance, it is possible to have cognition of something simultaneously through a probable middle term and through a demonstrative middle term. Similarly, an angel can simultaneously have a cognition of God through God's essence, which pertains to glorified cognition,

and through his own essence, which pertains to natural cognition.

Reply to objection 2: What belongs to beatitude is sufficient *per se*. But in order for it to exist, it presupposes what belongs to nature, since there is no beatitude that subsists *per se* except [God's] uncreated beatitude.

Reply to objection 3: It is impossible for two operations to belong simultaneously to a single power unless the one operation is ordered toward the other. But natural cognition and love are ordered toward glorified cognition and love. Hence, nothing prevents an angel from having natural cognition and natural love simultaneously with glorified cognition and glorified love.

Article 8

Is a beatified angel able to sin?

It seems that a beatified angel is able to sin (*peccare possit*):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 7), beatitude does not destroy the nature. But it is part of the notion of a created nature that it is able to fall short (*quod possit deficere*). Therefore, a beatified angel is able to sin.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says, rational powers are open to opposites. But a beatified angel's will does not cease to be rational. Therefore, it is open to both good and evil.

Objection 3: It is part of free choice that a man is able to choose good and to choose evil. But free choice is not diminished in the beatified angels. Therefore, they are able to sin.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says that the holy angels have a nature that is not able to sin. Therefore, the holy angels are not able to sin.

I respond: The beatified angels are not able to sin. The reason for this is that their beatitude consists in their seeing God through His essence. But God's essence is the very essence of goodness. Hence, an angel who sees God through His essence is related to God Himself in the same way that someone who does not see God is related to the common notion of the good. But it is impossible for anyone to will or to do anything except by fixing his sight (*attendens*) on the good, and it is impossible for anyone to will to turn away from the good *qua* good. Therefore, a beatified angel is not able to will or to do anything except by fixing his sight on God. But one who wills and acts in this way is not able to sin. Hence, a beatified angel is in no way able to sin.

Reply to objection 1: A created good, considered in itself, can fall short. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good—and beatitude is a union of this sort—it reaches the point of not being able to sin, and for the reason explained above.

Reply to objection 2: Rational powers are open to opposites in cases with respect to which they have no natural ordering, but they are not open to opposites with respect to what they are naturally ordered toward. For instance, the intellect is not able not to assent to naturally known principles and, similarly, the will is not able not to adhere to the good *qua* good, since it is naturally ordered to the good as its object.

Therefore, an angel's will is open to opposites with respect to doing or not doing many things. But with respect to God Himself, whom the angels see to be the very essence of goodness, they are not open to opposites. Rather, they are directed to all things in accord with God, no matter which opposites they might choose. And this is what it is to be without sin.

Reply to objection 3: Free choice is related to choosing the means to an end in the same way that the intellect is related to [syllogistic] conclusions. Now it is clear that the intellect's power is such

that it can proceed to diverse conclusions given a certain set of principles. However, when the intellect proceeds to a given conclusion by ignoring the order imposed by the principles, this stems from its own defectiveness. Hence, the fact that free choice is able to choose diverse things while preserving the order imposed by the end pertains to the *perfection* of its freedom. But when it chooses something by deviating from the order imposed by the end—i.e., when it sins—this is a *defect* in its freedom (*defectus libertatis*). Hence, the angels, who are not able to sin, have a greater freedom of choice (*maior libertas arbitrii*) than we ourselves, who are able to sin.

Article 9

Are the beatified angels able to make progress in beatitude?

It seems that the beatified angels are able to make progress in beatitude:

Objection 1: Charity is the principle of merit. But the angels have perfect charity. Therefore, the beatified angels are able to merit. But when merit increases, the reward of beatitude likewise increases. Therefore, the beatified angels are able to make progress in beatitude.

Objection 2: In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine says, “God uses us to our own advantage and for His goodness.” The same holds for the angels, whom He uses in spiritual ministries, since, as Hebrews 1:14 says, “Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?” But it would not be to their advantage if through this ministry they did not merit or make progress in beatitude. Therefore, it follows that the beatified angels are able to merit and to make progress in beatitude.

Objection 3: It is an imperfection for someone who is not at the summit to be unable to make progress. But angels are not at the summit. Therefore, if they are unable to make more progress, then it seems that they are imperfect and defective. But this is absurd.

But contrary to this: Meriting and making progress belong to the state of the pilgrim (*pertinent ad statum viae*). But angels are ‘comprehenders’ (*comprehensores*) and not pilgrims. Therefore, the beatified angels are unable to merit and unable to make progress in beatitude.

I respond: In every movement the mover’s intention is directed toward something determinate to which it intends to lead the movable object. For an intention is directed toward an end, and it is impossible for an end to be indeterminate. But since, as is clear from what was said above (a. 1 and q. 12, a. 4), a rational creature cannot by his own power attain beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, it is obvious that he needs to be moved toward beatitude by God. Therefore, there must be something determinate to which, as an ultimate end, every rational creature is directed.

And, in the context of the vision of God, this determinate thing cannot consist in *what* is seen, since the highest truth is seen by all those who are beatified in all the diverse grades. However, as far as the *mode of seeing* is concerned, the terminus is fixed beforehand in different ways by the intention of the one who is directing [the rational creatures] to their end. For it is impossible that a rational creature should be produced in order to have the *highest mode* of seeing or comprehending in the same way that he is produced in order to see the *highest essence*. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 12, a. 7), this highest mode can belong only to God. But since (a) infinite efficacy is required to comprehend God, and (b) a creature’s efficacy in seeing can only be finite, and (c) there are infinitely many degrees by which something finite can be distant from what is infinite, it follows that there can be infinitely many modes in which a rational creature understands God with more or less clarity. And just as beatitude consists in the seeing itself, so a given level of beatitude consists in a determinate mode of seeing. So,

then, each rational creature is led by God to the end of beatitude in such a way that he is also led by God's predestination to a determinate level of beatitude. Hence, once this level of beatitude has been attained, it is not possible to pass to a higher grade.

Reply to objection 1: Meriting belongs to that which is moving toward the end. Now a rational creature is moved toward the end not only by being acted upon but also by acting. And if the end in question is subject to the rational creature's power, then the action in question will be said to *acquire* the end, in the way in which a man acquires knowledge by studying, whereas if the end is not within his power but is instead expected from another, then the action will *merit* the end. On the other hand, someone who is already at the last terminus is such that he has been moved and not such that he is being moved.

Hence, imperfect charity, which belongs to the path [to the ultimate end], is what merits, whereas perfect charity does not merit but instead enjoys the reward—just as, even in the case of acquired habits, an operation that precedes the habit helps one to acquire the habit, whereas an operation that flows from the habit once acquired is now a perfect operation accompanied by delight. In the same way, an act of perfect charity does not have the nature of merit, but rather belongs to the perfection of the reward.

Reply to objection 2: There are two ways in which something is said to be advantageous:

First, it may be advantageous as something on the path to the end, and what merits beatitude is advantageous in this sense.

Second, it may be advantageous in the way in which a part is advantageous to the whole—for instance, in the way that a wall is advantageous to a house. It is in this second way that the ministry of the angels is advantageous to the beatified angels, since it is a certain part of their beatitude. For to diffuse a perfection one has to another is part of the nature of the perfect insofar as it is perfect.

Reply to objection 3: Even though a beatified angel might not be at the highest level of beatitude absolutely speaking, he is nonetheless at the limit as far as he himself is concerned, in keeping with God's predestination.

Still, an angel's joy can be increased by the salvation of those who are saved through his ministry—this according to Luke 15:10 ("There is joy among the angels of God over one sinner doing penance"). But this joy, which can continue to increase right up to judgment day, is incidental to the angel's reward. Hence, some claim that the angels can still merit as far as this incidental reward is concerned. However, it is better to insist that someone who is beatified cannot gain merit in any way at all (unless he is simultaneously a pilgrim and a comprehender, as Christ alone was both a pilgrim and a comprehender). For rather than meriting the joy in question, the angels acquire it by virtue of their beatitude.

QUESTION 63

The Sinful Wickedness of the Angels

Next we have to investigate how angels became bad, first with respect to the evil of sin (question 63) and second with respect to the evil of punishment (question 64).

On the first topic there are nine questions: (1) Can the evil of sin exist in an angel? (2) What sort of sins can exist in the angels? (3) What was it that an angel sinned by desiring? (4) Given that some angels became bad by a sin of their own will, were any angels naturally bad? (5) Given that no angels were naturally bad, were any of them able to become bad through an act of their own will at the very first instant of their creation? (6) Given that they could not sin at the very first instant of their creation, was there an interval between their creation and their fall? (7) Was the highest angel of those who fell also the highest among all the angels, absolutely speaking? (8) Was the sin of the first angel a cause of the sin of the others? (9) Did as many angels fall as remained faithful?

Article 1

Can the evil of sin exist in angels?

It seems that the evil of sin (*malum culpae*) cannot exist in angels:

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 9 says, evil can exist only in those things that are in a state of potentiality, since the subject of a privation is a being in potentiality. But since angels are subsistent forms, they do not have being in potentiality. Therefore, evil cannot exist in them.

Objection 2: The angels have more dignity than the celestial bodies have. But as the philosophers claim, evil cannot exist in the celestial bodies. Therefore, neither can it exist in the angels.

Objection 3: What is natural to a thing is such that it always exists in it. But it is natural to the angels that they should be moved by a movement of love toward God. Therefore, this cannot be taken away from them. But as long as they love God, they do not sin. Therefore, angels are not able to sin (*peccare non possit*).

Objection 4: A desire is only for something good, or at least for an apparent good. But an apparent good that is not a true good cannot exist in the angels, since either (a) there cannot be any error at all in them or (b), at the very least, there cannot be any error in them that precedes sin. Therefore, angels cannot desire anything that is not truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Therefore, an angel cannot sin by desiring something.

But contrary to this: Job 4:18 says, “In His angels He found depravity.”

I respond: Angels, along with other rational creatures, are such that if they are considered just in their nature alone, then they are able to sin; and if any rational creature is such that he is not able to sin, then this stems from a gift of grace and not from his natural condition.

The reason for this is that to go amiss (*peccare*) is nothing other than to deviate from the rectitude that a thing's act ought to have—regardless of whether we are talking about a deviation (*peccatum*) among natural things or among artifacts or in morals. Now the only sort of act that cannot deviate from rectitude is one whose rule is the agent's very power (*virtus*). For instance, if the craftsman's hand were itself the rule of cutting, then the craftsman could never cut the wood incorrectly; however, if there is some distinct rule of correct cutting, then his cutting can be either correct or incorrect.

Now it is only God's will that is the rule of its own act, since God's will is not ordered toward any end higher than itself. By contrast, a creature's will has rectitude in its act only to the extent that it is regulated by God's will, to which its ultimate end pertains—just as the will of anyone who is lower must be regulated in accord with the will of his superior, in the way that a soldier's will is regulated in accord

with the will of the general of the army. So, then, it is only in God's will that there can be no sin, whereas sin can exist in any created will whatsoever, as far as its natural condition is concerned.

Reply to objection 1: Angels do not have potentiality with respect to their natural *esse*, but in their intellective part they do have potentiality with respect to turning toward this or that object. And it is in this respect that evil can exist in them.

Reply to objection 2: The celestial bodies have only a natural operation. And so just as the evil of substantial corruption cannot exist in their nature, so neither can there be an evil of disorder in their natural action. By contrast, angels, in addition to their natural action, have the action of free choice, and it is with respect to this sort of action that evil can exist in them.

Reply to objection 3: It is natural for an angel to turn toward God with a movement of love, given that God is the principle of the angel's natural *esse*. But to turn toward God as the object of supernatural beatitude is something that stems from the love associated with grace (*ex amore gratuito*), and an angel was able to turn away from this object by sinning.

Reply to objection 4: There are two ways in which sin can exist in an act of free choice:

First, sin can exist in an act of free choice in virtue of the fact that something *bad* is chosen, as when a man sins by choosing adultery, which is bad in itself. This sort of sin always proceeds from some sort of ignorance or error; otherwise, what is evil would not be chosen as something good. Indeed, the adulterer is mistaken about the *particular* case when he chooses *this* pleasure associated with *this* disordered act as a good to be pursued *right now*—and this because of either the inclination of a passion or the inclination of a habit. (This is so even if he is not mistaken about the *universal* principle, but instead holds a true opinion about it.)

Now this sort of sin could not have existed in the angels, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 59, a. 4), the angels do not have passions by which their reason or intellect might be bound (*ligetur*) and, again, since no habit inclining them toward sin could have preceded their first sin.

Second, one can sin through free choice by choosing something *good* in itself, but choosing that good *without ordering it toward the proper rule or measure*—so that the defect which induces the sin stems solely from the disordered choice and not from the thing that is chosen. For instance, someone might choose to pray while disobeying the order of prayer established by the Church. A sin of this sort does not presuppose *ignorance*, but presupposes only a *lack of consideration* of things that ought to be considered.

It is in this second way that the angels sinned, when by their free choice they turned to a proper good without ordering that good toward the rule of God's will.

Article 2

Are pride and envy the only sins that can exist in angels?

It seems that pride (*superbia*) and envy (*invidia*) are not the only sins that can exist in angels:

Objection 1: If the pleasure associated with a given sin can belong to someone, then the sin itself can belong to him. But according to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 2, the demons also take pleasure in the lewdness of carnal sins. Therefore, carnal sins can also exist in the demons.

Objection 2: Listlessness (*acedia*), avarice (*avaritia*), and anger (*ira*) are spiritual sins in the same way that pride and envy are. But spiritual sins belong to the spirit in the same way that carnal sins belong to the flesh. Therefore, it is not just pride and envy that can exist in angels, but listlessness and avarice as well.

Objection 3: According to Gregory in *Moralia*, many vices stem from pride and likewise from envy. But once a cause has been posited, its effect is posited. Therefore, if pride and envy can exist in angels, then for the same reason other vices can exist in them as well.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Though the devil is not a fornicator or a drunkard or anything else of that sort, he is nonetheless proud and envious.”

I respond: There are two ways in which a sin can exist in someone: first, with respect to *guilt* (*secundum reatum*) and, second, with respect to *affect* (*secundum affectum*).

All sins can exist in the demons with respect to *guilt*. For when the demons induce men to commit all types of sins, they incur guilt for all those sins.

However, the only sins that can exist in the bad angels with respect to *affect* are those that a spiritual nature can be drawn toward. Now a spiritual nature cannot be drawn (*affici*) toward goods that are proper to the body, but is instead drawn toward those goods that can be found in spiritual entities. For an entity is drawn only toward what can in some way be suitable to its nature.

Now in the case of spiritual goods, when someone is drawn toward them, there can be a sin only by virtue of the fact that the rule of a superior is not observed in such an affect. And this is the sin of *pride*, viz., not to submit oneself to a superior in a matter in which one ought to submit. Hence, the first sin of an angel can be nothing other than pride.

However, as a consequence, *envy* was able to exist in an angel as well. For an affect’s tending toward something desirable is of a piece with its resisting the opposite. Now someone is envious in virtue of being saddened by the good of another, insofar as he sees the other’s good as an obstacle to his own good. But a bad angel could have seen another’s good as an obstacle to a good he desired only insofar as he desired to be uniquely excellent, where the other’s excellence put an end to this uniqueness (*nisi inquantum affectavit excellentiam singularem, quae quidem singularitas per alterius excellentiam cessat*). And so after the sin of pride, what followed in a sinful angel was the evil of envy, insofar as he was saddened (a) by the good of man and even (b) by God’s excellence, insofar as God uses man, against the will of the devil himself, for His own glory.

Reply to objection 1: The demons do not take pleasure in the lewdness of carnal sins in the sense that they themselves are drawn toward carnal pleasures. Rather, the fact that they take pleasure in all the sins of men, insofar as those sins are impediments to the human good, stems entirely from envy.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as avarice (*avaritia*) is a special sin, it is an immoderate desire for temporal things that come into use in human life and whose value can be measured by money. The demons are not drawn toward such goods, just as they are not drawn toward carnal pleasures, either. Hence, avarice, understood properly, cannot exist in them. However, if we use the name ‘avarice’ to designate any immoderate desire for the possession of created goods, then avarice so understood is included in the pride that exists in the demons.

On the other hand, anger (*ira*), like sense desire (*concupiscentia*), is accompanied by a certain passion. Hence, it itself cannot exist in the demons, except metaphorically.

Finally, listlessness (*acedia*) is a certain kind of sadness by which a man is rendered lethargic (*tardus*) with respect to spiritual acts because of the bodily work they involve. This does not apply to the demons.

So it is clear that only pride and envy are purely spiritual sins that can belong to the demons—as long as the name ‘envy’ is taken not for a passion, but simply for the will to resist the good of another.

Reply to objection 3: All the sins that can stem from pride and envy are included under pride and envy as posited in the demons.

Article 3

Did the devil desire to be like God?

It seems that the devil did not desire to be like God (*esse ut Deus*):

Objection 1: What does not fall under someone's apprehension cannot fall under his desire, since it is an apprehended good that moves the appetite, be it a sentient appetite, a rational appetite, or an intellective appetite (for it is only in appetites of these types that there can be sin). But a creature's being equal to God (*esse aequalem Deo*) does not fall under anyone's apprehension, since it implies a contradiction. For what is finite would have to be infinite if it were equal to what is infinite. Therefore, an angel could not have desired to be like God (*esse ut Deus*).

Objection 2: That which constitutes the end of a given nature can be desired without sin. But being assimilated to God is the end that every creature naturally tends toward. Therefore, if an angel desired to be like God—not through equality, but through some sort of likeness—then it seems that he did not sin in desiring this.

Objection 3: An angel is created with a greater fullness of wisdom than a man is. But no man, unless he is completely out of his mind (*nisi omnino amens*), chooses to be equal to an angel, not to mention God. For an act of choosing is directed only toward what is possible and toward what is subject to deliberation. Therefore, *a fortiori*, no angel sinned by desiring to be like God.

But contrary to this: Isaiah 14:13-14 says in the person of the devil, "I will ascend into heaven ... and I will be like the Most High." And in *De Quaestionibus Veteris Testamenti* Augustine says, "Inflated with self-exaltation, he wanted to be called 'God'."

I respond: Without any doubt, an angel sinned by desiring to be like God.

However, 'to be like God' can be understood in two ways: first, to be like God *through equality* (*per aequiparantiam*); and, second, to be like God *through similarity* (*per similitudinem*).

An angel could not have desired to be like God in the first way, since (a) he knew by his natural cognition that this is impossible, and since (b) his first act of sinning was not preceded by any habit or passion that might have clouded his cognitive power in such a way that, failing to see the impossibility in this particular case, he would choose the impossible—as sometimes happens with us.

And yet even if being like God in this first way were possible, it would still be contrary to an angel's natural desire. For everything has a natural desire to conserve its own being, and its own being would not be conserved if it were transmuted into a different nature. Hence, no entity in a lower grade of nature can desire the grade of a higher nature; for instance, a donkey has no desire to be a horse, since if the donkey were elevated to the grade of that higher nature, then it itself would no longer exist. Still, the imagination is easily deceived about this. For instance, given that a man desires to be in a higher grade of nature with respect to certain accidental characteristics that can increase without the subject's being corrupted, someone might imagine that it is possible for him to desire a higher grade of nature—and yet he could not attain that grade without ceasing to exist.

Now it is clear that God surpasses an angel not only with respect to certain accidental characteristics, but with respect to His grade of nature, and it is also the case that one angel surpasses another in this way. Hence, it is impossible for a lower angel to desire to be equal to a higher angel, not to mention desiring equality with God.

On the other hand, there are two ways in which someone can desire to be like God through similarity.

In one way, he desires to be like God with respect to something in which he is apt by nature to be assimilated to God. And if someone desires to be similar to God in this way, then he does not sin as long

as he desires to attain this similarity to God in the right way, viz., by receiving it from God. However, he would sin if he desired to be similar to God as a matter of justice, i.e., by his own power and not by God's power.

In the second way, someone can desire to be similar to God with respect to something in which he is not apt to be assimilated to God. For instance, suppose that someone desired to be the creator of heaven and earth, which is proper to God; he would sin in this desire. This is the way in which the devil desired to be like God. To be sure, he did not desire to be like God in the sense that he desired not to be subject to anyone, absolutely speaking; for to desire this would be to desire his own non-existence, given that there cannot be a creature who does not participate in *esse* in a way that is subject to God. Rather, he desired to be similar to God in the sense that he desired as his ultimate beatific end something that he could obtain by the power of his own nature, while turning his desire away from the supernatural beatitude that comes from God's grace. Or, alternatively, if he did desire as an ultimate end the sort of similarity to God which is given by grace, he willed to have this through the power of his own nature and without God's help in keeping with the divine plan. This second way of putting it is consonant with the writings of Anselm, who says that the devil desired what he would have attained if he had remained faithful. In fact, these two ways of putting it amount to the same thing in a certain sense. For on both of them, the devil desired to have ultimate beatitude through his own power—something that is proper to God.

And since that which is *per se* is a principle and cause of that which is *per aliud*, it also followed from this that he desired to have dominion over others. In this he likewise desired in a perverted way to be similar to God.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to all the objects are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Are any demons naturally bad?

It seems that some demons are naturally bad (*sint naturaliter mali*):

Objection 1: As Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 10, Porphyry says, "There are demons of a certain type who are deceitful by nature, pretending to be gods and the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to be bad. Therefore, some demons are naturally bad.

Objection 2: Men are created by God in the same way that angels are. But some men are naturally bad, and Wisdom 12:10 says of them, "Their badness was natural." Therefore, some angels can likewise be naturally bad.

Objection 3: Even though non-rational animals are God's creatures, some of them have certain types of natural badness; for instance, foxes are naturally deceptive, and wolves are naturally rapacious. Therefore, even though the demons are God's creatures, they can likewise be naturally bad.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "The demons are not naturally bad."

I respond: Everything that exists, insofar as it exists and has a certain nature, naturally tends toward some good; for it comes from a good principle, and an effect always turns toward its own principle.

Now it can happen that an evil is conjoined with a *particular* good; for instance, fire has the conjoined evil of being such that it consumes other things. However, no evil can be conjoined with the

universal good. Therefore, if a thing is such that its nature is ordered toward some particular good, then it can naturally tend toward an evil—not insofar as that evil is evil, but *per accidens*, insofar as that evil is conjoined with a certain good. On the other hand, if a thing is such that its nature is ordered toward the good in accord with the universal notion of the good (*secundum communem boni rationem*), then such a thing cannot tend by its nature toward any evil.

Now it is clear that every intellectual nature is ordered toward the universal good, which it can apprehend and which is an object of its will. Hence, since demons are intellectual substances, they cannot in any way have a natural inclination toward any evil whatsoever. And so they cannot be naturally bad.

Reply to objection 1: In that same place Augustine reprimands Porphyry for claiming that the demons are naturally deceitful, and he replies that they are deceitful not by nature, but by their own will.

The reason why Porphyry had claimed that the demons are naturally deceitful is that he held that the demons are animals with a sentient nature. Now a sentient nature is ordered toward a particular good, which can have an evil conjoined with it. Accordingly, sentient natures can have a natural inclination toward something evil—but only *per accidens*, insofar as that evil is conjoined with a good.

Reply to objection 2: The badness of some men can be called ‘natural’ either (a) because their badness is by habit, which constitutes a ‘second nature’, or else (b) because of a natural inclination of the sentient nature toward some disordered passion, in the way that some men are said to be naturally angry or naturally lustful. But an intellectual nature cannot have a natural inclination of this sort.

Reply to objection 3: Given their sentient nature, brute animals have a natural inclination toward certain particular goods that evils are conjoined with. For instance, a fox is naturally inclined toward seeking its food in a clever manner, and deceit is conjoined with this. Hence, to be deceitful is not bad for a fox, since it is natural to it—just as, according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, being fierce is not bad for a dog.

Article 5

Was the devil bad through the fault of his own will at the very first instant of his creation?

It seems that the devil was bad through the fault of his own will at the very first instant of his creation (*diabolus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus per culpam propriae voluntatis*):

Objection 1: John 8:44 says, “He was a murderer from the beginning.”

Objection 2: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1 Augustine says that the ‘unformedness’ of creatures preceded their being formed only in origin and not in time. And as he says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, ‘heaven’, in the sense in which heaven is said to have been created first, means the unformed angelic nature, whereas the sentence “God said, ‘Let there be light’, and there was light” refers to the formation of the angelic nature through its turning toward the Word. Therefore, the nature of an angel was created at the same time that light was made. But as soon as light was made, it was divided from the darkness, where ‘darkness’ designates the sinning angels. Therefore, at the very first instant of their creation some angels were beatified and some sinned.

Objection 3: Sin is opposed to merit. But an intellectual nature is able to gain merit at the first instant of its creation; this happened in the case of Christ’s soul, as well as in the case of the good angels themselves. Therefore, the demons were likewise able to sin at the very first instant of their creation.

Objection 4: Angelic nature is more powerful than corporeal nature. But at the very first instant of its creation a corporeal thing begins to have its own operation; for example, at the first instant at which

fire is generated, it begins to move upward. Therefore, at the first instant of his creation an angel was likewise able to act. Therefore, he had either an upright action or one that was not upright. If the action was upright, then since the angels had grace, they merited beatitude by that action. But as was explained above (q. 62, a. 5), in angels the reward immediately follows upon the merit. Therefore, they would [all] have been beatified immediately and so would never have sinned—which is false. Therefore, it follows that [the bad angels] sinned at the very first instant by acting in an way that was not upright.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:31 says, “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” But these things included even the demons. Therefore, at one time even the demons were good.

I respond: Some have claimed that the demons were bad at the very first instant of their creation—not, to be sure, bad by nature, but bad through the sin of their own will. For as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 11, “Those who acquiesced in the position that, as soon as he was made, the devil rejected righteousness, did not agree with those heretics, viz., the Manicheans, who claimed that the devil has an evil nature.”

Still, this position contradicts the authority of Scripture. For in the person of the prince of Babylon, Isaiah 14:12 asks of the devil, “How did you fall from heaven, O Lucifer, who rose in the morning?” And in the person of the king of Tyre, Ezekiel 28:13 says to the devil, “You were in the pleasures of the paradise of God.” This is why it was reasonable for the masters to reject this opinion as erroneous.

Hence, others have claimed that the angels were able to sin at the very first instant of their creation, but that they did not sin then.

But some have rejected this position on the grounds that when two operations follow one another, it seems impossible that both of them should be terminated at the very same instant (*nunc*). Now it is obvious that an angel’s sin was an operation posterior to his creation. But the terminus of the act of creation is the angel’s very *esse*, whereas the terminus of his act of sin was his being bad. Therefore, it seems impossible that an angel should have been bad at the very first instant at which he began to exist.

However, this argument does not seem adequate. For it applies only in the case of temporal movements that are effected successively; for instance, if a local motion follows an alteration, then the alteration and the local motion cannot be terminated at the same instant. By contrast, if the changes in question are instantaneous, then the terminus of the first change and the terminus of the second change can be simultaneous and exist at the same instant; for example, the air is illuminated by the moon at the very same instant at which the moon is illuminated by the sun. Now, clearly, creation is an instantaneous action; and so is the movement of free choice in an angel, since, as was explained above (q. 58, a. 3), angels do not have to reason comparatively or discursively. Hence, nothing prevents the terminus of creation and the terminus of an act of free choice from being simultaneous with one another and existing at the very same instant.

So we have to explain in some alternative way why it was impossible for an angel to have sinned in his very first instant through a disordered act of free choice. Even though a thing can begin to operate at the very same instant at which it begins to exist, still, the operation that begins simultaneously with the thing’s *esse* comes to the thing from the agent from whom it has its *esse*. For instance, a fire has its operation of moving upward from the thing that generates the fire. Hence, if a thing has *esse* from a defective agent that can be the cause of a defective action, then it will be able to have a defective operation at the very first instant at which it exists; for instance, a leg that is lame at birth because of a defect in the semen will immediately begin to limp. But the agent that produced angels in their *esse*, viz., God, cannot be a cause of a sin. Hence, one cannot claim that the devil was bad at the very first instant of his creation.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine explains in *De Civitate Dei* 11, “When Scripture says, ‘The devil sins from the beginning’ (1 John 3:8), he should be thought of as sinning not from the beginning of

his creation, but rather from the beginning of his sin”—namely, because he never drew back from his sin.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as ‘darkness’ designates the sins of the demons, the distinction between light and darkness should be taken to involve God’s foreknowledge. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 11 Augustine says, “The only one who could divide the light from the darkness was He who could likewise foreknow, before they fell, that they would fall.”

Reply to objection 3: Whatever is involved in merit comes from God, and so at the first instant of their creation the angels were able to merit. But as has been explained, the parallel argument does not hold for sin.

Reply to objection 4: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 11, God did not distinguish among the angels before some turned away from Him and some turned toward Him. And so all of them, having been created in grace, merited at the first instant. But some of them immediately put up an obstacle to their own beatitude and destroyed their previous merit. And so they were deprived of the beatitude that they had merited.

Article 6

Was there an interval between the creation of an angel and his fall?

It seems that there was an interval between the creation of an angel and his fall (*aliqua mora fuerit inter creationem et lapsum angeli*):

Objection 1: Ezekiel 28:14-15 says, “You walked perfect in your ways from the day of your conception, until iniquity was found in you.” But since walking is a continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore, there was an interval between the devil’s creation and his fall.

Objection 2: Origen says, “The ancient serpent did not at first walk on his breast and his belly”—by which he means the serpent’s sin. Therefore, the devil did not sin immediately after the first instant of his creation.

Objection 3: The ability to sin is common to men and angels. But there was an interval between the formation of man and his sin. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, there was an interval between the formation of the devil and his sin.

Objection 4: The instant at which the devil sinned was distinct from the instant at which he was created. But there is time in the middle between any two given instants. Therefore, there was an interval between the devil’s creation and his fall.

But contrary to this: John 8:44 says of the devil that “he stood not in the truth.” And as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 11, “We must take this to mean that he was in the truth, but did not persevere in the truth.”

I respond: There are two opinions about this matter. But the one that is more probable—as well as more consonant with the writings of the saints—is that the devil sinned immediately after the first instant of his creation. It is necessary to hold this if one posits (a) that he broke into (*proruperit*) an act of free choice at the first instant of his creation and (b) that, as we claimed above (q. 62, a. 3), he was created with grace. For since, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 5), the angels arrived at beatitude through a single meritorious act, it follows that if the devil, created in grace, merited at the first instant, then he would have received beatitude immediately after that first instant if he had not immediately put up an obstacle by sinning.

On the other hand, if one posits that the angels were not created in grace or that they could not have had an act of free choice at the first instant (*in primo instanti actum liberi arbitrii non potuerit habere*),

then nothing would prevent there from being an interval between their creation and their fall.

Reply to objection 1: Sometimes in Sacred Scripture instantaneous spiritual movements are understood metaphorically by reference to corporeal movements that are measured by time. And so ‘walking’ here means a movement of free choice tending toward the good.

Reply to objection 2: It is because of the first instant, at which the ancient serpent was not yet bad, that Origen says that the serpent did not walk on his breast immediately or from the beginning.

Reply to objection 3: An angel has inflexible free choice after his act of choice, and so unless he had put up an obstacle to beatitude immediately after the first instant, at which he had a natural movement toward the good, he would have been confirmed in the good. But the same does not hold for a man. And so the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to objection 4: As *Physics* 6 proves, the proposition ‘There is time in the middle between any two given instants’ is true insofar as time is continuous. But in the case of the angels, who are not subject to the celestial movement—i.e., the movement primarily measured by continuous time—‘time’ is understood as the succession of intellectual and affective operations.

So, then, the first instant in the case of angels is taken to correspond to that operation of the angelic mind by which the angel turns inward toward himself through his evening knowledge; for there is mention of an evening, but not a morning, on the first day. And this operation was a good one in all the angels. But from this operation some turned through morning knowledge to the praise of the Word, whereas others, remaining within themselves, became night and “were swelled up with pride,” as Augustine puts it in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4. And so the first operation was common to all the angels, but in the second operation they were separated. And so in the first instant all of them were good, but in the second instant the good were separated off from the bad.

Article 7

Was the highest angel among those who sinned the highest among all the angels?

It seems that the highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest among all the angels:

Objection 1: Ezekiel 28:14 says of him, “You were a Cherub, stretched out and protecting, and I set you on the holy mountain of God.” But as Dionysius explains in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the order of the Cherubim is lower than the order of the Seraphim. Therefore, the angel who was the highest among those who sinned was not the highest among all the angels.

Objection 2: God made the intellectual nature in order that it might attain beatitude. Therefore, if the angel who is the highest of all the angels sinned, then it would follow that God’s plan was frustrated in his most noble creature. But this is absurd.

Objection 3: The more a thing is inclined toward something, the less able it is to fall short of it. But the higher an angel is, the more inclined he is toward God. Therefore, the less able he is to fall short of God by sinning. And so it seems that any angel who sinned was not the highest among all the angels, but was instead one of the lower angels.

But contrary to this: In his homily on the hundred sheep, Gregory says that the first angel who sinned, “being set above all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in brightness and was by comparison more illustrious than all of them.”

I respond: There are two things to consider in a sin, viz., (a) one’s proneness to sinning and (b) one’s motive for sinning.

Thus, if we consider *the proneness to sinning* (*si consideremus pronitatem ad peccandum*) among

the angels, then the higher angels seem less likely to have sinned than the lower angels. This is why Damascene held that the greatest among those who sinned were the ones who were set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems consonant with position of the Platonists that Augustine records in *De Civitate Dei* 8 and 10. For the Platonists claimed that all the gods were good, but that among the demons, some were good and some were bad—where by ‘gods’ they meant those intellectual substances who are higher than the lunar sphere, and by ‘demons’ they meant those intellectual substances who are lower than the lunar sphere but higher than men in the order of nature.

Now this opinion should not be rejected outright as alien to the Faith, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, all of corporeal creation is administered by God through the angels. Hence, nothing prevents one from claiming that (a) lower angels were assigned by God to minister to the lower bodies, (b) higher angels were assigned to minister to the higher bodies, and (c) the highest angels were assigned to attend God. Accordingly, Damascene says that those who fell were from among the lower angels and that within their order there were also some good angels who remained faithful.

On the other hand, if we consider *the motive for sinning* (*motivum ad peccandum*), then the higher angels have a greater motive than the lower angels. For as was explained above (a. 2), the sin of the demons was pride, whose motive is excellence, which was greater among the higher angels. And this is why Gregory says that the one who sinned was the highest of all the angels.

And this opinion seems more plausible. For an angel’s sin proceeded not from any proneness to sin, but solely from free choice. Hence, more weight should be given to the argument taken from the motive for sinning.

Yet this does not mean that the other opinion should be summarily rejected. For even the leader of the lower angels could still have a motive for sinning.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Cherubim’ means ‘full of knowledge’, whereas ‘Seraphim’ means ‘ardent’ or ‘on fire’. And so it is clear that the Cherubim are named from their knowledge, which can co-exist with mortal sin, whereas the Seraphim are named from the ardor of charity, which cannot co-exist with mortal sin. And so the first angel who sinned is called a Cherub rather than a Seraph.

Reply to objection 2: God’s intention is frustrated neither in those who sin nor in those who are saved, since He foreknows the outcome for both, and He has glory from both. For He saves the latter by His goodness, and He punishes the former by His justice.

On the other hand, when an intellectual creature sins, he himself falls short of his due end. Nor is this absurd in the case of a sublime creature. For an intellectual creature was created by God in such a way that it lay within his own choice to act for the sake of his end.

Reply to objection 3: No matter how strong the inclination to the good was in the highest angel, it still did not induce necessity in him. Hence, he was able by his free choice not to follow that inclination.

Article 8

Was the sin of the first angel who sinned a cause of the sin of the others?

It seems that the sin of the first angel who sinned was not a cause of the sin of the others:

Objection 1: A cause is prior to what it causes. But as Damascene explains, they all sinned at the same time. Therefore, the sin of the one was not a cause of the sin of the others.

Objection 2: As was explained above (a. 2), the first angelic sin was nothing other than pride. But pride seeks excellence. Now to be subject to someone of lower status is more in conflict with excellence than to be subject to someone of higher status; and so, it seems, the sin of the demons was not that they

willed to be subject to one of the higher angels rather than to God. But the sin of one angel would have been a cause of the sin of the others only if the first angel had induced the others to subject themselves to him. Therefore, it does not seem that the sin of the first angel was a cause of the sin of the others.

Objection 3: To will to be subject to another in opposition to God is a greater sin than to will to rule over another in opposition to God, since it involves a weaker motive for sinning. Therefore, if the first angel's sin was a cause of the sin of the others because he induced them to be subject to him, then the lower angels sinned more gravely than the highest angel—which is contrary to the Gloss on Psalm 103:26 (“This sea dragon which You have formed”) that says, “He who was more excellent than the others in being became greater in wickedness.” Therefore, it is not the case that the sin of the first angel was a cause of the sin of the others.

But contrary to this: Apocalypse 13:4 says that the dragon dragged down with him “a third part of the stars.”

I respond: The sin of the first angel was a cause of the sin of the others—not, to be sure, a coercive cause, but rather a cause that induced them by exhortation. An indication of this is evident from the fact that all the demons are subject to that supreme angel, as is clear from what Our Lord says at Matthew 25:41 (“Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels”). For the order of God's justice is such that when someone consents to a sin at the suggestion of another, he is subject in punishment to that other's power—this according to 2 Peter 2:19 (“For by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave.”)

Reply to objection 1: Even though the demons all sinned at the same time, the sin of the one could still be a cause of the sin of the others. For an angel does not need an interval of time in order to choose or to exhort or to consent—in the way that a man needs deliberation in order to choose or consent and audible speech in order to exhort, where both of these take time. Now it is clear that even a man begins to speak at the very same instant that he has conceived something in his heart. And at the last instant of the speaking, when [the hearer] grasps the speaker's meaning, it is possible for him to assent to what is being said—as is especially clear in the case of first principles (*in primis conceptionibus*), which one accepts as soon as they are heard. Therefore, if we subtract the time taken up by the speech and deliberation that we ourselves require, then at the very same instant at which the first angel expressed his own affection by means of intellectual speech, it was possible for the others to consent to that affection.

Reply to objection 2: Other things being equal, one who is proud wills to subject himself to someone of higher status rather than to someone of lower status. However, if by being subject to someone of lower status he stands to receive some sort of excellence which he cannot receive by being subject to someone of higher status, then he will choose to be subject to the former rather than to the latter. Therefore, it was not contrary to the pride of the demons that they should will to subject themselves to someone of lower status [than God]—especially given that even then it was the highest angel in the order of nature that they were subject to. For they consented to his rule and willed to have him as their prince and leader in order that they might receive their ultimate beatitude by their own natural power.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 62, a. 6), an angel does not have anything to hold him back; instead, he moves with all his power to that toward which he is moved, whether it be good or bad. Therefore, since the highest angel had more natural power than the lower angels, he fell into sin with a more intense movement, and thus he also became greater in wickedness.

Article 9

Did as many angels sin as remained faithful?

It seems that more angels sinned than remained faithful (*plures peccaverunt de angelis quam permanserunt*):

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says, evil is found in the majority, but good in the few.

Objection 2: Sin and moral uprightness are found in angels and men in the same way. But there are more bad men than good men—this according to Ecclesiastes 1:15 (“The number of fools is infinite”). Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the same holds for angels.

Objection 3: The angels are distinguished both in person and in order. Therefore, if a majority of angelic persons remained faithful, then it seems not to be the case that some angels sinned from each of the orders of angels.

But contrary to this: 4 Kings 6:16 says, “There are more with us than with them.” This is interpreted as talking about the good angels who are with us to help and about the bad angels who are opposed to us.

I respond: The angels who remained faithful were more numerous than those who sinned. For sin is contrary to an angel’s natural inclination, and things that are contrary to nature occur in fewer cases, since nature attains its effect always or for the most part.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is talking here about men, in whom evil occurs because (a) they pursue sensible goods, which are known to more of them, and (b) they desert the good of reason, which is known to fewer of them. By contrast, the angels have just an intellectual nature. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 2: The reply to this objection is clear from what was just said.

Reply to objection 3: If we follow those who claim that the devil was the highest angel in the lower order of angels who preside over earthly affairs, then it is clearly not the case that angels of each order fell; rather, only angels of the lowest order fell.

By contrast, if we follow those who claim that the devil was the greatest angel of the highest order, then it is probable that some from each order of angels fell—just as men are taken up into every order in compensation for the angelic ruin. This is a corroboration of the freedom of free choice, which can be turned toward evil at any level of creation. However, in Sacred Scripture the names of certain orders, e.g., ‘Seraphim’ and ‘Thrones’, are not attributed to the demons, because these names are derived from the ardor of charity and from God’s indwelling, which cannot co-exist with mortal sin. On the other hand, the names ‘Cherubim’, ‘Powers’, and ‘Principalities’ are attributed to the demons, because these names are taken from knowledge and power, which can be common to both those who are good and those who are bad.

QUESTION 64

The Punishment of the Demons

Next we inquire into the punishment of the demons. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is a demon's intellect darkened? (2) Is a demon's will obstinate? (3) Do the angels have sorrow? (4) In what place are the demons punished?

Article 1

Is a demon's intellect darkened by being deprived of the cognition of all truth?

It seems that a demon's intellect is darkened (*intellectus daemonis sit obtenebratus*) by being deprived of the cognition of all truth:

Objection 1: If the demons had cognition of any truth, they would especially have cognition of themselves, i.e., they would have cognition of separated substances. But this is incompatible with their unhappiness (*miseria*), since such cognition seems to involve great happiness—so much so that some have identified man's ultimate beatitude with having cognition of separated substances. Therefore, the demons are deprived of all cognition of the truth.

Objection 2: What is most manifest by its nature seems to be especially manifest to the angels, regardless of whether they are good or bad. For the fact that what is most manifest by its nature is not especially manifest to us stems from the weakness of our intellect, which receives phantasms—just as the fact that an owl cannot see the sun's light stems from the weakness of its eyes. But God, who is in Himself the most manifest object because He is at the summit of truth, is such that the demons cannot have cognition of Him; for they do not have a clean heart, and it is only by means of a clean heart that God can be seen. Therefore, neither do they have cognition of anything else.

Objection 3: According to Augustine, the angels have two types of cognition of things, viz., morning knowledge and evening knowledge. But morning knowledge cannot belong to the demons, since they do not see things in the Word. Nor can they have evening knowledge, since evening knowledge relates the things that are known to the praise of the creator. (This is why Genesis 1 says that after evening comes morning.) Therefore, the demons cannot have any cognition of things.

Objection 4: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5, at their creation the angels knew the mystery of the kingdom of God. But the demons are deprived of this cognition; for if they had known the mystery of the kingdom of God, then, as 1 Corinthians 2:8 says, "They would in no way have crucified the Lord of glory." Therefore, by parity of reasoning, they are likewise deprived of every other cognition of the truth.

Objection 5: If someone knows a truth, then either (a) he has cognition of it naturally, in the way that we ourselves have cognition of first principles, or (b) he has cognition of it by receiving it from another, in the way that we come to know by being taught, or (c) he has cognition of it through long experience (*per experientiam longi temporis*), in the way that we come to know by discovery. But the demons cannot have cognition of the truth by their nature, since, as Augustine says, the good angels are divided off from them as the light is divided off from the darkness, and, as Ephesians 5:13 says, all manifestation takes place by means of light. Similarly, they cannot have cognition of the truth through revelation or by being taught by the good angels, since, as 2 Corinthians 6:14 puts it, "There is no fellowship between light and darkness." Nor can they have cognition of the truth through long experience, since experience has its source in the senses. Therefore, the demons have no cognition of the truth.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "We claim that the angelic

gifts given to the demons are in no way changed, but remain in their integrity and great splendor.” Now among these natural gifts is the cognition of the truth. Therefore, the demons have some cognition of the truth.

I respond: There are two kinds of cognition of the truth, one of which is had through *nature* and the other of which is had through *grace*. Again, there are two kinds of cognition of the truth had through *grace*, one of which is purely *speculative*, as when certain hidden things about divine matters are revealed to someone, and the other of which is *affective*, which produces love for God and properly pertains to the gift of wisdom.

Now of these three kinds of cognition, the *first* is neither taken away from the demons nor diminished in them. For this kind of cognition follows upon the very nature of an angel, who is by his nature a type of intellect or mind; and because of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be subtracted from his nature in the sense that he might be punished by the removal of something natural, in the way that a man might be punished by the removal of a hand or a foot, etc. This is why Dionysius says that a demon’s natural gifts remain in their integrity. Hence, the demons’ natural cognition is not diminished.

On the other hand, the *second* kind of cognition, which is had through grace and consists in purely speculative knowledge, is not taken away from the demons in its entirety, but it is diminished. For as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 9, divine secrets of the sort in question are revealed to them as much as is necessary, either by the mediation of the angels or through certain temporal effects of God’s power—though not in the same way that they are revealed to the holy angels, to whom they are revealed in more abundance and more clearly in the Word Himself.

Lastly, the demons are totally deprived of the *third* kind of cognition, just as they are totally deprived of charity.

Reply to objection 1: Happiness consists in one’s being joined to what is higher. Now separated substances are higher than we are in the order of nature, and so a man can have a certain sort of happiness by having cognition of separated substances—even though his perfect happiness lies in knowing the first substance, viz., God.

By contrast, it is natural (*connaturale*) for a separated substance to have cognition of separated substances, in just the way that it is natural for us to have cognition of sensible natures. Hence, just as a man’s happiness does not consist in his having cognition of sensible natures, so an angel’s happiness does not consist in his having cognition of separated substances.

Reply to objection 2: That which is most manifest by its nature is hidden from us because it exceeds the capacity of our intellect, and not just because our intellect receives its cognition from phantasms. Now the divine substance exceeds the capacity not only of the human intellect, but also of the angelic intellect. Hence, even an angel himself cannot by his nature have cognition of God’s substance. Nonetheless, because of the perfection of his intellect, he can by his nature have a deeper cognition of God than a man can. And this sort of cognition of God remains even in the demons. For even if they do not have the purity that comes from grace, they do nonetheless have a purity of nature that is sufficient for the cognition of God that belongs to them by their nature.

Reply to objection 3: A creature is darkness when compared to the excellence of the divine light, and this is why the cognition that a creature has in his own nature is called ‘evening knowledge’. For even though evening has some darkness adjoined to it, it nonetheless has some light as well, since it is night that is totally lacking in light. So, then, when the cognition of things in their proper nature is directed toward the praise of God, as it is in the good angels, then it has something of the divine light and can be called evening knowledge. By contrast, if it is not directed toward God, as happens in the case of the demons, then it is called ‘nocturnal knowledge’ rather than ‘evening knowledge’. Hence, we read in Genesis 1 that the darkness, which God separated from the light, He called ‘night’.

Reply to objection 4: The mystery of God's kingdom, which is fulfilled through Christ, was known in some way by all the angels at the beginning, especially if they were beatified by their vision of the Word—a vision that the demons never had. However, not all the angels knew this mystery perfectly or equally well. Hence, when Christ came into the world, the demons knew the mystery of the Incarnation much less perfectly than the others did. For as Augustine says, "It was not made known to the demons in the way it was made known to the holy angels, who enjoy a participation in the Word's eternity. Rather, it had to be made known to them through certain temporal effects in order to instill terror in them." Now if they had known perfectly and with certitude that Christ was the Son of God and what the effect of His passion would be, they would never have taken care to have the Lord of glory crucified.

Reply to objection 5: There are three ways in which demons know truths.

First, they know some truths by the subtlety of their nature. For even though their intellects are darkened by the fact that they are deprived of the light of grace, they are nonetheless enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature.

Second, they know some truths by having them revealed by the holy angels, with whom they do not have a conformity of will, but with whom they do have a similarity of intellectual nature, in accord with which they are able to receive what is shown to them by others.

Third, they know some truths through long experience—though not in the sense that they receive anything from sensation. Rather, as was explained above when we were discussing angelic cognition (q. 57, a. 3), when the likeness of the intelligible species of a thing that is naturally instilled in the demons is realized in singular things, they know certain things as present which they did not previously know as future.

Article 2

Is the will of the demons obstinate in evil?

It seems that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil (*non est obstinata in malo*):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), freedom of choice belongs naturally to an intellectual nature, and this nature remains in the demons. But freedom of choice is ordered *per se* and primarily toward good rather than to evil. Therefore, a demon's will is not so obstinate in evil that he cannot return to the good.

Objection 2: God's mercy, which is infinite, is greater than a demon's wickedness, which is finite. But no one returns from the wickedness of sin to the goodness of justice except through God's mercy. Therefore, even the demons can return to the state of justice from the state of wickedness.

Objection 3: If the demons have a will that is obstinate in evil, then they have this obstinacy especially in the sin by which they fell. But that sin, viz., pride, does not now remain in them, since the motive for it, viz., excellence, no longer remains in them. Therefore, a demon is not obstinate in evil.

Objection 4: Gregory says that one man can be cured (*reparari*) by another, since he fell because of another. But as was explained above (q. 63, a. 8), the lower demons fell because of the first demon. Therefore, their fall can be cured by another. Therefore, they are not obstinate in evil.

Objection 5: If someone is obstinate in wickedness, then he never does any good work. But a demon does some good works. For a demon confesses the truth when he says to Christ, "I know that you are the holy one of God" (Mark 1:24); the demons also "believe and tremble," as James 2:19 puts it; again, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "The demons desire the good and the best: to

exist, to live, and to understand.” Therefore, the demons are not obstinate in wickedness.

But contrary to this: Psalm 73:23 says, “The pride of those who hate you ascends continually,” which is interpreted as speaking about the demons. Therefore, the demons always persevere obstinately in wickedness.

I respond: Origen’s position was that, because of its freedom of choice, every created will is able to turn toward the good and able to turn toward evil—the only exception being Christ’s soul, due to its union with the Word.

However, this position undermines the genuineness of the beatitude of the holy angels and men, since everlasting stability is part of the nature of genuine beatitude—which is why it is called ‘eternal life’. This position is also incompatible with the authority of Sacred Scripture, which decrees that the demons and evil men “will be sent into eternal punishment,” and that those who are good “will be brought into eternal life” (Matthew 25:46). Hence, the position in question must be counted as erroneous, and according to the Catholic Faith one must hold firmly both that (a) the will of the good angels is confirmed in the good and that (b) the will of the demons is obstinate in evil.

The reason for this obstinacy is to be found not in the gravity of a demon’s sin, but rather in the condition of the nature of his state (*ex conditione naturae status*). For as Damascene puts it, the fall is to angels what death is to men. Now it is clear that all of a man’s mortal sins, whether they be great or small, can be remitted before death, whereas after death they remain forever and cannot be remitted. To understand the reason for this sort of obstinacy, note that in each thing the appetitive power is proportioned to the apprehensive power by which it is moved in the way that a movable thing is proportioned to its mover. For as was explained above (q. 59, a. 1), the sentient appetite is directed toward a particular good, whereas the will is directed toward the universal good; in the same way, the senses apprehend singulars, whereas the intellect apprehends universals. Now an angel’s apprehension differs from a man’s in that through his understanding (*intellectus*) an angel apprehends everything in an immovable way (*immobiliter*), just as we apprehend in an immovable way the first principles that are the object of an act of understanding (*intellectus*). By contrast, through reason (*ratio*) a man understands in a movable way (*mobiliter*) by reasoning discursively from one thing to another, so that he has a way open to both opposites. Hence, it is likewise the case that a man’s will adheres to something in a movable way in the sense that it is able to retreat from that thing and adhere to some contrary thing, whereas an angel’s will adheres to something in a fixed and immovable way. So if we think about an angel before he adheres to something, then he is able freely to adhere to this thing or to its opposite (we are speaking here of things that he does not will naturally); but after he has already adhered to one or the other, he adheres to it in an immovable way. And so it is customary to say that a man’s free choice is flexible with respect to opposites both before and after his act of choice, whereas an angel’s free choice is flexible with respect to opposites before his act of choice, but not afterwards.

So, then, the good angels, who always adhere to justice, are confirmed in the good, whereas the bad angels, who sin, are obstinate in sin. Later on (*Supplement*, q. 98, aa. 1 and 2) we will talk about the obstinacy of men who are damned.

Reply to objection 1: The good and bad angels both have free choice, but, as has been explained, they have it in accord with the mode and condition of their nature.

Reply to objection 2: God’s mercy frees from their sins those who are repentant. But those who are incapable of repentance adhere immovably to evil and are not freed by God’s mercy.

Reply to objection 3: As far as the devil’s desire is concerned, the sin by which he first sinned remains in him—even though it does not remain in him in the sense that he believes that he can fulfill that desire. In the same way, if someone believes that he is able to commit a murder and wills to do so and later has the power to do it taken away from him, the desire (*voluntas*) to commit the murder can still

remain in him in the sense that he wishes that he had done it, or in the sense that he would will to do it if he could do it.

Reply to objection 4: It is not the case that the entire reason why a man's sin can be remitted is that he sinned at the suggestion of another. And so the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to objection 5: A demon has two kinds of act:

One kind of act proceeds from a deliberate will and can properly be called his own act. This kind of act on the part of a demon is always bad, since even if he sometimes effects something good, he nonetheless does not effect it in an upright way—as, for instance, when he tells the truth in order to deceive someone, or when he believes or confesses the truth not willingly, but because he is compelled to by the evidentness of things.

By contrast, the second kind of act on the part of a demon is a natural act, which can be good and which attests to the goodness of his nature. And yet even a good act of this sort he uses for an evil end.

Article 3

Is there sorrow in the demons?

It seems that there is no sorrow (*dolor*) in the demons:

Objection 1: Sorrow and joy are opposed to one another and so they cannot exist in the same thing at the same time. But there is joy in the demons; for in *Contra Manichaeos* Augustine says, “The devil has power over those who despise God's precepts, and he rejoices over this utterly miserable power of his.” Therefore, there is no sorrow in the demons.

Objection 2: Sorrow is a cause of fear, since the things that we fear while they are still future are such that we have sorrow over them when they become present. But according to Job 41:24 (“He was made to fear no one”), there is no fear in the demons. Therefore, there is no sorrow in the demons.

Objection 3: It is good to have sorrow for evil. But the demons are unable to do anything in an upright way. Therefore, they cannot have sorrow, at least sorrow for the evil of sin—the sort of sorrow that involves the ‘worm of conscience’.

But contrary to this: A demon's sin is more grave than a man's sin. But according to Apocalypse 18:7 (“As much as she has glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow you give to her”), a man is punished with sorrow for the pleasure he takes in his sin. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the devil, who glorified himself to the maximum, is punished with the grief of sorrow.

I respond: Insofar as fear, sorrow, joy, etc., are passions, they cannot exist in the demons; for as such they are proper to the sentient appetite, which is a power existing in a corporeal organ.

However, insofar as the names ‘fear’, ‘sorrow’, and ‘joy’ designate simple acts of will, they can as such exist in the demons. And one must claim that sorrow does exist in the demons. For insofar as ‘sorrow’ signifies a simple act of will, it is nothing other than the will's resistance either to what does exist or to what does not exist. But it is clear that many things are either such that (a) they exist and the demons wish they did not exist or such that (b) they do not exist and the demons wish they did exist. For instance, because the demons are envious, they wish that those who are in fact saved might be damned. Hence, one must claim that there is sorrow in the demons, principally because it is part of the notion of punishment that punishment be repugnant to the will. In addition, they are deprived of the beatitude that they naturally desire, and their evil will is held in check in many matters.

Reply to objection 1: Joy and sorrow are opposites when they are directed at the same thing, but not when they are directed at diverse things. Hence, nothing prevents one from having sorrow over one

thing while at the same time rejoicing over something else. This is especially true when the sorrow and joy in question are simple acts of will. For not only in diverse things, but even in one and the same thing, there can be both something that we will and something that we will the opposite of.

Reply to objection 2: The demons have fear with respect to what is future in the same way that they have sorrow over what is present.

Now the cited verse, “He was made to fear no one,” is talking about the fear of God that keeps one from sinning. For in another place Scripture says that “the demons believe and tremble” (James 2:19).

Reply to objection 3: To have sorrow for the evil of sin because of the evil itself attests to the *will*’s goodness, which the evil of sin is opposed to. By contrast, to have sorrow over the evil of punishment—or over the evil of sin because of the punishment for it—attests to the *nature*’s goodness, which the evil of punishment is opposed to. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “The sorrow over a good that is lost because of punishment is a witness to the goodness of a nature.” Therefore, since a demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he does not have sorrow for the evil of sin.

Article 4

Is the air the demons’ place of punishment?

It seems that the air is not the demons’ place of punishment (*aer iste non sit locus poenalis daemonum*):

Objection 1: A demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore, there is no place of punishment for the demons.

Objection 2: A man’s sin is not more grave than a demon’s sin. But hell (*infernus*) is the place of man’s punishment. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it is the place of a demon’s punishment. Therefore, the misty air (*aer caliginosus*) is not the place of a demon’s punishment.

Objection 3: Demons are punished with a punishment of fire. But there is no fire in the misty air. Therefore, the misty air is not the demons’ place of punishment.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 3 Augustine says, “The misty air is, as it were, the prison of the demons until judgment day.”

I respond: Given their nature, the angels stand between God and men. Now the nature of divine providence is such that it procures the good of lower beings through the mediation of higher beings; and there are two ways in which the good of man is procured through divine providence:

The first way is *direct*, viz., when someone is induced toward the good and drawn back from evil, and this is fittingly accomplished through the mediation of the good angels.

The second way is *indirect*, viz., when someone who is under attack occupies himself with fighting back. And it was appropriate for this sort of procurement of the human good to be accomplished through the mediation of the bad angels—lest after their sin they should be totally useless to the natural order.

Accordingly, there have to be two places of punishment for the demons—one by reason of their sin, and this is hell; and the other for the sake of their putting men to the test, and this is the misty air. Now the procurement of human salvation will last until judgment day, and so the angels’ ministry and the demons’ agitations will last until then. Hence, until then, the good angels are sent here to us, and the demons are in the misty air to tempt us—even though some of the demons are even now in hell in order to torment those whom they have led into evil, just as some of the good angels are now with the holy souls in heaven.

After judgment day, however, all evildoers, both men and angels, will be in hell, whereas the good

will be in heaven.

Reply to objection 1: A place is a place of punishment for an angel or for a soul not in the sense that it affects them by altering their nature, but in the sense that it affects them by saddening their will, since the angel or soul sees himself as being in a place that is not agreeable to his will.

Reply to objection 2: It is not the case that one soul is given preference over another soul according to the order of nature, in the way that the demons are given preference over men by the order of nature. Therefore, the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: Some have claimed that the sentient punishment of both demons and souls is deferred until judgment day and that, similarly, the beatitude of the saints is deferred until judgment day. But this position is erroneous and incompatible with what the Apostle says at 2 Corinthians 5:1 (“If our earthly house of this habitation is dissolved, we have a house in heaven”).

By contrast, others, even though they do not concede this claim with respect to souls, concede it with respect to the demons. However, it is better to hold a uniform opinion about the bad souls and bad angels, just as it is better to hold a uniform opinion about the good souls and good angels.

Hence, one should say that a heavenly place is appropriate for the glory of the angels, even though their glory is not diminished when they come to us, since they still consider this heavenly place to be their own (just as we say that the bishop’s honor is not diminished when he is not actually seated on his episcopal chair). And, similarly, one should say that even if the demons are not actually bound to the fire of Gehenna when they are in the misty air, nonetheless, by the very fact that they know they deserve to be bound to it, their punishment is not diminished. Hence, a Gloss on James 3:6 says, “They carry the fire of Gehenna with them wherever they go.”

Nor is this contrary to the fact that “they pleaded with the Lord not to send them into the abyss,” as Luke 8:31 puts it. For they made this plea because they thought it a punishment to be driven from a place where they could harm men. Hence, Mark 5:10 says, “They begged Him not to drive them away out of the region.”

QUESTION 65

The Work of Creating Corporeal Creatures

Now that we have considered the spiritual creature, we next have to consider the corporeal creature. In the production of corporeal creatures Scripture recalls three works, viz., (a) the work of *creation* (*opus creationis*), when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and (b) the work of *division* (*opus distinctionis*), when it says, “He divided the light from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are below the firmament,” and (c) the work of *adornment* (*opus ornatus*), when it says, “Let there be lights in the firmament ...” Therefore, we must consider, first, the work of creation (questions 65-66); second, the work of division (questions 67-69); and, third, the work of adornment (questions 70-74).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Are corporeal creatures from God? (2) Are they made for the sake of God’s goodness? (3) Are they made by God through the mediation of angels? (4) Are the forms of bodies from angels or directly from God?

Article 1

Are corporeal creatures from God?

It seems that corporeal creatures are not from God:

Objection 1: Ecclesiastes 3:14 says, “I have learned that all the works which God has made last forever.” But visible bodies do not last forever; for 2 Corinthians 4:18 says, “The things that are seen are temporary (*temporalia*), whereas the things that are not seen are eternal.” Therefore, God did not make visible bodies.

Objection 2: Genesis 1:31 says, “God saw all the things He had made, and they were very good.” But corporeal creatures are evil. For we experience them to be harmful in many ways, as is clear with many kinds of snakes, with the heat of the sun, and with other things of this sort; and the reason why something is called evil is that it does harm. Therefore, corporeal creatures are not from God.

Objection 3: What is from God does not draw us away from God, but instead leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures draw us away from God; thus, in 2 Corinthians 4:18 the Apostle says, “While we look not at the things which are visible ...” Therefore, corporeal creatures are not from God.

But contrary to this: Psalm 145:6 says, “... who made heaven and earth, the sea and all the things that are in them.”

I respond: The position of certain heretics is that visible things were created not by a good God, but by an evil principle. And in support of their error they appropriate what the Apostle says at 2 Corinthians 4:4: “The god of this world (*deus huius saeculi*) has blinded the minds of unbelievers.”

However, this position is altogether impossible. For if diverse things are united in some one feature (*uniantur in uno*), then there must be a cause of this union, since diverse things are not united of themselves (*secundum se*). And so it is that whenever some one feature is found in diverse things, those diverse things must receive that one feature from a unitary cause (*ab aliqua una causa*), in the way that diverse hot bodies have their heat from fire. Now the feature which is *esse* is found universally in all things, regardless of how diverse they are. Therefore, there must be some one principle of being from which all things have *esse*, regardless of whether they are invisible and spiritual or whether they are visible and corporeal.

Now the devil is called “the god of this world” not because he is a creator (*non creatione*), but because those who live in a worldly fashion serve him. This is the same manner of speaking the Apostle uses in Philippians 3:19, when he says, “Their god is their belly.”

Reply to objection 1: All God's creatures endure forever in some sense, at least with respect to their matter. For creatures are never reduced to nothingness, even if they are corruptible. But the closer creatures are to God, who is altogether unchangeable, the more unchangeable they are. For corruptible creatures endure forever with respect to their matter, but change with respect to their substantial form. On the other hand, incorruptible creatures do, to be sure, endure with respect to their substance, but they are changeable with respect to other things, viz., place in the case of celestial bodies, and affections in the case of spiritual creatures.

As for what the Apostle says, "The things that we see are temporary"—although this is true even with respect to [visible] things considered in themselves, given that every visible creature is subject to time either because of its *esse* or because of its movement, still, the Apostle means to be speaking about visible things insofar as they are man's rewards. For those of man's rewards that consist in these visible things pass away with time, whereas the rewards that consist in invisible things remain forever (*permanent in aeternum*). Thus, he had said just before this, "... works in us an eternal weight of glory."

Reply to objection 2: A corporeal creature is good with respect to its nature, but it is not a universal good. Rather, it is a particular and contracted good, and as a result of this particularity and contraction there exists among corporeal creatures a contrariety in virtue of which one is contrary to another, even though both are good in themselves.

Now there are those who, considering things not on the basis of their natures, but rather on the basis of what is suited to them as individuals (*ex suo proprio commodo*), think that whatever is harmful to them in some respect is evil absolutely speaking—not taking into account that what is evil for one of them in some respect is either beneficial for another or beneficial for that same one in some [other] respect. This would in no way be the case if bodies were of themselves evil and harmful.

Reply to objection 3: Taken in themselves, creatures do not draw us away from God, but instead lead us to Him; for as Romans 1:20 says, "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made."

The fact that they turn us away from God is the fault of those who use them unwisely. Hence, Wisdom 14:11 says, "Creatures have become a snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they lead us away from God in this way testifies to the fact that they are from God. For they do not lead the unwise away from God except by attracting them with something good that exists in them, and they have this something good from God.

Article 2

Were corporeal creatures made for the sake of God's goodness?

It seems that corporeal creatures were not made for the sake of God's goodness:

Objection 1: Wisdom 1:14 says, "God created in order that all things might exist." Therefore, all things were created for the sake of their own proper *esse*, and not for the sake of God's goodness.

Objection 2: The good has the character of an end. Therefore, that which is a greater good among things is the end of that which is a lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures as a greater good to a lesser good. Therefore, corporeal creatures exist for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not for the sake of God's goodness.

Objection 3: Justice does not give unequally except to unequals. But God is just. Therefore, prior to any inequality created by God, there is an inequality not created by God. But an inequality not created by God cannot exist unless it stems from free choice. Therefore, every inequality follows from the

diverse movements of free choice. But corporeal creatures are not equal to spiritual creatures. Therefore, corporeal creatures were made because of certain movements of free choice and not for the sake of God's goodness.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 16:4 says, "The Lord has made all things for Himself."

I respond: Origen claimed that corporeal creatures were made not because of God's primary intention, but in order to punish sinful spiritual creatures. For he claimed that in the beginning God made spiritual creatures alone, and He made them all equal to one another. Given that they had free choice, some among them turned toward God and, corresponding to the intensity (*quantitas*) of their conversion to Him, they were given higher and lower ranks while retaining their simplicity. Others, however, having turned away from God, were tied to (*alligatae*) different kinds of bodies according to the manner of their turning away from God.

This position is erroneous.

First of all, it is contrary to Sacred Scripture, which, having recounted the production of each kind of corporeal creature, adds, "God saw that it was good"—as if to say, "Each of them was made because its very existence is good." By contrast, according to Origen's opinion, corporeal creatures were made not because it was good for them to exist, but in order to punish the evil of the other sort of being.

Second, it would follow that the present arrangement of the corporeal world exists by chance. For if the body of the sun was made the way it was in order to be a fitting punishment for a spiritual creature's sin, then if many spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one whose sin the sun was created as a punishment for, then it follows that there would be more suns in the world. And the same thing would hold for the other cases. But these consequences are altogether absurd.

Now that this position has been eliminated as erroneous, note that the entire universe is made up of all things in the way that a whole is made up of its parts. And if we want to ascribe an end to a given whole along with its parts, we will discover, first, that the individual parts exist for the sake of their own acts, in the way that an eye exists for the sake of seeing. Second, a less noble part exists for the sake of a more noble part, in the way that the senses exist for the sake of the intellect, and in the way that the lung exists for the sake of the heart. Third, the parts together (*omnes partes*) exist for the sake of the perfection of the whole, in the way that matter exists for the sake of form; for the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Further, a man as a whole exists for the sake of an extrinsic end, viz., to enjoy God.

So, then, likewise in the case of the parts of the universe, each creature exists for the sake of its own act and perfection. Second, the less noble creatures exist for the sake of the more noble creatures; for instance, the creatures below man exist for the sake of man. Further, each creature exists for the sake of the perfection of the whole universe. Further, the universe as a whole, with all its individual parts, is ordered to God as its end, insofar as God's goodness is represented in the whole and parts through a sort of imitation, and this for God's glory—though there is a special way that goes beyond this in which rational creatures have God as an end whom they can attain to by their action, viz., knowing and loving.

In this way it is clear that God's goodness is the end of all corporeal beings.

Reply to objection 1: By the very fact that a creature has *esse*, it represents God's *esse* and His goodness. And so the fact that God created all things in order that they might exist does not rule out His having created all things for the sake of His goodness.

Reply to objection 2: A proximate end does not exclude an ultimate end. Hence, the fact that corporeal creatures were in some sense made for the sake of spiritual creatures does not rule out their having been made for the sake of God's goodness.

Reply to objection 3: The equality of justice has a place in retributive matters (*in retribuendo*), since it is just that what is equal should be repaid with what is equal.

However, there is no room for this point in the initial establishment of things. For just as a

craftsman, without any injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building—not because of any prior differences among the stones but with an eye toward the building’s perfection as a whole, which would not exist unless the stones were positioned in different ways in the building—so, too, in the beginning God, in order that there might be perfection in the universe, made diverse and unequal creatures according to His wisdom—with no injustice, and yet without presupposing any differences of merit.

Article 3

Were corporeal creatures produced by God through the mediation of angels?

It seems that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the mediation of angels:

Objection 1: All things were created by God’s wisdom in just the way that things are governed by God’s wisdom—this according to Psalm 103:24 (“You have made all things in wisdom”). But as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* puts it, “One who is wise has the role of ordering.” Hence, in the governance of things, lower things are ruled by higher things with a sort of order, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3. Therefore, the order present in the production of things was likewise such that corporeal creatures, as lower creatures, were produced by spiritual creatures, as higher creatures.

Objection 2: A diversity of effects points to a diversity of causes, since one and the same cause always does the same thing. Therefore, if all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were directly (*immediate*) produced by God, there would be no diversity among creatures; nor would one creature be more distant from God than another. But this is clearly false, since the Philosopher says that certain corruptible things are “too far distant from God.”

Objection 3: An infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But each body is finite. Therefore, it could have been produced by the finite power of a spiritual creature. And it was in fact so produced, since in spiritual creatures actuality (*esse*) does not differ from possibility (*posse*)—especially given that no dignity which belongs to a thing by its nature is denied to it, except perhaps because of sin.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:1 says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” where ‘earth’ is understood to mean corporeal creatures. Therefore, corporeal creatures were directly produced by God.

I respond: Some have claimed that things proceeded from God step by step, so that the first creature proceeded directly from Him, and this creature produced another one, and so on down to corporeal creatures.

But this position is impossible. The initial production of a corporeal creature is through an act of creation, by which even the matter itself is produced; for the imperfect is prior to the perfect in being made. But it is impossible for anything to be created except by God alone.

To see this clearly, notice that the higher a cause is, the more things it extends to in its causing. But it is always the case that what is underlying (*id quod substernitur*) in things is more general (*communius*) than that which forms (*informat*) and limits (*restringit*) it. For instance, to exist (*esse*) is more general than to be alive (*vivere*), and to be alive is more general than to be intelligent (*intelligere*), and matter is more general than form. Therefore, the more of an underlying substratum something is, the more it must proceed directly from a higher cause. Therefore, that which is the most basic substratum in all things (*est primo substratum in omnibus*) properly involves the causality of the highest cause. Therefore, no secondary cause can produce anything without presupposing, within the thing produced,

something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing with respect to its *entire* substance, presupposing *nothing* that is uncreated or has been created by some cause. Hence, it follows that nothing is able to create except God alone, who is the first cause. And this is why, in order to show that all bodies are directly created by God, Moses said, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

Reply to objection 1: In the production of things there is a certain order—not, to be sure, an order such that one creature is created by another creature (for this is impossible), but rather an order such that diverse grades are established among creatures by God’s wisdom.

Reply to objection 2: As was shown above (q. 15, a. 2), the one God Himself, without prejudice to His simplicity, has knowledge of diverse things. And so likewise, in keeping with the diverse things known, He is through His wisdom a cause of the diverse things produced—just as a craftsman, by apprehending diverse forms, produces a diversity of artifacts.

Reply to objection 3: The quantity of an agent’s power is measured not only by the thing made but also by the manner of making it. For the same thing is made in different ways by a greater power and by a lesser power. But it is proper to an infinite power to produce something finite in such a way that nothing is presupposed. Hence, this mode of production cannot belong to any creature.

Article 4

Are the forms of bodies derived from angels?

It seems that the forms of bodies are derived from angels (*formae corporum sint ab angelis*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* Boethius says, “From the forms that exist without matter come the forms that exist in matter.” But the forms that exist without matter are the spiritual substances, whereas the forms that exist in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from the spiritual substances.

Objection 2: Everything that is such-and-such by participation is traced back to what is such-and-such through its essence. But spiritual substances are forms through their essence, whereas corporeal creatures participate in forms. Therefore, the forms of corporeal things are derived from the spiritual substances.

Objection 3: Spiritual substances have more causal power than celestial bodies do. But the celestial bodies are causes of forms in things here below, and thus they are said to be a cause of generation and corruption. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the forms that exist in matter are derived from the spiritual substances.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “Do not think that corporeal matter obeys the angels at will (*ad nutum servire*); rather, it obeys God.” But corporeal matter is said to obey at will the one from whom it receives its species. Therefore, corporeal forms are from God and not from angels.

I respond: Some have held the opinion that all corporeal forms are derived from the spiritual substances we call angels. And they have posited this in two ways:

Plato claimed that the forms which exist in corporeal matter are derived (*derivari*) from and shaped by (*formari*) Forms that subsist without matter, by way of a kind of participation. For he posited a sort of Man that subsists immaterially, and likewise Horse, and so on for the other Forms, from which singular sensible things are constituted insofar as an impression from those separated Forms is found in corporeal matter, in the manner of an assimilation that he called ‘participation’. And the Platonists

posited an order among the separated substances that corresponds to the order of the [corporeal] forms, viz., that there is a separated substance Horse that is a cause of all horses; and beyond this there is a separated Life, which they called Life itself and a cause of all life; and, further, there is a separated substance they called Being itself and a cause of all *esse*.

By contrast, Avicenna and certain others claimed that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist *per se* in matter but subsist *per se* only in an intellect. Thus, they asserted that all the forms that exist in corporeal matter proceed from the forms that exist in the intellect of spiritual creatures (whom they call ‘intelligences’, while we call them ‘angels’) in the way that the forms of artifacts proceed from the forms in the mind of a craftsman. And this seems to amount to the same thing that is proposed by certain modern heretics when they claim that while God is the creator of all things, it is the devil who shaped corporeal matter and divided it into the various species.

Now all these opinions seem to have proceeded from a single source. For they were asking about the cause of [corporeal] forms as if the forms themselves are made in their own right (*fierent secundum seipsas*). But as Aristotle shows in *Metaphysics* 7, what is made, properly speaking, is the composite, whereas the forms of corruptible things are such that they exist at some times and not at others without themselves being generated or corrupted, but rather because the composites are generated and corrupted. For the forms do not have *esse*, but instead it is the composites that have *esse* through the forms; for *being made* belongs to a thing in the same sense in which *esse* belongs to it. And so, since the similar is made by what is similar to it, it is not any immaterial form that one should look for as the cause of corporeal forms. Rather, one should look for some composite; for *this* fire is generated by *that* fire. So, then, corporeal forms are caused not in the sense that they flow from some immaterial form (*influxae ab aliqua immateriali forma*), but rather in the sense that their matter is reduced (*reducta*) from potentiality to actuality by some composite agent.

However, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, a composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, it follows further that corporeal forms are also derived from spiritual substances—not in the sense that the spiritual substances ‘pour’ the forms [into bodies] (*influxantibus formas*), but in the sense that they move [bodies] toward the forms (*moventibus ad formas*). Moreover, corporeal forms are further traced back to God as their first cause, as are the [intelligible] species of the angelic intellect, which are like seminal ideas (*seminales rationes*) of corporeal forms.

Now in the initial production of corporeal creatures there is no thought of any transition from potentiality to actuality. And so the corporeal forms that bodies had in this initial production were produced by God alone as a proper cause, and God is the only one whom matter obeys at will. Hence, to signal this, Moses premised each of the works with “God said, ‘Let there be this or that’.” This signifies the formation of things effected by God’s Word, from whom, as Augustine puts it, “comes every form and structure and agreement of parts.”

Reply to objection 1: By ‘forms that exist without matter’ Boethius means the conceptions of things that exist in God’s mind, just as in Hebrews 11:3 the Apostle says, “By faith we believe that the world was framed by the word of God, that from invisible things visible things might be made.”

However, if by ‘forms that exist without matter’ one means the angels, then one must claim that the forms that exist in matter come from the angels not by being poured into things, but through movement.

Reply to objection 2: Participated forms that exist in matter are traced back not to forms of the same type that subsist *per se*, as the Platonists held, but either (a) to the intelligible forms that belong to the angelic intellect and are such that corporeal forms proceed from them through movement or (b), further back, to the conceptions of God’s intellect, from which the seeds of the forms are instilled into created things, so that they can be educed into actuality through movement.

Reply to objection 3: The celestial bodies cause forms in bodies here below not by pouring those forms into the bodies but by moving the bodies.

QUESTION 66

The Order of Creation with respect to Division

The next thing to consider is the work of division (*opus distinctionis*). We have to consider, first, the order of creation with respect to division (question 66) and, second, the divisions in themselves (questions 67-69).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Did created matter's being unformed temporally precede its division? (2) Is there a single matter for all corporeal things? (3) Was the empyrean heaven co-created along with unformed matter? (4) Was time co-created along with unformed matter?

Article 1

Was matter unformed temporally prior to its being formed?

It seems that matter's being unformed temporally preceded its being formed:

Objection 1: Genesis 1:2 says that the earth was "void (*inanis*) and empty (*vacua*)"—or "invisible (*invisibilis*) and nondescript (*incomposita*)," according to another version—and this designates matter's being unformed, as Augustine says. Therefore, matter was unformed at some time before it was formed.

Objection 2: In its operation nature imitates God's operation, in the way that a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in nature's operation *being unformed* temporally precedes *being formed*. Therefore, the same holds for God's operation.

Objection 3: Matter is more important than an accident, since matter is a part of the substance. But as is clear in the Sacrament of the Altar, God can make it the case that an accident exists without a subject. Therefore, He could have made it the case that matter exists without form.

But contrary to this:

1. The imperfection of an effect attests to the imperfection of its agent. But God is the most perfect agent; thus, Deuteronomy 32:4 says of Him, "The works of God are perfect." Therefore, it is not the case that any work created by Him was ever unformed.

2. The formation of corporeal creatures was accomplished through the work of division. But *confusion* is opposed to *division*, in the way that *being unformed* is opposed to *being formed*. Therefore, if matter's being unformed temporally preceded its being formed, then it follows that at the beginning there was confusion among corporeal creatures of the sort the ancients called 'chaos'.

I respond: The saints have had differing opinions about this question. For instance, Augustine claims that corporeal matter's being unformed did not temporally precede its being formed, but preceded it only in origin or in the order of nature. On the other hand, others such as Basil, Ambrose, and Chrysostom claimed that matter's being unformed temporally preceded its being formed.

Even though these opinions seem to be contraries, they nonetheless differ very little from one another, since Augustine has a different understanding from the others of what it is for matter to be unformed. For Augustine takes matter's being unformed to mean that it lacks all form. And in this sense it is impossible to claim that matter's being unformed temporally preceded either its being formed (*formatio*) or its being divided (*distinctio*).

This is obvious in the case of its being formed. For if unformed matter was prior in duration, then it was already actual or in actuality (*in actu*); for its duration implies this, and the terminus of creation is an actual entity (*ens actu*). But the very thing that is actuality is form (*ipsum quod est actus est forma*). Therefore, to claim that matter preceded without form is to claim that an actual being (*ens actu*) preceded without actuality (*sine actu*)—which implies a contradiction.

Nor, again, can one claim that matter had some common form, and that afterwards the diverse

forms by which the matter was divided came over and beyond this (*supervenit ei*). For this would be same as the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual body, e.g., fire or air or water or something in between. From this it followed that *being altered* would be the only kind of *being made*. For since the antecedent [common] form would give *esse* in actuality in the genus *substance* and would make the thing a *this-something* (*hoc aliquid*), it followed that the added form (*superveniens forma*) would not make the thing an actual entity, absolutely speaking, but would instead make it an entity that is actually *such-and-such* (*hoc*)—which is proper to an accidental form. And so the subsequent forms would be accidents and, accordingly, there would be an *alteration* and not a *generation*.

Hence, one must claim that primary matter was neither created without any form at all nor created under some common form. Rather, it was created under distinct forms. And so if ‘matter’s being unformed’ refers to the condition of primary matter, which in its own right (*secundum se*) does not have any form, then matter’s being unformed did not *temporally* precede its being formed or being divided; rather, as Augustine says, it preceded it only *in origin* or *in nature*, in the sense in which potentiality is prior to actuality and in which a part is prior to its whole.

By contrast, the other saints understand the lack of form not as excluding all form, but as excluding the beauty (*formositas*) and elegance (*decor*) which is now apparent in corporeal creatures. And it is in this sense that they claim that corporeal matter’s lack of form temporally preceded its having form. Accordingly, as we shall see below (q. 69, a. 1 and q. 74, a. 2), Augustine agrees with them in some respects and disagrees with them in other respects.

And as far as can be gathered from the text of Genesis 1, there were three kinds of missing beauty (*formositas*) in virtue of which corporeal creatures were called unformed.

For the beauty of light (*pulchritudo lucis*) was missing from the whole diaphanous body that is called ‘the heavens’, and it is in virtue of this that the text says, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.” Two kinds of beauty were missing from the earth. The first is the beauty that it has from the fact that it is not covered by the waters, and in this regard the text says, “The earth was empty (or: invisible),” since its corporeal aspect could not be seen because of the waters covering it everywhere. The other kind of beauty is that which it has from the fact that it is adorned with herbs and plants, and in this regard the text says, “It was empty” (or “nondescript,” i.e., not adorned, according to the other version). And so since the text had previously mentioned the two created natures, viz., heaven and earth, it expressed heaven’s lack of form by saying, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep” (insofar as the air is also included under ‘heaven’), whereas it expressed earth’s lack of form by saying, “The earth was void and empty.”

Reply to objection 1: The name ‘earth’ in this text is understood differently by Augustine and by the other saints.

Augustine claims that in this text the names ‘earth’ and ‘waters’ signify primary matter itself. For Moses was unable to make primary matter clear to an uneducated people except by means of likenesses to things known to them. Hence, he made primary matter clear with multiple likenesses, not calling it just ‘water’ or just ‘earth’, lest it seem that primary matter is in fact either earth or water. Yet it does have a similarity to earth, insofar as it sits under forms; and it does have a similarity to water, since it is apt to be shaped by diverse forms. Therefore, the sense in which the earth is said to be “void and empty” (or “invisible and nondescript”) is that matter is known through form (and so, considered in itself, is “invisible” or “empty”), and its potentiality is fulfilled by form (and thus Plato says that matter is place (*locus*)).

By contrast, the other saints understood ‘earth’ as itself an element. We have already explained the sense in which it was unformed according to them.

Reply to objection 2: Nature produces an actual effect (*effectum in actu*) from a being that is in

potentiality (*de ente in potentia*), and so in its operation the potentiality must temporally precede the actuality, and the *being unformed* must precede the *being formed*.

God, on the other hand, produces an actual being *ex nihilo*, and so He can directly produce a complete entity (*rem perfectam*), given the magnitude of His power.

Reply to objection 3: Since an accident is a form, it is a certain actuality (*quidam actus*), whereas matter, given its character (*secundum id quod est*), is a being in potentiality (*ens in potentia*). It is a greater anomaly (*magis repugnat*) for matter to exist in actuality without form than for an accident to exist without a subject.

Reply to argument 1 for the contrary: If, according to the other saints, matter's being unformed temporally preceded its being formed, this did not stem from a lack of power on God's part. Rather, it stemmed from His wisdom, so that order might be preserved in the condition of things as they were led from being incomplete to being complete.

Reply to argument 2 for the contrary: Certain of the ancient natural philosophers posited a confusion that excluded every type of division—apart from the fact that Anaxagoras posited Mind as the only distinct and unmixed reality. But Sacred Scripture posits several distinctions before the work of division.

The first is the distinction between heaven and earth (in which, as will be explained below (a. 3), we also see a division with respect to matter), when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

The second is the distinction among the elements with respect to their forms, which is made by naming earth and water. It does not name air and fire, since it is not as obvious to the uneducated people Moses was addressing as it is in the case of earth and fire that things of this sort are bodies—though, as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 8, Plato understood (a) air to be signified by “the spirit of the Lord” (since air is also called a spirit) and (b) fire to be signified by ‘heaven’ (which he claimed to be of a fiery nature). However, Rabbi Moses, who agrees with Plato in other matters, claims that fire is signified by “darkness,” since, as he puts it, fire does not give light in its own proper sphere. Still, what was said above seems to more plausible, since “spirit of the Lord” is not normally used in Scripture except for the Holy Spirit, who is said here to “move over the waters,” not corporeally, but in the way that a craftsman's will “moves over” the matter that he wants to give shape to.

The third distinction is signified with respect to position. For the earth was under the waters and rendered invisible by them, whereas the air, which is the subject of darkness, is signified as having been above the waters when it says, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.”

Now what remained to be divided will become clear in what follows (q. 71).

Article 2

Is there a single type of unformed matter for all corporeal things?

It seems that there is a single type of unformed matter for all corporeal things (*una sit materia informis omnium corporalium*):

Objection 1: In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says, “I find two things that you have made, one that was formed and the other that was unformed.” He says that the latter is “the invisible and nondescript earth,” a phrase which, he says, signifies the matter of corporeal things. Therefore, there is a single type of matter for all corporeal things.

Objection 2: In *Metaphysics* 5 the Philosopher says that things which are one in genus are one in

matter. But all corporeal things agree in the genus *body*. Therefore, there is a single type of matter for all corporeal things.

Objection 3: Diverse actualities come to be in diverse potentialities, and a single actuality comes to be in a single potentiality. But there is a single form for all bodies, viz., corporeality. Therefore, there is a single type of matter for all corporeal things.

Objection 4: Matter, considered in itself, exists only in potentiality. But division comes about through forms. Therefore, if matter is considered in itself, there is just a single type of matter for all corporeal things.

But contrary to this: As *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1 says, if things agree in their matter, then they are transmutable into one another, and they act on and are acted upon by one another. But the celestial bodies and the lower bodies are not related in this way to one another. Therefore, they do not share the same type of matter (*eorum materia non est una*).

I respond: The philosophers have had differing opinions on this topic.

Plato and all the philosophers before Aristotle claimed that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Hence, since the four elements share a single type of matter, as mutual generation and corruption among them make clear, it followed as a result that there is a single type of matter for all bodies. And Plato ascribed the fact that some bodies are incorruptible not to the status of their matter, but rather to the will of their maker, viz., God, whom he represents as saying to the celestial bodies, “By your nature you are subject to dissolution, but by my will you are not subject to dissolution, since my will is stronger than your bond.”

However, Aristotle refutes this position by appeal to the natural motions of bodies. For since a celestial body has a natural motion that is different from the natural motion of the elements, it follows that its nature is different from the nature of the four elements. And just as circular motion, which is proper to a celestial body, lacks contrariety, whereas the motions of the elements are contrary to one another in the way that an upward motion is contrary to a downward motion, so too a celestial body exists without contrariety, whereas elemental bodies exist with contrariety. Moreover, since corruption and generation stem from contraries, it follows that it is by their nature that the celestial bodies are incorruptible and that the elements are corruptible.

However, despite this difference in natural corruptibility and incorruptibility, Avicenna, focusing on the unity of the form of corporeality (*attendens ad unitatem formae corporalis*), claimed that there is a single type of matter for all bodies.

To be sure, if the form of corporeality were of itself a single form such that the other forms by which bodies are divided supervened on it, then this claim would be necessary. For the form in question would immutably inhere in matter, and each body would be incorruptible with respect to it. Corruption would occur through the removal of the subsequent forms, but this would be corruption only in a qualified sense and not absolutely speaking, since some actual entity would be the subject of the privation—just as with the ancient natural philosophers, who posited as the subject of bodies some actual entity such as fire or air or something of this sort.

However, if we assume that no form that exists in a corruptible body remains as the substratum for generation and corruption, then it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible bodies is not the same as the matter of incorruptible bodies. For matter, given what it is, is in potentiality with respect to form. Therefore, matter, considered in itself, must be in potentiality with respect to the forms of all those things which share a common matter. Now through one form the matter comes to be actual (*in actu*) only with respect to that form. Therefore, it remains in potentiality with respect to all the other forms. Nor is this conclusion undermined if one of those forms is more perfect and virtually contains the others within itself. For potentiality, taken in itself, is related indifferently to the perfect and the imperfect; hence, just as it is in potentiality to a perfect form when it is the subject of an imperfect form, so the converse holds

as well. So, then, matter, insofar as it is the subject of the form of an incorruptible body, will still be in potentiality with respect to the form of a corruptible body. And since it does not have the latter form in actuality, it will simultaneously be the subject of the form [of an incorruptible body] and of the privation [of the form of a corruptible body], since a privation is the absence of a form in something which is in potentiality with respect to that form. But this is precisely the condition of a corruptible body. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a single type of matter for both a body that is corruptible by its nature and a body that is incorruptible by its nature.

And yet one should not claim, as Averroes imagines, that (a) the matter of the heavens is the celestial body itself, a being in potentiality with respect to place and not with respect to *esse*, and that (b) its form is the separated substance that is united to it as its mover. For it is impossible to posit an actual being unless either (a) the whole of it *is itself* an actuality and a form or (b) it *has* an actuality, i.e., a form. Therefore, if, once the separated substance that is posited as the mover is mentally removed, the celestial body is such that it does not *have* a form—i.e., if it is not composed of a form and the subject of that form—then what follows is that it is a form and actuality as a whole. But everything like that is an intellect in actuality—something that cannot be said of a celestial body, since it is sensible. What remains, then, is that the matter of a celestial body, taken in itself, is in potentiality only with respect to the form that it in fact has. And it makes no difference to the argument what that form is, whether it is a soul or something else. Hence, as Aristotle says, the form of a celestial body so perfects the matter that no potentiality with respect to *esse* remains in it in any way; rather, it has potentiality only with respect to place.

And so the matter of a celestial body is not the same as the matter of the elements, except by way of an analogy, insofar as both agree in the notion of potentiality.

Reply to objection 1: On this point Augustine is following the opinion of Plato, who does not posit the “fifth essence” (*quintam essentiam*).

An alternative reply is that unformed matter is one by a oneness of order, in the sense that all bodies are one within the order of corporeal creatures.

Reply to objection 2: If the genus is thought of within *physics* (*physice*), then, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, and this because of the different types of potentiality they have.

On the other hand, from the perspective of *logic* (*secundum logicam considerationem*), there is a single genus for all bodies, and this because there is a single concept of corporeality.

Reply to objection 3: The form of corporeality is not a single form in all bodies, since, as has been explained, it is not other than the forms by which bodies are distinguished from one another.

Reply to objection 4: Since potentiality is predicated in relation to actuality, *being in potentiality* is diversified by virtue of being ordered to diverse actualities, e.g., sight is ordered to color, and hearing is ordered to sound. Hence, the matter of a celestial body is other than the matter of an element by the very fact that it is not in potentiality to the form of any element.

Article 3

Was the empyrean heaven co-created with unformed matter?

It seems that the empyrean heaven was not co-created with unformed matter:

Objection 1: The empyrean heaven, if there is such a thing, must be a sensible body. But every sensible body is subject to motion (*est mobile*). However, the empyrean heaven is not subject to motion,

since its motion would be ascertained through the motion of some visible body—which does not at all appear to be the case. Therefore, it is not the case that the empyrean heaven is something co-created with unformed matter.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “The lower bodies are ruled in a certain order by the higher bodies.” Therefore, if the empyrean heaven is a highest body, it must have some influence on lower bodies. But this does not seem to be the case, especially if the empyrean heaven is posited as a body not subject to motion, since a body does not effect motion unless it is itself moved. Therefore, it is not the case that the empyrean heaven was co-created with unformed matter.

Objection 3: Someone might reply that the empyrean heaven is a place of contemplation not ordered to natural effects.

Against this: In *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “Insofar as we grasp something eternal with our mind, we are not in this world.” From this it is clear that contemplation elevates the mind above corporeal things. Therefore, there is no corporeal place set aside for contemplation.

Objection 4: Among the celestial bodies there is a body that is partly diaphanous and partly luminous, viz., the starry heaven (*caelum sidereum*). There is also a totally diaphanous celestial body, which some call the aqueous or crystalline heaven (*caelum aqueum vel crystallinum*). Therefore, if there is a yet higher celestial body, it must be totally luminous. But this is impossible, since if it were so, then the air would be continuously illuminated and night would never occur. Therefore, it is not the case that the empyrean heaven was co-created with unformed matter.

But contrary to this: Strabo says that the verse, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” is talking not about the visible firmament, but about the empyrean, i.e., fiery, heaven.

I respond: The empyrean heaven is posited only on the authority of Strabo and Bede, and again on the authority of Basil.

In positing the empyrean heaven, they all agree on one point, viz., that it is the place of the blessed in heaven (*locus beatorum*). For Strabo says, and Bede agrees, “As soon as it was made, it was filled with the angels.” Likewise, in *Hexameron* 2 Basil says, “Just as the damned are driven into the last darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light which lies outside the world, where the blessed shall receive the abode of rest.”

However, they differ in their reasons for positing the empyrean heaven. For Strabo and Bede posit the empyrean heaven because the firmament, by which they mean the starry heaven, is said to have been made not in the beginning, but on the second day. By contrast, Basil posits the empyrean heaven in order that God not seem to have begun His work simply with darkness. (The Manicheans falsely make this claim, calling the God of the Old Testament the ‘God of darkness’.)

However, these reasons are not very compelling. For Augustine and the other saints have an alternative answer to the question about the firmament’s being said to have been made on the second day. And, according to Augustine, the question about the darkness is answered by the fact that matter’s not being formed (which is signified by ‘darkness’) preceded its being formed not in duration, but [only] in origin. According to others, however, since the darkness is not a creature but is instead the privation of light, it attests to God’s wisdom that the things that He produced *ex nihilo* were such that He established them in a state of imperfection and afterwards brought them to completion.

Still, a more fitting explanation can be based on the very condition of glory. For there are two sorts of glory that are looked for in our future reward, viz., (a) spiritual glory and (b) corporeal glory not only in the human bodies that will be glorified, but also in the whole world that is to be renewed. But spiritual glory commenced at the very beginning of the world in the beatitude of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. Hence, it was fitting that corporeal glory should also have commenced at the beginning in a body that was likewise totally lucid from the beginning and free from the servitude of

corruption and mutability—just as all of corporeal creation is expected to be in the future after the resurrection. And so the reason why that heaven is called empyrean, i.e., fiery, is because of its splendor and not because of its heat.

Notice, though, that in *De Civitate Dei* 10 Augustine says that Porphyry “distinguished the angels from the demons in such a way that he claimed that airy places belong to the demons, whereas the ethereal or empyrean places belong to the angels.” However, Porphyry, as a Platonist, thought that the starry heaven was fiery, and so he called it ‘empyrean’ or ‘ethereal’, insofar as the name ‘ether’ is taken from inflammation and not, as Aristotle claims, from the swiftness of the motion. I point this out lest anyone think that Augustine posited an empyrean heaven in the way that it is now posited by modern authors.

Reply to objection 1: Sensible bodies are subject to motion according to the very status of the world, since the multiplication of the elect is procured through the motion of corporeal creatures. However, the motion of bodies will cease in the final consummation of glory, and the empyrean heaven had to have such a condition from the beginning.

Reply to objection 2: It is likely enough that since the empyrean heaven is, according to certain authors, ordered toward the state of glory, it does not have an influence on lower bodies, which belong to a differ order insofar as they are ordered toward the natural course of things.

Still, it seems more probable to claim that just as the highest angels, who stand before God (*assistent*), have influence over the intermediate and lowest angels, who are sent on mission, even though, according to Dionysius, they themselves are not sent on mission, so too the empyrean heaven has an influence over the bodies that are moved, even though it itself is not moved. And in light of this one can claim that the empyrean heaven communicates (*influit*) to the first moved heaven something fixed and stable rather than something that is transient and comes with motion, e.g., the power to contain and to cause, or something of this sort that pertains to its dignity.

Reply to objection 3: A corporeal place is set aside for contemplation not because it is necessary, but because it is fitting that an exterior brightness should correspond to the interior brightness. Hence, Basil says, “The ministering spirit was unable to pass his time in darkness, but had his fit dwelling place in light and joy.”

Reply to objection 4: As Basil says in *Hexameron* 2, “It is certain that heaven was created spherical in shape, with a dense body and strong enough that it could separate what was outside it from what was inside. Because of this, it necessarily left in its wake a region bereft of light, shut out from the splendor that radiated above it.”

However, since the body of the firmament, though solid, is diaphanous, given that it does not impede light (as is clear from the fact that we see the light of the stars despite the intervening heavens), an alternative reply is that the empyrean heaven has a light which is more subtle and is not condensed in such a way as to emit rays like the body of the sun does.

Yet another reply is that the empyrean heaven has the brightness of glory, which differs from natural brightness.

Article 4

Was time co-created with unformed matter?

It seems that time was not co-created with unformed matter:

Objection 1: In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine, speaking to God, says, “I find two things You have

made that are bereft of time, viz., primary corporeal matter and the angelic nature.” Therefore, time was not co-created with unformed matter.

Objection 2: Time is divided into day and night. But at the beginning there was neither night nor day; they came afterwards, when God divided the light from the darkness. Therefore, time did not exist at the beginning.

Objection 3: Time is the numbering (*numerus*) of the motion of the firmament, which, we read, was created on the second day. Therefore, time did not exist at the beginning.

Objection 4: Motion is prior to time. Therefore, motion, rather than time, should be numbered among the things created first.

Objection 5: Just as time is an extrinsic measure, so too is place. Therefore, time ought not to be counted among the things created first any more than place is.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says, “Spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time.”

I respond: It is commonly claimed the four things were created first, viz., (a) angelic nature, (b) the empyrean heaven, (c) unformed corporeal matter, and (d) time.

Note, however, that this claim does not go through on Augustine’s opinion. For Augustine posits two things that were created first, viz., angelic nature and corporeal matter, and makes no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two things, viz., angelic nature and unformed matter, precede matter’s formation not in duration, but [only] in nature; and just as they precede matter’s formation in nature, so too they precede motion and time in nature. Hence, time cannot be numbered among the things created first.

On the other hand, the aforementioned enumeration does go through on the opinion of the other saints, who posit that matter’s being unformed precedes its being formed in duration. In that case, time must be posited for that duration; otherwise, there could not be a measure of duration.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine says this on the understanding that angelic nature and unformed matter precede time in origin or nature.

Reply to objection 2: Just as, according to the other saints, matter was unformed in a certain way and later on formed, so too time was in a certain way unformed and afterwards formed and distinguished into day and night.

Reply to objection 3: If the motion of the firmament did not start immediately at the beginning, then the time that preceded it was not the numbering of the motion of the firmament, but was instead the numbering of whatever the first motion was. For it is accidental to time that it is the numbering of the motion of the firmament, and this in virtue of the fact that this motion is the first motion. But if some other motion were the first, then time would be the measure of that motion, since all things are measured by what is first in their genus.

Moreover, it is necessary to assert that there was some motion immediately at the beginning—at least in the sense of a succession of conceptions and affections in the angelic mind. But motion cannot be understood without time, since time is nothing other than the numbering of the prior and posterior in motion.

Reply to objection 4: Among the things counted as having been created first are those which have a general relation to things. And so time, which has the character of a common measure, should be counted, whereas motion, which is related only to the moveable subject, should not be counted.

Reply to objection 5: Place is understood as included with the empyrean heaven, since it encompasses all things.

And since place belongs to permanent things, all of it is simultaneously co-created. By contrast, time, which is non-permanent, is co-created in its beginning, since in like manner nothing is actual in time except the now.

QUESTION 67

The Work of Division: The First Day

The next thing to consider is the work of division in its own right (*opus distinctionis secundum se*): First, the work of the first day (question 67); second, the work of the second day (question 68); and, third, the work of the third day (question 69).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is ‘light’ properly predicated in the case of spiritual things? (2) Is corporeal light a body? (3) Is corporeal light a quality? (4) Was it appropriate for light to be made on the first day?

Article 1

Is ‘light’ properly predicated in the case of spiritual things?

It seems that ‘light’ (*lux*) is properly predicated in the case of spiritual things:

Objection 1: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4 Augustine says that in the case of spiritual things “light is better and more certain, and Christ is not called the ‘Light’ in the same way He is called the ‘stone’ (*lapis*)” (cf. Acts 4:11 and 1 Peter 2:4); the former is said properly, whereas the latter is said figuratively.”

Objection 2: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius places ‘Light’ (*lumen*) among the intelligible names of God. But intelligible names are properly predicated in the case of spiritual things. Therefore, ‘light’ (*lux*) is properly predicated in the case of spiritual things.

Objection 3: In Ephesians 5:13 the Apostle says, “All that is made manifest is light.” But manifestation exists more properly in the case of spiritual things than in the case of corporeal things. Therefore, so does light.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide* Ambrose posits ‘Light’ (*splendor*) among those names that are predicated of God metaphorically.

I respond: There are two ways in which it is proper (*convenit*) for a name to be predicated: (a) in accord with the name’s *first imposition* and (b) in accord with the *usage* of the name. This is clear in the case of the name ‘see’ (*visio*), which was first imposed to signify the act of the sense of sight. But then, because of the dignity and certitude of this sense, the name ‘see’, in accord with the usage of speakers, was extended to all cognition on the part of the other senses (for we say, “See how it tastes” or “See how it smells” or “See how hot it is”), and, further, even to the intellect’s cognition—this according to Matthew 5:8 (“Happy are the clean of heart, for they shall see God”).

Something similar should be said about the name ‘light’ (*lux*). For it was first instituted to signify that which effects manifestation in the case of the sense of sight, and then afterwards it was extended to signify everything that effects manifestation in the case of any kind of cognition whatsoever.

Therefore, if the name ‘light’ is taken according to its first imposition, then it is predicated metaphorically in the case of spiritual things, as Ambrose claims. However, if it is taken according to the way it is extended in the usage of speakers to any kind of manifestation, then it is properly predicated in the case of spiritual things.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 2

Is light a body?

It seems that light (*lux*) is a body:

Objection 1: In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says, “Light holds first place among bodies.” Therefore, light is a body.

Objection 2: The Philosopher says that light (*lumen*) is a species of fire. But fire is a body. Therefore, light is a body.

Objection 3: It is proper to bodies to be carried (*ferri*), to be intersected (*intersecari*), and to be reflected (*reflecti*). But all these things are attributed to light (*lumen*) or light rays (*radii*). Again, according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, different light rays are joined and separated, which likewise seems to be able to belong only to bodies. Therefore, light (*lumen*) is a body.

But contrary to this: Two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time. But light (*lumen*) is in the same place as air. Therefore, light is not a body.

I respond: It is impossible for light (*lumen*) to be a body. This is clear in three ways.

First, by appeal to *place*. For the place of a given body is different from the place of any other body. Nor is it possible, in accord with nature, for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time, no matter what sort of bodies they are; for contiguity (*contiguum*) requires a difference in position (*in situ*).

Second, the same thing is clear by appeal to *motion*. For if light were a body, then illumination would be the local motion of a body. But no local motion on the part of a body can be instantaneous (*in instanti*), since everything that is moved with respect to place (*movetur localiter*) must reach the middle (*medium*) of the relevant magnitude before reaching the end (*extremum*). But illumination is effected instantaneously. Nor can one reply that illumination is effected within an imperceptible temporal interval (*in tempore imperceptibili*). For a temporal interval could be hidden in the case of a small spatial distance (*in parvo spatio*), but a temporal interval could not be hidden in the case of a large spatial distance (*in magno spatio*), e.g., from the east to the west; for when the sun is at its easternmost point, the whole hemisphere is immediately illuminated all the way to the opposite point. There is also a second consideration based on motion. Each body has a determinate natural motion, whereas the motion of illumination is in all directions and is no more circular than straight. Hence, it is clear that illumination is not the local motion of a body.

Third, the same thing is clear by appeal to *generation and corruption*. For if light were a body, then when the air became dark because of the absence of a light source (*per absentiam luminaris*), it would follow that the body of light had been corrupted and that its matter had received another form. But this does not appear to be the case—unless one claims that darkness is a body as well. Nor is it clear from what matter such a large body is generated every day, given that it completely fills the hemispheric medium. Again, it is ridiculous to claim that such a large body is corrupted merely because of the absence of a light source. And if someone asserts that the light is not corrupted, but instead comes with and moves around with the sun, what can he possibly say about the fact that when a body is interposed around a candle, the whole house is darkened? Nor does the light seem to collect around the candle, since the brightness around the candle is not greater in that place than it was before.

Thus, since all these claims are contrary (*repugnant*) not only to reason, but also to the senses, one should say that it is impossible for light to be a body.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is taking ‘light’ here for a body that is luminous in actuality, viz., fire, which is the most noble of the four elements.

Reply to objection 2: Aristotle is calling fire in its proper matter ‘light’, just as fire is called a ‘flame’ (*flamma*) in airy matter and a ‘coal’ (*carbo*) in earthy matter.

Still, the examples that Aristotle uses in his logical works do not matter much, since he introduces them as probable according to the opinion of others.

Reply to objection 3: All the things in question are attributed to light metaphorically, in the same way that they can also be attributed to heat. For since, as is shown in *Physics* 8, local motion is naturally the first of movements, we use names pertaining to local motion in the case of alteration and all other movements—in the same way that, as *Metaphysics* 10 explains, the name ‘distance’, which is derived from place, is applied to all contraries.

Article 3

Is light a quality?

It seems that light (*lux*) is not a quality:

Objection 1: Every quality remains in its subject even after the agent ceases to act; for instance, heat remains in the water after it is been removed from the fire. But light (*lumen*) does not remain in the air when the light source (*luminare*) withdraws. Therefore, light is not a quality.

Objection 2: Every sensible quality has a contrary; for instance, hot has cold as a contrary, and black has white as a contrary. But there is no contrary for light (*lumen*), since darkness is the privation of light. Therefore, light is not a sensible quality.

Objection 3: A cause is more powerful than its effect. But the light (*lux*) of the celestial bodies is a cause of substantial forms in things here below. Also, it gives spiritual *esse* to colors, since it makes them visible in actuality. Therefore, light is not a sensible quality, but is instead a substantial or spiritual form.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 1 Damascene says that light is a certain quality.

I respond: Some have claimed that light (*lumen*) in the air does not have *natural esse* in the way that the color in a wall does, but that it instead has *intentional esse* in the way that the likeness (*similitudo*) of a color in the air does. However, this cannot be the case, and for two reasons.

First, ‘light’ (*lumen*) denominates the air, since the air becomes luminous in actuality (*luminosus in actu*). By contrast, ‘color’ does not denominate the air, since the air is not said to be colored.

Second, light has an effect in nature, since through the sun’s rays bodies become warm. Intentions, on the other hand, do not cause natural transmutations.

Others have claimed that light (*lux*) is the substantial form of the sun. But this, too, seems impossible, and for two reasons.

First, no substantial form is *per se* able to be sensed, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, what a thing is (*quod quid est*) is an object of the intellect. But light (*lux*) is visible in itself (*secundum se*).

Second, it is impossible for something that is a substantial form in one thing to be an accidental form in another thing, since it belongs *per se* to a substantial form to constitute a thing within a species, and so to be present to that thing always and in all respects. But light is not the substantial form of the air; otherwise, when it withdrew, the air would be corrupted. Hence, it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.

Therefore, one should claim that just as heat is an active quality that follows upon the substantial form of fire, so too light is an active quality that follows upon the substantial form of the sun or of any other body that gives light of itself, if there is any other such body. An indication of this is that the rays

of different stars have different effects corresponding to the different natures of the bodies.

Reply to objection 1: Since a quality follows upon a substantial form, a subject can be related in different ways to the reception of the quality, just as it is related in different ways to the reception of the form:

For when the matter receives a form in a complete way (*perfecte*), then the quality that follows upon the form is likewise had firmly, as when water is converted into fire.

On the other hand, if the substantial form is received imperfectly, in a certain inchoative way, then the consequent quality remains for a while but not permanently, as is clear in the case of hot water that returns to its own nature.

By contrast, illumination is not effected through a transmutation of matter aimed at the reception of a substantial form, so that there might be something like the inchoative reception of a form. For this reason, light does not remain unless the agent is present.

Reply to objection 2: Light does not have a contrary because it is a natural quality of the first corporeal cause of alteration, and this cause is far removed from contrariety.

Reply to objection 3: Just as heat acts instrumentally in the power of the substantial form to induce the form of fire, so light acts instrumentally in the power of the celestial bodies (a) to produce substantial forms and (b) to make colors visible in actuality, insofar as it is a quality of the first sensible body.

Article 4

Was it appropriate for the production of light to be put on the first day?

It seems that it was not appropriate for the production of light to be put on the first day:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 3), light is a certain quality. But since a quality is an accident, it has the character of something last and not of something first. Therefore, the production of light should not have been put on the first day.

Objection 2: It is through light that night is distinguished from day. But this distinction is effected by the sun, which, we read, was made on the fourth day. Therefore, the production of light should not have been put on the first day.

Objection 3: Night and day come about because of the circular motion of a luminous body. But circular motion is proper to the firmament, which, we read, was made on the second day. Therefore, the production of light, which divides night and day, should not have been put on the first day.

Objection 4: Someone might reply that the verse is to be understood as applying to *spiritual* light. Against this: The light which, we read, was made on the first day effects a division from darkness. But there were no dark spirits at the beginning, since, as was explained above (q. 63, a. 5), the demons were good at the beginning. Therefore, the production of light should not have been put on the first day.

But contrary to this: That without which day cannot exist had to be made on the first day. But without light there can be no day. Therefore, light had to be made on the first day.

I respond: There are two opinions about the production of light.

It seems to Augustine that it would not have been appropriate for Moses to omit the production of spiritual creatures. And so he claims that when it says, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," what is meant by 'heaven' is a still unformed spiritual nature, whereas what is meant by 'earth' is the unformed matter of corporeal creatures. And since spiritual nature has more dignity than corporeal nature, it was the first to be formed. Therefore, it is the formation of spiritual nature that is signified by

the production of light, so that what is meant is spiritual light. For the formation of a spiritual nature is effected by his being illuminated in such a way that he adheres to the word of God.

To others, however, it seems that the production of spiritual creatures was indeed omitted by Moses. But they have given different explanations for this.

Basil claims that Moses began his narration from that ‘beginning’ which has to do with the time of sensible things, and that he omitted spiritual, i.e., angelic, nature because it had been created before this beginning.

Chrysostom, however, gives a different explanation: Moses was addressing an uneducated people who could understand nothing except corporeal things and whom he wanted to call back from idolatry. But if substances above all corporeal creatures had been presented to them, they would have seized the occasion to commit idolatry. For they would have thought of these substances as gods, since they were already prone to worship even the sun and the moon and the stars as gods—something forbidden them by Deuteronomy 4:19.

Now Genesis 1:2 had earlier talked about different kinds of formlessness (*informitas*) with respect to corporeal creatures: (a) one, when it said, “The earth was void and empty,” and (b) the other, when it said, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.”

Now the formlessness involving darkness had to be removed first through the production of light, and this for two reasons.

First, because, as has been explained (a. 3), light is a quality of the first body, and so the world had first to be formed in accord with light.

Second, because of the commonality of light. For the lower bodies share in light with the higher bodies. And just as one proceeds in *cognition* from what is more common, so too in *operation*. For, as is explained in *De Generatione Animalium*, the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before the man. Therefore, the order of God’s wisdom had to be made manifest in such a way that what was produced first of all among the works of division was light, as the form of the first body and as a more common [quality].

Basil posits a third reason, viz., that all other things are made manifest through light.

Moreover, a fourth reason, touched on in the objections, can be added: Day cannot exist without light, and so light had to be made on the first day.

Reply to objection 1: Given the opinion that matter’s being unformed temporally (*duratione*) preceded its being formed, one must claim that matter was created from the beginning as the subject of substantial forms, but was later formed with respect to certain accidental conditions, among which light holds the first place.

Reply to objection 2: Some claim that the light in question was a kind of luminous cloud, which afterwards, once the sun was made, returned to its original matter. But this is implausible. For at the beginning of Genesis Scripture commemorates the establishment of nature, which afterwards perseveres. Hence, one should not claim that something which had been made at that point ceased to exist later on.

Accordingly, others claim that this luminous cloud remains even now and is conjoined to the sun in such a way that it cannot be distinguished from the sun. However, on this view the cloud would remain to no purpose (*remaneret superflua*); yet among the works of God there is nothing useless.

And so others claim that the body of the sun was formed from that cloud. However, this claim cannot be made if one posits that the body of the sun is not made from the nature of the four elements, but is instead incorruptible by its nature (cf. q. 66, a. 2). For according to this opinion, the sun’s matter could not have been the subject of any other form.

Therefore, one should claim, with Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, that the light in question was the light of the sun, but that the sun was as yet unformed in the sense that the substance of the sun existed and had the power to illuminate in general, but was only afterwards given a special and

determinate power with respect to particular effects. On this view, there were three respects in which light was divided from darkness in the production of this light:

First, with respect to its *cause*, since the cause of the light existed in the substance of the sun, whereas the cause of darkness lay in the opaqueness of the earth.

Second, with respect to *place*, since there was light in one hemisphere and darkness in the other.

Third, with respect to *time*, since within the same hemisphere there was light for one part of the time and darkness for the other part. And this is what it means when it says, “The light He called day, and the darkness night.”

Reply to objection 3: Basil claims that at the time in question light and darkness were effected not by motion, but by the emission and retraction (*contractio*) of light. But against this Augustine objects that there would be no reason for this alternation of the emitting and retracting of light, since there were as yet no men or animals whose uses this would serve. In addition, the nature of a luminous body is not such that light retracts in its presence; and even though this could be done miraculously, it is not, as Augustine points out, the miraculous that is to be sought in the first establishment of nature, but rather what the nature of the things dictates.

And so one should reply that there are two motions in the heavens. One is common to the whole of the heavens, and it causes day and night; and it is this motion that seems to have been established on the first day. The second motion is the one that is diversified by different bodies, and it is according to these motions that there is a diversity of days with respect to one another, and months, and years. And so on the first day mention is made only of the distinction between night and day, which is effected by the common motion. But on the fourth day there is mention of the diversity of days and seasons (*tempora*) and years, when it says, “... and let them be for seasons and for days and for years.” This diversity is effected by the particular motions.

Reply to objection 4: According to Augustine, formlessness does not temporally precede formation. Hence, he has to say that what the production of light means here is the formation of spiritual creatures—not of spiritual creatures perfected by glory, with which they were not created, but of spiritual creatures perfected by grace, with which they were indeed created, as has been explained (q. 62, a. 3). Thus, through this light there was a division of light from darkness, i.e., from the formlessness of [corporeal] creatures, which had not yet been formed.

Alternatively, if both kinds of creatures (*tota creatura*) were simultaneously formed, then the division was of light from that spiritual darkness which did not then exist (since the devil was not created evil), but which God foresaw would exist in the future.

QUESTION 68

The Work of the Second Day

The next thing to consider is the work of the second day. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Was the firmament made on the second day? (2) Are there waters above the firmament? (3) Does the firmament divide waters from waters? (4) Are there many heavens, or just one?

Article 1

Was the firmament made on the second day?

It seems that the firmament was not made on the second day:

Objection 1: Genesis 1:8 says, “God called the firmament ‘heaven’. But heaven was made before any of the days, as is clear when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Therefore, the firmament was not made on the second day.

Objection 2: The works of the six days are ordered in accord with God’s wisdom. But it would not befit God’s wisdom for Him to make at a later time (*posterius*) something that is naturally prior. But the firmament is naturally prior to water and earth, mention of which is made before the formation of light, which occurred on the first day. Therefore, the firmament was not made on the second day.

Objection 3: Everything that was made during the six days was formed from the matter that had been created before any of the days. But the firmament could not have been formed from pre-existing matter, since then it would be subject to generation and corruption. Therefore, the firmament was not made on the second day.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:6 says, “God said, let there be a firmament.” And this is later followed by, “... and the evening and the morning were the second day.”

I respond: As Augustine teaches, in questions of this sort there are two norms to be followed. The first is that the truth of Scripture must be unshakably held to. The second is that when divine Scripture can be interpreted in a number of different ways, one should not adhere to any of the interpretations so exclusively that what he presumes to assert to be the meaning of Scripture might turn out to be proven false by a compelling argument—lest, because of this, the Scripture be exposed to ridicule by non-believers, and lest the way of belief be thereby closed off to them.

Note, then, that there are two possible ways to understand the passage, “The firmament was made ... on the second day.”

In the first way, it is speaking of the firmament in which the stars exist. And on this reading, we must explain the verse in different ways, corresponding to the different opinions men have about the firmament.

For instance, some have claimed that this firmament is composed of the elements. This was the opinion of Empedocles, who nonetheless claimed that this body is incorruptible (*indissolubile*) because its composition involved only ‘love’ (*amicitia*) and not ‘strife’ (*lis*). Others have claimed that the firmament is of the nature of the four elements, not in the sense that it is composed of the elements, but in the sense that it is a simple element. This was the opinion of Plato, who claimed that a celestial body is elemental fire. Still others have claimed that the heavens are not of the nature of the four elements, but are a fifth body, beyond the four elements. And this was Aristotle’s opinion.

Given the first opinion, one could concede without qualification that the firmament was made on the second day, even with respect to its substance. For the work of *creation* involves producing the very substance of the elements, whereas the work of *division* and the work of *adornment* involve forming things out of the pre-existing elements.

Given Plato's opinion, on the other hand, it is wrong to believe that the firmament was made with respect to its substance on the second day. For on this view, to make the firmament is to produce the element fire. But the production of the elements pertains to the work of creation, according to those who claim that matter's not being formed temporally preceded its being formed. For the forms of the elements are the ones that first characterize matter.

A fortiori, given Aristotle's opinion, one cannot claim that the firmament was produced with respect to its substance on the second day, assuming that the six days involve temporal succession. For since the heavens are incorruptible by their nature, they have matter that cannot be the subject of any other form, and so it is impossible that the firmament should be out of matter that has existed at some previous time. Hence, the production of the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation [and not to the work of division].

However, according to these last two opinions, there is a type of formation of the firmament that belongs to the work of the second day—just as in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius claims that the sun's light was unformed in the first three days and was later formed on the fourth day.

On the other hand, if, as Augustine claims, the six days designate only an order of nature and not a temporal succession, then nothing prevents one from claiming, given any of these opinions, that the formation of the firmament with respect to its substance pertains to the second day.

Now the second possible way to understand the passage, "The firmament was made on the second day," is not to think of the firmament in which the stars are fixed, but to think instead of the part of the air in which clouds gather and which is called a firmament because of the density of the air in that region. For as Basil explains, what is dense and solid is said to be a 'firm body', as opposed to a 'mathematical body'. Given this interpretation, nothing follows that is incompatible with any of the above opinions. Hence, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 Augustine, commending this interpretation, says, "I judge this view to be the most praiseworthy. For what it says is not contrary to the faith, and it can be promptly accepted once the proof is presented."

Reply to objection 1: According to Chrysostom, Moses first told in summary what God had done, beginning with, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and afterwards explained it part by part. It is like someone saying, "This builder made that house," and then adding, "First he made the foundation, and later he erected the walls, and then he put a roof over it." And so we do not have to understand two different heavens when it says, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and when it later says, "On the second day the firmament was made."

It also possible to claim that the heaven said to be created at the beginning is different from the heaven said to be made on the second day. There are different ways to make this claim.

For instance, according to Augustine, the heaven said to have been made on the first day is unformed spiritual nature, whereas the heaven said to have been made on the second day is the corporeal heaven.

By contrast, according to Bede and Strabo, the heaven said to have been made on the first day is the empyrean heaven, whereas the firmament that is said to have been made on the second day is the starry heaven.

Again, according to Damascene, the heaven said to have been made on the first day is a spherical heaven without stars—the philosophers speak of this, calling it the ninth sphere and the first movable thing, which is moved by the diurnal motion—whereas he understands the firmament made on the second day to be the starry heaven.

According to yet another interpretation mentioned by Augustine, the heaven made on the first day is the starry heaven itself, whereas the firmament made on the second day is the region of the air in which clouds gather and which is also called 'heaven' equivocally. And it is in order to signal the equivocation that the text expressly says, "God called the firmament 'heaven'," just as it had previously said, "God

called the light ‘day’” (for ‘day’ is also used to mean a period of twenty-four hours). And, as Rabbi Moses points out, this same practice can be observed in other places.

Reply to objection 2 and reply to objection 3: The replies to these objections are clear from what was said above.

Article 2

Are there waters above the firmament?

It seems that there are no waters above the firmament:

Objection 1: Water is naturally heavy. But the proper place of what is heavy is just down below and not up above. Therefore, there are no waters above the firmament.

Objection 2: Water is naturally a fluid. But, as is clear from experience, a fluid cannot stay still on the surface of a round body. Therefore, since the firmament is a round body, there cannot be water above the firmament.

Objection 3: Since water is an element, it is ordered toward the generation of mixed bodies, in the way that what is incomplete (*imperfectum*) is ordered toward what is complete (*perfectum*). But the place for such mixing is upon the earth and not above the firmament. Therefore, water would be useless above the firmament. But nothing in the works of God is useless. Therefore, there are no waters above the firmament.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:7 says, “He divided the waters that were above the firmament from those that were under the firmament.”

I respond: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, “The authority of this passage of Scripture is greater than all the capability of human genius. Hence, whatever sort of waters these were, and in whatever way they were there, we do not at all doubt that they were there.”

However, the question of what sort of waters these are is not answered in the same way by everyone.

For Origen says that the waters above the heavens are the spiritual substances, and this is why Psalm 148:4 says, “Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord,” and Daniel 3:60 says, “Bless the Lord, all you waters that are above the heavens.”

But to this Basil replies in *Hexameron* 3 that these things are said not because the waters are rational creatures, but because “the consideration of them, contemplated thoughtfully by beings with understanding, brings to completion the glorification of their Creator.” Hence, in the same place (Daniel 3) the same thing is said about fire and hail and other things of this sort, which are clearly not rational creatures.

Therefore, one should claim that the waters are corporeal. However, it is necessary to specify in different ways what kinds of waters they are, in accord with the different opinions about the firmament.

For if the firmament is understood to be the starry heaven and is claimed to be of the nature of the four elements, then by parity of reasoning the waters that are above the heavens can be believed to be of the same nature as elemental waters.

On the other hand, if the firmament is understood to be the starry heaven but not of the nature of the four elements, then the waters above the firmament will not be of the nature of elementary waters. Instead, just as, according to Strabo, one heaven is called ‘empyrean’, i.e., fiery, only because of its splendid light (*splendor*), so too the other heaven, which is above the starry heaven, will be called ‘aqueous’ (*aequeum*) only because of its transparency.

Again, if one claims that the firmament has a nature different from that of the four elements, then, as Augustine points out in *Super Genesim contra Manichaeos*, he can still say that the firmament divides the waters if we mean by ‘water’ the unformed matter of bodies and not the element water. For on this view, whatever lies between bodies divides waters from waters.

However, if the firmament is understood to be that part of the air in which clouds gather, then the waters that are above the firmament are those waters which, having been evaporated (*vaporabiliter resolutae*), are elevated above the part of the air from which rain is generated. For it is altogether impossible to claim, as some have (Augustine touches on this view in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2), that evaporated waters are elevated above the starry heaven—and this (a) because of the solidity of the heavens, (b) because of the intermediate region of fire, which would consume vapors of this sort, (c) because the place where light and rarified things are carried is under the curve of the moon’s orbit, and also (d) because vapors do not appear to the senses to be elevated even as far as the peaks of certain mountains. What’s more, the reply that the rarefaction of a body goes on *ad infinitum* because bodies are infinitely divisible is groundless. For a natural body is divided or rarified only to a set limit and not *ad infinitum*.

Reply to objection 1: To some it seems that the correct response to this argument is that even though the waters are naturally heavy, they are retained above the heavens by God’s power. But in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 Augustine rules out this response, saying, “At this point it is fitting to inquire into how God made the natures of things, and not what He intended to do in them by His miraculous power.”

Hence, one should respond alternatively that, given the last two opinions above about the waters and the firmament, the solution is clear from what has been said. According to the first opinion, one has to posit an order among the elements that is different from the one Aristotle posits, so that certain dense waters surround the earth, whereas certain rarified waters surround the heavens—with the result that those waters are related to the heavens in the same way that these waters here below are related to the earth. Yet another response, as has been explained, is that ‘water’ here means the matter of bodies.

Reply to objection 2: Given the last two opinions mentioned above, the answer here is clear from what was said above.

On the other hand, given the first opinion mentioned above, Basil has two replies. The first is that it is not necessary that everything that appears round on its concave side is also round up above on its convex side. Second, the waters that are above the heavens are not fluids, but are, as it were, firmed up with a glacier-like solidity around the heavens. That is why some call these waters the ‘crystalline’ heaven.

Reply to objection 3: According to the third opinion, the waters above the firmament are elevated as vapor because of the usefulness of rain.

By contrast, given the second opinion, the waters are above the firmament, i.e., above the whole diaphanous heaven without stars. Some say that this heaven is the first moveable thing and that it turns all of heaven with the diurnal motion in order to effect, through the diurnal motion, the continuity of generation—just as the heaven in which the stars exist, through a motion that is in accord with the zodiac, effects the diversity of generation and corruption by approaching and receding and by the diverse powers of the stars.

On the other hand, given the first opinion, the waters are there, as Basil says, to temper the heat of the celestial bodies. As Augustine points out, some take as an indication of this the fact that the star Saturn is the coldest because of its proximity to the higher waters.

Article 3

Does the firmament divide waters from waters?

It seems that the firmament does not divide waters from waters:

Objection 1: There is just one natural place for one body according to its species. But as the Philosopher says, all water is the same in species as all other water. Therefore, waters are not distinct from waters with respect to place.

Objection 2: Someone might reply that the waters above the firmament differ in species from the waters below the firmament.

Against this: Things that are diverse in species do not need anything else to distinguish them. Therefore, if the higher waters and lower waters differ in species, then it is not the firmament that distinguishes them from one another.

Objection 3: It seems that what divides waters from waters is something touched by waters on both sides, like a wall built in the middle of a river. But it is clear that the lower waters do not reach all the way to the firmament. Therefore, the firmament does not divide waters from waters.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:6 says, “Let there be a firmament made in the middle of the waters, and let it divide waters from waters.”

I respond: If one looked at just the surface of the text of Genesis, he could construct a picture that corresponds to the position of certain ancient philosophers. For some of them claimed that water is an infinite body and the principle of all other bodies. Indeed, one could read the immensity of the waters into the name ‘deep’ (*abyssum*), when it says, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.” In addition, they claimed that the sensible heaven which we see does not contain all corporeal things under itself, but that there is an infinite body of waters above the heaven. And so one could claim that the firmament of the heaven divides the outer waters from the inner waters, i.e., from all the bodies contained below the heaven whose principle they claimed to be water.

However, since this position is shown to be false by sound arguments, one should not claim that this is what Scripture means.

Instead, consider that Moses was speaking to an uneducated people and, in accommodating himself to their intellectual weakness, he proposed to them only what is manifestly obvious to the senses. Now everyone, no matter how uneducated, perceives through the senses that earth and water are bodies. Air, however, is not perceived by everyone to be a body, since even some philosophers have claimed that air is nothingness, calling what is full of air a vacuum. And so Moses explicitly mentions water and earth, but does not explicitly name air, so as not to propose something unknown to the uneducated. Yet in order to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he makes room for an interpretation involving air by signifying it as connected to the water, when he says, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep”—which means that a diaphanous body, the subject of light and darkness, is upon the face of the water. So, then, regardless of whether we mean by the firmament the starry heaven or the cloudy part of the air, it is appropriate to say that the firmament divides waters from waters, given either that ‘water’ means unformed matter or that all diaphanous bodies are understood by the name ‘waters’. For the starry heaven divides the lower diaphanous bodies from the higher bodies, whereas the cloudy air divides the higher part of the air, in which rains and similar irruptions are generated, from the lower part of the air, which is connected with water and is understood under the name ‘waters’.

Reply to objection 1: If ‘firmament’ means the starry heaven, then the higher waters are not the same in species as the lower waters.

On the other hand, if ‘firmament’ means the cloudy air, then both waters are of the same species.

And in that case the two places are not assigned to the waters for the same reason; instead, the higher place is the place of the generation of waters, whereas the lower place is the place of rest for those waters.

Reply to objection 2: If the waters are taken to be diverse in species, the firmament is said to divide waters from waters not in the sense that it causes the distinction between them, but in the sense that it is the terminus of both sorts of waters.

Reply to objection 3: Because of the invisibility of the air and of similar bodies, Moses includes all bodies of this sort under the name ‘waters’. And in this way it is clear that there are waters on both sides of the firmament, no matter how ‘firmament’ is understood.

Article 4

Is there just one heaven?

It seems that there is just one heaven:

Objection 1: Heaven is distinguished from earth when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” But there is just one earth. Therefore, there is likewise just one heaven.

Objection 2: Everything that includes all its own matter is just one. But heaven is like this, as the Philosopher proves in *De Caelo* 1. Therefore, there is just one heaven.

Objection 3: Whatever is predicated univocally of many things is predicated of them in accord with a single common concept. But if there is more than one heaven, then ‘heaven’ is predicated univocally of many things; for if it were being predicated equivocally, then it would not be proper to say ‘many heavens’. Therefore, if there are said to be many heavens, then there must be some common concept in accord with which they are called heavens. But there is no such ascribable concept. Therefore, one should not say that there are many heavens.

But contrary to this: Psalm 148:4 says, “Praise Him, you heavens of heavens.”

I respond: On this question, there seems to be a disagreement between Basil and Chrysostom. For Chrysostom says that there is just one heaven and the fact that the Psalm says “... you heavens of heavens” in the plural is due to an idiom of the Hebrew language, in which it is customary to signify heaven only in the plural, just as in Latin there are likewise many nouns that lack a singular form. On the other hand, Basil and Damascene, who follows him, claim that there are many heavens.

This disagreement, however, is more verbal than substantive. For what Chrysostom calls ‘the one heaven’ is the whole of the body that is above the earth and waters, so that even the birds that fly in the air are on this account called ‘the birds of heaven’. On the other hand, it was because there are many distinctions to be drawn within this body that Basil posited many heavens.

Thus, in order to understand the division of the heavens, note that there are three ways in which ‘heaven’ is used in Scripture:

Sometimes the name ‘heaven’ is used properly and naturally. Given this usage, ‘heaven’ means a body that is (a) very high (*sublime*), (b) either actually or potentially luminous, and (c) incorruptible by its nature. Accordingly, three heavens are posited. The first is totally luminous and is called the *empyrean* heaven. The second is totally diaphanous and is called the *aqueous* or *crystalline* heaven. The third is partly diaphanous and partly luminous in actuality, and this is called the *starry* heaven; it is divided into eight spheres, viz., the sphere of the fixed stars and the seven spheres of the planets, which can themselves be called eight heavens.

Second, the name ‘heaven’ is used to designate participation in a property of a celestial body, viz.,

(a) height or (b) actual or potential luminosity. It is according to this usage that Damascene posits as a single heaven the entire region from the waters to the orbit of the moon. This he calls the ‘airy heaven’. And so, according to him, there are three heavens: the *airy* heaven, the *starry* heaven, and the other higher heaven, which he understands to be the “*third* heaven” the Apostle reports he was taken up to (*raptus usque*) (2 Corinthians 12:2).

However, since that first heaven contains two elements, viz., fire and air, and since there is a higher and lower region in each of them, Rabanus divides it into four: (a) the highest region of fire, which he calls the *fiery* heaven, (b) the lower region of fire, which he calls the *olympian* heaven because of the height of a mountain that is called Olympus, (c) the highest region of air, which he called the *ethereal* heaven because of its illumination (*inflammatio*), and (d) the lower region of air, which he calls the *airy* heaven. And so when these four heavens are added to the three higher heavens, there are, according to Rabanus, seven corporeal heavens in the universe.

Third, the name ‘heaven’ is used metaphorically. Sometimes the Holy Trinity is itself called ‘heaven’ in this way, because of its spiritual sublimity and light; it is of this heaven that the devil is understood to have said, “I will ascend into heaven,” i.e., into equality with God. Again, sometimes the spiritual goods with which the saints are rewarded are called heavens because of their preeminence, as in Augustine’s interpretation of the passage, “Your reward will be manifold (*multa*) in the heavens” (Matthew 5:12 and Luke 6:23). Again, sometimes the three types of supernatural vision, viz., corporeal, imaginative, and intellectual, are called three heavens; it is with these in mind that Augustine interprets Paul’s being taken up to the third heaven.

Reply to objection 1: Earth is related to heaven as the center to a circumference. But around one center there can be many circumferences. Hence, even though there is one earth, many heavens are posited.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through insofar as ‘heaven’ means the universe of corporeal creatures. Given this meaning, there is indeed just one heaven.

Reply to objection 3: As is clear from what has been said, height and some sort of luminosity are common to all the heavens.

QUESTION 69

The Work of the Third Day

The next thing to consider is the work of the third day. On this topic there are two questions, (1) one about the gathering together of the waters and (2) the other about the production of plants.

Article 1

Was the gathering together of the waters fittingly said to have been done on the third day?

It seems that the gathering together of the waters was not fittingly said to have been done on the third day:

Objection 1: The things that were made on the first and second days are expressed by the verb ‘to make’; for it says, “God said ‘Let light be made’ ... and ‘Let a firmament be made’.” But the third day is grouped with the first two days. Therefore, the work of the third day should have been expressed by the verb ‘to make’ and not just by the verb ‘to gather together’.

Objection 2: Prior to the third day the earth was everywhere covered with the waters; this is why it was said to be “invisible.” Therefore, there was no place on the earth (*super terram*) where the waters could be gathered together.

Objection 3: Things that are not continuous with one another do not have a single location. But it is not the case that all waters have continuity with one another. Therefore, it is not the case that all the waters are gathered together into one place.

Objection 4: To gather together involves local motion. But it seems natural for waters to flow and to run to the sea. Therefore, no divine command had to be given for this.

Objection 5: The earth is already named at the beginning of its creation, when it says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that the name ‘earth’ was imposed on it on the third day.

But contrary to this: The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

I respond: On this topic one has to reply in different ways, depending on whether he follows Augustine’s interpretation or that of the other saints.

In all these works Augustine posits only an ordering of origin and nature and not a temporal ordering. For he says that the first things created are (a) unformed spiritual nature and (b) corporeal nature without any form (which, he says, is first signified by the names ‘earth’ and ‘water’)—first only in origin and not because the lack of form preceded formation in time. And again, according to him, the one formation preceded the other only in the order of nature and not in duration. According to this ordering, the formation of the highest nature, viz., the spiritual, has to be posited first, because light is said to have been made on the first day. But just as spiritual nature has preeminence over corporeal nature, so the higher bodies have preeminence over the lower ones. Hence, the formation of the higher bodies is mentioned in the second place, when it says, “Let there be a firmament”—which means the impressing of a celestial form on unformed matter that exists antecedently only in origin and not in time. In the third place he posits the impressing of elemental forms on unformed matter that exists antecedently in origin and not in time. Hence, the verse, “Let the waters be gathered together and let the dry land appear,” has to do with the impressing on corporeal matter of (a) the substantial form of water, through which the relevant sort of motion belongs to it, and (b) the substantial form of earth, through which it belongs to it to be seen in the relevant way.

However, according to the other saints, there is a temporal ordering in these works. For they claim that matter’s being unformed temporally precedes its being formed, and the one formation temporally

precedes the next. But according to them, matter's being unformed is not to be understood as the absence of all form, since there was already heaven and water and earth (the three of them having been named because they are manifestly perceptible by the senses); instead, matter's being unformed is understood as the absence of due division and of any finished beauty. And corresponding to the three names in question, Scripture posited three sorts of formlessness. For heaven, which is the highest, has the formlessness of darkness, since the source of light comes from it, whereas the formlessness of water, which is in the middle, is signified by the name 'deep' (*abyssum*), since, as Augustine explains in *Contra Faustum*, this name signifies an immensity of turbulent water. On the other hand, the formlessness of earth is touched on when it says, "The earth was invisible (or: void)," because it was covered with water. On this view, then, the formation of the highest body was done on the first day. And since time follows upon the motion of the heavens and is the number of the motion of the highest body, this formation effected the division of time, viz., into night and day. On the other hand, the middle body, viz., water, was formed on the second day through the firmament, and it received a certain distinctness and order (so that other things are also included under the name 'water', as was explained above (q. 68, a. 3)). And on the third day the last body, viz., earth, was formed as a result of its being uncovered by the waters. And a division was made in the lowest body, viz., between the earth and the sea. Hence, fittingly enough, just as he had expressed the formlessness of the earth by saying "The earth was invisible (or: void)," so he expressed its being formed by saying, "And dry land appeared."

Reply to objection 1: According to Augustine, the reason that Scripture does not use the verb 'to make' for the work of the third day, as it had for the preceding works, is in order to show that the higher forms, viz., the spiritual forms of the angels and the forms of the celestial bodies, are perfect and stable in *esse*, whereas the forms of the lower bodies are imperfect and changeable. And so the gathering together of the waters and the appearance of dry land signify that it is forms of this latter sort that are being impressed. For as he himself says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, "Water flows in a transient manner, and earth is fixed in a stable manner."

By contrast, according to the others, one must reply that the work of the third day is perfect only with respect to local motion. And so it was unnecessary for Scripture to use the verb 'to make'.

Reply to objection 2: The reply is clear, given Augustine's view. For it is unnecessary to say that the earth was first covered with the waters and that the waters were afterwards gathered together; instead, the waters were produced already gathered together in this way.

Given the view of the others, however, there are three possible replies, as Augustine himself points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1.

The first possible reply is that the waters are elevated to a greater height in the place where they are gathered together. For as Basil explains, it is known from experience that in the case of the Red Sea, the sea is higher than the land.

The second possible reply is that the water covered the earth while more rarified as a cloud and was then condensed and gathered together.

The third possible reply is that the earth could have had certain hollowed out parts in which to receive the flowing waters.

Of these replies, the first seems the most probable.

Reply to objection 3: All waters have a single terminus, viz., the sea, into which they flow together by either apparent or hidden channels. It is for this reason that the waters are said to be gathered together into one place.

An alternative reply is that it says 'one place' not in an absolute sense, but by contrast with the place of dry land, so that the meaning is, "The waters are gathered together in one place," i.e. separately from dry land. For in order to signify the plurality of the places of the water, it adds, "The gathering together of the waters He called 'seas'."

Reply to objection 4: It is God's command that gives natural motion to bodies. Hence, [Psalm 148:8] says that by their natural motions "they fulfill His word."

An alternative reply is that it would be natural for water to be everywhere around the earth, just as the air is everywhere around the water and the earth, but that because of the necessity of the end, viz., that animals and plants should live upon the earth, some part of the earth needed not to be covered by the waters. Some philosophers attribute this to the action of the sun, which dries the earth by the elevation of vapors. But Sacred Scripture attributes it to God's power, not only in Genesis, but also in Job 38:10, where it says in the personage of the Lord, "I set my bounds around the sea," and in Jeremiah 5:22, "'Will you not then fear me', says the Lord, 'who has placed the sand as a boundary for the sea?'"

Reply to objection 5: According to Augustine, what is meant by the earth which is first mentioned is primary matter, whereas in the present context what is meant is the element earth.

An alternative reply, taken from Basil, is that the earth was first named with respect to its nature, whereas in the present context it is named with respect to its principal property, which is dryness. This is why it says, "The dry land He called earth."

Another reply, taken from Rabbi Moses, is that whenever it says, "He called ...," this signals an equivocation in the relevant name. Hence, it had previously said, "He called the light 'day'," because a period of twenty-four hours is also called 'day', in accord with which it says in the same place, "There was evening and morning, one day." Similarly, it says, "He called the firmament (read: the air) heaven," because what was first created is also called 'heaven'. Again, it says, "The dry land (read: the part that was not covered by the waters) He called 'earth'," as opposed to 'sea', even though the earth is called by the common name 'earth', regardless of whether or not it is covered with waters.

Moreover, the phrase "He called" is understood throughout to mean that He gave the relevant nature or property so that the thing could be so called.

Article 2

Is it inappropriate that the production of plants is said to have been effected on the third day?

It seems inappropriate that the production of plants is said to have been effected on the third day:

Objection 1: Plants have life, just as animals do. But the production of animals is placed among the works of adornment and not among the works of division. Therefore, the production of plants should not have been recorded under the third day, which has to do with the work of dividing.

Objection 2: What pertains to the cursing of the earth should not be recorded along with the formation of the earth. But the production of certain plants pertains to the cursing of the earth—this according to Genesis 3:17-18 ("Cursed is the earth in your work; it will bring forth thorns and thistles for you"). Therefore, the production of plants in general should not have been recorded under the third day, which has to do with the formation of the earth.

Objection 3: Just as plants stay close to the earth, so do rocks and metals, and yet no mention is made of the latter in the formation of the earth. Therefore, plants should not have been made on the third day, either.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:12 says, "The earth brought forth the green herb," and afterwards, "The evening and the morning were the third day."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), on the third day the earth's formlessness is removed. Now two kinds of formlessness were set forth concerning the earth: (a) that it was "invisible" (*invisibilis*) or "void" (*inanis*), because it was covered with the waters; and (b) that it was nondescript

(*incomposita*) or empty (*vacua*), i.e., it did not have the due attractiveness that the earth derives from the plants that, as it were, clothe it. And so both types of formlessness are removed on the third day: (a) the first by virtue of the fact that the waters were gathered together into one place and that the dry land appeared, and (b) the second by virtue of the fact that earth brought forth the green herb.

However, as far as the production of plants is concerned, Augustine's opinion differs from that of the others. For the other commentators, following what the text says on its face (*secundum quod superficies litterae sonat*), claim that plants were produced in actuality within their own species on the third day. By contrast, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5 Augustine says, "The earth is said at that time to have produced the plant and the tree in their causes (*causaliter*), i.e., to have received the power to produce them."

He confirms this claim with the authority of Scripture. For Genesis 2:4-5 says, "These are the generations of heaven and earth, when they were created, on the day when God made heaven and earth and every green thing of the field before it sprang out of the earth, and every plant of the region, before it grew." Therefore, before they sprang out of the earth, they were made in their causes within the earth.

And he also confirms it with the following line of reasoning: In those first days God established creatures in their origins and causes (*originaliter et causaliter*) and later rested from His work; but after that, in order to administer the things created through the work of propagation, He is at work up to the present time. But the production of plants from the earth belongs to the work of propagation. Therefore, plants were produced on the third day only in their causes and not in actuality.

However, according to the others, one could say that the first establishment of the species belongs to the work of the six days, but that what now belongs to the administration of things is that the generation of things similar in species proceeds from the species that were established at the beginning. And this is what Scripture says: "before they sprang out of the earth" or "before they grew"—that is, before similar things were produced from things similar to them in species, just as we now see them to be made naturally through insemination. Hence, Scripture explicitly says, "The earth brings forth the green and seed-bearing plant," because what was produced were perfect species of plants, from which the seeds of the other plants sprang forth. And it does not matter where they have the power of insemination—whether in the root, or in the stalk, or in the fruit.

Reply to objection 1: The life in plants is hidden, since they lack local motion and sensation, by which animate things are especially distinguished from inanimate things. And so since they stay close to the earth without motion, their production is posited as an aspect of the formation of the earth.

Reply to objection 2: Even before the curse in question, thorns and thistles had been produced either virtually or in actuality. But they had not been produced as a punishment for man, viz., in such a way that the earth which he cultivated for food would bring forth certain unfruitful and harmful things. This is why it says, "... it will bring forth ... *for you*."

Reply to objection 3: As has already been explained (q. 67, a. 4 and q. 68, a. 3), Moses set forth only what was manifestly apparent. But mineral bodies have a generation that it is hidden in the bowels of the earth. And, again, they are not obviously distinct from the earth, but seem to be certain species of earth. And this is why he made no mention of them.

QUESTION 70

The Work of Adornment: The Fourth Day

The next thing to consider is the work of adornment: first, each of the days in itself (questions 70-73) and, second, all six days in general (question 74). On the first topic we must consider, first, the work of the fourth day (question 70); second, the work of fifth day (question 71); third, the work of the sixth day (question 72); and, fourth, matters pertaining to the seventh day (question 73).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Should the celestial lights (*luminaria*) have been produced on the fourth day? (2) What is the reason for their being produced? (3) Are they living beings?

Article 1

Should the celestial lights have been produced on the fourth day?

It seems that the celestial lights should not have been produced on the fourth day:

Objection 1: The lights are bodies that are incorruptible by nature. Therefore, their matter cannot exist without their forms. But their matter was produced in the work of creation, before any of the days. Therefore, their forms were produced in the work of creation, too. Therefore, they were not made on the fourth day.

Objection 2: The lights are, as it were, vessels of light (*vasa luminis*). But light (*lux*) was made on the first day. Therefore, the lights should have been made on the first day and not on the fourth day.

Objection 3: Just as plants are fixed in the earth, so the lights are fixed in the firmament; this is why Scripture says, “He set them in the firmament” (Genesis 1:17). But the production of plants is described simultaneously with the formation of the earth in which they inhere. Therefore, the production of the lights should likewise have been placed on the second day, in conjunction with the production of the firmament.

Objection 4: The sun and moon and other lights are causes of plants. But in the natural order a cause precedes its effect. Therefore, the lights should not have been made on the fourth day, but should instead have been made on the third day or earlier.

Objection 5: According to astronomers (*secundum astrologos*), many stars are greater than the moon. Therefore, it should not have been the case that the only two “great lights” (Genesis 1:16) posited are the sun and moon.

But contrary to this: The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

I respond: In recapitulating God’s works Scripture says, “So the heavens and the earth were completed (*perfecti*), and all their adornments” (Genesis 2:1). Three works can be understood in these words:

The first is *the work of creation (opus creationis)*, through which heaven and earth are described as produced but unformed.

The second is *the work of division (opus distinctionis)*, through which heaven and earth are brought to completion (*sunt perfecta*), either (a) through substantial forms given to wholly unformed matter (as Augustine claims) or else (b) with respect to a fitting order and elegance (as the other saints claim).

To these two works is added the *work of adornment (opus ornatus)*, which differs from completion. For the completion of heaven and earth seems to involve what is intrinsic to heaven and earth, whereas adornment involves things that are distinct from heaven and earth—in the way that a man is completed by his proper parts and forms, while he is adorned by his clothes or things of that sort. Now the distinction among things is made especially clear through local motion, by which they are separated from one another. And so the work of adornment involves the production of those things that have motion in

heaven and on earth.

Now as was explained above (q. 69, a. 1), there are three things mentioned in the work of creation, viz., heaven, water, and earth. And the three of them receive formation through the work of division on the first three days: Heaven is divided on the first day; the waters are divided on the second day; and on the third day a division is made among the earth, the sea, and the dry land.

In similar manner, on the first day of the work of adornment, i.e., on the fourth day, there is the production of the lights that move in heaven, in order to adorn heaven. On the second day, i.e., on the fifth day, the birds and the fish are made, in order to adorn the middle element, since the birds and fish have motion in the air and water, which are taken as one. On the third day, i.e., on the sixth day, the animals that have motion on earth are produced, in order to adorn the earth.

Note that Augustine does not disagree with the other saints about the production of the lights. For he claims that they were made in actuality and not just virtually, since the firmament does not have the power to produce lights in the way that the earth does have the power to produce plants. Hence, Scripture does not say, “Let the firmament produce lights,” in the way that it does say, “Let the earth bring forth the green herb” (Genesis 1:11).

Reply to objection 1: According to Augustine’s position, this objection does not give rise to any difficulties. For he does not posit a temporal succession in these works, and thus he does not have to concede that the matter of the lights existed with any other form.

Likewise, if we follow those who hold that the celestial bodies are of the nature of the four elements, then there is no difficulty, since they can claim that the celestial bodies, like animals and plants, are formed from pre-existing matter.

However, according to those who hold that the celestial bodies are of a nature different from the elements and are incorruptible by their nature, one must claim that the substance of the lights was created at the beginning, but that they were at first unformed and are now formed—formed not, to be sure, by their substantial forms, but rather by the conferral of specific powers. And the reason why the lights are mentioned only on the fourth day and not at the beginning is, as Chrysostom says, in order to draw the people away from idolatry by showing them that the lights are not gods, since they did not exist from the beginning.

Reply to objection 2: According to Augustine’s position, no difficulty results, since the light which is mentioned on the first day was spiritual light, whereas in the present context it is corporeal light that is being made.

However, if the light made on the first day is understood to be corporeal light, then one must claim that light was produced on the first day with respect to the general nature of light, whereas on the fourth day the lights are given specific power for specific effects, in accord with which we see that the rays of the sun have different effects from the rays of the moon, and so on for the others. And it is because of this specification of power that Dionysius says, in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, that the sun’s light, which was at first unformed, was formed on the fourth day.

Reply to objection 3: According to Ptolemy, the lights are not fixed in the spheres, but instead have a motion that is distinct from the motion of the spheres. Hence, Chrysostom says that the reason why the text says “He set them in the firmament” is not that they were fixed there, but rather that He commanded them to exist there, just as He placed man in paradise, in order that he might exist there.

However, according to Aristotle’s opinion, the stars are fixed in their orbs and in reality are moved only with the motion of the orbs. Still, it is the motion of the lights and not the motion of the spheres that is perceived by the senses. And as has been explained (q. 67, a. 4 and q. 68, a. 3), Moses, accommodating himself to an uneducated people, followed what is apparent to the senses.

On the other hand, if the firmament made on the second day is distinct in nature from the one in which the stars are placed, then the objection disappears—even though the senses (which, as has been

explained, Moses is following) do not discern this distinction,. For in that case the firmament was made on the second day with respect to its lower part, whereas on the fourth day the stars were placed in the firmament with respect to its upper part—so that the firmament is taken as a whole for one single thing, as it appears to the senses.

Reply to objection 4: As Basil explains, the production of the plants is placed ahead of the production of the lights in order to discourage idolatry. For those who believe that the lights are gods claim that plants have their first origin from the lights—even though, as Chrysostom explains, through their motions the lights cooperate in the production of plants in just the way that a farmer does.

Reply to objection 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great because of their efficacy and power and not because of their size. For even if other stars exceed the moon in size, the moon's effects are still sensed more in things here below. And the moon also appears greater to the senses.

Article 2

Is the reason for the production of the lights appropriately ascribed?

It seems that the reason for the production of the lights is not appropriately ascribed:

Objection 1: Jeremiah 10:2 says, “Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear.” Therefore, the lights were not made “as signs” (Genesis 1:14).

Objection 2: A sign is opposed to a cause. But the lights are causes of what is done here below. Therefore, they are not signs.

Objection 3: The distinction among seasons and among days began on the first day. Therefore, the lights were not made “for seasons and for days and for years ” (Genesis 1:14), i.e., for the distinctions among them.

Objection 4: Nothing is done for the sake of something more lowly than itself, since the end is better than the things that exist for the sake of the end. But the lights are better than the earth. Therefore, the lights were not made “in order to give light to the earth” (Genesis 1:15).

Objection 5: The moon does not “rule over the night” (Genesis 1:16) when it is a new moon (*luna prima*). But it is probable that the moon was a new moon when it was made, since men begin to make computations at the new moon. Therefore, the moon was not made to rule over the night.

But contrary to this: The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 65, a. 2) a corporeal creature can be said to have been made (a) for the sake of its proper act or (b) for the sake of some other creature or (c) for the sake of the whole universe or (d) for the sake of God's glory. But in order to turn the people back from idolatry, Moses touched only on reasons that had to do with the usefulness to men of the things made. Hence, Deuteronomy 4:19 says, “Lest, perhaps, lifting up your eyes to heaven, you see the sun and the moon, and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error you adore and serve those things that the Lord your God created for the service of all the nations.”

Now at the beginning of Genesis Moses explains this service in three ways:

First, the lights are useful to men with respect to vision, which directs them in their works and is especially useful in coming to know things. In this regard God says, “Let them shine in the firmament ... and give light to the earth” (Genesis 1:15).

Second, he explains it by reference to the changes of seasons, through which weariness is relieved, health is conserved, and the conditions necessary for food are satisfied—none of which would be the case if there were always summer or always winter. And in this respect He says, “Let them be for

seasons and for days and years” (Genesis 1:14).

Third, he explains it by reference to the opportunities for business and work, given that the lights of heaven are taken to signal rainy weather or sunny weather, which are favorable for different kinds of occupations. And in this regard He says, “Let them be as signs” (Genesis 1:14).

Reply to objection 1: The lights are signs of corporeal changes—though not of those that depend on free choice.

Reply to objection 2: We are sometimes led by a sensible cause to the knowledge of a hidden effect, and vice versa. Hence, nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. Yet the reason why he says “signs” rather than “causes” is to remove an occasion for idolatry.

Reply to objection 3: On the first day there was the general division of time into day and night, in accord with the diurnal motion, which is common to all of heaven and which can be understood to have begun on the first day. However, the specific divisions into days and seasons—in accord with which one day is hotter than another, and one season hotter than another, and one year hotter than another—comes from the stars’ particular motions and can be understood to have begun on the fourth day.

Reply to objection 4: The illumination of the earth is understood as being useful for man, who is better than the bodies of the lights because of his soul.

Yet there is nothing to prevent one from saying that a more worthy creature has been made for the sake of a lower creature, not insofar as the higher creature is considered in itself but insofar as it is ordered to the completeness (*integritas*) of the universe.

Reply to objection 5: When the moon is full (*luna perfecta*), it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and in this sense it rules over the night. Also, it is probable enough that the moon was made when it was full, just as plants were made in their completeness, already productive of seeds, and likewise the animals and man. For even though natural processes go from the incomplete to the complete, nonetheless, what is complete is prior, absolutely speaking, to what is incomplete.

However, Augustine does not endorse this claim, since he asserts that it is not inappropriate for God to have made something incomplete which He later brought to completion.

Article 3

Are the celestial lights living beings?

It seems that celestial lights are living things:

Objection 1: A higher body ought to be adorned with more noble adornments. But the adornment of lower bodies consists in living beings, viz., fish, birds, and terrestrial animals. Therefore, the lights, which belong to the adornment of heaven, are living beings.

Objection 2: The form of a more noble body is itself more noble. But the sun and moon and other lights are more noble than the bodies of plants and animals. Therefore, they have a more noble form. But the most noble form of all is a soul, which is a principle of life; for as Augustine says in *De Vera Religione*, any living substance is more eminent (*praefertur*) in the order of nature than any non-living substance. Therefore, the celestial lights are living beings.

Objection 3: A cause is more noble than its effect. But the sun and moon and other lights are a cause of life, as is especially clear in the case of animals generated by putrefaction, which attain life by the power of the sun and stars. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the celestial bodies are alive and are living beings.

Objection 4: As is clear from *De Caelo* 1, the motions of heaven and of the celestial bodies are natural. But natural motion derives from an intrinsic principle. Therefore, since the principle of the

motion of the celestial bodies is an intelligent substance (*substantia apprehensiva*), which, as *Metaphysics* 12 says, is moved in the way that one who desires is moved by what he desires, it seems that the intelligent principle is a principle intrinsic to the celestial bodies. Therefore, they are living beings.

Objection 5: The first moveable being is heaven. But as is shown in *Physics* 8, within the genus of moveable beings, the first is one that moves itself, since that which is such-and-such through itself (*per se*) is prior to that which is such-and-such through another (*per aliud*). But as is shown in the same book, only living beings move themselves. Therefore, the celestial bodies are living beings.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, “No one thinks that the heavens or the lights are living beings; for they are inanimate and insensible.”

I respond: On this question the philosophers had differing opinions. For as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 18, Anaxagoras “was found guilty by the Athenians of claiming that the sun is a hot rock and thereby denying that it is a god” or anything living. By contrast, the Platonists claimed that the celestial bodies are living beings.

Similarly, among the doctors of the faith there was a diversity of opinion on this topic. For Origen claimed that the celestial bodies are living beings. Jerome, too, seems to have thought the same thing in his exposition of Ecclesiastes 1:6 (“The spirit goes forth, surveying all places round about”). By contrast Basil and Damascene insist that the celestial bodies are not living beings. Augustine, on the other hand, leaves the matter in doubt, not embracing either side—as is clear from *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2 and from *Enchiridion*, where he also adds that if the celestial bodies are living beings, then their souls belong in fellowship with the angels.

Now in order that the truth might to some extent come to be known amid this diversity of opinions, note that the union of the soul and the body is for the sake of the soul and not for the sake of the body; for form does not exist for the sake of matter, but just the opposite. But the nature and power of a soul are known from its operation, which is also in some sense its end.

Now as is clear from the works of nutritive and sentient souls, the body is necessary for those of a soul’s operations that are exercised by means of the body. Hence, it is necessary for souls of this kind to be united to bodies for the sake of their operations. Moreover, there are other operations of a soul that are not exercised by means of the body and yet which are such that some assistance is supplied by the body for those operations. For instance, the human soul is supplied by the body with phantasms, which it needs in order to exercise its act of understanding (*indiget ad intelligendum*). Hence, a soul of this sort has to be united with its body for the sake of its own operation, even though it is possible for such a soul to be separated from its body.

Now it is clear that the soul of a celestial body could not have the operations of a *nutritive* soul, viz., to take nourishment, to grow, and to generate. For operations of this sort do not belong to a body that is incorruptible by its nature.

Similarly, the operations of a *sentient* soul do not befit a celestial body, since all sensation is based on touch, which apprehends the elemental qualities. Again, all the organs of the sentient powers require a specific proportion in their mixture of the elements, whereas the celestial bodies are held to be devoid of the elemental natures.

Therefore, it follows that there are only two operations of a soul that could belong to a celestial soul, viz., to understand and to effect motion. (For desire follows upon sensation and intellection and is ordered in conjunction with them.)

Now since an intellectual operation is not exercised by means of a body, it needs the body only insofar as phantasms are supplied to it through the senses. But as has been explained, the operations of a sentient soul do not belong to the celestial bodies. So, then, it is not for the sake of any intellectual operation that a soul would be united to a celestial body.

It follows, then, that a soul would be united to a celestial body solely for the sake of motion. But in

order to effect motion, the soul does not need to be united to a body as the form of the body; instead, it effects motion through a contact of power, in the way that a mover is united to what is moveable. Hence, in *Physics* 8, after Aristotle has shown that the first self-mover is composed of two parts, one of which effects motion and the other of which is moved, and while he is explaining how these two parts are united, he says that they are united through contact, either (a) contact of the two of them with one another, if they are both bodies, or (b) contact of the one with the other and not vice versa, if the one is a body and the other is not a body. Likewise, the Platonists held that souls are united to bodies only through a contact of power, in the way that a mover is united to what is moveable. And so from the fact that Plato posits celestial bodies as living beings, nothing should be inferred other than that spiritual substances are united to celestial bodies in the way that movers are united to what is moveable.

Now the claim that the celestial bodies are moved by an intelligent substance—and not just by their natures, as are heavy and light things—is clear from the fact that a thing's nature effects motion solely toward a single place which is such that the body comes to rest in it once it occupies it, whereas this is not the case with the motion of the celestial bodies. Hence it follows that the celestial bodies are moved by an intelligent substance. In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine likewise says that “all bodies” are administered by God “through the spirit of life.”

So, then, it is clear that the celestial bodies are not living beings in the way that plants and animals are. Rather, they are ‘alive’ only in an equivocal sense. Hence, between those who claim that the celestial bodies are living beings and those who claim that they are inanimate there is only a verbal difference and little or no substantive difference.

Reply to objection 1: Some things pertain to adornment because of their proper motions. And in this regard, the celestial lights agree with other things that pertain to adornment, given that they are moved by a living substance.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents a thing from being more noble absolutely speaking and yet not more noble in some given respect. Therefore, even if the form of a celestial body is not more noble, absolutely speaking, than the soul of an animal, it is nonetheless more noble with respect to the character of its form. For the form of a celestial body, unlike a soul, totally perfects its matter, with the result that its matter has no potentiality for any other form. Also, with respect to motion, the celestial bodies are moved by more noble movers.

Reply to objection 3: Since a celestial body is a moved mover, it has the character of an instrument that acts in the power of the principal agent. And so it is by virtue of its mover, which is a living substance, that it is able to be a cause of life.

Reply to objection 4: The motion of a celestial body is natural not because of its active principle but because of its passive principle, viz., because a celestial body has within its nature an aptitude for being moved with this motion by an intellect.

Reply to objection 5: A celestial body is said to move itself insofar as it is composed of a mover and a moveable thing—not in the sense of being composed of them as of form and matter, but in the sense of being composed of them according to a contact of power, as has been explained. And in this way one could even say that a celestial body's mover is an intrinsic principle, so that its motion could be called natural even on the part of the active principle, in the way that a voluntary motion can be called natural to an animal insofar as it is an animal, as is explained in *Physics* 8.

QUESTION 71

The Work of the Fifth Day

The next thing to consider is the work of the fifth day.

The Only Article

Is the Work of the Fifth Day Appropriately Described?

It seems that the work of the fifth day is not appropriately described:

Objection 1: Waters produce what the power of water is sufficient to produce. But the power of water is not sufficient to produce all the fish and birds, since we see that many of them are generated by insemination (*ex semine*). Therefore, it is not appropriate to say, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the creature that flies over the earth” (Genesis 1:20).

Objection 2: Fish and birds are not produced from just water; rather, earth seems to be more dominant in their composition than water is. For their bodies naturally move toward the earth, and so they also come to rest on the earth. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that fish and birds are produced from water.

Objection 3: Just as fish have motion in the waters, so birds have motion in the air. Therefore, if fish are produced from the waters, then birds should be produced from the air and not from the waters.

Objection 4: Not all fish creep in the waters, since some, like sea lions, have feet with which to walk on land. Therefore, the production of fish is not sufficiently captured by saying, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life” (Genesis 1:20).

Objection 5: Terrestrial animals are more perfect than birds and fish. This is clear from the fact that their parts are more distinct and that they have a more perfect type of generation. For they generate animals, whereas fish and birds generate eggs. But the more perfect is prior in the order of nature. Therefore, fish and birds should not have been generated on the fifth day, before the terrestrial animals.

But contrary to this: The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 70, a. 1), the work of adornment corresponds in its ordering to the ordering of the divisions. Hence, just as the middle day of the three days given over to division, i.e., the second day, is devoted to the division of the middle body, viz., the waters, so too the middle day of the three days given over to adornment, i.e., the fifth day, is devoted to the adornment of the middle body through the production of birds and fish. Hence, just as on the fourth day Moses refers to “the lights” and “light” in order to signal that the fourth day corresponds to the first day, on which he had said that light was made, so on this fifth day he makes mention of “the waters” and “the firmament of heaven” in order to signal that the fifth day corresponds to the second day.

Note, however, that just as Augustine differs from the others over the production of plants, so too he differs from them over the production of the fish and birds. For the others claim that on the fifth day the fish and birds were produced in actuality, whereas in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5 Augustine claims that on the fifth day the nature of the waters produced the fish and birds in potentiality.

Reply to objection 1: Avicenna claimed that all the animals can be generated by mixing the elements together in some combination or other, even through a natural process, in the absence of semen.

But this seems wrong. For nature proceeds to its effects by determinate means, and so what is naturally generated from semen cannot be naturally generated without semen.

So one should reply in a different way: In the natural generation of animals the active principle is a formative power that exists in the semen in the case of those animals that are generated from semen. What takes the place of this power in animals that are generated from putrefaction is the power of a

celestial body. And in both kinds of the generation of animals, the material principle is an element or something elemental.

Now in the first establishment of things the active principle was the word of God, which produced animals out of elemental matter either in actuality (according to the other saints) or virtually (according to Augustine). It is not that water or earth has within itself the power to produce all the animals, as Avicenna claimed, but rather that the very fact that animals can be produced out of elemental matter by the power of semen or by the power of the stars is itself the result of the power originally given to the elements.

Reply to objection 2: There are two possible ways to consider the bodies of birds and fish.

The first way is to consider them in themselves. And if we consider them in this way, then the earthly element must be more dominant in them, because in order for the right mixture to be effected in an animal body, the element that is less active, viz., earth, must be the quantitatively most abundant element in that body.

However, if the bodies in question are considered insofar as they are apt to move with certain particular movements, then in this sense they have an affinity with the bodies within which they move. And their generation is being described along these lines in the present context.

Reply to objection 3: Because air is not sensed, it is not counted by itself, but is instead counted along with the others—(a) partly with water, as far as the lower part of the air is concerned, since this part is made more thick by water vapors, and (b) partly with the heavens, as far as the higher part of the air is concerned.

Now birds have their motion in the lower part of the air, and so they are said to fly “under the firmament of heaven” (Genesis 1:20), even if ‘firmament’ is being taken for the cloudy part of the air. And this is why the production of birds is ascribed to water.

Reply to objection 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through what lies in between them. And so there are certain animals that lie between terrestrial animals and aquatic animals. They share something in common with both kinds, and they are numbered among those with which they have the most in common, in accord with what they share in common with them, and not with the other extreme.

Still, in order to include all animals of this sort, which have something that is specific to the fish, the text adds “God created the great whales ...” (Genesis 1:21) after it had already said, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life” (Genesis 1:20).

Reply to objection 5: The production of these animals is ordered in accord with the order of the bodies that are adorned by them more than in accord with their own proper dignity.

In any case, the path of generation goes from the less perfect animals to the more perfect animals.

QUESTION 72

The Work of the Sixth Day

The next thing to consider is the work of the sixth day.

The Only Article

Is the Work of the Sixth Day Appropriately Described?

It seems that the work of the sixth day is not appropriately described:

Objection 1: Just as birds and fish have a living soul (*viventem animam*), so too do the terrestrial animals. And yet the terrestrial animals are not the living soul itself. Therefore, it was inappropriate to say, “Let the earth bring forth the living soul (*viventem animam*)” (Genesis 1:24); instead, it should have said, “Let the earth bring forth the four-footed animals (*quadrupedia*) that have a living soul.”

Objection 2: A genus should not be divided in such a way that it itself is a contrary of its own species (*genus non debet dividi contra speciem*). But *cattle* and *beast* fall under *four-footed animal*. Therefore, it is wrong for “four-footed animals” to be named alongside “cattle” and “beasts” (Genesis 1:25).

Objection 3: Just as the other animals are in a determinate genus and species, so too is man. But when man is made, there is no mention of his genus or species. Therefore, no mention of the genus or species should have been made in the case of the production of the other animals, either—as when it says, “... in their genus” or “... in their species” (Genesis 1:24-25).

Objection 4: Terrestrial animals are more similar to man, who is said to be blessed by God, than are the birds and fish. Therefore, since the birds and fish are said to be blessed (see Genesis 1:22), *a fortiori* this should likewise have been said of the other animals.

Objection 5: Some animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a certain kind of corruption. But corruption is not fitting in the first establishment of things. Therefore, animals should not have been produced in the first establishment of things.

Objection 6: Some animals are poisonous and harmful to man. But nothing harmful to man should have been created before the sin. Therefore, these animals either (a) should not have been made by God at all, since He is the author of good things, or (b) should not have been made before the sin.

But contrary to this: The authority of Scripture suffices for the contrary.

I respond: Just as the middle body is adorned on the fifth day, where this corresponds to the second day, so too the last body, viz., earth, is adorned on the sixth day, where this corresponds to the third day by the production of the terrestrial animals. Hence, on both the third day and the sixth day there is mention of the earth. And here again, according to Augustine the terrestrial animals are produced in potentiality, whereas according to the other saints they are produced in actuality.

Reply to objection 1: As Basil says, the different grades of life found among the different living things can be inferred from Scripture’s way of speaking. For instance, plants have the most imperfect and concealed form of life. Hence, in their production there is mention only of generation and not of life, since the act of life exists in them only with respect to generation—given that, as will be explained below (q. 78, a. 2), the powers of nutrition and growth are at the service of the power of generation.

Among the animals, by contrast, the terrestrial animals are, generally speaking, more perfect than the birds and the fish—not because the fish lack memory (which Basil asserts and Augustine disproves), but because of the distinctions among the organic parts of the terrestrial animals and the perfection of their act of generation (though with respect to some aspects of intelligence, certain imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more eminent). And so Scripture calls fish “creeping things having life” rather

than “living souls.” But it calls terrestrial animals “living souls” because of the perfection of life found in them. It is as if fish were bodies having some aspect of a soul, whereas terrestrial animals, because of the perfection of their life, were souls that dominate their bodies.

However, the most perfect grade of life exists in man. And so Scripture does not say that the life of man is produced from the water or from the earth, as with the rest of the animals. Rather, it says that the life of man is produced by God.

Reply to objection 2: By ‘beasts of burden’ (*iumenta*) or ‘cattle’ (*pecora*) Scripture means domestic animals, which are of service to man in some way or other. On the other hand, by ‘beasts’ it means wild animals such as bears or lions. And by ‘creeping animals’ (*reptilia*) it means either (a) animals that do not have feet by which to be raised from the earth, such as serpents, or (b) animals that have short feet by which they are raised just a little, such as lizards and turtles and others of this sort. However, because there are animals that are not included under any of these classifications, such as deer and goats, it added ‘four-footed animals’ in order to include them as well.

An alternative reply is that Scripture first used ‘four-footed animals’ as a genus, so to speak, and then added other things as something like species. For there are also certain four-footed reptiles, such as lizards and turtles.

Reply to objection 3: In the case of the other animals and plants, the text made mention of genera and species in order to signal the generation of like from like. In the case of man, however, it was unnecessary to say this, since what had already been said about the other animals could also be understood to apply to man.

An alternative reply is that animals and plants are produced “according to their own genera and species” (see Genesis 1:24-25) in the sense that they are far removed from being like God, whereas man is said to be formed to the image and likeness of God.

Reply to objection 4: God’s blessing bestowed the power to multiply through generation. And so given that this blessing was posited in the case of the birds and the fish, which are there first, it was unnecessary to repeat it in the case of the earthly animals; instead, it is taken for granted. However, in the case of men the blessing is repeated because among men there are special reasons for the multiplication, viz., (a) to bring to completion the number of the elect and (b) “lest anyone claim that there is some sin involved in the role of generating children” (*Super Genesim ad Litteram* 3). By contrast, plants “have no desire to propagate offspring, and they generate without any sensations; hence, they are judged unworthy of a verbal blessing” (*ibid.*).

Reply to objection 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of something else, it is not incompatible with the first establishment of things that more noble things should be generated from the corruption of less noble things. Hence, animals that are generated from the corruption of inanimate things or of plants could have been generated at that time. However, animals that are generated from the corruption of animals could not have been produced at that time, except only in potentiality.

Reply to objection 6: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim contra Manichaeos* 1, “If an inexperienced man enters a craftsman’s workshop, he sees there many instruments, the reasons for which he does not know, and if he is really foolish, he thinks that they are superfluous. And if he incautiously falls into the fire or hurts himself with some sharp tool, he comes to believe that there are many harmful things there. But because the craftsman knows what these tools are used for, he laughs at the man’s foolishness. So, too, in this world some dare to find fault with many things, the reasons for which they do not see. For even if many things are not necessary for our own house, they nonetheless bring the universe to completion.”

Moreover, before the sin man had made ordinate use of the things of the world. Hence, the poisonous animals would not have been dangerous to him.

QUESTION 73

The Seventh Day

The next things to consider are those that are relevant to the seventh day. On this topic there are three questions: (1) about the completion of the works, (2) about God's rest, and (3) about the blessing and sanctification of this day.

Article 1

Should the completion of God's works be ascribed to the seventh day?

It seems that the completion of God's works (*completio divinatorum operum*) should not be ascribed to the seventh day:

Objection 1: All the things that are done in the world belong to God's works. But as Matthew 13:37ff. says, the consummation of the ages (*consummatio saeculi*) will occur at the end of the world (*in fine mundi*). Again, the time of Christ's Incarnation is the time of a certain completion and is thus called "the fullness of time" in Galatians 4:4. And, as John 19:30 reports, Christ Himself said at His death, "It is finished." Therefore, it is not the case that the completion of God's works belongs to the seventh day.

Objection 2: If someone is completing his work, then he is doing something. But God is not said to have done anything on the seventh day; just the opposite, He is said to have "rested from all His work" (Genesis 2:2). Therefore, the completion of the works does not belong to the seventh day.

Objection 3: If something is such that many things are being added to it, then it is not said to be complete (*completum*), unless perhaps those things are superfluous. For what is called perfect (*perfectum*) is such that it lacks nothing it ought to have. But many things have been made since the seventh day; there has been the production of many individuals and even of new species that often come to light, especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates new souls even now. The Incarnation was likewise a new work; Jeremiah 31:22 says of it, "The Lord has created something new on the earth." Moreover, there are new miraculous works, about which Ecclesiasticus 36:6 says, "Renew your signs, and work new miracles." Again, all things will be made new in the glorification of the saints—this according to Apocalypse 21:5 ("And He who sat on the throne said: "Behold, I make all things new"). Therefore, the completion of God's works should not be attributed to the seventh day.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:2 says, "On the seventh day God completed His work which He had done."

I respond: There are two kinds of perfection for a thing, first perfection and second perfection. A thing has *first perfection* (*prima perfectio*) insofar as it is perfect in its substance. This perfection is the form of the whole that arises from the integration of the parts. On the other hand, *second perfection* (*secunda perfectio*) is the end. Now the end is either (a) an operation, e.g., the end of the harpist is the playing of the harp, or (b) something that is arrived at through an operation, e.g., the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building it. First perfection is a cause of second perfection, since the form is a principle of operation.

Now the last perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect happiness of the saints, which will come at the last consummation of the ages. But the first perfection, which consists in the completeness of the universe (*integritas universi*), existed in the first establishment of things. It is this perfection that is ascribed to the seventh day.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, first perfection is a cause of second perfection. Now two things are required to attain happiness, viz., nature and grace. As has been explained, the perfection

itself of happiness will come at the end of the world. But this consummation will have pre-existed in its causes—with respect to *nature*, in the first establishment of things, and with respect to *grace*, in Christ's Incarnation, since, as John 1:17 says, grace and truth were made through Jesus Christ. So, then, (a) on the seventh day there was the consummation of *nature*, (b) in Christ's Incarnation there was the consummation of *grace*, and (c) at the end of the world there will be the consummation of *glory*.

Reply to objection 2: God did something on the seventh day—not by making a new creature, but rather by governing (*administrando*) his creatures and moving them to their proper operations, which already in some sense belongs to a sort of initiation of second perfection.

And so the consummation of His works is attributed to the seventh day, according to our version of Scripture (*secundum nostram translationem*), whereas, according to the other version, it is attributed to the sixth day. And both versions can stand. For the consummation that involves the *completeness* of the parts of the universe belongs to the sixth day, whereas the consummation that involves the *operations* of the parts belongs to the seventh day.

A possible alternative reply is to claim that in the case of continuous motion, as long as something can continue moving (*potest moveri ulterius*), the motion is not said to be complete (*perfectus*) until there is rest, since rest signals a completed motion (*motum consummatum*). Now God could have made more creatures beyond those that He had made in the six days. Hence, by the very fact that He stopped making new creatures on the seventh day, He is said to have finished His work.

Reply to objection 3: Nothing made afterwards by God is totally new, without in some sense having pre-existed in the work of the six days. For certain things pre-existed *in their matter* (*materialiter*), in the sense in which God formed the woman from Adam's rib. Others pre-existed in the work of the six days not only in their matter but also *in their causes* (*causaliter*), in the sense in which individuals that are now being generated pre-existed in the first individuals of their species. Also, if any new species arise, they pre-existed *in certain active powers*; for instance, animals generated from putrefaction are produced by the powers that the stars and elements received at the beginning—even if new species of such animals are produced. Again, animals of new species sometimes arise from *mixing animals of diverse species*, as when a mule is generated from a donkey and a horse, and these likewise pre-existed in their causes in the work of the six days. On the other hand, some things pre-existed *by way of likeness*, in the way that [human] souls are now created; the same holds for the work of the Incarnation, since, as Philippians 2:7 says, “The Son of God was made in the likeness of men.” Also, spiritual glory pre-existed in the angels by way of likeness, whereas bodily glory pre-existed in the heavens, mainly the empyrean heaven.

Thus, Ecclesiastes 1:10 says, “Nothing under the sun is new; for it has already pre-existed in the ages that were before us.”

Article 2

Did God rest from all His work on the seventh day?

It seems that God did not rest from all His work on the seventh day:

Objection 1: John 5:17 says, “My Father is working even until now, and I am working.” Therefore, He did not rest from all His work on the seventh day.

Objection 2: Rest is opposed to movement or to the labor that is sometimes caused by movement. But God produced His works without movement (*immobiliter*) and without labor. Therefore, He cannot be said to have rested from His work on the seventh day.

Objection 3: If someone replies that God rested on the seventh day by virtue of His making man rest, then against this: Rest is a counterbalance to His operation. But the expression “God created or made this or that” is not understood to mean that God made man create or make things. Therefore, neither can it be correct to claim that God is said to have rested by virtue of His making man rest.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:2 says, “God rested on the seventh day from all the work He had done.”

I respond: Rest is properly opposed to movement and, as a result, it is opposed to labor, which arises from movement. Now even though movement is properly understood of bodies, the name ‘movement’ (*motus*) is nonetheless extended to spiritual things in two ways. First, insofar as every operation is called a movement; for instance, even God’s goodness is said to be moved in a certain sense and to proceed into things insofar as it communicates itself to them—this according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2. Second, a desire that tends toward something else is said to be a sort of movement. Hence, rest is likewise understood in two ways: first, it is taken for the cessation of work; second, it taken for the fulfillment of desire.

God is said to have rested in both these ways on the seventh day. First of all, on the seventh day He stopped making new creatures, since, as has been explained (a. 1), afterwards He made nothing that did not in some sense pre-exist in those first works. Second, He did not need the things that had been made, but was happy in enjoying Himself. Hence, after all His works were posited, He is not said to have rested “*in* His works,” in the sense that He needed them for His happiness; instead, He is said to have rested “*from* His works,” i.e., He rested in Himself, since He is sufficient for Himself and He fulfills His own desire.

Moreover, even though He rested from eternity in Himself, still, it is the fact that He rested in Himself after His works were finished that pertains to the seventh day. And this is what it is to rest *from* His works, as Augustine explains in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4.

Reply to objection 1: God is operating even until now by conserving and governing the creatures He has made and not by making new creatures.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, rest is opposed not to labor or movement but rather to the production of new things and to a desire that tends toward another.

Reply to objection 3: Just as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in His enjoyment of Himself, so too we are likewise made happy only through the enjoyment of God. And so He likewise makes us rest in Himself from His works and our works. Therefore, it is appropriate to interpret this passage as saying that God rested by virtue of His making man rest.

However, this explanation should not be proposed by itself; instead, the other explanation is more principal than and prior to this one.

Article 3

Do blessing and sanctification befit the seventh day?

It seems that blessing and sanctification do not befit the seventh day:

Objection 1: It is customary to call a time blessed or holy because of something good that happens at that time or because some evil is avoided. But God gains nothing and loses nothing, regardless of whether he works or ceases to work. Therefore, it is not the case that a special blessing and sanctification befit the seventh day.

Objection 2: ‘Blessing’ (*benedictio*) comes from ‘goodness’ (*bonitas*). But according to

Dionysius, the good diffuses and communicates itself. Therefore, it would have been fitting for the days on which God produced creatures to be blessed rather than the day on which He stopped producing creatures.

Objection 3: Before this in the text, a blessing had been recorded in the case of each creature, when it said in the case of each of the works, “God saw that it was good.” Therefore, it was unnecessary for the seventh day to be blessed, after the production of all things.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:3 says, “God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because on that day He rested from all His work.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), there are two ways to understand God’s resting on the seventh day: (a) insofar as He stopped doing new works, though in such a way that He conserves and governs the creatures that have been made; (b) insofar as He rested in Himself after His works.

Thus, with respect to the former, a blessing befits the seventh day. For as was explained above (q. 72), the blessing pertains to multiplication; hence, He said to the creatures He blessed, “Grow and multiply.” But the multiplication of things is accomplished through the creature’s being governed, insofar as like comes from like.

With respect to the latter, sanctification befits the seventh day. For sanctification occurs especially in the fact that one rests in God, and this is why things dedicated to God are called holy.

Reply to objection 1: The seventh day is sanctified not because God is able to acquire or lose anything, but because something accrues to creatures through multiplication and through rest in God.

Reply to objection 2: On the first six days things were produced in their first causes. But afterwards things are multiplied and conserved from those first causes, and this likewise pertains to God’s goodness. The perfection of God’s goodness is especially shown by the fact it is in God’s goodness alone that He Himself rests and that we are able to rest, enjoying that goodness.

Reply to objection 3: The good that is recalled on each of the days pertains to the first establishment of nature, whereas the blessing of the seventh day pertains to the propagation of nature.

QUESTION 74

All Seven Days in General

Next we consider all seven days in general. And on this topic there are three questions: (1) about whether there are enough days, (2) about whether there is just one day or more than one, (3) about certain ways of speaking that Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days.

Article 1

Are these days adequately enumerated?

It seems that these days are not adequately enumerated:

Objection 1: The work of creation is no less distinct from the works of division and adornment than these latter two works are from one another. But distinct days are assigned to division and other distinct days to adornment. Therefore, distinct days should likewise be assigned to creation.

Objection 2: Air and fire are more noble elements than are earth and water. But one day is assigned to the division of the waters and another day to the division of the earth. Therefore, other distinct days should be assigned to the division of the fire and the division of the air.

Objection 3: Birds and fish are no less diverse from one another than are birds and terrestrial animals. What's more, man is more diverse from the other animals than any of the other animals are from one another. But one day is assigned to the production of the fish of the sea and another separate day to the production of the animals of the earth. Therefore, separate days should likewise have been assigned to the production of the birds of the heavens and to the production of man.

But contrary to this:

1. It seems that some of the days are superfluous. For instance, light is related to the celestial lights as an accident to a subject. But a subject is produced simultaneously with its proper accident. Therefore, it should not have been the case that light was produced on one day and the celestial lights on another day.

2. These days are devoted to the first establishment of the world. But on the seventh day nothing was established for the first time. Therefore, the seventh day should not be counted with the other days.

I respond: The explanation for the distinctions among these days can be made clear on the basis of what has gone before (q. 70, a. 1). For the parts of the world had first to be divided, and afterwards each part had to be adorned by being filled, as it were, with its own inhabitants.

Thus, according to the other saints, corporeal creation has three designated parts: (a) the first part, which is signified by the name 'heaven'; (b) the middle part, which is signified by the name 'water'; and (c) the last part, which is signified by the name 'earth'. (As *De Caelo 1* reports, the Pythagoreans likewise held that perfection consists in a triad, viz., a beginning, a middle, and an end.) Therefore, the first part is divided on the first day and adorned on the fourth day; the middle part is divided on the second day and adorned on the fifth day; and the last part is divided on the third day and adorned on the sixth day.

By contrast, Augustine, while agreeing with the other saints about the last three days, differs from them over the first three days. For according to him, spiritual creation is formed on the first day, whereas corporeal creation is formed on the other two days, with the higher bodies are formed on the second day and the lower bodies on the third day. And so the perfection of God's works corresponds to the perfection of the number *six*, which arises from its parts being joined together in a certain way, where these parts are *one*, *two*, and *three*. For one day is assigned to the formation of spiritual creation, two days are assigned to the formation of corporeal creation, and three days are assigned to adornment.

Reply to objection 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation has to do with the production of unformed matter and unformed spiritual nature. These two productions occur outside of time (*extra tempus*), as he himself says in *Confessiones* 12, and so the creation of both sorts of creature is posited before any of the days.

However, according to the other saints, one can reply that the work of division and the work of adornment involve certain changes in creatures, and that this change is measured by time. By contrast, the work of creation consists solely in God's action at the instant of His producing the substance of things. And so every work of division and work of adornment is said to have been accomplished "in a day," whereas creation is said to have been accomplished "in the beginning," a phrase that bespeaks something indivisible.

Reply to objection 2: Since the fire and the air are not discerned by ordinary people, they are not explicitly named by Moses among the parts of the world. Instead, as Augustine explains, they are counted either (a) along with the middle part, viz., water, especially as regards the lower part of the air, or (b) along with the heavens, as regards the higher part of the air.

Reply to objection 3: The production of animals is recorded insofar as they serve to adorn the various parts of the world. And so the days that involve the production of animals are distinguished or combined according to whether they agree or differ with respect to the part of the world that is being adorned.

Reply to argument 1 for the contrary: On the first day the nature of light was made in some subject. But it is on the fourth day that the celestial lights are said to have been made—not, as was explained above (q. 70, a. 1), because their substance was made *de novo*, but because they were formed in a way in which they had not been formed before.

Reply to argument 2 for the contrary: According to Augustine, there is something assigned to the seventh day after everything that is attributed to the six days, viz., that God rested in Himself from His works. And so after the six days it was necessary to make mention of the seventh day.

By contrast, according to the other saints, one can reply that on the seventh day the world had a certain new status, viz., that nothing would be added to it *de novo*. And so after the six days a seventh day is posited and designated as the cessation of work.

Article 2

Are all the days a single day?

It seems that all the days are a single day:

Objection 1: Genesis 2:4-5 says, "These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord made the heaven and the earth and every plant of the field, before it sprang up in the earth." Therefore, there was a single day on which He made heaven and earth and every plant of the field. But heaven and earth were made on the first day (or, better, before all the days), whereas the plants of the field were made on the third day. Therefore, a single day is both the first day and the third day and, by parity of reasoning, a single day is all the days.

Objection 2: Ecclesiasticus 18:1 says, "He who lives forever created all things at once (*creavit omnia simul*)."

But this would not be the case if there were many days of these works, since many days do not occur "at once." Therefore, there is just a single day and not many days.

Objection 3: On the seventh day God stopped doing new works. Therefore, if the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows that He did not make the seventh day—which is absurd.

Objection 4: God finished in an instant the whole of the work ascribed to a given day; for in the case of each work it says, “He spoke and it was done.” Therefore, if He had reserved a later work for another day, it would follow that for the rest of the day in question He would have stopped working—which would be superfluous. Therefore, it is not the case that there is any day of subsequent work that is distinct from a day of previous work.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1 says, “The evening and the morning were the second day ... and the third day,” and so on for the others. But one cannot say ‘second’ and ‘third’ when there is just one. Therefore, there was not just a single day.

I respond: On this question Augustine disagrees with the other commentators. For in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, *De Civitate Dei* 11, and *Ad Orosium*, Augustine claims that what are called seven days are all a single day presented in a sevenfold manner. By contrast, the other commentators think that there were seven distinct days and not just a single day.

Now there is a big difference between these two opinions when they are applied to the exposition of the text of Genesis.

According to Augustine, ‘day’ refers to a cognition in the angelic mind, so that the first day is a cognition of the first divine work, the second day is a cognition of the second work, and so on for the others. And each work is said to have been done on a given day because God did not produce anything in reality without impressing it upon the angelic mind. But the angelic mind is able to understand many things at once—especially in the Word, in whom every angelic cognition is perfected and terminated. And so a day is distinguished according to the natural order of the things known and not according to either a succession of cognitions or a succession in the production of the things. On the other hand, an angelic cognition can be truly and properly called a ‘day’, since, according to Augustine, light, which is the cause of a day, is properly found in spiritual entities.

By contrast, according to the others, what is indicated by means of these days is both a succession of temporal days and a succession in the production of things.

On the other hand, there is not a big difference between the two opinions when they are applied to the manner in which things were produced. This is because of the two points of interpretation on which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 67, a. 1 and q. 69, a. 1), Augustine differs from the others.

First, Augustine understands the earth and the water that were created first to be totally unformed corporeal matter, whereas he understands the making of the firmament and the gathering of the waters and the appearance of dry land to be the bestowal of forms on corporeal matter. By contrast, the other saints understand the earth and the water that were created first to be the world’s elements themselves, existing with their own proper forms, whereas they understand the subsequent works to be the division of the previously existing bodies. This was explained above (q. 67 a. 1 and 4 and q. 69, a. 1).

Second, they differ over the production of the plants and animals. The other saints claim that in the work of the six days the plants and animals were produced in actuality, whereas Augustine claims that they were produced only in potentiality.

Therefore, given Augustine’s claim that the works of the six days were accomplished simultaneously, what follows is the same mode of production for creatures. For on both views, in the first establishment of things matter existed with the substantial forms of the elements, and, according to both views, in the first establishment of things there were no actual plants or animals.

However, differences remain with respect to four points. For according to the other saints, after the initial production of creatures there was a temporal interval during which (a) light did not exist, (b) the firmament had not been formed, (c) the earth was still covered with the waters, and (d) the celestial lights had not been formed. On Augustine’s interpretation there is no need to make these claims.

Therefore, in order not to do prejudice to either of these opinions, we must reply to the arguments for both sides.

Reply to objection 1: On the day on which God created heaven and earth He also created every green plant of the field—not in actuality but before they grew up out of the earth, i.e., in potentiality. Augustine ascribes this to the third day, whereas the others ascribe it to the first establishment of things.

Reply to objection 2: God created all things at once with respect to their substance—a substance that was in some sense unformed. But as far as the formation that was accomplished through division and adornment is concerned, it did not all take place at the same time. Hence, Scripture expressly uses the verb *to create* [for the first establishment of things].

Reply to objection 3: On the seventh day God stopped doing new works, but He did not stop propagating some things from others. The fact that other things come along after the first day pertains to this propagation.

Reply to objection 4: The fact that not all things are divided and adorned at the same time does not stem from God's lack of power (as though He needed time to operate), but is instead meant to preserve order within the establishment of things. And so different days had to be devoted to the different states of the world, and a new state of perfection was in every case added to the world by a subsequent work.

Reply to argument for the contrary: According to Augustine the order of the days has to be traced back to the natural order of the works that are attributed to the days.

Article 3

Does Scripture use appropriate language to express the works of the six days?

It seems that Scripture does not use appropriate language to express the works of the six days:

Objection 1: Just as light and the firmament and other such works were made through God's Word, so too were heaven and earth, since "all things were made through Him," as John 1:3 says. Therefore, mention should have been made of the Word of God in the creation of heaven and earth, just as it was in the other works.

Objection 2: Water was created by God, even though there is no mention of its having been created. Therefore, the creation of things is not adequately described.

Objection 3: As Genesis 1:31 says, "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." Therefore, in the case of each work it should have said, "God saw that it was good." Therefore, it was wrong to omit this in the case of the work of creation and in the case of the work of the second day.

Objection 4: The spirit of God is God. But it does not befit God to move (*ferri*) or to have a position. Therefore, it was wrong to say, "The spirit of God moved over the waters" (Genesis 1:2).

Objection 5: No one makes what has already been made. Therefore, after it said, "God said, 'Let there be a firmament (Genesis 1:6)'" and it was made, it was wrong to add, "God made a firmament" (Genesis 1:7). And the same thing holds for the other works.

Objection 6: Morning and evening are not sufficient to divide a day, since there are many parts of a day. Therefore, it was wrong to say, "Morning and evening were the second (or third) day" (Genesis 1:8 and 1:13).

Objection 7: It is the term 'first'—and not the term 'one'—that corresponds to 'second' and 'third'. Therefore, it should have said, "Morning and evening were the first day," where it in fact says "one day" (Genesis 1:5).

Reply to objection 1: According to Augustine, the person of the Son is mentioned both in the first

creation of things and in the division and adornment of things, though in different ways.

For the division and adornment pertain to the formation of things. But just as the formation of artifacts is accomplished through the form of the craft that exists in the craftsman's mind and is called his 'intelligible word', so too the formation of the whole of creation is accomplished through the Word of God. And this is the sense in which there is mention of the Word in the work of division and adornment.

On the other hand, in the creation the Son is mentioned as a beginning, when it says, "In the beginning God created ...," since 'creation' is being understood as the production of unformed matter. However, according to the other saints, who claim that the elements were created first with their proper forms, a different reply must be given. For instance, Basil claims that the phrase "God said ..." signifies a divine command. But before mention is made of a divine command, a creature has to be produced that would obey the command.

Reply to objection 2: According to Augustine, 'heaven' refers to unformed spiritual matter, whereas 'earth' refers to the unformed matter of all bodies. And so no creature is omitted.

By contrast, according to Basil, heaven and earth are posited here as two endpoints, so that the things in the middle are implicitly understood by reference to them, especially in light of the fact that the motion of each body in the middle is either toward the heaven, as with the motion of light bodies, or toward the earth, as with the motion of heavy bodies.

Others, however, claim that Scripture normally includes all four elements under the name 'earth'. Hence, in Psalm 148:7, after it says, "Praise the Lord from the earth," it adds, "fire, hail, snow, and ice."

Reply to objection 3: In the case of the work of creation there is something that corresponds to what is said in the case of the work of division and adornment, viz., "God saw that this or that was good."

To see this clearly, notice that the Holy Spirit is the Love. Now as Augustine explains in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1, "There are two things for the sake of which God loves His creatures, viz., (a) that they might exist and (b) that they might remain in existence. Therefore, (a) in order that what would remain in existence might exist, it says, 'The spirit of God moved over the waters'"—insofar as 'waters' refers to unformed matter, in the way that the craftsman's love 'moves over' a given material in order that he might form a work from it—"whereas (b) in order that what He had made should remain in existence, it says, 'God saw that it was good'." The latter signifies the divine craftsman's delight in the thing made (not that He knows it in any other way, or that it pleases Him in any other way, than before He had made it).

And so the Trinity of persons is made known both in the work of creation and in the work of formation. More specifically, in the work of creation, the person of the Father is made known through "God created ...," the person of the Son is made known through "the beginning" in which He created, and the person of Holy Spirit is made known by the fact that He "moved over the waters." Again, in the work of formation, the person of the Father is made known in God's speaking, the person of the Son is made known in the Word by which He speaks, and the person of the Holy Spirit is made known in the delight with which God sees that what He has made is good.

On the other hand, in the work of the second day, the reason why it does not say, "God saw that it was good" is that the work of dividing the waters is begun on that day and completed on the third day. Hence, what is said on the third day refers back to the second day as well.

An alternative reply is that the reason why Scripture does not use an approval of this sort is that the division posited on the second day is of things that are not evident to the people.

Yet another reply is that 'firmament' here is being taken for the cloudy air, which is not one of the permanent parts of the universe or one of the principal parts of the world.

These are the three explanations given by Rabbi Moses.

On the other hand, some give a mystical explanation based on numbers: The reason why the work of second day is not given an approval is that the number *two* recedes from oneness.

Reply to objection 4: By ‘the spirit of the Lord’ Rabbi Moses understands the air or the wind, just as Plato did. And he claims that the text says “the spirit of the Lord” because Scripture was everywhere accustomed to attributing the breathing of the winds to God.

However, according to the saints, “the spirit of the Lord” refers to the Holy Spirit, who is said to move over the waters—i.e., over unformed matter, according to Augustine—“so that no one might think that God loves the works He has made out of a necessity of need. For a love borne of need is subject to the things that it loves. And it is appropriate that what is first made known is something inchoate over which He is said to move. For He does not move over a place, but rather moves with a preeminent power” (Augustine, *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 1).

On the other hand, according to Basil, he moves over the element water, i.e., “He fosters and enlivens the nature of the waters, like a hovering mother-hen, impressing vital power on the things that are being fostered.” For water especially has a vital power, since most animals are generated in water and the semen of all animals is liquid. Also, spiritual life is given through the water of Baptism; hence John 3:5 says, “Unless you are reborn of water and the Holy Spirit”

Reply to objection 5: According to Augustine, the threefold *esse* of things is designated by three of the phrases: (a) the *esse* of things in the Word is designated by its saying, “Let there be ...”; (b) the *esse* of things in the angelic mind is designated by its saying, “It was made”; and (c) the *esse* of things in their proper natures is designated by its saying, “He made it.” And since the formation of the angels is described on the first day, it was not necessary to add “He made it” there.

By contrast, according to the other saints, one can reply that the fact that it says, “God said, ‘Let there be ...’” signifies God’s command with respect to making, whereas the fact that it says, “It was made” signifies the completion of the work. But it was necessary to add how it was made, especially because of those who claimed that all visible things were made by the angels. And so to exclude this, it adds that God Himself made them. Hence, in the case of each of the works, after it says, “And it was made,” some act of God’s is added, either “He made it” or “He divided them” or “He called it ...” or something of this sort.

Reply to objection 6: According to Augustine, ‘morning’ and ‘evening’ refer to the morning knowledge and evening knowledge of angels, which was explained above (q. 58, aa. 6 and 7).

Alternatively, according to Basil, the whole of a time was customarily named by its principal part, viz., day, in the way that Jacob said, “The days of my wandering” (Genesis 47:9), without making any mention of night.

Now evening and morning are posited as the endpoints of a day, the beginning of which is morning and the end of which is evening.

Alternatively, ‘evening’ designates the beginning of night, whereas ‘morning’ designates the beginning of day. And it was fitting that when the first division of things was mentioned, only the beginnings of the times should be designated.

Moreover, evening is mentioned first because, given that the day begins with light, the terminus of light, i.e., evening, occurs before the terminus of darkness and night, i.e., morning.

Alternatively, according to Chrysostom, evening is mentioned first in order to signify that a natural day ends in the morning and not in the evening.

Reply to objection 7: It says ‘one day’ on the first establishment of a day in order to signify that a period of twenty-four hours pertains to a single day. Hence, by saying “one day” it fixes the measure of a natural day.

An alternative reply is that it says “one day” in order to signify that the day is consummated by the return of the sun to one and the same point.

Yet another reply is that it says “one day” because once the seven days have been completed, there will be a return to the first day, which is one with the eighth day.

These are the three reasons that Basil gives.

QUESTION 75

The Essence of the Human Soul

Now that we have considered the spiritual creature and the corporeal creature, we must consider man, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance (*ex spiritali et corporali substantia componitur*). We will consider first the nature of man (questions 75-89) and then the production of man (questions 90-102).

Now the theologian's role is to consider man's nature with respect to the soul and not the body, except insofar as the body is related to the soul. And so the first part of our consideration will have to do with the soul. Since, according to Dionysius, *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 11, there are three aspects of spiritual substances, viz., their essence, their power, and their operation, we will consider, first, that which has to do with the essence of the soul (questions 75-76); second, that which has to do with the soul's powers or capacities (*virtutem vel potentias*) (questions 77-83); and, third, that which has to do with the soul's operations (questions 84-89).

On the first point there are two things to consider. The first is the soul itself in its own right (question 75), and the second is the union of the soul with the body (question 76).

On the first topic there are seven questions: (1) Is a soul a body? (2) Is the human soul something subsistent? (3) Are the souls of brute animals subsistent? (4) Is the soul a man or is a man instead something composed of a soul and a body? (5) Is the soul composed of form and matter? (6) Is the human soul incorruptible? (7) Is the soul the same in species as an angel?

Article 1

Is a soul a body?

It seems that a soul is a body:

Objection 1: A soul is a mover of a body. But it does not give movement without being moved, both because (a) it seems that nothing can be a mover unless it is moved, since nothing gives to another what it itself does not have—e.g., something that is not itself hot does not give heat—and because (b) if something is an unmoved mover, then, as *Physics* 8 shows, it is a cause of a movement that is everlasting (*sempiternum*) and uniform (*eodem modo se habentem*)—but this does not appear to be the case with an animal's movement, which is from the soul. Therefore, a soul is a mover that is moved. But every mover that is moved is a body. Therefore, a soul is a body.

Objection 2: Every cognition is effected by means of some sort of likeness. But a body cannot bear a likeness to an incorporeal thing. Therefore, if a soul were not a body, it would not be able to have any cognition of corporeal things.

Objection 3: A mover must have some contact with the thing moved. But only bodies have contact. Therefore, since a soul moves a body, it seems that a soul is a body.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says that a soul "is simple in comparison to a body, since it is not spread out with its mass (*mole*) through a region in space (*per spatium loci*)."

I respond: In order to inquire into the nature of a soul, one must take for granted that what is called a 'soul' (*anima*) is a first principle of life in those things around us that are alive; for we say that living things are 'ensouled' (*animata*) and that things which lack life are 'not ensouled' (*inanimata*).

There are two operations by which life is especially made manifest, viz., cognition and movement. The ancient philosophers, unable to transcend the imagination, posited bodies as the principle of these operations, and they claimed that bodies alone are entities and that what is not a body is nothing. Accordingly, they claimed that a soul is a certain sort of body.

Even though the falsity of this view can be shown in many ways, we will make use of just the one way in virtue of which it is most surely and most generally clear that a soul is not a body:

It is evident that not every principle of a vital operation is a soul, since otherwise an eye would be a soul, given that it is a principle of seeing; and the same thing would have to be said of others among the soul's instruments. Instead, we are claiming that a soul is the *first* principle of life. For even though a body can in some sense be a principle of life, in the way that the heart is a principle of life in an animal, nonetheless, a body cannot be the *first* principle of life. For it is clear that *being a principle of life*, or *being alive* (*vivens*), cannot belong to a body by reason of its being a body; otherwise, each body would be alive or would be a principle of life. Therefore, the fact that a body is alive—or is even a principle of life—is something that belongs to it by virtue of the fact that it is a body of a given sort (*tale corpus*). But the fact that a body is actually of a given sort (*actu tale*) is due to a principle that is called its act (*eius actus*). Therefore, a soul, i.e., a first principle of life, is the *act of a body* and not itself a body—just as heat, i.e., a principle of heating, is a certain act of a body and not itself a body.

Reply to objection 1: Since everything that is moved is moved by another, and since this cannot go on *ad infinitum*, one must admit that not every mover is moved. For since to be moved is to go from potentiality to actuality, a mover gives what it has to the moveable thing insofar as it makes that thing to be actually such-and-such (*esse in actu*).

Now as is shown in *Physics* 8, there is a sort of mover that is completely unmoveable and that is moved neither *per se* nor *per accidens*; and this sort of mover can effect a movement that is always uniform (*semper uniformem*). On the other hand, there is another sort of mover that is moved *per accidens* and not *per se*, and because of this it does not effect a movement that is always uniform; a soul is a mover of this sort. Finally, there is a sort of mover that is moved *per se*, viz., a body.

Since the ancient natural philosophers believed that only bodies exist, they claimed that (a) every mover is itself moved and that (b) a soul is moved *per se* and is a body.

Reply to objection 2: It is not necessary that a likeness of the thing of which there is a cognition should exist *in actuality* in the *nature* of that which has the cognition. Instead, if something is such that it has cognition first in potentiality and afterwards in actuality, then a likeness of the thing of which there is cognition exists only *in potentiality*, and not in actuality, in the *nature* of the thing having the cognition—just as a color exists in the pupil only in potentiality and not in actuality. Hence, it is not necessary for there to be an actual likeness of corporeal entities in the nature of a soul; rather, it is necessary only that likenesses of this sort should exist in a soul in potentiality.

However, since the ancient natural philosophers were ignorant of the distinction between actuality and potentiality, they claimed that a soul is a body in order that it might have cognition of bodies; and they claimed that it is composed of the principles of all bodies in order that it might have cognition of all bodies.

Reply to objection 3: There are two sorts of contact, contact of *quantity* and contact of *power* (*contactus quantitatis et virtutis*). In the case of the first sort of contact, a body is touched only by a body. In the case of the second sort of contact, a body can be touched by an incorporeal entity that moves the body.

Article 2

Is a human soul something subsistent?

It seems that a human soul is not something subsistent:

Objection 1: That which is subsistent is said to be a *this-something* (*hoc aliquid*). Yet it is not the

soul that is a *this-something*, but rather that which is composed of a soul and a body. Therefore, a soul is not something subsistent.

Objection 2: Anything that is subsistent can be said to operate. But a soul is not said to operate, since, as *De Anima* 1 puts it, “To say that a soul senses or understands is like saying that a soul weaves or builds.” Therefore, a soul is not something subsistent.

Objection 3: If a soul were something subsistent, then it would have an operation without a body (*operatio sine corpore*). But none of its operations occurs without a body (*nulla est sine corpore*)—not even the act of intellectual understanding, since the soul cannot have an act of intellectual understanding without phantasms, and phantasms cannot exist without a body. Therefore, a human soul is not something subsistent.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “If anyone discerns the nature of the mind and sees that it is a substance, but not a corporeal substance, he will see that those who think it is a corporeal substance make this mistake because they attach to the soul those things, viz., the images of bodies, without which they cannot think of any nature.” Therefore, the nature of a human mind is not only incorporeal but also a substance, i.e., something subsistent.

I respond: One must claim that the principle of intellectual operations, which we call a man’s soul, is an incorporeal and subsistent principle. For it is clear that by means of his intellect a man is able to have cognition of the natures of all bodies. But that which is able to have cognition of given things must be such that it has nothing of those things in its own nature, since what exists in it naturally would in that case impede the cognition of those other things. For instance, we see that a sick tongue infected with bilious and bitter humors (*infecta cholerico et amaro humore*) is unable to perceive anything sweet; instead, everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if an intellectual principle had within itself the nature of any sort of body, it would be unable to have cognition of all bodies. But each body has some determinate nature. Therefore, it is impossible that this intellectual principle should be a body. And, similarly, it is impossible that it should have intellectual understanding through a bodily organ, since the determinate nature of that bodily organ would likewise prevent its having cognition of all bodies—in just the same way that if some determinate color exists not only in the pupil but also in the glass vase, then a liquid poured into that vase seems to be of that same color.

Therefore, the intellectual principle itself, which is called the *mind* or the *intellect*, has an operation in its own right (*habet operationem per se*) that the body does not share in. But nothing can operate in its own right unless it subsists in its own right (*nihil potest per se operari nisi quod per se subsistit*). For to operate belongs to a being that is actual (*in actu*), and so a thing operates in the way in which it exists. It is for this reason that we say that it is the hot thing (*calidum*), rather than the heat (*calor*), that gives warmth. It follows, then, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.

Reply to objection 1: The term ‘*this-something*’ can be taken in two senses. In the first sense it is taken for any subsistent thing, whereas in the second sense it is taken for a subsistent thing that is complete in the nature of some species. The first sense excludes inherence of the sort that belongs to an accident or material form; the second sense excludes in addition the incompleteness that belongs to a part. Hence, a hand could be called a *this-something* in the first sense, but not in the second sense.

So, then, since the human soul is a part of the human species, it can be called a *this-something*, i.e., subsistent, in the first sense, but not in the second sense. For in the second sense what is called a *this-something* is that which is composed of a soul and a body.

Reply to objection 2: Aristotle is making this assertion (*verba illa dicit*) not to express his own opinion, but rather to express the opinion of those who were claiming that to have intellectual understanding is to be moved. This is clear from what he says just before the cited passage.

An alternative reply is that to act in its own right (*per se agere*) befits something that exists in its own right (*per se existenti*). But the phrase ‘exists in its own right’ (*per se existens*) can sometimes be predicated of a thing as long as it is not inherent like an accident or a material form, even if it is a part. On the other hand, what is said to subsist properly and *per se* is such that it is neither inherent in the aforementioned ways nor a part. In this sense, neither an eye nor a hand could be said to subsist in its own right, and so neither could it be said to operate on its own. Hence, the operations of the parts are attributed to the whole *by means of* the parts (*per partes*). For we say that a man sees by means of his eye, and that he touches by means of his hand. This is different from saying that a hot thing gives warmth by means of its heat (*per calorem*), since there is no sense in which the heat gives warmth, properly speaking. Therefore, one can claim that a soul understands in the same sense in which an eye sees, but that it is more proper to say that the man understands by means of his soul.

Reply to objection 3: The body is not required for the intellect’s action as an organ by means of which that action is exercised; rather, the body is required for the sake of the action’s object (*ratione obiecti*). For a phantasm is related to intellectual understanding in the way that a color is related to seeing. But needing the body in this sense does not rule out the intellect’s being subsistent; otherwise, it would be the case that because it needs external sensible things in order to have sensation, an animal is not something subsistent.

Article 3

Are the souls of brute animals subsistent?

It seems that the souls of brute animals are subsistent:

Objection 1: Man agrees with the other animals in genus. But as has been shown (a. 2), man’s soul is subsistent. Therefore, the souls of the other animals are likewise subsistent.

Objection 2: Something sentient (*sensitivum*) is related to what can be sensed (*ad sensibilia*) in the same way that something intellectual (*intellecivum*) is related to what can be understood intellectually (*intelligibilia*). But the intellect understands intelligible things without the body. Therefore, the senses apprehend sensible things without the body. But the souls of brute animals are sentient. Therefore, they are subsistent for the same reason that the human soul, which is intellectual, is subsistent.

Objection 3: A brute animal’s soul moves its body. But a body is moved and does not effect movement. Therefore, a brute animal’s soul has an operation without its body.

But contrary to this: In *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* it says, “We believe that man alone has a soul that is a substance (*anima substantiva*), whereas the souls of animals are not substances.”

I respond: The ancient philosophers did not draw a distinction between sensation and intellectual understanding, and they attributed both of them to a corporeal principle, as has already been explained (a. 1).

Now Plato did distinguish intellectual understanding from sensation, but he attributed both of them to an incorporeal principle, arguing that just as intellectual understanding belongs to the soul in its own right, so too does sensing. And from this it followed that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent.

Aristotle, on the other hand, claimed that, among the works of the soul, only intellectual understanding is exercised without a corporeal organ. By contrast, sensing and the resulting operations of the sentient soul clearly occur with bodily changes; for instance, in the act of seeing the pupil is changed by the species of color, and the same thing is clear with the other senses.

And so it is clear that the sentient soul does not have any proper operation of its own (*non habet*

aliquam operationem propriam per seipsam); instead, every operation of the sentient soul belongs to the conjoined entity (*est coniuncti*). From this it follows that since the souls of brute animals do not operate in their own right (*per se*), they are not subsistent; for each thing has its *esse* in the same way that it has its operation (*similiter unumquodque habet esse et operationem*).

Reply to objection 1: Even though man agrees with the other animals in genus, he nonetheless differs from them in species, and a difference in species is accompanied by a difference in form. Nor does it have to be the case that every difference of form makes for a diversity of genera.

Reply to objection 2: There is a sense in which the sentient part of the soul (*sensitivum*) is related to what can be sensed in the way that the intellective part (*intellectivum*) is related to what can be understood intellectually, viz., each is in potentiality with respect to its objects.

However, there is another sense in which they are related in different ways to their objects; for the sentient part is acted upon by the sensible object via a corporeal change, and hence an excessiveness in the sensible objects harms the sensory power (*excellentia sensibilibus corrumpit sensum*). This does not occur in the case of the intellect, for an intellect that is having an intellective understanding of the most intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand lesser objects. What's more, even though the body gets tired out in intellective understanding, this is incidental (*per accidens*), given that the intellect needs the operation of the sentient powers to prepare phantasms for it.

Reply to objection 3: There are two sorts of moving powers.

There is one which *commands* movement (*imperat motum*), viz., the appetitive power. And its operation in the sentient soul does not occur without the body. Rather, anger and joy and all passions of this sort exist along with some change in the body.

The second sort of moving power is one which *executes* movement (*exequens motum*) and through which the members of the body are rendered capable of obeying the appetite. This power's act is to be moved and not to effect movement.

Hence, it is clear that to effect movement is not an act that the sentient soul has without the body.

Article 4

Is the [human] soul the man?

It seems that the [human] soul is the man:

Objection 1: 2 Corinthians 4:16 says, "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." But what is 'inward' in a man is the soul. Therefore, the soul is the interior man.

Objection 2: The human soul is a certain substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore, it is a particular substance. Therefore, it is a hypostasis or person. But it is not a person unless it is a human person. Therefore, the soul is the man, since a human person is a man.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine commends Varro for thinking that "a man is neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but the soul and the body together."

I respond: There are two ways to understand the claim that the soul is the man.

In the first way, it is understood to mean that (a) *man* is a soul and yet that (b) *this* man, e.g., Socrates, is not a soul but is instead composed of a soul and a body. I bring this position up because some have claimed that the form alone belongs to the nature of the species, whereas the matter is part of the individual and not of the species.

However, this cannot be true. For what pertains to the nature of the species is what is signified by

the definition. But in the case of natural things the definition signifies both the form and the matter—and not just the form. Hence, the matter is part of the species in the case of natural things—not, to be sure, *designated* matter (*materia signata*), which is a principle of individuation, but rather *common* matter (*materia communis*). For just as it is of the nature of *this* man to be composed of *this* soul and *this* flesh and *these* bones, so it is of the nature of *man* to be composed of a soul and flesh and bones, since whatever belongs to the substance of the species must belong in a general way (*communiter*) to the substance of all the individuals contained under that species.

In the second way, the claim that the soul is the man is understood to mean that *this* soul is *this* man. To be sure, this claim could be sustained if one asserted that the sentient soul's operations are its own without the body, since in that case all the operations attributed to the man would belong to the soul alone. But it is the entity that performs the entity's operations. Hence, it is the man that performs the man's operations. But it has been shown (a. 3) that an act of sensing is not an operation belonging only to the soul. Therefore, since sensing is one of the man's operations, even if not his proper operation, it is clear that a man is something composed of a soul and a body and is not the soul alone.

However, Plato, who claimed that sensing is proper to the soul, was able to hold that a man is a soul making use of a body.

Reply to objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, each thing seems to be mainly what is principal in it, in the way that a city is said to do what the mayor of the city (*rector civitatis*) does. It is in this sense that what is principal in a man is sometimes called the man. In some cases this is the intellective part of man, which is indeed principal and is called the 'interior' man, and in other cases it is the sentient part along with the body, which is principal in the opinion of those who are engaged only with sensible things. And the latter is called the 'exterior' man.

Reply to objection 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or person; rather, a hypostasis or person is a particular substance that has the *complete* nature of a species. Hence, a hand or foot cannot be called a hypostasis or a person. And, likewise, neither can a soul, since it is a part of a human nature (*pars speciei humanae*).

Article 5

Is a [human] soul composed of matter and form?

It seems that a [human] soul is composed of matter and form:

Objection 1: Potentiality (*potentia*) is contrasted with actuality (*actus*). But everything that exists in actuality participates in the *First Actuality* (*primus actus*), who is God and through participation in whom all things exist and are good and are alive—as is clear from Dionysius's teaching in *De Divinis Nominibus*. Therefore, everything that exists in potentiality participates in the *first potentiality* (*prima potentia*). But the first potentiality is primary matter (*materia prima*). Therefore, since a human soul in some sense exists in potentiality, which is clear from the fact that a man is sometimes engaged in intellective understanding [only] in potentiality, it seems that a human soul participates in primary matter as one of its parts.

Objection 2: Anything in which the properties of matter are found is such that matter is found in it. But the properties of matter are found in a soul. These properties are *to be a subject* (*subiici*) and *to undergo change* (*transmutari*). For a soul is the subject of knowledge and of virtue, and it undergoes a change from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore, there is matter in the soul.

Objection 3: As *Metaphysics* 8 says, anything that does not have matter does not have a cause of

its *esse*. But a soul has a cause of its *esse*, since it is created by God. Therefore, a soul has matter.

Objection 4: Anything that is just a form and does not have matter is pure and infinite actuality (*actus purus et infinitus*). But this belongs to God alone. Therefore, a soul has matter.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 7 Augustine shows that a soul is made neither from corporeal matter nor from spiritual matter.

I respond: A soul does not have matter. This can be seen in two ways.

The first way stems from *the nature of a soul in general*. For it belongs to the nature of a soul to be the form of a body. Therefore, either it is (a) a form as regards the whole of itself or (b) a form as regards some part of itself. If it is a form as regards the whole of itself, then it is impossible that a part of it should be matter—given that ‘matter’ means a being that exists only in potentiality. For a form *qua* form is an actuality, whereas what exists just in potentiality cannot be part of an actuality. For potentiality is incompatible with actuality, since it is divided off against actuality. On the other hand, if a soul is a form as regards some part of itself, then we will call that part ‘the soul’, and we will call the matter of which it is primarily the actuality ‘the first animated thing’.

The second way stems from *the specific nature of a human soul insofar as it is intellective*. For it is clear that whatever is received in a thing is received in it according to the mode of the receiver. So each thing is such that there is cognition of it insofar as its form exists in the one who has cognition of it. But an intellective soul has cognition of an entity in that entity’s nature taken absolutely speaking (*in sua natura absolute*); for instance, it has cognition of a rock insofar as the rock is a rock taken absolutely speaking. Therefore, it is the form of a rock taken absolutely speaking, i.e., according to its proper formal notion (*secundum propriam rationem formalem*), that exists in the intellective soul. Thus, an intellective soul is a form absolutely speaking and not something composed of matter and form. For if an intellective soul were composed of matter and form, then the forms of the things would be received in it as individuals, and so the soul would know them only as singulars, just as happens in the case of the sentient powers, which receive the forms of things in a corporeal organ. For matter is a principle of individuation for forms.

Therefore, it follows that an intellective soul, along with every intellectual substance that has cognition of forms taken absolutely, lacks a composition of form and matter.

Reply to objection 1: The First Actuality is the universal source of all actualities (*universale principium omnium actuum*), since it is infinite and has “everything virtually within itself to begin with,” as Dionysius puts it. Hence, things participate in it not as parts, but rather according to the diffusion of its procession (*secundum diffusionem processionis ipsius*). Now since potentiality is receptive of actuality, it must be proportioned to the actuality. But the received actualities that proceed from the infinite First Actuality and are participations in it are diverse. Hence, there cannot be a single potentiality that receives all the actualities, in the way that there is a single actuality that flows into (*influens*) all the participated actualities; otherwise, the receptive potentiality would equal the active power of the First Actuality.

However, the receptive potentiality that exists in an intellective soul is different from the receptive potentiality of primary matter, as is clear from the differences in what is received. For primary matter receives individual forms, whereas the intellect receives forms absolutely speaking. Hence, a potentiality of the sort that exists in the intellective soul does not indicate that the soul is composed of matter and form.

Reply to objection 2: To be a subject (*subiici*) and to undergo change (*transmutari*) belong to matter insofar as it is in potentiality. Therefore, just as an intellect’s potentiality is different from primary matter’s potentiality, so the notions of *being a subject of* and *undergoing change* are different in the two cases. For it is insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to intelligible species that the intellect

is the subject of knowledge and undergoes a change from ignorance to knowledge.

Reply to objection 3: The form is a cause of the matter's *esse*, along with the agent. Hence, insofar as the agent brings matter to the actuality of a form by transforming it, it is a cause of *esse* for it. But if something is a subsistent form, it does not have *esse* through any formal principle; nor does it have a cause that changes it from potentiality to actuality. Hence, after the cited passage, the Philosopher concludes that in the case of things composed of matter and form "the cause is none other than that which moves the thing from potentiality to actuality, whereas things that do not have matter are all simply beings that are truly something."

Reply to objection 4: Everything that is participated in is related to what participates in it as its actuality. But if a created form is posited as subsisting *per se*, then it must participate in *esse*, since "its very life," or whatever else is said of it, "participates in *esse* itself," as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 5. Now participated *esse* is limited to the capacity of that which participates. Hence, God alone, who is His own *esse* itself, is pure and infinite actuality (*actus purus et infinitus*). On the other hand, in intellectual substances there is a composition of actuality and potentiality—not, to be sure, a composition of form and matter, but rather a composition of form and participated *esse*. Hence, an intellectual substance is said by some to be composed of *that by which* it exists and *that which* exists (*componi ex quo est et quod est*). For *esse* itself is *that by which* something exists.

Article 6

Is the human soul corruptible?

It seems that the human soul is corruptible:

Objection 1: Things whose principles and processes are similar seem to have similar ends as well. But the principle of generation for men is similar to the principle of generation for beasts, since they are made from the earth. Again, the processes of life are similar in both cases, since "all things breathe alike, and man has no more than the beast," as Ecclesiastes 3:19 puts it. Therefore, as Ecclesiastes 3 concludes, "Death (*interitus*) for a man and a beast is one, and the condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, the human soul is likewise corruptible.

Objection 2: Everything that is made *ex nihilo* is reducible to nothingness, since the end must correspond to the beginning. But as Wisdom 2:2 says, "We are born from nothing"—which is true not only with respect to the body but also with respect to the soul. Therefore, as that same passage concludes, "After this we shall be as if we had never existed"—even with respect to the soul.

Objection 3: No entity exists without its proper operation. But the soul's proper operation, which is to understand intellectually in conjunction with a phantasm (*intelligere cum phantasmate*), cannot exist without a body, since the soul understands nothing without a phantasm and, as *De Anima* says, "there is no phantasm without the body." Therefore, the soul does not remain after the body has been destroyed.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that out of God's goodness human souls are such that they are "intellectual" and have "an incorruptible substantial life."

I respond: One must claim that the human soul, which we call the intellective principle, is incorruptible.

For a thing is corrupted in one of two ways, either (a) *per se* or (b) *per accidens*. But it is impossible for anything subsistent to be generated or corrupted *per accidens*, i.e., generated or corrupted because something else is generated or corrupted. For *being generated* and *being corrupted* belong to a thing in the same way as does its *esse*, which is acquired through generation and lost through corruption.

Hence, that which has *esse per se* can be generated or corrupted only *per se*, whereas things that do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, are said to be made and corrupted through the generation and corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (a. 3) that only human souls, and not the souls of brute animals, are subsistent *per se*. Hence, the souls of brute animals are corrupted when their bodies are corrupted, whereas the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted *per se*.

However, this is wholly impossible—not only in the case of the human soul, but in the case of any subsistent thing that is just a form. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing because of its very self (*secundum se*) is inseparable from that thing. But *esse* belongs *per se* to form, i.e., to actuality. This is why matter acquires *esse* in actuality to the extent that it acquires form, whereas corruption occurs in it to the extent that form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself. Hence, it is impossible that a subsistent form should cease to exist.

Even if one conceded that the soul is, as some claim, composed of form and matter, he would still have to claim that it is incorruptible. For there is corruption only where there is contrariety, since instances of generation and corruption are from contraries into contraries; hence, the celestial bodies are incorruptible because they do not have a matter that is subject to contrariety. But there cannot be any contrariety within the intellective soul. For it receives *esse* in its own mode, and the things that are received in it exist without contrariety. For within the intellect the concepts of contraries (*rationes contrariorum*) are not themselves contraries; rather, there is a single science of the contraries. Therefore, it is impossible for the intellective soul to be corruptible.

Again, an indication of this can also be found in the fact that each thing naturally desires *esse* in its own mode. But in things with cognition, desire follows upon cognition. Now the senses have cognition of *esse* only in the here and now, whereas the intellect apprehends *esse* absolutely speaking and with respect to all of time. Hence, everything that has an intellect naturally desires to exist always. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore, every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

Reply to objection 1: As is made clear in Wisdom 2, Solomon introduces this argument on behalf of the foolish. Thus, the claim that man and the other beasts have a similar principle of generation is true with respect to the body; for all animals are alike in being made from the earth. However, it is not true with respect to the soul; for the soul of brute animals is produced by a corporeal power, whereas the human soul is produced by God. In order to indicate this, Genesis says of the other animals, “Let the earth bring forth the living soul” (1:24), whereas of man it says, “He breathed into his face the breath of life” (2:7). And so Ecclesiastes 12:7 concludes, “The dust returns to the earth, from where it came, and the spirit returns to God, who made it.”

Likewise, the process of life is similar with respect to the body; on this score Ecclesiastes 3:19 says, “All things breathe alike,” and Wisdom 2:2 says, “The breath in our nostrils is smoke ...” But the process is not similar with respect to the soul. For a man has intellective understanding, whereas brute animals do not.

Hence, the claim that man has nothing more than the beast is false. And so death is similar with respect to the body, but not with respect to the soul.

Reply to objection 2: Just as a thing is said to be able to be created not through any passive potentiality (*per potentiam passivam*) but only through the active power (*per potentiam activam*) of the creator, who is able to produce something *ex nihilo*, so too when a thing is said to be able to be reduced to nothingness, this does not imply *within the creature* a potentiality for *non-esse*, but instead implies *within the creator* a power not to communicate *esse* (*in creatore potentia ad hoc quod esse non influat*). By contrast, a thing is said to be able to be corrupted because there exists *within it* a potentiality for *non-esse*.

Reply to objection 3: To understand intellectually in conjunction with a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul insofar as it is united to the body. However, when it is separated from the body, it

will have another mode of understanding like that of other substances that are separate from a body. This will be explained more fully below (q. 89, a. 1).

Article 7

Does a [human] soul belong to the same species as an angel?

It seems that a [human] soul belongs to the same species as an angel (*anima et angelus sint unius speciei*):

Objection 1: Each thing is ordered toward its proper end by the nature of its species, through which it has an inclination toward that end. But the soul's end is the same as an angel's, viz., eternal beatitude. Therefore, they belong to the same species.

Objection 2: The ultimate specific difference is the most noble, since it brings the nature of the species to completion. But in an angel and in a soul there is nothing more noble than intellectual *esse*. Therefore, an angel and a soul agree in their ultimate specific difference. Therefore, they belong to the same species.

Objection 3: A soul seems to differ from an angel only in being united to a body. But since the body lies outside the soul's essence, it does not seem relevant to its species. Therefore, an angel and a soul belong to the same species.

But contrary to this: Things that have diverse natural operations differ in species. But an angel and a soul have diverse natural operations. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, "Angelic minds have simple and beatific acts of intellective understanding (*simplices et beatos intellectus*), not inferring (*non congregantes*) their knowledge of God from visible things"—whereas a little later he says the opposite about the soul. Therefore, a soul and an angel do not belong to the same species.

I respond: Origen claimed that all angels and human souls belong to the same species. As was explained above (q. 47, a. 2), he said this because he held that the different grades found among such substances were incidental, stemming from free choice.

But this cannot be the case, since among incorporeal substances there is no numerical diversity without a diversity of species and without natural inequality.

For if incorporeal substances are not composed of matter and form but are instead subsistent forms, then it will clearly be necessary for there to be a diversity of species among them. For it is unintelligible that there should be a separated form that is not the only one of its species (*una unius speciei*)—just as, if whiteness were separated, then there could be only one whiteness, since *this* whiteness differs from *that* whiteness only because it is the whiteness of *this* thing or the whiteness of *that* thing. Now diversity in species is always accompanied by a natural diversity; for instance, among the species of color one is more perfect than another, and likewise for the other species. This is because the differences that divide the genus are contraries. But contraries are related to one other as the perfect and the imperfect, since the sources of contrariety are, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, the disposition and [corresponding] privation.

The same thing would follow even if substances of the sort in question were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of *this* thing is distinct from the matter of *that* thing, then it must be the case either that (a) the form is the source (*principium*) of the distinction between the matters, in the sense that the matters are diverse because of their relation to diverse forms, in which case it still follows that there is a difference in species and a natural inequality, or that (b) the matter is the source of the distinctness of the forms, in which case *this* matter can be said to be distinct from *that* matter only because of a

distinction in quantity (*secundum divisionem quantitativam*)—something that has no place in the case of incorporeal substances such as an angel or a soul.

Hence, it is impossible for an angel and a soul to belong to the same species.

Now we will show below (q. 76, a. 2) how it is that many souls belong to the same species.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through in the case of an end that is proximate and natural. However, eternal beatitude is an end that is ultimate and supernatural.

Reply to objection 2: The ultimate specific difference is the most noble because it is maximally determinate, in the way in which an actuality is more noble than the corresponding potentiality. However, in this sense *intellectual* (*intellectuale*) is not the most noble, because it is indeterminate and common with respect to the many grades of intellectuality, just as *sentient* (*sensibile*) is indeterminate and common with respect to the many grades within sentient *esse*. Hence, just as it is not the case that all sentient beings belong to the same species, so neither is it the case that all intellectual beings belong to the same species.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the body does not belong to the essence of the soul, the soul is by the nature of its essence such that it can be united to the body (*sit corpori unibilis*). Hence, it is not the soul, but rather the composite, that properly speaking belongs to a species. And the very fact that the soul needs the body in a certain way for its operation shows that the soul has a lower grade of intellectuality than does an angel, who is not united to a body.

QUESTION 76

The Union of the Soul with the Body

Next we must consider the union of the soul with the body. On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is the intellective principle united to the body as a form? (2) Is the intellective principle multiplied in accord with the multiplication of the bodies, or is there a single intellect for all men? (3) Are there any other souls in a body whose form is an intellective principle? (4) Are there any other substantial forms in such a body? (5) What sort of body does it have to be that has an intellective principle as its form? (6) Is the intellective principle united to the sort of body in question by the mediation of some accident? (7) Is the intellective principle united to the sort of body in question by the mediation of some other body? (8) Does the soul exist as a whole in each part of the body?

Article 1

Is the intellective principle united to the body as its form?

It seems that the intellective principle is not united to the body as its form:

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the intellect is “separated” and that it is not the act or actuality of a body (*nullius corporis est actus*). Therefore, it is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 2: Every form is specified (*determinatur*) in accord with the nature of the matter whose form it is; otherwise, a proportionality between the form and the matter would not be required. Therefore, if the intellect were united to the body as its form, then since each body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature. And in that case, as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 2), the intellect would not have cognition of all things—which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore, the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 3: If a given receptive potentiality is the actuality of a body, then it receives its form materially and individually, since what is received exists in the receiver in accord with the mode of the receiver (*receptum est in recipiente secundum modum recipientis*). But the form of a thing that is understood intellectually is not received materially and individually in the intellect; instead, it is received immaterially and universally. Otherwise, the intellect would not have cognition of immaterial things and universals, but would instead have cognition only of singulars, in the way that the senses do. Therefore, the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 4: A power (*potentia*) and [corresponding] action belong to the same thing, since it is the same thing that is able to act and that acts. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 2), an intellective action does not belong to a body. Therefore, neither is an intellective power a power that belongs to a body. But a power or potentiality (*virtus sive potentia*) cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which that power or potentiality is derived. Therefore, the intellect’s substance is not the form of the body.

Objection 5: That which has *esse per se* is not united to a body as its form. For a form is that *by which* something exists, and so the *esse* of a form does not belong to the form itself in its own right (*secundum se*). But as was explained above (q. 75, a. 2), the intellective principle does have *esse* in its own right and is subsistent. Therefore, it is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 6: That which exists in a thing in its own right (*secundum se*) exists in it always. But a form is such that it is united to matter in its own right. For it is through its essence, and not through any accident, that it is the actuality of the matter; otherwise, what comes to be from the matter and the form would be unified accidentally and not substantively. Therefore, a form cannot exist without its proper

matter. But as was shown above (q. 75, a. 6), since the intellective principle is incorruptible, it persists without being united to a body, after its body has been corrupted. Therefore, the intellective principle is not united to the body as its form.

But contrary to this: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 8, the difference is taken from a thing's form. But the constitutive difference of *man* is *rational*, which is said of man because of his intellective principle. Therefore, the intellective principle is the form of a man.

I respond: One must claim that the intellect, which is the principle of an intellectual operation, is the form of the human body.

For that by which something operates first and foremost (*primo operatur*) is the form of that to which the operation is attributed. For instance, that by which the body is first and foremost made healthy is health, and that by which the soul first and foremost knows is knowledge (*scientia*); hence, health is a form belonging to the body, and knowledge is a form belonging to the soul. The reason for this is that nothing acts except insofar as it is actually such-and-such, and so that by which it is actually such-and-such is that by which it acts. But it is obvious that the soul is that by which the body is first and foremost alive. And since life is made manifest by different operations within the different grades of living things, the soul is that by which we perform each of these vital works. For instance, the soul is that by which we first and foremost assimilate nourishment (*nutrimur*), have sensory cognition (*sentimus*), and move from place to place (*movemur secundum locum*); and, similarly, the soul is that by which we first and foremost have intellective understanding (*intelligimus*). Therefore, this principle by which we first and foremost have intellective understanding—regardless of whether it is called the intellect or the intellective soul—is the form of the body. This is Aristotle's demonstration in *De Anima* 2.

Now if someone wants to claim that the intellective soul is not the form of the body, then he has to find a sense in which the action in question, viz., intellective understanding, is an action that belongs to *this* man. For each of us experiences that it is he himself who understands. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 5, there are three ways in which an action is attributed to someone. For he is said to effect something, or to act, either (a) *by himself as a whole* (*secundum se totum*), as in 'The physician heals'; or (b) *by a part of himself*, as in 'The man sees with his eyes'; or (c) *incidentally* (*per accidens*), as in 'The one who is white is building', since it is incidental to a builder that he is white. Thus, when we say that Socrates (or Plato) understands, it is obvious that this is not being attributed to him incidentally, since it is attributed to him insofar as he is a man, and 'man' is predicated essentially of him. Therefore, either (a) one must claim that Socrates has intellective understanding by himself as a whole, as Plato posited when he claimed that a man is an intellective soul, or (b) one must claim that the intellect is a part of Socrates. However, as was shown above (q. 75, a. 4), the first answer cannot hold up. For it is the very same man who perceives that he both understands and senses, and yet sensation does not exist without the body. Hence, the body must be a part of the man. Therefore, it follows that the intellect by which Socrates has intellective understanding is a part of Socrates in such a way that the intellect is somehow united to Socrates' body.

In *De Anima* 3 the Commentator claims that this union is effected by the intelligible species, which has two subjects, viz., (a) the potential intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) and (b) the phantasms that exist in the bodily organs. And so it is through the intelligible species that the potential intellect is connected with the body of *this* man or *that* man.

However, this sort of connection or union is not sufficient for the intellect's action to be *Socrates'* action. This is clear from a comparison with sensation, on the basis of which Aristotle proceeds to a consideration of what is involved in intellective understanding. For as *De Anima* 3 explains, phantasms are related to the intellect as colors are related to the visual power (*ad visum*). Therefore, species of the phantasms exist in the potential intellect in the same way that species of the colors exist in the visual

power. But it is clear that the action of the visual power is not attributed to a wall in virtue of the fact that the colors whose likenesses are in the visual power exist in that wall. For we do not say that the wall *sees*; rather, we say that the wall *is seen*. Therefore, from the fact that species of the phantasms exist in the potential intellect it does not follow that *Socrates*, in whom the phantasms exist, *understands*; rather, what follows is that he or, better, his phantasms *are understood*.

Again, some have wanted to claim that an intellect is united to a body as its mover, and that a single entity is made up of an intellect and a body in such a way that the intellect's action can be attributed to the whole.

However, there are a number of things wrong (*multipliciter vanum*) with this claim:

First, an intellect moves a body only through an appetite, whose movement presupposes the intellect's operation. Therefore, it is not because Socrates is moved by an intellect that he understands; to the contrary, it is because he understands that Socrates is moved by an intellect.

Second, Socrates is an individual in a nature whose essence is unified (*una*) and composed of matter and form. If an intellect were not his form, it would follow that it lies outside his essence, and in that case an intellect would be related to the whole Socrates as a mover is related to the thing moved. But intellectual understanding is an action that comes to rest within the agent and that, unlike the action of heating, does not pass into another. Therefore, it cannot be the case that understanding is attributed to Socrates by virtue of his being moved by an intellect.

Third, a mover's action is never attributed to the thing moved except as an instrument, in the way that the carpenter's action is attributed to the saw. Therefore, if it is because of his mover's action that understanding is attributed to Socrates, then it follows that understanding is attributed to him as an instrument. But this contradicts the Philosopher, who claims that intellectual understanding does not occur by means of a corporeal instrument.

Fourth, even though the action of a part may be attributed to the whole—in the way that the eye's action is attributed to the man—still, the action of one part is never attributed to another part, except perhaps incidentally. For we do not say that the hand sees in virtue of the fact that the eye sees. Therefore, if Socrates and his intellect are made one in the way in question, then the intellect's action cannot be attributed to Socrates.

On the other hand, if (a) Socrates is a whole composed by the union of the intellect to the other things belonging to Socrates and if (b) the intellect is nonetheless united to the other things belonging to Socrates only as a mover, then it follows that Socrates is not a single thing absolutely speaking (*non sit unum simpliciter*) and hence is not an entity absolutely speaking. For an entity is a being in the same sense in which it has oneness (*sic enim aliquid est ens quomodo et unum*).

Therefore, the only way left is the one proposed by Aristotle, viz., that *this* man understands because an intellectual principle is his form. Thus, it is clear from the intellect's very operation that an intellectual principle is united to the body as its form.

The same point can also be made clear from the nature of the human species, since the nature of an entity is shown by its operation. But the proper operation of a man *qua* man is to have intellectual understanding, since it is through this operation that he transcends all the animals. Hence, in the *Ethics* Aristotle locates ultimate happiness in this operation, as in something proper to man. Therefore, a man must be assigned his species in accord with the principle of this operation, since each thing is assigned a species by reference to its proper form. Therefore, it follows that an intellectual principle is the proper form of a man.

But note that the more noble a form is, the more it dominates corporeal matter, and the less immersed it is in it, and the more it exceeds it in its operation or power. Hence, we see that the form of a mixed body has certain operations that are not caused by the qualities of the elements. And the further one proceeds in nobility among forms, the more the power of the form exceeds elemental matter; for

instance, the vegetative soul exceeds it more than does the form of a metal, and the sentient soul exceeds it more than does the vegetative soul. But the human soul ranks first in nobility among forms. Hence, by its power it exceeds corporeal matter to such a degree that it has a certain operation and power that corporeal matter does not share in at all. And this power is called the intellect.

Now notice that if someone were to claim that the soul is composed of matter and form, he could in no way agree that the soul is the form of the body. For given that form is actuality, whereas matter is being only in potentiality, there is no way in which what is composed of matter and form can in its own right as a whole be the form of something else. Still, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 5), if some part of it is a form, then we will call that which is form ‘the soul’ and that whose form it is ‘the first animated thing’.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2, the highest (*ultima*) among natural forms, and the one that completes the natural philosopher’s investigation, viz., the human soul, is (a) separated, to be sure, and yet (b) in matter. The latter he proves from the fact that “man, along with the sun, generates a man out of matter.” On the other hand, it is separated with respect to its intellectual power, since the intellectual power is not a power that belongs to any corporeal organ in the way that the visual power is an act that belongs to the eye. For intellectual understanding is an act that cannot be exercised by means of a corporeal organ, in the way that the act of seeing is exercised. Still, the soul exists in matter to the extent that the soul itself, to which the power of understanding belongs, is the form of the body and the terminus of human generation.

So, then, the reason why the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3 that the intellect is “separated” is that it is not a power that belongs to any corporeal organ.

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the second and third objections. For the fact that the intellectual power is not an act belonging to the body is sufficient both (a) for a man’s being able to understand all things through his intellect and (b) for the intellect’s understanding immaterial things and universals.

Reply to objection 4: Because of its perfection, the human soul is not a form that is immersed in corporeal matter or entirely encompassed (*totaliter comprehensa*) by it. And so nothing prevents it from being the case that a certain power of the soul is not an act belonging to the body, even though the soul is by its essence the form of the body.

Reply to objection 5: The soul communicates the *esse* in which it itself subsists to the corporeal matter that, along with the intellectual soul, makes up a single entity, with the result that the *esse* that belongs to the whole composite is also the *esse* of the soul itself. This is not the case with other forms that are not subsistent. And it is for this reason that the human soul, but not other forms, remains in its own *esse* after its body has been destroyed.

Reply to objection 6: It is fitting for the soul in its own right to be united to the body, in the same way that it is fitting for a lightweight body to be high up. And just as a lightweight body remains lightweight when separated from its proper place and retains its aptitude for, and inclination toward, its proper place, so too the human soul remains in its *esse* when it has been separated from its body—even while retaining its natural aptitude for, and inclination toward, union with the body.

Article 2

Is the intellectual principle multiplied as the bodies are multiplied?

It seems that the intellectual principle is not multiplied as the bodies are multiplied, but that instead

there is just a single intellect for all men (*sit unus intellectus in omnibus hominibus*):

Objection 1: No immaterial substance is numerically multiplied within a single species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; for as was shown above (q. 75, a. 5), it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, it is not the case that there are many human souls belonging to a single species. But all men belong to a single species. Therefore, there is a single intellect for all men (*unus intellectus omnium hominum*).

Objection 2: When a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied as the bodies are multiplied, it would seem to follow that when the bodies are removed, what remains is not a multitude of souls, but just a single one of all the souls. But this is heretical, since the difference between rewards and punishments would disappear.

Objection 3: If my intellect is distinct from your intellect, then my intellect is a certain individual, and likewise your intellect; for they are particulars that differ numerically and agree in a single species. But whatever is received in a thing exists in that thing according to the mode of the receiver. Therefore, the species of things are received individually in my intellect and in your intellect. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect, because the intellect has cognition of universals.

Objection 4: What is understood (*intellectum*) exists in an intellect when that intellect has an act of understanding (*in intellectu intelligente*). Therefore, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, then what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you (*aliud sit intellectum a me et aliud intellectum a te*). And so what is understood will be counted as an individual (*individualiter numeratum*), and it is only in potentiality that it will be understood intellectually; and so it will be necessary to abstract a common intention from the two things understood, since from any two different things it is possible to abstract a common intelligible thing. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect, since if it were so, then the intellect would not seem to be distinct from the power of imagining (*a virtute imaginativa*). Therefore, it seems to follow that there is a single intellect for all men.

Objection 5: When a student receives knowledge from a teacher, one cannot say that the teacher's knowledge generates knowledge in the student, since otherwise knowledge would be an active form in the way that heat is—which is clearly false. Therefore, it seems that numerically the same knowledge that is in the teacher is communicated to the student. But this is impossible unless there is a single intellect for the two of them. Therefore, it seems that there is a single intellect for the student and the teacher—and, consequently, for all men.

Objection 6: In his book *De Quantitate Animae* Augustine says, "If I were to claim that there are as many human souls as that, I would laugh at myself." But it is especially with respect to the intellect that the soul seems to be one. Therefore, there is a single intellect for all men.

But contrary to this: In *Physics* 2 the Philosopher says that particular causes are related to particulars in the same way that universal causes are related to universals. But it is impossible for a soul that is one in species to belong to animals that are diverse in species. Therefore, it is impossible for an intellectual soul that is one in number to belong to things that are numerically diverse.

I respond: It is altogether impossible for there to be a single intellect for all men.

This is utterly obvious if, in keeping with Plato's opinion, a man is the intellect itself. For it would follow that if there is just one intellect for Socrates and Plato, then Socrates and Plato are a single man and are distinct from one another only in what lies outside the essence of both. And in that case the distinction between Socrates and Plato will be no different from the distinction between a man wearing a tunic and the same man wearing a cape (*distinctio non alia quam hominis tunicati et cappati*)—which is completely absurd.

It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, in keeping with Aristotle's opinion, the intellect is thought of as a part, i.e., a power, of that soul which serves as the form of a man. For it is impossible that

many numerically diverse things should have a single form, just as it is impossible that numerically diverse things should have a single *esse*. For the form is the source of *esse* (*principium essendi*).

Similarly, it is clear that the claim in question is impossible regardless of how one thinks of the intellect's union with *this* man and *that* man:

(a) For instance, it is obvious that if they are a single principal agent and two instruments, then one can say that there is a single agent absolutely speaking but more than one action—just as, if a single man touches different things with his two hands, there will be one toucher and two touches.

(b) Conversely, if they are a single instrument and two different principal agents, then there would be more than one agent but a single action—in the same way that if many men are dragging a boat with a single rope, there will be many draggers but only a single dragging.

(c) On the other hand, if they are a single principal agent and a single instrument, then there will be one agent and one action—just as, when a blacksmith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one striking.

But it is clear that however the intellect might be united to or connected with *this* man or *that* man, the intellect has preeminence over the other things that belong to a man. For instance, the sentient powers obey the intellect and serve it. Therefore, if one supposed that two men had more than one intellect but a single sensory power—for instance, if the two men had a single eye—then there would be more than one man seeing but just a single act of seeing (*visio*). But if there is a single intellect, then no matter how different the other powers used by the intellect as instruments are, Socrates and Plato could not in any way be called anything but a single knower (*intelligens*). And if we add that the very act of intellectual understanding (*ipsum intelligere*), which is the intellect's action, is not effected by any organ other than the intellect itself, it will follow further that there is both a single agent and a single action; that is, it will follow that all men are a single knower and that there is a single act of understanding (I mean with respect to the same intelligible object).

To be sure, my intellectual action and yours could be diversified by a diversity of phantasms—that is, by the fact that the phantasm of a rock in me is different from the one in you—if the phantasm itself, differing in the two of us, were the form of the potential intellect. For a single agent produces different actions corresponding to different forms; for instance, there are different acts of seeing (*visiones*) corresponding to the different forms of things in the same eye.

However, the phantasm is not itself the form of the potential intellect; rather, the form of the potential intellect is the intelligible species that is abstracted from the phantasms. But in a single intellect there is just one intelligible species that is abstracted from different phantasms of the same species. For instance, it is clear that in one man there can be different phantasms of a rock, and yet what is abstracted from all of them is a single intelligible species of a rock, through which that one man's intellect understands the nature *rock* by means of a single operation, despite the diversity of the phantasms. Therefore, if there were a single intellect for all men, then the diversity of the phantasms existing in *this* man and *that* man could not, as the Commentator imagines in *De Anima* 3, cause a diversity of intellectual operations in *this* man and *that* man.

Therefore, what follows is that it is altogether impossible and absurd to posit a single intellect for all men.

Reply to objection 1: Even though the intellectual soul, just like an angel, has no matter *out of which* it is made (*non habeat materiam ex qua sit*), it is nonetheless the form of a certain matter—something that is not true of an angel. And so corresponding to the division of matter (*secundum divisionem materiae*) there are many souls of a single species, whereas it is altogether impossible for there to be many angels of a single species.

Reply to objection 2: Each thing has oneness in the same way that it has *esse* and, as a result, the same judgment should be made about the multiplication of a thing as about its *esse*. But it is obvious that

by its own *esse* an intellectual soul is united to a body as its form and, yet, when the body is destroyed, the intellectual soul remains with its *esse*. For the same reason, a multitude of souls corresponds to the multitude of bodies, and, yet, when the bodies are destroyed, the souls remain multiplied in their *esse*.

Reply to objection 3: The *individuality* (*individuatio*) of that which has intellective understanding, or of the species through which it understands, does not rule out its understanding universals; otherwise, given that intellects are certain subsistent substances and thus particulars, they would not be able to understand universals. Rather, it is the *materiality* of a cognitive [power] and of the species through which it has cognition that impedes the cognition of a universal. For just as every action follows the mode of the form by which its agent acts—in the way that the action of giving warmth follows the mode of heat—so too a cognition follows the mode of the species by which the knower has the cognition. But it is obvious that a common nature is made distinct and is multiplied in accord with the individuating principles, which come from the side of the matter. Therefore, if the form by which a cognition comes to be is a material form that is not abstracted from the conditions of matter, then it will be a likeness of the nature of a species or genus insofar as that nature is made distinct and multiplied by individuating principles, and so the nature will not be able to be known in its commonality. By contrast, if the species is abstracted from the conditions of the material individual, then it will be a likeness of the nature in the absence of the principles that divide and multiply it; and it is in this way that there is cognition of a universal.

Also, as far as this present point is concerned, it makes no difference whether there is a single intellect or more than one. For even if there were just one intellect, it would have to be a certain individual (*aliquem quendam*), and the species through which it has intellective understanding would have to be a certain individual (*aliquam quendam*).

Reply to objection 4: What is understood intellectually is a single thing, regardless of whether there is a single intellect or many. For what is understood exists in the intellect not in its own right (*non secundum se*) but as a likeness. For as *De Anima* 3 says, “It is not the rock, but a likeness of the rock, that exists in the soul.” And yet, except when the intellect is reflecting upon itself, what is understood is the rock, and not a likeness of a rock; otherwise, scientific knowledge would be about intelligible species and not about the things.

Now it is possible for diverse things to be assimilated to one and the same thing by means of diverse forms. And since cognition comes to be by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known (*secundum assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam*), it follows that it is possible for the same thing to be known by different knowers. This is clear in the case of the senses; for many knowers see the same color by means of different likenesses. Similarly, many intellects have intellective understanding of a single thing that is understood (*plures intellectus intelligunt unam rem intellectam*).

According to Aristotle’s position, the only difference between the senses and the intellect is that a thing is sensed in accord with the disposition it has outside the soul, in its particularity, whereas the nature of a thing, which is what there is intellective understanding of, exists, to be sure, outside the soul, but outside the soul it does not have the very mode of existence according to which it is understood. For a common nature is understood intellectually with its individuating principles set aside, but it does not have this mode of existing outside the soul. However, according to Plato’s position, the thing that is understood intellectually exists outside the soul in the same mode as that in which it is understood; for he claimed that the natures of things are separated from matter.

Reply to objection 5: The student’s knowledge is different from the teacher’s. In what follows (q. 117, a. 1) we will show how it is caused.

Reply to objection 6: Augustine’s meaning is that there are not so many souls that they cannot be united in a single concept of the species.

Article 3

Are there, in addition to the intellective soul, other souls in a man that differ from it in their essence, viz., a sentient soul and a nutritive soul?

It seems that there are, in addition to the intellective soul, other souls in a man that differ from it in their essence, viz., a sentient soul and a nutritive soul:

Objection 1: The corruptible and the incorruptible cannot belong to the same substance. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 6), the intellective soul is incorruptible, whereas the other souls, viz., the sentient soul and the nutritive soul, are corruptible. Therefore, it cannot be the case that in a man the intellective soul, the sentient soul, and the nutritive soul have a single essence.

Objection 2: If someone replies that in a man the sentient soul is incorruptible, then against this:

As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “The corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus.” But the sentient soul is corruptible in a horse and in a lion and in other brute animals. Therefore, if the sentient soul were incorruptible in a man, it would not be of the same genus in a man and in a brute animal. But something is called ‘an animal’ from the fact that it has a sentient soul. Therefore, *animal* will not be a single genus common to both man and the other animals—which is absurd.

Objection 3: In *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher claims that the embryo is an animal before being a man. But this cannot be the case if the same essence belongs to both the sentient soul and the intellective soul, since something is an animal through the sentient soul and a man through the intellective soul. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the sentient and intellective souls have a single essence.

Objection 4: In *Metaphysics* 8 the Philosopher says that the genus is taken from the matter and the difference from the form. But *rational*, which is the constitutive difference of man, is taken from the intellective soul, whereas something is called an *animal* because it has a body animated by a sentient soul. Therefore, the intellective soul is related to a body animated by a sentient soul as form to matter. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the intellective soul is the same in essence as the sentient soul. Rather, the intellective soul presupposes the sentient soul as a material suppositum.

But contrary to this: *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “Unlike Jacob and the other Syrians, we do not say that there are two souls in a man—the one an animal soul, by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and the other a spiritual soul, which gives rise to reason. To the contrary, we say that in a man there is one and same soul which both vivifies the body by its association with it and conducts itself by its reason.”

I respond: Plato held that there are diverse souls in the one body and even, corresponding to the organs, distinct souls to which he attributed the various vital operations—claiming that the nutritive power resides in the liver, the concupiscible power in the heart, and the cognitive power in the brain.

In *De Anima* Aristotle argues against this opinion as regards the parts of the soul that use corporeal organs in their operations; he does so by appealing to the fact that in animals that live after having been divided, the different operations of the soul, such as sensation and appetite, are found in each part. But this would not be so if different principles of the soul’s operations—i.e., souls diverse in their essence—were distributed among the different parts of the body. However, as regards the intellective soul, he seems to leave it in question whether it is separate from the other parts of the soul “only conceptually or also spatially” (*solum ratione, an etiam loco*).

Now Plato’s position could be sustained if one claimed that the soul is united to the body not as a form but as a mover, as Plato did in fact claim. For nothing absurd follows if the same moveable thing is moved by different movers, especially with respect to different parts.

However, if we claim that the soul is united to the body as a form, it seems altogether impossible for many souls, differing in their essence, to exist in a single body. This can be made clear in three ways:

First, an animal would not have oneness absolutely speaking (*non esset simpliciter unum*) if it had more than one soul. For nothing has oneness absolutely speaking except because of a single form through which the thing has *esse*, since the fact that an entity is a being and the fact that it is unified derive from the same source. And so things that are denominated from different forms, e.g., *white man*, do not have oneness absolutely speaking. Therefore, if the fact that a man is living were derived from one form, viz., the vegetative soul, and the fact that he is an animal were derived from a second form, viz., the sentient soul, and the fact that he is a man were derived from a third form, viz., the rational soul, then it would follow that a man does not have oneness absolutely speaking—in just the way Aristotle argued against Plato in *Metaphysics* 8 that if the idea *animal* were different from the idea *bipedal*, then a bipedal animal would not have oneness absolutely speaking. It is for this reason that in *De Anima* 1 he asks, in opposition to those who posit diverse souls in the body, what it is that contains those souls, i.e., what it is that is constituted as one thing from them. One cannot reply that they are made one by the body's oneness, since it is the soul that contains the body and makes it to have oneness, rather than vice versa.

Second, the position in question is seen to be impossible by appeal to the modes of predication. For things derived from different forms are such that either (a) they are predicated of one another *per accidens*, if the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white is sweet, or (b), if the forms are ordered to one another, then there will be *per se* predication in the second mode of *per se* predication, since the subject occurs in the definition of the predicate. For instance, a surface is a prerequisite for color, and so if we say that a body with a surface is colored, this will be the second mode of *per se* predication. Therefore, if the form from which something is called 'an animal' were different from the form from which it is called 'a man', then either (a) one of them would be able to be predicated of the other only *per accidens*, if they have no ordering with respect to one another, or (b) there would be a predication in the second mode of *per se* predication, if one of the souls were a prerequisite for the other. But both of these alternatives are manifestly false. For *animal* is predicated *per se* of *man* and not *per accidens*; nor does *man* occur in the definition of *animal*—just the opposite. Therefore, the form through which something is an animal must be the same form through which something is a man; otherwise, a man would not truly be something that is an animal, so that *animal* might be predicated *per se* of *man*.

Third, the position in question is seen to be impossible from the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense, it impedes the other operations. But this would not be possible if the principle of the actions were not one in essence.

Therefore, one should claim that in a man the sentient, intellectual, and nutritive souls are numerically the same (*eadem numero*).

Now just how this is possible can easily be seen if one attends to the differences among species and forms. For the species and forms of things are found to differ with respect to the more perfect and the less perfect. For instance, within the order of things, the living are more perfect than the non-living, and animals are more perfect than plants, and men are more perfect than brute animals; and within each of these genera there are diverse levels. This is why in *Metaphysics* 8 Aristotle compares the species of things to numbers, which themselves differ in species insofar as the number *one* (*unitas*) is added or subtracted. And in *De Anima* 2 he compares the different types of soul to shapes that are such that one of them contains the other, in the way that a pentagon contains a tetragon and goes beyond it. So, then, the intellectual soul has within its power whatever the sentient soul of brutes animals has and whatever the nutritive soul of plants has. Therefore, just as a surface with a pentagonal shape is not tetragonal through one shape and pentagonal through another shape—since the tetragonal shape would be superfluous, given

that it is contained within the pentagon—so neither is Socrates a man through one soul and an animal through another soul; instead, it is through one and the same soul that he is a man and an animal.

Reply to objection 1: The sentient soul does not have incorruptibility by virtue of its being sentient; rather, incorruptibility is owed to it by virtue of its being intellective. Therefore, when a soul is merely sentient, it is corruptible, whereas when it is intellective in addition to being sentient, then it is incorruptible. For even though sentience does not bestow incorruptibility (*incorruptio*), it nonetheless cannot rob what is intellective of its incorruptibility.

Reply to objection 2: It is the composites, and not the forms, that are collected together into a genus or species. Now man is corruptible, just as the other animals are. Hence, the difference with respect to corruptibility and incorruptibility, which has to do with the forms, does not make man differ in genus from the other animals.

Reply to objection 3: The embryo first has a soul that is merely sentient, but when this is cast off, there comes a more perfect soul that is both sentient and intellective (*qua abiecta advenit perfectior anima quae est simul sensitiva et intellectiva*). This will be shown in more detail below (q. 118, a. 2).

Reply to objection 4: It is not necessary for there to be among natural things a diversity that corresponds to the diverse concepts (*rationes*) or logical intentions (*intentiones logicae*) that follow upon our mode of understanding. For reason can apprehend one and the same entity in diverse ways. Therefore, since, as has been explained, the intellective soul contains within its power what the sentient soul has and more besides, reason is able to consider what pertains to the power of the sentient soul separately as something imperfect and material (*quasi imperfectum et materiale*), so to speak. And since it finds this to be common to men and other animals, it forms the concept of the genus from it. On the other hand, it takes that in which the intellective soul exceeds the sentient soul as formal and perfective (*quasi formale et completivum*), and from this it formulates the specific difference of man.

Article 4

Is there in man any other form besides the intellective soul?

It seems that there is in man some other form besides the intellective soul:

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says, “The soul is the actuality of a physical body that has life in potentiality.” Therefore, the soul is related to the body as form to matter. But a body has a substantial form through which it is a body. Therefore, in the body there is a substantial form prior to the soul.

Objection 2: Man, along with every animal, is a self-mover. But as *Physics* 8 shows, everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which effects the movement and the other of which is moved. Now the part that effects the movement is the soul. Therefore, the other part must be such that it is capable of being moved. But as *Physics* 5 says, primary matter cannot be moved, since it is an entity only in potentiality, whereas everything that is moved is a body. Therefore, in man—and in every animal—there must be a second substantial form through which the body is constituted.

Objection 3: There is an ordering among forms according to their relation to primary matter, since ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ are predicated relative to some principle. Therefore, if in man there were no substantial form besides the rational soul, and if instead the rational soul directly inhered in primary matter, then it would follow that the rational soul belongs to the order of the most imperfect forms, viz., those that directly inhere in matter.

Objection 4: The human body is a mixed body. But a mixture cannot be made just of matter (*non*

fit secundum materiam tantum), since in that case it would be a mere corruption. Therefore, the forms of the elements, which are substantial forms, must remain in a mixed body. Therefore, in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellective soul.

But contrary to this: A single entity has just a single substantial *esse*. But it is the substantial form that gives substantial *esse*. Therefore, a single entity has just one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be in a man any substantial form other than the intellective soul.

I respond: If one claimed, as did the Platonists, that the intellective soul is united to the body only as its mover and not as its form, then he would have to assert that in a man there is another substantial form through which the body moved by the soul is constituted in its own *esse*. However, if, as we have already claimed above (a. 1), the intellective soul is united to the body as its substantial form, then it is impossible for any other substantial form besides it to be found in a man.

To see this clearly, note that a substantial form differs from an accidental form in that an accidental form gives such-*esse* (*esse tale*) and not *esse* absolutely speaking (*esse simpliciter*); for instance, heat makes its subject *to be hot* and not *to be* absolutely speaking. And so when an accidental form appears, one does not say that a thing is made or generated absolutely speaking (*fieri vel generari simpliciter*); rather, one says that the thing comes to be such-and-such (*fieri tale*) or that it comes to be disposed in a certain way (*fieri aliquo modo habens se*). Similarly, when an accidental form disappears, one does not say that something is corrupted absolutely speaking (*corrumpi simpliciter*); rather, one says that it is corrupted in a certain respect (*corrumpi secundum quid*). By contrast, a substantial form gives *esse* absolutely speaking, and so at its appearance something is said to be generated absolutely speaking, and at its disappearance something is said to be corrupted absolutely speaking. This is why the ancient natural philosophers, who thought that primary matter is some actual being (e.g., fire or air or something of this sort), claimed that nothing is either generated or corrupted absolutely speaking; instead, as *Physics* 1 reports, they maintained that every instance of coming-to-be is an instance of being-altered. Therefore, if it were true that besides the intellective soul there are other preexistent substantial forms in the matter through which the soul's subject is an actual being, then it would follow that the soul does not give *esse* absolutely speaking, and that consequently it is not a substantial form, and that at the soul's appearance there is no generation absolutely speaking, and that at its disappearance there is no corruption absolutely speaking; instead, there would be generation or corruption only in a certain respect. But all of these claims are manifestly false.

Hence, one should reply that (a) there is no substantial form in a man other than the intellective soul alone, and that (b) just as the intellective soul virtually contains the sentient soul and the nutritive soul, so too it virtually contains all the lower forms, and that (c) it brings about by itself alone whatever the more imperfect forms bring about in other things. And the same should be said of the sentient soul in brute animals and of the nutritive soul in plants and, in general, of all the more perfect forms in relation to the less perfect forms.

Reply to objection 1: Aristotle did not say merely that the soul is “the actuality of a body.” Rather, he said that the soul is “the actuality of an organic physical body that has life in potentiality,” and that this potentiality “does not exclude the soul.” Hence, the soul is also clearly included in what the soul is called the actuality of, in the same manner of speaking in which one says that heat is the actuality of what is hot, and that light is the actuality of what is bright—not that it is bright taken separately without the light, but that it is bright because of the light. Likewise, the soul is said to be the actuality of a body, etc., because it is through the soul that it is a body, and that it is organic, and that it “has life in potentiality.” And first actuality is said to be in potentiality with respect to second actuality, i.e., operation; for this potentiality does not rule out, i.e., exclude, the soul.

Reply to objection 2: It is not through its own *esse*, or insofar as it is united to the body as its

form, that the soul moves the body; instead, it moves the body through its moving power, the actualization of which presupposes that the body has already been brought into actuality through the soul. So through its moving power the soul is the part that effects movement, and the animated body is the part that is moved.

Reply to objection 3: In matter there are different grades of perfection, e.g., *to exist (esse)*, *to live (vivere)*, *to sense (sentire)*, and *to understand intellectually (intelligere)*. Now the next in line (*secundum*), which supervenes on what is prior to it (*superveniens priori*), is always more perfect than what is prior to it. Therefore, a form that gives only the first grade of perfection to matter is the least perfect, while a form that gives the first and second and third grades, and so on, is the most perfect, even though it inheres directly in the matter (*tamen materiae immediata*).

Reply to objection 4: Avicenna claimed that (a) the substantial forms of the elements maintain their integrity in a mixed thing, but that (b) a mixture comes into existence insofar as the contrary qualities of the elements are moderated to a mean (*reducuntur ad medium*).

But this is impossible. For the diverse forms of the elements can exist only in diverse parts of matter, and the diversity of those parts must presuppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. But matter subject to dimensions is found only in bodies, and diverse bodies cannot exist in the same place. Hence, it follows that the elements in a mixed thing are distinct from one another in place. Hence, there will not be a *genuine mixture (vera mixtio)*, i.e., a mixture with respect to the whole, but instead there will be a *mixture with respect to the senses (mixtio ad sensum)*, which consists of very small entities positioned close to one another.

Averroes, on the other hand, claimed in *De Caelo* 3 that, because of their imperfection, the forms of the elements lie midway between accidental forms and substantial forms, and so they admit of more and less. And so in a mixture they are remitted and moderated to a mean, and a single form is fused together from them.

But this is even more impossible. For the substantial *esse* of any given thing consists in something indivisible, and, as *Metaphysics* 7 puts it, every addition or subtraction changes the species, just as with numbers. Hence, it is impossible that any substantial form should admit of more and less. Nor is it any less impossible for something to lie midway between a substance and an accident.

And so, in keeping with what the Philosopher says in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1, one should reply that the forms of the elements remain in a mixed thing *virtually* but *not in actuality*. For what remains are the qualities which, though less intense (*remissae*), are proper to the elements, and it is in these qualities that the power of the elemental forms resides. And the quality of this sort of mixture is a proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body, e.g., the form of a rock or of any type of soul.

Article 5

Is it fitting for an intellectual soul to be united to the sort of body in question?

It seems that it is not fitting for an intellectual soul to be united to the sort of body in question:

Objection 1: The matter has to be proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is an incorruptible form. Therefore, it is not fitting for it to be united to a corruptible body.

Objection 2: The intellectual soul is a maximally immaterial form; an indication of this is that it has an operation in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more subtle a body is, the less it has of matter. Therefore, the soul should have been united to the most subtle sort of body, viz., fire, and not to a body that is mixed and rather earthy (*non corpori mixto et terrestri magis*).

Objection 3: Since the form is the principle of the species, it is not the case that diverse species spring from a single form. But the intellective soul is a single form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body that is composed of parts of dissimilar species.

Objection 4: There ought to be a more perfect subject (*perfectius susceptibile*) for a more perfect form. But the intellective soul is the most perfect of forms. Therefore, since the bodies of the other animals are naturally provided with covering, e.g., fur instead of clothes and hooves instead of shoes, and since they are also naturally endowed with weapons such as claws, teeth, and horns, it seems that the intellective soul should not have been united to an imperfect body, i.e., one deprived of these sorts of assistance.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says that the soul is “the actuality of an organic physical body that has life potentially.”

I respond: Since the form does not exist for the sake of the matter, but instead the matter exists for the sake of the form, the reason why the matter is the way that it is has to be taken from the form (*ex forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia sit talis*), and not vice versa.

Now as was established above (q. 55, a. 2), within the order of nature the intellective soul occupies the lowest grade among intellectual substances. For unlike the angels, the intellective soul is not endowed by nature with knowledge of the truth, but instead, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, it must gather its knowledge from divisible things by way of the senses.

Now nature is not lacking in necessities, and so the intellective soul had to possess not only the power of intellective understanding, but also the power of sensing. But the action of the senses does not exist in the absence of a corporeal instrument. Therefore, the intellective soul had to be united to a body of a sort that could serve as an appropriate instrument of the sensory power (*conveniens organum sensus*). But all the other senses are grounded in the sense of touch, and the organ of touch must be a medium between those contraries that the sense of touch apprehends, viz., hot and cold, moist and dry, etc. And in this way it is in potentiality with respect to the contraries and able to sense them. Hence, the more the organ of touch is drawn toward a balanced composition (*reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis*), the more sensitive the sense of touch will be. But the intellective soul has the sentient power most fully, because, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, what belongs to the lower exists more perfectly in the higher. Hence, the body to which the intellective soul is united had to be a mixed body that, among all others, was more drawn toward a balanced composition. And because of this, among all the animals man has the best sense of touch. And among men themselves, those who have a better sense of touch have better intellective understanding. An indication of this is that as, *De Anima* 2 points out, “We see that those who are refined in body are very capable mentally.”

Reply to objection 1: Someone might want to evade this objection by claiming that man’s body was incorruptible before sin.

But this reply does not seem adequate. For prior to sin, man’s body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of God’s grace. Otherwise, his immortality would not have been taken away because of sin, just as a demon’s immortality was not taken away because of sin.

And so one must reply in an alternative way, viz., that there are two conditions in which matter is found: (a) one is chosen in order that it might be appropriate for the form, and (b) the other follows from a necessity of a prior disposition. For instance, a craftsman chooses iron as the matter for the form of a saw because of iron’s aptness for cutting through hard material, whereas the fact that the teeth of the saw can become blunt and rusted follows from a necessity of the matter. So, then, the intellective soul needs a body that has a balanced composition, but it thereby follows, from a necessity of the matter, that the body is corruptible.

Now if someone objects that God could have circumvented this necessity, the appropriate reply

is that, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 2, when it comes to the constitution of natural things, one takes into account not what God can do, but instead what is fitting for the nature of things. Still, God provided in this case by applying the remedy against death through the gift of grace.

Reply to objection 2: It is not because of the intellectual operation itself, taken in its own right, that the intellective soul needs the body; rather, it needs the body because of the sentient power, which requires an instrument with balanced composition (*organum aequaliter complexionatum*). And this is the reason why the intellective soul had to be united to this sort of body and not to a simple element or to a mixed body in which fire dominated quantitatively. For because of fire's excessively active power, such a body could not have had a balanced composition. On the other hand, this body, with its balanced composition, has a certain dignity because of its remoteness from the contraries, and in this feature it is in some sense similar to a celestial body.

Reply to objection 3: It is not the parts of an animal, such as the eye, the hand, the flesh and bone, etc., that belong to a species, but rather the whole animal. And so it cannot be said, properly speaking, that these parts are diverse in *species*; rather, they are diverse in *disposition*. And this fact is traced to the intellective soul, which, even though it is one in essence, is nonetheless, because of its perfection, complex in its power (*multiplex in virtute*). And so for the diverse operations it needs diverse dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. Because of this, we see that there is more diversity in the parts of perfect animals than in the parts of imperfect animals, and more diversity in animals than in plants.

Reply to objection 4: Since the intellective soul comprehends universals, it has power with respect to infinitely many things. And so it was impossible for nature to have given it determinate natural judgments (*determinatae existimationes naturales*) or even determinate aids or defenses or coverings like those of the other animals, whose souls have apprehension and power with respect to a limited range of particulars (*ad aliqua particularia determinata*). In place of all of these, man by nature has reason and hands, which are "the instruments of instruments" (*organa organum*), since by use of them man is able to make instruments of infinitely many kinds and for the sake of infinitely many effects.

Article 6

Is the intellective soul united to the body through the mediation of certain accidental dispositions?

It seems that the intellective soul is united to the body through the mediation of certain accidental dispositions:

Objection 1: Every form is in a matter that is proper to it and disposed for it. But the dispositions for a form are certain accidents. Therefore, certain accidents must be presupposed in the matter prior to the substantial form—and so prior to the soul, since the soul is a substantial form.

Objection 2: Diverse forms of a single species require diverse parts of matter. But diverse parts of matter can be thought of only as corresponding to the division of dimensional quantities. Therefore, dimensions have to be presupposed in the matter prior to those substantial forms that are multiplied within a single species.

Objection 3: The spiritual is applied to the corporeal through a virtual contact. But the soul's virtue (*virtus*) is its power (*potentia*). Therefore, it seems that the soul is united to the body by the mediation of power, which is a certain accident.

But contrary to this: As *Metaphysics* 7 says, an accident is posterior to its substance “both temporally and conceptually.” Therefore, no accidental form can be thought of as existing in the matter prior to the soul, which is the substantial form.

I respond: If the soul were united to the body as its mover, then nothing would prevent its being the case—indeed, it would have to be the case—that certain dispositions mediate between the soul and the body, viz., (a) on the part of the soul, a power by which it moves the body, and (b) on the part of the body, a certain aptitude by which the body is able to be moved by the soul.

However, if, as has already been explained (a. 1), the intellective soul is united to the body as its substantial form, then it is impossible for any accidental disposition to mediate (*cadat media*) between the body and the soul—or, for that matter, between *any* substantial form and its matter. The reason is that there is a certain order in which the matter is in potentiality to all its corresponding actualities, and so the actuality that is the first of all the actualities, absolutely speaking, must be thought of as the first one that is in the matter. But the first among all the actualities is *esse*. Therefore, it is impossible to think of the matter as being hot or quantified before thinking of it as existing in actuality. But *esse* in actuality is had through the substantial form, which makes a thing to exist absolutely speaking, as has already been explained (a. 4). Hence, it is impossible that any accidental disposition should exist in the matter prior to the substantial form or, consequently, prior to the soul.

Reply to objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (a. 4), a more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the lower forms. And so one and the same existent form perfects the matter with respect to diverse grades of perfection. For it is one and the same form in essence through which a man is (a) a being in actuality, (b) a body, (c) a living being, (d) an animal, and (e) a man. But it is clear that every genus is such that its proper accidents follow from it. Therefore, just as the matter is thought of as being complete in its *esse* (*perfecta secundum esse*) prior to its being thought of as a body (*ante intellectum corporeitatis*), and so on, so too the accidents that are proper to it as a being are thought of as preceding its being a body (*ante corporeitatem*). And so dispositions are thought of as being present in the matter prior to the form with respect to the form’s later effects, but not with respect to all its effects.

Reply to objection 2: Quantitative dimensions are accidents that follow upon the thing’s being a body, which belongs to the matter as a whole (*accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit*). Hence, once the matter is thought of as existing under the corporeity and dimensions, it can then be thought of as being divided into distinct parts, so that it might receive diverse forms corresponding to further grades of perfection. For even though, as has been explained (a. 4), it is in essence the same form that gives the diverse grades of perfection to the matter, there are nonetheless differences according to reason’s consideration of it.

Reply to objection 3: A spiritual substance that is united to a body only as its mover is united to it through its power, i.e., virtually (*per potentiam vel virtutem*). But the intellective soul is united to the body as a form through its own *esse*.

Still, it is through the soul’s power or virtue that it oversees (*administrat*) the body and moves it.

Article 7

Is the soul united to the animal body by the mediation of some other body?

It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by the mediation of some other body:

Objection 1: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 7 Augustine says, “The soul oversees (*administrat*) the body through light, i.e., fire, and air, which are more similar to a spirit.” But fire and air are bodies.

Therefore, the soul is united to the human body by the mediation of a body.

Objection 2: If something is such that when it is taken away, the union of things that had been united is dissolved, then it seems to be a mediator between those things. But when breathing (*spiritus*) ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore, breath, which is a subtle body, is a mediator in the union of the body and the soul.

Objection 3: Things that are distant from one another are united only through a medium. But the intellective soul is distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal and because it is incorruptible. Therefore, it seems that it is united to the body by the mediation of something that is an incorruptible body. And this seems to be some sort of celestial light, which harmonizes the elements and makes them one.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says, “one need not ask if the soul and body are one, just as one need not ask whether the wax and the shape are one.” But the shape is united to the wax without the mediation of any other body. Therefore, the soul is likewise united to the body without the mediation of a body.

I respond: If, as the Platonists hold, the soul were united to the body only as a mover, then it would be appropriate to claim that certain other bodies intervene between man’s soul—or that of any animal—and his body. For it is appropriate that a mover should effect movement in a distant thing through the mediation of things that are closer.

However, if, as has already been explained (a. 1), the soul is united to the body as its form, then it is impossible that it should be united to it by the mediation of a body. The reason for this is that a thing is called *one* in the same way that it is called *a being*. But it is the form that through itself makes a thing to exist in actuality, since it is an actuality through its own essence and so does not give *esse* through any mediator. Hence, the oneness of an entity composed of matter and form is due to the form itself, which is united to the matter in its own right as the actuality of the matter. Nor, with the exception of the agent, is there anything else that makes the matter to exist in actuality—as *Metaphysics* 8 explains.

Hence, the views of those who claimed that certain bodies mediate between man’s soul and body are clearly false. Certain Platonists among them asserted that (a) the intellective soul has an incorruptible body that is naturally united to it and from which it is never separated, and that (b) it is by the mediation of this body that the intellective soul is united to a corruptible human body.

Others claimed that it is united to the body by the mediation of a corporeal spirit.

Still others said that it is united to the body by the mediation of light, which they claimed to be a body and a fifth essence by nature, so that (a) the vegetative soul is united to the body by the mediation of the light of the starry heaven, (b) the sentient soul is united by the mediation of the light of the crystalline heaven, and (c) the intellectual soul is united by the mediation of the light of the empyrean heaven. All of this is clearly fictitious and ridiculous, since (a) light is not a body, (b) the fifth essence enters only virtually and not materially into the composition of mixed bodies, given that it is not subject to alteration (*inalterabilis*), and (c) the soul is directly united to the body as the form of its matter.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about the soul insofar as it moves the body; this is why he uses the word ‘oversight’ (*administratio*). And it is true that the grosser parts of the body are moved by the more subtle ones. As the Philosopher puts it in *De Causa Motus Animalium*, the first instrument of the moving power is a spirit.

Reply to objection 2: The reason why the union of the soul with the body ceases when breath ceases is not that breath is a mediator, but that the disposition by which the body is disposed toward such a union is destroyed. Still, breath is a mediator in effecting movement as the first instrument of movement.

Reply to objection 3: If the conditions of the body and the soul are thought of separately, then

there are several senses in which the soul is distant from the body. Hence, if the two of them had *esse* separately from one another, then many mediators would have to intervene. But since the soul is the form of the body, it does not have *esse* separately from the body's *esse*; instead, it is united to the body directly through its own *esse*. In the same way, if any form at all is thought of as an actuality, it has a great distance from matter, which is a being only in potentiality.

Article 8

Does the soul exist as a whole in each part of the body?

It seems that the soul does not exist as a whole in each part of the body:

Objection 1: In *De Causa Motus Animalium* the Philosopher says, "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; rather, if it is in some principle of the body, then it will vivify the other parts, since all of them are apt by nature to effect their proper movement."

Objection 2: The soul is in the body whose actuality it is. But it is the actuality of an organic body. Therefore, it exists only in an organic body. But not every part of the human body is an organic body. Therefore, the soul does not exist as a whole in each part of the body.

Objection 3: *De Anima* 2 says that the soul as a whole is related to the whole body of the animal in the same way that a part of the soul is related to a part of the body, e.g., the power of vision to the pupil. Therefore, if the whole soul exists in each part of the body, then it will follow that each part of the body is an animal.

Objection 4: Every power of the soul is grounded in the very essence of the soul. Therefore, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, then it will follow that every power of the soul exists in every part of the body—and so vision will exist in the ear and hearing in the eye. But this is absurd.

Objection 5: If each part of the body were such that the soul as a whole exists in it, then each part of the body would be directly dependent on the soul. Therefore, it would not be the case that one part of the body depends upon another, or that one part is more important than another—which is manifestly false. Therefore, the soul does not exist as a whole in each part of the body.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, "In each body the soul exists as a whole in the whole and as a whole in each part of it."

I respond: As we have already explained in the other articles, if the soul were united to the body only as a mover, then one could claim that it is not in every part of the body, but is just in the one part of the body by which it moves the other parts.

However, since the soul is in fact united to the body as its form, it must exist in the whole body and in each part of the body. For it is a substantial form and not an accidental form. But a substantial form is the perfection not only of the whole, but of each part. For since a whole consists of its parts, a form of a whole that does not give *esse* to each part of a body is a form which is, like the form of a house, itself a composition and an ordering [of parts]; and a form of this sort is an accidental form. The soul, by contrast, is a substantial form, and so it has to be the form and actuality not only of the whole but also of each part. And so just as, when the soul departs, [the body] is only equivocally called an animal and a man, like an animal in a picture or one made out of stone, so it is with the hands and eyes, or bones and flesh—as the Philosopher explains. An indication of this is that when the soul departs, no part of the body retains its proper function (*proprium opus*), whereas anything that retains its species retains the operation of that species. Now an actuality exists in that of which it is the actuality. Hence, the soul has to be in the whole body and in each part of the body.

From here we can consider the claim that the soul exists *as a whole* in each part of the body. For there are three kinds of wholes, corresponding to the three types of division in which a whole is divided into parts. One type is a whole divided into *quantitative parts*, e.g., a whole line or a whole body. Next, there is the type of whole divided into *rational or essential parts* (*partes rationis et essentiae*), as when what is defined is divided into the parts of the definition, or when what is composed is resolved into its matter and form. The third type is a whole power (*totum potentiale*), which is divided into *virtual parts* (*partes virtutis*).

Now the first type of wholeness belongs to forms only *per accidens* and then only to those forms that have a uniform relation (*habent indifferentem habitudinem*) to a quantitative whole and to its parts. For instance, as far as its own nature is concerned, a whiteness (*albedo*) is equally in a whole surface and in each part of the surface, and so the whiteness is incidentally (*per accidens*) divided when the surface is divided. By contrast, a form that requires diversity in the parts—such as a soul, and especially the soul of a perfect animal—is not related in the same way to the whole and to the parts, and so it is not divided *per accidens* when the quantity is divided. So, then, quantitative wholeness cannot be attributed to the soul either *per se* or *per accidens*.

On the other hand, the second kind of wholeness, which involves a completeness of concept or of essence, belongs to forms properly and *per se*. And the same holds for a wholeness of power (*totalitas virtutis*), since a form is a principle of operation.

Therefore, if one were asking whether or not whiteness exists as a whole in the whole surface and in each of the parts, it would be necessary to draw a distinction. For if the question were about a quantitative whole that has whiteness *per accidens*, then the whiteness would not exist as a whole in each of the parts. And the same would have to be said of a complete power, since the whiteness that exists in the whole surface is able to affect vision more than is the whiteness that exists in some small part (*particula*) of the surface. On the other hand, if the question were about the specific and essential whole (*de totalitate speciei et essentiae*), then whiteness as a whole is in each part of the surface.

However, since, as has been explained, the soul does not have a quantitative wholeness either *per se* or *per accidens*, it is enough to say that the soul exists as a whole in each part of the body with respect to a wholeness of perfection and essence, but not with respect to a completeness of power. For it is not the case that the soul is in each part of the body with respect to each of its powers; rather, it is in the eye with respect to the power of seeing (*secundum visum*) and in the ear with respect to the power of hearing (*secundum auditum*), and so on for the others.

Note, however, that since the soul requires diversity in the parts, it is not related in the same way to the whole and to the parts. Rather, it is related to the whole in the first place and *per se* (*primo et per se*), since the whole is what it properly and proportionately perfects; by contrast, it is related to the parts secondarily (*per posterius*), insofar as they are ordered toward the whole.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is talking about the soul's moving power.

Reply to objection 2: The soul is the actuality of an organic body in the sense that the organic body is what it perfects in the first place and proportionately.

Reply to objection 3: An animal is composed of the soul and the whole body, which the soul perfects in the first place and proportionately. But the soul is not in a part in this same way. Hence, it is not necessary for a part of an animal to be an animal.

Reply to objection 4: Some powers of the soul, viz., the intellect and will, are in it insofar as it exceeds the whole capacity of the body, and powers of this sort are not said to be in any part of the body. However, other powers are common to the soul and the body, and so it is not necessary for each of these powers to be in whatever part the soul is; instead, a power is just in that part of the body that is proportionate to its operation.

Reply to objection 5: One part of the body is said to be more important (*principalior*) than another because of the diverse powers whose organs are parts of the body. A more important part of the body is one that is an organ of a more important power or one that serves that power in a more important way.

QUESTION 77

The Powers of the Soul in General

Next we must consider what pertains to the powers of the soul—first in general (question 77), and then specifically (questions 78-83). On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is the essence of the soul the soul's own power? (2) Is there just a single power of the soul, or are there many powers? (3) How are the powers of the soul distinguished from one another? (4) What is the ordering of the powers with respect to one another? (5) Is the soul the subject of all the powers? (6) Do the powers flow from the essence of the soul (*fluant ab essentia animae*)? (7) Does one power arise from another? (8) Do all the powers of the soul remain in it after death?

Article 1

Is the very essence of the soul the soul's power?

It seems that the very essence of the soul is the soul's power (*potentia*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, "Mind, knowledge, and love exist in the soul substantially or, what amounts to the same thing, essentially." And in *De Trinitate* 10 he says, "Memory, understanding, and will constitute one life, one mind, one essence."

Objection 2: The soul is more noble than primary matter. But primary matter is its own power or potentiality (*potentia*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, so is the soul.

Objection 3: A substantial form is more simple than an accidental form; an indication of this is that a substantial form is not intensified or remitted, but consists in what is indivisible. But an accidental form is its own power itself (*ipsa sua virtus*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, so is the substantial form, i.e., the soul.

Objection 4: The sentient power is that by which we have sensation, and the intellectual power is that by which we have intellectual understanding. But according to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 2, it is first and foremost (*primo*) the soul by which we sense and understand. Therefore, the soul is its own powers.

Objection 5: Everything that does not belong to a thing's essence is an accident. Therefore, if the soul's power lies outside its essence, it follows that the soul's power is an accident. But this is contrary to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 9, where he says that the aforementioned powers "are not in the soul as in a subject, in the way that color or shape or any other quality or quantity is in a body; for nothing like that goes beyond the subject it is in, whereas the mind is able to love and to know other things as well."

Objection 6: "A simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is a simple form, since, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 5), it is not composed of form and matter. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the soul's power is in it as in a subject.

Objection 7: An accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But *sentient* and *rational* are substantial differences, and they are taken from sensation and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore, the soul's powers are not accidents. And so it seems that the soul's power is its essence.

But contrary to this: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 11, Dionysius says, "The celestial spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." So, *a fortiori*, in the case of the soul, the essence is one thing and the virtue or power (*virtus sive potentia*) is something else.

I respond: It is impossible to maintain that the soul's essence is its power, even though some have made this claim. For present purposes, this will be shown in two ways:

First, since *potentiality* (*potentia*) and *actuality* (*actus*) divide *being* and every genus of being,

potentiality and actuality have to be referred back to the same genus. And so, if an actuality is not in the genus of substance, then the potentiality corresponding to it cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the soul's operation is not in the genus of substance; rather, it is only in the case of God that His operation is His substance. Hence, God's power, which is a principle of operation, is the very essence of God. But as was explained above for the case of angels (q. 54, a. 3) as well, this cannot be true either of the soul or of any other creature.

Second, this is likewise obviously impossible in the case of the soul. For in its essence the soul is an actuality. Therefore, if the soul's essence were itself an immediate principle of operation, then whatever has a soul would always actually be engaging in [all of the] vital works, in the same way that whatever has a soul is always actually alive. For the soul, just insofar as it is a form, is not an actuality ordered toward any further actuality, but is instead the ultimate terminus of generation. Hence, the fact that the soul is in potentiality with respect to some further actuality is not something that belongs to it because of its *essence*, just insofar as it is a form; rather, it is something that belongs to it because of its *power*.

And so insofar as the soul itself is the subject of its own power, it is called a *first actuality* that is ordered toward a *second actuality*. But a thing that has a soul is not always in actuality with respect to [all the] vital works (*non semper esse in actu operum vitae*). Hence, in the definition of the soul one likewise says that the soul is "the actuality of a body having life in potentiality," where this potentiality "does not exclude the soul." Therefore, it follows that the soul's essence is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality with respect to an actuality insofar as it itself is an actuality.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about the mind insofar as it knows itself and loves itself. So, then, insofar as the knowledge and love are referred back to the mind itself as what is known and loved, they are substantially or essentially in the soul, since it is the soul's very substance or essence that is being known and loved. And this is likewise the way to understand what he says in the other place, viz., "[Memory, understanding, and will constitute] one life, one mind, one essence."

An alternative reply is that, as some claim, this last passage is rendered true by the way in which a *whole of power* (*totum potestativum*) is predicated of its parts, where this sort of whole lies between a *universal whole* (*totum universale*) and an *integral whole* (*totum integrale*). For a universal whole is present to each part with its whole essence and power, in the way that *animal* is predicated of *man* and *horse*, and in this sense is properly predicated of each part. By contrast, an integral whole is not in each part either with its whole essence or with its whole power; and so it is not in any way predicated of each part—though in a certain way, albeit improperly, it is predicated of all the parts taken together, as when we say that the walls, the roof, and the foundation are a house. Lastly, a whole of power (*totum potentiale*) is present to each part with its whole essence but not with its whole power; and there is a sense in which it can be predicated of each part, but not as properly as a universal whole is. And it is in this sense that Augustine is claiming that memory, understanding, and will are a single essence of the soul.

Reply to objection 2: The actuality with respect to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. And this is why the power or potentiality (*potentia*) of the matter is not distinct from its essence (*non est aliud quam eius essentia*).

Reply to objection 3: Acting belongs to the composite, in the same way that the *esse* belongs to the composite; for acting belongs to that which exists. But the composite has *esse* substantively through its substantial form, whereas it acts through a power that follows upon its substantial form. Hence, a power of the soul is related to the soul in the way that an active accidental form is related to the agent's substantial form, e.g., in the way that heat is related to the form of fire.

Reply to objection 4: The very fact that an accidental form is a principle of action is something it derives from the substantial form. And so the substantial form is the *first* principle of action, but not the

proximate principle of action. This is the sense in which the Philosopher is claiming that “the soul is that by which we understand and sense.”

Reply to objection 5: If *accident* is taken in the sense in which it is divided off against *substance*, then there cannot be anything between a substance and an accident, since they are divided off as an affirmation and a negation, viz., *existing in a subject* and *not existing in a subject*. And in this sense, since the soul’s power is not its essence, it must be an accident contained within the second species of *quality*.

On the other hand, if *accident* is taken in the sense in which it is posited as one of the five universals, then there is something between a substance and an accident. For whatever is essential to a thing pertains to *substance*, but not everything that lies outside of the essence can be called an accident; rather, an accident is only that which is not caused by the essential principles of the species. For a *property* (*proprium*) does not belong to the thing’s essence, but is caused by the essential principles of the thing, and so it lies between an essence and an accident taken in the present sense. In this way, the powers of the soul can be said to lie between a substance and an accident in the sense that they are natural properties of the soul.

As for Augustine’s claim that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents are in a subject, this is to be understood in the way explained above; that is, knowledge and love are being related to the soul insofar as the soul is that which is being loved and known—and not insofar as the soul is that which is knowing and loving. In this way his argument goes through. For if the love were in the-soul-as-loved as in a subject, then it would follow that an accident transcends its own subject, since there are also other things loved through the soul.

Reply to objection 6: Even though the soul is not composed of matter and form, it nonetheless has potentiality mixed in with it, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 5). And so it can be the subject of an accident.

The cited proposition, [viz., “A simple form cannot be a subject,”] has a place in the case of God, who is Pure Actuality, and it is in the material on God that Boethius introduces this proposition.

Reply to objection 7: Insofar as *rational* and *sentient* are differences, they are taken not from the powers of sentience and reason, but from the sentient and rational soul itself. Yet because substantial forms, which are unknown to us in their own right, are known through their accidents, nothing prevents accidents from sometimes being used [in definitions] in place of substantial differences.

Article 2

Does the soul have more than one power?

It seems that the soul does not have more than one power (*non sint plures potentiae animae*):

Objection 1: The intellectual soul comes closest to a likeness of God. But in God there is a single and simple power. Therefore, the same holds for the intellectual soul.

Objection 2: The higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul exceeds all other forms in its power. Therefore, it is especially the case that it ought to have a single power or potentiality (*unam virtutem seu potentiam*).

Objection 3: Operating belongs to that which exists in actuality. But as was established above (q. 76, a. 3-4), it is through one and the same essence of the soul that a man has *esse* with respect to the diverse grades of perfection. Therefore, it is through one and the same power of the soul that he carries out the diverse operations of those diverse grades.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher posits a multiplicity of powers of the soul.

I respond: One must claim that the soul has a multiplicity of powers (*plures potentias*). To see this clearly, note that, as the Philosopher says in *De Caelo* 2, the lowest things cannot attain perfect goodness, but they do attain a certain imperfect goodness by means of a few movements; and things higher than these acquire perfect goodness by means of many movements; and still higher things acquire perfect goodness by means of a few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things that possess perfect goodness without any movements at all—in the same way that someone who is least disposed toward health cannot attain perfect health, but does attain some measure of health by means of a few medicines; and someone who is better disposed toward health can attain perfect health, but by means of many medicines; and someone who is still better disposed can attain perfect health by means of a few medicines; and someone who is the best disposed toward health has perfect health without any medicines at all.

Therefore, one should reply that the things below man attain certain particular goods and so have a few limited operations and powers, whereas man can attain universal and perfect goodness, since he is able to possess beatitude. However, he is, according to nature, in the lowest order of beings to whom beatitude belongs, and so the human soul needs many and diverse operations and powers. By contrast, the angels have a lesser diversity of powers, whereas in God there is no power or action at all beyond His essence.

There is also another reason why the human soul abounds in a diversity of powers, viz., that it is at the boundary between spiritual and corporeal creatures (*est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum*), and so the powers of both sorts of creatures come together in it.

Reply to objection 1: The intellectual soul comes closer to a likeness of God than do lower creatures in the very fact that it is able to attain perfect goodness—even if through many diverse operations, a point on which it falls short of higher beings.

Reply to objection 2: A unified power is higher as long as it extends to just as many effects. But a multiplicity of powers is higher if more effects are subject to it.

Reply to objection 3: There is a single substantial *esse* for a single entity, but it is possible for there to be many operations. And so there is a single essence of the soul, but many powers.

Article 3

Are the powers distinguished from one another by their acts and objects?

It seems that the powers are not distinguished from one another by their acts and objects:

Objection 1: Nothing is contracted to a species by anything posterior to it or extrinsic to it. But the act is posterior to the corresponding power, whereas the object is extrinsic to the power. Therefore, it is not through their acts or objects that the powers are distinguished from one another in species.

Objection 2: Contraries differ from one another to the maximal degree. Therefore, if powers were distinguished from one another by their objects, it would follow that there is no one power with respect to contraries. But this is obviously false in almost all the relevant cases; for instance, the same visual power has black and white [as objects], and the same sense of taste has the sweet and the bitter [as objects].

Objection 3: When a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if the differences among the powers stemmed from differences among their objects, the same object would not belong to diverse powers. But this is obviously false; for instance, the same thing is such that the cognitive power has

cognition of it and the appetitive power desires it.

Objection 4: That which is a *per se* cause of something is a cause of that thing in all cases. But certain diverse objects belonging to diverse powers also belong to some one power. For instance, color and sound belong to the sense of sight and the sense of hearing, which are diverse powers; and yet they also belong to the unified common sensory power (*ad unam potentiam sensus communis*). Therefore, powers are not distinguished from one another by differences in their objects.

But contrary to this: Things that are posterior are distinguished by appeal to what is prior. But in *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says that “acts and operations are conceptually prior to the corresponding powers and prior still to them are their opposites,” i.e., their objects. Therefore, powers are distinguished from one another by their acts and objects.

I respond: A power, insofar as it is a power, is ordered toward an act. Hence, the nature of the power (*ratio potentiae*) has to be taken from the act toward which it is ordered and, as a result, the nature of the power must vary as the nature of the act varies. But the nature of the acts varies with the diverse nature of the objects.

Now every action belongs to either an *active power* or a *passive power*. The object is related to the act of a *passive power* as its source (*principium*) and moving cause; for instance, color is a source of the act of seeing (*principium visionis*) insofar as it moves the visual power (*inquantum movet visum*). On the other hand, the object is related to the act of an *active power* as its terminus and end; for instance, the object of the power to grow is a full size (*quantum perfectum*), which is the end of growth. Now an action receives its species from these two things, viz., either from its source or from its end, i.e., its terminus; for instance, heating differs from cooling insofar as the former proceeds from what is hot, viz., the active principle, to the hot, whereas the latter proceeds from what is cold to the cold. Hence, it must be the case that powers vary according to their acts and objects.

Note, however, that what is incidental (*per accidens*) does not make for a diversity of species. For instance, since being of a certain color is incidental to an animal, the species that belong to *animal* do not vary according to differences in color; instead, they vary according to the difference in what accrues *per se* to an animal, viz., by differences belonging to the sentient soul, which is sometimes found accompanied by reason and sometimes found without reason. Hence, *rational* and *non-rational* are differences that divide *animal* and constitute its diverse species.

So, then, not just any variation in the objects makes for a variation in the powers of the soul; rather, what makes for a variation is a difference in something that the power is related to *per se*. For instance, the sensory power is related *per se* to *sensible quality* (*passibilem qualitatem*), which is divided *per se* into *color*, *sound*, etc.; and so the sentient power that has to do with color (the sense of sight) is distinct from the sentient power that has to do with sound (the sense of hearing). But it is incidental to sensible qualities such as color whether a thing is a musician or a grammarian, large or small, a man or a rock. And so it is not by differences of this latter sort that the powers of the soul are distinguished.

Reply to objection 1: Even though the act is posterior to the power in *esse*, it is nonetheless prior in intention and conceptually, in the way that the end is prior to the agent. And even though the object is extrinsic, it is nonetheless a principle and end of the action; and those things that are intrinsic to the thing are proportioned to the principle and to the end.

Reply to objection 2: If a power is related *per se* to one of two contraries as its object, then the other contrary must be related to some other power. However, a power of the soul relates *per se* not to the proper natures of the contraries, but rather to a nature that is common to both of the contraries; for instance, the sense of sight is related *per se* not to the nature *white*, but to the nature *color*. And the reason for this is that the one contrary is in some sense the nature of the other, since they are related as the perfect and the imperfect.

Reply to objection 3: Nothing prevents what is the same in subject from being conceptually diverse. And in this sense it can be related to diverse powers of the soul.

Reply to objection 4: A higher power is related *per se* to a more universal conception of its object (*respicit universalio rem rationem obiecti*) than a lower power is. For the higher a power is, the more things it extends to. And so more things agree in the single conception of the object that the higher power is related to *per se*, and yet those things differ from one another in the conceptions that the lower powers are related to *per se*. And this is how diverse objects belong to diverse lower powers, even though they fall under a single higher power.

Article 4

Is there any ordering among the powers of the soul?

It seems that there is no ordering among the powers of the soul (*in potentiis animae non sit ordo*):

Objection 1: There is no 'before' (*prius*) or 'after' (*posterius*) among things that fall under the same division; rather, they are naturally 'simultaneous' (*naturaliter simul*). But the powers of the soul are divided off against one another. Therefore, there is no ordering among them.

Objection 2: The powers of the soul are related to their objects and to the soul itself. But from the side of the soul, there is no ordering among the powers, since the soul is one. Likewise, from the side of the objects, there is no ordering among the powers, since the objects are diverse and wholly disparate, as is clear in the case of color and sound. Therefore, there is no ordering among the powers of the soul.

Objection 3: In powers that are ordered with respect to one another one finds that the operation of the one depends upon the operation of the other. But it is not the case that the act of one power of the soul depends on the act of another; for instance, the sense of sight can act without the sense of hearing, and vice versa. Therefore, it is not the case that there is an ordering among the powers of the soul.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher compares the parts or powers of the soul to shapes. But shapes have an ordering with respect to one another. Therefore, so do the powers of the soul.

I respond: Since the soul is one, whereas the powers are many, and since a multitude proceeds from one thing in a certain order, there must be an ordering among the powers of the soul.

In fact, three types of ordering are found among them. Two of these types have to do with the dependence of one power on another, while the third is taken from an ordering among their objects.

Now there are two ways to think of the dependence of one power on another: the first concerns an *ordering of nature*, insofar as what is perfect is naturally prior to what is imperfect; and the second concerns an *ordering of time and generation*, insofar as the perfect arises from the imperfect.

According to the first type of ordering among the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sentient powers, and so they direct them and command them. Similarly, the sentient powers are prior in this type of ordering to the powers of the nutritive soul.

According to the second type of ordering, the converse holds. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior, in the line of generation, to the powers of the sentient soul and so prepare the body for the actions of the sentient powers. And the same holds for the powers of the sentient soul with respect to the powers of the intellectual soul.

On the other hand, according to the third type of ordering, certain of the sentient powers (*vires sensitivae*) have an ordering with respect to one another, viz., the sense of sight, the sense of hearing, and the sense of smell. For the visible is naturally prior to the other [objects], since it is common to both

higher and lower bodies. And the audible sound exists in the air, which is naturally prior to the mixing of the elements that the odoriferous follows upon.

Reply to objection 1: The species of certain genera are related as ‘before’ and ‘after’, e.g., the genera *number* and *shape*, as far as their *esse* is concerned—even though the species in question are said to be ‘simultaneous’ insofar as they bear the predication of a common genus.

Reply to objection 2: The relevant ordering of the powers of the soul is (a) on the part of the soul, which has an aptitude for diverse acts in a certain order, even though it is one in essence, and (b) on the part of the objects, and also (c) on the part of the acts, as has been explained.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through in the case of those powers among which there is an ordering only of the third type. By contrast, those powers that are ordered according to the other two modes are related in such a way that the act of the one is dependent on the act of the other.

Article 5

Are all the soul’s powers in the soul as in a subject?

It seems that all the soul’s powers are in the soul as in a subject:

Objection 1: The powers of the soul are related to the soul in the same way that the powers of the body are related to the body. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore, the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul.

Objection 2: The operations of the soul’s powers are attributed to the body because of the soul; for, as is explained in *De Anima* 2, “the soul is first and foremost (*primum*) that by which we have sensation and intellectual understanding.” But the powers are the proper principles of the operations of the soul. Therefore, the powers are first and foremost (*per prius*) in the soul.

Objection 3: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says that the soul senses (*sentit*) certain things but not through the body—indeed, without the body—e.g., fear and things of that sort. But if the sentient power were not in the soul alone as in a subject, it would not be able to sense anything without a body. Therefore, the soul is the subject of the sentient power and, by parity of reasoning, of all the other powers as well.

But contrary to this: In *De Somno et Vigilia* the Philosopher says, “Sensing is proper neither to the soul nor the body, but to the conjoined being.” Therefore, the sentient power is in the conjoined being as in a subject. Therefore, it is not the case that the soul is by itself (*sola*) the subject of all its own powers.

I respond: The subject of an operative power is that which is able to operate, since every accident denominates its proper subject. But the thing that is able to operate is the same as the thing that does operate. Hence, “what has the power” as a subject “is that to which the operation belongs,” as the Philosopher likewise says at the beginning of *De Somno et Vigilia*.

Now it is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 2-3 and q. 76, a. 1) that certain operations that are exercised without a corporeal organ, e.g., intellectual understanding and willing, belong to the soul. Hence, the powers that are the principles of these operations are in the soul as in a subject.

However, there are certain operations of the soul that are exercised through corporeal organs, e.g., the act of seeing with the eyes and the act of hearing with the ears. And the same holds for all the other operations of the nutritive and sentient parts of the soul. And so the powers that are the principles of such operations are in the conjoined being as in a subject, and not in the soul alone.

Reply to objection 1: All the powers are said to belong to the soul not as a *subject* but as a

principle, since it is through the soul that the conjoined being is able to carry out such operations.

Reply to objection 2: All the powers in question are in the soul prior to being in the conjoined being, but as in a *principle* and not as in a *subject*.

Reply to objection 3: Plato's opinion was that sensing is an operation proper to the soul, just as intellectual understanding is, and in many matters related to philosophy Augustine makes use of Plato's opinions by reciting them without asserting them.

Now as far as the matter at hand is concerned, there are two possible ways to understand the claim that the soul senses some things with the body and some without the body:

In the first way, the phrases 'with the body' (*cum corpore*) and 'without the body' (*sine corpore*) modify *the act of sensing* insofar as it proceeds from the one who is sensing. And given that the phrases are taken in this way, nothing has sensation without a body, since the action of sensing cannot proceed from the soul except through a corporeal organ.

In the second way, the phrases modify the act of sensing on the part of *the object that is sensed*. And given that the phrases are taken in this way, the soul senses some things 'with the body', i.e., as existing in the body, as when it senses a wound or something of that sort, whereas it senses other things 'without the body', i.e., as existing not in the body but only in the soul's apprehension, as when it senses that it is sad or joyful about something that has been heard.

Article 6

Do the powers of the soul flow from its essence?

It seems that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence (*non fluant ab eius essentia*):

Objection 1: Diverse things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Therefore, since the powers of the soul are many and diverse, they cannot proceed from the soul's essence.

Objection 2: That from which something else proceeds is a cause of that thing. But the soul's essence cannot be called a cause of the powers, as is clear to one who runs through each of the genera of causes. Therefore, the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.

Objection 3: 'Emanation' names a certain movement. But as *Physics* 7 proves, nothing is moved by itself—except perhaps by reason of a part, as when an animal is said to be moved by itself because one part of it is the mover and another part the thing moved. Again, as *De Anima* 1 proves, the soul is not moved. Therefore, it is not the case that the soul in itself is a cause of its own powers.

But contrary to this: The powers of the soul are certain properties that are natural to it. But a subject is a cause of its proper accidents and thus, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 7, is mentioned in the definition of its accident. Therefore, the powers of the soul proceed from the soul's essence as from a cause.

I respond: A substantial form and an accidental form agree in some things and differ in others. They agree in that both are actualities and each is such that because of it something in some way exists in actuality. However, there are two ways in which they differ:

First, a substantial form makes something to exist absolutely speaking, and its subject is a being only in potentiality. By contrast, an accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely speaking, but makes it to be such-and-such qualitatively (*esse tale*), or to be such-and-such a size (*esse tantum*), or to be related in some way (*esse aliquo modo se habens*); for its subject is a being in actuality. Hence, it is clear that actuality is found in a substantial form prior to being found in its subject; and because the

first thing in any genus is the cause, the substantial form causes *esse* in actuality in its subject. By contrast, actuality is found in the subject of an accidental form prior to being found in the accidental form, and so the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. Hence, insofar as the subject exists in potentiality, it is receptive of the accidental form, whereas insofar as it exists in actuality, it is productive of the accidental form. (I am making this claim about a proper and *per se* accident, since with respect to extraneous accidents the subject is receptive only, while an extrinsic agent produces such an accident.)

The second difference between a substantial form and an accidental form is that because what is less important (*minus principale*) exists for the sake of what is more important (*principalius*), the matter exists for the sake of the substantial form, whereas, conversely, the accidental form exists for the sake of the completion of its subject.

Now it is clear from what has been said (a. 5) that the subject of the soul's powers is either (a) just the soul itself, which, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 3), can, insofar as it has some sort of potentiality (*secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis*), be the subject of an accident, or (b) the composite. But the composite exists in actuality because of the soul. Hence, it is clear that all the soul's powers—whether their subject is the soul by itself or the composite—flow from the soul's essence as their principle. For it has already been explained that an accident (a) is caused by its subject insofar as its subject exists in actuality and (b) is received in its subject insofar as its subject is in potentiality.

Reply to objection 1: Many things can naturally proceed from a single simple thing according to a certain order, and this, once again, because of the diversity of the things receiving them. So, then, from a single essence of the soul there proceed many and diverse powers, both because of the ordering among the powers, and also because of the diversity of the corporeal organs.

Reply to objection 2: The subject is a *final cause* and, in some sense, an *acting cause* of its proper accidents—and also a *material cause*, insofar as it receives the accidents. And from this one can infer that the soul's essence is a cause of all the soul's powers as an *end* and an *active principle*, whereas it is a cause of some of its powers as their *subject*.

Reply to objection 3: The emanation of the proper accidents from a subject is not through any sort of transmutation but through a sort of natural resultancy (*per aliquam naturalem resultationem*), in the manner in which one thing naturally results from another, e.g., color from light.

Article 7

Does one power arise from another?

It seems that it is not the case that one power arises from another:

Objection 1: Things that begin to exist at the same time are such that the one does not arise from the other. But all the powers of the soul are co-created together with the soul. Therefore, it is not the case that one of those powers arises from another.

Objection 2: A power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident arises from its subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another, since an accident does not have accidents. Therefore, it is not the case that one power arises from another.

Objection 3: An opposite does not arise from its opposite, but instead each of them arises from something similar to it in species. But the powers of the soul are divided off from one another as opposites, in the way that diverse species are divided off from one another as opposites. Therefore, it is not the case that one of them arises from another.

But contrary to this: Powers are known through their acts. But the act of one power is caused by another power; for instance, an act of imagining (*actus phantasiae*) is caused by an act of sensing. Therefore, one power of the soul is caused by another.

I respond: Among things that proceed in a certain natural ordering from one first thing, just as the first thing is a cause of all of them, so what is closer to the first thing is in some sense a cause of what is more remote from the first thing. But it was shown above (a. 4) that there is a multiple ordering among the powers of the soul. And so one power of the soul proceeds from the soul's essence by the mediation of another power. But since (a) the soul's essence is related to the powers both as an active and final principle and also as a receptive principle (either separately by itself or together with the body), and since (b) that which is an agent and an end is more perfect, whereas that which is a receptive principle is as such less perfect, it follows that those powers of the soul which are prior in the order of perfection and nature are principles of the other powers in the manner of an end and an active principle. For we see that the sensory power exists for the sake of the intellect, and not vice versa. Again, the sensory power is a certain deficient participation in the intellect, and so according to its natural origin it in some sense arises from the intellect in the way that what is imperfect arises from what is perfect.

Conversely, along the path of receptive principles, the more imperfect powers are principles with respect to the others, in the same way that the soul, insofar as it has the sentient power, is thought of as a subject and as a sort of material [cause] with respect to the intellect. And because of this, the less perfect powers are prior on the path of generation, since the animal is generated before the man.

Reply to objection 1: Just as a power of the soul flows from the soul's essence—not through a transmutation but through a sort of natural resultancy—and yet is simultaneous with it, so the same holds for one power with respect to another.

Reply to objection 2: An accident cannot *per se* be the subject of an accident, but one accident is received in the substance prior to another, in the way that quantity is received before quality. And in this sense the one accident is said to be the subject of the other—in the way that a surface is said to be the subject of a color—because it is by the mediation of the one accident that the substance receives the other accident. And something similar can be said about the powers of the soul.

Reply to objection 3: The powers of the soul are opposed to one another by an opposition of what is perfect to what is imperfect, in the way that the species of number and shape are opposed to one another. However, this sort of opposition does not prevent one power from arising from another, since what is imperfect naturally proceeds from what is perfect.

Article 8

Do all the powers of the soul remain in a soul that is separated from its body?

It seems that all the powers of the soul remain in a soul that is separated from its body:

Objection 1: In *De Spiritu et Anima* it says, "The soul recedes from the body, taking the sensory power and power of imagination with it, along with reason, and intellect, and understanding, and concupiscibility, and irascibility."

Objection 2: The powers of the soul are the soul's natural properties. But a property always exists in, and is never separated from, that of which it is a property. Therefore, the powers of the soul remain in it even after death.

Objection 3: The soul's powers, even its sentient powers, are not weakened when the body is weakened, since, as *De Anima* 1 says, "If an old man received the eyes of a young man, he would see in

the same way that a young man does.” But weakening is a path to corruption. Therefore, the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted; instead, they remain in the separated soul.

Objection 4: As the Philosopher shows, memory is a power of the sentient soul. But memory remains in a separated soul; for in Luke 16:25 the rich glutton, whose soul is in hell, is told, “Remember that you received good things in your life.” Therefore, memory remains in a separated soul and, consequently, so do the other powers of the sentient part of the soul.

Objection 5: Joy and sadness exist in the concupiscible power, which is a power of the sentient part of the soul. But it is obvious that separated souls are sad or joyful about the rewards or punishments they have. Therefore, the concupiscible power remains in a separated soul.

Objection 6: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says that just as when the body lies senseless though not yet wholly dead, the soul sees certain things by means of an imaginative vision, so the same holds when the soul is completely separated from its body through death. But the imagination is a power of the sentient part of the soul. Therefore, the power of the sentient part remains in a separated soul and, consequently, so do all the other powers.

But contrary to this: In *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* it says, “A man is composed of just two substances, the soul with its reason and the flesh with its senses.” Therefore, when the flesh is dead, the sentient powers do not remain.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 5-7), all the powers of the soul have the soul alone as their *principle*.

However, certain of the powers, viz., the intellect and the will, have the *soul alone* as their subject, and powers of this sort must remain in the soul after its body has been destroyed.

By contrast, certain of the powers, viz., all the powers of the sentient and nutritive parts of the soul, have the *conjoined being* as their subject. Now when a subject is destroyed, its accidents cannot remain. Hence, when the conjoined being is corrupted, powers of the sort in question do not remain in actuality but remain only *virtually* in the soul as in their principle or root. And so the claim made by some, viz., that powers of this sort remain in the soul even after the body is corrupted, is false. And the further claim that the acts of these powers remain in a separated soul is all the more false, since no action belongs to these powers except through a corporeal organ.

Reply to objection 1: The book in question has no authority. Hence, what is written in it is rejected just as easily as it is asserted.

Still, one can reply that the soul takes powers of the sort in question along with it virtually and not actually.

Reply to objection 2: The powers which we claim do not remain actual in the separated soul are properties not of the soul alone, but of the conjoined being.

Reply to objection 3: Powers of the sort in question are said not to be weakened when the body is weakened because the soul, which is a virtual principle of these powers, remains immutable.

Reply to objection 4: Memory as referred to here (*illa recordatio*) is taken in the sense in which Augustine posits memory in the mind, and not in the sense in which it is posited as a part in the sentient soul.

Reply to objection 5: Sadness and joy are in the separated soul not with respect to the sentient appetite, but with respect to the intellective appetite—as is also the case with the angels.

Reply to objection 6: Augustine is speaking here by way of inquiry and not by way of assertion. That is why he retracts some of the things that were said in this place.

QUESTION 78

The Specific Powers of the Soul

Next we have to consider the specific powers of the soul. It is relevant to the theologian's inquiry to ask specifically only about the intellective and appetitive powers, in which the virtues are found. But because knowledge of these powers in some way depends on the others, our inquiry concerning the specific powers of the soul will have three parts. For we have to consider, first, those powers that are preparatory for intellective understanding (question 78); second, the intellective powers (question 79); and, third, the appetitive powers (questions 80-83).

On the first topic there are four questions: first, concerning the genera of the powers of the soul; second, concerning the species of the vegetative part of the soul; third, concerning the exterior sensory powers; and fourth, concerning the interior sensory powers.

Article 1

Are there five kinds of power that belong to the soul?

It seems that there are not five kinds of power that belong to the soul, viz., (a) the vegetative, (b) the sentient, (c) the appetitive, (d) the power to effect movement with respect to place, and (e) the intellective:

Objection 1: The powers of the soul are called the soul's 'parts'. But there are only three parts of the soul commonly enumerated by everyone, viz., the vegetative soul, the sentient soul, and the rational soul. Therefore, there are only three kinds of power that belong to the soul, and not five.

Objection 2: The powers of the soul are the principles of the vital works (*principia operum vitae*). But there are four senses in which something is said to be alive (*vivere*). For in *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says, "There are many senses of 'to be alive' (*multipliciter ipso vivere dicto*), so that something is said to be alive even if just one of the following is present: intellective understanding; sensing; movement and standing still with respect to place; and movement with respect to nourishment, decrease, and increase." Therefore, given that the appetitive is left out, there are just four genera of the powers of the soul.

Objection 3: What is common to all the powers ought not to be designated as a special kind of soul. But appetite (*appetere*) belongs to each of the powers of the soul. For the sense of sight desires a fitting visible object, and thus Ecclesiasticus 40:22 says, "The eye will desire favor and beauty (*gratiam et speciem*) but, more than these, green sown fields (*virides sationes*).” And by the same line of reasoning, each of the other powers desires an object fitting for itself. Therefore, the appetitive should not be posited as a special type of power belonging to the soul.

Objection 4: As is explained in *De Anima* 3, in animals the principle that effects movement is either the sensory power, the intellect, or the appetite. Therefore, the principle that effects movement should not be posited as a special kind of soul beyond the ones mentioned above.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says, "We claim that the powers are the vegetative, the sentient, the appetitive, the power to effect movement with respect to place, and the intellective."

I respond: There are five *kinds of power* that belong to the soul, and they are enumerated above. Three are called *souls (animae)*, whereas four are called *ways of being alive (modi vivendi)*.

The reason for this difference is that the different *souls* are distinguished by the fact that there are diverse ways in which the soul's operation exceeds the operation of corporeal nature; for the whole of the corporeal nature is subject to the soul (*tota natura corporalis subiacet animae*) and is related to it as its

matter and instrument.

Thus, there is a certain operation of the soul that exceeds corporeal nature to the extent that it is not even exercised by means of a corporeal organ (*per organum corporale*); and this is the operation of the *rational soul*.

Again, there is another operation of the soul, lower than this one, which is, to be sure, effected by means of a corporeal organ, but not by means of any corporeal quality (*fit per organum corporale non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem*); and this is the operation of the *sentient soul*. For even though *hot* and *cold* and *moist* and *dry* and other corporeal qualities of this sort are required for the operation of the sensory power, they are nonetheless not required in such a way that the sentient soul's operation proceeds by the mediation of the power of such qualities; instead, they are required only for appropriately disposing the organ.

Again, the lowest operation of the soul is that which is effected by means of a corporeal organ and by the power of a corporeal quality. Yet this operation exceeds the operation of corporeal nature because the motions of bodies are from an exterior principle, whereas operations of the sort in question are from an intrinsic principle—something that is common to all the operations of the soul, since anything with a soul (*omne animatum*) moves itself in some way. And this is the operation of the *vegetative soul*; for, as *De Anima* 2 explains, digestion and what follows upon digestion are effected instrumentally by the action of heat.

By contrast, the *kinds of powers* belonging to the soul are distinguished by their objects. As was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), the higher a power is, the more universal the object it is related to. But the object of the soul's operation can be thought of in a three-step ordering:

For the object of some of the soul's operations is just the body that is united to the soul. And this kind of power belonging to the soul is the *vegetative*, since the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united.

Again, there is another kind of power belonging to the soul that has a more universal object, viz., all bodies that can be sensed (*omne corpus sensibile*), and not just the body united to the soul.

And there is yet another kind of power belonging to the soul that has a still more universal object, viz., not just all the bodies that can be sensed but every being in general (*universaliter omne ens*).

From this it is clear that these last two kinds of power belonging to the soul have an operation not only with respect to the conjoined being, but also with respect to extrinsic beings. But since something that operates must in some way be conjoined to the object with respect to which it operates, it is necessary for an extrinsic being that is the object of an operation of the soul to be related to the soul in two ways:

First, it must be related to the soul in such a way that it is apt to be conjoined to the soul and to exist in the soul through a likeness of itself (*per suam similitudinem*); and in this regard there are two kinds of power, viz., the *sentient power* with respect to the less general object (*respectu obiecti minus communis*), i.e., the sensible body, and the *intellective power* with respect to the most general object of all, i.e., being in general (*ens universale*).

Second, the soul is itself inclined toward and tends toward the exterior being. And in accord with this relation there are two kinds of power belonging to the soul, viz., the *appetitive power*, according to which the soul is related to an extrinsic being as to an end, which is the first thing in intention, and the *power of effecting movement with respect to place*, insofar as the soul is related to the exterior being as to a terminus of operation and motion; for every animal effects movement in order to obtain something that is desired and intended.

Lastly, the *ways of being alive* are distinguished in a manner that corresponds to the grades of living things. For some living things, viz., *plants*, are such that only the vegetative is present in them. Some are such that, in addition to the vegetative, the sentient is also present, but not movement with

respect to place; these are the *immobile animals* such as small shellfish (*conchilia*). Still other living things are such that they have, in addition, movement with respect to place; these are the *perfect animals*, which require many things for their life and so need movement in order to be able to find the necessities that are situated at some distance from them. Finally, there are some living beings, viz., *men*, in whom the intellective is combined with the others. However, as *De Anima* 2 explains, the appetitive does not constitute a separate grade of living thing, since appetite exists in everything in which sentience exists.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The first two objections are answered by what has been said.

Reply to objection 3: A *natural appetite* is an inclination which an entity has by its nature toward something; hence, it is by a natural appetite that every power desires what is fitting for it. However, an *animal's appetite* follows upon an apprehended form. And for an appetite of this sort a special power of the soul is required; the power of apprehension (*apprehensio*) is not by itself sufficient. For a thing is desired insofar as it exists in its own nature. But it does not exist with its own nature in the apprehensive power; instead, it exists there by means of a likeness.

Hence, it is clear that it is only for its own act that the sense of sight naturally desires the visible thing; that is, it desires to see it. By contrast, an animal, through its appetitive power, desires the thing seen not only in order to see it, but also for its other uses. And if the soul needed the things perceived by the sensory powers only for the sake of the actions of those powers—i.e., only in order that it might sense those things—then it would not be necessary to posit the appetitive as a special genus among the powers of the soul. For in that case the natural appetite of the powers would be sufficient.

Reply to objection 4: Even though the appetitive and sensory powers are principles for effecting movement in perfect animals, it is nonetheless not the case that the appetitive and sensory powers as such are sufficient to effect movement without some other power being added to them. For immobile animals have appetitive and sensory powers, and yet they do not have the power to effect movement. Moreover, this power to effect movement exists not only in the appetitive and sensory powers insofar as they command movement, but also in the parts of the body themselves, in order that they might readily obey the appetitive power of the soul that moves them. An indication of this is that when the members of the body lose their natural disposition, they do not obey the appetitive power with respect to movement.

Article 2

Are the parts of the vegetative soul appropriately enumerated as the nutritive, the augmentative and the generative?

It seems that the parts of the vegetative soul are not appropriately enumerated as the nutritive, the augmentative and the generative:

Objection 1: Powers (*vires*) of this sort are called 'natural'. But the powers (*potentiae*) of the soul go beyond natural powers (*supra vires naturales*). Therefore, powers (*vires*) of this sort should not be posited as powers of the soul (*potentiae animae*).

Objection 2: What is common to both living and non-living things should not be counted as a power of the soul. But generation is common to all generable and corruptible things, both living and non-living. Therefore, the generative power should not be posited as a power of the soul.

Objection 3: The soul is more powerful than a corporeal nature is. But it is by the very same active power that a corporeal nature communicates both the species and appropriate size (*speciem et debitam quantitatem*). Therefore, *a fortiori*, the same holds for the soul. Therefore, the augmentative

power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power.

Objection 4: Each thing is conserved in *esse* by that through which it has *esse*. But it is the generative power through which an entity acquires the *esse* of a living thing. Therefore, a living thing is conserved through that same power. But as *De Anima* 2 explains, it is the nutritive power that is ordered toward the conservation of a living thing, since it is a power that is able preserve its subject. Therefore, the nutritive power should not be distinguished from the generative power.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher says that the works of this soul are “to generate and to make use of nourishment,” and again, “to effect growth” (*augmentum facere*).

I respond: There are three powers of the vegetative part [of the soul]. For as has been explained (a. 1), the vegetative part has as its object the very body that is alive through the soul, and there are three operations of the soul that are necessary for such a body.

One operation is that through which it acquires *esse*, and this is what the *generative* power is ordered toward. The second is that through which the living body acquires its appropriate size, and this is what the *augmentative* power is ordered toward. The third operation is that through which the body of a living thing is preserved both in *esse* and in its appropriate size, and this is what the *nutritive* power is ordered toward.

However, there is a certain difference among these powers that has to be noted. For the nutritive and augmentative powers have their effect in the thing in which they exist, since it is the very body that is united to the soul that grows and is conserved through the augmentative and nutritive powers that exist in that same soul. By contrast, the generative power has its effect not in the same body but in another body, since nothing generates its very own self. And so the generative power in a certain sense approaches the dignity of the sentient soul, which has an operation with respect to exterior things—even though the sentient soul has this sort of operation in a more excellent and universal way—since, as is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, the highest manifestation of a lower nature attains to the lowest manifestation of a higher nature.

And so, as *De Anima* 2 says, among these three powers it is the generative that is closer to the boundary [with the sentient] and more important and more perfect; for it is an already perfected entity that “has the role of making another entity like itself.” Moreover, the augmentative and nutritive powers serve the generative power, while the nutritive power serves the augmentative.

Reply to objection 1: Powers of the sort in question are called ‘natural’ both (a) because they have an effect that is similar to that of nature, which likewise communicates *esse*, size, and conservation (though these powers do it in a higher way), and also (b) because these powers exercise their actions by the instrumentality of the active and passive powers that are the principles of natural actions.

Reply to objection 2: Among inanimate things, generation is totally from the outside (*ab extrinseco*). By contrast, the generation of living things has a higher mode, through something that belongs to the living being itself, viz., its seed (*semen*), in which there resides a principle that gives form to the body. And so in a living thing there has to be a power through which this sort of seed is prepared; and this is the generative power.

Reply to objection 3: Since the generation of living things is by means of seed, the animal that is generated must be small in size at the beginning. Because of this, it has to have a power of the soul through which it is brought to its appropriate size. By contrast, an inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent, and so it receives both its species and quantity simultaneously in accord with the condition of the matter.

Reply to objection 4: As has already been explained (a. 1), the operation of the vegetative principle is brought to completion by the mediation of heat, the role of which is to consume moisture. And so in order to restore the moisture that is lost, the vegetative principle needs to have a nutritive

power through which food is converted into the substance of the body. This is likewise necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.

Article 3

Are the five exterior sensory powers appropriately distinguished?

It seems that the five exterior sensory powers (*sensus*) are not appropriately distinguished:

Objection 1: The senses have cognition of accidents. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, since powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the sensory powers are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents.

Objection 2: Shape and size and the other accidents that are called ‘common sensibles’ are not ‘*per accidens* sensibles’, but are instead divided off against the latter in *De Anima* 2. But it is a diversity of *per se* objects that diversifies powers. Therefore, since shape and size differ more from color than sound does, it seems that, *a fortiori*, there should be another sentient power that has cognition of shape and size rather than of color and sound.

Objection 3: A single sense has cognition of a single pair of contraries (*unus sensus est unius contrarietatis*); for instance, the sense of sight has cognition of white and black. But the sense of touch has cognition of several pairs of contraries, viz., hot and cold, moist and dry, etc. Therefore, the sense of touch is not a single sensory power, but a number of them. Therefore, there are more than five sensory powers.

Objection 4: Species are not divided off against their genus. But the sense of taste is a sort of sense of touch. Therefore, it should not be posited as another sense over and beyond the sense of touch.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that “there is no other sensory power beyond these five.”

I respond: Some want to take the explanation for the distinctions among, and number of, the exterior sensory powers from the organs in which one or another of the elements dominates—either water or air or something of that sort. Others take the explanation from the medium, either the conjoined medium or the extrinsic medium, be it air or water or something else of that sort. Still others take it from the diverse natures of the sensible qualities, depending on whether the quality in question belongs to a simple body or whether instead it follows upon complexity.

However, none of these views is satisfactory. For the powers do not exist for the sake of the organs; rather, the organs exist for the sake of the powers. Hence it is not because there are diverse organs that there are diverse powers. Rather, nature instituted diversity in the organs in order that they might correspond to a diversity of powers. Similarly, nature provided the diverse media for the diverse sensory powers, insofar as this was appropriate for the acts of the powers. And it is the intellect—and not the sensory powers—that has cognition of the natures of the sensible qualities.

Therefore, the explanation for the number of, and distinctions among, the exterior sensory powers has to be taken from what is proper and *per se* to the sensory powers themselves. Now a sensory power is a passive power that is susceptible to being affected by an exterior sensible thing. Therefore, the exterior things that effect the changes are what a sensory power perceives *per se*, and the sensory powers are distinguished from one another in a way that corresponds to the diversity of such things.

Now there are two kinds of change, *natural change* (*immutatio naturalis*) and *spiritual change* (*immutatio spiritualis*). A change is *natural* insofar as the form of the thing that effects the change is received with its natural *esse* in the thing changed, e.g., heat in a thing that is heated. The change is

spiritual insofar as the form of the thing that effects the change is received with spiritual *esse* in the thing changed, e.g., the form of a color in the pupil, which does not thereby become colored. And for the operation of a sensory power what is required is a spiritual change, through which an *intention* of the sensible form (*intentio formae sensibilis*) comes to exist in the organ of the sensory power. Otherwise, if a natural change were by itself sufficient for sensing, then every natural body would have sensation whenever it was altered.

Now in certain sensory powers, e.g., the *sense of sight*, there is only a spiritual change, whereas in the other sensory powers the spiritual change is accompanied by a natural change either on the part of the object alone or on the part of the organ as well.

On the part of the object, the natural change is with respect to place in the case of sound, which is the object of the *sense of hearing*. For sound is caused by vibration and movement in the air. And as for alteration, in the case of odor, which is the object of the *sense of smell*, a body has to be altered in some way through heat in order to give off an odor.

On the part of the organ, a natural change is involved in the *sense of touch* and the *sense of taste*; for instance, when a hand touches something hot, it itself becomes hot; and the tongue is moistened by the moistness of various tastes. By contrast, the organ of the sense of smell and the organ of the sense of hearing do not undergo any natural change in sensing, except incidentally.

Now since the sense of sight does not involve a natural change in either the organ or the object, it is maximally spiritual, and it is the most perfect and the most general of all the sensory powers. And after the sense of sight comes the sense of hearing, and then the sense of smell, both of which involve a natural change on the part of the object; for as *Physics* 8 proves, local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration. On the other hand, the sense of touch and the sense of taste are the most material; the distinction between them will be explained in a moment (*ad* 3 and *ad* 4 below). The reason why the first three senses are not effected through a conjoined medium is so that no natural change will touch the organ, as occurs with these last two sensory powers.

Reply to objection 1: Not all accidents have the power to effect change (*vim immutativam*) in their own right; rather, only qualities of the third species are such that alteration occurs because of them. And so only qualities of this sort are the objects of the sensory powers; for as *Physics* 7 explains, “A sensory power is altered in the same way that inanimate bodies are.”

Reply to objection 2: Size and shape and other such accidents, which are called *common sensibles*, lie between *per accidens sensibles* and *proper sensibles*, where the latter are the objects of the sensory powers.

For the proper sensibles effect change in the sensory powers directly and primarily (*primo et per se*), since they are the qualities that effect alterations.

By contrast, the common sensibles are all traced back to quantity. In the case of size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity, whereas shape is a quality that involves quantity, since the nature of a shape consists in its being the boundary of a magnitude (*terminatio magnitudinis*). On the other hand, motion and rest are sensed insofar as the subject is related in one or more ways to (a) the magnitude of an object or of its spatial distance (in the case of augmentation or local motion), or to (b) sensible qualities (in the case of alteration). And so to sense motion and rest is in a certain way to sense one thing and many things.

Now a quantity is the proximate subject of a quality that effects alteration; for instance, a surface is the proximate subject of a color. And so the common sensibles do not effect change primarily and directly in a sensory power. Rather, they effect such change by means of a sensible quality; for instance, a surface effects change in a sensory power by means of its color.

And yet the common sensibles are not *per accidens* sensibles, since common sensibles make for variations in the way that a sensory power is affected. For instance, a sensory power is affected in

different ways by a large surface and by a small surface, since the whiteness itself is also called large or small and so is divided in accord with its proper subject.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher seems to say in *De Anima* 2, the sense of touch is one in genus but divided into many species of sensory power; and this is why it has diverse pairs of contraries as objects. However, these species are not separated from one another by organ, but are instead spread throughout the whole body, and so the distinction among them is not obvious. On the other hand, the sense of taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, is joined together with the sense of touch in the tongue, but not throughout the whole body, and so it is easily distinguished from the sense of touch.

However, one could reply that all these pairs of contraries are such that (a) each belongs to a single proximate genus and (b) all of them together belong to a common genus that is the object of the sense of touch according to its common nature. But this common genus is unnamed, in the same way that the proximate genus of *hot* and *cold* is unnamed.

Reply to objection 4: According to what the Philosopher says, the sense of taste is that species of the sense of touch which exists just in the tongue, and it is distinct not from the sense of touch in general but from those species of the sense of touch that are spread throughout the body.

On the other hand, if the sense of touch is just a single sensory power because of the single common nature of its object, one will have to say that the sense of taste is distinguished from the sense of touch by reason of different sorts of changes. For as far as its organ is concerned, and given the quality which is its proper object, the sense of touch is affected by a natural change and not just a spiritual change. The organ of the sense of taste, however, is not necessarily affected with a natural change by the quality that is its proper object, in such a way, namely, that the tongue itself becomes sweet or bitter; instead, it is affected by the preparatory quality on which taste is based, viz., moistness, which is an object of the sense of touch.

Article 4

Are the interior sensory powers appropriately distinguished?

It seems that the interior sensory powers are not appropriately distinguished:

Objection 1: What is common is not divided off [on the same level] over against what is proper (*commune non dividitur contra proprium*). Therefore, the common sensory power (*sensus communis*) should not be enumerated among the interior sentient powers, over against the proper exterior sensory powers.

Objection 2: One should not posit an interior apprehensive power for any object that a proper and exterior sensory power is sufficient for. But the proper exterior sensory powers are sufficient for judging sensible things, since each sensory power judges with respect to its own proper object. These sensory powers seem likewise sufficient for perceiving their own acts; for instance, since the action of a sensory power in some sense lies between the power and the object, it seems that the sense of sight is much more capable of perceiving its own act of seeing, as something closer to itself, than of seeing color—and so on for the other sensory powers. Therefore, it was unnecessary to posit an interior power, called the ‘common sensory power’, for this purpose.

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher, the power of imagining (*vis phantastica*) and the power of remembering (*vis memorativa*) are passions of the primary sentient power. But a passion is not divided off over against its subject. Therefore, memory (*memoria*) and imagination (*phantasia*) should not be posited as powers distinct from the sensory power.

Objection 4: The intellect is less dependent on the sensory power than is any power of the sentient part of the soul. But the intellect does not have cognition of anything unless it receives it from the sensory power; for as *Posterior Analytics* 1 says, “Whoever lacks one of the sensory powers lacks one sort of knowledge.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, one should not posit a power of the sentient part, called the estimative power (*vis aestimativa*), to perceive intentions that are not perceived by the sensory power.

Objection 5: Acts of the cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*), i.e., comparing and composing and dividing, and acts of the power of reminiscing (*vis reminiscitiva*), i.e., using a sort of syllogism to conduct an inquiry, are no less distant from the acts of the estimative power and of the power of remembering than acts of the estimative power are from an act of imagining (*ab actu phantasiae*). Therefore, either the cogitative power and power of reminiscing should be posited as powers distinct from the estimative power and the power of remembering, or else the estimative power and the power of remembering should not be posited as powers over and beyond the power of imagining.

Objection 6: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine posits three types of vision: (a) *corporeal vision*, which is effected through the sensory power; (b) *spiritual vision*, which is effected through the power of imagining or fantasizing (*per imaginationem sive phantasiam*); and (c) *intellectual vision*, which is effected through the intellect. Therefore, there is no interior power other than the power of imagining that lies between the sensory powers and the intellect.

But contrary to this: In his *De Anima* Avicenna posits five interior sentient powers, viz., “the common sensory power (*sensus communis*), the imaging power (*phantasia*), the imaginative power (*potentia imaginativa*), the estimative power (*potentia aestimativa*), and the power of remembering (*potentia memorativa*).”

I respond: Since nature is not lacking in what is necessary, there must be as many actions of the sentient part of the soul as are sufficient for the life of a perfect animal. And if these actions cannot all be traced back to a single principle, then they require diverse powers, since a power of the soul is nothing other than a proximate principle for the soul’s operation.

Note, then, that the life of a perfect animal requires that the animal apprehend a thing not only in the presence of the sensible object, but also in its absence. Otherwise, since an animal’s movement and action follow upon apprehension, the animal would not move in order to find out about a thing that is absent—just the opposite of what appears to be true, especially in the case of perfect animals, which move purposefully (*moventur motu processivo*), since they are moving toward something absent that has been apprehended. Therefore, through its sentient soul the animal must not only receive the species of sensible things when it is presently being affected by those things, but must also retain and conserve the species. But among corporeal things, to receive and to retain are traced back to diverse principles; for instance, moist things are good at receiving but bad at retaining, and the opposite holds for dry things. Hence, since the sentient power is the act of a corporeal organ, a power that receives sensible species must be different from a power that conserves them.

Again, note that if an animal moved solely because of sensibly pleasurable or painful things, one would have to posit in the animal only an apprehension of forms that the sensory power perceives and with respect to which it takes delight or feels revulsion. But an animal has to seek out or flee from certain things not only because they are pleasant or unpleasant to sense, but also because of other kinds of suitability and utility, or harm—as, for instance, when a sheep, seeing a wolf coming, flees not because of the ugliness of the wolf’s color or shape, but because of the danger to the sheep’s nature; or as when a bird collects straw not because the straw delights its senses, but because this is useful for building a nest. Therefore, an animal has to perceive intentions of this sort which the exterior sensory powers do not perceive. And for this sort of perception there has to be some distinct principle, since perception of sensible forms comes from changes effected by the sensible thing, whereas the perception of the

intentions just alluded to does not.

So, then, the *proper sensory powers* and the *common sensory power* are ordered toward the reception of sensible forms. (The distinction between them will be explained below.)

On the other hand, the *imaging power* or *power of imagining* (*phantasia vel imaginatio*)—they are the same—is ordered toward the retention or conservation of forms. For the imaging (or imagining) power is, as it were, a sort of treasury of forms that have been received through the sensory power.

Now the *estimative power* (*vis aestimativa*) is ordered toward apprehending intentions that are not received through the sensory power, whereas the *power of remembering* (*vis memorativa*), which is a treasury of intentions of this sort, is ordered toward conserving them. An indication of this is that, in animals, the source of remembering comes from some intention of this sort, e.g., that something is harmful or agreeable. And the very nature of the past, which the power of remembering attends to, is intertwined with intentions of this sort.

Now note that as far as sensible forms are concerned, there is no difference between man and the other animals, since they are affected in similar ways by sensible exterior things. However, there is a difference with respect to the intentions we have just been talking about. For the other animals perceive intentions of this sort only by a sort of natural instinct, whereas man also perceives them through a certain comparison (*per quamdam collationem*). And so what in animals is called the *natural estimative power*, in man is called the *cognitive power*, which arrives at intentions of this sort through a certain comparison. Hence, it is also called *particular reason*, and physicians assign it a determinate organ, viz., the middle part of the head; for it compares intentions of individuals in the way in which *intellective reason* compares intentions of universals.

As for the power of remembering, man has not only *memory* (*memoria*), like the other animals, in the immediate recording of past things, but also *reminiscence* (*reminiscentia*) in inquiring quasi-syllogistically into the memory of the past by means of individual intentions.

Now Avicenna posits a fifth power, between the estimative power and the power of imagining, which composes and divides the imagined forms—as is clear, for instance, when from the imagined form of gold and imagined form of a mountain we compose a single form of a golden mountain, which we never actually see. But this operation is not apparent in animals other than man, in whom the power of imagining is sufficient for this. In his book *De Sensu et Sensibilibus* Averroes likewise attributes this action to the power of imagining.

And so it is necessary to posit just four interior powers of the sentient part of the soul, viz., the common sensory power (*sensus communis*), the power of imagining (*vis imaginativa*), the estimative power (*vis aestimativa*), and the power of remembering (*vis memorativa*).

Reply to objection 1: The interior sensory power is called ‘common’ not through predication, like a genus, but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.

Reply to objection 2: A proper sensory power judges a proper sensible by distinguishing it from other things that fall under the same sensory power, e.g., distinguishing white from black or green. But neither the sense of sight nor the sense of taste can distinguish white from sweet, since whatever makes a distinction between two things must have cognition of both of them. Hence, the judgment regarding this distinction must belong to the common sensory power, which is such that (a) all the apprehensions of the senses are referred to it as to a common terminus, and such that (b) it also perceives the intentions of the sensory powers, as when someone sees that he is seeing. For the latter cannot be done through a proper sensory power, which has cognition only of the sensible form by which it is changed. The act of seeing is perfected in such a change, and from this change there follows another change in the common sensory power, which perceives the act of seeing.

Reply to objection 3: Just as one power arises from the soul by the mediation of another power in the way explained above (q. 77, a. 7), so too the soul is the subject of one power by the mediation of

another. It is in this sense that the power of imagining and the power of remembering are called passions of the primary sentient power (*passiones primi sensitivi*).

Reply to objection 4: Even though the intellect's operation arises from the sensory power, nonetheless, in the entity apprehended through the sensory power the intellect knows many things that the sensory power is unable to perceive. The same holds for the estimative power, though on a lower level.

Reply to objection 5: The cogitative power and power of remembering have an eminence in man not because they are proper to the sentient part of the soul, but—by a sort of overflow—because of their affinity for and nearness to universal reason. And so they are not different powers from the ones in other animals, but the same powers, and yet more perfect.

Reply to objection 6: Augustine is calling 'spiritual vision' the vision which is effected by the likenesses of bodies in the absence of the bodies. From this it is clear that spiritual vision is common to all interior apprehensions.

QUESTION 79

The Intellective Powers

Next we ask about the intellective powers. On this topic there are thirteen questions: (1) Is the intellect a power of the soul, or is it the soul's essence? (2) If it is a power, is it a passive power? (3) If it is a passive power, should one posit an active intellect (*intellectus agens*)? (4) Is the active intellect a part of the soul? (5) Is there a single active intellect for everyone? (6) Does memory exist in the intellect? (7) Is it a power distinct from the intellect? (8) Is reason a power different from the intellect? (9) Are higher reason and lower reason distinct powers? (10) Is intellective understanding (*intelligentia*) a distinct power over and beyond the intellect? (11) Are the speculative intellect and the practical intellect distinct powers? (12) Is *synderesis* a power of the intellective part of the soul? (13) Is conscience a power of the intellective part of the soul?

Article 1

Is the intellect a power of the soul, or is it instead the soul's essence?

It seems that the intellect (*intellectus*) is not a power of the soul, but is instead the soul's essence:

Objection 1: The intellect (*intellectus*) seems to be the same thing as the mind (*mens*). But the mind is the essence of the soul and not a power of the soul; for in *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, “‘Mind’ (*mens*) and ‘spirit’ (*spiritus*) are not predicated as relations (*relative*), but instead point to the essence.” Therefore, the intellect is the very essence of the soul.

Objection 2: The diverse kinds of power that belong to the soul are united in the soul's essence alone and not in any one power. But as *De Anima* 2 says, the appetitive and the intellective are diverse kinds of power belonging to the soul. And yet they come together in the mind (*mens*); for in *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine locates intellective understanding (*intelligentia*) and willing (*voluntas*) in the mind. Therefore, the mind or intellect (*mens et intellectus*) is the very essence of the soul and not one of its powers.

Objection 3: According to Gregory in his homily on the feast of the Ascension, “Man has intellective understanding along with the angels.” But the angels are called ‘minds’ and ‘intellects’. Therefore, the mind or intellect of a man is the soul itself and not one of the powers of the soul.

Objection 4: It is because a substance is immaterial that it is intellective. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore, it seems that the soul is intellective through its essence.

But contrary to this: As is clear from *De Anima* 2, the Philosopher posits the intellective as a power of the soul.

I respond: Given what was said above (q. 54, a. 3 and q. 77, a. 1), one should reply that the intellect is a power of the soul and not the very essence of the soul. The only time the immediate principle of an operation is the very essence of a thing is when the operation itself is the thing's *esse*. For an essence is related to its *esse* in the same way that a power is related to its operation, i.e., its act. But it is only in the case of God that His intellective understanding (*intelligere*) is the same as His *esse*. Hence, it is only in the case of God that His intellect is His essence, whereas in other intellectual creatures the intellect is a certain power of the one who has intellective understanding (*quaedam potentia intelligentis*).

Reply to objection 1: ‘Sense’ (*sensus*) is sometimes taken for a power and sometimes for the sentient soul itself, since the sentient soul is denominated by the name of its principal power, viz., the sensory power. Likewise, the intellective soul is sometimes denominated by the name ‘intellect’ as by its principal power. For instance, *De Anima* 1 says, “The intellect is a certain substance.” And this is also

the sense in which Augustine says that the mind is ‘spirit’ or ‘essence’.

Reply to objection 2: The appetitive and the intellective are diverse kinds of power belonging to the soul, corresponding to diverse types of objects. But the appetitive agrees in part with the intellective and in part with the sentient as regards the mode of operating with a corporeal organ and the mode of operating without a corporeal organ. For appetite follows upon apprehension. This is why Augustine locates willing (*voluntas*) in the mind (*mens*) and the Philosopher puts it in reason (*ratio*).

Reply to objection 3: In the angels there are no powers other than the intellective power and the will, which follows upon intellective understanding. And the reason why an angel is called a ‘mind’ or an ‘intellect’ is that all his power consists in this. By contrast, the soul has many other powers, such as the sentient and nutritive powers. And so the two cases are not parallel.

Reply to objection 4: The immateriality of an intelligent created substance is not itself its intellect; rather, it is because of its immateriality that it has the power to have intellective understanding (*virtutem ad intelligendum*). Hence, the intellect does not have to be the substance of the soul; all it has to be is the soul’s virtue and power (*virtus et potentia*).

Article 2

Is the intellect a passive power?

It seems that the intellect is not a passive power:

Objection 1: Each thing is acted upon or suffers (*patitur*) in accord with its matter, whereas it acts by reason of its form. But the intellective power follows upon the immateriality of an intelligent substance. Therefore, it seems that the intellect is not a passive power.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 75, a. 6), the intellective power is incorruptible. But as *De Anima* 3 says, if the intellect is passive, then it is corruptible. Therefore, the intellective power is not passive.

Objection 3: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 and as Aristotle says in *De Anima* 3, to act is more noble than to be acted upon. But all the powers of the vegetative part of the soul are active, and yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the intellective powers, which are the highest, are all active powers.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “To have intellective understanding (*intelligere*) is in some way to be acted upon.”

I respond: ‘To suffer’ or ‘to be acted upon’ (*pati*) has three senses:

First, its most proper sense, viz., when something that belongs to a thing by its nature or by a proper inclination is taken away from it—as, for instance, when water loses its coldness by being heated, or when a man gets sick or becomes sad.

Second, a less proper sense, viz., when someone is said to suffer or be acted upon by reason of the fact that something is taken away from him, whether or not the thing in question is agreeable to him. In this sense, someone is said to suffer or be acted upon not only when he gets sick but also when he gets well, not only when he becomes sad but also when he becomes joyful, or when he is altered or moved in any way at all.

Third, a thing is said to be acted upon in a general sense (*pati communiter*) solely by reason of the fact that what is in potentiality in some respect receives what it was in potentiality with respect to, without losing anything at all. In this sense, anything that goes from potentiality to actuality can be said to suffer or be acted upon, even when it is being perfected. And this is the sense in which for us to have

intellective understanding is to be acted upon.

This is clear from the following line of reasoning:

As was explained above (q. 78, a. 1), an intellect has its operation with respect to being in general (*ens in universali*). Therefore, we can think about whether a given intellect is in potentiality or in actuality by considering how that intellect is related to being in general (*ens universale*).

For there is an intellect that is related to being in general (*ens universale*) as the actuality of all being (*actus totius entis*), and this is the divine intellect, i.e., God's essence, in which all being preexists virtually and in its origin, as in its first cause. And so God's intellect is not in potentiality but is instead pure actuality (*actus purus*).

By contrast, no created intellect can be related as actuality to the whole of being in general (*ut actus respectu totius entis universalis*), since in that case it would have to be an unlimited being (*ens infinitum*). Hence, by the very fact that it is created, a created intellect is not the actuality of all intelligible things, but is instead related to intelligible things themselves as potentiality is related to actuality.

Now there are two ways in which potentiality is related to actuality. There are some potentialities that are always being perfected by an actuality, as we claimed above (q. 58, a. 1) concerning the matter of the celestial bodies. On the other hand, there are some potentialities that are not always actualized (*non semper in actu*) but instead proceed from potentiality into actuality, as is the case with generable and corruptible things. Thus, the angelic intellect is always in actuality with respect to its intelligible things—and this because of its closeness to the first intellect, which, as was just explained, is pure actuality. By contrast, the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intellects and furthest from the perfection of God's intellect, is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things, and at the start it is “like a blank slate on which nothing has been written,” as the Philosopher puts it in *De Anima* 3. This is manifestly obvious from the fact that at the start we have intellective understanding only in potentiality, and afterwards we are brought to have intellective understanding in actuality.

So, then, it is clear that for us to have intellective understanding is for us to be acted upon, in the third sense of being acted upon. And, as a result, our intellect is a passive power.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the first and second senses of being acted upon, which are proper to primary matter. However, the third sense of being acted upon belongs to anything that is in potentiality and is then brought to actuality.

Reply to objection 2: According to some, the passive intellect is the sentient appetite, in which the passions of the soul reside and which, in *Ethics* 1, is called “rational by participation” because it obeys reason. On the other hand, according to others, the passive intellect is the cogitative power, which is named ‘particular reason’. In both cases, ‘passive’ is being taken in accord with the first two senses of being acted upon, insofar as such an ‘intellect’, so-called, is the act of a corporeal organ.

However, the intellect which is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things and which Aristotle for this reason names the ‘passive intellect’ (*intellectus possibilis*) is passive only in the third sense. For it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And so it is incorruptible.

Reply to objection 3: The agent is more noble than the patient as long as the action and passion are being referred back to the same thing; however, it is not always the case if they are being referred back to diverse things. Now the intellect is a passive power with respect to the whole of being in general, whereas the vegetative power is active with respect to a particular being, viz., the conjoined body. Hence, nothing prevents what is passive in the one way from being more noble than what is active in the other way.

Article 3

Is it appropriate to posit an active or agent intellect?

It seems that it is inappropriate to posit an active or agent intellect (*intellectus agens*):

Objection 1: Our intellect is related to intelligible things in the same way that the sensory power is related to sensible things. But it is not the case that because the sensory power is in potentiality with respect to sensible things, an active sensory power is posited; instead, only a passive sensory power is posited. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things, it seems that only a passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*) and not an active intellect (*intellectus agens*) should be posited.

Objection 2: If someone replies that there is also an agent, such as light, involved in sensing, then against this: Light is required for vision insofar as it makes the medium actually lucid; for color itself is in its own right the mover of what is lucid. By contrast, in the case of the intellect's operation there is no medium posited that has to be actualized (*quod necesse sit fieri in actu*). Therefore, it is unnecessary to posit an active intellect.

Objection 3: A likeness of the agent is received in the patient according to the mode of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power (*virtus immaterialis*). Therefore, the intellect's immateriality is sufficient for its being the case that forms are received in it in an immaterial mode (*immaterialiter*). But a form is actually intelligible by the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore, there is no need to posit an active intellect in order that it might make the species actually intelligible (*ad hoc quod faciat species intelligibiles in actu*).

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, "Just as in every nature, so also in the soul, there is something by which it becomes all things and something by which it makes all things." Therefore, it is appropriate to posit an active intellect.

I respond: According to Plato's opinion, there was no need to posit an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible (*ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu*)—though, as will be explained below (a. 4 and q. 84, a. 6), positing an active intellect was perhaps necessary in order to provide the 'intelligible light' for the one having intellectual understanding (*ad praeibendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti*). For Plato held that the forms of natural things subsist without matter and are consequently intelligible, since a thing is actually intelligible by virtue of being immaterial. He called them 'species' or 'ideas' (*species sive ideas*), and he said that it was by participating in these ideas that (a) corporeal matter is formed in the sense that the individuals are naturally constituted in their own genera and species, and that (b) our intellects are formed in the sense of having knowledge (*scientia*) of the genera and species of things.

By contrast, since Aristotle did not hold that the forms of natural things subsist without matter and since forms that exist in matter are not actually intelligible, it followed that the natures or forms of sensible things—natures that we have intellectual understanding of—are not actually intelligible. But nothing is brought from potentiality into actuality except by some actual being, in the way that the sensory power is brought into act by what is actually sensible. Therefore, it was necessary to posit some power on the part of the intellect that would render them actually intelligible by abstracting the species from material conditions. And this is why it is necessary to posit an active intellect.

Reply to objection 1: Sensible things are actualized outside the soul, and so there is no need to posit an active sensory power. And in this way it is clear that (a) in the nutritive part of the soul all the powers are active, whereas (b) in the sentient part all of them are passive, and (c) in the intellectual part there is something active and something passive.

Reply to objection 2: There are two opinions about what the effect of light is:

Some claim that light is required for vision because it makes the colors actually visible. And given this view, the active intellect is required for intellectual understanding in a way similar to, and for the same reason that, light is required for seeing.

By contrast, according to others, light is required for seeing not in order that the colors might become actually visible, but in order that the medium might become actually lucid, as the Commentator claims in *De Anima* 2. And given this view, the analogy by which Aristotle assimilates the active intellect to light consists in the fact that just as light is necessary for seeing something, so the active intellect is necessary for understanding something intellectually—but not for the same reason.

Reply to objection 3: Assuming that an agent already exists, it is quite possible for its likeness to be received in different ways in diverse patients because of their diverse dispositions. But if there is no preexistent agent, then the patient's disposition makes no difference in this regard.

Now as regards the nature of sensible things, which do not subsist outside of matter, there is nothing in the nature of the things that is actually intelligible. And so the immateriality of the passive intellect would not be sufficient for the intellectual understanding of those things if there were no active intellect present to make them actually intelligible by way of abstraction.

Article 4

Is the active intellect something that belongs to our soul?

It seems that the active intellect is not something that belongs to our soul:

Objection 1: The active intellect's effect is to illuminate for the sake of intellectual understanding. But this illumination is effected by something higher than the soul—this according to John 1:9 (“This was the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into this world”). Therefore, it seems that the active intellect is not something that belongs to the soul.

Objection 2: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says of the active intellect (*intellectui agenti*) that it “is not such that it is sometimes engaged in intellectual understanding and sometimes not (*non aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit*).” But our soul is not always engaged in intellectual understanding; rather, sometimes it is engaged in intellectual understanding and sometimes not. Therefore, the active intellect is not something that belongs to our soul.

Objection 3: An agent and a patient are sufficient for something's being done. Therefore, if the passive intellect, which is a passive power, belongs to our soul, and if the active intellect, which is an active power, does, too, then it will follow that a man is always able to engage in intellectual understanding when he wants to. But this is obviously false. Therefore, the active intellect is not something that belongs to our soul.

Objection 4: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the active intellect is “a substantial being in actuality (*substantia actu ens*).” But there is nothing that is both in actuality and in potentiality in the same respect. Therefore, if the passive intellect, which is in potentiality with respect to all intelligible things, is something that belongs to our soul, then it seems impossible for the active intellect to be something that belongs to our soul.

Objection 5: If the active intellect is something that belongs to our soul, then it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit, since habits and passions do not have the character of an agent with respect to the ‘passions of the soul’; rather, a passion is the action itself as belonging to the passive power, whereas a habit is something that follows upon actions. But every power of the soul flows from

the essence of the soul. Therefore, it would follow that the active intellect proceeds from the essence of the soul. And so it would not be in the soul through participation in any higher intellect—which is just wrong. Therefore, the active intellect is not something that belongs to our soul.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “It is necessary for these differences to exist in the soul,” viz., the passive intellect and the active intellect.

I respond: The active intellect of which the Philosopher speaks is something that belongs to the soul.

To see this clearly, note that beyond the human intellective soul it is necessary to posit a higher intellect from which the soul obtains its power to engage in intellective understanding. For it is always the case that what participates in something and is changeable and imperfect requires prior to itself something that is such-and-such through its essence, unchangeable, and perfect. But the human soul is called ‘intellective’ through participation in an intellectual power. An indication of this is that the human soul is intellective not as a whole, but rather with respect to a part of itself. Moreover, it arrives at an intellective understanding of truth discursively and through a movement, by way of argument. Again, it has imperfect intellective understanding, both because it does not understand all things and also because in the case of those things that it does understand, it proceeds from potentiality to actuality. Therefore, there must be some higher intellect by which the soul is assisted in engaging in intellective cognition. Thus, some have claimed that it is this intellect, separated with respect to its substance, which is the active intellect and which, by illuminating the phantasms, renders things actually intelligible.

However, granted that there is some such separated active intellect, it is nonetheless still necessary to posit within the human soul itself a power which is a participation in that higher intellect and through which the human soul renders things actually intelligible. As in the case of other perfect natural entities, there are, in addition to the universal agent causes, proper powers that are derived from the universal agents and given to individual perfect things. For instance, it is not the sun alone that generates a man; rather, there is in man a power to generate man—and the same holds for the other perfect animals. But among lower things there is none more perfect than the human soul. Hence, one must claim that within the human soul there is a power, derived from a higher intellect, through which it can illuminate phantasms. We know this from experience when we perceive ourselves abstracting universal forms from particular conditions—which is what it is to render things actually intelligible. But as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1) when we were discussing the passive intellect, an action belongs to a being only through some principle that formally inheres in it. Therefore, the power that is the principle of this action must be something within the soul. This is why Aristotle compared the active intellect to light, which is something received in the air.

Plato, on the other hand, compared the separated intellect that leaves an impression on our souls (*imprimenter in animas nostras*) to the sun, as Themistius reports in his commentary on *De Anima* 3. Now according to the teaching of our Faith, this separated intellect is God Himself, who is the creator of the soul and in whom alone the soul is beatified, as will become clear below (q. 90, a. 3 and *ST* 1-2, q. 3, a. 7). Hence, it is because of Him that the human soul participates in the intellectual light—this according to Psalm 4:7 (“The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”).

Reply to objection 1: The true light in question illuminates as a universal cause, because of which, as has been explained, the human soul participates in a certain particular power.

Reply to objection 2: The Philosopher is talking about actually engaging in intellective understanding and not about the active intellect. Hence, a little before this he had said of the former that it is the same as actual knowledge of the thing.

An alternative reply is that if he is indeed talking about the active intellect, what he means is that it is not because of the active intellect (*non est ex parte intellectus agentis*) that we are sometimes engaged in intellective understanding and sometimes not; instead, it is because of the intellect that is in

potentiality.

Reply to objection 3: If the active intellect were related to the passive intellect as an active object is related to a power, in the way that something visible in actuality is related to the power of sight, then it would follow that we have intellectual understanding of all things immediately, since the active intellect's function is to fashion all things.

As things stand, however, the active intellect behaves not as an object but as that which renders the objects actual, and what is required for this, besides the presence of the active intellect, are (a) the presence of phantasms, (b) well-disposed sentient powers, and (c) the exercise of the right sort of act. For through one thing that is understood intellectually other things come to be understood as well; for instance, propositions come to be understood through terms, and conclusions come to be understood through first principles. And as far as this is concerned, it makes no difference whether the active intellect is something that belongs to the soul or something separated.

Reply to objection 4: The intellectual soul is, to be sure, actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality with respect to the determinate species of things. Conversely, the phantasms are in actuality likenesses of certain appearances (*similitudines specierum quarundam*), but they are immaterial in potentiality. Hence, nothing prevents one and the same soul, insofar as it is actually immaterial, from having (a) one power—a power called the active intellect—through which it renders things actually immaterial by abstracting them from the conditions of individual matter, and (b) another power that is receptive of this sort of species—and this power is called the passive intellect insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to species of this sort.

Reply to objection 5: Since the essence of the soul is immaterial and is created by the highest intellect, there is no problem with a power proceeding from it—just as other powers of the soul do—which is a participation in the highest intellect and by which it abstracts from matter.

Article 5

Is there a single active intellect for everyone?

It seems that there is a single active intellect for everyone:

Objection 1: Nothing that is separated from a body is multiplied as bodies are multiplied. But as *De Anima* 3 says, the active intellect is “separated.” Therefore, it is not multiplied in the many bodies of men, but is the same in everyone.

Objection 2: The active intellect fashions the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of oneness is *a fortiori* one. Therefore, there is a single active intellect for everyone.

Objection 3: All men agree in the first conceptions of the intellect. But they assent to these conceptions through the active intellect. Therefore, all men agree in having a single active intellect.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that the active intellect is like light. But it is not the case that the same light exists in diverse illuminated things. Therefore, it is not the case that the same active intellect exists in diverse men.

I respond: The truth with regard to this question depends on what has already been said (a. 4).

For if the active intellect were not something that belongs to the soul but were instead a separated substance, then there would be a single active intellect for all men. And this is how those who posit the oneness of the intellect understand the situation.

On the other hand, if the active intellect is something that belongs to the soul as one of its powers, then one must claim that there are many active intellects corresponding to the plurality of souls, and that

they are multiplied as men are multiplied, as was explained above (q. 76, a. 2). For it is impossible for numerically one and the same power to belong to diverse substances.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separated from the premise that the passive intellect is separated. For, as he points out, the active intellect is more noble than the passive intellect. But the reason why the passive intellect is called ‘separated’ is that it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And it is in this sense, too, that the active intellect is said to be ‘separated’—and not in the sense that it is a separated substance.

Reply to objection 2: The active intellect is a cause of the universal by abstracting it from matter. What is required for this is not that it be [numerically] one in everyone who has an intellect, but rather that it be one in everyone as regards its relation to those things from which it abstracts the universal and with respect to which the universal is one. And this feature belongs to the active intellect insofar as it is immaterial.

Reply to objection 3: All things of the same species share in an action that follows upon the nature of the species, and, consequently, they share in the power that is the principle of that action—but not in the sense that the power is numerically the same in all of them. Now to have cognition of the first intelligible things (*cognoscere prima intelligibilia*) is an action that follows upon the human species. Hence, all men must share in the power that is the principle of that action, and this is the power of the active intellect. But it is not necessary for this power to be numerically the same in everyone; what is necessary is that it should be derived from a single principle in each of them. And so the fact that men share in the first intelligible things points to the oneness of the separated intellect that Plato compares to the sun, but not to the oneness of the active intellect that Aristotle compares to light.

Article 6

Does memory exist in the intellective part of the soul?

It seems that memory does not exist in the intellective part of the soul:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that what belongs to the higher part of the soul “are not things that are common to men and beasts.” But memory is common to men and beasts; for in the same place he says, “Beasts can sense corporeal things through their bodily senses and commit those things to memory.” Therefore, memory does not belong to the intellective part of the soul.

Objection 2: Memory is of past things. But ‘past’ expresses a determinate time. Therefore, memory provides cognition of a thing under the rubric of a determinate time (*sub determinato tempore*), i.e., it provides cognition of something under the rubric of a *here* and *now*. But this feature belongs to the sensory power and not to the intellective power. Therefore, memory exists only in the sentient part of the soul and not in the intellective part.

Objection 3: What is conserved in the memory are the species of things that are not actually being thought about. But this cannot occur in the intellect, since the intellect becomes actualized (*fit in actu*) by being formed by an intelligible species (*per hoc quod informatur specie intelligibili*), and for the intellect to be actualized is just for it to be actually engaged in intellective understanding (*intellectum esse in actu est ipsum intelligere in actu*). And so the intellect understands in actuality all the things whose species it has within it. Therefore, it is not the case that memory exists in the intellective part.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “Memory, intellective understanding (*intelligentia*), and will are one mind.”

I respond: Since it is the nature of memory to conserve species of things that are not actually

being apprehended, the first thing that has to be considered is whether intelligible species are able to be conserved in this way in the intellect.

Avicenna, for one, claimed that this is impossible. For, he said, this sort of thing happens in the sentient part of the soul with respect to certain powers insofar as they are acts of corporeal organs in which species can be conserved without actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which lacks a corporeal organ, nothing exists except as actually intelligible (*nisi intelligibiliter*). Hence, if the likeness of a thing exists in the intellect, then that thing is such that it is actually being understood intellectually. So, then, according to him, as soon as someone ceases to be having an actual intellectual cognition of a given thing, the species of that thing ceases to exist in the intellect. Moreover, if he once again wants to have an intellectual cognition of that thing, then he must turn to the active intellect, which Avicenna posits as a separated substance, in order for the intelligible species to flow from it into the passive intellect. And from the exercise and practice of turning to the active intellect, there follows in the passive intellect, according to him, a certain facility of turning to the active intellect, a facility that he claimed is the habit of knowledge (*habitus scientiae*). Therefore, according to this position, there is nothing conserved in the intellectual part of the soul that is not actually being considered. Hence, on this view memory cannot be posited in the intellectual part of the soul.

However, this opinion is manifestly incompatible with what Aristotle says. For in *De Anima* 3 he says that (a) “when the passive intellect becomes each of the things in knowing them, it is said to be actually knowing them (*dicitur qui secundum actum*),” and that (b) “this happens when it is able to act *through itself*; thus, even at that point it is in some sense in potentiality, though not in the same way as it was before it learned or discovered the relevant thing.” Now the passive intellect is said to ‘become each thing’ insofar as it receives the species of each thing. Therefore, by the fact that it receives the species of intelligible things, it is such that it is able to operate when it wants to, but not such that it is always operating; for even then it is in some sense in potentiality, though in a different way from the way it was in potentiality before it had intellectual cognition. More specifically, it is in potentiality in the way in which someone who knows something habitually is in potentiality with respect to actually considering that thing.

Moreover, the position described above is contrary to reason. For what is received in a thing is received in it in accord with the mode of what receives it. But the intellect has a more stable and unchanging nature than does corporeal matter. Therefore, if corporeal matter holds on to the forms it receives not only while actually acting through them but also after it has ceased to act through them, then *a fortiori* the intellect will receive intelligible species in an unchangeable and permanent way, regardless of whether they are taken from sensible things or flow forth from some higher intellect.

So, then, if ‘memory’ is taken to mean merely a power that conserves species, then one must claim that memory exists in the intellectual part of the soul. On the other hand, if it is also part of the concept of memory that its object is something past insofar as it is past, then memory will exist only in the sentient part of the soul, which apprehends particulars, and not in the intellectual part. For since ‘the past insofar as it is the past’ signifies being under the rubric of a determinate time, it involves the condition of a particular.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as it conserves species, memory is not common to us and the beasts. For species are conserved not in the sentient part of the soul alone, but rather in the conjoined being, since the power of remembering is the act of an organ. By contrast, the intellect conserves species in its own right, without a connection to any corporeal organ. Hence, in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “The soul is the locus of species—not the whole soul, but the intellect.”

Reply to objection 2: Pastness (*praeteritio*) can apply to two things, viz., the *object* that one has cognition of, and the *act of cognition*.

These two are joined together in the sentient part of the soul, which apprehends a thing when it is

changed by a present sensible object. Hence, an animal remembers at the same time both (a) that it was *sensing at a prior time* in the past and (b) that it was sensing some *past sensible object*.

By contrast, as far as the intellective part is concerned, pastness is incidental to, and does not belong *per se* to, the intellect's *object*. For the intellect has an intellective understanding of a man insofar as he is a man, and it is incidental to a man insofar as he is a man that he exists in the present or in the past or in the future.

On the other hand, as far as the *act* is concerned, pastness can be taken account of *per se* in the intellect as well as in the sensory power. Our soul's having an intellective cognition is a particular act that exists at this or that time, since a man is said to be having an intellective cognition now or yesterday or tomorrow. This is not incompatible with the status of intellection (*non repugnat intellectualitati*), since even though this sort of act of intellective cognition is a particular, it is nonetheless an immaterial act, as was explained above concerning the intellect (q. 76, a. 1). And so just as the intellect has an intellective understanding of itself even though it itself is a singular intellect, so it has an intellective understanding of its own act of intellective understanding, which is a singular act existing in either the present or the past or the future.

So, then, insofar as it concerns past things, the nature of memory is preserved in the intellect by the fact that it understands intellectually that it has previously had an intellective understanding—but not by its having an intellective understanding of a past thing insofar as that thing has a *here* and *now*.

Reply to objection 3: An intelligible species sometimes exists in the intellect only in potentiality, and in such a case the intellect is said to be in potentiality. On the other hand, an intelligible species sometimes exists in the intellect because of the full completion of the act (*secundum ultimam completionem actus*), and in such a case the intellect is said to be actually engaged in intellective understanding (*tunc intelligit actu*). And sometimes the intellect is in a middle state between potentiality and actuality, and in that case the intellect is said to be habituated (*in habitu*); and it is in this mode that the intellect conserves species even when it is not actually engaged in intellective understanding.

Article 7

Is intellective memory a power distinct from the intellect?

It seems that intellective memory is a power distinct from the intellect:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine posits in the mind “memory, intellective understanding (*intelligentia*), and will.” But it is clear that memory is a power distinct from the will. Therefore, it is likewise a power distinct from the intellect.

Objection 2: The nature of the distinctions among the powers is the same in the case of the sentient part of the soul as it is in the case of the intellective part. But as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), in the sentient part memory is a power distinct from the sensory power. Therefore, memory in the intellective part of the soul is a power distinct from the intellect.

Objection 3: According to Augustine, memory, intellective understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one of them arises from another. But this could not be the case if memory were the same power as the intellect. Therefore, it is not the same power.

But contrary to this: It is part of the nature of memory that it is a treasury or locus where species are conserved. But as has been pointed out (a. 6), in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher attributes this role to the intellect. Therefore, in the intellective part of the soul it is not the case that memory is a power distinct from the intellect.

I respond: As has been explained (q. 77, a 3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the diverse natures of their objects, since the nature of each power consists in its being ordered toward what it is related to, i.e., its object. It was also explained above (q. 59, a. 4) that if a power is by its proper nature ordered toward an object taken under some general concept of the object, that power will not be diversified by the diversity of particular differences; for instance, the visual power, which relates to its object under the concept *being colored*, is not diversified by the difference between *white* and *black*.

Now the intellect is related to its object under the common conception *being* (*respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis*), since the passive intellect is that by which the intellect becomes all things. Hence, there is no difference among beings by which the passive intellect is diversified. Yet the passive intellect is diversified as a power from the active intellect because, with respect to the very same object, there must be one principle that is an active power and makes a thing to be an object in actuality, and another principle that is a passive power and is moved by the object now existing in actuality. And so the active power is related to its object as a being in actuality is related to a being in potentiality, whereas the passive power's relation to its object is just the opposite, as a being in potentiality is related to a being in actuality. So, then, there can be no difference among the powers in the intellect except the difference between the passive and the active.

Hence, it is clear that memory is not a power distinct from the intellect; for it pertains to the nature of a passive power to conserve as well as to receive.

Reply to objection 1: Even though in *Sentences* 1, dist. 3 the claim is made that memory, intellective understanding, and will are three "powers," this is nonetheless not what Augustine means. For in *De Trinitate* 14 he explicitly says, "If memory (*memoria*), intellective understanding (*intelligentia*), and will (*voluntas*) are taken to be always present in the soul regardless of whether they are being thought of, then they seem to belong to memory alone. At present, by 'intellective understanding' I mean that by which we understand when we are thinking, and by 'will' I mean love or affection (*dilectio*), which joins together the child with the parent." From this it is clear that Augustine is not using these words for three powers, but that he is instead taking 'memory' for the soul's habitual retention, whereas he is taking 'intellective understanding' for an act of the intellect and 'will' for an act of the will.

Reply to objection 2: The past and the present can be proper differences that diversify sentient powers, but they cannot, for the reason stated above (a. 6), be proper differences that diversify intellective powers.

Reply to objection 3: Intellective understanding arises from memory in the way that an act arises from a habit. And it is in this sense, too—and not as one power with respect to another—that memory is equal to intellective understanding.

Article 8

Is reason a power distinct from intellect?

It seems that reason (*ratio*) is a power distinct from the intellect (*intellectus*):

Objection 1: In *De Spiritu et Anima* it says, "When we wish to ascend from the lower to the higher, the first thing to occur to us is the sensory power, then the imagination, next reason (*ratio*), after that the intellect (*intellectus*).” Therefore, reason is a power distinct from the intellect, just as imagination is distinct from reason.

Objection 2: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says that the intellect is related to reason

in the way that eternity is related to time. But being in eternity does not belong to the same power as does being in time. Therefore, reason and intellect are not the same power.

Objection 3: Man shares intellect with the angels and sensory power with the brute animals. But reason, which is proper to man and by which man is called a ‘rational’ animal, is a power distinct from the sensory power. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, reason is a power distinct from the intellect, which belongs properly to the angels and is the source of their being called ‘intellectual’ beings.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 3 Augustine says, “That by which man exceeds the non-rational animals is reason (*ratio*), or mind (*mens*), or intellective understanding (*intelligentia*), or whatever other word it is most appropriately called by.” Therefore, reason and intellect and mind are a single power.

I respond: Reason and intellect cannot be diverse powers in man. This is seen clearly if the acts of the two of them are examined. For to have intellective understanding (*intelligere*) is simply to apprehend intelligible truth, whereas to engage in discursive reasoning (*rationari*) is to proceed from one thing that is understood to another in order to come to a cognition of intelligible truth (*veritatem intelligibilem cognoscere*). And so as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, angels, who by their nature have perfect possession of the cognition of intelligible truth, do not have to proceed from one thing to another, but instead apprehend the truth about things simply and without discursive reasoning (*simpliciter et absque discursu*). By contrast, as he says in the same place, men arrive at the understanding of intelligible truth by proceeding from one thing to another, and this is why they are called ‘rational’.

Therefore, it is clear that to engage in discursive reasoning (*rationari*) is related to having intellective understanding (*intelligere*) in the way that moving (*moveri*) is related to coming to rest (*quiescere*), or in the way that coming to acquire (*acquirere*) is related to possessing (*habere*)—where the one is complete (*perfecti*) and the other incomplete (*imperfecti*). And since motion always proceeds from what is unmoved and terminates in what is at rest, so it is that (a) on the path of *inquiry* (or *discovery*) (*secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis*) human reasoning proceeds from some things that are simply understood, viz., first principles, and, again, (b) on the path of *judgment* (*in via iudicii*) it returns through analysis (*resolvendo*) to the first principles and in light of them examines what has been discovered. Now it is clear that even among natural things, moving and coming to rest are traced back to one and the same power and not to diverse powers, since it is through the same nature that a thing moves to a place and rests in that place. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it is through the same power that we have intellective understanding and reason discursively. And so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.

Reply to objection 1: This enumeration is made in accord with an ordering of acts and not in accord with a distinction among powers—though the book in question does not have much authority in any case.

Reply to objection 2: The reply is clear from what has been said. For eternity is related to time in the way that what is unchanging is related to what is changing. And so Boethius is likening intellective understanding to eternity and discursive reasoning to time.

Reply to objection 3: The other animals are inferior to man to such an extent that they cannot attain to the cognition of the truth that reason seeks. Man, however, attains in an imperfect way the understanding of intelligible truth had by the angels. And so the angels’ cognitive power is not of a different genus from the cognitive power of reason, but is instead related to it as the perfect is related to the imperfect.

Article 9

Are higher reason and lower reason diverse powers?

It seems that higher reason and lower reason are diverse powers:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that the image of the Trinity exists in the higher part of reason but not in the lower part. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore, higher reason and lower reason are two distinct powers.

Objection 2: Nothing takes its origin from itself. But lower reason takes its origin from higher reason and is regulated and directed by it. Therefore, higher reason is a power distinct from lower reason.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher says that the *scientific* (*scientificum*) part of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is a different principle and different part of the soul from the *opivative* and *ratiocinative* part (*alia pars animae ab opinativo et ratiocinativo*), by which it has cognition of contingent things. And he proves this by appealing to the fact that “parts of the soul that differ in genus are ordered toward things that differ in genus.” Now the contingent and the necessary differ in genus as the corruptible and the incorruptible. But since the necessary is the same as the eternal and the temporal is the same as the contingent, it seems that (a) what the Philosopher is calling the ‘scientific’ part is the same as higher reason, which, according to Augustine, “tends toward considering and consulting eternal things,” and that (b) what the Philosopher is calling the ‘ratiocinative’ or ‘opivative’ part is the same as lower reason, which, according to Augustine, “tends toward dealing with temporal things.” Therefore, higher reason is a power of the soul that is distinct from lower reason.

Objection 4: Damascene says, “From the imagination comes opinion. Then the mind, judging that the opinion is true or false, judges with respect to truth, and then it is called ‘mind’ (*mens*), from ‘measuring’ (*mentio*). Therefore, what is called ‘intellect’ has to do with those things that have already been judged and truly determined.” So, then, the opivative part, which is lower reason, is different from ‘mind’ and ‘intellect’, which can be interpreted as higher reason.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that higher and lower reason are distinguished only as functions (*non nisi per officia distinguuntur*). Therefore, they are not two distinct powers.

I respond: As higher and lower reason are understood by Augustine, they cannot in any way be two distinct powers of the soul. For he says, “Higher reason tends toward considering and consulting eternal things”—‘considering’ in the sense that it looks at them in themselves, and ‘consulting’ in the sense that takes from them rules for acting. On the other hand, he says that lower reason “tends toward temporal things.” Now these two sorts of things, viz., the temporal and the eternal, are related to our cognition in such a way that the one is the medium for the cognition of the other. For on the path of *discovery*, we go by way of temporal things to a cognition of eternal things—this according to the Apostle in Romans 1:20 (“The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made”)—whereas on the path of *judgment*, we pass judgment on temporal things by reference to eternal things, once we have cognition of them, and we go on to deal with temporal things in light of the nature of eternal things.

Now it is possible for a medium and that which is arrived at through the medium to belong to diverse *habits*, in the way that the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of understanding (*intellectus*), whereas the conclusions deduced from them belong to the habit of scientific knowledge (*scientia*). And so from the principles of geometry it is possible to draw a conclusion in another science, viz., the science of perspective.

However, both the medium and ultimate end belong to the same *power* of reason. For an act of reason is, as it were, a movement that arrives at one thing from another; but the same moving thing that passes through the medium is the one that arrives at the terminus. Hence, higher and lower reason are one and the same power of reason. They are distinguished, according to Augustine, by the functions of their acts and by diverse habits; for instance, wisdom (*sapientia*) is attributed to higher reason and scientific knowledge (*scientia*) to lower reason.

Reply to objection 1: The term ‘part’ can be used in a way corresponding to any sort of partition. Therefore, it is because reason is divided by diverse functions that higher and lower reason are called parts (*partitiones*)—and not because they are diverse powers.

Reply to objection 2: Lower reason is said to be derived (*deduci*) from higher reason, or regulated by it, insofar as the principles that lower reason makes use of are derived from and directed by the principles of higher reason.

Reply to objection 3: The ‘scientific’ part of the soul that the Philosopher is talking about is not the same thing as higher reason. For necessary knowable things are also found among temporal things, and there is natural science and mathematics with respect to them. On the other hand, since the opinative and ratiocinative part has to do only with contingent things, it is concerned with less than lower reason is.

But neither should one claim simply that there is one power by which the intellect has cognition of necessary things and another power by which it has cognition of contingent things. For it has cognition of both in accord with the same type of object, viz., in accord with the natures *being* and *true*. Hence, necessary things, which have perfect *esse* in truth, are such that the intellect has perfect cognition of them as far as their ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) is concerned, and it is by appeal to the ‘what-ness’ that the intellect infers (*demonstrat*) their proper accidents. On the other hand, contingent things are such that the intellect has imperfect cognition of them, even as they themselves have imperfect *esse* and truth. However, the actual perfect and imperfect do not diversify powers; instead, they diversify acts with regard to their mode of acting and, as a result, they diversify the principles of the acts and the habits themselves.

And the reason why the Philosopher posited the scientific and the ratiocinative as two parts of the soul is not that they are two distinct powers, but that they are distinguished according to their diverse aptitudes for receiving diverse habits. And it was the diversity of the habits that he wanted to inquire about in that place. For even if contingent things and the necessary things differ in their proper genera, they nonetheless agree in the common nature *being*, which is what the intellect looks to and which contingent and necessary things are related to in diverse ways as the imperfect and the perfect.

Reply to objection 4: This distinction of Damascene’s has to do with a diversity of acts and not with a diversity of powers. For ‘opinion’ signifies an act of the intellect that is drawn to one part of a contradiction with fear of the other part. And to ‘pass judgment on’, or to ‘measure’ (*mensurare*), is an act of the intellect that applies firm principles to the examination of proposed objects; and this is what the name ‘mind’ (*mens*) is taken from. On the other hand, to ‘have intellectual understanding’ is to adhere with a sort of approbation to what has been judged.

Article 10

Is intellectual understanding a power distinct from the intellect?

It seems that intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) is a power distinct from the intellect (*intellectus*):

Objection 1: In *De Spiritu et Anima* it says, “When we wish to ascend from the lower to the

higher, the first thing to occur to us is the sensory power, then the imagination, next reason (*ratio*), after that the intellect (*intellectus*), and after that intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*).” But imagination and the sensory power are distinct powers. Therefore, so are intellect and intellectual understanding.

Objection 2: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 5 Boethius says, “The sensory power, the imagination, reason (*ratio*), and intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) all see the man himself in different ways.” But the intellect (*intellectus*) is the same power as reason (*ratio*). Therefore, it seems that intellectual understanding is a power distinct from the intellect, in the same way that reason is a power distinct from the imagination and the sensory power.

Objection 3: As *De Anima* 2 says, “Acts are prior to powers.” But intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) is a certain act divided off from the other acts that are attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says, “The first movement is called intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*), and when there is intellectual understanding with respect to something, this is called an intention (*intentio*); and when the soul is stable and configured to that of which there is intellectual understanding (*permanens et figurans animam ad id quod intelligitur*), this is called thinking things out (*excogitatio*); and when thinking things out remains the same and the soul examines itself and passes judgement, this is called *phronesis*, i.e., wisdom (*sapientia*); and *phronesis* extended in time (*dilatata*) makes for cogitation (*cogitatio*), i.e., orderly interior speech (*interius dispositum sermonem*), from which, they say, comes forth speech expressed by the tongue.” Therefore, it seems that intellectual understanding is a certain special power.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “Intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) is of indivisibles, in which there is nothing false.” But this sort of cognition belongs to the intellect. Therefore, intellectual understanding is not a distinct power over and beyond the intellect.

I respond: The name ‘intellectual understanding’ (*intelligentia*) signifies the very act of the intellect, viz., to have intellectual understanding (*intelligere*). However, in certain books translated from Arabic, the separated substances that we call angels are called ‘intelligences’ (*intelligentiae*), perhaps because they are always actually engaged in intellectual understanding. By contrast, in the books translated from Greek they are called ‘intellects’ (*intellectus*) or ‘minds’ (*mentes*).

So, then, intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*) is distinguished from the intellect (*intellectus*) not as one power from another, but as an act from a power. Such a division is found also among the philosophers. For instance, they sometimes posit four ‘intellects’, viz., the *active intellect* (*intellectus agens*), the *passive intellect* (*intellectus possibilis*), the *habitual intellect* (*intellectus in habitu*), and the *acquired intellect* (*intellectus adeptus*). Of these four, the active intellect and passive intellect are diverse powers, just as in all other cases the active power is one thing and the corresponding passive power is another. However, the other three are distinguished as three states of the passive intellect, which (a) sometimes is only in potentiality, and in that case it is called the *passive intellect*; (b) sometimes is in first actuality, i.e., knowledge (*scientia*), and in that case it is called the *habitual intellect*; and (c) sometimes is in second actuality, i.e., actual consideration, and in that case it is called the *intellect in act or actuality* (*intellectus in actu*) or acquired intellect (*intellectus adeptus*).

Reply to objection 1: Assuming that this authority should be taken seriously, ‘intellectual understanding’ is being posited as an act of the intellect. And so it is divided off against the intellect as an act is divided off against its corresponding power.

Reply to objection 2: Boethius is taking ‘intellectual understanding’ (*intelligentia*) for an act of the intellect that transcends the act of reason. Hence, in the same place he says that reason belongs only to the human race, just as intellectual understanding belongs only to God, since it is proper to God to understand all things without any inquiry at all.

Reply to objection 3: All these acts enumerated by Damascene belong to a single power, viz., the intellectual power. First, the intellectual power simply apprehends something, and this act is called

intellective understanding (intelligentia). Second, it orders what it apprehends either toward having cognition of something else or toward acting, and this is called *intention (intentio)*. When it persists in inquiring into that which it intends, then this is called *thinking things out (excogitatio)*. And when it examines what has been thought out with respect to some things that have certitude, it is said to know (*scire*) or to be wise (*sapere*)—which is *phronesis* or wisdom (*sapientia*), since, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, it belongs to wisdom to pass judgment. And from the fact that it holds something as certain and as having been examined, it thinks about how it might be possible to make it manifest to others; this is the *ordering of interior speech (dispositio interioris sermonis)*, and from this flows *exterior speech (exterior locutio)*. For it is not every difference among acts that makes for diverse powers; instead, as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), it is only the sort of difference that cannot be traced back to the same principle.

Article 11

Are the speculative intellect and the practical intellect diverse powers?

It seems that the speculative intellect and the practical intellect are diverse powers:

Objection 1: As *De Anima* 2 makes clear, the apprehensive power and the power that effects movement are diverse powers. But the speculative intellect is purely apprehensive, whereas the practical intellect is a power that effects movement. Therefore, they are diverse powers.

Objection 2: Powers are diversified by the diverse natures of their objects. But the object of the speculative intellect is the true, whereas the object of the practical intellect is the good; and these objects differ in nature. Therefore, the speculative intellect and practical intellect are diverse powers.

Objection 3: In the intellective part of the soul, the practical intellect is related to the speculative intellect in the way that, in the sentient part of the soul, the estimative power is related to the power of imagining. But as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), the estimative power differs from the power of imagining as one power from another. Therefore, the practical intellect and speculative intellect differ in the same way.

But contrary to this: *De Anima* 3 says that the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension. But it is not the case that one power is changed into another. Therefore, the speculative intellect and practical intellect are not diverse powers.

I respond: The practical intellect and speculative intellect are not diverse powers. The reason for this, as was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), is that something related incidentally to the nature of a power's object does not diversify the power. For instance, it is incidental to what is colored that it is a man, or that it is large or small; hence, all things of this sort are apprehended by one and the same visual power.

Now it is incidental to what is apprehended by the intellect that it is ordered or not ordered toward an action—but it is in this that the speculative intellect and the practical intellect differ. For the speculative intellect orders what it apprehends only toward the consideration of truth and not toward an action, whereas the practical intellect is such that it does order what it apprehends toward an action. And this is just what the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3, viz., that “the speculative intellect differs from the practical intellect in its end.” Hence, each is denominated from its end, the one being speculative, and the other practical, i.e., operative (*operativus*).

Reply to objection 1: The practical intellect is a power that effects movement not in the sense that it executes movement, but in the sense that it directs one toward movement. This feature belongs to it because of the mode of its apprehension.

Reply to objection 2: The true and the good include one another, since the true is a certain good

(otherwise it would not be desirable) and the good is in a certain sense true (otherwise it would not be intelligible). Therefore, just as the true can be an object of desire insofar as it has the nature of a good, as when someone desires to have cognition of the truth, so the object of the practical intellect is a good that can be ordered toward action, under the concept of the true. For the practical intellect has cognition of truth in the same way that the speculative intellect does, but it orders the truth it has cognition of toward action.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (a. 7), there are many differences that diversify the sentient powers but do not diversify the intellective powers.

Article 12

Is synderesis a special power distinct from the others?

It seems that synderesis (*synderesis*) is a special power distinct from the others:

Objection 1: Things that fall under the same division seem to belong to the same genus. But in Jerome's Gloss on Ezechiel 1:6, synderesis is divided off against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, all of which are powers. Therefore, synderesis is a certain power.

Objection 2: Opposites belong to the same genus. But synderesis and sensuality (*sensualitas*) appear to be opposites, since synderesis always inclines one toward what is good, whereas sensuality always inclines one toward what is bad; this is why sensuality is signified by a serpent, as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12. Therefore, it seems that synderesis is a power in the same way that sensuality is.

Objection 3: In *De Libero Arbitrio* Augustine says that present in nature's court of judgment (*in naturali iudicatorio*) are certain "rules and seeds of the virtues, both true and unchangeable," and these we call synderesis. Therefore, since, as Augustine claims in *De Trinitate* 12, the unchangeable rules by which we make judgments have to do with the higher part of reason, it seems that synderesis is the same as reason. And so it is a power.

But contrary to this: According to the Philosopher, the rational powers bear a relation to opposites. However, synderesis does not bear a relation to opposites, but inclines one only toward what is good. Therefore, synderesis is not a power. For if it were a power, it would have to be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals.

I respond: Synderesis is a habit and not a power, even though some have claimed that synderesis is a certain power higher than reason (*ratio*) and others have claimed that it is reason itself—not reason insofar as it is reason, but reason insofar as it is a nature.

To see this clearly, note that, as was explained above (a. 8), since man's discursive reasoning (*ratiocinatio*) is a movement, it proceeds from the intellective understanding of certain things (*ab intellectu aliquorum*) that serve as unchangeable principles—viz., things known naturally without reason's inquiry—and likewise terminates in an intellective understanding, insofar as we make judgments on the basis of principles naturally known in themselves (*per principia per se naturaliter nota*) about the things that we discover by reasoning discursively. But it is clear that practical reason reasons about actions (*de operabilibus*) in the same way that speculative reason reasons about speculative objects (*de speculativis*). Therefore, just as we have been naturally endowed with principles regarding speculative objects (*principia speculabilium*), so too we have been naturally endowed with principles regarding actions (*principia operabilium*).

Now the first principles regarding speculative objects that we have been naturally endowed with do

not involve any special power, but instead involve a special habit, which is called the *intellective understanding of principles* (*intellectus principiorum*), as is clear from *Ethics* 6. Hence, the principles that we have been naturally endowed with regarding actions do not involve a special power, either, but instead involve a special natural habit, which we call *synderesis*. Hence, *synderesis* is said to goad us toward what is good and to murmur about what is bad (*instigare ad bonum et murmurare de malo*), insofar as (a) we proceed to discover things on the basis of the first principles and (b) we pass judgment about what has been discovered.

It is clear, then, that *synderesis* is a natural habit and not a power.

Reply to objection 1: Jerome's division is made according to a diversity of acts and not a diversity of powers. But diverse acts can belong to the same power.

Reply to objection 2: Similarly, the opposition between sensuality and *synderesis* is made by reference to an opposition of acts and not an opposition of diverse species within a single genus.

Reply to objection 3: Unchangeable natures of the sort in question are the first principles of actions, concerning which one cannot be in error. And they are attributed to reason as a power and to *synderesis* as a habit. Hence, we make natural judgments by means of both, viz., reason and *synderesis*.

Article 13

Is conscience a power?

It seems that conscience (*conscientia*) is a power:

Objection 1: Origen says that conscience is “the spirit corrector” and “companion teacher of the soul, by which the soul is separated from what is bad and adheres to what is good.” But ‘spirit’ names a power in the soul, either the mind—this according to Ephesians 4:23 (“Be renewed in the spirit of your mind”)—or the imagination; hence, it is also called an imaginative spiritual vision, as is clear from Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12. Therefore, conscience is a power.

Objection 2: Nothing is subject to sin except a power of the soul. But conscience is subject to sin; for Titus 1:15 says, “Their mind and conscience are defiled.” Therefore, it seems that conscience is a power.

Objection 3: Conscience must be either an act or a habit or a power. But it is not an act, since in that case it would not always remain in a man. Nor is it a habit, since in that case there would be many such habits and not just one; for in our acting we are directed by many cognitive habits. Therefore, conscience is a power.

But contrary to this: Conscience can be laid aside (*deponi potest*), but a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore, conscience is not a power.

I respond: Properly speaking, conscience is an act and not a power. This is clear both from the name ‘conscience’ and also from what is attributed to conscience by common linguistic usage.

For according to the strict meaning of the word, conscience implies an ordering of knowledge toward something, since ‘conscience’ means ‘knowledge with another’ (*cum alio scientia*). But the application of knowledge to something is accomplished through an act. Hence, from the meaning of the name it is clear that conscience is an act.

The same thing is evident from what is attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to testify (*testificari*), to bind (*ligare*), or to goad (*instigare*), and also to accuse (*accusare*) or rebuke (*remordere*), or to restrain (*reprehendere*). And all of these follow upon the application of our cognition or knowledge to the things we do. This application is accomplished in three ways. First, insofar as we recognize that

we have done or not done something—this according to Ecclesiastes 7:23 (“Your conscience knows that you have often spoken ill of others”), and it is in this sense that conscience is said to *testify*. Second, our knowledge is applied when through our conscience we judge that something should be done or should not be done, and it is in this sense that conscience is said to *goad* or *bind*. Third, our knowledge is applied when through our conscience we judge that something that has been done was good to do or was not good to do (*quod est factum sit bene factum vel non bene factum*), and it is in this sense that conscience is said to *excuse* (*excusare*) or to *accuse* (or *rebuke*).

Now it is clear that all these things follow upon the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Hence, properly speaking, ‘conscience’ names an act. However, since habits are the principles of acts, sometimes the name ‘conscience’ is attributed to the first natural habit, viz., synderesis, in the way that in a Gloss on Ezekiel 1:6 Jerome calls synderesis ‘conscience’, and in the way that Basil calls natural judgment ‘conscience’, and in the way that Damascene says that conscience is the law of our intellect. For it is common for causes and effects to be named by one another.

Reply to objection 1: Conscience is ‘spirit’ in the sense that ‘spirit’ is standing in for ‘mind’, since conscience is a sort of dictate of the mind.

Reply to objection 2: Defilement (*inquinatio*) is said to exist in a conscience not in the sense that conscience is the subject of the defilement, but in the sense that what is known exists in the cognition of it, i.e., insofar as someone knows himself to be defiled.

Reply to objection 3: Even if the act does not always remain in its own right, it nonetheless remains at all times in its cause, which is the power and the habit. And even if there are many habits by which a conscience is informed, all of them nonetheless have their efficacy from a single first habit, viz., from the habit with respect to the first principles, which is called ‘synderesis’. This is why, as was noted above, this habit especially is sometimes called conscience.

QUESTION 80

The Appetitive Powers in General

Next we have to consider the appetitive powers. And on this topic there are four things to be considered: first, the appetitive powers in general (question 80); second, the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*) (question 81); third, the will (question 82); and, fourth, free choice (question 83).

On the first topic there are two questions: (1) Should appetite be posited as a special power of the soul? (2) Is the division of appetite into the sentient appetite and the intellect I've appetite a division into diverse powers?

Article 1

Is appetite a special power of the soul?

It seems that appetite (*appetitus*) is not a special power of the soul:

Objection 1: No power should be assigned to the soul with respect to what is common to living and non-living things. But to desire (*appetere*) is common to living and non-living things, since, as *Ethics* 1 says, the good is "what all things desire." Therefore, appetite is not a special power of the soul.

Objection 2: Powers are distinguished by their objects. But it is the very same thing that we have cognition of and that we desire. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be a distinct appetitive power in addition to the apprehensive power.

Objection 3: What is common is not divided off from what is proper. But every power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing, viz., the object that is fitting for it. Therefore, there is no need to countenance a power which is distinct from the others and which is called the appetitive power with respect to the object *desirable in general* (*appetibile in communi*).

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher distinguishes the appetitive from the other powers. Likewise, in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene distinguishes the appetitive powers from the cognitive powers.

I respond: It is necessary to posit an appetitive power in the soul. To see this clearly, note that every form has some inclination following upon it, in the way that fire is by its form inclined toward the highest place and toward generating what is similar to itself.

However, in those things that participate in cognition the form exists in a higher mode than in things that lack cognition.

For among those things that lack cognition, the form determines each thing only to its own singular *esse*, which is likewise its *natural esse*. Therefore, a natural inclination, which is called *natural appetite*, follows upon this sort of natural form.

By contrast, among things that have cognition, each is determined to its own proper natural *esse* through a natural form, yet in such a way that it is receptive to the species of other things, in the way that the sensory power receives the species of all sensible things and the intellect receives the species of all intelligible things. The result is that man's soul is in a certain sense all things through its sensory power and intellect, and in this respect things that have cognition come close in a certain sense to a likeness of God, "in whom all things preexist," as Dionysius says. Therefore, just as forms exist in a higher mode in things that have cognition, beyond the mode of natural forms, so there must exist in them an inclination beyond the natural inclination called 'natural appetite'. And this higher inclination involves the appetitive power of the soul, through which an animal is able to desire what it apprehends and not merely to desire what it is inclined toward by its natural form.

So, then, it is necessary to posit an appetitive power of the soul.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, in things that have cognition, desire (*appetere*) is found in a mode higher than the common mode in which it is found in all things in general. And so there must be a power of the soul that is prescribed for this (*oportet ad hoc determinari aliquam potentiam animae*).

Reply to objection 2: What is apprehended and desired is the same in subject but conceptually diverse. For a thing is apprehended as a sensible or intelligible being, but it is desired as something fitting or good. Now what is required for a diversification of powers is a *conceptual* diversity in the objects of those powers, and not a *material* diversity.

Reply to objection 3: Each power of the soul is a sort of form or nature, and it has a natural inclination toward something. Hence, it is by a *natural appetite* that each power of the soul desires an object fitting for itself. Beyond this, there is *animal appetite*, which follows upon apprehension and by which something is desired not because it is fitting for the act of this or that power, in the way that the visual power (*visio*) is for seeing and the power of hearing (*auditio*) is for hearing, but because it is fitting for the animal absolutely speaking.

Article 2

Are the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite diverse powers?

It seems that the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite are not diverse powers:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 77, a. 3), powers are not diversified by incidental differences. But the difference between being apprehended by the sensory power and being apprehended by the intellect is incidental to a desirable object. Therefore, the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite are not diverse powers.

Objection 2: Intellective cognition is of universals, and this is what distinguishes it from sentient cognition, which is of singulars. But there is no room for this distinction in the case of appetite; for since appetite is a movement from the soul toward the things—i.e., toward singulars—every desire seems to be a desire for a singular thing. Therefore, it is not the case that the intellective appetite should be distinguished from sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Just as the appetitive power falls as a lower power under the apprehensive power, so it is with the power to effect movement. But the power to effect movement that follows upon man's intellective understanding is not distinct from the power to effect movement that follows upon sensory cognition in the other animals. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, neither is the appetitive power in man distinct from the appetitive power in the other animals.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher distinguishes two appetites, and he says that the higher appetite moves the lower appetite.

I respond: It is necessary to claim that the intellective appetite is a power distinct from the sentient appetite. For an appetitive power is a passive power that is naturally moved by what is apprehended; hence, as is explained in *De Anima* 3 and *Metaphysics* 12, the desirable apprehended thing is an unmoved mover, whereas the appetite is a moved mover. But things that are passive and movable are distinguished in a way that corresponds to the distinction among active movers, since what effects movement must be proportioned to what is moved, and what is active must be proportioned to what is passive. And the passive power itself has its proper nature from being ordered toward its active counterpart (*ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum*). Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect is different in genus from what is apprehended by the sensory power, it follows that the

intellective appetite is a power distinct from the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 1: The difference between being apprehended by the sensory power and apprehended by the intellect is not incidental to what is desirable. Rather, this feature belongs to it *per se*, since what is desirable moves the appetite only insofar as it is apprehended. Hence, differences in what is apprehended are *per se* differences in what is desired. And so the appetitive powers are distinguished by the differences in the apprehended things as by their proper objects.

Reply to objection 2: Even if the intellective appetite is led toward things which are singulars outside the soul, it is nonetheless led toward them under some universal notion (*secundum aliquam rationem universalem*)—as when it desires something because it is good. Hence, in the *Rhetoric* the Philosopher says that there can be hatred with respect to a universal, as when “we hate every type of thief.” Similarly, through the intellective appetite we can desire non-material goods that the sensory power does not apprehend—e.g., knowledge, virtue, and other things of this sort.

Reply to objection 3: As is explained in *De Anima* 3, a general opinion (*opinio universalis*) does not effect movement except by the mediation of a particular case (*mediante particulari*). Similarly, a higher appetite effects movement by the mediation of a lower appetite. This is why the power to effect movement that follows upon the intellect is not distinct from the power to effect movement that follows upon the sensory power.

QUESTION 81

The Sentient Appetite

Next we have to consider sensuality or the sentient appetite (*sensualitas*). And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Is sensuality a purely appetitive power? (2) Is it divided into the irascible and the concupiscible as into diverse powers? (3) Do the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

Article 1

Is sensuality a purely appetitive power?

It seems that sensuality (*sensualitas*) is not a purely appetitive power, but a cognitive power as well:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “The soul’s sensual movement, which is concentrated in the bodily senses, is common to us and the beasts.” But the bodily senses fall under the cognitive powers. Therefore, sensuality is a cognitive power.

Objection 2: Whatever falls under the same division seems to belong to the same genus. But in *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine divides sensuality off against higher reason and lower reason, both of which involve cognition. Therefore, sensuality is likewise a cognitive power.

Objection 3: In a man’s temptations sensuality takes the place of the serpent. But in the temptation of the first parents the serpent’s role was to introduce and propose the sin, and this role belongs to a cognitive power. Therefore, sensuality is a cognitive power.

But contrary to this: Sensuality is defined as “a desire for things that have to do with the body.”

I respond: The name ‘sensuality’ (*sensualitas*) seems to be taken from ‘sensual movement’ (*sensualis motus*)—which is what Augustine is talking about in *De Trinitate* 12—in the way that the name of a power is taken from its act, e.g., the visual power (*visus*) from the act of seeing (*visio*).

Now sensual movement is a desire (*appetitus*) that follows upon sentient apprehension. For an act of the apprehensive power is not called a movement in as proper a sense as the action of the appetitive power is, since the apprehensive power’s operation finds its perfection in the fact that the things apprehended exist in the one apprehending them, whereas the appetitive power’s operation finds its perfection in the fact that the one who has the desire is inclined toward the desirable thing. And so the apprehensive power’s operation is more like rest, whereas the operation of an appetitive power is more like a movement. Hence, ‘sensual movement’ means the operation of an appetitive power. And so ‘sensuality’ is a name of the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine’s claim that the soul’s sensual movement is concentrated in the bodily senses means not that the senses are included under sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination toward the bodily senses, viz., when we desire the things that are apprehended by the bodily senses. And in this way the bodily senses are, as it were, entries (*praeambulae*) into sensuality.

Reply to objection 2: Sensuality is divided off from higher reason and lower reason insofar as they all share in the act of motion. For the cognitive power, which is what higher and lower reason belong to, is a power that effects movement, just like the appetitive power, which sensuality belongs to.

Reply to objection 3: The serpent not only displayed and proposed the sin, but also incited them to commit the sin (*inclinavit in effectum peccati*). And it is in this last respect that sensuality is signified by the serpent.

Article 2

Is the sentient appetite divided into the irascible and the concupiscible as into diverse powers?

It seems that the sentient appetite is not divided into the irascible (*irascibilis*) and the concupiscible (*concupiscibilis*) as into diverse powers:

Objection 1: As *De Anima 2* explains, the same power of the soul is related to a pair of contraries, in the way that the power of seeing is related to both white and black. But the agreeable (*conveniens*) and the harmful (*nocivum*) are contraries. Therefore, since the concupiscible has to do with the agreeable and the irascible with the harmful, it seems to be the same power of the soul that is both irascible and concupiscible.

Objection 2: The sentient appetite is directed only at things that are agreeable to the senses. But what is agreeable to the senses is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore, there is no sentient appetitive power that differs from the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: Hatred (*odium*) resides in the irascible power; for in *Super Matthaewm* Jerome says, “Let us have in the irascible power a hatred for vices.” But since hatred is the contrary of love (*amor*), it is in the concupiscible power. Therefore, the same power is both concupiscible and irascible.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene posit two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, as parts of the sentient appetite.

I respond: The sentient appetite is generically one faculty (*una vis*), which is called sensuality, but it is divided into two powers, which are the species of the sentient appetite, viz., the irascible and the concupiscible. To see this clearly, consider that in a natural corruptible thing there has to be not only (a) an inclination toward pursuing what is agreeable and avoiding what is harmful, but also (b) an inclination toward resisting the corrupting or contrary things that pose an obstacle to what is agreeable and that inflict what is harmful—in just the way that fire has a natural inclination not only (a) to recede from a lower place that is not agreeable to it and to tend toward a higher place that is agreeable to it, but also (b) to resist what corrupts it or impedes it.

Therefore, since the sentient appetite is an inclination that follows upon sentient apprehension in the way that a natural appetite is an inclination that follows upon a natural form, it must be the case that in the sentient part of the soul there are two appetitive powers: (a) one through which the soul is simply inclined to pursue those things that are agreeable according to the senses and to avoid those things that are harmful, and this is called the *concupiscible* power; and (b) a second through which the animal resists aggressors that pose obstacles to what is agreeable and that inflict harm, and this is called the *irascible* power. Hence, the object of the irascible power is said to be what is difficult (*arduum*), because the irascible power tends toward overcoming contraries and winning out over them.

Moreover, these two inclinations are not reducible to a single principle. For sometimes the soul, in opposition to the inclination of the concupiscible power, inflicts hardships upon itself in order to fight off contraries in accord with the inclination of the irascible power. The passions of the irascible power even seem to fight against the passions of the concupiscible power, since, in most cases, aroused concupiscence diminishes anger, and aroused anger diminishes concupiscence.

This point is also clear from the fact that the irascible power is, as it were, a promoter and defender of the concupiscible power when it rises up against obstacles to those agreeable things sought by the concupiscible power, and when it fights against the harmful things that the concupiscible power shrinks from. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible power take their origin from passions of the concupiscible power and terminate in the latter. For instance, anger arises from an inflicted pain and,

having gained vengeance, terminates in joy. It is also for this reason that, as is explained in *De Animalibus* 8, struggles among animals are over concupiscible objects like food and sexual pleasure.

Reply to objection 1: The concupiscible power is directed toward both the agreeable and the disagreeable. By contrast, the irascible power is directed toward resisting the disagreeable that stands in opposition to it.

Reply to objection 2: Just as, in keeping with what was pointed out above (q. 78, a. 2), among the apprehensive powers of the sentient part of the soul there is an estimative power that perceives things that do not affect the sensory powers, so also in the sentient appetite there is a power that does not seek what is appropriate for delighting the senses, but instead seeks something that is appropriate insofar as it is useful to the animal for its own defense. And this is the irascible power.

Reply to objection 3: Hatred absolutely speaking belongs to the concupiscible power. However, because of the pugnacity caused by hatred, it can also be relevant to the irascible power.

Article 3

Do the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

It seems that the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason:

Objection 1: The irascible and concupiscible powers are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason; this is why it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine points out in *De Trinitate* 12. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason.

Objection 2: Whatever obeys a given thing does not fight against it. But the irascible and concupiscible powers fight against reason—this according to the Apostle in Romans 7:23 (“But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind”). Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey reason.

Objection 3: Just as the appetitive power is lower than the rational part of the soul, so too is the sentient [apprehensive] power. But the sentient [apprehensive] part of the soul does not obey reason, since we do not hear or see when we want to. Therefore, it is likewise not the case that the powers of the sentient appetite, viz., the irascible and the concupiscible, obey reason.

But contrary to this: Damascene says that what is “obedient to” reason and susceptible to persuasion “by reason is divided into concupiscence (*concupiscentia*) and anger (*ira*).”

I respond: There are two ways in which the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part of the soul, where one finds the intellect (or reason) and will. The first of these ways has to do with reason, and the second has to do with the will.

The irascible and concupiscible powers obey *reason* with respect to their *acts*. The explanation for this is that in the other animals the sentient appetite is apt to be moved by the estimative power, in the way that a sheep, taking the wolf to be an enemy, fears it. But as was explained above (q. 78, a. 4), in man the estimative power is replaced by the cogitative power, which some call ‘particular reason’ because it brings together intentions of individuals (*collativa intentionum individualium*). This is why the sentient appetite is apt to be moved by the cogitative power in a man. Now particular reason is itself apt to be moved and directed by ‘universal reason’, and so there are syllogisms in which singular conclusions are derived from universal propositions. Thus, it is clear that universal reason gives commands to (*imperat*) the sentient appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible, and that this appetite obeys it. And since deriving singular conclusions from universal principles is the work of discursive reason and not of simple intellective understanding (*non est opus simplicis intellectus sed*

rationis), the irascible and concupiscible powers are said to obey reason rather than the intellect. Moreover, anyone can experience within himself that when he applies universal considerations, anger and fear and other such [passions] are mitigated or, as the case may be, instigated.

Likewise, the sentient appetite is subject to the *will* as regards *execution*, which is brought about by the power that effects movement. For in the other animals movement follows immediately upon an appetitive act (*appetitum*) of the concupiscible and irascible powers; for instance, when the sheep becomes fearful of the wolf, it immediately flees, since in sheep there is no higher appetitive act that might resist this movement. By contrast, a man is not immediately moved by an appetitive act of the concupiscible or irascible powers; rather, he awaits the command of the will (*expectatur imperium voluntatis*), which is a higher appetite. For in the case of all ordered powers that effect movement, a mover effects movement only by the power of the first mover; thus, the lower appetite is not sufficient to effect movement unless the higher appetite consents—which is what the Philosopher is saying in *De Anima* 3: “The higher appetite moves the lower appetite in the way that a higher sphere moves a lower sphere.”

Therefore, these are the ways in which the irascible and concupiscible powers are subject to reason.

Reply to objection 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent as regards what is proper to the sentient part of the soul, whereas ‘irascible’ and ‘concupiscible’ name the sentient appetite as regards its act, to which the irascible and concupiscible powers are induced by reason, as has been explained.

Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1, “One finds in the animal both despotic rule (*despoticus principatus*) and constitutional rule (*politicus principatus*). For the soul rules the body with a despotic rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetite with a constitutional and royal rule.” Despotic rule is that by which someone rules slaves, who do not have the ability to resist the ruler in any of his commands, since they have nothing of their own (*quia nihil sui habent*). By contrast, political and royal rule is that by which someone rules free men, who, even if they are subject to the rule of the leader, nonetheless have something of their own (*habent aliquid proprium*) by which they are able to resist the leader’s command.

So, then, the soul is said to rule the body with despotic rule because the bodily members cannot in any way resist the soul’s rule, but instead at the soul’s desire the hand and foot move immediately, along with any member of the body that is apt to be moved by a voluntary movement. By contrast, the intellect, i.e., reason, is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible powers with constitutional rule, since the sentient appetite has something of its own by which it is able to resist reason’s command. For the sentient appetite is apt to be moved not only by the estimative power in other animals and the cogitative power (which is ruled by universal reason) in man, but also by the power of imagining and the sensory power. Hence, we experience the irascible and concupiscible powers resisting reason when we sense or imagine something pleasant that reason forbids, or something unpleasant that reason prescribes. And so the fact that the irascible and concupiscible powers fight against reason in some cases does not rule out their being obedient to reason.

Reply to objection 3: The exterior sensory powers need for their acts exterior sensible things by which they are affected and whose presence is not within reason’s power. By contrast, the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not need exterior things. And so they are subject to the command of reason, which is able not only to instigate or mitigate the affections of the appetitive power, but also to form the phantasms that belong to the power of imagining.

QUESTION 82

The Will

Next we have to consider the will. And on this topic there are five questions: (1) Does the will desire anything by necessity? (2) Does the will desire everything by necessity? (3) Is the will a more eminent power than the intellect? (4) Does the will move the intellect? (5) Is the will divided into the irascible and the concupiscible?

Article 1

Is there anything the will desires by necessity?

It seems that the will desires nothing by necessity (*nihil ex necessitate appetat*):

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says that if something is necessary, then it is not voluntary. But everything that the will desires is voluntary. Therefore, nothing that the will desires (*appetit*) is desired necessarily (*est necessario desideratum*).

Objection 2: According to the Philosopher, rational powers are directed toward opposites. But the will is a rational power, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, the will exists in reason. Therefore, the will is directed toward opposites. Therefore, it is not determined to anything by necessity (*ad nihil de necessitate determinatur*).

Objection 3: Because of the will we are masters of our own acts (*domini nostrorum actuum*). But we are not masters of what exists by necessity (*ex necessitate*). Therefore, no act of the will can exist by necessity (*de necessitate*).

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, “Everyone desires beatitude with one accord (*una voluntate*).” But if this fact were contingent and not necessary, then in at least a few cases it would not be true. Therefore, there is something the will wills by necessity (*voluntas ex necessitate aliquid vult*).

I respond: There are many senses of ‘necessity’ (*necessitas*). Now the necessary is what is *not able not to be*.

One way in which this feature belongs to something is in virtue of an *intrinsic principle*—either a *material* intrinsic principle, as when we say that it is necessary for everything composed of contraries to be corrupted, or a *formal* intrinsic principle, as when we say that it is necessary for a triangle to have three angles equal to two right angles. This is *natural and absolute necessity* (*necessitas naturalis et absoluta*).

In a second way, some things are *not able not to be* in virtue of some *extrinsic principle*—either an *end* or an *agent*. In virtue of an *end*, as when without this thing one cannot attain a given end at all, or one cannot attain it in a satisfying way (*bene*); it is in this sense that food is said to be necessary for life, or that a horse is said to be necessary for a journey. This is called the *necessity of the end* (*necessitas finis*), and it is also sometimes called utility (*utilitas*). On the other hand, some things are not able not to be because of an *agent*, as when someone is coerced by some agent in such a way that he cannot do the contrary. And this is called the *necessity of coercion* (*necessitas coactionis*).

The necessity of coercion is altogether at odds with the will (*omnino repugnat voluntati*). For what is contrary to a thing’s inclination we call ‘violent’. But the movement of the will is itself an inclination toward something. And so just as something is called ‘natural’ because it accords with a natural inclination (*inclinatio naturae*), so something is called ‘voluntary’ because it accords with the will’s inclination. Therefore, just as it is impossible for something to be simultaneously both violent and natural, so it is impossible for something to be, absolutely speaking, both coerced (or violent) and

voluntary.

However, the necessity of the end is not at odds with the will when the end can be arrived at in just one way; for instance, given that one wills to cross the sea, a necessity arises in the will for willing a ship.

Similarly, a *natural necessity* is not at odds with the will, either. At the very least, it is necessary that just as the intellect adheres by necessity to its first principles, so too the will adheres by necessity to its final end, which is beatitude. For as *Physics* 2 says, the end plays the role in matters of action (*in operativis*) that a [first] principle plays in speculative matters (*in speculativis*). For what belongs to something naturally and immutably must be the foundation and source (*fundamentum et principium*) of everything else, since in each thing what is primary is its nature, and all movement proceeds from something immovable.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine should be understood to be talking about the necessity of coercion. By contrast, natural necessity “does not destroy the will’s freedom,” as Augustine himself says in the same book.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as the will wills something naturally, it is more like the intellective understanding of natural principles than it is like reason, which is directed toward opposites. Hence, in this sort of case the will is more an *intellectual* power than a *rational* power.

Reply to objection 3: We are masters of our own actions insofar as we are able to choose *this* or *that*. But as *Ethics* 3 says, choice (*electio*) is about the means to an end and not about the end. Hence, the desire for the ultimate end is not among those acts of which we are the masters.

Article 2

Does the will will by necessity everything it wills?

It seems that the will wills by necessity everything it wills:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus* 4 Dionysius says, “Evil lies beyond the will.” Therefore, it is by necessity that the will tends toward the good proposed to it.

Objection 2: The will’s object is related to the will as a mover to what is moved. But the movement of what is moved follows necessarily from the mover. Therefore, it seems that the will’s object moves it by necessity.

Objection 3: Just as what is apprehended by the sensory power is an object of the sentient appetite, so what is apprehended by the intellect is an object of the intellective appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sensory power moves the sentient appetite by necessity; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says that animals are moved by what they see. Therefore, it seems that what is apprehended by the intellect moves the will by necessity.

But contrary to this: Augustine says, “The will is that by which one sins and that by which one lives in an upright way”—and so it is directed toward opposites. Therefore, it is not the case that the will wills by necessity everything it wills.

I respond: The will does not will by necessity everything it wills. To see this clearly, note that, as has already been explained (a.1), the will adheres to its ultimate end in the same way that the intellect adheres naturally and by necessity to its first principles.

Now some intelligible things do not have a necessary connection to the first principles, e.g., contingent propositions, the denial of which does not imply the denial of the first principles. Propositions like these are such that the intellect does not assent to them by necessity.

On the other hand, there are some propositions which are necessary and which have a necessary connection with the first principles, e.g., demonstrable conclusions, the denial of which implies the denial of the first principles. These propositions are such that the intellect assents to them by necessity once it recognizes the necessary connection of the conclusions to the principles by way of a demonstrative deduction; however, it does not assent to them by necessity before it recognizes the necessity of the connection by way of the demonstration.

Something similar holds for the will as well.

For there are some particular goods which do not have a necessary connection to beatitude and in the absence of which someone can have beatitude (*potest esse beatus*). The will does not adhere to goods of this sort by necessity.

On the other hand, there are some particular goods which have a necessary connection to beatitude and by which a man adheres to God, in whom alone true beatitude consists. However, before the necessity of this sort of connection is demonstrated by the certitude of the vision of God, the will does not adhere to God by necessity, or to the things that are of God. On the other hand, the will of one who sees God through His essence adheres to God necessarily, in the same way that we now will by necessity to have beatitude.

Thus, it is clear that the will does not will by necessity everything it wills.

Reply to objection 1: The will tends toward nothing except under the notion of the good (*sub ratione boni*). But because the good is complex (*quia bonum est multiplex*), the will is not determined by necessity to one alternative (*non ex necessitate determinatur ad unum*).

Reply to objection 2: A mover causes movement by necessity in the movable thing when the power of the mover exceeds the movable thing in such a way that the totality of the movable thing's possibilities is subject to the mover (*ita quod tota eius possibilitas moventi subdatur*). But since the will's possibilities encompass a universal and perfect good (*possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti*), it is not the case that the totality of its possibilities is subject to any particular good. And so no particular good moves it by necessity.

Reply to objection 3: The sentient power is not a power that brings together diverse things in the way that reason does; instead, it simply apprehends some one thing. And this is why one thing determinately moves the sentient appetite. By contrast, reason brings together many things, and for this reason the intellective appetite, i.e., the will, is able to be moved by many things and is not moved by any one of them with necessity.

Article 3

Is the will a higher power than the intellect?

It seems that the will is a higher power than the intellect:

Objection 1: The good or the end is the object of the will. But the end is the first and highest of all causes. Therefore, the will is the first and highest of all powers.

Objection 2: Natural entities proceed from the imperfect to the perfect. And this is also apparent among the powers of the soul; for they proceed from the sensory power to the intellect, which is the more noble. But there is a natural progression from an act of the intellect to an act of the will. Therefore, the will is a more perfect and more noble power than the intellect.

Objection 3: Habits are proportioned to their powers in the way that perfections are proportioned to the things they perfect. But the habit by which the will is perfected, viz., charity, is more noble than

the habits by which the intellect is perfected; for 1 Corinthians 13:2 says, “If I should know all mysteries ... and if I should have all faith ... and have not charity, I am nothing.” Therefore, the will is a higher power than the intellect.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher claims that the highest power of the soul is the intellect.

I respond: There are two ways to think about the eminence of two things with respect to one another: (a) absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) and (b) relatively speaking (*secundum quid*). Something is thought of as such-and-such absolutely speaking insofar as it is such-and-such in its own right (*secundum seipsum tale*), whereas it is thought of as such-and-such relatively speaking insofar as it such-and-such in relation to something else (*secundum respectum ad alterum*).

Thus, if the intellect and the will are considered *in their own right*, then the intellect is the more eminent. This is apparent from a comparison of their objects to one another. For the intellect’s object is more simple and more absolute than the will’s object, since the notion *desirable good* is itself an object of the intellect (*objectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis*), whereas it is the desirable good, whose notion exists in the intellect, that is the will’s object. But the more simple and abstract something is, the higher and more noble it is in its own right. And so the intellect’s object is higher than the will’s object. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power has to do with the object it is ordered toward, it follows that the intellect is in its own right and absolutely speaking higher and more noble than the will.

On the other hand, *relatively speaking* and in relation to something else, the will is in some cases higher than the intellect, viz., because the will’s object exists in a higher entity than the intellect’s object does. For instance, I might claim that hearing is, relatively speaking, more noble than seeing, because some entity that makes a sound is more noble than some entity that is colored, even though color is more simple and more noble than sound. For as was explained above (q. 16, a. 1 and q. 27, a. 4), the intellect’s action consists in the nature of what is understood existing in the one who understands, whereas the act of the will is perfected in the will’s being inclined toward that thing as it exists in itself. And this is why in *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says that the good and the bad, which are objects of the will, exist in the things, whereas the true and the false, which are objects of the intellect, exist in the mind. Therefore, when an entity in which a given good exists is more noble than the soul itself, in which the nature as understood exists, then the will is higher than the intellect in relation to such an entity. But when the entity in which a given good exists is inferior to the soul, then the intellect is higher than the will in relation to such an entity. Hence, the love of God is better than the cognition of God, whereas, conversely, the cognition of corporeal things is better than the love of corporeal things.

Still, absolutely speaking, the intellect is more noble than the will.

Reply to objection 1: The notion of a cause is taken from a comparison of the one thing to the other, and in such a comparison the notion of the good is the most important; but ‘true’ is said, rather, in an absolute sense, and it signifies the notion of the good itself. Hence, even the good is something true.

On the other hand, the true is itself a certain good, because the intellect is an entity, and the true is its end. And among other ends this end is the most excellent, just as the intellect is the most excellent among the powers.

Reply to objection 2: What is prior in generation and in time is less perfect, since in one and the same thing potentiality temporally precedes actuality and imperfection temporally precedes perfection.

However, what is prior absolutely speaking and according to the order of nature is more perfect, since this is the sense in which actuality is prior to potentiality. And it is in this sense that the intellect is prior to the will—as a mover is prior to what is moved, and as what is active is prior to what is passive. For it is the good as intellectually understood that moves the will.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for the will taken in comparison to what is

above the soul. For the virtue of charity is the virtue by which we love God.

Article 4

Does the will move the intellect?

It seems that the will does not move the intellect:

Objection 1: The mover is more noble than and prior to what is moved, since the mover is an agent and, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 and the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, an agent is more noble than its patient. But as was explained above (a. 3), the intellect is prior to and more noble than the will. Therefore, the will does not move the intellect.

Objection 2: A mover is not moved by the thing it moves, except perhaps incidentally. But the intellect moves the will, since the desirable thing as apprehended by the intellect is an unmoved mover, whereas the appetite is a moved mover. Therefore, the intellect is not moved by the will.

Objection 3: We can will only what is understood intellectually. Therefore, if the will moves the intellect to intellectual understanding by willing to have intellectual understanding, then another act of intellectual understanding will have to precede this act of willing, and another act of willing will have to precede that act of intellectual understanding, and so on *ad infinitum*—which is impossible. Therefore, it is not the case that the will moves the intellect.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, “It is within our power to learn an art or not to learn it, as we will.” But something is within our power through the will, and we learn an art through the intellect. Therefore, the will moves the intellect.

I respond: There are two ways in which something is said to effect movement.

The first way is in the manner of an *end*, in the sense in which an end is said to move an agent. It is in this way that the intellect moves the will, since the will’s object is a good as intellectually understood, and it moves the will as an end.

The second way in which something is said to effect movement is in the manner of an *agent*—in the way in which the thing that effects an alteration moves the thing that is altered, and in the way in which the thing that gives an impulse moves the thing that is impelled. This is the way in which the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm explains in *De Similitudinibus*.

The reason for this is that in the case of all ordered active powers, the power that is directed toward a universal end moves the powers that are directed toward particular ends. This is apparent both in natural matters and political matters. For the heavens, which act for the sake of conserving generable and corruptible things in general, move all the lower bodies, each of which acts for the sake of conserving its own species or even the individual. Again, a king, who intends the common good of the whole kingdom, moves by his commands all the heads of the cities (*praepositi civitatum*), who devote themselves to ruling the individual cities.

Now the will’s object is the good and the end in general (*bonum et finis in communi*). But each power is directed toward some proper good that is appropriate for it, in the way that the power of sight is directed toward the perception of color, and in the way that the intellect is directed toward the cognition of what is true. And so the will moves all the powers of the soul to their acts in the manner of an agent—except for the natural powers of the vegetative part of the soul, which are not subject to our choice.

Reply to objection 1: The intellect can be thought of in two ways: first, insofar as it apprehends being and truth in general (*est apprehensivus entis et veri universalis*), and, second, insofar as it is a

certain entity and particular power that has a determinate act.

Similarly, the will can be thought of in two ways: first, according to the universality of its object, i.e., insofar as it desires the good in general (*appetitiva boni communis*), and, second, insofar as it is a certain determinate power of the soul having a determinate act.

Thus, if the intellect and will are compared with respect to the nature of the universality of both their objects, it has already been explained above (a. 3) that in this sense the intellect is absolutely speaking higher and more noble than the will.

Moreover, if the intellect is thought of with respect to the universality of its object and the will insofar as it is a certain determinate power, then, once again, the intellect is higher than and prior to the will, since the will itself, along with its act and its object, is contained under the notions *being* and *true*, which the intellect apprehends. Hence, the intellect has intellectual understanding of the will and of its act and its object, just as it has intellectual understanding of the other specific things it understands, such as a rock or a piece of wood, which are contained under the common notions *being* and *true*.

However, if the will is thought of with respect to the general notion of its object, which is the good, and the intellect is thought of insofar as it is a certain specific entity and power, then the intellect is contained under the common notion *good* as a certain specific good, along with the act of intellectual understanding itself and its object, which is the true; each of them is a certain specific good. And in this respect the will is higher than the intellect and able to move it.

From these considerations it is apparent that the reason why these powers include one another by their acts is that the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills that the intellect understand. And by a similar line of reasoning, the good is contained under the true insofar as the good is a certain true thing that is understood, and the true is contained under the good insofar as the true is a certain desired good.

Reply to objection 2: As has already been explained, the intellect moves the will in a way different from the way in which the will moves the intellect.

Reply to objection 3: There is no need to proceed to infinity; instead, one stops with the intellect as the first thing. For an apprehension must precede every movement of the will, but it is not the case that a movement of the will precedes every apprehension. Rather, the source of counsel and understanding is an intellectual principle that is higher than our intellect, viz., God. Aristotle likewise makes this claim in *Eudemian Ethics* 7, and in this way he shows that there is no infinite regress.

Article 5

Should the irascible and the concupiscible be distinguished in the higher appetite, i.e., the will?

It seems that the irascible and the concupiscible should be distinguished in the higher appetite, i.e., the will:

Objection 1: The name of the concupiscible power is taken from desire (*a concupiscendo*) and the name of the irascible power is taken from anger (*ab irascendo*). But there are some instances of desire (*concupiscentia*) that can involve only the intellectual appetite, i.e., the will, and cannot involve the sentient appetite, e.g., the desire for wisdom (*concupiscentia sapientiae*) of which Wisdom 6:21 says, “The desire for wisdom leads to the everlasting kingdom.” There are likewise instances of anger that can involve only the intellectual appetite and cannot involve the sentient appetite, as when we are angry about vices; hence, in *Super Matthaeum* Jerome says, “Let us have in the irascible power a hatred for vices.” Therefore, the irascible and the concupiscible should be distinguished in the intellectual appetite, just as in the sentient appetite.

Objection 2: According to what is commonly said, charity exists in the concupiscible power, whereas hope exists in the irascible power. But charity and hope cannot exist in the sentient appetite, since they are intelligible objects and not sensible objects. Therefore, the concupiscible and the irascible should be posited in the intellective part of the soul.

Objection 3: *De Spiritu et Anima* says, “The soul has these powers [viz., the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational] before it is mixed with the body.” But no power of the sentient part belongs just to the soul; instead, as was explained above (q. 77, a. 5), it belongs to the conjoined being. Therefore, the irascible and the concupiscible exist in the will, i.e., in the intellective appetite.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa says that the non-rational part of the soul is divided into the desirous power and the irascible power (*dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum*); and Damascene says the same thing in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2. Moreover, in *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that “the will exists in reason, whereas concupiscence and anger, or desire and vehemence (*animus*), exist in the non-rational part of the soul.”

I respond: The irascible and the concupiscible are not parts of the intellective appetite, which is called the will. For, as was explained above (q. 59, a. 4 and q. 79, a. 7), a power that is ordered toward an object under a common notion is not diversified by special differences contained under that common notion. For instance, since the power of sight is directed to the visible under the notion *colored*, visual powers are not multiplied according to the diverse species of color. However, if there were a power that was directed toward what is white insofar as it is white and not insofar as it is colored, then it would be diverse from a power directed toward what is black insofar as it is black.

Now the sentient appetite is not directed toward the common notion *good*, since the sensory powers do not apprehend the universal. And so the parts of the sentient appetite are diversified in a way that corresponds to the diverse notions of particular goods. For the concupiscible is directed at the proper notion of the good insofar as it is pleasant to the senses and agreeable to the nature, whereas the irascible is directed toward the notion of the good insofar as it repels and attacks that which inflicts harm.

The will, however, is directed toward the good under the common notion *good*. And so it is not the case that appetitive powers are diversified within it, i.e., within the intellective appetite, in such a way that within the intellective appetite there would be a distinct irascible power and a distinct concupiscible power—just as it is not the case that apprehensive powers are multiplied in the intellect, even though they are multiplied among the sensory powers.

Reply to objection 1: Love (*amor*), concupiscence (*concupiscentia*), and other things of this sort are taken in two ways.

For sometimes they are taken insofar as they are certain passions, bringing with them a certain arousal of feeling (*cum concitatione animi*). This is the way they are commonly taken, and when they are taken in this way, they exist only in the sentient appetite.

In the second way, they signify a simple affection, without passion or an arousal of feeling. Taken in this way, they are acts of the will, and in this sense they are likewise attributed to the angels and to God. But insofar as they are taken in this way, they involve only a single power, which is called the will, and not diverse powers.

Reply to objection 2: The will can be called irascible insofar as it wills to fight off evil not from the force of passion, but by the judgment of reason. And, in the same way, it can be called concupiscible because of its desire for the good. And this is the sense in which charity and hope exist in a concupiscible power and an irascible power, i.e., they are in the will insofar as it is ordered toward acts of this sort.

This is likewise the way one can interpret what *De Spiritu et Anima* says, viz., that the irascible and the concupiscible belong to the soul before it is united to the body (insofar as one understands this to be a

natural ordering and not a temporal ordering)—even though it is unnecessary to pay heed to what this particular book says.

Reply to objection 3: From this the answer to the third objection is obvious.

QUESTION 83

Free Choice

Next we ask about free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does man have free choice? (2) What is free choice: a power, an act, or a habit? (3) If it is a power, is it an appetitive power or a cognitive power? (4) If it is an appetitive power, is it the same power as the will, or a distinct power?

Article 1

Does man have free choice?

It seems that man does not have free choice or free judgment (*liberum arbitrium*):

Objection 1: Anyone who has free choice does what he wants to. But a man does not do what he wants to; for Romans 7:15 says, “For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do.” Therefore, man does not have free choice.

Objection 2: Anyone who has free choice is such that it is up to him to will or not to will, to act or not to act. But this is not the way it is with man; for Romans 9:16 says, “It is not up to him that wills”—i.e., it is not up to him to will—“nor up to him that runs ...”—i.e., it is not up to him to run. Therefore, man does not have free choice.

Objection 3: As *Metaphysics* 1 says, “The free is that which is a cause of itself.” Therefore, that which is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will; for Proverbs 21:1 says, “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; wherever He will He shall turn it,” and Philippians 2:13 says, “It is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish.” Therefore, man does not have free choice.

Objection 4: Anyone who has free choice is the master of his own acts. But man is not the master of his own acts, since, as Jeremiah 10:23 says, “The way of a man is not his; neither is it in a man ... to direct his own steps.” Therefore, man does not have free choice.

Objection 5: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “Each man is such that the end appears to him in a way that corresponds to what he is like (*qualis est*).” But what we are like is not within our power; rather, it is ours by nature. Therefore, it is natural to us that we should pursue a given end. Therefore, this does not come from free choice.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 15:14 says, “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”—and a Gloss adds, “... that is, left him with freedom of choice.”

I respond: Man has free choice. Otherwise, deliberations, exhortations, precepts, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would make no sense (*frustra essent*).

To see this clearly, note that some things act without judgment, e.g., a rock moving downward and, similarly, all things that lack cognition.

Other things act with judgment, but not with *free* judgment, viz., brute animals. For instance, a sheep, seeing a wolf, judges by a natural judgment—and not by a free judgment—that it should run away from the wolf, since it makes this judgment by natural instinct (*ex naturali instinctu*) and not by comparing alternatives (*non ex collatione*). And the same holds for every judgment made by brute animals.

Now a man acts by judgment, since through his cognitive power he judges that something should be pursued or avoided. But the reason why he acts by *free* judgment and is able to go in alternative ways (*potens in diversa ferri*) is that in the case of a particular action this judgment arises from a comparison made by reason (*ex collatione quadam rationis*) and not from natural instinct. For with respect to contingent matters, reason has an openness with respect to opposites (*ratio habet viam ad opposita*), as is

clear from dialectical syllogisms and rhetorical persuasions. But particular actions (*operabilia*) are contingent matters, and so with respect to them the judgment of reason is related to different alternatives and is not determined to just one (*ad diversa se habet et non est determinatum ad unum*). Accordingly, by the very fact that he is rational, man must have free choice.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 81, art. 3), even though the sentient appetite obeys reason, it is still able to resist it in some cases by having desires that are contrary to what reason dictates. This, then, is the good that a man does not do when he wants to, viz., not to have a desire contrary to reason—as Augustine’s gloss on the same passage explains.

Reply to objection 2: This passage from the Apostle should not be interpreted to mean that man does not will by free choice or that he does not run by free choice. Rather, it should be interpreted to mean that free choice is not sufficient for these things unless it is moved and assisted by God.

Reply to objection 3: Free choice is a cause of its own movement in the sense that through free choice a man moves himself to act. However, freedom does not require that what is free should be the first cause of itself—just as, in order for something to be a cause of another, it is not required that it be the first cause of that thing. Therefore, God is the first cause and moves both natural causes and voluntary causes. And just as, in the case of natural causes, He does not, by moving them, deprive their acts of being natural, so too He does not, by moving voluntary causes, deprive their actions of being voluntary, but instead He brings this very thing about in them (*sed potius hoc in eis facit*). For within each thing He operates in accord with what is proper to that thing (*secundum eius proprietatem*).

Reply to objection 4: Man’s way is said not to be within his power with respect to the *execution* of his choices, in which a man can be impeded, whether he wants to be or not. However, the choices themselves (*electiones ipsae*) exist *within us*, assuming God’s assistance.

Reply to objection 5: There are two senses of ‘what a man is like’ (*qualitas hominis*): (a) natural and (b) subsequent (*superveniens*).

The *natural* sense of what a man is like can be understood either with respect to *the intellective part of the soul* or with respect to *the body and the powers associated with the body*. Thus, given what man is naturally like because of the intellective part of the soul, a man naturally desires his ultimate end, viz., beatitude. As was explained above (q. 82, art. 1 and 2), this is a natural appetite and is not subject to free choice. On the other hand, as regards the body and the powers associated with the body, a man can be what he is like naturally insofar as he has a certain temperament (*complexio*) or disposition because of the influence of corporeal causes which cannot affect the intellective part of the soul, since that part of the soul is not the actuality of a body (*non est alicuius corporis actus*). So, then, given what each man is like according to his corporeal makeup (*secundum corpoream qualitatem*), the end will strike him in a certain way, since a man is inclined by this sort of disposition to choose something or to reject it. However, inclinations of this sort are subject to the judgment of reason, which, as was explained above (q. 81, a. 3), the lower appetite obeys. Hence, this is not prejudicial to freedom of choice.

Now the *subsequent* qualities (*qualitates supervenientes*) are those such as habits and passions, in accord with which someone is more inclined toward one alternative than toward another. Yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, and the qualities themselves are also subject to reason, since it is within our power (a) to acquire such qualities, either by causing them or by disposing ourselves to them (*vel causiter vel dispositivè*), or (b) to exclude them from ourselves. And there is nothing here that is incompatible with freedom of choice.

Article 2

Is free choice a power?

It seems that free choice is not a power:

Objection 1: Free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) is nothing other than free judgment (*liberum iudicium*). But ‘judgment’ names an act and not a power. Therefore, free choice is not a power.

Objection 2: Free choice is said to be “a faculty of will and reason (*facultas voluntatis et rationis*).” But ‘faculty’ names a facility with respect to a power, and this sort of facility occurs through a habit. Therefore, free choice is a habit. Also, Bernard says that free choice “is a habit of the soul, free for itself.” Therefore, it is not a power.

Objection 3: No natural power is destroyed by sin (*tollitur per peccatum*). But free choice is destroyed by sin; for Augustine says, “A man who uses free choice badly loses both himself and free choice.” Therefore, free choice is not a power.

But contrary to this: Nothing except a power, it seems, is the subject of a habit. But free choice is the subject of grace, with the assistance of which it chooses the good. Therefore, free choice is a power.

I respond: Even though, according to the proper signification of the term, ‘free choice’ names a certain act, nevertheless, in the common usage of speakers, what we call free choice is the principle of this act, viz., that by which a man judges freely (*quo homo libere iudicat*).

Now the principles of our acts include both powers and habits; for we are said to have cognition both through [the habit of] knowledge (*per scientiam*) and through the intellective power (*per intellectivam potentiam*). Therefore, free choice has to be either a power or a habit or a power along with a habit.

But there are two ways in which it is clear that free choice is neither a habit nor a power along with a habit.

First, if it were a habit, it would have to be a natural habit, since it is natural to man to have free choice. But there is no natural habit available to us for the things that fall under free choice, since the things with respect to which we have natural habits, e.g., assenting to first principles, are such that we are inclined toward them naturally, and things that we are inclined toward naturally do not fall under free choice—as has already been explained in the case of the desire for beatitude (q. 82, a. 1 and 2). Hence, it is contrary to the proper notion of free choice that it be a natural habit. But for it to be a non-natural habit is contrary to its status as something natural (*contra naturalitatem eius*). And so it follows that free choice is in no way a habit.

Second, as *Ethics* 2 says, a habit is something according to which we are related either in a good way or in a bad way (*bene vel male*) to passions or actions. For instance, through temperance we are related in a good way to sensory desires (*bene ad concupiscentias*), whereas through intemperance we are related to them in a bad way; again, through knowledge we are related in a good way to acts of intellective understanding, whereas through the contrary habit we do badly with respect to the cognition of truth. But free choice is related indifferently to both choosing well and choosing badly (*indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male*). Hence, it is impossible for free choice to be a habit.

Therefore, it follows that free choice is a power.

Reply to objection 1: It is customary for a power to be signified by the name of its act. And so the power which is the principle of the act of free judgment is signified by the act. Otherwise, if ‘free choice’ named an act, then it would not always be present (*non semper maneret*) in a man.

Reply to objection 2: ‘Faculty’ sometimes names a power that stands ready to operate. And this

is the sense in which ‘faculty’ occurs in the definition of free choice.

Now Bernard is taking ‘habit’ not in the sense in which it is divided off against ‘power’, but rather insofar as it signifies a relation (*habitus*) by which someone is in some way related to an act—and this is either through a power or through a habit. For through a power a man is related as one who is able to act, whereas through a habit he is related as one who is ready to act well or as one who is ready to act badly.

Reply to objection 3: By sinning, a man is said to have lost free choice not with respect to his natural freedom, i.e., freedom from coercion, but with respect to that freedom which is freedom from sin and misery (*a culpa et a miseria*). This will be treated below in the tract on morals, in the second part of this work (*ST* 1-2, qq. 85-89 and q. 109).

Article 3

Is free choice an appetitive power?

It seems that free choice is a cognitive power and not an appetitive power:

Objection 1: Damascene says, “Free choice immediately accompanies the rational (*cum rationali confestim comitatur*).” But reason (*ratio*) is a cognitive power. Therefore, free choice is a cognitive power.

Objection 2: Free choice is, as it were, free judgment. But judging is an act of a cognitive power (*cognitiva virtus*). Therefore, free choice is a cognitive power.

Objection 3: Free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) mainly involves the act of choosing (*electio*). But the act of choosing seems to involve cognition, since choosing implies a sort of comparison of one alternative to another, and this is proper to a cognitive power (*proprium cognitivae virtutis*). Therefore, free choice is a cognitive power (*potentia cognitiva*).

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that choice (*electio*) is “a desire for those things that are within our power (*desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis*).” But desire is an act of an appetitive power. Therefore, so is the act of choosing. But free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) exists insofar as we choose. Therefore, free choice is an appetitive power (*virtus appetitiva*).

I respond: The act of choosing is what is proper to free choice (*proprium liberi arbitrii est electio*); for we are said to have free choice because we are able to take one thing while rejecting another, and this is what it is to choose. And so it is on the basis of the act of choosing that one must inquire into the nature of free choice.

Now in an act of choosing, something from the cognitive power comes together with something from the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power it is required that there be deliberation (*consilium*), through which one judges which of the alternatives is to be preferred, whereas on the part of the appetitive power it is required that the judgment made through deliberation be accepted by desiring it. And so in *Ethics* 6 Aristotle leaves it in doubt whether the act of choosing belongs mainly to the appetitive power or to the intellective power; for he says that choice “is either an appetitive understanding or an intellective desire (*intellectus appetitivus vel appetitus intellectivus*).”

However, in *Ethics* 3 he leans more to the view that it is an intellective desire, when he calls choice a ‘deliberative desire’ (*desiderium consiliabile*). The reason for this is that the proper object of an act of choosing is the means to an end. But the means to an end has, as such, the character of the sort of good that is called ‘useful’ (*bonum utile*). And so, since it is the good as such that is the object of the appetite, it follows that an act of choosing is mainly an act of the appetitive power. And so free choice is an

appetitive power.

Reply to objection 1: Appetitive powers accompany apprehensive powers. And this is why Damascene says, “Free choice immediately accompanies the rational.”

Reply to objection 2: Judgment is, as it were, the conclusion and determination of deliberation. But deliberation is made determinate, first of all, by the decision of reason (*per sententiam rationis*) and, secondly, by the approval of the appetite (*per acceptationem appetitus*). That is why in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, “When we have judged on the basis of deliberating, we desire in accord with the deliberation.” This is the sense in which the act of choosing is itself called a sort of judgment, from which comes the name ‘free decision’ (*liberum arbitrium*).

Reply to objection 3: The comparison that is implied by the name ‘choice’ pertains to the antecedent deliberation, which belongs to reason. For even though the appetite does not itself carry out a comparison, still, insofar as it is moved by a cognitive power that does carry out comparisons, it has a certain likeness to a comparison when it opts for one alternative over the other (*dum unum alteri praeoptat*).

Article 4

Is free choice a power distinct from the will?

It seems that free choice is a power distinct from the will:

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says that *thelesis* is one thing and *bulesis* another. But *thelesis* is the will (*voluntas*) and *bulesis* seems to be free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), since *bulesis*, according to Damascene, is a willing (*voluntas*) with respect to some aspect of one thing in comparison to another. Therefore, it seems that free choice is a power distinct from the will.

Objection 2: Powers are known through their acts. But choosing (*electio*), which is the act of free choice, is distinct from the act of willing (*aliud a voluntate*), as *Ethics* 3 says. For the act of willing (*voluntas*) has to do with the end, whereas the act of choosing has to do with the means to the end. Therefore, free choice is a power distinct from the will (*liberum arbitrium est alia potentia a voluntate*).

Objection 3: The will is an intellectual appetite. But the intellect has two powers, viz., the active intellect and the passive intellect (*agens et possibilis*). Therefore, the intellectual appetite should likewise have another power besides the will. And there does not seem to be such a power except for free choice. Therefore, free choice is a separate power over and beyond the will (*alia potentia praeter voluntatem*).

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says that free choice is nothing other than the will.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 80, a. 2), the appetitive powers have to be proportioned to the apprehensive powers. But, within the intellectual appetite, the will and free choice, which is nothing other than the power of choosing (*vis electiva*), bear the same relation to one another that, within intellectual apprehension, the intellect and reason bear to one another. This is clear from the relations among their objects and acts.

For to understand a thing intellectually (*intelligere*) implies a simple acceptance (*importat simplicem acceptationem*) of it, and so, properly speaking, what is said to be understood intellectually are principles that are known in their own right without any comparisons (*sine collatione per seipsa cognoscuntur*). By contrast, to reason discursively (*rationari*) is, properly speaking, to come to the cognition of one thing on the basis of something else, and so, properly speaking, we have discursive

reasoning with respect to conclusions that are known from principles (*proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur quae ex principiis innotescunt*).

Something similar holds for the appetite. An act of willing (*velle*) implies a simple desire (*importat simplicem appetitum*) for something, and so the will (*voluntas*) is said to be concerned with the end, which is desired for its own sake (*propter se appetitur*). On the other hand, to choose (*eligere*) is to desire something for the sake of attaining something else, and so, properly speaking, choice is directed toward the means to an end.

Now, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means to the end, which are desired for the sake of the end, in the same way that, in cognitive matters, the principle is related to the conclusion, to which we assent because of the principles. Hence, it is clear that the will is related to the power to choose, i.e., to free choice, in the same way that the intellect is related to reason. But it was shown above (q. 79, a. 8) that understanding intellectually and reasoning discursively belong to the same power, just as coming to rest and being moved belong to the same power. Hence, an act of willing and an act of choosing likewise belong to the same power (*eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere*). Because of this, the will and free choice are a single power and not two powers.

Reply to objection 1: *Bulesis* is distinguished from *thelesis* because of a difference between the acts and not because of a diversity of powers.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, choosing (*electio*) and willing (*voluntas*), i.e., the act itself of willing (*ipsum velle*), are diverse acts, and yet they belong to a single power, just as understanding intellectually (*intelligere*) and reasoning discursively (*ratiocinari*) likewise belong to the same power.

Reply to objection 3: The intellect is related to the will as its mover. And so there is no need to distinguish an active will from a passive will (*non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile*).

QUESTION 84

How the Conjoined Soul Understands Corporeal Things That are Below Itself

Next we have to consider the acts of the soul with respect to the intellectual and appetitive powers, since the other powers of the soul are not directly relevant to the theologian's inquiry. Now the acts of the appetitive part of the soul are relevant to moral knowledge (*moralis scientia*), and so they will be treated in the second part of this work (*ST* 1-2 and 2-2), in which moral matters will be discussed. At present, however, we will discuss the acts of the intellectual part.

In the consideration of these acts, we will proceed in the following way: We have to consider, first, how the soul has intellectual understanding when it is conjoined to the body (questions 84-88), and, second, how the soul has intellectual understanding when it is separated from the body (question 89).

The consideration of the first topic will have three parts: We will consider, first, how the soul has intellectual understanding of corporeal things, which are below it (questions 84-86); second, how it has intellectual understanding of itself and of what is contained within itself (question 87); and, third, how it has intellectual understanding of immaterial substances, which are above it (question 88).

As for the cognition of corporeal things, there are three matters to be considered: first, by what means (*per quid*) it has cognition of them (question 84); second, in what manner and order (*quomodo et quo ordine*) it has cognition of them (question 85); and, third, what (*quid*) it has cognition of in them (question 86).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Does the soul have cognition of corporeal things through the intellect? (2) Does the soul have intellectual understanding of them through its own essence or instead through species? (3) If through species, are the species of all intelligible things naturally inherent (*naturaliter innatae*) in the soul? (4) Do the species flow into the soul from immaterial separated forms? (5) Does our soul see in the eternal conceptions (*in rationibus aeternis*) all the things it has intellectual understanding of? (6) Does it acquire intelligible cognition from the sensory power? (7) Can the intellect engage in actual intellectual understanding through the intelligible species that it possesses without turning itself toward phantasms? (8) Is the intellect's judgment impeded when the sentient powers are impeded?

Article 1

Does the soul have cognition of bodies through the intellect?

It seems that the soul does not have cognition of bodies through the intellect:

Objection 1: In *Soliloquia* 2 Augustine says, "Bodies cannot be comprehended by the intellect; nor can a body be seen except by the senses." Also, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 he says that intellectual vision is of things that by their essence exist in the soul. But bodies are not things of this sort. Therefore, the soul cannot have cognition of bodies through the intellect.

Objection 2: The intellect is related to sensible things in the same way that the sensory power is related to intelligible things. But through the sensory power the soul cannot in any way have cognition of spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore, through the intellect the soul cannot in any way have cognition of bodies, which are sensible.

Objection 3: The intellect has as its objects things that are necessary and always remain the same way. But all bodies are changeable and do not remain the same way. Therefore, the soul cannot have cognition of bodies through the intellect.

But contrary to this: Scientific knowledge (*scientia*) exists in the intellect. Therefore, if the intellect does not have cognition of bodies, it follows that there is no scientific knowledge of bodies.

And so natural science, which is about changeable bodies, will amount to nothing (*peribit*).

I respond: To make this question clear, note that the first philosophers who inquired into the natures of things thought that there was nothing in the world except bodies. And because they saw that all bodies are changeable and believed them to be in constant flux, they judged that we can have no certitude concerning the truth about things. For what is in continuous flux cannot be apprehended with certitude, because it perishes before the mind can reach a judgment about it; for instance, as the Philosopher reports in *Metaphysics* 4, Heraclitus claimed that “it is impossible to touch the water of a flowing stream twice.”

Coming along later, and wishing to be able to salvage the claim that we can have stable cognition (*certam cognitionem*) of truth through the intellect, Plato posited, over and beyond corporeal things, another kind of entity separated from matter and movement, which he called *species* or *ideas* (*species sive ideas*), through participation in which each singular and sensible thing is said to be either a man or a horse or something else of that sort. In this way, then, he claimed that scientific knowledge, definitions, and whatever else pertains to the act of intellectual understanding has to do not with sensible bodies but instead with those immaterial and separated entities. The result is that the soul does not have intellectual understanding of corporeal entities, but instead has intellectual understanding of the separated species of corporeal entities.

But there are two reasons why this view is evidently false:

First, since the species in question are immaterial and unchangeable, the cognition of motion and matter (which is proper to natural science), along with demonstration by means of moving causes and material causes, would be excluded from the sciences.

Second, it seems laughable that while we are seeking knowledge of things that are manifest to us, we should introduce other entities that cannot be the substances of those things, because they differ from them in *esse*; and so even if we do have cognition of the separated substances in question, we cannot on that account make judgments about sensible things.

Plato seems to have deviated from the truth in this matter because his view that every cognition involves some sort of likeness led him to believe that the form of a thing that is known must exist in the knower in the same way that it exists in the thing known. Now he thought that the form of a thing that is understood exists in the intellect in a way that is universal, immaterial, and without change. This is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, which has intellectual understanding in a mode that is universal and in some sense necessary; for the mode of an action corresponds to the mode of the agent's form. And so he thought that the things that are understood must subsist in this same way in themselves, viz., immaterially and unchangeably.

However, this is not necessary. For we see even among sensible things that a form exists in one sensible thing in a way different from the way in which it exists in another sensible thing; for instance, in one thing whiteness is more intense (*intensior*) and in another it is less intense (*remissior*), and in one thing whiteness is combined with sweetness and in another thing it exists without sweetness. Along the same lines, a sensible form exists in one way in a thing that exists outside the soul and in another way in the sensory power, which receives the forms of sensible things without matter; for instance, it receives the color of the gold without the gold. Similarly, the intellect receives the species of corporeal things, which are material and changeable, in its own way, viz., immaterially and without change. For what is received exists in the thing receiving it according to the mode of the thing receiving it.

Therefore, one must reply that the soul, through the intellect, has cognition of bodies by means of a cognition that is immaterial, universal, and necessary.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine's words should be taken to apply to the things *by which* our intellect has cognition and not to the things *of which* it has cognition. For the intellect has cognition by understanding bodies intellectually. But it understands not through the bodies, or through material and

corporeal likenesses, but instead through immaterial and intelligible species, which by their essence (*per sui essentiam*) are able to exist in the soul.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 22, one should not claim that just as the senses have cognition only of bodies, so the intellect has cognition only of spiritual things. For then it would follow that God and angels have no cognition of corporeal things. The reason for this disanalogy (*diversitas*) is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power, but the higher power accomplishes in a more excellent way what belongs to the lower power.

Reply to objection 3: Every change (*motus*) presupposes something that perdures (*aliquid immobile*). For instance, when there is a change (*transmutatio*) with respect to a quality, the substance perdures; and when a substantial form is changed, the matter perdures. Also, there are unchanged relations involving changing things; for instance, even if Socrates is not always sitting, it is nonetheless unchangeably true that whenever he is sitting, he remains in one place. Because of this, nothing prevents us from having unchangeable scientific knowledge about changeable things.

Article 2

Does the soul have intellectual understanding of corporeal things through its own essence?

It seems that the soul has intellectual understanding of corporeal things through its own essence:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says that the soul “captures and collects images of bodies that are made in its very self and of its very self; for in forming them it communicates something of its own substance.” But it is through likenesses of bodies that the soul has intellectual understanding of bodies. Therefore, it is through its own essence, which it communicates in forming such likenesses and from which it forms them, that the soul has cognition of corporeal things.

Objection 2: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “The soul is in some sense all things.” Therefore, since like is known by like, it is through itself, it seems, that the soul has cognition of corporeal things.

Objection 3: The soul is higher than corporeal creatures. But as Dionysius says, lower things exist in a more eminent way in higher things than they do in themselves. Therefore, all corporeal creatures exist in a more noble way in the substance of the soul than they do in themselves. Therefore, it is through its own substance that the soul is able to have cognition of corporeal creatures.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, “The mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the body’s sensory power.” But the soul itself is not knowable through the bodily sensory power. Therefore, it does not have cognition of corporeal things through its own substance.

I respond: The ancient philosophers claimed that it is through its own essence that the soul has cognition of bodies. For it was generally instilled in the minds of all of them that like is known by like. And they believed that the form of the thing known exists in the knower in the same way that it exists in the thing known.

The Platonists, on the other hand, held a contrary opinion. For since Plato perceived that the intellectual soul is immaterial and has cognition non-materially, he claimed that the forms of the things that are known subsist immaterially.

By contrast, since the prior naturalists had believed that the things known were corporeal and material, they claimed that the things known must also exist materially in the soul when it has cognition. And so, in order to attribute cognition of all things to the soul, they claimed that the soul has a nature in common with all things. And since the nature of things that have a beginning (*natura principiatorum*) is

constituted from the principles, they attributed to the soul the nature of a principle, so that those who thought that fire was the principle of all things held that the soul has the nature of fire, and similarly for air and water. Empedocles, who posited four material elements and two principles that effect movement, likewise claimed that the soul was constituted by these. And so since they posited things materially in the soul, they held that all the soul's cognition is material, and they did not distinguish the intellect from the sensory power.

However, this opinion is disproved, first, by the fact that things that have a beginning exist only in potentiality in the material principle, which is what they were talking about. However, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 9, there is cognition of a thing only insofar as it exists in actuality and not insofar as it exists in potentiality, and so neither is the potentiality itself known except through the actuality. So, then, it would not be sufficient to attribute the nature of the principles to the soul in order for the soul to have cognition of all things—unless there existed within it the natures and forms of *all* the singular effects, e.g., bone and flesh and other things of this sort, as Aristotle argues, in opposition to Empedocles, in *De Anima* 1.

Second, if the thing known had to exist materially in the knower, then there would be no reason why entities subsisting materially outside the soul should themselves lack cognition; for instance, if it is by means of fire that the soul has cognition of fire, then fire which exists outside the soul would likewise have cognition of fire.

It follows, then, that material things that are known must exist in the knower not in a material way, but rather in a non-material way. The reason for this is that an act of cognition extends to things that exist outside the one who has the cognition; for we have cognition even of those things that exist outside of us. But it is through matter that the form of an entity is determined to a singular thing (*determinatur ad aliquid unum*). Hence, it is clear that the nature of cognition stands in opposition to the nature of materiality. And so, as *De Anima* 2 says, things that receive forms only materially, such as plants, have no cognition at all (*nullo modo sint cognoscitiva*). But to the extent that something possesses the form of the thing known in a more non-material way, its cognition is more perfect. Hence, our intellect, which abstracts species not only from matter but also from individuating material conditions, has more perfect cognition than does the sensory power, which receives without matter but with material conditions the forms of the things it has cognition of. And among the senses themselves, the sense of sight has the most perfect cognition (*est magis cognoscitivus*), since it is the least material—as was explained above (q. 78, a. 3). And among intellects themselves, any given one is more perfect to the extent that it is more non-material.

From these considerations it is clear that if there is any intellect that has cognition of all things through its own essence, then its essence must possess everything within itself in a non-material way—just as the ancients claimed that the soul's essence is actually composed of the principles of all material things, so that it might have cognition of all things. But it is proper to God that His essence should, in a non-material way, comprehend all things in the sense in which effects preexist virtually in their cause. Therefore, it is God alone who has intellectual understanding of all things through His own essence—and not the human soul or even the angels.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking here about imaginative vision, which is effected by the images of bodies. In forming these images, the soul communicates something of its own substance in the sense in which a subject exists in order to be informed by some form. And so it makes images of this sort 'from' itself—not in the sense that the soul or something of the soul is converted into this or that image, but in the sense in which a body is said to become something colored when it is informed by a color.

This interpretation is clear from what follows the quoted passage. For he says, "It keeps something"—namely, something not formed by such an image—"that freely judges concerning the species of such images"—and this, he says, is the mind or intellect. And he says that the part of the soul

which is informed by images of this sort, viz., the imagination (*partem imaginativam*), “is common to us and to the beasts.”

Reply to objection 2: Unlike the ancient naturalists, Aristotle did not claim that the soul is actually composed of all things. Rather, he said that “the soul is in some sense all things” insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to all things—in potentiality to sensible things through the senses and to intelligible things through the intellect.

Reply to objection 3: Every creature has finite and determinate *esse*. Hence, even if a higher creature’s essence bears a certain likeness to a lower creature’s essence insofar as they share in the same genus, it nonetheless does not bear a perfect likeness to it, since it is determined to a species that lies outside of the lower thing’s species. By contrast, God’s essence, as the universal principle of all things, is a perfect likeness of all things with respect to *everything* that is found in things.

Article 3

Does the soul have intellectual understanding of all things through species that it is naturally endowed with?

It seems that the soul has intellectual understanding of all things through species that it is naturally endowed with (*per species sibi naturaliter inditas*):

Objection 1: In his homily on the feast of the Ascension Gregory says, “Man has intellectual understanding in common with the angels.” But the angels have intellectual understanding through forms that they are naturally endowed with; thus, in the *Liber de Causis* it says, “Every intelligence is filled with forms.” Therefore, the soul likewise has species of things which it is naturally endowed with and by means of which it has intellectual understanding of corporeal things.

Objection 2: The intellectual soul is more noble than the primary matter of a corporeal thing. But primary matter is created by God with forms that it is in potentiality with respect to. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the intellectual soul is created by God with intelligible species. And so the soul has intellectual understanding of corporeal things through species that it is naturally endowed with.

Objection 3: No one can give true replies except about something he knows (*scit*). But even someone uneducated (*idiot*a), who has not acquired any scientific knowledge (*scientiam*), gives true replies about singular things if he is interrogated in the right order—as is told of a certain man in Plato’s *Meno*. Therefore, before someone acquires scientific knowledge, he has a cognition of things (*antequam aliquis acquirat scientiam, habet rerum cognitionem*). But this would not be so unless the soul had species that it is naturally endowed with. Therefore, the soul has intellectual understanding of corporeal things through species that it is naturally endowed with.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3, talking about the intellect, the Philosopher says that it is “like a slate on which nothing has been written.”

I respond: Since a form is a principle of action, a thing has to be related to the form that is the principle of an action in the same way that it is related to the action; for instance, if moving upwards derives from the form of being lightweight (*ex levitate*), then what is borne upwards only in potentiality is lightweight only in potentiality, whereas what is being carried upwards in actuality is lightweight in actuality.

Now we see that a man sometimes has cognition only in potentiality, both with respect to the sensory power and with respect to the intellect. And from this potentiality he is led into actuality (a) by the actions of sensible things on the sensory power in order to have sensation and (b) by learning or

discovery in order to have intellectual understanding. Hence, one must claim that a soul with cognitive powers (*anima cognoscitiva*) is in potentiality both with respect to those likenesses that are principles of sensing and also with respect to those likenesses that are principles of intellectual understanding. Because of this, Aristotle claimed that the intellect, by which the soul has intellectual understanding, does not have any species that it is naturally endowed with, but is in potentiality at the beginning with respect to all species of this sort.

Now that which actually has a form is sometimes unable to act in accord with that form because of some impediment, as when a lightweight thing is impeded from being borne upwards. For this reason, Plato claimed that man's intellect is naturally full of all the intelligible species, but is prevented by its union with the body from being able to make the transition into actual [understanding] (*exire in actum*).

However, this claim does not seem right.

For, first, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it does not seem possible to suffer such a great forgetfulness of this natural knowledge that one would not know that he possesses knowledge of this sort. For no man is oblivious of those things that he knows naturally, such as that a whole is greater than its part, and other things of this sort. This seems especially problematic if one claims, as we established above (q. 76, a. 1), that it is natural for the soul to be united to the body; for it is absurd that a thing's natural operation should be totally impeded by something that belongs to it by nature.

Second, the falsity of the claim in question is manifestly obvious from the fact that when one of the senses is inoperative (*deficiente aliquo sensu*), there is no knowledge (*scientia*) of the things apprehended by that sense; for instance, someone born blind cannot have cognition of colors (*notitiam de coloribus*). This would not be the case if the soul were naturally endowed with the notions of all intelligible things.

And so one should reply that the soul does not have cognition of corporeal things through species that it is naturally endowed with.

Reply to objection 1: Man does, to be sure, agree with the angels in having intellectual understanding, but he falls short of the eminence of their intellect, just as lower bodies, which *merely exist* according to Gregory, fall short of the sort of existence had by higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally perfected (*completa*) by their form, but instead remains in potentiality to forms that it does not now have, whereas the matter of the celestial bodies is totally perfected by their forms in such a way that it does not remain in potentiality with respect to any other form, as was established above (q. 66, a. 2). Similarly, an angel's intellect is by its own nature perfected by intelligible species, whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to species of this sort.

Reply to objection 2: Primary matter has substantial *esse* (*esse substantiale*) through form, and so it had to be created with some form; otherwise, it would not exist in actuality. Yet when it exists with one form, it remains in potentiality with respect to other forms. By contrast, the intellect does not have substantial *esse* through an intelligible species. And so the cases are not parallel.

Reply to objection 3: A well-ordered interrogation (*ordinata interrogatio*) proceeds from common principles, known *per se* (*per se notis*), to more particular matters (*ad propria*), and scientific knowledge is caused by such a progression in the learner's soul. Hence, when at a later point he gives true replies about the things concerning which he is being questioned, this is not because he knew those things beforehand; rather, it is because at that point he is learning them *de novo*. For regardless of whether it is by making a presentation or by asking a series of questions (*proponendo vel interrogando*) that the teacher proceeds from the common principles to the conclusions, in both cases the listener's mind becomes certain about the conclusions by means of the principles.

Article 4

Do the intelligible species flow into the soul from separated forms?

It seems that the intelligible species flow into the soul from separated forms (*effluent in animam ab aliquibus formis separatis*):

Objection 1: Everything that is such-and-such by participation is caused to be that way by something that is such-and-such by its essence; for instance, what is on fire is traced back to fire as a cause. But insofar as the intellective soul is actually engaged in intellective understanding, it participates in the intelligible things themselves; for the intellect in act is in a certain sense the thing understood in act. Therefore, the things that are actually understood in their own right and in their essence are causes of the intellective soul's actually having intellective understanding. But the things that are actually understood through their essence are forms that exist without matter. Therefore, the intelligible species by which the soul has intellective understanding are caused by separated forms.

Objection 2: Intelligible things are related to the intellect in the same way that sensible things are related to the sensory power. But sensible things, which exist in actuality outside the soul, are causes of the sensible species which exist in the sensory power and by which we have sensation. Therefore, the intelligible species by which our intellect has intellective understanding are caused by actually intelligible things that exist outside the soul. But intelligible things of this sort are not anything other than forms separated from matter. Therefore, the intelligible forms that belong to our intellect flow from separated substances.

Objection 3: Everything that is in potentiality is led into actuality by what is actual. Therefore, if our intellect, at first being in potentiality, later has actual intellective understanding, this must be caused by some intellect that is always active. But this is a separated intellect. Therefore, the intelligible species by which we have actual intellective understanding are caused by separated substances.

But contrary to this: On the view just proposed we would not need the sensory powers in order to have intellective understanding. That this is false is clear mainly from the fact that someone who lacks one of the sensory powers can in no way have scientific knowledge of the sensible things that correspond to that sensory power.

I respond: Some have claimed that the intelligible species that belong to our intellect proceed from certain separated forms or substances—and this in one of two ways:

(a) Plato, as has been explained (a. 1), posited forms of sensible things that subsist in their own right without matter, e.g., the form of man, which he called *man per se*, and the form or idea of a horse, which he called *horse per se*, and so on for the others. Therefore, he claimed that these separated forms are participated in both by our soul and by corporeal matter—by our soul in order for the soul to have cognition, and by corporeal matter in order for corporeal matter to exist. So just as corporeal matter, by participating in the idea *rock* becomes *this* rock, so our intellect, by participating in the idea *rock*, comes to have an intellective understanding of *rock*. Now this participation is effected by a likeness of the idea itself in the thing that participates in it, in the way in which an exemplar is participated in by an example of it. Therefore, just as he claimed that the sensible forms that exist in corporeal matter flow from the ideas as certain likenesses of them, so too he claimed that our intellect's intelligible species are likenesses of the ideas that they flow from. Because of this, as was explained above (a. 1), he referred scientific knowledge and definitions to the ideas.

(b) However, since, as Aristotle proves a number of times, it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, Avicenna, having rejected [Plato's] position, claimed that the intelligible species of all sensible things do not, to be sure, subsist *per se* without matter,

but that instead they preexist in a non-material way in separated intellects. Species of this sort flow from the first of these separated intellects into the next one, and so on for the others up to the last separated intellect, which he names ‘the active intellect’ (*intellectus agens*). From this active intellect, he says, intelligible species flow into our souls and sensible forms flow into corporeal matter.

And so Avicenna agrees with Plato that our intellect’s intelligible species flow from certain separated forms, but whereas Plato claims that these forms subsist *per se*, Avicenna places them in the active intelligence (*in intelligentia agente*). They also disagree in that Avicenna claims that the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after our intellect ceases to have actual intellectual understanding; instead, the intellect needs to turn itself [toward the active intelligence] once again in order to receive the intelligible species anew. Hence, he does not posit a knowledge that our soul is naturally endowed with, as Plato does when he claims that participations in the ideas remain in the soul permanently (*immobilter*).

However, given this position, no sufficient reason can be given for why our soul is united with a body. For one cannot claim that the intellectual soul is united with a body for the sake of the body, since it is not the case that form exists for the sake of matter or that what effects movement exists for the sake of the thing moved; in fact, just the opposite is true. Now given that the soul does not depend on the body with respect to its *esse*, the body seems necessary to the intellectual soul mainly for the soul’s proper operation, i.e., intellectual understanding. But if the soul were by its nature apt to receive intelligible species only through the influence of separated principles and did not take them from the sensory powers, then it would not need the body in order to have intellectual understanding, and its union with the body would be pointless (*frustra corpori uniretur*).

Nor does it seem adequate to reply that our soul needs the sensory powers for intellectual understanding because it is in some way stimulated by them to consider the things whose intelligible species it has received from the separated principles. For a stimulation of this sort does not seem necessary to the soul except insofar as it is in some sense sleepy or oblivious because of its union with the body, as the Platonists claim. And so the sensory powers would be of no use to the intellectual soul except to remove an impediment that is posed for the soul because of its union with the body. Therefore, one still needs to ask what reason there is for the soul’s union with the body.

On the other hand, if one claims, in accord with Avicenna, that the sensory powers are necessary for the soul because the soul is stimulated by them to turn itself toward the active intelligence, from which it receives the species, then this, too, is inadequate. For if it were in the soul’s nature to have intellectual understanding through species that flow from the active intelligence, it would follow that the soul is sometimes able to turn itself toward the active intelligence by an inclination of its own nature—or even that it is sometimes stimulated by one of the other senses to turn itself toward the active intelligence in order to receive the species of sensible things for which the man in question does not have [the appropriate] sensory power. And in this way someone born blind would be able to have scientific knowledge of colors (*scientia colorum*)—which is manifestly false.

Hence, one should reply that the intelligible species by which our soul has intellectual understanding do not flow from separated forms.

Reply to objection 1: The intelligible species that our intellect participates in are traced back, as to a first cause, to a principle that is intelligible through its essence, viz., God. But they proceed from that principle by the mediation of the forms of sensible and material things, from which, as Dionysius puts it, we gather knowledge.

Reply to objection 2: Given the *esse* that they have outside the soul, material things are able to be sensible in actuality, but not intelligible in actuality. Hence, there is no parallel between the sensory power and the intellect.

Reply to objection 3: Our passive intellect is led from potentiality into actuality by some actual

being, viz., by the active intellect, which, as has been explained (q. 79, a. 4), is a certain power of our soul. But it is not led into actuality by any separated intellect as a proximate cause—though perhaps as a remote cause.

Article 5

Does the intellective soul have cognition of material things in the eternal conceptions?

It seems that the intellective soul does not have cognition of material things in the eternal conceptions (*in rationibus aeternis*):

Objection 1: That *in which* something is known is itself known to a greater extent and in a prior way. But in the state of the present life, man's intellective soul does not have cognition of the eternal conceptions, since it does not have cognition of God Himself, in whom the eternal conceptions exist, but is instead "conjoined to Him as something unknown," as Dionysius puts in *Mystica Theologia*, chap. 1. Therefore, the soul does not have cognition of all things in the eternal conceptions.

Objection 2: Romans 1:20 says, "The invisible things of God are clearly seen through the things that have been made." But the eternal conceptions are numbered among the invisible things of God. Therefore, it is the eternal conceptions that are known through material creatures, and not vice versa.

Objection 3: The eternal conceptions are nothing other than the ideas; for in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "The ideas are stable conceptions of things that exist in God's mind." Therefore, if one claims that the intellective soul has cognition of all things in the eternal conceptions, there will be a return to the opinion of Plato, who claimed that all knowledge is derived from the ideas.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 12 Augustine says, "If both of us see that what you say is true and if both of us see that what I say is true, then where, I ask, do we see it? Certainly, I do not see it in you, and you do not see it in me; rather, both of us see it in that immutable truth that lies beyond our minds." But immutable truth is contained in the eternal conceptions. Therefore, the intellective soul has cognition of all true things in the eternal conceptions.

I respond: As Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 2, "If those who are called philosophers have by chance made claims that are true and compatible with our Faith, then we must appropriate those truths from them, as from unjust possessors, for our own advantage. For the teachings of the Gentiles contain certain counterfeit and superstitious inventions (*simulata et superstitiosa figmenta*) that each of us who has left the company of the Gentiles should avoid." And so if Augustine, who had been imbued with the teachings of the Platonists, found anything consistent with the Faith in their sayings, he took it over, whereas when he found anything opposed to the Faith, he changed it into something better.

Now, as was explained above (a. 4), Plato claimed that the forms of things subsist in their own right separated from matter, and he claimed that through participation in these forms, which he called 'ideas', our intellect has cognition of all things. For instance, just as corporeal matter becomes a rock through participation in the idea *rock*, so too our intellect comes to have a cognition of *rock* through participation in that same idea. However, as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 11, it seems alien to the Faith that the forms of things should subsist in their own right without matter, as the Platonists claimed when they said that *life per se* or *wisdom per se* were certain creative substances. So in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine posited, in place of these ideas that Plato had posited, the conceptions of all creatures existing in God's mind; all things are formed in accord with these conceptions, and, in addition, the human soul has cognition of all things in accord with these conceptions (*secundum quas rationes*).

Therefore, when the question arises whether the human soul has cognition of all things in the

eternal conceptions, one should reply that there are two senses of ‘having a cognition of something *in* something’.

The first sense is to have a cognition ‘in something’ as *in an object that is known*—as, for instance, when someone sees in a mirror those things whose images are reflected back in the mirror (*in speculo resultant*). And in this sense the soul, in the state of the present life, is unable to see all things in the eternal conceptions. However, the blessed in heaven, who see God and see all things in Him, do in this sense have cognition of all things in the eternal conceptions.

In the second sense, one is said to have a cognition of something ‘in something’ as *in a principle of cognition*, as if we were to say that we see ‘in the sun’ those things that we see because of the sun (*per solem*). And given this sense, one must claim that the human soul has cognition of all things in the eternal conceptions, by participation in which we have cognition of all things. For the intellectual light that exists in us is nothing other than a participated likeness of the uncreated light in which the eternal conceptions are contained. Hence, in Psalm 4:6-7 it says, “Many say, ‘Who shows us good things?’” And to this question the Psalmist replies by saying, “The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”—as if to say that all things are shown to us by the very mark (*sigillatio*) of the divine light in us.

Still, since in addition to the intellectual light in us, intelligible species taken from the things are necessary for having scientific knowledge of material things, it follows that it is not solely through participation in the eternal conceptions that we have knowledge of material things, in the way that the Platonists claimed that participation in the ideas was by itself sufficient for having knowledge. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “Given that the philosophers prove with convincing arguments that all temporal things are caused by the eternal conceptions, have they been able because of this to see in these conceptions, or infer from them, how many kinds of animals there are, or what the origins (*semina*) of each are? Have they not instead looked for all these things through the history of places and times?”

Moreover, Augustine did not think that all things are known in the eternal conceptions, or in immutable truth, in such a way that the eternal conceptions themselves are seen; this is clear from what he himself says in *83 Quaestiones*: “Not each and every rational soul is claimed to be fit for that vision”—namely, the vision of the eternal conceptions—“but only one that is holy and pure”—as are the souls of the blessed in heaven.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 6

Is intellective cognition taken from sensible things?

It seems that intellective cognition is not taken from sensible things:

Objection 1: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Purity of truth should not be expected from the sensory powers of the body.” And there are two ways to prove this. First, from the fact that “everything that a corporeal sense touches is changing without any temporal intermission, and what does not remain the same cannot be perceived.” Second, from the fact that “even when all the things we sense through the body are not present to the senses, we still have their images, as when we are sleeping or furiously angry; but we are unable to discern with the senses whether we are sensing the sensible things themselves or their misleading images, and nothing can be perceived that is not distinguished from what is false.” And so he concludes that truth should not be expected from the sensory powers. But intellective cognition apprehends truth. Therefore, it is not the case that intellective cognition should be expected

from the senses.

Objection 2: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says, “Do not think that the body has an effect on the spirit, as if the spirit, instead of matter, might be subjected to the body’s action; for what acts is in every way more excellent than what it acts on.” Hence, he concludes that “the body does not cause an image of a body in the spirit, but that the spirit itself causes an image within itself.” Therefore, intellectual cognition is not derived from sensible things.

Objection 3: An effect does not extend beyond the power of its cause. But intellectual cognition extends beyond sensible things; for we have intellectual cognition of certain things that cannot be perceived by the sensory power. Therefore, intellectual cognition is not derived from sensible things.

But contrary to this: In *Metaphysics* 1 and at the end of *Posterior Analytics* the Philosopher says that our cognition begins from the sensory power.

I respond: On this question philosophers have held three positions.

As Augustine explains in his letter *Ad Dioscorum*, Democritus claimed that “the only cause of our cognition is that images come from the bodies we are thinking about and enter into our souls.” And in *De Somno et Vigilia* Aristotle likewise says that Democritus claimed that cognition is effected “by images and discharges (*per idola et defluxiones*).” As Aristotle explains in *De Anima*, the reason for this position was that Democritus himself and the other ancient naturalists did not believe that the intellect differs from the sensory power. And so since the sensory power is affected by the sensible thing, they thought that all of our cognition is brought about just by the changes caused by sensible things. Democritus asserted that these changes are effected through a discharge of images.

By contrast, Plato claimed that the intellect differs from the sensory power, and that the intellect is an immaterial power that does not use a corporeal organ in its own act. And because what is immaterial cannot be affected by what is corporeal, he claimed that intellectual cognition comes about not through the intellect’s being affected by the senses, but rather, as was explained above (aa. 4 and 5), through the intellect’s participation in separated intelligible forms. Moreover, he claimed that the sensory power operates on its own (*operantem per se*). Hence, because the sensory power is a certain spiritual power, it is not affected by the sensible things; rather, the sensory organs are affected by the sensible things, and the soul is in some way stimulated by this change to form the species of sensible things within itself. This is the opinion that Augustine seems to be alluding to in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, when he remarks, “The body does not sense, but instead the soul senses through the body, which it uses as a messenger in order to form within itself what is announced from the outside.” So, then, according to Plato’s opinion, intellectual cognition does not proceed from the sensible thing; not even sentient cognition proceeds entirely from sensible things. Instead, sensible things stimulate the sentient soul to exercise sentient cognition and, similarly, the senses stimulate the intellectual soul to exercise intellectual understanding.

Aristotle, on the other hand, proceeded along a middle course. For with Plato he claimed that the intellect differs from the sensory power. But he claimed that the sensory power does not have a proper operation that the body does not share in (*sine communicatione corporis*), and so sensing is an act of the conjoined being and not of the soul alone; and he made a similar claim about all the operations of the sentient part of the soul. Therefore, since it is not unfitting that sensible things existing outside the soul should cause something in the conjoined being, Aristotle agreed with Democritus that the operations of the sentient part are caused by the impression sensible things make on the sensory power—not by way of discharges, as Democritus had held, but rather through a certain operation. (For as is clear from *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1, Democritus held that every action is effected by a discharge of atoms.) On the other hand, Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation that it does not share with the body. But nothing corporeal can leave an impression (*potest imprimere*) on an incorporeal entity. And so, according to Aristotle, the mere impression of sensible bodies is not enough to cause an intellectual

operation; instead, what is required is something more noble, since “an agent is more honorable than a patient,” as he himself puts it. However, it is not the case that intellectual operations are caused in us by the mere impression of some higher entities, as Plato had claimed. Instead, that higher and more noble agent, which Aristotle calls the ‘active intellect’ and which we have already talked about above (q. 79, aa. 3-4), makes the phantasms received from the senses intelligible in actuality, in the manner of a sort of abstraction (*per modum abstractionis cuiusdam*). Accordingly, as far as the phantasms are concerned, the intellectual operation is caused by the sensory power. But because (a) the phantasms are not sufficient to affect the passive intellect and because (b) they have to be made intelligible in actuality by the active intellect, it cannot be claimed that sentient cognition is the total and perfect cause of intellectual cognition; instead, it is more like a material cause.

Reply to objection 1: What these words of Augustine’s mean is that truth is not to be expected in its totality. What is required is the light of the active intellect, through which we have cognition in an unchangeable way of the truth in changeable things, and through which we distinguish those things from their likenesses.

Reply to objection 2: Augustine is talking here about imaginative cognition and not intellectual cognition. And since, according to Plato’s opinion, the power of imagining has an operation that belongs to the soul alone, Augustine used the same line of reasoning to show that bodies do not impress their likenesses on the power of imagining, but that the soul itself does this. Aristotle uses the same argument, viz., that an agent is more honorable than a patient, to prove that the active intellect is something separate. There is no doubt that, given Plato’s position, it is necessary to posit in the power of imagining not just a passive power, but an active power as well.

However, if we hold, in accord with Aristotle’s opinion, that the operation of the power of imagining belongs to the conjoined being, then no difficulty ensues. For a sensible body is more noble than an animal’s sensory organ, since it is related to the sensory organ as a being in actuality is related to a being in potentiality—for instance, as something colored in actuality is related to the pupil, which is colored in potentiality.

Still, one could claim that even though the first change in the power of imagining is effected by the sensible things—given that “an image (*phantasia*) is a movement effected in the sensory power (*motus factus secundum sensum*),” as *De Anima* says—nonetheless, there is an operation of man’s soul which, by dividing and composing, fashions diverse images of things, even images that have not been received from the senses. And Augustine’s words can be understood to be making this point.

Reply to objection 3: Sentient cognition is not the total cause of intellectual cognition. And so it is no surprise that intellectual cognition extends further than sentient cognition does.

Article 7

Can the intellect have actual intellectual understanding through the intelligible species it has within itself, without turning itself to phantasms?

It seems that the intellect can have actual intellectual understanding through the intelligible species it has within itself, without turning itself to phantasms:

Objection 1: The intellect becomes active (*fit in actu*) because of the intelligible species by which it is informed. But the intellect’s becoming active is the very act of intellectual understanding. Therefore, the intelligible species are sufficient for the intellect’s actually engaging in intellectual understanding, without turning itself to phantasms.

Objection 2: The imagination depends more on the sensory power than the intellect depends on the imagination. But the imagination can be actually engaged in imagining in the absence of sensible things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the intellect can be actually engaged in intellectual understanding without turning itself to phantasms.

Objection 3: There are no phantasms of incorporeal things, since the imagination does not transcend time and continuous quantity (*continuum*). Therefore, if our intellect were unable to have actual intellectual understanding of anything without turning itself to phantasms, it would follow that it cannot have intellectual understanding of anything incorporeal. But this is clearly false, since we have intellectual understanding of truth itself and of God and of the angels.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, “The soul does not have intellectual understanding of anything without a phantasm.”

I respond: In the state of our present life, in which our intellect is joined to a passible body, it is impossible for it to have an actual intellectual understanding of anything unless it turns itself toward phantasms. There are two indications that make this apparent.

First of all, given that the intellect is a power that does not use a corporeal organ, if no act of a power that uses a corporeal organ were required for its act, then the intellect would not in any way be impeded in its act by an injury to a corporeal organ. But the senses, the imagination, and all the other powers that belong to the sentient part of the soul use a corporeal organ. Hence, it is clear that in order for the intellect to be actually engaged in intellectual understanding—not only for attaining knowledge *de novo*, but also for making use of already acquired knowledge—what is required are acts of the imagination and of the rest of the powers. For we see that when the act of the power of imagining is impeded by an injury to an organ, as in the case of those who are delirious (*in phreneticis*) or, similarly, when the act of the power of remembering is impeded, as in those who are groggy (*in lethargicis*), a man is prevented from having actual intellectual understanding even of those things that he previously had scientific knowledge of.

Second, everyone can experience in his own case that when someone tries to have an intellectual understanding of something, he forms for himself phantasms as examples in which he inspects, as it were, what he is trying to understand. And so, too, when we want to make someone else understand something, we propose to him examples from which he can form phantasms in order to understand the matter at hand. The reason for this is that a cognitive power is proportioned to the thing it has cognition of. Hence, the proper object of an angelic intellect, which is totally separated from a body, is an intelligible substance separated from a body, and it is through intelligible things of this sort that an angel has cognition of material things. By contrast, the proper object of the human intellect, which is conjoined to a body, is a ‘what-ness’ or nature existing in corporeal matter (*quidditas sive naturam in materia corporali existens*), and it is through these natures of visible things that it ascends to some sort of cognition of invisible things as well. But it is part of the conception of this sort of nature that it exists in an individual and not without corporeal matter; for instance, it is part of the conception of the nature of a rock that it exists in individual rocks (*de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide*), and part of the conception of the nature of a horse that it exists in individual horses, and so on for the others. Hence, the nature of a rock, or of any material entity, is such that there cannot be a complete and true cognition of it except insofar as it is thought of as existing in a particular. But we apprehend particulars through the sensory power and the imagination. And so for the intellect to have an actual intellectual understanding of its own proper object, it is necessary that it turn itself to phantasms, in order that it might inspect the universal nature as it exists in the particular (*ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem*). On the other hand, if the proper object of our intellect were a separated form, or if the natures of sensible things did not subsist in particulars (as the Platonists held), then it would not be necessary that our intellect always turn itself to phantasms when engaging in intellectual understanding.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 79, a. 6), the species that are conserved in the passive intellect exist in it habitually when it is not actually engaged in intellectual understanding. Hence, the conservation of these species is not itself sufficient for us to be actually engaged in intellectual understanding; instead, it is necessary for us to make use of the species in a way appropriate to the entities whose species they are, and these entities are natures that exist in particulars.

Reply to objection 2: A phantasm is itself a likeness of a particular thing, and so the imagination does not need any other likeness of the particular in the way that the intellect does.

Reply to objection 3: We have cognition of incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, by way of a comparison to sensible bodies, of which there are phantasms. For instance, we come to an intellectual understanding of truth by considering things with respect to which we see the truth, whereas, as Dionysius says, we have cognition of God (a) as a cause, and (b) through preeminence (*per excessum*), and (c) through negation (*per remotionem*). Again, other incorporeal substances are such that, in the state of our present life, we cannot have cognition of them except through negation or through some sort of comparison to corporeal things. And so when we have intellectual understanding of something of this sort, we necessarily have to be turned toward the phantasms of bodies, even though there are no phantasms of these things themselves.

Article 8

Is the intellect's judgment impeded when the sensory power is inoperative?

It seems that the intellect's judgment is not impeded when the sensory power is inoperative (*per ligamentum sensus*):

Objection 1: Something higher is not dependent on something lower. But the intellect's judgment is higher than the sensory power. Therefore, the intellect's judgment is not impeded when the sensory power is inoperative.

Objection 2: Reasoning by means of a syllogism (*sylogizare*) is an act of the intellect. Now as *De Somno et Vigilia* says, during sleep the sensory power is inoperative; and yet it sometimes happens that someone who is sleeping reasons by means of a syllogism. Therefore, the intellect's judgment is not impeded by the fact that the senses are inoperative.

But contrary to this: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, morally illicit things that occur during sleep (*contingunt in dormiendo*) do not count as sins. But this would not be so if a sleeping man had the free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore, the use of reason is impeded when the sensory power is inoperative.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 7), the proper object proportioned to our intellect is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment cannot be made about a thing if not everything that pertains to that thing is known, and especially if the terminus or end of the judgment is unknown. But in *De Caelo* 3 the Philosopher says, "Just as the end of productive knowledge (*factiva scientia*) is a piece of work (*opus*), so the end of natural knowledge (*naturalis scientia*) is that which is apparent principally to the senses." For a craftsman seeks to have cognition of knives only for the sake of his work, so that he might make this particular knife; and, similarly, a natural scientist seeks to have cognition of the nature of a rock or of a horse only in order to know the natures of those things that are apparent to the senses.

Now it is obvious that the craftsman could not render a perfect judgment about a knife if he did not know how to make one (*si opus ignoraret*); and, similarly, no perfect judgment of natural knowledge can be made about natural things if sensible things are not known. But all the things we have intellectual

understanding of in our present state are such that we have cognition of them in relation to natural sensible things. Hence, it is impossible for a perfect judgment of the intellect to exist in us when the sensory power is inoperative, since it is through the sensory power that we have cognition of sensible things.

Reply to objection 1: Even though the intellect is higher than the sensory power, it nonetheless receives in a certain way from the sensory power, and its first and principal objects are grounded in sensible things (*fundatur in sensibilibus*). And so it is necessary that the intellect's judgment should be impeded when the sensory power is inoperative.

Reply to objection 2: As *De Somno et Vigilia* says, the sensory power is inoperative in those who are asleep because of the release of certain vapors and fumes. And so the sensory power can be more or less inoperative, depending on the disposition of such evaporations.

For instance, when there is a lot of movement of vapors, both the senses and the imagination are inoperative, so that there are no phantasms; this happens especially when someone goes to sleep after heavy eating or drinking.

However, if the movement of vapors is a bit less intense, then phantasms appear, but they are distorted and chaotic (*distorta et inordinata*); this occurs in those who are feverish.

Again, if the movement is still more sedate, then well-ordered phantasms appear; this occurs mainly near the end of the time of sleep and in men who are sober and have a strong imagination.

On the other hand, if the movement of the vapors is minimal, not only does the imagination remain free, but even the common sensory power is partly operative (*ex parte solvitur*), so that a man sometimes judges in his sleep that what he is seeing are dreams, as if he were distinguishing between things and their likenesses. But to some extent the common sensory power remains inoperative, and so even if he distinguishes certain likenesses from the things, he is nonetheless always deceived about some matters.

So, then, depending on the way in which the sensory power and imagination are operating in sleep, the intellect's judgment is freed up, but not entirely. Hence, those who engage in syllogistic reasoning while asleep always recognize, when they wake up, that they have made a mistake in some matter.

QUESTION 85

The Mode and Order of Intellective Understanding

Next we have to consider the mode and order of intellective understanding. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Does our intellect have intellective understanding by abstracting species from phantasms? (2) Are the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms related to our intellective understanding as *that which* is understood or as *that by which* something is understood? (3) Does our intellect by its nature first have intellective understanding of what is more universal? (4) Can our intellect have intellective understanding of many things at once? (5) Does our intellect come to intellective understanding by composing and dividing? (6) Can our intellective understanding be mistaken? (7) Is it possible for someone to understand the same thing better than someone else? (8) Does our intellect understand what is indivisible prior to what is divisible?

Article 1

Does our intellect have intellective understanding of corporeal and material things through abstraction from phantasms?

It seems that our intellect does not have intellective understanding of corporeal and material things through abstraction from phantasms (*per abstractionem a phantasmatis*):

Objection 1: If an intellect understands a thing otherwise than it is, then it has falsity. But the forms of material things are not abstracted from the particulars whose likenesses the phantasms are. Therefore, if we understand material things by means of the abstraction of species from phantasms, then falsity will exist in our intellect.

Objection 2: Material things are natural things that have matter as part of their definition (*in quarum definitione cadit materia*). But nothing can be understood intellectually in the absence of something that is part of its definition. Therefore, material things cannot be understood without matter. But matter is a principle of individuation. Therefore, material things cannot be understood by means of the abstraction of a universal from a particular—which is what it is to abstract intelligible species from phantasms.

Objection 3: *De Anima* 3 says that phantasms are related to the intellective soul in the way that colors are related to the power of vision. But an act of seeing occurs not by means of an abstraction of species from colors, but by the colors' leaving an impression on the power of vision (*per hoc quod colores imprimunt in visum*). Therefore, it is impossible to have intellective understanding by means of something's being abstracted from phantasms; instead, it must be had by means of the phantasms' leaving an impression on the intellect (*per hoc quod phantasmata imprimunt in intellectum*).

Objection 4: *De Anima* 3 says that there are two [cognitive powers] in the intellective soul, viz., the passive intellect and the active intellect (*intellectus possibilis et agens*). But the passive intellect's function is to receive the species that have already been abstracted and not to abstract the intelligible species from phantasms. Nor does abstracting the species belong to the active intellect. For the active intellect is related to the phantasms in the way that light (*lumen*) is related to colors; but light flows into the colors rather than abstracting anything from them (*non abstrahit aliquid a coloribus sed magis eis influit*). Therefore, there is no way in which we have intellective understanding by means of abstraction from phantasms.

Objection 5: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, "The intellect *understands* species in the phantasms"—and thus does not *abstract* them.

But contrary to this: *De Anima* 3 says, "Things are susceptible to intellective understanding

(*circa intellectum sunt*) insofar as they are separable from matter.” Therefore, it must be the case that material things are understood intellectually insofar as they are abstracted from matter and from material likenesses, i.e., phantasms.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), an object of cognition (*obiectum cognoscibile*) is proportioned to the relevant cognitive power. Now there are three levels of cognitive power:

For there is a cognitive power, viz., *the sensory power*, that is the act of a corporeal organ. And so the object of any sentient power is *a form insofar as it exists in matter*. And since matter of this sort is a principle of individuation, it follows that every power of the sentient part of the soul has cognition only of particulars.

On the other hand, there is a cognitive power, viz., *the angelic intellect*, which is not the act of a corporeal power and is not conjoined in any way with corporeal matter. And so the object of this sort of cognitive power is a form that subsists without matter; for even though the angels have cognition of material things, they nonetheless have their intuitive vision of them (*ea intuentur*) ‘in’ immaterial things, viz., in themselves and in God (cf. q. 84, a. 5).

By contrast, human understanding (*intellectus humanus*) is situated in the middle. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 76, a. 1), human understanding is not the act of any [corporeal] organ. Yet it is a certain power belonging to a soul that is the form of a body, and so it is proper to it to have cognition of forms that exist individually in corporeal matter, though not insofar as they exist in such matter. But to have a cognition of what exists in a material individual, but not insofar as it exists in such matter, is to abstract the form from the individual matter represented by the phantasms. And so it is necessary to say that our intellect has intellectual understanding of material things by abstracting from the phantasms. And it is through material things considered in this way that we come to have a certain sort of cognition of immaterial things —just the opposite of the way that angels have cognition of material things through immaterial things.

However, Plato, who paid attention only to the immateriality of the human intellect, but not to the fact that it is united in some way to a body, claimed that the objects of the intellect are separated ideas and that we have intellectual understanding not by abstracting but rather by participating in abstract entities. This was explained above (q. 84, a. 1).

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which it is possible to abstract: *first*, in the *mode of composition and division*, as when we understand intellectually that one thing does not exist in another, or that it is separated from it; *second*, in the *mode of simple and absolute consideration*, as when we have an intellectual understanding of the one thing without considering the other at all.

Thus, in the *first* mode of abstraction, it involves falsity to abstract through intellection things that are not abstracted in reality (*secundum rem*). By contrast, in the *second* mode, it does not involve falsity to abstract through intellection things that are not abstracted in reality, as is manifestly obvious in the case of sensible things. For instance, if we think or say (*si intelligamus vel dicamus*) ‘No color exists in a body that is colored’, or ‘Color is separated from a body that is colored’, there will be falsity in what we think or in what we say (*in opinione vel in oratione*). On the other hand, if we are considering a color and its properties, paying no attention at all to the apple that is colored, then what we think or orally express in so doing will involve no falsity in thought or speech. For an apple is not part of the nature of a color (*pomum not est de ratione coloris*), and nothing prevents the color from being thought of without the apple’s being thought of at all. Similarly, I claim that what belongs to the nature (*ratio*) of any species of material thing, e.g., *rock* or *man* or *horse*, can be considered without the individual principles, which do not belong to the nature (*ratio*) of the species. And to abstract the universal from the particular, or to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasms, is just this: to consider the nature (*natura*) of the species without considering the individual principles that are represented through the phantasms.

Therefore, when one says, ‘An intellect has falsity when it understands a thing otherwise than it is’,

the sentence is true if ‘otherwise’ refers to the thing that is understood. For the intellect has falsity when it understands a thing to be otherwise than it is. Hence, the intellect would have falsity if it abstracted the species of a rock from matter in such a way that it understood this species not to exist in matter, as Plato posited.

However, the proposition ‘The intellect has falsity when it understands a thing otherwise than it is’ is not true if ‘otherwise’ is referred to the one who is doing the understanding (*accipiat ex parte intelligentis*). For there is no falsity involved in the fact that the mode of the one who understands is, in his understanding, different from the mode of the thing in its existing. For in the one who is doing the understanding, the thing that is understood exists immaterially, in the manner of an intellect, and not materially, in the manner of a material thing.

Reply to objection 2: Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is the form alone, and that the matter is not part of the species. But according to this view, matter would have no place in the definitions of natural things.

And so one should reply in an alternative way that there are two types of matter, viz., (a) *common matter* and (b) *designated* (or *individual*) matter (*materia communis et signata vel individualis*)—where common matter is, e.g., *flesh* and *bone*, and individual matter is, e.g., *this flesh* and *these bones*.

Thus, the intellect abstracts the species of a *natural* thing from *individual* sensible matter, but not from *common* sensible matter. For instance, it abstracts the species *man* from *this flesh* and *these bones*, which, as *Metaphysics* 7 points out, are not part of the nature of the species but are instead parts of the individual; and so the nature can be thought about without them. However, the species *man* cannot be abstracted by the intellect from *flesh* and *bones*.

By contrast, *mathematical* species can be abstracted by the intellect not only from *individual* sensible matter but also from *common* sensible matter—and yet not from common *intelligible* matter, but only from individual *intelligible* matter. For sensible matter is called ‘corporeal’ matter insofar as it is subject to sensible qualities like hot and cold, hard and soft, and so on, whereas what is called intelligible matter is a substance insofar as it is subject to quantity. Now it is clear that quantity exists in a substance prior to its sensible qualities. Hence, quantities such as numbers, dimensions, and shapes (which are the limits of quantities) can be thought about without sensible qualities—which is what it is to abstract them from sensible matter. Now these quantities cannot be thought about without an understanding of a substance’s being the subject of quantity—which would be to abstract them from *common* intelligible matter. But they can indeed be thought about without *this* or *that* substance—which is to abstract them from *individual* intelligible matter.

On the other hand, there are certain [species], e.g., *being*, *one*, *potentiality*, *actuality*, and others of this sort, that can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter. These can exist without any matter at all, as is clear in the case of immaterial substances.

And because Plato did not take into account what was said above about the two modes of abstraction, he posited as abstract entities, existing in reality, all the things that we have claimed to be abstracted by the intellect.

Reply to objection 3: Colors have the same mode of existing in a material corporeal individual as the power of sight does, and so colors can impress their likeness on the power of sight. But as is clear from what has been said, since phantasms are likenesses of individuals and exist in corporeal organs, they do not have the same mode of existing that the human intellect does. And so they cannot by their own power leave an impression on the passive intellect. Rather, by the power of the active intellect, a certain likeness results in the passive intellect from the active intellect’s turning toward the phantasms; and this likeness is representative of those things that the phantasms are about, though only with respect to the nature of their species. This is the sense in which the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasms—and not in the sense that numerically the same form at first existed in the

phantasms and later comes to exist in the passive intellect, in the way that a body is taken from one place and transferred to another.

Reply to objection 4: It is the case both that (a) the phantasms are illuminated by the agent intellect and, again, that (b) the intelligible species are abstracted from them by the power of the active intellect.

They are *illuminated* in the sense that just as the sentient part of soul is made more powerful by being conjoined to the intellect, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are rendered suitable for intelligible intentions to be abstracted from them.

And the active intellect *abstracts* the intelligible species from the phantasms in the sense that (a) by the power of the active intellect we are able, in our thinking, to grasp the natures of the species without their individual conditions, and that (b) the passive intellect is informed by the likenesses of these natures.

Reply to objection 5: On the one hand, our intellect *abstracts* intelligible species *from* the phantasms insofar as it considers the natures in general (*in universali*); on the other hand, it *understands* them *in* the phantasms, since, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), it is unable to understand even the things whose species it abstracts except by turning itself to the phantasms.

Article 2

Are the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms related to our intellect as *that which* is understood intellectually?

It seems that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are related to our intellect as *that which* (*id quod*) is understood intellectually:

Objection 1: A thing which is actually being understood (*intellectum in actu*) exists in the one who is engaged in understanding, since a thing which is actually being understood is the intellect itself insofar as it is acting (*ipse intellectus in actu*). But nothing of the things which is being understood, except the abstracted intelligible species, exists in an intellect actually engaged in understanding. Therefore, it is a species of this sort that is the very thing which is actually being understood.

Objection 2: A thing which is actually being understood has to exist in something; otherwise, it would be nothing at all. But it does not exist in the thing that is outside the soul; for since the thing outside the soul is material, nothing that is in it can be a thing which is actually being understood. Therefore, it follows that what is actually being understood exists in the intellect. And so the thing which is actually being understood is nothing other than the aforementioned intelligible species.

Objection 3: In *Perihermenias* 1 the Philosopher says, “Spoken words (*voces*) are signs of things received in the soul (*notae earum quae sunt in anima passionum*).” But spoken words signify the things which are understood; for we signify by spoken words what we understand intellectually. Therefore, the things received in the soul (*passiones animae*), i.e., the intelligible species, are themselves the things which are actually understood.

But contrary to this: Intelligible species are related to the intellect in the way that sensible species are related to the sensory power. But a sensible species is *that by which* (*id quo*) the sensory power senses and not *that which* (*illud quod*) is sensed. Therefore, the intelligible species is *that by which* the intellect understands intellectually and not *that which* (*quod*) is understood.

I respond: Some have claimed that the cognitive powers that exist in us have cognition of nothing except what they receive within themselves (*nihil nisi proprias passiones*); for instance, they claim that a

sensory power senses only what is received in its corresponding organ (*passionem sui organi*). On this view, the intellect has intellectual understanding of nothing except what is received within itself, i.e., the intelligible species received within it (*nisi suam passionem, idest speciem intelligibilem in se receptam*). Accordingly, this sort of species is itself what is understood.

However, there are two reasons why this opinion is manifestly false.

First, the things we have intellectual understanding of are the same things that scientific knowledge is about. Therefore, if the things we have intellectual understanding of were just the species that exist in the soul, then it would follow that all types of scientific knowledge are not about things that exist outside the soul, but only about the intelligible species that exist within the soul—just as, according to the Platonists, all types of scientific knowledge are about the ideas, which they claimed to be the things which are actually understood.

Second, this would entail the error of those ancients who claimed that “whatever seems to be the case is true,” with the result that contradictories would be simultaneously true. For if a power has cognition only of what it receives within itself (*non cognoscit nisi propriam passionem*), then that is all it makes judgments about. But something seems to be the case insofar as the cognitive power is affected in a given way. Therefore, the cognitive power’s judgment will always be a judgment about what it itself receives as such (*de propria passione, secundum quod est*); and so every judgment will be true. For instance, if the sense of taste senses only what it itself receives, then when someone with a healthy sense of taste judges that honey is sweet, he will be judging correctly; and, similarly, when someone with a diseased sense of taste judges that honey is bitter, he will be judging correctly. For each of them judges in accord with how his own sense of taste is affected. And so it follows that every opinion—and, in general, every instance of accepting a proposition (*omnis acceptio*)—will be equally true.

Therefore, one should reply instead that an intelligible species is related to the intellect as *that by which* (*quo*) the intellect has intellectual understanding. This is made clear as follows:

As *Metaphysics* 9 says, there are two kinds of action, one of which *remains within the agent* (*manet in agente*), e.g., seeing and understanding intellectually, and the other of which *passes into an exterior thing* (*transit in rem exteriorem*), e.g., heating and cutting. Both kinds of action stem from some form. And just as the form from which an action tending toward an exterior thing arises is a likeness of the action’s object—in the way that a heating agent’s heat is a likeness of the thing that is made hot (*ut calor calefacientis est similitudo calefacti*)—so, similarly, the form from which an action remaining within the agent arises is a likeness of the object. Thus, the likeness of a visible thing is that in virtue of which the power of sight sees, and the likeness of a thing that is understood, i.e., the intelligible species, is the form in virtue of which the intellect has intellectual understanding.

However, since the intellect reflects upon itself (*supra seipsum reflectit*), it is by the same act of reflection (*secundum eandem reflexionem*) that it understands both its own act of intellectual understanding (*suum intelligere*) and the species by which it understands intellectually (*speciem qua intelligit*). And so the intellectual species is in a secondary sense that which is understood intellectually. But that which is understood intellectually in the primary sense is the thing of which the intelligible species is a likeness.

This point is also made clear by the opinion of the ancients, who claimed that like is known by like. For they claimed that it is through the element earth that exists within the soul that the soul has cognition of the element earth as it exists outside the soul—and so on for the other elements. Therefore, if we substitute the intelligible species of the element earth for the element itself—in accord with the teaching of Aristotle, who said that “it is not a rock, but the species of a rock that exists within the soul”—then it will follow that it is by means of intelligible species that the soul has cognition of things that exist outside the soul.

Reply to objection 1: It is through its likeness that the thing which is being understood

intellectively exists in the who is engaged in understanding. The sense in which it is said that a thing which is actually being understood is the intellect itself insofar as it is acting, is that a likeness of the thing which is being understood is the form of the intellect in the same way that the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of a sensory power that is acting. Hence, it does not follow that the abstracted intelligible species is the thing which is actually being understood; rather, what follows is that the abstracted intelligible species is a *likeness* of the thing which is actually being understood.

Reply to objection 2: When one says ‘a thing which is actually being understood’ (*intellectum in actu*), there are two things implied, viz., (a) the thing which is being understood and (b) the very fact of its being understood. Similarly, when one says ‘the abstracted universal’, there are two things implied, viz., (a) the nature itself of the thing and (b) its abstractness or universality.

Therefore, the nature which happens to be understood intellectually or to be abstracted, or to which the intention of universality accrues, does not itself exist except in singular things; but the intention of universality, or the very fact of the nature’s being understood or abstracted exists in the intellect.

We can see this by a comparison with a sensory power. For the power of sight sees the color of an apple without seeing its smell. Therefore, if someone asked where the color is that is seen without the smell, it is obvious that the color which is seen exists only in the apple; however, the fact that it is perceived without its smell accrues to it because of the power of sight, since within the power of sight there exists a likeness of its color but not of its smell.

Similarly, the human-ness (*humanitas*) that is understood intellectually exists only in this or that man; but the fact that human-ness is apprehended without individual conditions—i.e., the fact that human-ness is abstracted, and that an intention of universality results from this—happens to human-ness insofar as it is perceived by the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the nature of the species without a likeness of the individual principles.

Reply to objection 3: There are two types of operation in the sentient part of the soul. One involves just [the sensory power’s] *being affected* (*immutatio*), and on this score the sensory power’s operation is perfected by its being affected by the sensible thing. The second operation is [the sensory power’s] *being formed* (*formatio*), insofar as the power of imagining forms for itself an image (*idolum*) of an absent thing or even of a thing that has never been seen.

These two types of operation are joined together in the intellect. For the first thing to consider is the passive intellect’s being acted upon insofar as it is informed by the intelligible species (*passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili*). Once it is formed by the intelligible species, it forms, in the second place, a definition or composition or division that is signified by spoken words.

Hence, the concept (*ratio*) that the spoken name (*nomen*) signifies is the definition. And the spoken sentence (*enuntiatio*) signifies the intellect’s composition or division. Thus, it is not the case that spoken words signify the intelligible species themselves; instead, they signify the things that the intellect forms for itself in order to make its judgments about exterior things (*ea quae intellectus sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus*).

Article 3

Is what is more universal prior in our intellectual cognition?

It seems that what is more universal is not prior in our intellectual cognition (*magis universalia non sint priora in nostra cognitione intellectuali*):

Objection 1: What is prior and better known by its nature (*secundum naturam*) is posterior and

less well known as far as we are concerned (*quoad nos*). But universals are prior and better known by their nature, since “what is prior is such that there is no valid inference from it [to what is posterior] with respect to subsistence.” Therefore, universals are posterior in our intellect’s cognition.

Objection 2: Composites are prior to simples as far as we are concerned. But universals are more simple. Therefore, they are known later as far as we are concerned.

Objection 3: In *Physics* 1 the Philosopher says that, in our cognition, what is defined comes earlier than the parts of the definition. But the parts of a definition of what is less universal are more universal; e.g., *animal* is part of the definition of *man*. Therefore, universals are known later as far as we are concerned.

Objection 4: It is through effects that we arrive at causes and principles. But universals are a sort of principle. Therefore, universals are known later as far as we are concerned.

But contrary to this: *Physics* 1 says, “One must descend (*oportet devenire*) from universals to singulars.”

I respond: In our intellect’s cognition there are two things that have to be taken in account.

The first is that intellective cognition in some sense takes its origin from sentient cognition. And since the sensory power deals with singulars and the intellect with universals, it must be the case that, as far as we are concerned, the cognition of singulars is prior to the cognition of universals.

The second thing that has to be taken into account is that our intellect proceeds from potentiality to actuality. But everything that proceeds from potentiality to actuality first arrives at an incomplete actuality, which lies between the potentiality and the actuality, before arriving at perfect actuality. Now the perfect actuality at which the intellect arrives is *complete scientific knowledge (scientia completa)*, through which it has a distinct and determinate cognition of things. And the incomplete actuality is *imperfect scientific knowledge (scientia imperfecta)*, through which things are known indistinctly with a sort of murkiness (*indistincte sub quadam confusione*); for what is known in this way is known in some respect in actuality and in some sense in potentiality. Hence, in *Physics* 1 the Philosopher says, “What is first manifest and certain to us are things that are somewhat indistinct (*confusa*), but later on, by drawing distinctions, we come to have distinct cognition of principles and elements.” And it is clear that to have cognition of something that contains many things without having a proper knowledge of each of the things contained in it is for our cognition of it to be somewhat indistinct. And it is possible for us to have this sort of indistinct cognition both of a *universal whole*, which contains its parts in potentiality, and also of an *integral whole*, since it is possible for there to be an indistinct cognition of both kinds of whole in the absence of a distinct cognition of the parts.

Now to have a distinct cognition of what is contained in a *universal whole* is to have a cognition of something less general (*de re minus communi*) than it. For instance, to have an indistinct cognition of an animal is to have a cognition of the animal insofar as it is an animal, whereas to have a distinct cognition of an animal is to have a cognition of the animal insofar as it is a rational animal or a non-rational animal—e.g., to have a cognition of it as a man or a lion.

Thus, what happens is that our intellect has the cognition *animal* prior to having the cognition *man*, and the same line of reasoning holds whenever we are comparing something more universal to something less universal. And since the sensory power goes from potentiality to actuality in the same way that the intellect does, this same order of cognition is evident in the case of the sensory power as well. For in accord with the sensory power, we judge what is more general prior to what is less general, both with respect to place and with respect to time. For instance, with respect to place, when something is seen from afar, it is perceived to be a body before it is perceived to be an animal, and it is perceived to be an animal before it is perceived to be a man, and it is perceived to be a man before it is perceived to be Socrates or Plato. Again, with respect to time, at the beginning a young child distinguishes a man from a

non-man before distinguishing *this* man from *that* man; this is why, as *Physics* 1 points out, “At the beginning young children call all men ‘father’, whereas later on they mark each man as distinct (*determinant unumquemque*).”

The reason for this is clear. If someone knows something indistinctly, he is still in potentiality with respect to knowing a principle of division (*principium distinctionis*); for instance, someone who knows the genus is in potentiality with respect to knowing the specific differences. And so it is clear that indistinct cognition lies between potentiality and actuality.

Therefore, one should claim that, as far as we are concerned, the cognition of singulars is prior to the cognition of universals in the sense that sentient cognition is prior to intellectual cognition. However, with respect to both the sensory power and the intellect, cognition that is more general (*communis*) is prior to cognition that is less general.

Reply to objection 1: A universal can be considered in two ways:

First, insofar as the universal nature is considered along with the intention of universality. Since the intention of universality, viz., one and the same thing’s having a relation to many, arises from the intellect’s act of abstracting (*proveniat ex abstractione intellectus*), the universal must be posterior when considered in this way. Hence, *De Anima* 1 says, “Either the universal *animal* is nothing or else it is posterior.” By contrast, according to Plato, who posited subsistent universals, the universal, when considered in this first way, would be prior to the particular, which, on his view, exists only through participation in those subsistent universals that are called ‘ideas’.

The second way in which a universal can be considered is with respect to the nature itself, e.g., *animal-ness* or *human-ness*, insofar as it is found in the particulars. When the universal is considered in this way, one should say that there are two orderings of nature:

The first is the *path of generation and time* (*via generationis et temporis*), and on this path the things that are imperfect and in potentiality are prior. In this sense, what is more general is prior in nature. This is obvious in the generation of man and animal; for “the animal is generated prior to the man,” as *De Generatione Animalium* puts it.

The second is the *ordering of perfection* (*ordo perfectionis*), or the *ordering of nature’s intention* (*ordo intentionis naturae*), in the sense that actuality is absolutely speaking prior in nature to potentiality, and the perfect is absolutely speaking prior in nature to the imperfect. Given this ordering, the less general is prior in nature to the more general, e.g., *man* is prior in nature to *animal*. For nature’s intention does not stop at the generation of the animal; instead, nature tends toward generating the man.

Reply to objection 2: The more general universal is related to the less general universal as both a whole and a part:

As a whole, in the sense that the more universal contains in potentiality not only the less universal but other things as well. For instance, it is not only *man*, but also *horse*, that is contained under *animal*.

As a part, in the sense that in its definition (*ratio*) the less general contains not only the more general, but other things as well. For instance, *man* contains not only *animal*, but also *rational*.

So, then, considered in itself, *animal* is prior in our cognition to *man*, but *man* is prior in our cognition to *animal*’s being a part of the definition of man.

Reply to objection 3: There are two ways in which to have a cognition of a part:

First, *absolutely speaking*, according to what the part is in its own right. And in this sense nothing prevents there being a cognition of the parts prior to the cognition of the whole—e.g., a cognition of the rocks prior to a cognition of the house.

Second, *insofar as they are parts of this whole*. And in this sense it is necessary for us to have a cognition of the whole before a cognition of the parts; for instance, we first have a cognition of the house by means of an indistinct cognition, before we distinguish each of its parts from the others.

So, then, one should reply that the parts of a definition (*definientia*), *considered absolutely*, are

known before that which is defined. Otherwise, what is defined would not be made known to us through those parts. On the other hand, *insofar as they are the parts of the definition*, they are known after what is defined; for instance, we know *man* in a sort of indistinct cognition before we know how to distinguish everything that belongs to the definition of *man*.

Reply to objection 4: Insofar as a universal is taken together with *the intention of universality*, it is in some sense a principle of cognition, since the intention of universality follows upon that mode of intellective understanding that occurs through abstraction. However, it is not the case that, as Plato thought, everything that is a principle of cognition has to be a principle of being; for sometimes we have cognition of a cause through its effect and of a substance through its accidents. Hence, according to Aristotle, the universal, taken in this way, is neither a principle of being nor a substance; this is clear from *Metaphysics* 7.

On the other hand, if we consider the nature of the genus and the nature of the species (*natura generis et speciei*) *insofar as they exist in singulars*, then the universal taken in this way has the character of a formal principle with respect to the singulars; for something is singular because of the matter, whereas the nature of the species (*ratio speciei*) is taken from the form. However, the nature of the genus is related to the nature of the species more in the manner of a material principle, since the nature of the genus (*natura generis*) is taken from what is material in the thing, whereas the nature of the species (*ratio speciei*) is taken from what is formal; for instance, the notion (*ratio*) *animal* is taken from the sentient, whereas the notion *man* is taken from the intellective. And the reason why nature's ultimate intention is directed toward the species and not toward the individual or toward the genus is that the form is the end of generation, whereas the matter exists for the sake of the form.

However, it is not necessary for every cognition of a cause or principle to be posterior as far as we are concerned, since sometimes we come to a cognition of unknown effects through their sensible causes, and sometimes vice versa.

Article 4

Can we have an intellective understanding of many things at once?

It seems that we can have an intellective understanding of many things at once:

Objection 1: The intellect lies beyond time (*est supra tempus*). But *before* (*prior*) and *after* (*posterior*) have to do with time. Therefore, the intellect understands diverse things at once and not according to *before* and *after*.

Objection 2: Nothing prevents diverse forms that are not opposed to one another from actually existing in the same thing at the same time, in the way that a smell and a color exist in an apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to one another. Therefore, nothing prevents a single intellect from coming into act with respect to diverse intelligible species simultaneously, and in this way it can have an intellective understanding of many things at once.

Objection 3: The intellect has an intellective understanding of a whole, such as a man or a house, all at once. But many parts are contained in a whole. Therefore, the intellect can have an intellective understanding of many things at once.

Objection 4: As *De Anima* says, one cannot have a cognition of the difference between one thing and another without apprehending both of them at the same time; and the same line of reasoning holds for any comparison whatsoever. But our intellect has cognition of the differences between one thing and another, and of comparisons between one thing and another. Therefore, it has a cognition of many things

at once.

But contrary to this: *Topics* says, “Intellective understanding is of one thing only, but scientific knowledge is of many things.”

I respond: The intellect can have an intellective understanding of many things in the manner of one thing (*per modum unius*), but not in the manner of many things (*per modum multorum*)—and by ‘in the manner of one thing (or many things)’ I mean through one (or many) intelligible species. For the mode of an action follows upon the form that is the principle of that action.

On the other hand, if certain things are such that the intellect can understand them under a single intelligible species, then it can understand them all at once. For the reason why God sees all things at once is that He sees all things through one thing, viz., His own essence.

However, if certain things are such that the intellect understands them through diverse intelligible species, then it does not understand them all at once. The reason for this is that it is impossible for a subject to be perfected all at once by several forms that belong to the same genus but different species; for instance, it is impossible for the same body to be simultaneously colored in the same respect by diverse colors, or for it to have diverse shapes. But all intelligible species belong to one genus, since they are perfections of a single intellective power, even though the things that they are the species of belong to diverse genera. Therefore, it is impossible for a single intellect to be perfected all at once by diverse intelligible species in such a way as to have an actual intellective understanding of diverse things.

Reply to objection 1: The intellect lies beyond the time that measures the motion of corporeal things. But the plurality of intelligible species causes an alternation of intelligible operations (*quandam vicissitudinem intelligibilium operationum*), in accord with which one operation occurs before another. In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine calls this ‘time’ when he says, “God moves the spiritual creature through time.”

Reply to objection 2: It is not only forms which are opposites that cannot exist all at once in the same subject; neither can forms of the same genus, even if they are not opposites. This is clear from the example adduced above about colors and shapes.

Reply to objection 3: Parts can be thought of in two ways:

First, they can be thought of with a certain *indistinctness* insofar as they exist in the whole, in which case they are being thought of through the single form of the whole and so are being thought of all at once.

Second, they can be thought of by a *distinct* cognition insofar as each is thought of through its own intelligible species, in which case they cannot all be understood intellectually at once.

Reply to objection 4: When the intellect understands a distinction between two things or a comparison of the one to the other, it has a cognition of the two distinct things, or of the two things being compared, under the notion *comparison* or *distinction* itself—just as it was claimed above that the intellect has a cognition of the parts under the notion *whole*.

Article 5

Does our intellect engage in intellective understanding by composing and dividing?

It seems that our intellect does not engage in intellective understanding by composing and dividing (*non intelligat componendo et dividendo*):

Objection 1: Composition and division [of subject and predicate] always involve many items. But the intellect cannot have an intellective understanding of many things at once. Therefore, the intellect

cannot engage in intellectual understanding by composing and dividing.

Objection 2: Either the present tense, the past tense, or the future tense (*tempus praesens, praeteritum vel futurum*) is adjoined to every composition and division. But the intellect abstracts from time, just as it abstracts from other particular conditions. Therefore, the intellect does not engage in intellectual understanding by composing and dividing.

Objection 3: The intellect engages in intellectual understanding by assimilating itself to the things (*per assimilationem ad res*). But there is no composition or division [of subject and predicate] among the things; for among the things there is nothing except what is signified by the predicate and by the subject—and this is one and the same thing if the composition is true. For a man is truly that which is an animal. Therefore, the intellect does not compose and divide.

But contrary to this: As the Philosopher says in *Perihermenias* 1, spoken words signify the intellect's conceptions (*conceptiones intellectus*). But in spoken language there is composition and division, as is clear in the case of affirmative and negative propositions (*in propositionibus affirmativis et negativis*). Therefore, the intellect composes and divides.

I respond: It is necessary for the human intellect to engage in intellectual understanding by composing and dividing. For since the human intellect passes from potentiality into actuality, it has a certain likeness to generable things, which do not have their perfection immediately, but instead acquire it successively. In the same way, the human intellect does not immediately come to a perfect cognition of a thing in its first apprehension of it. Instead, it first apprehends an aspect of it (*aliquid de ipsa*), viz., the 'what-ness' (*quidditas*) of the thing itself, which is the first and proper object of the intellect; and then it comes to understand the properties, accidents, and relations associated with the thing's essence (*circumstantes rei essentiam*). Accordingly, it must necessarily (a) compose one apprehended thing with another or divide one apprehended thing from another and (b) proceed from one composition or division to another, i.e., reason discursively (*ratiocinari*).

By contrast, the angelic intellect and the divine intellect are incorruptible beings that have their total perfection immediately from the beginning. Hence, the angelic intellect and the divine intellect are immediately in perfect possession of a complete cognition of a thing. Thus, in having a cognition of a thing's 'what-ness', they have, with respect to that thing, an immediate cognition of whatever we ourselves can come to a cognition of by composing and dividing and reasoning discursively.

And so the human intellect engages in intellectual cognition by composing and dividing, as well as by reasoning discursively. By contrast, the divine intellect and the angelic intellect do, to be sure, have a cognition of composition and division and discursive reasoning; however, they have this cognition not by themselves composing or dividing or reasoning discursively, but instead through an intellectual understanding of their simple 'what-ness' (*quidditas*).

Reply to objection 1: The intellect's composing and dividing are effected through a sort of comparison or contrast. Hence, the sense in which the intellect, in composing and dividing, has a cognition of many things is the same sense in which it has a cognition of contrasts or comparisons between things.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (a. 1 and q. 84, a. 7), the intellect abstracts from phantasms, and yet it does not have actual intellectual understanding except by turning itself back to the phantasms. And it is because the intellect turns itself back to the phantasms that tense is adjoined to the intellect's compositions and divisions.

Reply to objection 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the intellect's own mode and not according to the mode of the thing. Hence, even though there is something on the part of the thing that corresponds to the intellect's composition and division, it is not present in the thing in the same way that it is present in the intellect. For the proper object of the human intellect is the

‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) of a material thing that falls under the sensory power and imagination.

Now there are two sorts of composition found in a material thing:

The first is the composition of *form* with respect to *matter*, and the intellect’s composition corresponds to this sort of composition by a universal whole’s being predicated of its part. For the genus is taken from the common matter, whereas the difference that completes the species is taken from the form, and the particular is taken from the material individual.

The second sort of composition is the composition of an *accident* with respect to its *subject*, and the intellect’s composition corresponds to this sort of real composition by an accident’s being predicated of its subject, as when one says, ‘The man is white’.

On the other hand, the intellect’s composition differs from the thing’s composition by the fact that the items composed in the thing are diverse from one another, whereas the intellect’s composition is a sign of the identity of the items that are composed. For the intellect does not compose in such a way as to affirm that the man is the whiteness (*homo est albedo*); rather, it composes in such a way as to affirm that the man is white, i.e., that the man is a thing that has the whiteness (*homo est albus, id est habens albedinem*). For that which is the man is the same subject as that which has the whiteness.

Something similar holds for the composition of form and matter. For ‘animal’ signifies that which has a sentient nature, ‘rational’ signifies that which has an intellective nature, and ‘man’ signifies that which has both a sentient nature and an intellective nature. But Socrates has all these things along with a material individual. And it is according to this notion of identity that our intellect composes one thing with another by predicating.

Article 6

Is there falsity in the intellect?

It seems that there can be falsity in the intellect (*intellectus possit esse falsus*):

Objection 1: In *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says, “The true and the false exist in the mind.” But as was explained above (q. 79), the mind and the intellect are the same thing. Therefore, there is falsity in the intellect.

Objection 2: Opinion and discursive reasoning belong to the intellect. But falsity is found in both of them. Therefore, there can be falsity in the intellect.

Objection 3: Sin exists in the intellective part of the soul. But sin is accompanied by falsity, since, as Proverbs 14:22 says, “Those err who work evil.” Therefore, falsity can exist in the intellect.

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Everyone who makes a mistake fails to understand intellectually that which he is mistaken about.” And in *De Anima* the Philosopher says, “Intellective understanding is always correct (*intellectus semper est rectus*).”

I respond: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher compares the intellect to the sensory power on the point at issue here. For the sensory power is not deceived with respect to its proper object; for instance, the power of sight is not deceived about color, except perhaps incidentally (*per accidens*) because of an impediment involving the organ—as when a feverish man’s sense of taste judges sweet things as bitter because his tongue is full of bad humors.

In the case of the common sensibles, however, the sensory power makes mistakes in judging about size or shape, as when it judges that the sun is the size of a human foot, even though it is larger than the earth. Moreover, the sensory power makes many more mistakes with respect to things that are sensible *per accidens*, as when it judges that vinegar is honey because of a similarity in their color. The reason

for this is clear. Each power is, as such, ordered *per se* toward its proper object, and things of this sort always behave in the same way. Hence, as long as the power remains, its judgment does not fail with respect to its proper object.

Now the proper object of the intellect is the ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) of a thing. Hence, with respect to the ‘what-ness’ of a thing the intellect does not make mistakes, speaking *per se*. But with respect to what accompanies a thing’s essence or ‘what-ness’, the intellect can be mistaken when it relates one thing to another, either by composing or by dividing or by reasoning discursively.

For this reason, it is also the case that the intellect cannot err with respect to those propositions that it has an immediate cognition of once it has a cognition of the ‘what-ness’ of their terms. This occurs in the case of first principles, from which an infallibility of truth also arises, and in the case of conclusions in accord with the certitude of scientific knowledge. Still, it happens incidentally (*per accidens*) that the intellect is mistaken about what something is in the case of composite things. This is not because of any [bodily] organ, since the intellect is not a power that uses an organ; rather, it is because of compositions that intervene with respect to the definition in cases where either the definition of one thing is applied falsely to another thing, e.g., the definition of a circle is applied to a triangle, or when the definition is false in itself and implies an impossible composition, as would occur if, say, *rational animal with wings* were taken to be the definition of some entity.

Hence, in the case of simple things, where no composition can intervene in their definitions, we cannot be mistaken; rather, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, in such cases we are mistaken when we totally fail to grasp them (*deficimus in totaliter non attingendo*).

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is claiming that falsity exists in the mind with respect to composition and division.

Reply to objection 2: In this second objection, he is saying the same thing about opinion and discursive reasoning.

Reply to objection 3: As for the error of sinners, this consists in an application with respect to something desirable. However, the intellect is never deceived in its absolute consideration of the ‘what-ness’ of a thing and of those things that we have cognition of through the ‘what-ness’. And this is what the passages [from Augustine and the Philosopher] that are adduced for the contrary position are talking about.

Article 7

Can someone understand one and the same thing better than someone else does?

It seems that it cannot be the case that someone understands one and the same thing better (*melius*) than someone else does:

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “If anyone understands (*intelligit*) a thing to be otherwise than it is, then he does not understand (*intelligit*) it at all. Therefore, there is no doubt that there is a perfect understanding, unsurpassable in excellence. And so there are not infinitely many degrees of understanding a given thing; nor can one man understand it more (*plus*) than another.”

Objection 2: When the intellect has intellectual understanding, it has truth. But since truth is a sort of equality (*aequalitas quaedam*) between the intellect and the thing, it does not admit of more and less, since it is not proper to say that something is more equal or less equal. Therefore, neither is it proper to say that something is more understood or less understood intellectually.

Objection 3: The intellect is the most formal aspect of a man. But a difference in form causes a

difference in species. Therefore, if one man has greater understanding than another man (*si unus homo magis alio intelligit*), it seems that they do not belong to the same species.

But contrary to this: Our experience indicates that some understand more deeply (*profundius*) than others; for instance, someone who can trace a conclusion back to its first principles and first causes understands it more deeply than someone who is able to trace it back only to its proximate causes.

I respond: There are two ways to interpret what it means for someone to understand one and the same thing more (*magis*) than someone else does.

On the first interpretation, ‘more’ modifies the act of intellective understanding *on the part of the thing that is understood*. And on this interpretation, it is not possible for someone to understand the very same thing more than someone else, since if he understood it to be otherwise than it is—whether better than it is or worse—he would be mistaken and, as Augustine argues, would not understand it at all.

On the second interpretation, ‘more’ determines the act of intellective understanding *on the part of the one who is engaged in understanding*. And on this interpretation, someone can understand the same thing better than someone else, in virtue of having more power of understanding—in the same way that someone who has a more perfect power and in whom the visual power is more perfect sees a given thing better by a corporeal act of seeing than someone else does.

There are two ways in which this occurs in the case of the intellect:

One way is on the part of the intellect itself, when it is more perfect. For it is clear that to the extent that the body is better disposed, the soul is better. This is manifestly obvious in the case of beings that are diverse in species. The reason is that actuality and form are received into matter in accord with the matter’s capacity. Hence, since even among men there are those who have a body that is better disposed, they receive a soul that has a greater power of intellective understanding. Hence, *De Anima* 2 says, “We notice that those with soft flesh are more mentally gifted.”

The second way is on the part of the lower powers that the intellect needs for its own operation. For those in whom the power of imagining and the cogitative power and the power of remembering are better disposed are better disposed for intellective understanding.

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is obvious from what has been said.

Reply to objection 2: The same holds for the second objection. For the truth of the intellect consists in the thing’s being understood intellectually as it is.

Reply to objection 3: A difference of form that arises only from the different dispositions of the matter makes for a diversity only in number and not in species. For diverse individuals have diverse forms that are diversified according to the matter.

Article 8

Does our intellect have cognition of what is indivisible prior to what is divisible?

It seems that our intellect has cognition of what is indivisible prior to what is divisible:

Objection 1: In *Physics* 1 the Philosopher says, “We have intellective understanding and scientific knowledge on the basis of our cognition of principles and elements.” But indivisibles are the principles and elements of what is divisible. Therefore, indivisibles are known to us prior to what is divisible.

Objection 2: That which is posited in a thing’s definition is such that we have a prior cognition of it, since, as *Topics* 6 says, a definition comes “from what is prior and more known.” But indivisibles are posited in the definition of what is divisible; for instance, as Euclid says, “A line is a length without breadth whose extremities are two points.” And oneness is posited in the definition of number, since, as

Metaphysics 10 says, “Number is a multitude measured by *one*.” Therefore, our intellect understands the indivisible prior to the divisible.

Objection 3: Cognition is by means of what is similar. But what is indivisible is more similar to the intellect than what is divisible, since, as *De Anima* 3 says, “The intellect is something simple.” Therefore, our intellect first has a cognition of what is indivisible.

But contrary to this: *De Anima* 3 says, “What is indivisible is shown to be a privation.” But a privation is known later. Therefore, what is indivisible is known later as well.

I respond: As is clear from what has gone before (a. 1 and q. 84, a. 7), in the state of the present life the object of our intellect is the ‘what-ness’ of a material thing, which the intellect abstracts from the phantasm. And since a cognitive power’s proper object is that which it has cognition of in the first place and *per se*, the order in which we have intellectual understanding of the indivisible can be thought about in terms of the indivisible’s relation to a ‘what-ness’ of the sort in question.

Now as *De Anima* 3 says, ‘indivisible’ is used in three senses:

In one sense, a continuum is indivisible by virtue of the fact that it is actually undivided, even though it is divisible in potentiality. The indivisible in this sense is understood by us prior to its division into parts, since, as was explained above (a. 3), an indistinct cognition is prior to a distinct cognition.

In a second sense, something is indivisible by its species, in the way that a man’s reason is something indivisible. And in this sense, too, the indivisible is understood prior to its division into the parts of reason, as was explained above (a. 3), and likewise prior to the intellect’s composing and dividing by affirming or negating.

The reason for this is that the intellect in its own right understands indivisibles of these two sorts as its proper object.

In a third sense, what is indivisible is altogether indivisible—e.g., a point (*punctus*) and oneness (*unitas*), which are divided neither in actuality nor in potentiality. And the indivisible in this sense is understood in a posterior way through the privation of divisibility (*per privationem divisibilis*). Hence, a point is defined by a privation (*privative*): A point is that which has no parts. Similarly, the definition of *one* is that which is not divisible, as *Metaphysics* 10 says. The reason is that an indivisible in this sense has a certain sort of opposition to a corporeal thing, whose ‘what-ness’ is what the intellect grasps in the first place and *per se*.

However, if, as the Platonists claimed, our intellect had intellectual understanding by participating in separated indivisibles, then it would follow that what is indivisible in this third sense would be understood first. For according to the Platonists, things participate first in what is prior.

Reply to objection 1: In the acquisition of scientific knowledge, it is not always the principles and elements that are prior, since sometimes we go from sensible effects to a cognition of intelligible principles and causes.

On the other hand, in fully completed scientific knowledge (*in complemento scientiae*), the knowledge of the effects always depends on the cognition of principles and elements. For as the Philosopher says in the same place, “We are thought to have scientific knowledge when we are able to resolve what is derived from the principles into its causes.”

Reply to objection 2: ‘Point’ does not occur in the commonly accepted definition of a line, since it is obvious that in an infinite line, or even in a circular line, there are no points except in potentiality. However, Euclid is here defining a finite straight line, and so he posits ‘point’ in the definition of a line in the way that a terminus occurs in the definition of what it terminates.

Oneness (*unitas*), on the other hand, is the measure of number and so occurs in the definition of a number that is measured. It does not, however, have a place in the definition of the divisible; instead, just the opposite occurs.

Reply to objection 3: The likeness through which we have intellectual understanding is the species of what we have cognition of that exists in the one who understands. And so it is not because of the likeness of a nature to the cognitive power that something is understood first; rather it is because of the cognitive power's agreement with the object. Otherwise, the power of seeing would have cognition of the sense of hearing rather than of color.

QUESTION 86

What Our Intellect Has Cognition of in Material Things

Next we have to consider what our intellect understands in material things. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does our intellect have cognition of singulars? (2) Does our intellect have cognition of infinitely many things? (3) Does our intellect have cognition of contingent things? (4) Does our intellect have cognition of future things?

Article 1

Does our intellect have cognition of singulars?

It seems that our intellect has cognition of singulars (*cognoscat singularia*):

Objection 1: If someone has cognition of a composition, then he has cognition of the terms (*extrema*) of the composition. But our intellect has cognition of the composition ‘Socrates is a man’; for it is the intellect’s role to form a proposition. Therefore, our intellect has cognition of the singular thing that is Socrates.

Objection 2: The practical intellect directs one in acting. But acts have to do with singulars. Therefore, the intellect has cognition of singulars.

Objection 3: Our intellect has an intellective understanding of itself. But the intellect is itself a singular; otherwise, it would not have any acts at all, since acts belong to singular things. Therefore, our intellect has cognition of something singular.

Objection 4: A higher power is capable of whatever a lower power is capable of. But the sensory power has cognition of singulars. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so does the intellect.

But contrary to this: In *Physics* 1 the Philosopher says, “The universal is known in accord with reason (*secundum rationem*), the singular in accord with the sensory power (*secundum sensum*).”

I respond: Our intellect cannot have a direct and primary cognition of the singular in material things. The reason for this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter (*materia individualis*), while, as was explained above (q. 85, a. 1), our intellect has intellective understanding by abstracting the intelligible species from individual matter. But it is the universal that is abstracted from individual matter. Hence, our intellect has direct cognition only of the universals (*directe est cognoscitivus nisi universalium*).

However, our intellect can have cognition of the singular indirectly and, as it were, by a sort of turning back (*indirecte et quasi per quandam reflexionem*). For as was explained above (q. 85, a. 7), even after it has abstracted intelligible species, it cannot have actual intellective understanding except by turning itself to the phantasms, in which it has intellective understanding of the intelligible species, as *De Anima* 3 says.

So, then, our intellect understands the universal itself directly through the intelligible species, whereas it indirectly understands the singulars that the phantasms are phantasms of. And it is in this way that it forms the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’.

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first object is obvious from what was just said.

Reply to objection 2: As *Ethics* 7 puts it, the choice of a particular action (*electio particularis operabilis*) is, as it were, the conclusion of the practical intellect’s syllogism. But a singular conclusion cannot be inferred directly from a universal proposition; rather, it is inferred by the mediation of some assumed singular proposition. Hence, as *De Anima* 3 says, the practical intellect’s universal conception effects movement only through the mediation of a particular apprehension by the sentient part of the soul.

Reply to objection 3: The problem with a singular’s being intelligible is not that it is *singular* but

rather that it is *material*, since nothing is understood intellectually except in an immaterial mode. And so if a given singular, such as the intellect, is immaterial, there is no problem with its being intelligible (*hoc non repugnat intelligibilitati*).

Reply to objection 4: A higher power can do what a lower power does, but it does it in a more eminent way. Hence, what the sensory power has cognition of materially and concretely—which is what it is to have direct cognition of a singular—the intellect has cognition of immaterially and abstractly—which is what it is to have cognition of a universal.

Article 2

Can our intellect have cognition of infinitely many things?

It seems that our intellect can have cognition of infinitely many things (*possit cognoscere infinita*):

Objection 1: God exceeds all infinities (*excedit omnia infinita*). But as was explained above (q. 12, a. 1), our intellect can have cognition of God. Therefore, *a fortiori*, our intellect can have cognition of all other infinities.

Objection 2: Our intellect is apt by nature to have cognition of genera and species. But some genera—e.g., *number*, *ratio*, and *shape*—have infinitely many species. Therefore, our intellect can have cognition of infinitely many things.

Objection 3: If one body did not prevent another body from being in one and the same place, then nothing would prevent infinitely many bodies from being in one place. But one intelligible species does not prevent another intelligible species from existing simultaneously in the same intellect, since it is possible to have habitual knowledge of many things (*multa scire in habitu*). Therefore, nothing prevents our intellect from having habitual knowledge of infinitely many things.

Objection 4: Since, as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1), our intellect is not a power that belongs to corporeal matter, it seems to be infinite in potentiality. But an infinite power ranges over infinitely many things (*virtus infinita est super infinita*). Therefore, our intellect can have cognition of infinitely many things.

But contrary to this: *Physics* 1 says, “The infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown.”

I respond: Since a power is proportioned to its object, the intellect must be related to the infinite in the way that it is related to its object, viz., the ‘what-ness’ (*quidditas*) of a material thing. Now as *Physics* 3 explains, in material things there is no actual infinity (*infinitum in actu*), but only a potential infinity (*infinitum in potentia*) insofar as one thing succeeds another. And so a *potential infinity* is found in our intellect when it takes one thing after another, since our intellect never has an intellectual understanding of so many things that it cannot have an intellectual understanding of more things.

However, our intellect cannot have either an *actual* or a *habitual* cognition of infinitely many things.

Our intellect cannot have an *actual* cognition of infinitely many things, because it can have an actual cognition all at once only of that which it understands through a single species. But an infinity does not have a single species; otherwise, it would have the character of something total and complete. And so an infinity cannot be understood intellectually except by taking one part after another. This is clear from the definition of an infinity given in *Physics* 3. For the infinite is “that which is such that when one takes a quantity from it, it is always possible to take more,” and so it would be possible to have an actual cognition of an infinity only if all its parts were enumerated—which is impossible.

For the same reason, we cannot have a *habitual* intellectual cognition of infinitely many things. For

in our case a habitual cognition is caused by an actual thought, since as *Ethics* 2 says, it is by understanding intellectually that we become scientific knowers (*scientes*). Hence, we would not be able to have the habit of having a distinct cognition of infinitely many things unless we had thought of all the infinitely many things by enumerating them through a succession of cognitions—which is impossible.

And so our intellect cannot have either an actual or habitual cognition of infinitely many things; rather, as has been explained, it can have a cognition of infinitely many things only in potentiality.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 7, a. 1), God is called infinite as a form that is not terminated by any *matter*, whereas among material things something is called infinite because of a lack of *formal* termination (*per privationem formalis terminationis*). And because form is known in its own right (*secundum se*), whereas matter without form is not known, it follows that a material infinite is unknown in its own right. By contrast, a formal infinite, i.e., God, is known in His own right (*notum secundum se*), but He is unknown as far as we are concerned (*ignotum quoad nos*) because of the weakness of our intellect, which in the state of the present life has a natural ability to understand material things. And so in our present state we cannot know God except through His material effects. However, in our future state this defect of our intellect will be removed by [the light of] glory, and at that time we will be able to see God Himself in His essence—though without comprehending Him.

Reply to objection 2: Our intellect is apt to have a cognition of species by abstracting them from phantasms. And so one cannot have either an actual or habitual cognition of those species of numbers or shapes which he has not imagined—except, perhaps, generically (*in genere*) and in their general principles, which is to understand them potentially and indistinctly.

Reply to objection 3: If two or more bodies were in one place, they would not have to enter that place successively in such a way that the located bodies would be enumerated by a succession of entrances. By contrast, intelligible species enter our intellect successively, since it is not the case that many of them are actually understood all at once. And so it is necessary for the species in our intellect to be numbered and not to be infinitely many.

Reply to objection 4: Our intellect has cognition of the infinite in the same sense in which it is infinite in power. For its power is infinite in the sense that it is not terminated by corporeal matter. And it has cognition of the universal, which is abstracted from the material individual, and, as a result, it is not terminated in any individual, but, as far as it itself is concerned, it extends to infinitely many individuals.

Article 3

Does our intellect have cognition of contingent things?

It seems that our intellect does not have cognition of contingent things (*non sit cognoscitivus contingentium*):

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 6 says, understanding (*intellectus*), scientific knowledge (*scientia*), and wisdom (*sapientia*) have to do with necessary things and not contingent things.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 4 explains, things that exist at some times and not at others are measured by time. But the intellect abstracts from time in the same way that it abstracts from the other conditions of matter. Therefore, since it is a property of contingent things to exist at some times and not at others, it seems that our intellect cannot have cognition of contingent things.

But contrary to this: All scientific knowledge exists in the intellect. But some sciences have to do with contingent things—e.g., the moral sciences, which have to do with human acts subject to free choice, and the natural sciences, as regards that part of them which treats generable and corruptible

things. Therefore, the intellect has cognition of contingent things.

I respond: Contingent things can be thought of in two ways: first, insofar as they are contingent and, second, insofar as something necessary is found in them. For nothing is contingent to such an extent that it has nothing necessary within itself. For instance, the very thing that is Socrates' running is, to be sure, contingent in itself, but the relation of running to movement is necessary, since it is necessary that Socrates is moving if he is running.

Each thing is contingent on the part of its matter. For the contingent is that which is able to be and able not to be, and potentiality has to do with matter. By contrast, necessity follows upon the nature of form, since what follows upon the form is in the thing by necessity. Matter is a principle of individuation, whereas the universal notion (*ratio universalis*) is obtained by the abstraction of the form from particular matter. It was explained above (a. 1) that the intellect has *per se* and direct cognition of universals and the sensory power has *per se* and direct cognition of singulars, which, as was said above (a. 1), are also understood intellectually in a certain indirect way.

So, then, contingent things, insofar as they are contingent, are such that the sensory power has direct cognition of them and the intellect has indirect cognition of them, whereas the intellect has cognition of the universal and necessary aspects of contingent things. Hence, if we attend to the universal aspects of knowable things, all scientific knowledge has to do with what is necessary. But if we attend to the things themselves, then some scientific knowledge has to do with necessary things and some has to do with contingent things.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Does our intellect have cognition of future things?

It seems that our intellect has cognition of future things (*cognoscat futura*):

Objection 1: Our intellect has cognition through intelligible species, which abstract from the here and now, and so they are related indifferently to all times. But the intellect can have cognition of present things. Therefore, it can have cognition of future things.

Objection 2: When a man is bereft of his sensory powers, he is able to have cognition of some future things, as is clear in the case of those who are asleep and those who are delirious. But when someone is bereft of his sensory powers, his intellect becomes stronger. Therefore, the intellect, as far as it itself is concerned, has cognition of future things.

Objection 3: Man's intellectual cognition is more efficacious than any sort of cognition on the part of brute animals. But there are certain animals that have cognition of some future things; for instance, crows that crow repeatedly signify that rain is coming soon. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the human intellect can have cognition of future things.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiastes 8:6-7 says, "There is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger."

I respond: As with the cognition of contingent things, so in the same way we have to draw a distinction concerning the cognition of future things. For *insofar as they fall under a time*, future things are singulars, which, as was explained above (a. 1), the human intellect has cognition of only by turning back [to the phantasms] (*per reflexionem*). However, the *natures* of future things can be universal and perceptible by the intellect, and there can even be scientific knowledge of them.

Speaking in general about the cognition of future things, notice that there are two possible ways to have cognition of future things, viz., (a) *in themselves* and (b) *in their causes*.

Cognition of future things *in themselves* can be had only by God, to whom they are present even while they are future in the course of time; for as was explained above when we discussed God's knowledge (q. 14, a. 13), His eternal intuitive vision (*aeternus intuitus*) ranges over the whole course of time all at once.

However, even we can have cognition of future things insofar as they exist *in their causes*. And if they exist in their causes in such a way that they proceed from those causes with necessity, then our cognition has the certitude of scientific knowledge (*cognoscuntur per certitudinem scientiae*), as when an astronomer (*astrologus*) foreknows a future eclipse. On the other hand, if they exist in their causes in such a way that they proceed from those causes in most cases (*ut in pluribus*), then there can be cognition of them through a prediction that is more or less certain (*conjectura vel magis vel minus certam*), depending on whether the causes are more or less inclined toward the effects.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for a cognition that involves the universal aspects of causes, on the basis of which there can be a cognition of future things that stems from the way in which an effect is ordered toward its cause (*secundum modum ordinis effectus ad causam*).

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine puts it in *Confessiones* 12, the soul has a certain power of prophecy, so that it is able, by its nature, to have cognition of future things; and so when it withdraws from the bodily senses and in a sense reverts to itself, it participates in the knowledge of future things.

And this opinion would indeed be reasonable if we held, as the Platonists do, that the soul receives its cognition of things by participating in the ideas. For in that case, if it were unimpeded by the body, the soul would by its nature have cognition of the universal causes of all effects. Hence, it knows future things when it is withdrawn from the body's senses.

However, since this mode of cognition is not connatural to our intellect, given that our intellect instead receives its cognition from the sensory powers, it follows that it is not because of the soul's nature that it has cognition of future things when it turns itself away from the senses, but rather because of the action of certain higher spiritual or corporeal causes (*per impressionem aliquarum causarum superiorum spiritualium et corporalium*).

Through *spiritual* causes, as when a human intellect is illuminated by God's power through the ministry of the angels and its phantasms are ordered toward the cognition of future things—or even, as was explained above (q. 57, a. 3), when through the action of demons there is a movement in the imagination toward foreknowing certain future things that the demons have cognition of. It is when it is turned away from the senses that the human soul is more susceptible to these impressions from spiritual causes; for in turning away from the senses it becomes more like the spiritual substances and more unimpeded by external disturbances.

This also happens through the action of higher *corporeal* causes. For it is clear that higher bodies act upon lower bodies. Hence, since the sentient powers are the acts of corporeal organs, it follows that the imagination is in some way affected by the action of the celestial bodies. Hence, since celestial bodies are a cause of many future things, certain signs of future things come to exist in the imagination. These signs are perceived more often at night and by those who are asleep than during the day and by those who are awake. For as *De Somno et Vigilia* says, "Impressions made by day more easily dissipate. The night air is calmer, because the nights are more silent. And within the body these impressions do the job of the sensory power because of sleep, since small interior movements are sensed more readily by those who are asleep than by those who are awake. And these movements produce phantasms, on the basis of which future things are foreseen."

Reply to objection 3: Brute animals do not have anything beyond the imagination to order their phantasms, in the way that men have reason. And so a brute animal's imagination is wholly led by the

celestial impressions. Thus, some future things, like rain and others of this type, can be known better through movements of this sort in animals than through such movements in men, who are moved by the counsel of reason. Hence, in *De Somno et Vigilia* the Philosopher says, “Some extremely foolish men have the most foreknowledge. For their mind (*intelligentia*) is not affected by cares, but is, as it were, vacuous and empty of all anxiety and moves wherever it is led.”

QUESTION 87

How Our Intellect Has Cognition of Itself and of What Exists Within It

Next we have to consider how the intellectual soul has cognition of itself and of what exists within it. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does the intellectual soul have cognition of itself through its own essence? (2) How does it have cognition of the habits that exist within it? (3) How does the intellect have cognition of its own act? (4) How does it have cognition of an act of the will?

Article 1

Does the intellectual soul have cognition of itself through its own essence?

It seems that the intellectual soul has cognition of itself through its own essence:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, “The mind knows itself through itself, because it is incorporeal.”

Objection 2: An angel and a human soul share in the genus *intellectual substance*. But an angel has intellectual understanding of himself through his own essence. Therefore, so does the human soul.

Objection 3: As *De Anima* 3 says, “In things that exist without matter, the intellect and what is understood are the same.” But the human mind exists without matter, since, as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1), it is not the actuality of any body. Therefore, in the human mind the intellect and what is understood are the same. Therefore, it has intellectual understanding of itself through its own essence.

But contrary to this: *De Anima* 3 says, “The intellect has intellectual understanding of itself in the same way that it has intellectual understanding of other things.” But it has intellectual understanding of other things through likenesses of those things and not through their essence. Therefore, neither does it have intellectual understanding of itself through its own essence.

I respond: As *Metaphysics* 9 says, each thing is such that there can be cognition of it insofar as it is actual and not insofar as it is potential. For something is a being and is true, i.e., falls under cognition, insofar as it is actual. This is manifestly obvious in the case of sensible things; for instance, the power of seeing perceives only what is actually colored and not what is potentially colored. Similarly, it is clear that insofar as the intellect has cognition of material things, it has cognition only of what is actual; and so, as *Physics* 1 says, the intellect does not have cognition of primary matter except in relation to form (*secundum proportionem ad formam*).

Hence, among immaterial substances, too, each of them bears the same relation to being intelligible through its essence that it bears to being actual through its essence.

Thus, God’s essence, which is pure and perfect (*perfectus*) actuality, is simply and perfectly intelligible in its own right (*secundum seipsam*). Hence, it is through His essence that God has perfect intellectual understanding not only of Himself but also of all things.

On the other hand, an angel’s essence is, to be sure, in the genus of intelligible things as an actuality, but not as a pure and completely perfect (*completus*) actuality. Hence, an angel’s act of intellectual understanding (*eius intelligere*) is not completely perfected (*completur*) through his essence. For even though an angel has intellectual cognition of himself through his essence, he nonetheless cannot have cognition of all things through his essence; instead, he has cognition of things other than himself through likenesses of those things.

By contrast, a human intellect is in the genus of intelligible things only as a being in potentiality, in the same way that primary matter is in the genus of sensible things; this is why the intellect is called the passive or potential intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). Therefore, if the intellect is considered in its essence, it has intellectual understanding in potentiality (*potentia intelligens*). Hence, of itself it has the

power to have intellectual understanding, but it is not itself understood intellectually except insofar as it becomes activated (*actu*).

On this score, the Platonists likewise held that the order of intelligible entities transcends the order of intellects; for the intellect has intellectual understanding only through participation in what is intelligible, and, according to them, what participates is inferior to what it participates in. Therefore, if, as the Platonists held, the human intellect were activated (*fieri et actu*) through participation in separated intelligible forms, then the human intellect would understand itself through this sort of participation in incorporeal things.

However, since, as was explained above (q. 86, a. 4), it is connatural to our intellect, in the state of the present life, to be directed toward material and sensible things, it follows that our intellect understands itself insofar as it is activated (*fit actu*) by species abstracted from sensible things through the light of the active intellect—and this is the actualization (*actus*) both of the intelligible things themselves and, through their mediation, of the passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*).

Therefore, it is through its act, and not through its essence, that our intellect has cognition of itself. And this in two ways:

First, in a *particular* way (*particulariter*), insofar as Socrates or Plato perceives himself to have an intellectual soul in virtue of the fact that he perceives himself to have intellectual understanding.

Second, in a *general* way (*in universali*), insofar as we consider the nature of the human mind on the basis of the intellect's act. But, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 5), it is true that the discernment (*iudicium*) and efficacy of the cognition by which we grasp the nature of the soul belongs to us because of the derivation of our intellect's light from God's truth, in which the conceptions (*rationes*) of all things are contained. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, "We intuitively see (*intuemur*) inviolable truth, on the basis of which we perfectly define, as far as we are able to, not how each man's mind in fact is, but rather how it ought to be in light of the eternal conceptions."

However, there is a difference between these two types of cognition. For the mind's very presence, which is the principle of the act by which the mind perceives itself, is sufficient for the first type of cognition that is had of the mind. And it is for this reason that the mind is said to have a cognition of itself through its own presence. By contrast, the mind's presence is not itself sufficient for the second type of cognition that is had of the mind; instead, what is required is diligent and subtle inquiry. Hence, many are ignorant of the nature of the soul, and many have fallen into error about the nature of the soul. This is why, in *De Trinitate* 10, Augustine says of this sort of inquiry into the mind, "It is not as something absent that the mind seeks to discern itself; rather, it seeks to discern itself as something present"—that is, to have a cognition of how it differs from other things, which is what it is to have a cognition of its own 'what-ness' and nature.

Reply to objection 1: The mind knows itself through itself in the sense that it eventually (*tandem*) arrives at a cognition of itself, but through its own act. For the mind itself is what is known, because it loves itself, as Augustine adds in the place cited. For there are two possible reasons why something is said to be known in itself (*per se notum*): either (a) because there is nothing else through which one arrives at a knowledge of it, in the way that the first principles are said to be known in themselves, or (b) because it is not known *per accidens*—in the way in which color is *per se* visible, whereas a substance is visible *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 2: An angel's essence is an actuality in the genus of intelligible things, and so it is both an intellect and something that is understood intellectually. Hence, an angel apprehends his own essence through himself.

By contrast, this is not the case with a human intellect, which either (a) is entirely in potentiality with respect to intelligible things, as is the case with the passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*), or else (b) is the actuality of the intelligible things which are abstracted from the phantasms, as is the case with

the active intellect.

Reply to objection 3: This proposition (*verbum*) of the Philosopher's is true in general of all types of intellect. For just as an activated sensory power (*sensus in actu*) is the sensible thing, because of the likeness of the sensible thing that serves as the form of the activated sensory power, so too the activated intellect (*intellectus in actu*) is the thing as actually understood (*intellectum in actu*), because of the likeness of the thing understood that serves as the form of the activated intellect. And so the human intellect, which proceeds into act because of the species of the thing understood, is itself understood through that same species as through its own form.

Now to say that in those things without matter the intellect is the same as the thing understood is the same as saying that in things that are actually being understood the intellect and what is understood are the same. For something is actually being understood intellectually because it is without matter. But there is a difference here. For the essences of certain things exist without matter, e.g., the separated substances we call angels, and each of them is both something that is understood intellectually and something that understands intellectually. On the other hand, there are some things whose essences do not exist without matter; instead, all that exists without matter are the likenesses abstracted from them.

Hence, in *De Anima* 3 the Commentator says that the proposition adduced in the objection is true only in the case of the separated substances. For, as was just explained, the proposition is rendered true in their case in a way in which it is not rendered true in the case of other things.

Article 2

Does our intellect have cognition of the soul's habits through their essence?

It seems that our intellect has cognition of the soul's habits through their essence:

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 13 Augustine says, "Faith is not seen in the heart in which it exists in the same way that the soul of another man is seen from the movements of his body. Rather, a most certain knowledge grasps it, and the conscience calls out in testimony to it." And the same argument holds for the other habits of the soul. Therefore, the habits of the soul are perceived (*cognoscuntur*) through themselves and not through their acts.

Objection 2: We have cognition of material things that exist outside the soul in virtue of the fact that their likenesses are present in the soul, and this is why they are said to be understood (*cognoscuntur*) through their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present in the soul through their essence. Therefore, it is through their essence that they are understood.

Objection 3: That because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself such-and-such to a greater degree (*propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis*). But other things are understood by the soul because of its habits and intelligible species. Therefore, the soul's habits and intelligible species are understood by the soul to a greater degree through themselves.

But contrary to this: Habits are principles of acts, just as powers are. But as *De Anima* 2 says, "Acts and operations are conceptually prior (*priores secundum rationem*) to powers." For the same reason, therefore, acts and operations are prior to habits. And so habits are known through their acts, just as powers are.

I respond: In some sense a habit lies between a pure potentiality (*potentia pura*) and a pure actuality (*actus purus*). Now it has already been explained (a. 1) that nothing is understood except insofar as it is actual. So, then, insofar as a habit falls short of being a complete actuality, it falls short of being knowable through itself. Rather, it has to be known through its act—whether this be (a) when

someone perceives himself to have a habit by virtue of perceiving himself to be producing the act proper to that habit, or (b) when someone is inquiring into the nature and character of a habit by considering its act. The first type of cognition of a habit is effected by the very presence of the habit, since by the very fact that it is present it causes the act in which it is immediately perceived. On the other hand, the second type of cognition of a habit comes about through diligent inquiry, as was explained above (a. 1) in the case of the mind.

Reply to objection 1: Even though faith is not perceived through exterior bodily movements, it is nonetheless perceived by the one in whom it exists through an interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he perceives himself to be making an act of faith (*nisi per hoc quod se credere percipit*).

Reply to objection 2: Habits are not present in our intellect as objects of the intellect, since, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), in the state of the present life the object of our intellect is the nature of a material thing. Instead, habits are present in the intellect as things by which the intellect engages in intellectual understanding.

Reply to objection 3: The dictum ‘That because of which (*propter quod*) a thing is such-and-such is itself such-and-such to a greater degree’ is true if it is understood to apply to things that belong to the same order, e.g., things in the same genus of cause. For instance, if one claimed that health exists for the sake of life (*propter vitam*), it would follow that life is desirable to a greater degree.

However, the dictum is not true if it is applied to things that belong to diverse orders. For instance, if one claimed that health exists because of medicine (*propter medicinam*), it would not thereby follow that medicine is more desirable; for health belongs to the order of ends, while medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes.

So, then, if we take two things, both of which belong *per se* to the order of the objects of cognition, the one because of which the other is known (*cognoscitur*) will itself be known (*notum*) to a greater degree—in the way that principles are known to a greater degree than their conclusions are. However, a habit does not, insofar as it is a habit, belong to the order of objects of cognition. Furthermore, it is not because of a habit as an *object* of cognition that certain things are known; instead, certain things are known because of a habit as a *disposition* or *form* by which the knower understands. And so the argument does not go through.

Article 3

Does the intellect have cognition of its own act?

It seems that the intellect does not have cognition of its own act (*non cognoscat proprium actum*):

Objection 1: It is the object of a cognitive power (*cognoscitiva virtus*) that is properly speaking such that there is cognition of it. But an act differs from its object. Therefore, the intellect does not have cognition of its own act.

Objection 2: If there is a cognition of something, then there is an act by which that cognition takes place. Therefore, if the intellect has a cognition of its own act, then there is an act by which it has the cognition of that act; and, again, the cognition of this latter act will take place by means of yet another act. Therefore, there will be an infinite regress (*erit procedere in infinitum*)—which seems impossible.

Objection 3: The intellect is related to its own act in the same way that a sensory power is related to its own act. But a proper sensory power does not sense its own act; rather, as *De Anima* says, this is the role of the common sensory power. Therefore, neither does the intellect have intellectual cognition

of its own act.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “I understand that I understand.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), there is cognition of a thing insofar as it is actual. Now the ultimate perfection of an intellect is its operation. For this operation is not like an action which tends toward something else (*tendens in alterum*) and which is a perfection of the thing acted upon, in the way that an act of building is a perfection of the thing built. Rather, as is explained in *Metaphysics* 9, the intellect’s action remains within the agent as the agent’s own perfection and actuality.

Therefore, the first thing that is understood about an intellect is its very act of intellectual understanding. But this applies in different ways to the different types of intellects:

For there is one type of intellect, viz., God’s intellect, which is its very act of intellectual understanding. And so in the case of God, His understanding that He understands is the same as His understanding His own essence, since His essence is His very act of intellectual understanding.

On the other hand, there is another type of intellect, viz., the angelic intellect, which, as was explained above (q. 79, a. 1), is not its own act of intellectual understanding, but is nonetheless such that the first object of its act of understanding is its own essence. Hence, even though, in an angel, his understanding that he understands is conceptually different from his understanding his own essence, he nonetheless understands both of them together and in a single act; for his understanding his own essence is a proper perfection of his essence, and an entity taken together with its perfection is understood all at once and by a single act.

But there is another type of intellect, viz., the human intellect, which (a) is not its own act of understanding and which (b) is such that the primary object of its act of understanding is not its own essence but instead something extrinsic, viz., the nature of a material thing. And so what is understood in the first place by the human intellect is an object of this latter sort, and what is understood in the second place is the very act by which the [primary] object is understood. Furthermore, by this act the intellect itself is understood, since the intellect’s perfection is the very act of intellectual understanding. This is why the Philosopher says that objects are understood prior to their acts, and acts prior to their powers.

Reply to objection 1: The object of the intellect is something general, viz., *being* and *true*, under which is also included the very act of intellectual understanding. Hence, the intellect is able to have intellectual understanding of its own act. But it does not understand its own act in the first place, since in the state of the present life the primary object of our intellect is not just any being or any true thing but rather, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), *being* and *true* as thought of in material things (*ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus*). And it is on this basis that our intellect arrives at the cognition of all other things.

Reply to objection 2: The human act of intellectual understanding is not itself the actuality and perfection of the material nature that is understood, in the sense that the nature of the material thing and the very act of understanding it could be understood in a single act, in the way that a thing together with its perfection is understood by a single act. Hence, the act by which the intellect understands a rock is different from the act by which it understands that it understands the rock, and so on. Nor, as was explained above (q. 86, a. 2), is it problematic for there to be a potential infinity in the intellect.

Reply to objection 3: A proper sensory power has an act of sensing (*sentit*) because of a change effected in the material organ by a sensible exterior thing. But it is impossible for something material to effect a change within itself; instead, one material thing is affected by another. And so the act of a proper sensory power is perceived through the common sensory power.

By contrast, the intellect does not have intellectual understanding through any material change in an organ, and so the cases are not parallel.

Article 4

Does the intellect have intellectual understanding of acts of willing?

It seems that the intellect does not have intellectual understanding of acts of willing (*non intelligit actum voluntatis*):

Objection 1: The intellect does not have cognition of anything that is not in some way present in the intellect. But an act of willing is not present in the intellect, since the intellect and the will are diverse powers. Therefore, the intellect does not have cognition of acts of willing.

Objection 2: An act takes its species from its object. But the object of the will differs from the object of the intellect. Therefore, an act of willing has a species different from that of an object of the intellect. Therefore, the intellect does not have cognition of it.

Objection 3: In *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says of the soul's affections that they are perceived "neither through images, in the way that bodies are, nor through their presence, in the way that crafts (*artes*) are, but through certain notions (*per quasdam notiones*).” But it does not seem to be possible for there to be notions of things in the soul other than the essences of the things perceived or likenesses of those things. Therefore, it seems impossible for the intellect to have cognition of the soul's affections, i.e., of acts of willing.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "I understand myself to have an act of willing (*intelligo me velle*)."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 59, a. 1), an act of willing is nothing other than a certain inclination that follows upon an understood form, in the same way that a natural desire (*appetitus naturalis*) is an inclination that follows upon a natural form. But a thing's inclination exists within the thing itself in the way appropriate to it (*per modum eius*). Hence, a natural inclination exists naturally in a natural thing; and an inclination which is a sentient desire exists in a sensible way in a thing that has sentience; and, similarly, an intelligible inclination, which is an act of willing, exists intelligibly, as in its source and proper subject, in someone who has intellectual understanding. This is why, in *De Anima* 3, the Philosopher employs the following manner of speaking: "The will exists in reason." But if something exists intelligibly in someone who has intellectual understanding, then it follows that that thing is understood by him.

Hence, an act of willing is understood by the intellect both (a) insofar as someone perceives himself to be willing (*inquantum aliquis percipit se velle*) and also (b) insofar as someone has cognition of the nature of this act (*inquantum aliquis cognoscit naturam huius actus*) and, as a result, cognition of the nature of its source (*principium*), which is either a habit or a power.

Reply to objection 1: This argument would go through if the will and the intellect differed in subject in addition to being diverse powers. For in that case what exists in the will would be absent from the intellect. As things stand, however, since both of them are rooted (*radicetur*) in the same substance of the soul and the one is in some sense a principle of the other, it follows that what exists in the will somehow exists in the intellect as well.

Reply to objection 2: The good and the true, which are the objects of the will and the intellect, do, to be sure, differ conceptually, but, as was explained above (q. 16, a. 4 and q. 82, a. 4), the one is contained under the other. For the true is something good, and the good is something true. And so what belongs to the will falls under the intellect, and what belongs to the intellect is able to fall under the will.

Reply to objection 3: The soul's affections do not exist in the intellect just through a likeness, as bodies do, or through their presence in the subject, as crafts do. Rather, they exist in the intellect in the way that something that is derived from a principle exists in a principle that is such that a notion of what

is derived exists in it (*principiatum est in principio in quo habetur notio principiati*). And this is why Augustine says that the soul's affections exist in memory through certain notions (*per quasdam notiones*).

QUESTION 88

How the Human Soul Understands Things That are Above It

Next we have to consider how the human soul has cognition of things that are above it, viz., immaterial substances. And on this topic there are three questions: (1) Can the human soul, in the state of the present life, have intellectual understanding of the immaterial substances which we call angels through themselves? (2) Can the human soul come to a knowledge (*notitia*) of immaterial substances through its cognition of material things? (3) Is it God that is understood by us in the first place?

Article 1

Can the human soul, in the state of the present life, have intellectual understanding of immaterial substances through themselves?

It seems that the human soul, in the state of the present life, can have intellectual understanding of immaterial substances through themselves (*possit intelligere substantias immateriales per seipsas*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine says, “Just as the mind itself gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses, so it gathers knowledge of incorporeal things through its very self (*per semetipsam*).” But things of this latter sort are immaterial substances. Therefore, the mind has intellectual understanding of immaterial substances.

Objection 2: What is similar is known by means of what is similar to it. But the human mind is more similar to immaterial things than to material things, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 76, a. 1), the mind is itself immaterial. Therefore, since our mind has intellectual understanding of material things, *a fortiori* it has intellectual understanding of immaterial things.

Objection 3: The fact that things that are maximally sensible in their own right (*secundum se maxime sensibilia*) are not maximally sensible by us stems from the fact that excesses in the case of sensibles (*excellantiae sensibilibus*) damage our sensory power. But as *De Anima* 3 says, excesses in the case of intelligibles (*excellantiae intelligibilibus*) do not damage our intellect. Therefore, things that are maximally intelligible in their own right are likewise maximally intelligible to us. But since material things are intelligible only because we make them actually intelligible through abstraction from matter, it is clear that substances that are immaterial are by their nature more intelligible in their own right. Therefore, *a fortiori*, we have a much better intellectual understanding of them than of material things.

Objection 4: In *Metaphysics* 2 the Commentator says that if we could not understand abstract substances intellectually, then “nature would have acted pointlessly (*otiose*), since it would have rendered what is naturally intelligible in its own right (*intellectum in se*) unintelligible by anyone (*non intellectum ab aliquo*).” But there is nothing pointless or useless (*otiosum sive frustra*) in nature. Therefore, we can have intellectual understanding of immaterial substances.

Objection 5: The intellect is related to intelligible things in the same way that the sensory power is related to sensible things. But our sense of sight can see all bodies, regardless of whether they are higher and incorruptible bodies or lower and corruptible bodies. Therefore, our intellect can have intellectual understanding of all intelligible substances, even higher and immaterial substances.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 9:16 says, “Who will investigate the things in the heavens?” But substances of the sort in question are said to be ‘in the heavens’ (*in caelis*)—this according to Matthew 18:10 (“Their angels in heaven (*in caelis*) ...”). Therefore, immaterial substances cannot be understood through human inquiry (*per investigationem humanam*).

I respond: According to Plato’s opinion, not only are immaterial substances understood by us intellectually, but they are the very first things understood by us. For Plato claimed that immaterial

subsistent forms, which he called ‘ideas’, are the proper object of our intellect, and so they are understood by us in the first place and *per se* (*primo et per se*). However, the soul’s cognition is applied to material things insofar as the imagination and sensory power are mixed in with intellection (*intellectui permiscetur phantasia et sensus*). Hence, the more the soul has been purified (*depuratus*), the more it perceives the intelligible truth that belongs to the immaterial things.

By contrast, according to Aristotle’s position, which is closer to our experience (*quam magis experimur*), in the state of the present life our intellect has a natural relation to the natures of material things. Hence, as is clear from what has been said (q. 84, a. 7), our intellect does not understand anything except by turning itself toward the phantasms. And so it is clear that given the mode of cognition that we experience, we cannot have intellectual understanding in the first place and *per se* of immaterial substances, which do not fall under the sensory power or the imagination.

However, in his commentary on *De Anima* 3, Averroes claims that in this life man can in the end arrive at an intellectual understanding of separated substances because of our continuity or union with a certain separated substance which he calls the active intellect and which, because it is a separated substance, naturally understands separated substances. Hence, when the active intellect has been perfectly united with us in such a way that we are able to have perfect intellectual understanding through it, then we will understand separated substances in the same way that we now understand material substances through the passive intellect that is united with us.

Now Averroes claimed that the active intellect is united with us in the following way: Since we have intellectual understanding through the active intellect and through the contemplated intelligibles (*per intelligibilia speculata*), as is clear when we understand conclusions through their understood principles, the active intellect has to be related to the contemplated intelligibles either (a) as a principal agent to its instruments or (b) as a form to its matter. For these are the two ways in which an action is attributed to two principles. That is, the action is attributed either (a) to a principal agent and to its instrument, as when the action of cutting is attributed to the craftsman and to his saw, or (b) to a form and its subject, as when the action of heating is attributed to the heat and to the fire. But in both these ways the active intellect will be related to the contemplated intelligibles as a perfection to what is perfectible, and as an actuality to a potentiality. Now what is perfected is received along with the perfection itself all at once in something; for instance, what is actually visible is received along with the light all at once in the pupil. Therefore, the contemplated intelligibles are received along with the active intellect all at once in the passive intellect. And the greater the number of contemplated intelligibles we receive, the closer we get to the active intellect’s being perfectly united with us—so that when we have had cognition of all the contemplated intelligibles, the agent intellect will be perfectly united with us and we will be able to have cognition of all things, material and immaterial, through it. This is what he posits as ultimate human happiness. Moreover, as far as this proposal is concerned, it does not matter (a) whether in that state of happiness the passive intellect understands separated substances through the active intellect, as Averroes himself thinks, or (b) whether instead—a view Averroes attributes to Alexander—the man understands separated substances through the active intellect, and the passive intellect never understands separated substances (because he posits a corruptible passive intellect).

However, the positions just laid out cannot stand.

First of all, if the active intellect is a separated substance, it is impossible for us to formally have intellectual understanding through it. For that by which an agent formally acts is a form and actuality that belongs to the agent, since every agent acts insofar as it is actualized—just as was explained above (q. 76, a. 1) concerning the passive intellect.

Second, given the position in question, if the active intellect is a separated substance, then it is not united with us in its substance. Instead, only its light is united to us to the extent that there is a participation in the contemplated intelligibles (*secundum quod participatur in intellectis speculatis*); and

the active intellect is not united to us with respect to its other actions, so that we might thereby be able to understand immaterial substances. This is like the fact that when we see colors illuminated by the sun, it is not the sun's substance that is united with us, so that we might be able to perform the sun's actions. Instead, it is only the sun's light that is united with us for seeing colors.

Third, even on the assumption that the active intellect's substance is united with us along the lines explained above, they themselves do not claim that the active intellect is totally united with us after one or two intelligibles—instead, it is totally united with us after *all* the contemplated intelligibles. But all the contemplated intelligibles together fall short of the active intellect's power, since it takes much more power to understand separated substances intellectually than to understand all material substances. Hence, it is clear that even if all material substances were understood intellectually, the active intellect would not be united with us in such a way that we would be able to understand separated substances through it.

Fourth, it is scarcely possible for anyone in this world to have an intellectual understanding of all material intelligibles, and so no one—or at most very few—would attain happiness. But this contradicts the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, where he says that happiness is “a general good that is accessible to all who are not bereft of virtue.” It is likewise contrary to reason that the end of a species should be attained only by a few members of the species (*ut in paucioribus consequantur ea quae continentur sub specie*).

Fifth, in *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher explicitly says that happiness “is an operation in accord with perfect virtue.” And having enumerated many virtues, he concludes in *Ethics* 10 that ultimate happiness, which consists in the cognition of the most intelligible things, is in accord with the virtue of wisdom, which he had claimed in *Ethics* 6 is “the chief among the speculative virtues.” Hence, it is clear that Aristotle located man's ultimate happiness in cognition of separated substances of a sort that can be had through the speculative sciences—and not through the sort of continuity with the active intellect fabricated by some.

Sixth, it was shown above (q. 79, a. 4) that the active intellect is not a separated substance, but a certain power of the soul that extends actively to the same things that the passive intellect extends to passively. For as *De Anima* 3 says, the passive intellect “is that by which the intellect becomes all things,” whereas the active intellect is “that by which the intellect makes all things.” Therefore, both the active intellect and the passive intellect extend, in the state of the present life, only to material things, which the active intellect makes actually intelligible and which are received in the passive intellect.

Hence, in the state of the present life, we cannot understand immaterial substances through themselves either by means of the passive intellect or by means of the active intellect.

Reply to objection 1: From this quotation from Augustine one can infer that what our mind is capable of attaining by way of cognition of incorporeal things is such that the mind can have this cognition through itself. And this is true to the extent that even among the philosophers one finds the claim that knowledge concerning the soul is a certain source of cognition about separated substances. For by understanding itself, our soul takes a step toward having the sort of cognition of incorporeal substances that it is possible for it to have. But it does not, by understanding itself, understand them absolutely speaking or perfectly.

Reply to objection 2: Likeness to a nature is not a sufficient explanation for cognition; otherwise, one would have to say what Empedocles said, viz., that the soul shares in the nature of all things in order to have cognition of all things. Instead, what is required for cognition is that a likeness of the thing understood should exist in the one having the cognition as a certain form of his own. Now in the state of the present life our passive intellect is apt to be informed by the likenesses of material things abstracted from phantasms, and so it has a better cognition of material substances than of immaterial substances.

Reply to objection 3: The object must have a certain proportion to the cognitive power—more specifically, a proportion of what is active to what is passive, and a proportion of what is perfect to what

is perfectible. Hence, the fact that excessive sensibles (*excellentia sensibilia*) are not grasped by the sensory power is explained not only by the fact that they damage the sensory organs but also by the fact that they are disproportionate to the sentient powers. And it is in this latter way that immaterial substances are disproportionate to our intellect, in its present state, with the result that they cannot be understood by it.

Reply to objection 4: This argument of the Commentator's is defective in several ways.

First, from the fact that separated substances are not understood by us, it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect. For they are understood by themselves and by one another.

Second, separated substances do not have being understood by us as their end. But what is called 'pointless' or 'useless' is that which does not attain the end for which it exists. And so even if immaterial substances were not understood in any way by us, it would not follow that they are useless.

Reply to objection 5: The sensory power has cognition of higher and lower bodies in the same way, viz., through an organ's being affected by the sensible thing. But we do not have intellective cognition of material substances, which are understood by means of abstraction, in the same way that we have intellective cognition of immaterial substances, which cannot be understood in this way by us, since there are no phantasms of them.

Article 2

Can our intellect arrive at an intellective understanding of immaterial substances through its cognition of material things?

It seems that our intellect can arrive at an intellective understanding of immaterial substances through its cognition of material things:

Objection 1: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, "It is impossible for the human mind to be stimulated upward to the immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies unless in its own right it uses material guidance." Therefore, it follows that we can be led by material things to an intellective understanding of immaterial substances.

Objection 2: Scientific knowledge exists in the intellect. But there are sciences about immaterial substances, along with definitions. For instance, Damascene defines an angel, and certain texts about angels are proposed in both the theological and philosophical disciplines. Therefore, immaterial substances can be understood by us.

Objection 3: The human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it itself can be understood intellectually by us through its own act, by which it understands material things. Therefore, other immaterial substances, too, can be understood by us through their effects on material things.

Objection 4: The only sort of cause that cannot be comprehended through its effects is one which lies at an infinite distance from its effects. But this is proper to God alone. Therefore, other immaterial substances, which are created, can be understood by us through material things.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, "Intelligible things cannot be understood by means of sensible things, and simples cannot be understood by means of composites, and incorporeal things cannot be understood by means of corporeal things."

I respond: As Averroes reports in *De Anima* 3, a thinker by the name of Avempace held that through the understanding of material substances we are able to arrive, through true philosophical principles, at an intellective understanding of immaterial substances. For given that our intellect is able to abstract the 'what-ness' (*quidditas*) of a material thing from matter, if there is still something material

left in that ‘what-ness’, our intellect will be able to do another abstraction; and since this process does not go on to infinity, it will be able at last to arrive at an understanding of a ‘what-ness’ that is wholly without matter. And this is what it is to understand an immaterial substance intellectually.

This argument would be effective if, as the Platonists held, immaterial substances were the forms and species of the material things around us. However, if we do not hold this but presuppose instead that immaterial substances have a nature that is altogether different from the ‘what-nesses’ of material things, then no matter how much our intellect abstracts the ‘what-ness’ of a material thing from matter, it will never arrive at anything like an immaterial substance. And so it is not the case that through material substances we can perfectly (*perfecte*) understand immaterial things.

Reply to objection 1: We can ascend from material things to some sort of cognition of immaterial things, but not to perfect cognition, since there is not enough likeness (*comparatio*) between material things and immaterial things. Instead, as Dionysius points out in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 2, if the likenesses taken from material things are used for understanding immaterial things, they turn out to be very dissimilar.

Reply to objection 2: In the sciences the higher things are treated principally through the way of negation (*per viam remotionis*). So, for instance, Aristotle makes the celestial bodies known by negating the properties of lower bodies. Hence, *a fortiori*, we cannot have cognition of immaterial substances in such a way as to apprehend their ‘what-nesses’. Instead, the treatments proposed to us in the sciences about immaterial substances proceed by appeal to the way of negation and to certain of their relations to material things.

Reply to objection 3: The human soul has intellectual cognition of itself through its own act of understanding, which is the act proper to it and which perfectly reveals its power and nature. By contrast, the human soul is not able, either through its own act or through any other features found in material things, to have a perfect cognition of the power or nature of immaterial substances. For material things do not measure up to (*non adaequant*) the powers of immaterial substances.

Reply to objection 4: Created immaterial substances do not share the same *natural* genus with material substances, since immaterial substances do not have the same type of power or matter. However, they do share the same *logical* genus with material substances, since even immaterial substances are in the category of *substance*, given that their ‘what-ness’ is not the same as their *esse*.

By contrast, God does not share with material substances either a *natural* genus or a *logical* genus, since, as was explained above (q. 3, a. 5), there is no sense in which God is in a genus. Hence, through the likenesses of material things something affirmative can be understood of the angels in accord with a common conception (*secundum rationem communem*), though not in accord with any conception of a species (*secundum rationem speciei*); but this cannot occur in any way in the case of God.

Article 3

Is God the first thing that the human mind has cognition of?

It seems that God is the first thing (*primum*) that the human mind has cognition of:

Objection 1: That in which all other things are understood and by appeal to which we pass judgment on other things is the first object understood by us—in the way that light is sensed by the eye, and in the way that first principles are understood by the intellect. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* and in *De Vera Religione*, we have cognition of all things in the light shed by the First Truth, and it is through this truth that we pass judgment on all things. Therefore, God is that which is first understood

by us.

Objection 2: That because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself such-and-such to a greater degree (*propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis*). But God is a cause of all of our cognitions, since as John 1:9 says, “He is the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into the world.” Therefore, God is that which is understood by us in the first place and to the greatest degree.

Objection 3: That which is first understood in an image is the exemplar by reference to which the image is formed (*exemplar quo imago formatur*). But as Augustine says, the image of God exists in our mind. Therefore, God is that which is first understood in our mind.

But contrary to this: John 1:18 says, “No one has ever seen God.”

I respond: Since, as has been explained (a. 1), the human intellect cannot, in the state of the present life, have cognition of created immaterial substances, *a fortiori* it cannot have cognition of the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence, one should reply simply that God is not the first object understood by us; instead, we come to a cognition of God through creatures—this according to the Apostle in Romans 1:20 (“The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made”).

Now, as has been explained many times above (q. 84, a. 7 and q. 85, a. 8 and q. 87, a. 2), in the state of the present life the first thing understood by us is the ‘what-ness’ of a material thing, which is the object of our intellect.

Reply to objection 1: The sense in which we understand and pass judgment on all things in the light of the First Truth is that, as was explained above (q. 12, a. 2 and q. 84, a. 5), the intellect’s very light—whether its natural light (*lumen naturale*) or the light of grace (*lumen gratuitum*)—is nothing other than the imprint of the First Truth. Hence, since our intellect’s light is itself related to our intellect not as *that which* is understood but as *that by which* things are understood, *a fortiori* God is not that which is first understood by our intellect.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 87, a. 2), the dictum ‘That because of which a thing is such-and-such is itself such-and-such to a greater degree’ must be thought of as applying to things that belong to the same order.

Now the sense in which other things are understood ‘because of God’ is not that God is the first object, but rather that He is the first cause of our cognitive power.

Reply to objection 3: If the image of God in our soul were perfect, in the way that the Son is the perfect Image of the Father, then our mind would immediately have an intellectual understanding of God. However, our mind is an imperfect image. Hence, the argument does not go through.

QUESTION 89

A Separated Soul's Cognition

Next we have to consider a separated soul's cognition. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Can a soul that has been separated from its body have intellectual understanding? (2) Does a separated soul have intellectual understanding of separated substances? (3) Does a separated soul have intellectual understanding of all natural things? (4) Does a separated soul have cognition of singulars? (5) Does a habit of knowledge acquired here remain in a separated soul? (6) Can a separated soul make use of a habit of knowledge acquired here? (7) Does spatial distance impede a separated soul's cognition? (8) Do souls separated from their bodies have cognition of what is happening here?

Article 1

Can a separated soul have intellectual understanding of anything at all?

It seems that a separated soul cannot have intellectual understanding of anything at all:

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 1 the Philosopher says, "Understanding is corrupted when something is corrupted interiorly." But everything interior that belongs to a man is corrupted by death. Therefore, understanding is itself likewise corrupted.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 84, a. 7 and 8), the human soul is prevented from understanding by impediments in the sensory power (*per ligamentum sensus*) and by an unruly imagination. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 77, a. 8), the sensory power and imagination are totally corrupted by death. Therefore, after death the soul does not have intellectual understanding of anything at all.

Objection 3: If a separated soul has intellectual understanding, then it must have this understanding by means of certain [intelligible] species. But it does not have understanding by means of innate species, since in the beginning the soul "is like a slate on which nothing has been written." Nor does it have understanding by means of species that it abstracts from things, since it no longer has the organs associated with the sensory power and imagination, by the mediation of which intelligible species are abstracted from things. Nor does it have understanding by means of species that have been previously abstracted and are now conserved in the soul; for in that case a child's soul would not understand anything after death. Nor does it have understanding even by means of intelligible species that flow into it from God (*per species intelligibiles divinitus influxas*), since this sort of cognition would not be natural cognition—which is what we are talking about now—but would instead be a cognition associated with grace. Therefore, a soul separated from its body cannot have intellectual understanding of anything.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* 1 the Philosopher says, "If the soul had no proper operations, then it would not be possible for the soul to be separated." But it is possible for the soul to be separated. Therefore, it has proper operations—and especially that operation which is intellectual understanding (*intelligere*). Therefore, it has intellectual cognition when it exists without its body.

I respond: This question derives its difficulty from the fact that as long as a soul is conjoined with its body, it cannot have intellectual understanding of anything except by turning itself toward phantasms. This is clear from experience.

Now if, as the Platonists held, this fact were not due to the nature of the soul, but instead belonged to the soul incidentally (*per accidens*) because it is tied to a body, then the question could easily be answered. For once the impediment of the body were removed, the soul would revert to its own nature, so that it would understand intelligible things directly (*simpliciter*) and without turning itself to

phantasms—just as happens in the case of other separated substances.

However, on this view, the soul would not be united to its body for the soul's own good, given that its intellective understanding would be poorer (*peius*) when it is united with the body than when it is separated. Instead, the union would be solely for the sake of the betterment of the body. But this is ludicrous (*irrationabile*), since the matter exists for the sake of the form, and not vice versa.

By contrast, if we hold that it is by its nature that the soul has to turn itself toward phantasms in order to have intellective understanding, then, since the soul's nature is not changed by the death of the body, it seems that a [separated] soul cannot have intellective understanding of anything. For there are no phantasms at hand toward which it might turn itself.

So to remove this difficulty, note that since nothing operates except insofar as it is actualized, each thing's mode of operating (*modus operandi*) follows upon its mode of being (*modus essendi ipsius*). But even while a soul's nature remains the same, its mode of being when it is united with a body is different from its mode of being when it is separated from its body—not in such a way that the soul's being united to a body is incidental (*accidentale*) to it, but rather in such a way that it is by reason of its nature that the soul is united to a body. In the same way, the nature of something lightweight is not changed when it goes from being in its proper place, which is natural to it, to being outside its proper place, which lies beyond its nature (*est ei praeter naturam*). Therefore, corresponding to the mode of being by which a soul is united to a body, the soul has a mode of understanding that involves turning toward the phantasms of bodies that exist in the bodily organs. But when a soul is separated from its body, it has a mode of understanding that involves turning toward those things that are intelligible absolutely speaking—just like the mode of understanding had by the other separated substances. Hence, the mode of understanding that involves turning toward phantasms is natural to a soul in the same way that being united to a body is likewise natural to it, whereas being separated from its body lies outside the conception of its nature (*praeter rationem suae naturae*), just as understanding without turning toward phantasms lies outside its nature. And so a soul is united to a body in order that it might exist and operate in accord with its nature.

However, this reply once again provokes a doubt. For since (a) nature is always ordered toward what is better, and since (b) the mode of understanding that involves turning toward intelligible things absolutely speaking is better than the mode of understanding that involves turning toward phantasms, God should have constituted the soul's nature in such a way that (a) the more noble mode of understanding would be natural to it and that (b) for this reason it would not need to be united to a body.

Notice, then, that even if intellective understanding by turning toward higher things is more noble, absolutely speaking, than understanding by turning toward phantasms, nonetheless, the former mode of understanding was less perfect as a possibility for the soul (*prout erat possibilis animae erat imperfectior*). This is made clear as follows:

In all intellectual substances the intellective power comes through the influence of the divine light. This light is unitary and simple in the first principle, and the further away intellectual creatures are from the first principle, the more this light is divided and differentiated, like lines emanating from a central point. And so it is that God understands all things through His own unitary essence. The higher intellectual substances, on the other hand, even if they have intellective understanding through more than one form (*per plures formas*), nonetheless understand through forms that are fewer and more universal and more powerful for comprehending things because of the efficacy of the intellective power that exists in them, whereas in the lower intellectual substances, to the extent that they fall short of the intellective power of the higher substances, the forms are greater in number, less universal, and less efficacious for comprehending things. Therefore, if the lower substances had forms with the same degree of universality that the higher substances do, then because they have weaker intellects, they would not receive through those forms a perfect cognition of things, but would instead have a cognition that was somewhat general and indistinct. In a certain way, this same thing is apparent among men; for those of weaker intellect do

not receive perfect cognition through the universal conceptions had by more intelligent men, unless each individual case is specifically (*in speciali*) explained to them.

Now it is clear that, according to the order of nature, human souls are the lowest among intellectual substances. The perfection of the universe requires this, so that diverse grades might exist among things. Therefore, if human souls had been constituted by God in such a way as to have intellective understanding in the mode in which separated substances have it, then they would not have had perfect cognition, but would instead have had indistinct cognition in general. Therefore, in order for them to be able to have perfect and proper cognition of things, they were naturally constituted in such a way as to be united to bodies and so to receive their proper cognition of sensible things from the things themselves, in much the same way that uneducated men cannot be led to scientific knowledge except through sensible examples.

So, then, it is clear that it is for the soul's own good that it should be united to a body and have intellective cognition by turning itself toward phantasms. And yet the soul is able to be separated and to have a different mode of intellective understanding.

Reply to objection 1: If the Philosopher's words are carefully unpacked (*diligenter discutantur*), the Philosopher asserted this claim after having first made a certain assumption, viz., that the act of intellective understanding is a certain movement of the conjoined being in the same way that the act of sensing is. For he had not yet shown the difference between intellective understanding and sensing.

An alternative reply is that he is speaking of the mode of intellective understanding which involves turning toward phantasms.

Reply to objection 2: The second objection is about this same mode of intellective understanding.

Reply to objection 3: A separated soul has intellective understanding neither through innate [intelligible] species, nor through species that it abstracts during the time it is separated, nor solely through conserved species, as the objection proves. Instead, it has intellective understanding through participated species which come from the influence of God's light and which the soul comes to participate in just as the other separated substances do, though in an inferior mode. Hence, as soon as it ceases to turn itself toward the body, the soul turns itself toward higher things. And yet the cognition is not for this reason non-natural. For God is the source not only of the influence of the light of grace, but also of the influence of the natural light.

Article 2

Does a separated soul have intellective understanding of separated substances?

It seems that a separated soul does not have intellective understanding of separated substances:

Objection 1: A soul that is joined to a body is more perfect than a soul separated from a body, since the soul is naturally part of a human nature, and every part is more perfect within its own whole. But as was established above (q. 88, a. 1), a soul conjoined to a body does not have intellective understanding of separated substances. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it does not have such understanding when it has been separated from its body.

Objection 2: If anything is understood, it is understood either through its presence or through a species of it. But separated substances cannot be understood by the soul through their presence, since nothing penetrates the soul except God alone. Nor can they be understood by the soul through any species of them that the soul is able to abstract from an angel, since an angel is more simple than the soul is. Therefore, there is no way in which a separated soul is able to have cognition of separated substances.

Objection 3: Certain philosophers have held that man's ultimate happiness consists in the cognition of separated substances. Therefore, if a separated soul is able to have intellectual understanding of separated substances, it will attain happiness solely by virtue of being separated. But this is absurd.

But contrary to this: Separated souls have cognition of other separated souls. For instance, the rich man in hell sees Lazarus and Abraham, according to Luke 16:23. Therefore, separated souls also see both demons and angels.

I respond: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, "Our mind receives cognition of incorporeal things through itself," i.e., by having cognition of itself, as was explained above (q. 88, a. 1). Therefore, by appeal to the fact that a separated soul has cognition of itself, we are able to grasp the way in which it understands other separated substances.

Now it was explained above (a. 1) that as long as a soul is united to its body, it has intellectual understanding by turning itself toward phantasms. And so it cannot even understand itself except insofar as it comes to be actually engaged in intellectual understanding through a species abstracted from phantasms. For as was explained above (q. 87, a. 1), it is through its own act that it understands itself. However, when it has been separated from its body, it will have intellectual understanding by turning itself not toward phantasms but toward things that are intelligible in their own right, and so it will understand itself through itself.

Now it is common to each separated substance that it understands what lies above it and what lies below it in a mode that corresponds to its own substance. For a thing is understood intellectually insofar as it exists in the one who is engaged in understanding, and something exists in another in accord with the mode of thing that it exists in. Now the mode of a separated soul's substance is lower than an angelic substance's mode, but it is similar to the mode of other separated souls. And so a separated soul has perfect cognition of other separated souls, whereas it has imperfect and deficient cognition of the angels.

Now I am speaking here of the *natural* cognition had by a separated soul; there is a different account of the cognition associated with [the light of] *glory*.

Reply to objection 1: A separated soul is indeed less perfect if one considers the nature that it shares in common with the nature of the body (*natura qua communicat cum natura corporis*). However, a separated soul is nonetheless more free with respect to intellectual understanding, since the soul is kept from a purity of understanding by the burdensomeness of the body and its care for it (*per gravedinem et occupationem corporis*).

Reply to objection 2: A separated soul has intellectual understanding of the angels through divinely impressed likenesses (*per similitudines divinitus impressas*). However, these likenesses fall short of a perfect representation of the angels, because the soul's nature lies below that of an angel.

Reply to objection 3: Man's ultimate happiness does not consist in the cognition of just any separated substances; rather, it consists solely in the cognition of God, who cannot be seen except through grace. However, there is indeed a great, even if not ultimate, happiness in the cognition of other separated substances—if, that is, they are understood perfectly. However, as has been explained, a separated soul does not understand them perfectly by its natural cognition.

Article 3

Does a separated soul have cognition of all natural things?

It seems that a separated soul has cognition of all natural things:

Objection 1: In separated substances there are conceptions (*rationes*) of all natural things. But separated souls have cognition of the separated substances. Therefore, they have cognition of all natural things.

Objection 2: If someone has intellective understanding of something more intelligible, then, *a fortiori*, he can have intellective understanding of something less intelligible. But a separated soul has intellective understanding of the separated substances, which are the greatest among intelligible things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it can have intellective understanding of all natural things, which are less intelligible.

But contrary to this:

1. Natural cognition is more vigorous in the demons than in a separated soul. But the demons do not have cognition of all natural things; instead, as Isidore says, they learn many things by experience over a long period of time. Therefore, neither do separated souls have cognition of all natural things.

2. If as soon as a soul were separated, it had cognition of all natural things, then it would be pointless for men to study diligently in order to gain scientific knowledge of things. But this is absurd. Therefore, it is not the case that a separated soul has cognition of all natural things.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), a separated soul has intellective understanding through species that it receives by the influence of the divine light, just as angels do. However, since the soul's nature lies below the nature of an angel, for whom this mode of cognition is connatural, a separated soul does not acquire perfect cognition of things through species of this sort, but instead receives a cognition that is general and indistinct. Therefore, a separated soul bears the same relation to imperfect and indistinct cognition of natural things through these species that angels bear to perfect cognition of natural things.

Now through species of this sort angels understand all natural things by a perfect cognition, since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, God effects in the angelic understanding whatever He effects in the proper natures of things. Hence, separated souls likewise have a cognition of all things—not a certain and proper cognition, but a general and indistinct cognition.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 55, a. 1 and q. 87, a. 4), an angel has cognition of all natural things through [intelligible] species and not through his own substance. And so from the fact that a soul has some sort of cognition of a separated substance it does not follow that it has cognition of all natural things.

Reply to objection 2: Just as a separated soul does not have a perfect intellective understanding of the separated substances, so neither does it have a perfect intellective understanding of all natural things. Instead, as has been explained, it has a sort of indistinct cognition of natural things.

Reply to argument 1 for the contrary: Isidore is here talking about the cognition of *future* things, which angels and demons and separated souls have cognition of only in their causes or through divine revelation. By contrast, we ourselves are talking about the cognition of *natural* things.

Reply to argument 2 for the contrary: Cognition that is acquired in this life through study is proper and perfect cognition, whereas the cognition in question is indistinct. Hence, it does not follow that an eagerness for learning is pointless.

Article 4

Does a separated soul have cognition of singulars?

It seems that a separated soul does not have cognition of singulars:

Objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (q. 77, a. 8), the only cognitive power that remains in a separated soul is the intellect. But as was established above (q. 86, a. 1), the intellect does not have cognition of singulars. Therefore, a separated soul does not have cognition of singulars.

Objection 2: A cognition by which something is understood as a singular (*in singulari*) is more determinate than a cognition by which something is understood in general (*in universali*). But a separated soul does not have determinate cognition of the species of natural things. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it does not have cognition of singulars.

Objection 3: If a separated soul had cognition of singulars and not through the sensory power, then by parity of reasoning it would have cognition of all singulars. But it does not have cognition of all singulars. Therefore, it does not have cognition of any singulars.

But contrary to this: In Luke 16:27 the rich man situated in hell said, “I have five brothers.”

I respond: Separated souls have cognition of some singulars, but not all of them, not even all of the ones that exist at the present time (*quae sunt praesentia*). To see this clearly, note that there are two modes of intellectual understanding. One mode is through abstraction from phantasms and, in accord with this mode, singulars cannot be understood directly by the intellect; instead, they are understood indirectly, as was explained above (q. 86, a. 1). The second mode of intellectual understanding is through an influx of species from God, and, in accord with this mode, the intellect can have cognition of singulars. For just as in accord with what was explained above (q. 14, aa. 5-8), God Himself has cognition of all things, both universals and singulars, through His essence and insofar as He is a cause of all universal and individual principles, so too, through the species that are certain participated likenesses of the divine essence, separated substances are able to have cognition of singulars.

However, on this score there is a difference between angels and separated souls. For through species of this sort angels have perfect and proper cognition of things, whereas separated souls have indistinct cognition. Hence, because of the efficacy of their intellect angels have, through species of this sort, a perfect and proper cognition not only of the natures of things at the level of a species (*in speciali*) but also of the singulars contained under those species. By contrast, through species of the sort in question separated souls can have cognition only of those singulars on which they are in some way fixed (*ad quae quodammodo determinantur*), viz., either by a previous cognition or by some affective tie (*per aliquam affectionem*) or by a natural relation or by divine ordination. For everything that is received in an entity has determinate conditions (*determinatur*) that correspond to the mode of the recipient.

Reply to objection 1: The intellect does not have cognition of singulars by way of abstraction. But this is not the manner in which a separated soul has intellectual understanding; instead, that manner is the one that has been explained.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, a separated soul’s cognition is fixed on the species of those things that it bears some determinate relation to, or on individuals belonging to those species.

Reply to objection 3: A separated soul is not related in the same way to all singulars; instead, it has a relation to some of them that it does not have to others. And so there is no universally applicable reason (*aequalis ratio*) why a separated soul should have cognition of all singulars.

Article 5

Does a habit of scientific knowledge acquired here remain in a separated soul?

It seems that a habit of scientific knowledge acquired here does not remain in a separated soul:

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 13:8 the Apostle says, “Knowledge shall be destroyed.”

Objection 2: In this world some less virtuous men (*quidam minus boni*) abound in scientific knowledge, while other more virtuous men lack scientific knowledge. Therefore, if a habit of scientific knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some less virtuous men would be more competent (*potiores*) in the future state than some more virtuous men. But this seems absurd.

Objection 3: Separated souls will have scientific knowledge because of the influx of the divine light. Therefore, if scientific knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul, it follows that two forms of the same species will exist in the same subject. But this is impossible.

Objection 4: In the *Categories* the Philosopher says that a habit is a quality that is difficult to change, whereas scientific knowledge is sometimes corrupted by illness or something else of this sort. But no change in this life is as powerful as the change effected by death. Therefore, it seems that a habit of knowledge is corrupted by death.

But contrary to this: In his letter to Paulinus Jerome says, “Let us learn on earth things such that the knowledge of them will survive for us in heaven.”

I respond: Some have claimed that (a) a habit of scientific knowledge exists not in the intellect itself but in the sentient powers—more specifically, in the power of imagining, in the cogitative power, and in the power of remembering—and that (b) intelligible species are not conserved in the passive intellect. And if this opinion were true, then it would follow that once the body is destroyed, any habit of scientific knowledge acquired here would be totally destroyed.

However, since scientific knowledge exists in the intellect, which, as *De Anima* 3 says, is “the locus of species,” a habit of scientific knowledge acquired here exists partly in the aforementioned sentient powers and partly in the intellect itself. This can be thought about by appeal to the very acts by which a habit of scientific knowledge is acquired, since, as *Ethics* 2 says, “habits are similar to the acts by which they are acquired.” Now the acts of the intellect by which scientific knowledge is acquired in the present life involve the intellect’s turning itself toward phantasms, which exist in the aforementioned sentient powers. Hence, through such acts the passive intellect itself acquires a certain capacity (*facultas*) for thinking by means of the species it has received, and the aforementioned lower powers acquire a certain aptitude (*habilitas*) such that the intellect, by turning toward them, is more easily able to think about intelligible things. But just as an act of the intellect principally and formally exists in the intellect itself, whereas it exists materially and dispositively in the lower powers, so too the same thing must be said about the corresponding habit.

Therefore, as regards what someone has of present scientific knowledge in the lower powers, this will not remain in a separated soul; on the other hand, what he has in the intellect itself must remain. For as *De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae* says, there are two ways in which a form is corrupted, viz., (a) *per se*, when it is corrupted by its contrary, e.g., hot by cold, and (b) *per accidens*, viz., through the corruption of its subject. Now it is clear that the scientific knowledge that exists in a human intellect cannot be corrupted through the corruption of its subject; for as was shown above (q. 79, a. 2), the intellect is incorruptible. Similarly, neither can the intelligible species that exist in the passive intellect be corrupted by a contrary; for there is no contrary to an intelligible intention, especially with respect to the simple understanding by which one understands a thing’s ‘what-ness’ (*praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est*). On the other hand, as regards the operation by which the intellect composes and divides, or even as regards the operation by which it reasons discursively, contrariety is found in the intellect in the sense that falsity in a proposition or argument is contrary to truth. And in this sense scientific knowledge is sometimes corrupted by a contrary, viz., when someone is drawn away from knowledge of the truth by false argumentation. And so the Philosopher, in the book already cited, claims that there are two ways in which scientific knowledge is corrupted *per se*, viz., through forgetfulness on the part of the memory and through deception by false argumentation. But

these have no relevance in the case of a separated soul.

Hence, one should reply that to the extent that a habit of scientific knowledge exists in the intellect, it remains in a separated soul.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage the Apostle is speaking not about scientific knowledge as a habit, but about the act of cognition. Hence, he adds by way of proof: “Now I know in part ...”

Reply to objection 2: Just as someone who is less virtuous will be greater in bodily stature than someone who is more virtuous, so too nothing prevents someone who is less virtuous from having in the future a habit of scientific knowledge that someone more virtuous does not have. But this is of no importance in comparison with the other prerogatives that more virtuous men will have.

Reply to objection 3: The two types of knowledge do not have the same nature. Hence, nothing absurd follows.

Reply to objection 4: This argument goes through in the case of the corruption of scientific knowledge as regards that part of it that belongs to the sentient powers.

Article 6

Does an act of scientific knowledge acquired here remain in a separated soul?

It seems that an act of scientific knowledge acquired here does not remain in a separated soul:

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 1 the Philosopher says that when the body is corrupted, the soul “neither remembers nor loves.” But to remember is to think about things that one previously knew. Therefore, a separated soul cannot have an act of the scientific knowledge which it acquired here.

Objection 2: Intelligible species will not be more powerful in a separated soul than they are in a soul united to a body. But as was established above (q. 84, a. 7), we are at present able to have an act of intellectual understanding through intelligible species only by turning ourselves toward phantasms. Therefore, a separated soul will not be able to do this. And so there is no way in which a separated soul will be able to have an act of intellectual understanding through intelligible species acquired here.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “Habits give rise to acts that are similar to the acts through which they are acquired.” But a habit of scientific knowledge is acquired here through acts of an intellect that is turning itself toward phantasms; therefore, this habit cannot give rise to other sorts of acts (*alios actus reddere*). But acts of the sort in question do not belong to a separated soul. Therefore, a separated soul will not have any acts of the scientific knowledge that has been acquired here.

But contrary to this: In Luke 16:25 the following is said to the rich man who is in hell: “Remember that you received good things in your life.”

I respond: There are two things to consider in an act, viz., the species of the act and its mode. The species of an act is thought of by reference to the object which the act of the cognitive power is directed toward through the [intelligible or sensible] species that is a likeness of the object, whereas the mode is thought of by reference to the agent’s power. For instance, the fact that someone sees a rock depends on the species of a rock that exists in the eye, but the fact that he sees it in a sharp-sighted way (*acute*) depends on the eye’s visual power.

Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 5), the intelligible species remain in a separated soul despite the fact that a separated soul’s status is not the same as it is at present, it follows that a separated soul is able to understand what it previously understood through the intelligible species acquired here. However, it does not understand them in the same mode, viz., through turning toward phantasms. Instead, it understands them in a mode appropriate to a separated soul. And so an act of scientific

knowledge acquired here remains in a separated soul, but not with the same mode.

Reply to objection 1: The Philosopher is talking about memory (*reminiscentia*) insofar as memory (*memoria*) pertains to the sentient part of the soul, but not insofar as memory exists in a certain way in the intellect, as was explained above (q. 79, a. 6).

Reply to objection 2: Different modes of intellective understanding stem from the different states of the soul that is engaged in understanding and not from different levels of power (*ex diversa virtute*) on the part of the [intelligible] species.

Reply to objection 3: It is with respect to the species of the acts, but not with respect to the mode of acting, that the acts through which a habit is acquired are similar to the acts which the habit causes. For instance, performing just deeds without performing them justly, i.e., with delight, causes a habit of political justice, through which one operates with delight.

Article 7

Does spatial distance impede a separated soul's cognition?

It seems that spatial distance (*distantia localis*) impedes a separated soul's cognition:

Objection 1: In *De Cura pro Mortuis Agenda* Augustine says, "The souls of the dead are in a place where they cannot know what is happening here." But they do know what is happening among themselves. Therefore, spatial distance impedes a separated soul's cognition.

Objection 2: In *De Divinatione Daemonum* Augustine says, "Because of their swift motion, the demons report certain things that are unknown to us." But agility of movement would not matter if spatial distance did not impede the demons' cognition. Therefore, *a fortiori*, spatial distance impedes the cognition of a separated soul, which is inferior in nature to a demon.

Objection 3: In the same way that someone is distant with respect to place, so too he can be distant with respect to time. But temporal distance impedes a separated soul's cognition, since a separated soul does not have cognition of future things. Therefore, it seems that distance with respect to place likewise impedes a separated soul's cognition.

But contrary to this: Luke 16:23 says, "When the rich man was in torment, he raised his eyes and saw Abraham in the distance." Therefore, spatial distance does not impede a separated soul's cognition.

I respond: Some have claimed that a separated soul has cognition of singulars by abstracting from sensible things. If this were true, then one could claim that spatial distance impedes a separated soul's cognition. For it would be required either that sensible things act on a separated soul or that a separated soul acts on sensible things—and in either case determinate distances would be required.

But the position just described is impossible, since the abstraction of species from sensible things is effected by means of the senses and other sentient powers, which do not remain as actualities in a separated soul.

Now a separated soul has intellective understanding of singulars through an influx of species from the divine light, and this light is related in the same way to what is distant as to what is close by. Hence, spatial distance does not in any way impede a separated soul's cognition.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is not claiming that the reason why the souls of the dead cannot see things *here* is that they are *there*, as if he believed spatial distance to be the cause of this ignorance. Rather, the ignorance can be due to something else, as will be explained below (a. 8).

Reply to objection 2: Augustine is here speaking in accord with the opinion by which some had claimed that demons have bodies naturally united to them. According to this position, they can even

have sentient powers whose cognition requires determinate distances. Augustine also touches on this position explicitly in the same book, even though he seems to touch on it by reciting it rather than by asserting it. This is clear from what he says in *De Civitate Dei* 21.

Reply to objection 3: Future things, which are distant with respect to time, are not actual entities (*entia in actu*). Hence, they are unknowable in themselves, since something lacks knowability in the same way that it lacks being (*entitas*). But things that are distant with respect to place are actual entities and knowable in their own right. Hence, the argument from spatial distance is distinct from the argument from temporal distance.

Article 8

Do separated souls have cognition of what is happening here?

It seems that separated souls have cognition of what is happening here:

Objection 1: If they did not have cognition of these things, then they would not care about them. But they do care about what is happening here—this according to Luke 16:28 (“I have five brothers ... so that he might give witness to them, lest they, too, come into this place of torment”). Therefore, separated souls have cognition of what is happening here.

Objection 2: The dead frequently appear to the living, whether asleep or awake, and warn them about what is happening here—in the way that Samuel appeared to Saul, as 1 Kings 28:11 reports. But this would not be the case if they had no cognition of what is happening here. Therefore, they have cognition of what is happening here.

Objection 3: Separated souls have cognition of what is happening around them. Therefore, if they did not have cognition of what is happening among us, then it would be the case that their cognition is impeded by spatial distance. But this was denied above (a. 7).

But contrary to this: Job 14:21 says, “He will not know whether his children turn out noble or ignoble.”

I respond: As regards natural cognition, which is what we are now talking about, the souls of the dead do not know what is happening here. The reason for this can be gathered from what has already been said (a. 4). For a separated soul has cognition of singulars by being in some sense directed toward them (*determinata ad illa*), either through a vestige of some previous cognition or affective tie, or else through divine ordination. Now it is both because of divine ordination and because of their mode of being that the souls of the dead are segregated off from fellowship with the living and joined in fellowship with spiritual substances that are separate from bodies. Hence, they are ignorant of what is happening among us. In *Moralia* 12 Gregory gives this explanation: “The dead do not know how life after them in the flesh is going among the living. For the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh, and just as the corporeal and the incorporeal are diverse in genus, so too they are distinct in cognition.” Augustine seems to touch on this, too, in *De Cura pro Mortuis Agenda*, where he says, “The souls of the dead are not involved (*non intersunt*) in the affairs of the living.”

However, there seems to be a disagreement between Gregory and Augustine as far as the souls of the blessed in heaven are concerned.

For in the same place Gregory adds, “Yet do not think the same way about the saintly souls, for since they see interiorly the clarity of almighty God, it is impossible to believe that there is anything exterior that they do not know.”

By contrast, in *De Cura pro Mortuis Agenda* Augustine explicitly says, “The dead, even the saints,

do not know what the living are doing, even their own children”—as we have it in a Gloss on Isaiah 63:16 (“Abraham has not known us ...”). Augustine confirms this claim by appeal to the fact that he was not visited by his mother or consoled by her in his sorrows, as he was when she was alive, and it is unlikely that she is less kind in her happier life. He also confirms it by the fact that the Lord promised king Josiah that he would die first, lest he see the evils that were going to befall his people (4 Kings 22:20). However, Augustine says this with hesitation; that is why he prefaces his remarks by saying, “Let each one take as he wishes what I am about to say.”

Gregory, on the other hand, speaks with confidence (*assertive*), as is evident from the fact that he says, “It is impossible to believe ...” But according to Gregory’s opinion, it seems that the souls of the saints, seeing God, have cognition of all present things that are happening here. For these souls are equal to the angels, of whom even Augustine asserts that they are not ignorant of what is happening among the living. But because the souls of the saints are most perfectly joined to God’s justice, they do not grieve; nor do they enter into the affairs of the living, except insofar as the order of divine justice requires it.

Reply to objection 1: The souls of the dead can care about the affairs of the living, even if they do not know their condition—just as we ourselves exercise care for the dead by offering suffrages for them, even though we do not know their condition.

It is also possible for the souls of the dead to have cognition of the deeds of the living not on their own, but through the souls of those who join them from here, or through the angels or demons, or even when God’s Spirit reveals these things to them, as Augustine says in the same book.

Reply to objection 2: When the dead appear in some way to the living, either (a) this happens because of God’s specially arranging for the souls of the dead to enter into the affairs of the living, in which case it is counted among God’s miracles, or (b) apparitions of this sort are effected by the actions of good or bad angels, even when the dead do not know about it—just as the living likewise, without knowing it, appear in the dreams of others of the living, as Augustine says in the aforementioned book.

Hence, one can say of Samuel that he appeared through a divine revelation—this according to Ecclesiasticus 46:23 (“He slept, and he made known to the king ... the end of his life”). Or else, if one does not accept the authority of Ecclesiasticus because it was not counted by the Hebrews among the canonical writings, one can claim that the apparition was arranged by demons.

Reply to objection 3: This sort of ignorance occurs for the reasons explained above and not because of spatial distance.

QUESTION 90

The Initial Production of Man with respect to His Soul

After what has gone before, we have to consider the initial production of man. And on this topic there are four things to consider: first, the production of man himself (questions 90-93); second, the goal of this production (question 93); third, the status and condition of man as he was first produced (questions 94-101); fourth, his location (question 102).

As far as the production is concerned, there are three topics to consider: first, the production of man with respect to his soul (question 90); second, the production of man with respect to the male body (question 91); third, the production of the woman.

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is the human soul something made, or is it part of God's substance? (2) Assuming that it is made, is it created? (3) Is the soul produced by the mediation of angels? (4) Was the soul produced before the body?

Article 1

Is a [human] soul made, or is it part of God's substance?

It seems that a [human] soul is not made, but is instead part of God's substance (*sit de substantia Dei*):

Objection 1: Genesis 2 says: "The Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul." But when one breathes, he emits something from himself. Therefore, the soul by which man lives is part of God's substance.

Objection 2: As was established above (q. 75, a. 5), a [human] soul is a simple form. But a form is an actuality. Therefore, a soul is a pure actuality—a feature that belongs to God alone. Therefore, a soul is part of God's substance.

Objection 3: If things exist and do not differ from one another in any way, then they are the same. But God and a [human] mind exist, and they do not differ from one another in any way—since they would have to differ from one another in virtue of certain differences, and if that were so, they would be composite. Therefore, God and a human mind are the same.

But contrary to this: In *De Origine Animae* Augustine enumerates certain positions that he takes to be "exceedingly and openly perverse and opposed to the Catholic Faith," the first among which is the claim, asserted by some, that "God made the soul from Himself and not from nothing."

I respond: There is an obvious implausibility in the claim that a [human] soul is part of God's substance. For as is clear from what has been said (q. 77, a. 2 and q. 79, a. 2 and q. 84, a. 6), the human soul (a) sometimes has intellectual understanding [only] in potentiality, (b) in some sense acquires scientific knowledge from the things themselves, and (c) has diverse powers—all of which are foreign to the nature of God, who, as was proved above (q. 3), (a) is pure actuality, (b) acquires nothing from another, and (c) has no differentiation within Himself.

Now the error in question seems to have originated in two positions held by the ancients.

Those who first began to consider the natures of things were unable to transcend the imagination and so claimed that there is nothing beyond bodies. So they claimed that God is a certain body that they judged to be the source of other bodies. And since, as *De Anima* 1 reports, they claimed that the soul is part of the nature of that body said to be the source, it followed as a result that the soul is part of the nature of God. Verging on this position, the Manicheans, who took God to be a certain sort of corporeal light, claimed that the soul is a part of this light that is tied down to a body.

Second, things progressed to the point that certain thinkers apprehended that something incorporeal

exists—not something separated from a body, but something that is the form of a body. Hence, as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 7, Varro claimed that God is a soul that governs the world by motion and reason. Accordingly, there were some who claimed that a man’s soul is a part of this whole soul in the same way that a man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to reach the point intellectually of distinguishing the different grades of spiritual substances except by reference to the distinctions among bodies.

But as was proved above (q. 3), all these claims are impossible. Hence, it is manifestly false that a [human] soul is a part of God’s substance.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Breathe’ should not be taken in a corporeal sense here. Instead, God’s ‘breathing’ is the same as His making a spirit—though it is true in any case that in breathing corporeally a man emits something extraneous to himself and not something of his own substance.

Reply to objection 2: Even though a [human] soul is a simple form in its essence, it is not its own *esse*; instead, it is a being by participation, as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 5). And so, unlike God, a human soul is not pure actuality.

Reply to objection 3: Things that *differ* in the proper sense differ *in* something (*differt aliquo*); this is why a difference is sought in cases where there is agreement. Because of this, things that differ from one another must be composite in some sense, since they differ in something and agree in something.

Given this, as *Metaphysics* 10 points out, even if it is the case that all things that *differ* from one another are *diverse*, it is nonetheless not the case that all things that are *diverse* also *differ* from one another (*licet omne differens est diversum, non tamen omne diversum est differens*). For simple things are diverse in their own right (*seipsis*), but they do not differ by any differences out of which they might be composed. For instance, a man and a donkey differ by the differences *rational* and *non-rational*, but one cannot say of these differences themselves that they differ from one another by still other differences.

Article 2

Is a [human] soul brought into being through creation?

It seems that a [human] soul is not brought into being (*producta in esse*) through creation:

Objection 1: That which has something material within itself is made from matter. But a soul has something material within itself, since it is not pure actuality. Therefore, a soul is made from matter. Therefore, it is not created.

Objection 2: Every actuality that belongs to some matter seems to be brought forth from the matter’s potentiality (*educi de potentia materiae*); for since matter is in potentiality with respect to actuality, every actuality preexists in potentiality within the matter. But a soul is the actuality of corporeal matter, as is clear from the definition of a soul. Therefore, a soul is brought forth from the potentiality of matter.

Objection 3: A soul is a certain form. Therefore, if a soul is made through creation, then by parity of reasoning all other forms are likewise made through creation. And so no form will come into being through generation—which is absurd.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:27 says, “God created man in His own image.” But man is “in God’s image” because of the soul. Therefore, the soul came into being through creation.

I respond: A rational soul can be made only through creation—something that is not true of other

forms. The reason for this is that since being-made (*fieri*) is a path to *esse*, being-made belongs to a given thing in the same way that *esse* belongs to it.

Now what is properly said to exist is that which itself has *esse* in the sense of subsisting in its own *esse* (*quasi in suo esse subsistens*); hence, it is only substances that are properly and truly called beings (*entia*). By contrast, an accident does not have *esse*, but is that *by which* something is such-and-such (*eo aliquid est*). This is the sense in which it is called a being (*ens*); for instance, a whiteness is called a being because by it something is white (*quia ea aliquid est album*). It is for this reason that *Metaphysics* 7 says that an accident “is said to be ‘of-a-being’ (*entis*) rather than ‘a being’ (*ens*).” Moreover, the same line of reasoning holds for every other non-subsistent form. And so being-made does not properly belong to any non-subsistent form; instead, such forms are said to be made by virtue of the fact that subsistent composites are made.

By contrast, as was shown above (q. 75, a. 2), a rational soul is a subsistent form. Hence, both being-made and *esse* belong to it properly speaking. And since a soul cannot be made from preexistent matter—either corporeal matter, since in that case it would have a corporeal nature, or spiritual matter, since in that case spiritual substances would be transformed into one another—one must claim that a soul can be made only through creation.

Reply to objection 1: In a soul the simple essence itself is akin to the material aspect (*sicut materiale*), whereas the formal aspect in it (*formale in ipsa*) is the participated *esse*, which is necessarily simultaneous with the essence of the soul, since *esse* follows *per se* upon form.

The same line of reasoning would hold if one claimed—as some do—that [a human soul] is composed of spiritual matter. For like celestial matter, spiritual matter is not in potentiality with respect to any other [substantial] form; otherwise, a soul would be corruptible.

Hence, there is no way in which a [human] soul can be made from preexisting matter.

Reply to objection 2: For an actuality to be drawn from the potentiality of matter (*actum extrahi de potentia materiae*) is nothing other than for something that previously existed in potentiality to be brought into actuality (*aliquid fieri actu quod prius erat in potentia*). However, since a rational soul has subsistent *esse* and not *esse* that depends on corporeal matter, and since, as was explained above (q. 75, a. 2), a rational soul exceeds the capability of corporeal matter, it follows that it is not brought forth from the potentiality of matter.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, there is no parallel between a rational soul and other forms.

Article 3

Is a rational soul produced directly by God, or is it produced through the mediation of angels?

It seems that a rational soul is not produced directly (*immediate*) by God, but is instead produced through the mediation of angels (*mediantibus angelis*):

Objection 1: There is more order among spiritual things than among corporeal things. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, lower bodies are produced through higher bodies. Therefore, lower spirits, i.e., rational souls, are likewise produced through higher spirits, i.e., angels.

Objection 2: The end of things corresponds to their source; for instance, God is both the source and the end of things. Therefore, it is also the case that a thing’s issuing forth from its source (*exitus a principio*) corresponds to its being brought back to its end (*reductio in finem*). But as Dionysius says,

“the lowest things are brought back to their end through the first things.” Therefore, the lowest things likewise proceed into *esse* through the first things; more specifically, souls proceed into being (*procedunt in esse*) through angels.

Objection 3: As *Meteorologia* 4 says, “The perfect is that which can make what is similar to itself.” But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal substances are. Therefore, since bodies make things that are similar in species to themselves, *a fortiori* angels will be able to make something that is lower than they are in its natural species (*secundum speciem naturae*), viz., a rational soul.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:7 says that God Himself “breathed into man’s face the breath of life.”

I respond: Some have claimed that angels, acting in the power of God, cause rational souls. But this opinion is altogether impossible and alien to the Faith.

For it has been shown (a. 2) that a rational soul can be produced only through creation. But God alone is able to create. For it belongs to the first agent alone to act without presupposing anything, since, as was established above (q. 65, a. 3), a secondary agent always presupposes something that comes from the first agent. But if an agent effects something out of what is presupposed (*quod agit aliquid ex aliquo praesupposito*), then it acts by transforming (*transmutando*). And so every other agent acts only by transforming, whereas God acts by creating. And since a rational soul cannot be produced by the transformation of any matter, it follows that it cannot be produced except directly by God.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said. For the fact that bodies cause what is similar to themselves or what is lower than themselves, and the fact that lower beings are brought back [to their end] through higher beings—all of this occurs through one or another sort of transformation.

Article 4

Was the human soul produced before the human body?

It seems that the human soul was produced before the human body:

Objection 1: As was established above (q. 66, a. 1 and q. 70, a. 1), the work of creation preceded the work of division and the work of adornment. But the soul was brought into being (*producta in esse*) through creation, whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore, the soul of man was produced before the body.

Objection 2: A rational soul shares more in common (*magis convenit*) with angels than with brute animals. But angels were created either before bodies or right at the beginning along with corporeal matter, whereas the human body was formed on the sixth day, after the brute animals had already been produced. Therefore, the human soul was created before the human body.

Objection 3: The end is proportionate to the beginning. But the soul remains in the end after the body. Therefore, it was likewise created at the beginning before the body.

But contrary to this: A proper actuality is effected in a proper potentiality. Therefore, since the soul is the proper actuality of the body, the soul was produced in the body (*anima producta est in corpore*).

I respond: Origen claimed that not only the first man’s soul, but the souls of all men, were created along with the angels before bodies—and he made this claim because he believed that all spiritual substances, both souls and angels, were equal in the status of their natures and unequal only in merit

(*solum merito distare*). The result is that some of these spiritual substances were tied to bodies—these are the souls of men and the souls of the celestial bodies—whereas others remained in their purity, divided into diverse orders (*secundum diversos ordines*).

We have already replied to this opinion above (q. 47, a. 2), and so we will leave it aside at present.

However, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 7 Augustine has a different reason for claiming that the soul of the first man was created along with the angels and before the body, viz., because he holds that (a) in the work of the six days man's body was produced only with respect to its causal principles (*solum secundum causales rationes*) and not in actuality, whereas (b) this cannot be said of the soul, because the soul was not made from any preexisting matter, whether corporeal or spiritual, and because the soul could not have been produced by any created power. And so it seems that (a) the soul itself was created along with the angels during the work of the six days, when all things were made, and that (b) afterwards it was directed by its own will to be in charge of a body (*propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad corpus adminstrandum*).

However, Augustine does not make these claims by way of assertion, as his words demonstrate. For he says, "As long as no Scriptural passage or sound argument contradicts it, it is permissible to believe that man was made on the sixth day in the sense that the causal principle of the human body was created in the elements of the world, whereas the soul itself had already been created."

Now this view could indeed be tolerated according to those who claim that the soul has a complete species and nature in its own right (*per se*) and is united to the body not as its form, but only in order to be in charge of the body. However, if the soul is united to the body as its form and is naturally a part of a human nature, then this view is altogether impossible. For it is clear that God instituted the first things in a state of natural perfection (*in perfecto statu suae naturae*), in the way required by the species of each thing. But since a soul is part of a human nature, it does not have its natural perfection except insofar as it is united to a body. Hence, it would not have been appropriate for the soul to be created without a body.

Therefore, in order to sustain Augustine's opinion about the work of the six days (cf. q. 74, a. 2), one could claim that (a) in the work of the six days the human soul came beforehand (*praecessit*) by way of a certain likeness of genus, in the sense that it agrees with the angels in being an intellectual nature, but that (b) it itself was created simultaneously with the body. By contrast, according to the other saints, both the soul and the body of the first man were produced during the work of the six days.

Reply to objection 1: If the soul's nature had a complete species, so that it might be created in its own right (*secundum se*), then the argument that the soul was created by itself (*per se*) at the beginning would go through. However, since the soul is naturally the form of a body, it must not have been created separately (*non fuit seorsum creanda*), but instead it had to be created in a body.

Reply to objection 2: The reply to the second objection is similar. If a soul had a species in its own right (*per se*), it would share more in common with the angels. However, because a soul is the form of a body, it belongs, as a formal principle, to the genus *animal*.

Reply to objection 3: The fact that a soul remains after its body stems from a defect of the body, i.e., death. This defect was not supposed to exist at the beginning of the soul's creation (cf. q. 97, a. 1).

QUESTION 91

The Production of the First Man's Body

The next thing we have to consider is the production of the first man's body. On this topic there are four questions: (1) What was the matter from which it was produced? (2) Which agent was it produced by? (3) What sort of constitution (*dispositio*) was given it through its production? (4) What was the manner and order of its production?

Article 1

Was the first man's body made from the slime of the earth?

It seems that the first man's body was not made from the slime of the earth (*de limo terrae*):

Objection 1: It takes more power to make something from nothing (*ex nihilo*) than to make it from something, since non-being (*non ens*) is more distant from actuality than is being-in-potentiality (*ens in potentia*). But since man is the most dignified of the lower creatures (*dignissima creaturarum inferiorum*), it was fitting that God's power should be manifested to the highest degree in the production of man's body. Therefore, it ought to be the case that man's body was made from nothing and not from the slime of the earth.

Objection 2: Celestial bodies are more noble than earthly bodies are. But the human body has the greatest nobility, since it is perfected by the most noble form, viz., the rational soul. Therefore, it ought to be the case that it was made from a celestial body rather than from an earthly body.

Objection 3: As is clear from their subtlety, fire and air are more noble bodies than earth and water. Therefore, since the human body is the most dignified of all bodies, it ought to be the case that it was made from fire and air rather than from the slime of the earth.

Objection 4: The human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore, it was made from all the elements and not from the slime of the earth.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:7 says, "God formed man from the slime of the earth."

I respond: Since God is perfect, He has given to His works a perfection corresponding to their mode [of being]—this according to Deuteronomy 32:4 ("God's works are perfect"). Now He Himself is perfect absolutely speaking because He contains all things within Himself antecedently—not in the mode of composition, but "in a simple and unified way (*simpliciter et unite*)," as Dionysius puts it, in the manner in which diverse effects preexist in a cause in accord with its unified essence (*secundum unam eius essentiam*).

Now this perfection flows into the angels insofar as all the things produced by God in nature fall within their cognition through diverse [intelligible] forms. By contrast, perfection of this sort flows into man in a lower-level way (*inferiori modo*). For man does not have within his natural cognition a knowledge of all natural things. Instead, he is in a certain sense *composed of* all things. For (a) he has within himself a rational soul from the genus of spiritual substances, and (b) he is, by way of likeness to the celestial bodies, far removed from contraries because of the exceptional balance of his constitution (*habet elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis*), whereas (c) he has the elements with respect to his substance. However, he has the elements in such a way that the higher elements, viz., fire and air, dominate in him with respect to their *power* (since life consists principally in heat, which comes from fire, and in moistness, which comes from air), whereas the lower elements are abundant in him with respect to their *substance*. For a balanced mixture would not be possible if the lower elements, which have less power, were not quantitatively more abundant in man; and the reason why man's body is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth is that slime is earth mixed with

water. And because all the creatures of the world are in some sense found in him, man is called a ‘miniature world’ (*minor mundus*).

Reply to objection 1: God’s creative power is manifested in man’s body because its matter was produced through creation.

Now the human body had to be made from the matter of the four elements in order that man might share something in common with the lower bodies (*haberet convenientiam cum inferioribus corporibus*), constituting, as it were, a certain middle ground between spiritual substances and corporeal substances.

Reply to objection 2: Even though a celestial body is, absolutely speaking, more noble than an earthly body, nonetheless, a celestial body shares less in common with the activity of the rational soul. For the rational soul takes its knowledge of truth in a certain way from the sensory powers, whose organs cannot be formed from a celestial body, because a celestial body cannot be acted upon (*cum sit impassibile*).

Nor is it true that a bit of the fifth essence (*aliquid de quinta essentia*) enters materially into the composition of the human body; this claim is made by some who hold that the soul is united to the body by the mediation of a certain sort of light (cf. q. 76, a. 7).

First of all, their claim that light is a body is false (cf. q. 67, a. 2).

Second, it is impossible for any part of the fifth essence to be divided off from a celestial body or to be mixed in with the elements—and this because of the celestial body’s impassibility. Hence, a celestial body can enter into the composition of mixed bodies only through the effect of its power.

Reply to objection 3: If fire and air, which are more powerful in their action, also abounded quantitatively in the composition of the human body, then they would completely draw the other elements to themselves, and it would be impossible to fashion the balanced mixture that man’s composition needs in order to have a good sense of touch, which is the foundation for the other senses. For the organ associated with each sense must have only in potentiality—and not in actuality—the contraries which are perceived by that sense. This must be so either in such a way that (a) the organ lacks the whole genus of relevant contraries, in the way that the pupil lacks color, so that it might be in potentiality with respect to all colors—something not possible in the case of the organ of touch, since it is composed of the elements, whose qualities the sense of touch perceives—or in such a way that (b) the organ is midway between the contraries, as is necessary in the case of the sense of touch. For the middle is in some sense in potentiality with respect to both extremes.

Reply to objection 4: The slime of the earth contains both earth and also water cementing the parts of earth together. Scripture does not make mention of the other [two] elements, both because (a) they are quantitatively less abundant in man’s body, as has been explained, and also because (b) in the whole account of the production of things Scripture, which was handed down to an uneducated people, does not make mention of fire and air, which uneducated people do not perceive with their sensory power.

Article 2

Was the human body produced directly by God?

It seems that the human body was not produced directly by God (*non sit immediate a Deo*):

Objection 1: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that God takes care of corporeal things through the angelic creature. But, as has been explained (a. 1), the human body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore, it ought to be the case that it was produced by the mediation of angels and not directly by

God.

Objection 2: It is unnecessary for anything that can be effected by a created power to be produced directly by God. But the human body can be produced through the created power of a celestial body; for instance, certain animals are generated by putrefaction through the active power of a celestial body, and Albumasar says that men are generated only in places with temperate climates (*in locis temperatis tantum*) and not in places where heat or cold is excessive. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the human body to be formed directly by God.

Objection 3: Nothing is made from corporeal matter except through matter's being transformed (*per aliquam materiae transmutationem*). But every corporeal transformation has as a cause that movement of a celestial body that is the first of the movements. Therefore, since the human body is produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a celestial body contributed something to the human body's being formed.

Objection 4: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says that man's body was made during the work of the six days in the sense that God placed certain causal principles within corporeal creation (*secundum causales rationes quas Deus inseruit creaturae coporali*), whereas later on man's body was formed in actuality. But that which preexists by means of its causal principles in corporeal creation can be produced through a corporeal power. Therefore, the human body was produced by some created power and not directly by God.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 17:1 says, "God created man out of the earth."

I respond: The first formation of the human body could not have occurred through any created power, but was instead directly from God.

To be sure, some have claimed that the forms existing in corporeal matter are derived from certain immaterial forms. But as has already been explained (q. 63, a. 4), the Philosopher fends off this position in *Metaphysics* 7 by appeal to the fact that it is composite things, and not forms, that are made *per se*. And since an agent is similar to what it makes, it is not fitting that a pure form, which exists without matter, should produce a form which exists in matter and which is made only in virtue of the fact that the relevant composite is made. And so it has to be the case that the cause of a form that exists in matter is itself a form that exists in matter; for what is composite is generated from what is composite.

On the other hand, even though God is altogether immaterial, it is He alone who through His power can produce matter by creating it. Hence, it belongs to Him alone to produce a form in matter without the assistance of a preexisting material form. For this reason, angels cannot transform bodies with respect to any form unless they are aided by certain 'seeds', as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 3.

Therefore, since the human body—by the power of which another similar in species might be formed by way of generation—had never previously been formed, it was necessary for the first human body to be formed directly by God.

Reply to objection 1: Even if angels provide some sort of ministry to God in what He does with respect to bodies, it is nonetheless the case that God does certain things among corporeal creatures that angels cannot in any way do—e.g., bringing back the dead and giving sight to the blind. It was likewise this sort of power by which He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth.

Still, it could have happened that angels provided some sort of ministry in the formation of the body of the first man—like the ministry they will provide at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.

Reply to objection 2: Perfect animals, which are generated from semen, cannot be generated solely through the power of a celestial body in the way that Avicenna imagines—this, despite the fact that the power of a celestial body does cooperate in the natural generation of perfect animals, in keeping with the Philosopher's claim in *Physics* 2 that "a man and the sun generate a man from matter." This is why a place with a temperate climate is required for the generation of men and other perfect animals.

However, the power of celestial bodies is indeed sufficient for generating certain imperfect animals from properly disposed matter, since it is clear that more is required for the production of a perfect entity than for the production of an imperfect entity.

Reply to objection 3: The movement of the heavens is a cause of natural transformations, but not of transformations that are effected outside the order of nature (*praeter naturae ordinem*) and by God's power alone, e.g., raising the dead and giving sight to the blind. It is these transformations that are similar to a man's being formed from the slime of the earth.

Reply to objection 4: There are two ways in which, among creatures, something is said to preexist through its causal principles.

In the first way it preexists in virtue of both an active and a passive power; that is, the thing preexists not only in the sense that it can be made out of preexisting matter, but also in the sense that there is some preexisting creature that is able to make it.

In the second way it preexists in virtue of a passive power alone, i.e., in the sense that it can be made by God from preexisting matter. It is in this sense that, according to Augustine, the human body preexisted through causal principles in the works that were produced.

Article 3

Is the human body appropriately constituted?

It seems that the human body is not appropriately constituted (*non habuerit convenientem dispositionem*):

Objection 1: Since man is the most noble of the animals, the human body should be optimally constituted for doing what is proper to animals, viz., sensing and moving about. But some animals have a more acute sensory power than man, and some have swifter movement; for instance, dogs have a better sense of smell than man, and birds move more swiftly. Therefore, man's body is not appropriately constituted.

Objection 2: The perfect is that which is lacking in nothing. But the human body lacks more things than do the bodies of other animals, which have hides and natural weapons for their protection—something that man lacks. Therefore, the human body is very imperfectly constituted.

Objection 3: Man is more distant from the plants than from the brute animals. But plants have an upright stature, whereas brute animals are on all fours. Therefore, it ought not to have been the case that man has an upright stature.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiastes 7:30 says, "God made man upright."

I respond: All natural things have been produced by God's craftsmanship (*ab arte divina*), and so they are in a certain sense the artifacts of God Himself (*sunt quodammodo artificata ipsius Dei*). Now every craftsman intends to give the best constitution to his work—not the best constitution absolutely speaking, but the best constitution relative to its end. And if such a constitution has some defect associated with it, the craftsman does not care. For instance, a craftsman who makes a saw for cutting makes it out of iron in order that it might be fit for cutting, and he does not care to make it out of glass, which is a more beautiful material, since such beauty would pose an obstacle to its end.

So, then, God gave the best constitution to each natural thing—not, to be sure, the best constitution absolutely speaking, but rather the best constitution relative to its being ordered toward its proper end. As the Philosopher puts it in *Physics* 2, "... because it is more worthy—not absolutely speaking, but relative to the substance of each one."

Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations, since matter is for the sake of form and instruments are for the sake of the agent's actions. Therefore, I claim that God made (*instituit*) the human body with the best constitution as far as appropriateness for this sort of form and its operations is concerned. And if there seems to be any defect in the constitution of the human body, notice that such a defect follows by material necessity from what is required in the body in order for it have a due proportion to the soul and to the soul's operations.

Reply to objection 1: The sense of touch, which is the basis for the other sensory powers, is more perfect in man than in any other animal, and for this reason it was necessary for man to have the most balanced physical constitution (*haberet temperatissimam complexionem*) of all the animals. Moreover, as is clear from what was said above (q. 78, a. 4), man is superior to all the other animals with respect to the interior sentient powers.

On the other hand, as far as some of the exterior sensory powers are concerned, it happens by a certain necessity that man falls short of the other animals. For instance, among all the animals, man has the worst sense of smell. For it was necessary that man, among all the animals, should have the largest brain in relation to his body (*respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum*), both in order to perfect in a less restricted way (*liberius*) the operations of the interior sentient powers—which, as was explained above (q. 84, a. 7), are necessary for the intellect's operation—and in order for the brain's cool temperature (*frigiditas cerebri*) to moderate the heart's heat, which has to abound in man in order for him to have an upright stature. But because of the brain's moistness, its size is an impediment to the sense of smell, which requires dryness.

In this same way, one can likewise give reasons for why certain animals have more acute vision or more sensitive hearing than man—because the obstacles to these senses must follow in man from the perfect balance of his constitution. And the same reason is also to be given for why other animals are swifter than man; for the balance of the human constitution is incompatible with excessive swiftness.

Reply to objection 2: Horns and hooves, which are the weapons of certain animals, along with a toughness of hide and a multitude of hair or feathers, which are the coverings of animals, attest to an abundance of the element earth, which is incompatible with the balance and tenderness of the human constitution. And so such things were not fitting for man. Rather, in place of these things man has his reason and his hands, by which he can make for himself, in an unlimited number of ways, weapons and coverings and the other things necessary for life. Hence, in *De Anima* 3 the hand is called “the organ of organs.” This was more appropriate for a rational nature, which has an unlimited number of ideas, with the result that it has the capacity to make an unlimited number of instruments.

Reply to objection 3: There are four reasons why having an upright stature was appropriate for man.

First, the sensory powers were given to man not only, as with the other animals, in order to procure the necessities of life, but also in order to have cognition. Hence, whereas the other animals do not delight in sensible things except in their relation to food and sexual attraction, man alone takes delight in the very beauty of sensible things in its own right. And so since the sensory powers are particularly strong in the facial area, the other animals have their faces turned toward the earth, as if in order to seek food and provide nourishment for themselves, whereas man has his face held up, in order that through the senses—and chiefly through the sense of sight, which is more subtle and reveals the many differences among things—he might be able in an unrestricted way (*libere*) to have cognition of sensible things, both earthly and celestial, from every angle, so that he might gather intelligible truth from all things.

Second, he has an upright stature so that the interior powers might have their operations more freely, given that the brain, in which the interior powers are in some sense activated (*perficiuntur*), is not close to the ground (*non depressum*) but is instead elevated over all the parts of the body.

Third, if man had a prone posture, he would have to use his hands as front feet. And so the hands

would cease to be useful for performing diverse works.

Fourth, if man had a prone posture and used his hands as front feet, then he would have to capture food with his mouth. And so, as is clear from the case of the other animals, he would have an oblong mouth, and hard and large lips, and a hardened tongue as well, so as not to be harmed by exterior things. And this sort of arrangement would completely impede speech, which is a proper work of reason.

And yet even though he has an upright stature, man is still maximally remote from plant life. For man has his superior part, i.e., the head, facing the higher part of the world, and he has his inferior part facing the lower part of the world, and so he is optimally arranged in his entire constitution. By contrast, plants have their superior part facing the lower part of the world (for their roots are, as it were, their mouths), whereas their inferior part is found in the higher part of the world. On the other hand, brute animals lie between the two, since the superior part of an animal is the part which takes in nourishment, whereas the inferior part is the part that emits waste products.

Article 4

Is the production of the human body appropriately described in Scripture?

It seems that the production of the human body is not appropriately described in Scripture:

Objection 1: Just as the human body was made by God, so too were the other works of the six days. But in the case of the other works it says, “God said, ‘Let such-and-such be made’, and it was made.” Therefore, something similar should have been said concerning the production of man.

Objection 2: As was explained above (a. 2), the human body was made directly by God. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say, “Let *us* make man.”

Objection 3: The form of the human body is the soul itself, which is the breath of life. Therefore, after it had said, “God formed man from the slime of the earth,” it was not appropriate to add, “... and He breathed into his face the breath of life.”

Objection 4: The soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body and most especially in the heart. Therefore, it was inappropriate to say, “He breathed into his face the breath of life.”

Objection 5: The male and female sexes have to do with the body, whereas the image of God has to do with the soul. But according to Augustine, the soul was made before the body. Therefore, after it had said, “To His image He made him,” it was not appropriate to add, “... male and female He created them.”

But contrary to this is the authority of Scripture.

I respond [by replying to the objections]:

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 6, the reason why man is preeminent over other things is not that God Himself made man—as if He Himself did not make the other things. For it is written, “The heavens are the works of your hands” (Psalm 101:26), and in another place, “His hands laid down the dry land” (Psalm 94:5). Rather, man is preeminent over other things because man was made to the image of God.

Nonetheless, in the case of the production of man Scripture uses a special way of speaking in order to indicate that the other things were made for the sake of man. For we normally make with greater thought and care those things that we principally intend.

Reply to objection 2: This phrase should not be taken to mean—as some have perversely taken it to mean—that God was saying to the *angels*, “Let us make man.” Instead, this is said in order to signify the plurality of the divine persons, whose image is found explicitly in man.

Reply to objection 3: Some have claimed that the [first] man's body was formed antecedently in time, and that later on God infused a soul into the already formed body. But it is contrary to the nature of the perfection of the first institution of things that God would make either the body without the soul or the soul without the body; for each of them is a part of human nature.

It is especially inappropriate to make the body without the soul, since the body depends on the soul, but not vice versa. And so to rule this out, some have claimed that (a) when it says, "God formed man," this means that the production of the body was simultaneous with the soul, and that (b) when it is added, "... and He breathed (*inspiravit*) into his face the breath of life," this is referring to the Holy Spirit—just as our Lord breathed (*insufflav*) on the Apostles, saying, "Receive the Holy Spirit" (John 20:22).

However, as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei*, this reading is ruled out by the words of Scripture. For the following is added to what was just cited: "And man was made a living soul"—but in 1 Corinthians 15:45 the Apostle relates this phrase to man's animal life and not to his spiritual life. Therefore, the words "breath of life" refer to the soul, so that when it says, "He breathed into his face the breath of life," this serves as an explanation, so to speak, of what had gone before; for the soul is the form of the body.

Reply to objection 4: The reason why it says that the breath of life was breathed into the man's face is that the vital operations (*operationes vitae*) are more manifest in man's face because of the sensory powers that exist there.

Reply to objection 5: According to Augustine, all the works of the six days were effected simultaneously. Hence, he does not hold that the first man's soul, which he claims to have been made simultaneously with the angels, was made before the sixth day. Instead, he claims that on the sixth day itself (a) the first man's soul was made in actuality and (b) his body was made with respect to its causal principles.

By contrast, the other doctors claim that both the man's soul and his body were made in actuality on the sixth day.

QUESTION 92

The Production of the Woman

The next thing we have to consider is the production of the woman. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Was it fitting for the woman to be produced in this [initial] production of things? (2) Was it fitting for the woman to be made from the man? (3) Was it fitting for the woman to be produced from the man's rib? (4) Was the woman made directly by God?

Article 1

Was it fitting for the woman to be produced in the initial production of things?

It seems that it was not fitting for the woman to be produced in the initial production of things [*in prima rerum productione*]:

Objection 1: In *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher says, "The female is an inadvertently caused male (*femina est mas occasionatus*).” But it was not fitting for anything inadvertent and deficient to exist in the initial institution of things. Therefore, it was not fitting for the woman to be produced in that initial production of things.

Objection 2: Subjection and abasement are the result of sin; for it is after the sin that the woman is told, "You shall be under the man's power" (Genesis 3:16), and Gregory says, "When we do not sin, we are all equal." But the woman has less natural power and dignity than the man, since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, "What acts is always more honorable than what is acted upon." Therefore, it was not fitting for the woman to be produced in the initial production of things, before the sin.

Objection 3: The occasions of sin should be eliminated. But God foreknew that the woman would be an occasion of sin for the man. Therefore, He should not have produced the woman.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:18 says, "It is not good for the man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."

I respond: As Scripture says, it was necessary for the woman to be made as a helper to the man—more specifically, as a helper in the work of generation and not as a helper for just any other work, as some have claimed, since for any other work a man can be helped more appropriately by another man than by a woman.

This can be made clearer if one considers the modes of generation among living things:

For some living things do not have within themselves the active power of generation, but are instead generated by an agent of another species, e.g., those plants and animals that are generated from the appropriate matter without seed (*sine semine*) by the active power of the celestial bodies.

On the other hand, other living things have the active and passive powers of generation joined together [within themselves], as in the case of plants that are generated from seeds. For in plants there is no vital work that is more noble than the work of generation, and so it is appropriate in their case for the active power of generation to be joined with the passive power of generation at all times.

By contrast, perfect animals have the active power of generation in the male sex and the passive power of generation in the female sex. And because in animals there is a vital work which is more noble than generation and which their life is principally ordered toward, the masculine sex is not joined at all times to the female in perfect animals, but is joined only at the time of coitus. So we might imagine that through coitus the male and the female become one in a way similar to that in which the masculine and feminine powers are joined at all times in a plant—even though in some plants the one power is more abundant, and in others the other power is more abundant.

Now man is ordered toward an even more noble vital work, viz., intellectual understanding. And so in the case of man there is an even stronger reason for why there ought to be a distinction between the two powers, with the result that the female is produced separately from the male and yet they are joined together as one carnally (*carnaliter in unum*) for the work of generation. And this is why, immediately after the formation of the woman, Genesis 2:24 says, "They will be two in one flesh."

Reply to objection 1: In relation to *a particular nature*, the female is something deficient and inadvertent (*aliquid deficiens et occasionatum*). For the active power that exists in the male's seed aims at producing something complete and similar to itself in the masculine sex, and the fact that a female is generated is due either to a weakness in the active power, or to some indisposition on the part of the matter, or even to some transformation from without, e.g., from the southern winds (*a ventis australibus*), which are humid, as *De Generatione Animalium* says.

However, in relation to *nature as a whole* (*per comparationem ad naturam universalem*), the female is not something inadvertent, but is instead ordered by the intention of nature toward the work of generation. Now the intention of nature as a whole depends on God, who is the universal author of nature. And so in instituting the nature, He produced not only the male but also the female.

Reply to objection 2: There are two kinds of subjection:

The first kind is *servile subjection*, according to which the one who presides makes use of his subjects for his own advantage. This kind of subjection was introduced after the sin.

The second kind is *civil* or *economic subjection*, according to which the one who presides makes use of his subjects for their own advantage and good. This kind of subjection existed even before the sin. For the good of order would have been lacking within the human multitude if some had not been governed by others who were wiser. And so it is by this sort of subjection that the woman is naturally subject to the man (*ex tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro*), since the discernment of reason (*discretio rationis*) naturally abounds more in the man. Nor, as will be explained below (q. 96, a. 3), is inequality among men (*inaequalitas hominum*) excluded by the state of innocence.

Reply to objection 3: If God had removed from the world everything that man (*homo*) has turned into an occasion of sin (*omnia ex quibus homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi*), the universe would have remained incomplete (*imperfectum*). Nor should the common good have been destroyed in order that a particular evil might be avoided, especially in light of the fact that God is powerful enough to order every evil toward the good.

Article 2

Was it fitting for the woman to be made from the man?

It seems that it was not fitting for the woman (*mulier*) to be made from the man (*vir*):

Objection 1: The sexes are common to both man (*homo*) and the other animals. But in the case of the other animals the females (*feminae*) were not made from the males (*mares*). Therefore, this should not have been the case with man, either.

Objection 2: Things that belong to the same species have the same type of matter. But the male (*mas*) and the female (*femina*) belong to the same species. Therefore, since the man was made from the slime of the earth, the woman (*femina*) should have been made from the same thing, and not from the man (*vir*).

Objection 3: The woman (*mulier*) was made as a helper to the man (*vir*) in the work of generation. But excessively close kinship renders a person unsuitable for generation, and this is why closely related

persons are excluded from matrimony, as is clear from Leviticus 18:6. Therefore, the woman should not have been made from the man.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 17:5 says, “He created from him”—that is, from the man—“a helper like to himself”—that is, the woman.

I respond: In the initial institution of things it was fitting for the woman (*mulier*) to be formed from the man (*vir*)—more so than in the case of the other animals.

It was fitting, first of all, in order that a certain dignity might be preserved for the first man (*primus homo*), viz., that, by way of likeness to God, he himself would be the source of his whole species in the way that God is the source of the whole universe. Hence, in Acts 17:26 Paul says that God “made the whole human race from one.”

It was fitting, second, in order that the man might love the woman more and adhere to her in a more inseparable way, given his realization that she had been produced from him. Hence, Genesis 2:23-24 says, “... she was taken out of man. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife.” This was especially necessary in the case of the human species, in which the male and the female remain together throughout their whole life (*per totam vitam*)—something that does not happen in the case of the other animals.

Third, it was fitting because, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8, in the case of human beings, the male and the female are conjoined not only because of the necessity for generation, as with the other animals, but also for the sake of their domestic life, in which the other works of the man and the woman take place and in which the man is the head of the woman (*in qua vir est caput mulieris*). Hence, it was fitting for the woman to be formed from the man as her source.

Fourth, there is a reason having to do with the mysteries [of the Faith] (*ratio sacramentalis*). For [the woman’s being made from the man] is a figure of the Church’s taking her origin from Christ. Hence, in Ephesians 5:32 the Apostle says, “This is a great mystery (*sacramentum magnum*); I mean in Christ and in the Church.”

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 2: The matter is that from which something is made. But a created nature has a determinate source, and since it is determined to one outcome, it also has a determinate process. Hence, it produces from determinate matter something that belongs to a determinate species.

By contrast, since God’s power is infinite, He can make something that is the same in species from any kind of matter whatsoever, e.g., the man from the slime of the earth and the woman from the man.

Reply to objection 3: The sort of close kinship that is an impediment to matrimony comes from natural generation. But the woman was produced from the man solely by God’s power and not through natural generation. This is why Eve is not called Adam’s daughter. For this reason, the argument is invalid (*non sequitur*).

Article 3

Was it fitting for the woman to be formed from the man’s rib?

It seems that it was not fitting for the woman to be formed from the man’s rib:

Objection 1: The man’s rib was much smaller than the woman’s body. But more can be made from less only either (a) through *addition*—but if this had happened, then the woman would be said to be made from what was added rather than from the rib—or (b) through *rarefaction*, since, as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, it is impossible for a body to increase unless it becomes rarified. But a

woman's body (*corpus mulieris*) is not more rarified than a man's, at least not in the proportion that a rib has to Eve's body. Therefore, Eve was not formed from Adam's rib.

Objection 2: There was nothing superfluous in the works that were initially created. Therefore, Adam's rib contributed to the perfection of his body. Therefore, when it was taken away, what remained was imperfect. But this seems wrong.

Objection 3: A rib cannot be separated from a man without pain. But there was no pain before the sin. Therefore, the rib should not have been separated from the man so that the woman might be formed from it.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:22 says, "The Lord God built the rib which He had taken from Adam into a woman."

I respond: It was fitting for the woman (*mulier*) to be formed from the man's rib (*ex costa viri*).

It was fitting, first, in order to signify that there should be social union (*socialis coniunctio*) between the man and the woman. For instance, the woman should not dominate over the man, and so she was not formed from his head. But neither should she be looked down upon by the man as if she were under servile subjection (*tamquam serviliter subiecta*) (cf. a. 1), and so she was not formed from his feet.

Second, it was fitting because of a mystery [of the Faith] (*propter sacramentum*). For the sacraments—i.e., the blood and water by which the Church was instituted—flowed from the side of Christ in dormition on the cross.

Reply to objection 1: Some claim that the woman's body was formed by the multiplication of the matter without any other addition, in the way in which our Lord multiplied the five loaves.

But this is altogether impossible. For the multiplication of the loaves occurred either through a transformation of the substance of the matter itself or through a transformation of its dimensions. But it did not occur through a transformation of the substance of the matter itself, both because (a) matter, considered in itself, is wholly unable to change as long as it exists in potentiality and has only the character of a subject, and also because (b) multitude and magnitude lie outside of the essence of matter itself. And so the multiplication of matter is not in any way intelligible as long as the same matter remains without addition—unless the matter takes on bigger dimensions. But as the Philosopher explains in *Physics* 4, for the matter to be rarefied is just for it to take on bigger dimensions. Therefore, to claim that the matter is multiplied without rarefaction is to posit contradictories simultaneously, viz., the definition without the thing defined.

Hence, since rarefaction does not seem to be present in the multiplications under discussion, it is necessary to posit an *addition to* the matter, either through creation or (what is more probable) through conversion. Hence, in *Super Ioannem* Augustine says, "Christ satisfied the five thousand men with the five loaves in the way that from a few seeds He produces a field full of corn"—which happens through the conversion of nutrients (*per conversionem alimenti*).

Yet we still say, "He fed the five thousand *with five loaves*," or "He formed the woman *from the man's rib*," because the addition was made to the preexisting matter of the loaves or of the rib.

Reply to objection 2: The rib contributed to Adam's perfection not insofar as he was a certain *individual*, but insofar as he was the source of the *species*—in the same way that semen, which is released by a natural operation accompanied by pleasure, contributes to the perfection of the one that generates. Hence, *a fortiori*, by God's power the woman's body was able to be formed from the man's rib without pain.

Reply to objection 3: From this the reply to the third objection is clear.

Article 4

Was the woman formed directly by God?

It seems that the woman was not formed directly (*immediate*) by God:

Objection 1: No individual produced from something similar to it in species is made directly by God. But the woman was made from the man, who was of the same species as she was. Therefore, she was not made directly by God.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that corporeal things are managed by God through the angels. But the woman's body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore, it was made by the ministry of the angels and not directly by God.

Objection 3: Among creatures the things that preexist through their causal principles are produced by the power of another creature and not directly by God. But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 9, the woman's body was produced in its causal principles in the initial works. Therefore, the woman was not produced directly by God.

But contrary to this: In the same book Augustine says, "Only God, from whom all of nature subsists, was able to form or shape the rib in such a way that it would be a woman."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), natural generation in any given species is from a determinate matter. But the matter from which man is generated is the human seed of a male or a female (*semen humanum viri vel feminae*). Hence, an individual of the human species cannot be naturally generated from any other type of matter. Rather, only God, who institutes nature, can bring things into being outside of the order of nature. And so only God was able to form the man from the slime of the earth or the woman from the man's rib.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for a case in which the individual is generated by a natural generation from something similar to it in species.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 9, we do not know whether angels provided service to God in the formation of the woman. However, it is certain that just as the man's body was not formed by angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the woman's body formed by angels from the man's rib.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in the same book, "The initial state of things was not such that the female was going to be formed wholly in this way, but it was only such that she *could* be formed in this way." And so with respect to its causal principles the woman's body preexisted in the initial works not in virtue of an active power, but only in virtue of a passive power ordered toward the creator's active power.

QUESTION 93

The End or Terminus of the Production of Man

The next thing we have to consider is the end or terminus of the production of man, insofar as man is said to be made to the image and likeness of God (*ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*) (Genesis 1:26). On this topic there are nine questions: (1) Does the image of God exist in man? (2) Does the image of God exist in non-rational creatures? (3) Does the image of God exist more in an angel than in a man? (4) Does the image of God exist in every man? (5) Is the image of God in man related to [God's] essence, or to all the divine persons, or to just one of the divine persons? (6) Is the image of God found in man only with respect to man's mind? (7) Does the image of God exist in man because of man's powers, or because of his habits, or because of his acts? (8) Does the image of God exist in man in relation to all objects? (9) What is the difference between an image and a likeness?

Article 1

Does the image of God exist in man?

It seems that the image of God does not exist in man:

Objection 1: Isaiah 40:18 says, "To whom have you likened God? Or what image will you make for Him?"

Objection 2: Being an image of God is proper to the Firstborn, of whom the Apostle says in Colossians 1:15, "He is the Image of the invisible God, the Firstborn of every creature." Therefore, the image of God is not found in man.

Objection 3: In *De Synodis* Hilary says, "An image is not different in species (*species indifferens*) from the thing it is an image of." And, again, he says, "An image is an undivided and unified likeness of a thing, meant to equate that thing with another thing." But God and man do not share the same species (*non est species indifferens Dei et hominis*); nor can man have equality with God. Therefore, the image of God cannot exist in man.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:26 says, "Let us make man to our image and likeness."

I respond: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Where there is an image (*imago*), there is always a likeness (*similitudo*), but where there is a likeness, there is not always an image." From this it is clear that *likeness* is part of the concept *image*, and that *image* adds something beyond the concept *likeness*, viz., that an image is modeled after something else (*sit ex alio expressum*). For the word 'image' (*imago*) is derived from something's being done in imitation of another (*agitur ad imitationem alterius*). Hence, even if one egg is similar to and equal to a second egg, nonetheless, it is not called an image of that other egg, because it is not modeled after it.

Moreover, equality is not part of the concept *image*. For as Augustine says in the same place, "It does not follow that where there is an image, there is equality." This is clear in the case of the image of someone in a mirror (*in speculo relucente*). Still, equality is part of the concept *perfect image*, since a perfect image lacks nothing that exists in the thing after which it is modeled (*in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini quod insit illi de quo expressa est*).

Now it is clear that in man there is some sort of likeness to God that is derived from God as its exemplar (*sicut ab exemplari*); however, it is not a likeness of equality, since in this case the exemplar infinitely exceeds that which it is the exemplar of. And so the image of God is said to exist in man not as a perfect image, but as an imperfect image. Scripture signifies this when it says that man was made "to the image of God (*ad imaginem Dei*). For the preposition 'to' (*ad*) signifies the approach of something that is far off in the distance (*accessum quendam qui competit rei distant*).

Reply to objection 1: The prophet is talking about corporeal images fabricated by man, and this is why he expressly says, “What image will you make for Him?” But it is God Himself who has placed a spiritual image of Himself in man.

Reply to objection 2: The “Firstborn of every creature” is the perfect Image of God, perfectly matching (*perfecte implens*) that of which He is the Image (cf. q. 35). This is why He is said to be “the Image” and never “to the image” (*dicitur imago et numquam ad imagem*).

By contrast, man is called an image because of a likeness, and he is said to be made “to the image” because of the imperfection of the likeness. And since a perfect likeness of God cannot exist except by an identity of nature, the Image of God exists in His Firstborn Son in the way that the image of a king exists in his connatural son, whereas in man the image of God exists in a different nature, in the way that the king’s image exists on a silver coin. This is clear from Augustine in *De Decem Chordis*.

Reply to objection 3: Since *one* is [the same as] *undivided being*, a species is called ‘non-different’ (*indifferens*) in the same way that it is called ‘one’. But a thing is said to be *one* not only in number or in species or in genus, but also in accord with a certain analogy or proportion (*secundum analogical vel proportionem quandam*); and this is the sort of oneness or agreement that a creature has with respect to God.

On the other hand, what [Hilary] says about equating the one thing with the other has to do with the concept *perfect image*.

Article 2

Is the image of God found in non-rational creatures?

It seems that the image of God is found in non-rational creatures (*in irrationalibus creaturis*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus* Dionysius says, “Things that have causes bear contingent images of their causes.” But God is a cause not only of rational creatures, but also of non-rational creatures. Therefore, the image of God is found in non-rational creatures.

Objection 2: The more explicit (*expressior*) a likeness is in a thing, the closer it approaches the nature of an image. But in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that a solar ray has a maximal likeness to God’s goodness. Therefore, it is made to the image of God.

Objection 3: The more perfect a thing is in goodness, the more like God it is. But the universe as a whole is more perfect in goodness than man is, since even if each particular thing is good, all of them together are called “very good” in Genesis 1:31. Therefore, the whole universe—and not just man—is made to the image of God.

Objection 4: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says of God, “... holding the world in His mind and forming it in a like image.” Therefore the whole world—and not just the rational creature—is made to the image of God.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 6 Augustine says, “This reaches its peak in man, since God made man to His own image by giving him an intellectual mind by which he stands out from the beasts.” Therefore, things that do not have an intellect are not made to the image of God.

I respond: Not just any likeness, even if it is modeled after another, is enough for the concept *image*. For if the likeness corresponds only to a genus or to some common accident, the thing in question will not thereby be said to be made “to the image” of the other. For instance, one could not say that a worm which comes out of a man is an image of the man because of the likeness in genus. Nor, again, can one say that if something becomes white and so like another thing, it is thereby made to that thing’s

image; for whiteness is an accident common to many species.

What is required for the concept *image* is that the likeness be either (a) with respect to the species, in the way that the image of a king exists in his son, or (b) at least with respect to some accident that is proper to the species—especially its shape—in the way that an image of a man is said to exist in copper. This is why Hilary explicitly says, “An image is not different in species.” And it is clear that a likeness in species has to do with the last difference [contained in the definition].

Now first, and most generally, some things are like God insofar as they *exist*. Second, some are like Him insofar as they are *alive*. Third, some are like Him insofar as they *have knowledge or intellectual understanding* (*sapiunt vel intelligunt*). These last ones are, as Augustine puts it in *83 Quaestiones*, “so close to God in likeness that nothing among creatures is closer.”

So, then, it is clear that, properly speaking, only intellectual beings are made to the image of God.

Reply to objection 1: Everything imperfect is a sort of participation (*quaedam participatio*) in what is perfect. And so even those things that fall short of the concept *image* still participate to some extent in the nature of an image insofar as they have some sort of likeness to God. This is why Dionysius says that things that have causes bear “contingent images” of their causes; that is, they bear the images not absolutely speaking, but to the extent that this is possible for them.

Reply to objection 2: Dionysius compares a solar ray to God’s goodness with regard to its causality, but not with respect to the dignity of its nature—which is what is required for the concept *image*.

Reply to objection 3: In the extensive and diffusive sense (*extensive et diffusive*), the universe is more perfect in goodness than an intellectual creature is. However, in the intensive and concentrated sense (*intensive et collective*), the likeness of the divine perfection is found to a greater degree in an intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good (*capax summi boni*).

An alternative reply is that a part is contrasted not with the whole, but with other parts. Hence, when one claims that intellectual natures alone are made to the image of God, this rules out other parts of the universe from being made to God’s image, but it does not rule out the universe’s being made to the image of God in some of its parts.

Reply to objection 4: Boethius is taking ‘image’ here as a kind of likeness by which an artifact imitates the pattern (*species*) of art that exists in the craftsman’s mind; and in this sense every creature is an ‘image’ of the exemplary conception that it has in God’s mind.

However, this is not the sense of ‘image’ that we are talking about in the present context. Instead, we are talking now about images that have a likeness in their nature. More specifically, all things are like the First Being insofar as they are beings, and some are like the First Life insofar as they are alive, and some are like the Highest Wisdom insofar as they have intellectual understanding.

Article 3

Is an angel made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is?

It seems that an angel is not made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is:

Objection 1: In his sermon *De Imagine* Augustine says that God did not grant to any creature other than man that it should be made to His image. Therefore, it is not true that an angel is made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is.

Objection 2: According to Augustine in *83 Quaestiones*, “Man is made to the image of God in such a way that he is formed by God without any other creature intervening. And so nothing is more

closely conjoined to God than he is.” But a creature is called an image of God to the extent that it is conjoined to God. Therefore, an angel is not made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is.

Objection 3: A creature is made to the image of God insofar as it has an intellectual nature. But there is no such thing as more of an intellectual nature or less of an intellectual nature (*intellectualis natura non intenditur nec remittitur*), since *intellectual nature* is in the genus *substance* and does not belong to the genus *accident*. Therefore, an angel is not made to the image of God to a greater degree than a man is.

But contrary to this: In one of his homilies Gregory says, “An angel is called ‘a seal of likeness’, because in him the likeness of the divine image is imprinted more explicitly.”

I respond: There are two ways of talking about the image of God:

First, with respect to what the notion of an image is *primarily* thought of as existing in, viz., an intellectual nature. And in this sense the image of God exists to a greater degree in angels than in men, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 58, a. 3), a more perfect intellectual nature exists in angels.

Second, the image of God in a man can be thought of with respect to what the image is *secondarily* thought of as existing in. More specifically, a certain imitation of God can be found in a man (a) insofar as man is from man in the way that God is from God, and (b) insofar as a man’s soul is a whole in his whole body and also a whole in each part of the body, in the same way that God is related to the world. As far as these and other such likenesses are concerned, the image of God is found to a greater degree in a man than in an angel. However, the nature of God’s image in man is associated with these likenesses *per se* only insofar as they presuppose the first sort of imitation, which has to do with the intellectual nature. Otherwise, brute animals would likewise be made to God’s image.

And so since as far as the intellectual nature itself is concerned, an angel is made to God’s image to a greater degree than a man is, one should grant that (a) absolutely speaking (*simpliciter*) an angel is made to God’s image to a greater degree than a man is, but that (b) in a certain respect (*secundum quid*) a man is made to God’s image to a greater degree than an angel is.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is here excluding from God’s image other lower creatures that lack intellectual understanding. He is not, however, excluding the angels.

Reply to objection 2: The claim that nothing is more closely conjoined to God than the human mind is asserted with respect to the genus *intellectual nature*, in the same way that fire is, as a species, the most subtle of bodies, even though one instance of fire is more subtle than another. For as Augustine had said earlier, “Those who have knowledge bear such a close likeness to Him that there is nothing closer among creatures.” Hence, this does not rule out the claim that an angel is made to God’s image to a greater degree.

Reply to objection 3: The assertion, “A substance does not admit of more and less,” does not imply that one species of substance is not more perfect than another. Instead, it implies that (a) one and the same individual does not participate more in its own species at some times and less at other times, and also that (b) different individuals [of the same species] do not participate to greater and lesser degrees in that species of substance.

Article 4

Is the image of God found in every man?

It seems that the image of God is not found in every man (*in quolibet homine*):

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 11:7 the Apostle says, “The man (*vir*) is the image of God, while the woman (*mulier*) is the image of the man.” Therefore, since the woman is an individual of the human species, not every individual is an image of God.

Objection 2: In Romans 8:29 the Apostle says, “Those whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son.” But not all men have been predestined. Therefore, not all men are conformed to the image.

Objection 3: As was explained above (a. 1), *likeness (similitudo)* is part of the concept *image (imago)*. But through sin a man becomes unlike God (*Deo dissimilis*). Therefore, he loses the image of God.

But contrary to this: Psalm 38:7 says, “Surely man passes as an image.”

I respond: Since it is because of his intellectual nature that man is said to be made to the image of God, it follows that he is made to God’s image to the highest degree to the extent that his intellectual nature is able to imitate God to the highest degree. But it is with respect to God’s knowing and loving Himself that an intellectual nature especially imitates God. Hence, there are three possible ways to think of the image of God in man:

In the first way, a man has a natural capacity to understand and to love God, and this capacity resides in the *very nature of the mind (consistit in ipsa natura mentis)*, which is common to all men.

In the second way, a man actually or habitually understands and loves God, but still imperfectly; and this is the image associated with *the conformity of grace (imago per conformitatem gratiae)*.

In the third way, a man has actual and perfect understanding of and love for God, and the image so taken is associated with *the likeness of glory (imago secundum similitudinem gloriae)*.

This is why a Gloss on Psalm 4:7 (“The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”) distinguishes three images: (a) the image of *creation*, (b) the image of *re-creation*, and (c) the image of *likeness*. The first image is found in all men, the second image is found only in the justified (*tantum in iustis*), and the third image is found only in the blessed in heaven (*solum in beatis*).

Reply to objection 1: The image of God is found in both the man and the woman with respect to what the character of an image primarily consists in, viz., an intellectual nature. Hence, after Genesis 1:27 had said, “He created him”—viz., man (*homo*)—“to the image of God,” it adds, “... male and female He created them.” And as Augustine explains, it says “them” in the plural, lest it be thought that both sexes had been joined in one individual.

On the other hand, there is a certain secondary sense in which the image of God is found in the man and not in the woman. For the man is the source and the end of the woman in the way that God is the source and the end of the whole creation. Hence, after the Apostle had said, “The man is the image and glory of God, while the woman is the glory of the man,” he explained why he had said this by adding, “For the man is not from the woman, but the woman is from the man; and the man is not created for the sake of the woman, but the woman is created for the sake of the man.”

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: These arguments proceed from the type of image that has to do with the conformity of grace and glory.

Article 5

Does the image of God in man bear upon the Trinity of divine persons?

It seems that the image of God in man does not bear upon the Trinity of divine persons (*non sit quantum ad Trinitatem divinarum personarum*):

Objection 1: In *De Fide ad Petrum* Augustine says, “There is a unified divine essence of the Holy Trinity, and there is a unified image to which man was made.” And in *De Trinitate* 5 Hilary says, “Man is made to the common image of the Trinity.” Therefore, the image of God in man bears upon the divine essence and not upon the Trinity of persons.

Objection 2: *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says that the image of God in man bears upon [God’s] eternity. Also, Damascene says, “Man’s being made to the image of God signifies *per se* the intellect, the free will, and the power.” Again, Gregory of Nyssa says that when Scripture said that man was made to God’s image, “this amounts to saying that human nature was made a participant in every good; for the divine nature (*divinitas*) is the plenitude of goodness.” But all of this pertains to the oneness of the essence and not to the distinction among the persons. Therefore, in man the image of God bears upon the oneness of the essence and not upon the Trinity of persons.

Objection 3: An image leads to the cognition of the one whose image it is. Therefore, if the image of God in man bore upon the Trinity of persons, then since man is able to know himself through his natural reason, it would follow that man could know the Trinity of divine persons through his natural reason. But as was shown above (q. 32, a. 1), this is false.

Objection 4: The name ‘image’ belongs only to the Son and not to each of the three Persons; for in *De Trinitate* 6 Augustine says, “The Son alone is the Image of the Father.” Therefore, if the image of God in man were associated with a [divine] person, there would be just an image of the Son in man and not an image of the whole Trinity.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 4 Hilary says, “Man’s being made to the image of God shows the plurality of the divine persons.”

I respond: As was established above (q. 40, a. 2), the distinctions among the divine persons stem only from origins or, better, from the relations of origin. But the mode of origin is not the same in all things; instead, each thing’s mode of origin is appropriate to its nature. For instance, living things are produced in one way and non-living things in another way; animals are produced in one way and plants in another way.

Hence, it is clear that the distinction among the divine persons is appropriate to the divine nature. Thus, being made to the image of God in imitation of the divine nature does not rule out being made to the image of God in a sense that represents the three persons. Instead, the one follows upon the other.

So, then, one should reply that the image of God exists in man in a way that bears upon both the divine nature and the Trinity of persons. For in God Himself the one nature exists in three persons (*in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura*).

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The reply to the first two objections is clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 3: This argument would go through if the image of God in man represented God perfectly. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, there is a huge difference (*maxima est differentia*) between the trinity that exists in us and the divine Trinity. And so, as he says in the same place, “We see, rather than believe, the trinity that is in us, whereas we believe, rather than see, that God is a Trinity.”

Reply to objection 4: Some have claimed that only the image of the Son exists in man. But Augustine disproves this claim in *De Trinitate* 12.

First, since the Son is similar to the Father by an equality of essence, it is necessary that if man is made to the likeness of the Son, then he is made to the likeness of the Father.

Second, if man had been made only to the image of the Son, then the Father would have said, “Let us make man to *your* image and likeness,” and not “to *our* image and likeness.”

Therefore, when it says, “He made him to the image of God,” one should not, as some have,

interpret this to mean that the Father made man only to the image of the Son, who is God. Instead, it should be interpreted to mean that the Triune God (*Deus Trinitas*) made man to His own image, i.e., to the image of the whole Trinity.

Now there are two readings of the sentence, ‘God made man to His image (*Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam*)’.

On the first reading, the preposition ‘to’ (*ad*) designates the terminus of the act of making, so that the sentence has this meaning: “Let us make man in such a way that the image exists in him.”

On the second reading, the preposition ‘to’ can designate the exemplary cause, as when one says, “This book is made to [conform to] that book.” On this reading the image of God is the divine essence itself—improperly (*abusive*) called an ‘image’—insofar as ‘image’ is being used for ‘exemplar’. Alternatively, in keeping with what some have claimed, the divine essence is being called an ‘image’ because one [divine] person is like the other with respect to the divine essence.

Article 6

Does the image of God exist in man only because of his mind?

It seems not to be the case that the image of God exists in man only because of his mind (*non solum secundum mentem*):

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 11:7 the Apostle says, “The man (*vir*) is the image of God.” But the man is not only the mind. Therefore, the image of God is not associated only with the mind.

Objection 2: Genesis 1:27 says, “God created man to His own image. To the image of God He created him. Male and female He created them.” But the distinction of male from female has to do with the body. Therefore, the image of God in man is associated with the body and not just with the mind.

Objection 3: An image seems mainly to have to do with shape. But shape pertains to bodies. Therefore, the image of God in man is associated with the body, too, and not just with the mind.

Objection 4: According to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, we have three types of vision, viz., (a) corporeal, (b) spiritual or imaginative, and (c) intellectual. Therefore, if, because of our intellectual vision, which pertains to the mind, there is a ‘trinity’ (*aliqua trinitas*) in us by virtue of which we are made to the image of God, then by parity of reasoning the same should hold for the other types of vision as well.

But contrary to this: In Ephesians 4:23-24 the Apostle says, “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind and put on the new man.” From this we are given to understand that our renewal, which is effected by our putting on the new man, pertains to the mind. But Colossians 3:10 says, “... putting on the new man, who is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of Him who created him,” where he attributes the renewal which is effected by putting on the new man to the image of God. Therefore, being an image of God involves just the mind.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), even though there is some sort of likeness to God in all creatures, it is only in the rational creature that one finds a likeness to God in the manner of an *image*, whereas in other creatures there is a likeness in the manner of a *trace* (*vestigium*). But it is his intellect or mind (*intellectus sive mens*) in which the rational creature exceeds other creatures. Hence, it follows that the image of God is found in the rational creature himself only because of his mind (*non nisi secundum mentem*).

Moreover, if the rational creature in question has any other parts, then the likeness of a trace is found in those parts, just as it is in the other creatures that this rational creature is similar to in virtue of

those parts. The reason for this can be seen clearly if one looks carefully at the way in which a trace represents and the way in which an image represents. For as has been explained (a. 2), an image's representation involves a likeness of species. By contrast, a trace represents in the manner of an effect that represents its cause in such a way that it does not attain to a likeness of species; for instance, the footprints left behind by the movement of animals are called traces, and ash is likewise called the trace of a fire, and the desolation of the land is called the trace of a hostile army.

One can see a difference of this sort between rational creatures and other creatures—both with respect to how a likeness to the divine *nature* is represented in the creatures and also with respect to how a likeness of the uncreated *Trinity* is represented in creatures. For as far as the likeness to the divine nature is concerned, rational creatures seem in some sense to attain a representation of the species insofar as they imitate God not only in existing and in living but also in having intellectual understanding—as was explained above (a. 2). By contrast, the other creatures do not have intellectual understanding; instead, what appears in them is a certain trace of a productive intellect (*vestigium intellectus producentis*), if the way they are arranged is taken into account (*si earum dispositio consideretur*).

Similarly, since, as was established above (q. 28, a. 3), the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word (*Verbum*) from the Speaker (*Dicens*) and by the procession of the Love (*Amor*) from the two of them, in the rational creature, in which there is a procession of a word stemming from (*secundum*) the intellect and a procession of love stemming from the will, one can say that there is an image of the uncreated Trinity through a certain representation of the species. By contrast, in the other creatures one does not find either a *source of a word*, or a *word*, or *love*; rather, what one finds is a certain trace, because the cause that produces these other creatures has within itself a Source of the Word, and the Word, and the Love. For the very fact that a creature has a limited and finite substance (*substantiam modificatam et finitam*) demonstrates that it comes from some Source, whereas a creature's species points to its Maker's Word in the same way that the form of a house points to the craftsman's conception; and the creature's being ordered points to its Maker's Love, by which the effect is ordered toward the good, in the same way that the use of a building points to the craftsman's will.

So, then, in man the likeness of God is found in the manner of an image because of his mind, whereas in his other parts the likeness of God is found in the manner of a trace.

Reply to objection 1: Man is called an image of God not because he is an image in his essence, but because the image of God is imprinted on him in virtue of his mind—in the way that a denarius is called an image of Caesar in virtue of bearing Caesar's image. Hence, it is not necessary that the image of God be received with respect to every part of a man.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine reports in *De Trinitate* 12, some have claimed that the image of the Trinity in man is borne not by one individual man, but by several individuals together (*secundum plura*). They say that “a man (*vir*) intimates the person of the Father, whereas the person of the Son is intimated by one who proceeds from the man in such a way as to be generated from him (*de illo nasceretur*); and they claim that the third person, corresponding to the Holy Spirit, is the woman, who proceeds from the man in such a way that she is neither his son nor his daughter.”

On the surface, this seems absurd. First, it would follow that the Holy Spirit is a source of the Son in the way that the woman is a source of the child who is generated from the man. Second, a man (*homo*) would be the image of just one person. Third, on this view Scripture ought not to have mentioned the image of God in man until after offspring had been produced.

And so one should reply that after Scripture had said “He created him to the image of God,” it added “male and female He created them” not in order to associate the image of God with the distinction between the sexes, but because the image of God is common to both sexes, since it stems from the mind, in which there is no distinction between sexes. Hence, in Colossians 3:10, after the Apostle had said, “... according to the image of Him who created him,” he adds, “where there is neither male nor female.”

Reply to objection 3: Even though the image of God in man does not involve the shape of the body, still, as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, “since man’s body, alone among the bodies of the land animals, does not lie face downward (*non prostratum est*), with its belly close to the ground, but is instead such that it is more suitable for contemplating the heavens, it can rightly seem to be made to the image and likeness of God to a greater degree than the other animal bodies.” However, this should be understood to mean not that there is an image of God in man’s body, but that the very shape of the human body represents, in the manner of a trace, the image of God in the soul.

Reply to objection 4: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, in both corporeal vision and imaginative vision there is a certain trinity.

For in corporeal vision there is first the *species* of the exterior body; second, the *act of seeing* itself, which is effected by the impression of a likeness of the species in question on the faculty of sight; and, third, the *will’s intention* in applying the faculty of sight to the act of seeing and keeping the act of seeing fixed on the thing seen.

Similarly, in the case of imaginative vision, one finds, first, a *species* reserved in memory; second, the *very act of imaginative seeing*, which stems from the fact that the soul’s glance, i.e., the very power of imagining, is informed by the species in question; and, third, there is the *will’s intention*, which joins the two.

However, both of these trinities fall short of the concept *image of God*.

For the species itself of the exterior body lies outside the nature of the soul, whereas even if the species that exists in memory does not exist outside the soul, it is nonetheless incidental to the soul. And so in both these cases the representation of the connaturality and coeternality of the divine persons is lacking.

Again, corporeal vision proceeds not only from the species of the exterior body but, along with this, from the sensory power of the one who sees; and, similarly, imaginative vision proceeds not only from the species that is conserved in the memory, but also from the power of imagining. And this does not appropriately represent the procession of the Son from the Father alone.

Again, the will’s intention, which connects the species and the power, does not proceed from them in the case of either corporeal vision or spiritual vision, and so it does not appropriately represent the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son.

Article 7

Is the image of God found in the soul’s acts?

It seems that the image of God is not found in the soul’s acts (*non inveniatur in anima secundum actus*):

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 11 Augustine says that man was made to the image of God “insofar as we exist, and know that we exist, and love our existence (*esse*) and our knowing (*nosse*).” But ‘existence’ (*esse*) does not signify an act. Therefore, the image of God in the soul is not associated with the soul’s acts.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 9 Augustine assigns the image of God in the soul to three things, viz., mind (*mens*), knowledge (*notitia*), and love (*amor*). But ‘mind’ signifies not an act, but rather a power of—or even the essence of—the intellective soul. Therefore, the image of God is not associated with acts.

Objection 3: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to memory

(*memoria*), intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*), and will (*voluntas*). But as the Master says in *Sentences* 1, dist. 3, these are “natural powers of the soul.” Therefore, the image is associated with powers and not with acts.

Objection 4: The image of the Trinity remains in the soul continuously (*semper manet*). But the acts do not remain continuously. Therefore, the image of God in the soul is not associated with the acts.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 11 Augustine associates the trinity in the lower parts of the soul with the sentient *act* of seeing and the imaginative *act* of seeing (*secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et imaginariam*). Therefore, the trinity that exists in the mind, in accord with which man is made to the image of God, should likewise be associated with the *act* of seeing (*debet attendi secundum actualem visionem*).

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), some type of representation of the species is part of the concept *image*. Therefore, if the image of the divine Trinity is going to be received in the soul, then it must be associated principally with what comes as close as possible to representing the species of the divine persons.

Now the divine persons are distinguished from one another by the procession of the Word from the Speaker and the procession of the Love that joins the two of them (*secundum processionem Verbi a Dicente et Amoris connectentis utrumque*). But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 14, the word in our soul cannot exist in the absence of actual thinking. Therefore, the image of the Trinity in our mind is primarily and principally associated with the *act*. More specifically, on the basis of the knowledge (*notitia*) we have, we form an interior word by thinking (*cogitando interius verbum formamus*) and from this we break out into love (*in amorem prorumpimus*).

However, since habits and powers are the principles of acts and since each thing exists virtually in its principles, there can be in the soul a secondary and, as it were, implied (*ex consequenti*) image of the Trinity that is associated with the soul’s powers and mainly with its habits, insofar as the acts exist virtually in the habits.

Reply to objection 1: Our existence (*esse*) pertains to the image of God because it is proper to us above and beyond the other animals; for *esse* belongs to us insofar as we have a mind. And so the trinity mentioned here is the same one that Augustine posits in *De Trinitate* 9, consisting of *mind*, *knowledge*, and *love*.

Reply to objection 2: Augustine at first finds in the mind the trinity mentioned in the objection. However, the mind is such that even if it in some sense knows itself as a whole, it is also in some sense ignorant of itself, viz., insofar as it is distinct from other things; and so it also seeks itself, as Augustine later shows in *De Trinitate* 10. Hence, given that *knowledge* (*notitia*) is not entirely the same as *mind* (*mens*), he takes three things in the soul—viz., memory (*memoria*), intellectual understanding (*intelligentia*), and will (*voluntas*)—which are proper to the mind and which no one is ignorant of having. And it is to these three things that he then ascribes the image of the Trinity, given that his first ascription was in some sense deficient.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine shows in *De Trinitate* 14, we are said to understand and to will (or love) certain things both when we are actually thinking of them and when we are not actually thinking of them. But when they exist in the absence of thought, they belong only to the memory, which in itself is nothing other than the habitual retention of knowledge and love. “But since,” as he himself puts it, “the word cannot exist there in the absence of thought (for we think everything that we say, at least by means of that interior word which does not belong to the language of any nation), the image in question is known instead in these three things, viz., memory, intellectual understanding, and will. I mean the intellectual understanding by which we understand when we are thinking; and I mean the will (or love (*amor*) or higher affection (*dilectio*)) which joins that parent and that offspring.” From this it is

clear that he locates the image of the Trinity in actual understanding and actual willing rather than in their habitual retention in memory—even though in habitual retention there is also a certain image of the Trinity in the soul, as he says in the same place. And so it is clear that ‘memory’, ‘intellective understanding’, and ‘will’ are not being used here for three powers, as they are in the *Sentences*.

Reply to objection 4: Someone could reply by citing the fact that in *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “The mind always remembers itself, always understands itself, and always loves itself.” Some take this to mean that actual intellective understanding of itself and actual love for itself are [always] present in the soul.

However, Augustine undermines this interpretation when he adds, “[The mind] is not always thinking of itself as discrete from those things that are not what it itself is.” From this it is clear that the soul is always understanding and loving itself *habitually* and not *actually*—though one can also say that because it perceives its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything at all.

However, since the soul is not always actually engaged in intellective understanding, as is clear in the case of someone who is sleeping, one must say that even if its acts do not in themselves remain continuously, they nonetheless do always remain in their principles, viz., the powers and habits. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “If the rational soul is made to the image of God because it is *able to* use reason and intellect to understand and contemplate God, then from the very beginning of its existence the image of God existed within it.”

Article 8

Does the image of the divine Trinity exist in the soul only in relation to the object which is God?

It seems that it is not the case that the image of the divine Trinity exists in the soul only in relation to the object which is God (*non solum per comparationem ad obiectum quod est Deus*):

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 6-7), the image of the divine Trinity is found in the soul because the *word* in us proceeds from the *speaker* and the *love* in us proceeds from both the *speaker* and the *word*. But [these processions] are found in us with respect to every object whatsoever. Therefore, the image of the divine Trinity is found in our mind with respect to every object whatsoever.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says, “When we are looking for the Trinity in the soul, we look in the whole soul, not separating rational action in the realm of temporal things from the contemplation of eternal things.” Therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul even with respect to temporal objects.

Objection 3: The fact that we understand and love God belongs to us by a gift of grace. Therefore, if the image of the Trinity in the soul is associated [only] with the memory of God, the understanding of God, and the willing (or loving) of God, then the image of God will exist in man only by grace and not by nature. Therefore, it will not be something common to all men.

Objection 4: The saints who dwell in heaven are maximally conformed to the image of God by the vision of glory (*secundum gloriae visionem*); this is why 2 Corinthians 3:18 says, “We are being transformed into the same image from glory to glory (*a claritate in claritatem*).” But temporal things are known through the vision of glory. Therefore, it is also in relation to temporal objects that the image of God exists in us.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “It is not because the mind remembers itself and understands itself and loves itself that the image of God exists in it; rather, it is because the

mind is able to remember, understand, and love the God by whom it was made.” Therefore, even less is it the case that the image of God in the mind is associated with objects other [than God or the mind itself].

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), *image* implies a likeness that somehow involves a representation of the species. Hence, the image of the divine Trinity in the soul must be associated with something that represents the divine persons by a representation of their species, insofar as this is possible for a creature. Now as has been said (a. 6-7), the divine persons are distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker and the procession of the Love from the two of them. And the Word of God is begotten of God insofar as He knows Himself (*secundum notitiam sui ipsius*), and the Love proceeds from God insofar as He loves Himself. Now it is clear that it is the diversity of the objects that differentiates the species of words and the species of love. For instance, the word *rock* conceived in the human heart is not the same in species as the word *horse*; nor is the love of a rock the same in species as the love of a horse. Therefore, the divine image in man is associated with (a) the word that is conceived from knowledge about God and (b) the love that is derived from that word. And so the image of God is present in the soul insofar as the soul is drawn—or is capable of being drawn—toward God.

Now there are two ways in which the mind is drawn toward something: (a) *directly and immediately*, and (b) *indirectly and mediate*ly, as when someone looking at a man’s image in a mirror is said to be drawn toward the man himself. This is why, in *De Trinitate* 14 Augustine says, “The mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we discern this, we discern the Trinity—not yet God Himself, but even now an image of God.” This is not because the mind is drawn toward itself, absolutely speaking, but rather because by being drawn toward itself, it can be drawn further toward God. This is clear from the passage just quoted.

Reply to objection 1: As far as the concept *image* is concerned, one must attend not only to the fact that something proceeds from something, but also to what exactly proceeds from what, viz., that the word *God* proceeds from knowledge about God.

Reply to objection 2: There is a sort of trinity in the whole soul—not, to be sure, such that, in addition to action regarding temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, “there is some third thing to look for by which the trinity is completed,” as Augustine adds in the same place. Instead, as he explains later, “Even if a trinity could be found in the part of reason that is derived from the side of temporal things, the image of God would still not be found there,” because this sort of knowledge of temporal things is incidental to the soul.

Moreover, the habits by which temporal things are known are not themselves always present in the soul; instead, they are sometimes there in the present and sometimes there only in memory, even after they have begun to be present. This is clear, for instance, in the case of faith, which comes to us temporally in the present life but which in the state of future beatitude will no longer be faith, but a memory of faith.

Reply to objection 3: The meritorious cognition and love of God occur only through grace. However, as was established above (q. 12, a. 12), there is such a thing as a natural cognition and love of God.

And it is likewise natural for the mind *to be able* to use reason to understand God, and because of this we have claimed that the image of God remains continuously (*permanere semper*) in the mind, regardless of whether (a) “this image of God is so thinned out”—clouded over, as it were—“as to amount to almost nothing,” as in those who do not have the use of reason, or whether (b) “it is darkened or deformed,” as in sinners, or whether (c) “it is bright and beautiful,” as in the justified—as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 14.

Reply to objection 4: Through the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself, and so this sort of vision of temporal things will be relevant to the image of God. This is what Augustine is talking about in *De Trinitate* 14: “In the nature to which the mind will happily adhere, the mind will see as immutable everything that that nature sees. For the conceptions of all creatures exist in the uncreated Word Himself.”

Article 9

Is it appropriate to distinguish the likeness [of God] from the image [of God]?

It seems that it is not appropriate to distinguish the likeness [of God] from the image [of God] (*similitudo ab imagine non convenienter distinguatur*):

Objection 1: It is not appropriate to distinguish a genus from its species. But *likeness* is related to *image* in the way that a genus is related to its species, since “where there is an image, there is always a likeness, but not vice versa,” as 83 *Quaestiones* puts it. Therefore, it is inappropriate to distinguish the likeness from the image.

Objection 2: The concept *image* involves not only a representation of the divine persons, but also a representation of the divine essence, where immortality and indivisibility are relevant to the latter. Therefore, it is not appropriate to claim that “the likeness exists in the essence [of the soul], since it is immortal and indivisible, whereas the image exists in other things” [*Sentences* 2, dist. 16].

Objection 3: As was established above (a. 4), there are three images of God in man, viz., the image of *nature*, the image of *grace*, and the image of *glory*. But innocence and justification pertain to grace. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that “the image is associated with *memory*, *intellective understanding*, and *will*, whereas the likeness is associated with *innocence* and *justification*” [*Sentences* 2, dist. 16].

Objection 4: The cognition of truth belongs to intellective understanding, whereas the love of virtue belongs to the will—and these are two parts of the image. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that “the image exists in the cognition of truth, whereas the likeness exists in the love of virtue” [*Sentences* 2, dist. 16].

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “It is not in vain that some understand that two things are being spoken of in the phrase ‘to [our] image and likeness’ (Genesis 1:26); for if there were just one thing, then a single name could have sufficed.”

I respond: A likeness is a certain sort of oneness (*quaedam unitas*); for as *Metaphysics* 5 says, “Oneness (*unum*) is a cause of likeness in quality.” Now since *one* is a transcendental and common to all things, it can be adapted to each individual (*ad singula potest aptari*) in the same way that *good* and *true* can be.

Hence, just as *good* can be applied to a particular thing both (a) as preliminary to it (*ut praeambulum ad ipsam*) and also (b) as subsequent to it (*ut subsequens*), viz., insofar as *good* designates some perfection it has, so it is with the relation of *likeness* to *image*. For instance, *good* is preliminary to *man* insofar as a man is a certain particular good and, again, *good* is subsequent to *man* insofar as we say that some individual man is good within his species (*bonum specialiter*) because of the perfection of his virtue. Similarly, *likeness* is thought of as preliminary to *image* insofar as *likeness* is more general than *image*, as was explained above (a. 1); and *likeness* is thought of as subsequent to *image* insofar as *likeness* signifies a certain perfection in an image, in the sense in which we say that an image of someone is like or unlike the one whose image it is, depending on whether the image represents him more

perfectly or less perfectly.

So, then, there are two possible ways to distinguish *likeness* from *image*.

In the first way, *likeness* is preliminary to *image* and exists in more things. And in this sense, the likeness [of God] involves those things that are more general than the properties of the intellectual nature that *image* is properly associated with. Accordingly, 83 *Quaestiones* says, “No one doubts that spirit”—i.e., mind—“is made to the image of God, whereas, according to what some want to say, the rest of a man”—viz., those things that belong to the lower parts of the soul or even to the body itself—“are made to the likeness [of God].” It is also in keeping with this reading that *De Quantitate Animae* says that the likeness of God in the soul is associated with the soul’s being incorruptible, since *corruptible* and *incorruptible* are differences of *being-in-general*.

In the second way in which it can be thought of, *likeness* signifies the vividness (*expressio*) and perfection of an image. It is in accord with this reading that Damascene says, “What is relevant to the *image* signifies an intellectual power and a power that is *per se* free because of choice, whereas what is relevant to the *likeness* is a likeness of virtue, to the extent that it is possible for virtue to exist in a man.” And this is equivalent to saying that the likeness pertains to the love of virtue; for there is no virtue without a love of virtue.

Reply to objection 1: A likeness is distinguished from an image not with respect to the general concept *likeness* (for this concept is included within the concept *image* itself), but rather insofar as a given likeness either (a) falls short of the concept *image* or (b) is perfective of an image.

Reply to objection 2: The soul’s essence is relevant to the image to the extent that the image represents the divine essence in what is proper to an intellectual nature, e.g., being simple and being indissoluble—though not in the conditions that follow upon being in general (*conditiones consequentes ens in communi*).

Reply to objection 3: Certain virtues exist in the soul naturally, at least as far as their seeds are concerned, and a natural likeness could be associated with these virtues. However, it is not inappropriate for something that is called an image by one criterion (*secundum assignationem unam*) to be called a likeness by some other criterion.

Reply to objection 4: Love for the Word (*dilectio verbi*), i.e., knowledge that is loved (*amata notitia*), pertains to the concept *image*, but the love of virtue pertains to the concept *likeness*, as does virtue as well.

QUESTION 94

The State of the First Man with respect to His Intellect

The next thing we have to consider is the state or condition of the first man, first with respect to his soul (questions 94-96) and then with respect to his body (question 97-101). On the first point there are two things to be considered: first, the condition of man with respect to his intellect (question 94) and second, the condition of man with respect to his will (questions 95-96).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Did the first man see God through His essence? (2) Was he able to see the separated substances, i.e., the angels? (3) Did he have knowledge (*scientia*) of all things? (4) Was he able to be mistaken or to be deceived?

Article 1

Did the first man see God through His essence?

It seems that the first man saw God through His essence:

Objection 1: Man's beatitude consists in the vision of the divine essence. But as Damascene says in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, "When the first man was living in Paradise, he had a life that was happy and rich in all things." And in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "If men had affections of the sort we have now, then how were they happy in that place of ineffable happiness, i.e., Paradise?" Therefore, in Paradise the first man saw God through His essence.

Objection 2: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "The first man did not lack anything that a good will desires." But a good will can desire nothing better than the vision of God's essence. Therefore, the man saw God through His essence.

Objection 3: The vision of God through His essence is a vision by which God is seen directly and without any enigma (*sine medio et sine aenigmate*). But as the Master says in *Sentences* 4, dist. 1, man in the state of innocence "saw God directly." He also saw Him without any enigma, since 'enigma' implies obscurity and, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 15, obscurity was introduced through sin. Therefore, in his initial state man saw God through His essence.

But contrary to this: In 1 Corinthians 15:46 the Apostle says, "It is not what is spiritual that is first, but what is animal." But to see God through His essence is maximally spiritual. Therefore, in the initial state of animal life the first man did not see God through His essence.

I respond: The first man did not see God through His essence, given the general state of his life—unless, perhaps, one claims that he saw God in a rapture when "God cast a deep sleep over Adam" (Genesis 2:21). The reason for this is that since God's essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of one who sees the divine essence is related to God in the same way that every man is related to beatitude. But it is clear that no man can voluntarily (*per voluntatem*) turn away from beatitude, since he naturally and necessarily wills beatitude and flees from unhappiness. Hence, no one who sees God through His essence can voluntarily (*voluntate*) turn away from God, i.e., sin. Because of this, everyone who sees God through His essence is so stable in his love for God that he is unable to sin for all eternity. Therefore, since Adam sinned, it is clear that he did not see God through His essence.

However, he did have a certain higher cognition of God than we ourselves have, and so in a way his cognition stood midway between the cognition associated with our present state and the cognition associated with heaven, by which God is seen through His essence.

To see this clearly, note that the vision of God through His essence is distinct from the vision of God through a creature. Now the higher a creature is and the more like God, the more clearly God is seen through that creature—just as a man is more perfectly seen in a mirror in which his image is

reflected more distinctly. And so it is clear that God is seen much more prominently through His intelligible effects than through His sensible and corporeal effects. In his present state, man is kept from the full and lucid consideration of intelligible effects by the fact that he is distracted by sensible things and occupies himself with them. But as Ecclesiastes 7:30 says, “God made man upright (*rectus*).” And the rectitude of man, as he was instituted by God, consists in the fact that his lower powers were subject to his higher powers and that his higher powers were not impeded by his lower powers. Hence, the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and firm contemplation of God’s intelligible effects, which he perceived by the illumination (*irradiatio*) of the First Truth, whether by natural cognition or graced cognition (*sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita*). Thus, in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says, “Perhaps God earlier spoke with the first men in the way that He speaks with the angels, illuminating their minds with the unalterable truth itself, though not with so great a participation in the divine essence as the angels have.” So, then, through these intelligible effects of God’s, man had a clearer cognition of God than we now have.

Reply to objection 1: Man was happy in Paradise, but not with that perfect beatitude to which he was going to be transported and which consists in the vision of the divine essence. Yet, as Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11, he had “a particular type of happy life” insofar as he had a certain natural integrity and perfection.

Reply to objection 2: A good will is a well-ordered will (*ordinata voluntas*). But the first man’s will would not have been well-ordered if he had willed to have in the state of merit what was promised to him as a reward.

Reply to objection 3: There are two types of medium (*duplex est medium*):

One of them is such that what is said to be seen through the medium is seen at the very same time in the medium, as when a man is seen through a mirror and is seen at the very same time as the mirror itself is seen.

The other type of medium is such that through our knowledge of it we arrive at something unknown, as is the case with the medium [or middle term] of a demonstration.

God was seen without this latter sort of medium, but not without the former sort of medium. For the first man did not have to arrive at a cognition of God through a demonstration taken from some effect, as we ourselves have to. Instead, in his own way he had a cognition of God immediately in His effects, especially in His intelligible effects.

Similarly, one should note that there are two possible ways to understand the obscurity implied by the name ‘enigma’.

In one sense, each creature is somewhat obscure if it is compared with the immensity of God’s splendor (*ad immensitatem divinae claritatis*). And in this sense Adam saw God “in an enigma” (*in aenigmate*) because he saw God through a created effect.

In the second sense, one can mean the obscurity that follows upon sin; more specifically, man is impeded from the consideration of intelligible things by his occupation with sensible things. On this reading, it is not the case that [Adam] saw God “in an enigma.”

Article 2

Did Adam in the state of innocence see angels through their essence?

It seems that Adam in the state of innocence saw angels through their essence:

Objection 1: In *Dialogi* 4 Gregory says, “In Paradise man used to enjoy God’s words and, with cleanness of heart and loftiness of vision, to have commerce with the spirits of the holy angels.”

Objection 2: In its present state the soul is impeded from a cognition of separated substances by the fact that it is united to a corruptible body that “weighs down the soul,” as Wisdom 9:15 puts it. This is why, as was explained above (q. 89, a. 2), a separated soul is able to see separated substances. But the soul of the first man was not weighed down by his body, since his body was not corruptible. Therefore, he was able to see separated substances.

Objection 3: As it says in the *Liber de Causis*, one separated substance has cognition of another separated substance by having cognition of itself. But the first man’s soul had cognition of itself. Therefore, it had cognition of the separated substances.

But contrary to this: Adam’s soul was of the same nature as our souls. But our souls cannot now have intellectual understanding of the separated substances. Therefore, neither could the first man’s soul.

I respond: The state of the human soul can be thought of in two ways:

(a) In one way, with respect to the *diverse modes of its natural esse*, and on this score the state of a separated soul is distinct from the state of a soul conjoined to a body.

(b) In the second way, the state of the soul is thought of in terms of *integrity and corruption*, while keeping its mode of natural *esse* fixed; and on this score the state of innocence is distinct from man’s state after the sin.

In the state of innocence, man’s soul was applied to perfecting and directing the body, just as it is now, and this is why the first man is said to have been made “a living soul” (Genesis 2:7), i.e., a soul giving life to a body and, more specifically, an animal soul. But as was explained above (q. 89, a. 1), [the first man] had integrity of life in the sense that his body was totally subject to his soul and in no way impeded it. And it is clear from what has gone before (q. 84, a. 7 and q. 85, a. 1) that because the soul is applied to directing and perfecting the body in its animal life, what belongs to our soul is a mode of intellectual understanding that involves turning toward phantasms. Hence, this mode of intellectual understanding likewise belonged to the soul of the first man.

Now given this mode of intellectual understanding, there are, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, three levels of movement in the soul: In the *first* of them “the soul is gathered into itself and away from exterior things.” The *second* level occurs when the soul ascends to the point of “being united with the united higher powers,” viz., the angels. In the *third* level the soul “is led to the good that surpasses all goods, viz., God.”

Therefore, with the first movement of the soul, which is away from exterior things and toward itself, our cognition of the soul is brought to perfection. For as was explained above (q. 87, a. 3), the soul’s intellectual operation has a natural ordering toward those things that lie outside itself, and so through the cognition of those things we can have a perfect cognition of our own intellectual operation, since an act is known through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself we can have a perfect cognition of the human intellect, since a power is known through its proper act.

By contrast, no perfect cognition is found in the second movement, since, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 2), an angel has intellectual understanding not by turning toward phantasms, but in a far more eminent way. So the mode of cognition just explained, by which the soul has cognition of itself, is not sufficient to lead to the cognition of an angel.

A fortiori, the third movement does not lead to perfect knowledge, since even the angels themselves are not able, by having cognition of themselves, to attain to the cognition of the divine substance—and this because of its surpassing nature (*propter eius excessum*).

So, then, the first man’s soul could not have seen the angels through their essence. However, it nonetheless had cognition of them in a more excellent mode than we ourselves have. For its cognition was more certain and more fixed with respect to interior intelligible things than our cognition is. And it is because of this great eminence that Gregory says that the first man’s soul “had commerce with the spirits of the angels.”

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what was just said.

Reply to objection 2: The fact that the first man's soul fell short of an intellectual understanding of the separated substances stemmed not from the body's weighing it down, but instead from the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of the separated substances. We ourselves, on the other hand, fall short for both these reasons.

Reply to objection 3: As was just explained, the first man's soul was not able through its cognition of itself to attain to a cognition of the separated substances. For even in the case of the separated substances, each has a cognition of other separated substances in a mode peculiar to itself (*per modum sui ipsius*).

Article 3

Did the first man have scientific knowledge of all things?

It seems that the first man did not have scientific knowledge of all things (*non habuerit scientiam omnium*):

Objection 1: Either (a) he had such knowledge through acquired [intelligible] species or (b) he had it through connatural species or (c) he had it through infused species. But not through acquired species, since, as *Metaphysics* 1 says, cognition of the sort in question is caused by experience, whereas he had not at that time experienced all things. Again, not through connatural species, since he had the same nature that we have and, as *De Anima* 3 says, our soul is "like a tablet on which nothing has been written." On the other hand, if he had such knowledge through infused species, then the knowledge he had of things was not of the same nature as our scientific knowledge, which we acquire from things.

Objection 2: The same mode of reaching perfection is present in all individuals of the same species. But other men do not at their inception have scientific knowledge of all things; instead, they acquire it in their own way over a period of time (*per temporis successionem*). Therefore, neither did Adam, immediately upon being formed, have scientific knowledge of all things.

Objection 3: The state of the present life is granted to man in order that his soul might make progress both with respect to cognition and with respect to merit; for this seems to be the reason why the soul is united to the body. But in that [initial] state man would have been making progress with respect to merit. Therefore, he would likewise have been making progress with respect to the cognition of things. Therefore, he did not have scientific knowledge of all things.

But contrary to this: He himself imposed names on the animals, as Genesis 2:20 says. But names have to fit the natures of things. Therefore, Adam knew the natures of all the animals and, by parity of reasoning, he had scientific knowledge of all other things.

I respond: In the order of nature, the perfect precedes the imperfect in the sense that actuality precedes potentiality; for what exists in potentiality is not led into actuality except by some actual being. And since things were originally instituted by God not only as they exist in themselves, but also as principles of other things, it follows that they were produced in a perfect state, in which they were able to be principles of other things.

Now man can be a principle of another not only through corporeal generation but also through instructing and governing (*per instructionem et gubernationem*). And so just as the first man was instituted in a perfect state with respect to his body, so that he could immediately generate, so also he was instituted in a perfect state with respect to his soul, so that he could immediately instruct and direct others. But no one can instruct unless he has scientific knowledge. And so the first man was instituted

by God in such a way that he had scientific knowledge of all the things in which a man is apt to be instructed. And these are all the things which exist virtually in the first principles that are known *per se*—in other words, whatever a man can have natural cognition of.

Now what is required for governing his own life and the lives of others is not only cognition of those things that can be naturally known, but also cognition of things that exceed natural cognition. For man's life is ordered toward a supernatural end. Similarly, in our own case, in order to govern our lives we must have cognition of what belongs to the Faith. Hence, the first man received cognition of these supernatural matters to the extent that this was necessary to direct human life in his state.

However, the first man did not have cognition of other things which cannot be known by man's natural efforts and which are not necessary for governing human life, e.g., the thoughts of men, future contingents, and singular facts such as, for instance, how many pebbles there are in a stream, and other things of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: The first man had scientific knowledge of all things through species that were infused by God. And yet his knowledge was not different in nature from our knowledge—just as the eyes that Christ gave to the man born blind were not different in nature from the eyes which nature produced.

Reply to objection 2: As is clear from what has been said, since Adam was the first man—something not true of the rest of men—it was fitting for him to have a modicum of perfection (*aliquid perfectionis*).

Reply to objection 3: In his scientific knowledge of naturally knowable things Adam made progress not with respect to the number of things known, but with respect to his mode of knowing them. For what he knew intellectually, he later came to know through experience.

On the other hand, as regards the supernatural things he had cognition of, he made progress, through new revelations, with respect to the number of things known, just as the angels make progress through new instances of enlightenment. However, progress in merit is unlike progress in knowledge, since it is not the case that one man is a principle of meriting for another man, whereas it is the case that one man is a principle of knowing for another man.

Article 4

Was man in his initial state able to be deceived?

It seems that man in his initial state was able to be deceived (*decipi potuisset*):

Objection 1: In 1 Timothy 2:14 the Apostle says, "The woman, having been deceived, was in sin."

Objection 2: In *Sentences* 2, dist. 21, the Master says, "The woman was not afraid of the serpent who was speaking to her, because she thought that he had received from God the role of speaking." But this was false. Therefore, the woman was deceived before the sin.

Objection 3: It is natural that the farther away something seems, the smaller it seems. But the nature of the eye is not changed because of sin, and so the same thing would have been true in the state of innocence. Therefore, a man would have been deceived about the size of something he saw, just as happens even now.

Objection 4: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12 Augustine says that in a dream the soul clings to a likeness as if it were something real. But in the state of innocence man ate and, as a result, slept and had dreams. Therefore, he was deceived by clinging to likenesses as if they were real things.

Objection 5: As was explained above (a. 3), the first man did not know men's thoughts or future

contingents. Therefore, if someone had spoken falsely to him about these matters, he would have been deceived.

But contrary to this: Augustine says, “It is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of the damned, to take truths for falsehoods.”

I respond: Some have claimed that there are two things that can be understood in the name ‘deception’: (a) a sort of cursory judgment (*qualiscumque existimatio levis*) by which someone clings to something false as if it were true, but without assent to the false belief (*sine assensu credulitatis*), and (b) a firm false belief (*firma credulitas*). Thus, with respect to things Adam had scientific knowledge of, man could not, before the sin, be deceived in either of these ways. But with respect to those things he did not have scientific knowledge of, he was able to be deceived, taking ‘deception’ in the broad sense for a sort of judgment that does not involve assent to a false belief (*pro existimatione qualicumque sine assensu credulitatis*). They make this claim because judging falsely in such matters is not harmful to a man; nor is it culpable, since assent is not rashly given.

However, this position is not consonant with the integrity of the initial state; for as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, in that state “there was a tranquil avoidance of sin such that, while the state remained, no evil at all could exist.” But it is clear that, as *Ethics* 6 explains, what is false is an evil for the intellect in the same way that what is true is its good. Hence, for as long as the state of innocence remained, it could not have been the case that man’s intellect should acquiesce in something false as if it were true. For just as there was a lack of a certain perfection, e.g., splendor (*claritas*), in the first man’s bodily parts and yet no evil could exist in him, so too in his intellect it was possible for there to be a lack of some sort of knowledge and yet there could not be any false judgment there (*nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi*).

The same point is also clear from the rectitude of the initial state. In accord with this rectitude, as long as the soul remained subject to God, man’s lower powers were subject to his higher powers and the higher powers were not impeded by the lower powers. But it is clear from what was said above (q. 85, a. 6) that the intellect always has truth with respect to its proper object. Hence, the intellect is never deceived in its own right; instead, every deception in the intellect stems from some lower power, viz., the imagination or some other such power. Hence, we see that as long as the power of natural judgment (*naturale iudicatorium*) is not rendered inoperative, we are not deceived by appearances; rather, we are deceived only when that power is rendered inoperative, as is clear in the case of those who are asleep. Hence, it is clear that the rectitude of the initial state is not compatible with any deception in the intellect.

Reply to objection 1: Even though the seduction of the woman preceded the sin of deed (*peccatum operis*), it was subsequent to a sin of interior elation. For in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 11 Augustine says, “The woman would not have believed the serpent’s words if she had not already had in her mind a love for her own power and a proud presumptuousness regarding that power.”

Reply to objection 2: What the woman believed was that the serpent had received the role of speaking (*officium loquendi*) not through its own nature, but by some supernatural act.

In any case, it is not necessary to follow the Master’s authority on this point.

Reply to objection 3: If something had been represented to the first man’s sensory power or imagination otherwise than it was in reality, he would not thereby have been deceived; for he would have discerned the truth through his reason.

Reply to objection 4: What happens in a dream is not imputed to a man, since he does not at that time have the use of reason, which is man’s proper operation.

Reply to objection 5: When someone told a falsehood about future contingents or the thoughts of the heart, a man in the state of innocence would not have believed that it was so; instead, he would have believed that it was possible—and this would not have been to make a false judgment.

An alternative reply is that he was divinely assisted, lest he be deceived in matters that he did not have scientific knowledge of. Nor does it count against this, as some have asserted, that in the temptation he was not assisted in not being deceived, even though he especially needed to be assisted at that point. For a sin had already taken place in his mind, and he did not have recourse to God's assistance.

QUESTION 95

Things Relevant to the First Man's Will, viz., Grace and Justice

The next thing we have to consider is what pertains to the first man's will. On this point there are two topics: first, concerning the grace and justice or moral rectitude of the first man (*de gratia et iustitia primi hominis*) (question 95) and, second, concerning the use of justice in his dominion over other things (question 96).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Was the first man created in grace? (2) Did the soul have passions in the state of innocence? (3) Did the soul have all virtues in the state of innocence? (4) Were the first man's works as efficacious for meriting as our works are now?

Article 1

Was the first man created in grace?

It seems that the first man was not created in grace (*creatus in gratia*):

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 15:45 the Apostle, distinguishing Adam from Christ, says, "The first Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a life-giving spirit." But the spirit's life-giving occurs through grace. Therefore, it is peculiar to Christ that he was made in grace.

Objection 2: In *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* Augustine says, "Adam did not have the Holy Spirit." But whoever has grace has the Holy Spirit. Therefore, Adam was not created in grace.

Objection 3: In *De Correptione et Gratia* Augustine says, "God ordered the lives of angels and men in such a way that He demonstrated in them, first, what their free choice was capable of and, second, what the gift of grace and the judgment of justice were capable of." Therefore, He first established men and angels with only their natural freedom of choice, and afterwards He conferred grace on them.

Objection 4: In *Sentences* 2, dist. 24 the Master says, "In creation man was given assistance through which he was able to hold his own but was not able to make progress (*datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat sed non poterat proficere*)." But whoever has grace is able to make progress through merit. Therefore, the first man was not created in grace.

Objection 5: In order for someone to receive grace, consent is required on the part of the recipient, since a sort of spiritual marriage is thereby consummated between God and the soul. But the consent to grace can belong only to someone who already exists. Therefore, man did not receive grace at the first instant of his creation.

Objection 6: Nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is nothing other than consummated grace. But in man grace preceded glory. Therefore, *a fortiori*, nature preceded grace.

But contrary to this: Men and angels are equally ordered toward grace. But angels were created in grace; for in *De Civitate Dei* 12 Augustine says, "God was in them, simultaneously creating them and giving them grace." Therefore, man was likewise created in grace.

I respond: Some claim that the first man was not created in grace, but that instead grace was conferred on him later—though before he sinned, since many passages from the saints attest that man had grace in the state of innocence.

However, as others claim, the very rectitude of the initial state in which God made man seems to require that man was created in grace—this according to Ecclesiastes 7:30 ("God made man upright"). For this rectitude involved reason's being subject to God, the lower powers' being subject to reason, and the body's being subject to the soul, where the first sort of subordination (*subjectio*) was a cause of both the second and the third. For, as Augustine says, as long as reason remained subject to God, the lower powers were subject to reason.

However, it is obvious that the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural; otherwise, it would have remained after the sin, since even among the demons their natural gifts remained after their sin, as Dionysius points out in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4. Hence, it is clear that the first sort of subjection, by which reason was subject to God, likewise did not stem from nature, but stemmed instead from the supernatural gift of grace, since it is impossible for an effect to be more potent than its cause. Thus, in *De Civitate Dei* 13 Augustine says, “After they had committed the transgression against the precept, and after God’s grace had deserted them, they were ashamed of the nakedness of their bodies; for they sensed the urges of their disobedient flesh as a punishment that corresponded to their own disobedience.” From this we can see that if the flesh’s obedience to the soul was lost when grace deserted them, then it was through the presence of grace in their soul that the lower powers had been subject to the soul.

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle adduces these words in order to show that there is a spiritual body if there is an animal body, since the life of the spiritual body began in Christ, who is “the firstborn from the dead” (Colossians 1:18), just as the life of the animal body began in Adam. Therefore, the Apostle’s words imply not that Adam was not spiritual with respect to his soul, but rather that he was not spiritual with respect to his body.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine points out in the same place, it is not being denied that the Holy Spirit was in Adam in some way, just as He is in the rest of those who are justified. Rather, the claim is that the Holy Spirit “was not in Adam in the same way that He is now in the faithful,” who are admitted to the reception of their eternal inheritance immediately after death.

Reply to objection 3: On the basis of this passage from Augustine one may conclude not that angels or men were created in a natural freedom of choice before they had grace, but that He made manifest in them (a) what free choice was capable of before their confirmation [in the good] and (b) what they would attain afterwards through the assistance of confirming grace.

Reply to objection 4: The Master is speaking in accord with the opinion of those who claimed that man was created in a natural state only (*in naturalibus tantum*) and not in grace.

An alternative reply is that even if man was created in grace, he still had his ability to make progress through merit from additional grace (*ex superadditione gratiae*) and not from the creation of his nature.

Reply to objection 5: Since the will’s movement is not continuous, nothing prevents it from being the case that the first man consented to grace at the very first instant of his creation.

Reply to objection 6: We merit glory through an act of grace, but we do not merit grace through an act of nature. Therefore, the cases are not parallel.

Article 2

Did the passions of the soul exist in the first man?

It seems that the passions of the soul did not exist in the first man:

Objection 1: It is because of the passions of the soul that “the flesh lusts against the spirit” (Galatians 5:17). But this did not occur in the state of innocence. Therefore, in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.

Objection 2: Adam’s soul was more noble than his body. But Adam’s body was impassible. Therefore, there were no passions in his soul, either.

Objection 3: The passions of the soul are suppressed (*comprimuntur*) by moral virtue. But in

Adam there was perfect moral virtue. Therefore, the passions were totally excluded from him.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that [our first parents] had “an untroubled love for God” and certain other passions of the soul.

I respond: The passions of the soul exist in the sentient appetite (*in appetitu sensuali*), the object of which is the good and the bad. Hence, among all the passions of the soul, some, e.g., love (*amor*) and joy (*gaudium*), are related to what is good, and some, e.g., fear (*timor*) and sorrow (*dolor*), are related to what is bad. And since, as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, in the initial state (a) there was nothing bad that was either present or threatening and (b) there was nothing good which was absent and which a good will would at that time have desired to possess, none of the passions that are related to what is bad, e.g., fear, sorrow, and others of this kind, existed in Adam, and, similarly, neither did those passions which are related to something good that is not had and yet should be had at present, e.g., an urgent desire (*cupiditas aestuans*).

However, those passions that can relate to a present good, e.g., joy and love, or to a future good to be had in its own time, e.g., a non-distressed desire or hope, did exist in the state of innocence—though otherwise than they exist in us. For in us the sentient appetite, in which the passions exist, is not totally subject to reason. And so the passions sometimes exist in us in a way that precedes reason’s judgment and impedes it, whereas sometimes they follow upon reason’s judgment, so that the sentient appetite obeys reason in some way. By contrast, in the state of innocence the lower appetite was totally subject to reason, and so the only passions in it were ones that follow upon the judgment of reason.

Reply to objection 1: The flesh “lusts against the spirit” in the sense that the passions fight against reason—something that did not occur in the state of innocence.

Reply to objection 2: In the state of innocence the human body was impassible with respect to those passions that undermine its natural disposition (*removent dispositionem naturalem*); this will be explained below (q. 97, a. 2). Similarly, the soul was impassible with respect to those passions that impede reason.

Reply to objection 3: Perfect moral virtue does not totally eliminate the passions, but instead orders them. For instance, as *Ethics* 3 says, “It belongs to the temperate man to desire what is necessary as is necessary.”

Article 3

Did Adam have all the virtues?

It seems that Adam did not have all the virtues:

Objection 1: Certain virtues are ordered toward constraining immoderation in the passions, in the way that immoderate desire (*immoderata concupiscentia*) is constrained by temperance (*temperantia*) and immoderate fear (*immoderatus timor*) is constrained by fortitude (*fortitudo*). But in the state of innocence immoderation in the passions did not exist. Therefore, neither did the aforementioned virtues exist.

Objection 2: Certain virtues have to do with passions that are related to what is bad—for instance, mildness (*mansuetudo*) has to do with instances of anger (*irae*) and fortitude has to do with instances of fear. But as has been explained (a. 2), such passions did not exist in the state of innocence. Therefore, neither did virtues of this type.

Objection 3: Repentance (*poenitentia*) is a virtue having to do with a previously committed sin; likewise, mercy (*miser cordia*) is a virtue having to do with unhappiness (*miseria*). But in the state of

innocence there was neither sin nor unhappiness. Therefore, neither were there virtues of this sort.

Objection 4: Perseverance (*perseverantia*) is a virtue. But as his later sin demonstrated, Adam did not have this virtue. Therefore, it is not the case that he had all the virtues.

Objection 5: Faith (*fides*) is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an enigmatic cognition (*importat aenigmaticam cognitionem*), which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the initial state.

But contrary to this: In one of his homilies Augustine says, “The prince of vices conquered Adam, who had been made to God’s image from the slime of the earth and who was armed with modesty (*pudicitia armatum*), restrained by temperance (*temperantia compositum*), and refulgent with splendor (*claritate splendidum*).”

I respond: There is a certain sense in which man had all the virtues in the state of innocence. This can be made clear from what has already been said. For it was explained above (a. 1) that the rectitude of the initial state was such that reason was subject to God and the lower powers were subject to reason. But the virtues are nothing other than certain perfections by which reason is ordered to God and by which the lower powers are disposed to following the rule of reason; this will become clearer when we discuss the virtues (*ST* 1-2, qq. 55-70). Hence, the rectitude of the initial state required that man in some sense have all the virtues.

However, note that certain virtues, e.g., *charity* and *justice*, are such that by their nature they involve no imperfection. Virtues of this sort existed absolutely speaking in the state of innocence, both with respect to their habits and with respect to their acts.

By contrast, there are some virtues that involve imperfection by their very nature, either on the part of their act or on the part of their matter. If the imperfection in question is not incompatible with the perfection of the initial state, then virtues of this sort could still have existed in the initial state. Examples are *faith*, which is directed toward things that are not seen, and *hope*, which is directed toward things that are not had. For the perfection of the first state did not extend to seeing God through His essence or to having Him with the enjoyment of final beatitude, and so faith and hope were able to have existed in the initial state, both with respect to their habits and with respect to their acts.

But if the imperfection that has to do with the nature of a given virtue is incompatible with the perfection of the initial state, then that virtue was able to have existed in the initial state with respect to its habit but not with respect to its act. This is clear, for instance, in the case of *repentance*, which is sorrow (*dolor*) for a sin that has been committed, and in the case of *mercy*, which is sorrow at the unhappiness of another; for sorrow, along with guilt and unhappiness, are incompatible with the perfection of the initial state. Hence, virtues of this sort existed in the first man with respect to their habits, but not with respect to their acts. For the first man was disposed in such a way that if he had previously sinned, he would be sorrowful, and, similarly, if he were to see unhappiness in another, he would dispel it as far as he was able to. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, “Shame”—which has to do with one’s own bad deeds—“occurs in a virtuous man only conditionally. For he is so disposed that he would feel shame if he were to commit some bad deed.”

Reply to objection 1: It is incidental to temperance and fortitude to *repel* excessive passions; this occurs [only] to the extent that there are excessive passions in their subject. By contrast, what belongs *per se* to virtues of this sort is to *moderate* the passions.

Reply to objection 2: The passions directed toward what is bad are incompatible with the perfection of the initial state if, like fear and sorrow, they are directed toward something bad that exists in the one having the passion.

By contrast, passions that have a relation to something bad that exists in someone else are not incompatible with the perfection of the initial state; for instance, in the initial state man was able to have

hated the malice of the demons in the same way that he loved the goodness of God. Hence, the virtues that have to do with such passions were able to have existed in the initial state, both with respect to their habit and with respect to their act.

However, virtues having to do with the passions that are directed toward what is bad in the same subject are such that, if they have to do only with passions of the sort in question, then they were able to have existed in the initial state only with respect to their habit and not with respect to their act—as has been explained concerning repentance and mercy.

On the other hand, there are certain virtues that have to do not only with these passions but also with other passions—e.g., temperance, which has to do not only with types of sadness (*circa tristitias*), but also with pleasures (*circa delectationes*), and fortitude, which has to do not only with types of fear (*circa timores*), but also with audacity and hope (*circa audaciam et spem*). Hence, an act of temperance could have existed in the initial state insofar as it was moderating pleasures; and the same holds for fortitude insofar as it was moderating audacity or hope, though not insofar as it was moderating sadness or fear.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 4: ‘Perseverance’ is taken in two ways:

In one way, insofar as it is a *virtue*, and in this sense it signifies a habit by which someone chooses to persevere in the good. On this reading, Adam had perseverance.

In the second way, insofar as it is a *circumstance modifying a virtue*, and in this sense it signifies a certain continuity of virtue without interruption. On this reading, Adam did not have perseverance.

Reply to objection 5: The reply to the fifth objection is clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Were the first man’s works less efficacious for meriting than our works are?

It seems that the first man’s work were less efficacious for meriting than our works are:

Objection 1: Grace is given out of God’s mercy, which grants more help to those who are more needy. But we ourselves need grace more than the first man did in the state of innocence. Therefore, grace is poured into us more copiously. Since grace is the root of merit, our works are rendered more efficacious for meriting.

Objection 2: A certain struggle and difficulty is required for merit. For 2 Timothy 2:5 says, “He who does not legitimately struggle will not be crowned,” and in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, “Virtue has to do with the difficult and the good.” But there is more struggle and difficulty now. Therefore, there is also more efficacy for meriting now.

Objection 3: In *Sentences* 2, dist. 24 the Master says, “Man would not have merited by resisting temptation, but now one who resists temptation merits.” Therefore, our works are more efficacious for meriting than were works in the initial state.

But contrary to this: On this view, man would be in a better condition after the sin.

I respond: The quantity of merit can be thought of in two ways:

In one way, in terms of its *root* in charity and grace (*ex radice caritatis et gratiae*). And on this reading, the quantity of merit corresponds to the *essential* reward (*praemio essentiali*), which consists in the enjoyment of God; for someone who does something out of greater charity enjoys God more perfectly.

In the second way, the quantity of merit can be thought of in terms of the quantity of the *work* (*ex*

quantitate operis); and this is twofold, viz., *absolute* quantity and *proportional* quantity (*quantitas absoluta et proportionalis*). For the widow who put two mites into the treasury did a lesser work in terms of absolute quantity than those who put in large sums, but in terms of proportional quantity the widow did more in our Lord's view, because she exceeded her means to a greater degree (Mark 12:41, Luke 21:1). Still, both of these sorts of quantity of merit correspond to an *incidental* reward (*praemio accidentali*), viz., joy with respect to a created good.

So, then, one should say that the works of man were more efficacious for meriting in the state of innocence than after the sin, if what is meant is the quantity of merit on the part of grace; for grace was more copious at that time, when no obstacle to it existed in human nature. The same thing holds if one considers the *absolute quantity* of the work. For since man had greater virtue, he did greater works.

However, if one considers *proportional quantity*, then more of the character of merit is found after the sin because of man's weakness. For a small work exceeds the power of someone who does it with difficulty to a greater degree than a great work exceeds the power of someone who does it without difficulty.

Reply to objection 1: After the sin man needed grace for more works than before the sin, but he did not have more of a need for grace. For even before the sin man needed grace to attain eternal life, which is the main reason why grace is necessary. But beyond this, after the sin man also needs grace for the remission of his sins and for support in his weakness.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, difficulty and struggle have to do with the quantity of merit in the sense of the proportional quantity of the works. For it is a sign of the will's promptitude that it tries to do what is difficult for itself, and the will's promptitude is caused by the magnitude of its charity. However, it can happen that, because someone is prepared to do even something that is difficult for himself, he does an easy work with as prompt a will as someone else does a difficult work. Still, to the extent that the actual difficulty has the character of punishment, it also has the character of satisfying for sin (*inquantum est poenalis habet etiam quod sit satisfactoria pro peccato*).

Reply to objection 3: According to the opinion of those who hold that the first man did not have grace, it would not have been meritorious for him to resist temptation, just as this is not now meritorious for someone who does not have grace. But there is a difference here, since in the initial state there was nothing interior that impelled man toward what is bad, as there now is. Hence, man would have been able to resist temptation more easily without grace at that time than he is now.

QUESTION 96

The Sort of Dominion That Belonged to the First Man in the State of Innocence

The next thing we have to consider is the sort of dominion that belonged to man in the state of innocence. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Did man in the state of innocence have dominion over the animals? (2) Did he have dominion over every creature? (3) Would all men have been equal in the state of innocence? (4) Did one man have dominion over another in the state of innocence?

Article 1

Did Adam in the state of innocence have dominion over the animals?

It seems that in the state of innocence Adam did not have dominion over the animals (*Adam in statu innocentiae animalibus non dominabatur*):

Objection 1: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 9 Augustine says that it was by the ministry of the angels that the animals were brought to Adam, so that he might impose names on them. But the ministry of the angels would not have been necessary in this case if man had had dominion over the animals in his own right. Therefore, in the state of innocence man did not have dominion over the other animals.

Objection 2: It is not right to bring together under one dominion things that are in conflict with one another (*discordant ad invicem*). But many animals, e.g. the sheep and the wolf, are naturally in conflict with one another. Therefore, it is not the case that all the animals were included under man's dominion.

Objection 3: Jerome says, "God gave man dominion over the animals before the sin even though man did not need it, because He foreknew that after the Fall man would be helped by the support of the animals." Therefore, before the sin it was at least the case that man did not make use of his dominion over the animals.

Objection 4: It seems proper to a master (*dominus*) to rule (*praecipere*). But rule (*praeceptum*) is appropriately exercised only over those who have reason. Therefore, man did not have dominion over the non-rational animals.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:26 says of man, "Let him have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air and over the beasts of the earth."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 95, a. 1), disobedience against man on the part of those things that should be subject to him followed as his punishment for his own disobedience against God. And so in the state of innocence, before this act of disobedience, nothing that should naturally be subject to man put up any opposition against him. But all the animals were naturally subject to man.

This is made clear in three ways:

First, from *the very manner in which nature proceeds*. For just as in the generation of things one sees a certain order by which nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect (since matter exists for the sake of form, and a less perfect form exists for the sake of a more perfect form), so too this holds with respect to the use that is made of natural things; more specifically, the less perfect are made use of by the more perfect. For instance, for their nourishment plants make use of the earth, and animals make use of plants, and men make use of both plants and animals. Hence, man by nature has dominion over the animals. Thus, the Philosopher says in *Politics* 1 that it is just and natural to hunt wild animals, because man thereby lays claim to what is naturally his.

Second, the same point is clear from *the order of God's providence*, which always governs lower things by means of higher things. Hence, since man is higher than the rest of the animals, given that he is

made to the image of God, it is appropriate for the other animals to be subject to his governance.

Third, the same point is clear from *the properties of man and the other animals*. For in the other animals what one finds, in accord with their natural judgment, is a certain participation in prudence with respect to some particular acts, whereas in man one finds general prudence, i.e., reason with respect to all actions (*ratio omnium agibilium*). But whatever is such-and-such by participation is subject to that which is such-and-such through its essence and in a general way.

Hence, it is clear that the subjection of the other animals to man is something natural.

Reply to objection 1: A higher power can do many things to his subjects that a lower power cannot do. But an angel is naturally higher than a man. Hence, some effect with respect to animals that was not able to be brought about by human power was able to be brought about by angelic power, viz., that all the animals should be brought together at once.

Reply to objection 2: Some claim that the animals that are now ferocious and kill other animals were tame in that initial state not only with respect to men but also with respect to the other animals.

However, this claim is wholly unreasonable. For the nature of the animals was not changed through man's sin in such a way that certain animals, e.g., lions and falcons, for whom it is now natural to eat the flesh of other animals, lived off of plants at that time. Moreover, Bede's gloss on Genesis 1:30 says that trees and plants were given not to *all* the animals and birds as food, but to *some* of them. Therefore, there would have been natural conflict among certain animals.

However, the animals were not thereby removed from man's dominion, just as they are not now thereby removed from the dominion of God, by whose providence all of this is arranged. Moreover, man executed this providence, even as is now obvious in the case of domestic animals. For men give hens as food to domesticated falcons.

Reply to objection 3: In the state of innocence men did not need animals (a) for bodily necessities, or (b) for clothing, since they were naked and unashamed and untroubled by any movement of disordered desire, or (c) for food, since they fed on the trees of Paradise, or (d) for transportation, because of their own bodily strength.

However, they did need the animals in order to gain experiential cognition of the animals' natures. This is indicated by the fact that God brought the animals to Adam, so that he might impose upon them names that designate their natures.

Reply to objection 4: The other animals have a certain participation in prudence and reason because of their natural judgment (*secundum aestimationem naturalem*), by which cranes follow their leader and bees obey their ruler. And they obeyed man at that time in the same way that certain domestic animals obey him now.

Article 2

Did man have dominion over all other creatures?

It seems that man did not have dominion over all other creatures:

Objection 1: Angels are naturally more powerful than men. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, "Corporeal matter did not obey even the holy angels at their will." Therefore, *a fortiori*, it did not obey man in the state of innocence.

Objection 2: The only powers of the soul had by plants are the nutritive power, the augmentative power, and the generative power. But these powers are not apt by nature to obey reason, as is clear within one and the same man. Therefore, since dominion belongs to man because of his reason, it seems

that in the state of innocence man did not have dominion over plants.

Objection 3: Whoever has dominion over a thing can change that thing. But man was not able to change the course of the celestial bodies, since this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says in his letter to Polycarp. Therefore, he did not have dominion over them.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:26 says of man, "... that he might have dominion over every creature."

I respond: In a certain sense all things exist within man, and so he has dominion over other things in the sense that he has dominion over what exists within himself.

Now there are four things to take account of within man, viz., *reason*, in accord with which he is like the angels; *the sentient powers*, in accord with which he is like the animals; *the natural powers*, in accord with which he is like the plants; and *the body itself*, in accord with which he is like inanimate things.

Now within man reason plays the role of that which has dominion and is not subject to any dominion. Hence, in his initial state man did not have dominion over the angels; and when it says "every creature," what this means is "every creature that is not made to God's image."

On the other hand, the soul, by commanding, has dominion over the sentient powers, such as the irascible and concupiscible powers, which in some sense obey reason. Hence, in the state of innocence man likewise had dominion over the other animals through his command.

Again, man has dominion over the natural powers, and the body itself, by making use of them rather than by commanding them. And so in the state of innocence man likewise had dominion over plants and inanimate things in this way—not by commanding them or changing them, but by using their help without impediment.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 3

Would all men have been equal in the state of innocence?

It seems that all men would have been equal in the state of innocence (*homines omnes fuissent aequales*):

Objection 1: Gregory says, "When we do not commit crimes (*ubi non delinquimus*), we are all equal (*pares*)."

 But there was no crime in the state of innocence. Therefore, everyone was equal.

Objection 2: Likeness and equality are the reason for mutual love (*ratio mutuae dilectionis*)—this according to Ecclesiasticus 13:19 ("Every animal loves what is like itself, and so too every man loves his neighbor"). But love among men, which is a bond of peace, abounded in the state of innocence. Therefore, everyone would have been equal in the state of innocence.

Objection 3: When a cause ceases, its effect ceases. But the cause of inequality among men at present seems to be (a) from the side of *God*, given that He rewards some for merits and punishes others, and (b) from the side of *nature*, given that some are born disabled or deprived because of a natural defect, while some are born strong and perfect. These things would not have occurred in the initial state.

But contrary to this: Romans 13:1 says, "What is from God is ordered toward God." But order seems to consist especially in inequality; for in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, "Order is an arrangement of equal and unequal things, assigning places to each." Therefore, in the initial state, which would have been the most orderly, there was inequality.

I respond: One must claim that there would have been some inequality in the initial state, at least with respect to sex, since without diversity of sex there would have been no generation. Likewise, there would have been inequality with respect to age, since some would have been born from others; nor would those who had sexual relations have been sterile.

But there would also have been diversity in the soul, both with respect to moral rectitude (*quantum ad iustitiam*) and with respect to knowledge. For man would have acted by free choice and not by necessity, and because of this men would have been able to apply themselves in greater or lesser degrees to doing or willing or knowing something. Hence, some would have made more progress than others in moral rectitude and knowledge.

Again, there could have been inequality on the part of the body. For the human body was not wholly exempt from the laws of nature in the sense that it would not receive greater or lesser help or assistance from exterior agents, since the life of men would likewise have been sustained by food. So nothing prevents one from saying that, given the diverse climatic conditions and the diverse arrangements of the stars, some would have been born more robust and bigger and more beautiful and more attractive in body than others. Yet in those who were surpassed in such things, there would have been no defect or flaw (*defectus sive peccatum*), either with respect to the soul or with respect to the body.

Reply to objection 1: With these words Gregory intends to rule out an inequality that stems from differences in moral rectitude and sin, on the basis of which some have to be subjected to others as a punishment.

Reply to objection 2: Equality is the reason why mutual love is equal. However, it is possible for there to be greater love among unequals than among equals, even though this sort of love does not come from both parties equally. For instance, a father naturally loves his child more than a brother loves his brother—even though a child does not love his father to the same degree that he is loved by him.

Reply to objection 3: The reason for the inequality could have been from the side of God, not in the sense that He punished some and rewarded others, but in the sense that He elevated some to a greater degree and some to a lesser degree, so that the beauty of order would better shine through among men. And the inequality could also have been caused in the way explained above from the side of nature—and this without any defect of nature.

Article 4

Did one man have dominion over another in the state of innocence?

It seems that one man did not have dominion over another in the state of innocence (*homo homini non dominabatur*):

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “God wanted rational man, made to His own image, to have dominion only over non-rational beings; He wanted man to have dominion over the beasts and not over man.”

Objection 2: Anything introduced as a punishment for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man’s being subject to man was introduced as a punishment for sin; for instance, after the sin the woman was told, “You will be under the man’s power” (Genesis 3:16). Therefore, in the state of innocence it was not the case that one man was subject to another.

Objection 3: Subordination is opposed to freedom. But freedom is one of the principal goods that was not lacking in the state of innocence, where “nothing was lacking that a good will could desire,” as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 14. Therefore, it is not the case that one man had dominion over

another in the state of innocence.

But contrary to this: The condition of men in the state of innocence was not more dignified than the condition of the angels. But among the angels there are some who have dominion over others; thus, one order of angels is even called Dominations. Therefore, it is not contrary to the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should have dominion over another.

I respond: ‘Dominion’ (*dominium*) is taken in two senses:

(a) In one sense, dominion is opposed to servitude, and in this sense a lord (*dominus*) is one to whom someone is subject as a servant (*servus*).

(b) In the second sense, dominion is related in general to any kind of subject at all, and in this sense even someone who has the role of governing and directing free men (*liberi*) can be called a lord.

Thus, if we take ‘dominion’ in the first sense, then it is not the case that one man had dominion over another in the state of innocence, whereas if we take ‘dominion’ in the second sense, then it was possible for one man to have dominion over another in the state of innocence. The reason for this is that a servant differs from a free man in that “a free man is a cause of himself (*causa sui*),” as it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, whereas a servant is ordered toward another.

Thus, someone has dominion over another *as a servant* when the one who has dominion looks to the one over whom he has dominion for his usefulness to himself, i.e., to the one who has dominion. And since everyone desires his own good and consequently finds it deplorable to have to give exclusively to someone else a good that ought to have been his own, it follows that this sort of dominion cannot exist without suffering on the part of the subjects (*sine poena subiectorum*). Consequently, this sort of dominion of one man over another would not have existed in the state of innocence.

On the other hand, someone has dominion over another *as a free man* when he directs him either to the proper good of the one who is being directed or to the common good. And this sort of dominion of one man over another would have existed in the state of innocence—and this for two reasons.

First, man is naturally a social animal, and so in the state of innocence men would have lived in society (*vixissent socialiter*). But it would not be possible for a multitude to live in society unless there were someone in charge who looked toward the common good (*nisi aliquis praesideret qui ad bonum commune intenderet*); for the many necessarily look toward many goods, while the one looks toward one good. This is why the Philosopher says at the beginning of the *Politics* that whenever the many are ordered toward one thing, that one thing will always be found to be central and directive (*unum ut principale et dirigens*).

Second, if one man had preeminence over another in knowledge and moral rectitude, then it would not have been fitting for him not to act for the benefit of the others—this according to 1 Peter 4:10 (“As every man has received grace, ministering the same one to another”). Thus, in *De Civitate Dei* 19 Augustine says, “Those who are just rule not out of a desire to dominate, but because it is their duty to give counsel (*officio consulendi*). The natural order of things prescribes this, and thus did God make man.”

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: From what has been said it is clear how to reply to all the objections, which are based on the first sense of ‘dominion’.

QUESTION 97

The Conservation of the Individual in the First State

The next thing we have to consider is what pertains to the state of the first man with respect to the body: first, as regards the conservation of the individual (question 97); and, second, as regards the conservation of the species (questions 98-101).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Was man immortal in the state of innocence? (2) Was man impassible in the state of innocence? (3) Did man need food in the state of innocence? (4) Did he attain immortality through the tree of life?

Article 1

Was man immortal in the state of innocence?

It seems that man was not immortal in the state of innocence:

Objection 1: *Mortal* is part of the definition of man. But when a definition is denied, the thing defined is denied. Therefore, if he was a man, then he could not have been immortal.

Objection 2: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, “What is corruptible differs in genus from what is incorruptible.” But there is no transmutation of things differing in genus into one another. Therefore, if the first man was incorruptible, then man would not be able to be corruptible in the present state (*in statu isto*).

Objection 3: If man was immortal in the state of innocence, this was so either by nature or by grace. But it was not by nature; for since nature remains the same in species, he would also be immortal now. Similarly, it was not by grace, since the first man recovered grace through repentance—this according to Wisdom 10:2 (“He brought him out of his sins”). Therefore, he would have recovered his immortality, too. But this is obviously false. Therefore, man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

Objection 4: Immortality is promised to man as a reward—this according to Apocalypse 21:4 (“Death will be no more”). But man was not created in a state of reward; rather, he was created in order to merit a reward. Therefore, man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

But contrary to this: Romans 5:12 says, “Through sin death entered into the world.” Therefore, before the sin man was immortal.

I respond: There are three senses in which a thing can be said to be incorruptible:

(a) First, *because of matter* (*ex parte materiae*), viz., either because it does not have matter, as in the case of the angels, or because it has matter that is in potentiality only to a single [substantial] form, as in the case of the celestial bodies. This is called *being incorruptible by nature*.

(b) Second, a thing is said to be incorruptible *because of a form* (*ex parte formae*), viz., when a thing corruptible by nature has a disposition by which it is absolutely prevented from being corrupted (*dispositio per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur*). This is called *being incorruptible by glory*, since as Augustine says in his letter *Ad Dioscorum*, “God made the soul so powerful by nature that the fullness of its health, i.e., the vigor of its incorruption, spills over from its beatitude into its body.”

(c) Third, a thing is said to be incorruptible *because of an efficient cause* (*ex parte causae efficientis*). This is the sense in which man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For as Augustine says in *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, “God made man to live immortally as long as he did not sin, so that he would be the source of life or death for himself.” For his body was not incorruptible (*indissolubile*) through any sort of vigor of immortality that existed within it; instead, his soul had a certain power, given supernaturally by God, through which, as long as it remained subject to God, it was able to preserve the body from all corruption. This made good sense. For since, as was

explained above (q. 76, a. 1), the rational soul exceeds the proportion of corporeal matter, it was fitting that at the beginning a power should be given to it by which it was able to conserve the body in a way that exceeded the nature of corporeal matter.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: These arguments go through in the case of what is incorruptible and immortal by nature.

Reply to objection 3: The power of preserving the body from corruption was not natural to the human soul, but stemmed from a gift of grace. And even though the soul would regain grace with respect to having its sins remitted and meriting glory, it would nonetheless not regain it with respect to the effect of its lost immortality. For this effect was reserved for Christ, through whom, as will be explained below (ST 3, q. 14, a. 4), the defect of nature was to be remade into something better (*naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat*).

Reply to objection 4: The immortality of glory, which is promised as a reward, is different from the immortality which was given to man in the state of innocence.

Article 2

Was man passible in the state of innocence?

It seems that man was passible in the state of innocence:

Objection 1: To sense something is a sort of being acted upon (*pati quoddam*). But in the state of innocence man was able to have sensation. Therefore, he was passible.

Objection 2: Sleeping is a sort of being acted upon (*passio quaedam*). But man slept in the state of innocence—this according to Genesis 2:21 (“God cast a deep sleep upon Adam”). Therefore, he was passible.

Objection 3: In the same place it adds, “He took one of his ribs.” Therefore, he was passible even to the point of the having part of his body removed.

Objection 4: Man’s body was soft. But what is soft is naturally passive in relation to what is hard. Therefore, if a hard body had struck the first man’s body, he would have been acted upon by it. And so the first man was passible.

But contrary to this: If he was passible, then he was also corruptible, since being acted upon, if amplified, brings a substance to ruin (*passio magis facta abiicit a substantia*).

I respond: There are two senses of ‘being acted upon’ (*passio*):

(a) The first sense is the proper one, and in this sense ‘is acted upon’ is said of something that is taken out of its natural disposition (*a sua naturali dispositione removetur*). For a passion is the effect of an action, and among natural things contraries act on one another and are acted upon by one another, and one takes another out of its natural disposition.

(b) In the second sense, ‘is acted upon’ is taken in a general way for any sort of change, even if it contributes to the perfection of the nature. It is in this sense that an act of intellective understanding or an act of sensing is said to be an instance of being acted upon.

Therefore, in the second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and he was acted upon, both with respect to his body and with respect to his soul. By contrast, in the first sense of ‘being acted upon’, he was impassible both with respect to his body and with respect to his soul, just as he was immortal. For he was able to prevent his being acted upon—just as he was likewise able to prevent his death—as long as he persisted without sin.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: This makes clear the reply to objections one and two. For

sensing and sleeping do not take a man out of his natural disposition, but instead order him toward the good of nature.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 92, a. 3), the rib existed in Adam insofar as he was the source of the human race, just as semen exists in a man insofar as he is a source through generation. Therefore, just as the release of semen is not accompanied by an instance of being acted upon which takes a man out of his natural disposition, so one should say the same thing about the removal of the rib in question.

Reply to objection 4: In the state of innocence man's body was able to persist without suffering injury from anything hard—partly because of man's own reason, through which he was able to avoid dangers, and partly because of God's providence, which protected him in such a way that nothing unexpected would happen to him by which he might be injured.

Article 3

Did man need food in the state of innocence?

It seems that man did not need food in the state of innocence (*non indigebat cibis*):

Objection 1: Man needs food in order to restore what has been lost. But in Adam's body, it seems, there was no loss, since he was incorruptible. Therefore, he did not need food.

Objection 2: Food is necessary for nutrition. But nutrition does not occur without one's being acted upon. Therefore, since man's body was impassible, food was not, it seems, necessary for him.

Objection 3: For us food is necessary for the conservation of our life. But there was another way in which Adam was able to conserve his life, since he was not going to die as long as he did not sin. Therefore, food was not necessary for him.

Objection 4: The discharge of excess materials (*emissio superfluitatum*) follows upon the consumption of food; but this excess material has a foulness that does not befit the dignity of the initial state. Therefore, it seems that in the initial state man did not make use of food.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:16 says, "You shall eat of every tree that is in Paradise."

I respond: In the state of innocence man had an animal life in need of food, whereas after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life that is not in need of food.

To see this clearly, note that the rational soul is both a *soul* (*anima*) and a *spirit* (*spiritus*). It is called a *soul* with respect to what is common to it and the other souls, viz., giving life to a body; hence Genesis 2:7 says, "Man was made into a living soul," i.e., a soul giving life to a body. On the other hand, it is called a *spirit* with respect to what is proper to itself and not to the other souls, viz., that it has an immaterial intellectual power.

Therefore, in the initial state the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to the soul insofar as it is a *soul*, and so the body was called an animal insofar as it had life from the soul. But as the *De Anima* says, among the lower things here below the first source of life is the vegetative soul, whose operations are to make use of food and to generate and to grow. And hence these works belonged to man in the initial state.

However, in the last state, after the resurrection, the soul will in some way communicate to the body those things that are proper to the soul insofar as it is a *spirit*—immortality for everyone, but also impassibility, glory, and power for the blessed (*quantum ad bonos*), whose bodies will be called 'spiritual'.

Hence, after the resurrection men will not need food, but in the state of innocence they did need

food.

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine put it in *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, “How is it that an immortal body was sustained by food? For what is immortal does not need food or drink.”

Now it was explained above (a. 1) that the immortality that belonged to the initial state stemmed from a certain supernatural power residing in the soul—and not from any disposition inhering in the body. Hence, some of the body’s moisture was able to be lost through the action of heat; and so it was necessary for man to help himself by taking food, lest the moisture be totally consumed.

Reply to objection 2: In the act of nutrition there is an alteration and an instance of being acted upon, viz., on the part of the food, which is converted into the substance of the one that is nourished. Hence, one can infer from this not that the man’s body was passible, but rather that the food that was taken was passible—though it is also true that such an instance of being acted upon contributed to the perfection of the nature.

Reply to objection 3: If the man had not helped himself to food, he would have sinned—just as he did sin by taking the forbidden food. For at one and the same time he was commanded both to abstain from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and to eat from every other tree in Paradise.

Reply to objection 4: Some claim that in the state of innocence man took only as much food as was necessary for him, so that there was no emission of excess material.

But it seems hard to believe that in the food that was consumed there was no excess material that was unable to be converted into human nourishment. Hence, it was necessary for the waste excess to be emitted. However, God saw to it (*divinitus provisum*) that this did not involve anything foul.

Article 4

Could the tree of life have been a cause of immortality?

It seems that the tree of life could not have been a cause of immortality:

Objection 1: Nothing is able to act beyond its own species, since an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible; otherwise it could not have been taken in nourishment, since, as has been explained (a. 3), food is converted into the substance of the one that is nourished. Therefore, the tree of life could not have conferred incorruptibility or immortality.

Objection 2: Effects that are caused by the powers of plants and other natural things are natural. Therefore, if the tree of life had caused immortality, the immortality in question would have been natural.

Objection 3: This seems to go back to the fables of the ancients, who claimed that the gods who ate of a certain food became immortal; but the Philosopher ridicules these ancients in *Metaphysics* 3.

But contrary to this:

1. Genesis 3:22 says, “..... lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.”

2. In *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* Augustine says, “Tasting of the tree of life held back the corruption of the body, and even then, after the sin, he would have been able to remain uncorrupted if he had been permitted to eat of the tree of life.”

I respond: The tree of life caused immortality in a certain way, but not absolutely speaking.

To see this clearly, note that in the initial state man had two remedies, directed against two defects, for conserving his life.

The first defect is the loss of moisture due to the action of natural heat, which is an instrument of the soul. And against this defect man helped himself by eating of the other trees in Paradise, in the same

way that we now help ourselves by the food we eat.

However, the second defect is that, as the Philosopher puts it in *De Generatione Animalium* 1, whatever is generated from what is extraneous and is added to what was previously moist diminishes the active power of the species. For instance, water added to wine is at first converted into the taste of the wine, but as more and more water is added, it weakens the strength of the wine, and finally the wine becomes watery. So, then, we see that at the beginning the active power of the species is so strong that it can convert food in a way that is sufficient not only to restore what was lost but also to add to it. However, afterwards, what is assimilated is sufficient not for an increase, but only for restoring what was lost. And, finally, in the state of old age, it is not even sufficient for this, and so a loss of size follows, and, finally, the natural dissolution of the body.

Man was helped by the tree of life against this defect, since the tree of life had the power to fortify the power of the species against the sort of weakness that stems from the admixture of what is extraneous. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "Food was there for man, lest he get hungry; drink was there, lest he get thirsty; and the tree of life was there, lest old age destroy him." And in *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* he says, "In the manner of medicine the tree of life prevented men from dying."

However, it was not a cause of immortality absolutely speaking. For the power that existed in the soul to conserve the body was not caused by the tree of life. Nor was the tree of life able to confer on the body even the disposition for immortality, so that it might never be destroyed. This is clear from the fact that the power of a body is finite. Hence, the power of the tree of life was able to reach as far as to give the body the power to endure up to some determinate time, but not for an infinitely long time. For it is clear that the greater the power, the more durable the effect it imparts. Hence, since its power was finite, once the tree of life was eaten from, it preserved the body from corruption up to some determinate time. And when that time ended, either the man would be transferred to a spiritual life or he would need to eat from the tree of life once again.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3 and argument to the contrary 1 and argument to the contrary 2: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said. For the first set of arguments reach the conclusion that the tree of life did not cause incorruptibility absolutely speaking, whereas the other arguments reach the conclusion that it did cause incorruptibility by impeding corruption in the way explained above.

QUESTION 98

The Conservation of the Species in the Initial State: Generation

The next thing to consider is what pertains to the conservation of the species: first, with respect to generation itself (question 98) and, second, with respect to the condition of the generated offspring (questions 99-101).

On the first topic are two questions: (1) Would there have been generation in the state of innocence? (2) Would the generation have been through sexual union?

Article 1

Would there have been generation in the state of innocence?

It seems that in the state of innocence there would not have been generation:

Objection 1: As *Physics* 5 says, “Corruption is contrary to generation.” But contraries have to do with the same thing, and in the state of innocence there would not have been corruption. Therefore, there would not have been generation, either.

Objection 2: Generation is ordered toward conserving within the species what cannot be conserved with respect to the individual; hence, generation is not found among those individuals that last forever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived forever without death. Therefore, generation would not have existed in the state of innocence.

Objection 3: It is through generation that men are multiplied. But when owners are multiplied (*multiplicatis dominis*), there has to be a division of possessions in order to avoid confusion about ownership (*ad evitandam confusionem domini*). Therefore, since man was set up as the owner of the animals, if a multiplication of the human race had been made through generation, then a division of ownership would have ensued. But this seems contrary to the natural law, according to which all things are held in common, as Isidore says. Therefore, there would not have been generation in the state of innocence.

But contrary to this: Genesis 1:28 says, “Grow and multiply, and fill the earth.” But multiplication of the sort in question here could not have occurred without new generation, since only two human beings were made at the beginning. Therefore, there would have been generation in the initial state.

I respond: In the state of innocence there would have been generation for the multiplication of the human race. Otherwise, man’s sin would have been absolutely necessary in order that such a great good might follow from it.

Therefore, note that man by nature is constituted as a sort of middle ground between corruptible creatures and incorruptible creatures. For his soul is naturally incorruptible, whereas his body is naturally corruptible. But notice that what nature intends (*intentio naturae*) relates to corruptible creatures in a way different from the way it relates to incorruptible creatures. For it seems that it is what exists always and forever that belongs *per se* to nature’s intention. By contrast, what exists only for some temporal interval does not seem to stem chiefly from what nature intends, but is instead ordered toward something else; otherwise, when it is corrupted, nature’s intention would cease. Therefore, since among corruptible things the only thing that remains forever or is everlasting is the species, what nature principally intends has to do with the good of the species, whose conservation natural generation is ordered toward. By contrast, incorruptible substances remain forever not only with respect to the species but also with respect to the individuals, and so what nature principally intends has to do with the individuals themselves as well.

So, then, generation belongs to man with respect to his body, which is corruptible by its nature. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, what belongs to man is that a multitude of individuals is intended *per se* by nature—or, better, by the author of nature, who alone is the creator of human souls. And so for the multiplication of the human race He established generation within the human race—even in the state of innocence.

Reply to objection 1: In the state of innocence man's body, taken just by itself, was corruptible, but it was able to be preserved from corruption by the soul. And this is why generation, which is appropriate for corruptible things, was not to be taken away from man.

Reply to objection 2: Even if generation in the state of innocence was not for the sake of the conservation of the species, it was nonetheless for the sake of the multiplication of the individuals.

Reply to objection 3: In our present state, it is necessary for there to be a division of possessions when the owners are multiplied. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 2, the holding of possessions in common (*communitas possessionis*) is an occasion for discord.

However, in the state of innocence men's wills were ordered in such a way that, without any danger of discord, they would have had, to the extent appropriate for each, common use (*communiter uti fuissent*) of the goods that fell under their ownership. For this practice is observed even now among many good men.

Article 2

Would there have been generation through sexual union in the state of innocence?

It seems that in the state of innocence there would not have been generation through sexual union (*per coitum*):

Objection 1: As Damascene says, in the earthly paradise man was “like an angel.” But in the future state of resurrection, when men will be similar to angels, “they will neither marry nor be given in marriage,” as Matthew 22:30 says. Therefore, neither would there have been generation through sexual union in paradise.

Objection 2: The first men were created at a perfect age. Therefore, if among them there had been generation through sexual union before the sin, then they would have been carnally joined even in paradise—which is clearly false according to Scripture.

Objection 3: In carnal union (*in coniunctione carnali*) man becomes especially like the beasts, because of the vehemence of the pleasure; this is why there is praise for celibacy (*continentia*), through which men abstain from pleasures of this sort. But it is because of sin that man is compared to the beasts—this according to Psalm 48:21 (“Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them”). Therefore, before the sin there would have been no carnal union between male and female.

Objection 4: In the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted through sexual union. Therefore, there would not have been sexual union in the state of innocence.

But contrary to this:

1. According to Genesis 1:27 and 2:22, it was before the sin that God made them male and female. But nothing in the works of God is in vain. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been sexual union, which the difference between the sexes is ordered toward.

2. Genesis 2:18-20 says that the woman was made to help the man—but not for anything if not for

the generation that is effected through sexual union, since for any other sort of work the man could be helped more fittingly by a man rather than by a woman. Therefore, even in the state of innocence there would have been generation through sexual union.

I respond: Some ancient doctors, reflecting on the shamefulness of the concupiscence associated with sexual union in our present state (*considerantes concupiscentiae foeditatem quae invenitur in coitu in isto statu*), claimed that in the state of innocence there would not have been generation through sexual union. Hence, in his book *De Homine* Gregory of Nyssa says that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied in some other way—just as the angels are multiplied without sexual intercourse (*absque concubitu*) through the operation of God’s power. Furthermore, he claims that God made them male and female before the sin with an eye toward the mode of generation that would exist after the sin, which God had foreknowledge of.

But this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man is neither taken away from nor added to man because of sin. But it is clear that because of his animal life—which, as was explained above (q. 97, a. 3), he had even before the sin—it is natural to man to generate through sexual union, just as it is natural to the other perfect animals as well. And this is made clear by the natural members of the body deputed for this use. So just as with the other bodily members, one should not claim that the use of these natural members did not exist before the sin.

Thus, there are two things to take into account concerning sexual union in our present state:

The first is what belongs to *nature*, viz., the union of the male and the female in order to generate. For every instance of generation requires an active power and a passive power. Hence, since in all the animals in which there is a distinction between the sexes, the active power exists in the male and the passive power in the female, the order of nature requires that the male and the female come together through sexual union in order to generate.

The other thing that can be taken into account is the *deformity of unbridled concupiscence* (*quaedam deformitas immoderatae concupiscentiae*). This did not exist in the state of innocence, wherein the lower powers were altogether subject to reason. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Far be it from us to suspect that offspring could not have been brought forth without the sickness of disordered desire (*sine libidinis morbo*). Instead, the members in question were moved at will just like the other members—and this without burning desire or seductive stimulation, but with tranquility of mind and body.”

Reply to objection 1: In paradise man was like the angels because of his spiritual mind, even though he had an animal life with respect to his body. However, after the resurrection man will be a spiritual effect like the angels, both with respect to his soul and with respect to his body. Hence, the arguments are not parallel.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 9, the reason why the first parents did not have sexual intercourse in paradise was either (a) that, because of their sin, they were ejected from Paradise shortly after the woman was formed, or (b) that they were waiting for God’s authority, from which they had received the general command [to multiply], to specify a determinate time for sexual intercourse (*ad determinatum tempus commixtionis*).

Reply to objection 3: The beasts lack reason. Hence, man becomes bestial in sexual union to the extent that he cannot by means of his reason moderate the pleasure of sexual union and the fervor of sensual desire.

However, in the state of innocence there was nothing of this sort that was not moderated by reason. This was not, as some claim, because there was less sensual pleasure. (For the sensual pleasure would have been greater to the extent that the nature was purer and the body more sensitive.) Instead, it was because the concupiscible power would not have indulged in pleasure of this sort in a disordered way, given that it was regulated by reason—which implies not that there is less pleasure in the senses, but

rather that the concupiscible power does not cling (*inhaeret*) to the pleasure in an unbridled way (*immoderate*). (By ‘unbridled’ I mean ‘beyond the measure of reason’.) In like manner, one who is temperate with respect to food taken in moderation (*sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto*) does not have less pleasure than a glutton; instead, his concupiscible power lingers less over this sort of pleasure (*minus super delectatione huiusmodi requiescit*).

This is consonant with the passage from Augustine, which does not rule out a great deal of pleasure (*magnitudinem delectationis*) in the state of innocence, but instead rules out feverish disordered desire (*ardorem libidinis*) and disquietude of mind. And so in the state of innocence celibacy (*continentia*) would not have been praiseworthy—even though in our times it is praised not because of its lack of fecundity, but because of its exclusion of disordered desire. For in the state of innocence fecundity would have existed without disordered desire.

Reply to objection 4: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, in the state of innocence “there was no corruption of virginal integrity involved in sexual intercourse (*nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris*). For the man’s seed was able to be emitted into his wife’s uterus in such a way that the integrity of the female genitalia was preserved—just as, even now, a menstrual flow can be emitted from a virgin’s uterus while that same integrity is preserved. For just as it is not the groan of pain but the sense of completion (*impulsus maturitatis*) that relaxes a woman’s viscera in order for her to give birth, so too it was not lustful desire (*libidinis appetitus*) but the voluntary use [of the organs] (*voluntarius usus*) that united the two natures in order for them to conceive.”

QUESTION 99

The Condition of the Generated Offspring with respect to their Body

The next thing to consider is the condition of the offspring that are generated: first, with respect to their body (question 99); second, with respect to their justice or moral rectitude (*quantum ad iustitiam*) (question 100); and, third, with respect to their knowledge (question 101).

On the first topic there are two questions: (1) In the state of innocence, would children have had full corporeal power immediately upon birth? (2) Would all children have been born males?

Article 1

In the state of innocence, would children have had full power over the movement of their limbs immediately upon birth?

It seems that in the state of innocence children would have had full power over the movement of their limbs (*virtutem perfectam ad motum membrorum*) immediately upon birth:

Objection 1: In *De Baptismo Pavulorum* Augustine says, “To the weakness of mind corresponds that weakness of body”—viz., the weakness of body that is apparent in children. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore, neither would there have been weakness of body in little children.

Objection 2: Certain animals are such that they have enough power to use their limbs immediately upon being born. But man is more noble than the other animals. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it is natural for man to have the power to use his limbs immediately upon birth. And so [the lack of such power] seems to be a punishment that followed upon sin.

Objection 3: The inability to attain something pleasant presented to one is a source of affliction. But if children had not had the power to move their limbs, then oftentimes they would have been unable to attain something pleasant presented to them. Therefore, they would have been afflicted. But this could not have been the case before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence children would not have lacked the power to move their limbs.

Objection 4: The weakness of old age (*defectus senectutis*) seems to correspond to the weakness of childhood (*defectus pueritiae*). But in the state of innocence there would not have been any weakness of old age. Therefore, there would not have been any weakness of childhood, either.

But contrary to this: Every generated thing is imperfect before it becomes perfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been produced through generation. Therefore, at the beginning they would have been imperfect both in size and in bodily power.

I respond: Truths that are supernatural (*ea quae super naturam*) we hold by faith alone, and what we hold on faith (*credimus*) we owe to some authority. Hence, in all our assertions we ought to be guided by (*sequi debemus*) the nature of things, except with respect to what is handed down to us by God’s authority and lies beyond nature.

Now it is clearly natural—in the sense of belonging to the principles of human nature—for children not to have enough power to move their limbs immediately upon birth. For man has by nature a brain that is larger in size, relative to his body, than the other animals do. Hence, it is natural that because of the great moisture of the brain in children, the nerves, which are the instruments of movement, are not fit for moving the limbs.

From the other side, no Catholic doubts that it could happen by God’s power that children have the full power to move their limbs immediately upon birth. But it is clear from the authority of Scripture that “God made man upright” (Ecclesiastes 7:30) and that, as Augustine says, this uprightness consists in the

full subjection of the body to the soul. Therefore, just as there could not have been in the initial state anything in a man's limbs that conflicted with the man's well-ordered will, so too a man's limbs could not have failed to do the human will's bidding.

However, a well-ordered human will is one that tends toward acts that are appropriate for the man, and it is not the case that the very same acts are appropriate for a man at every age. Therefore, one should claim that immediately upon birth the children would have had enough power to move their limbs not for just any acts at all, but for the acts appropriate to a child, e.g., sucking at the breast and other acts of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about the sort of weakness that now appears in some children even with respect to those acts that are appropriate for children. This is clear from his previous remark that "even when they are hungry and close to the breast, they are more apt to cry than to suck."

Reply to objection 2: The fact that certain animals have the use of their limbs immediately upon birth does not stem from their nobility, since other animals more perfect than they are do not have such use of their limbs. Rather, this happens to them because of the dryness of their brains and because the acts proper to such animals are imperfect, so that even a little power is sufficient for them.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to this objection is clear from what was said in the body of this article.

An alternative reply is that the children would have desired nothing except what was appropriate for a well-ordered will in their particular state.

Reply to objection 4: In the state of innocence man would have been generated but would not have been corrupted. And so in that state it would have been possible for there to be some childhood weaknesses that followed upon generation, but there could not have been any weaknesses of old age that were ordered toward corruption.

Article 2

In the state of innocence would any females have been born?

It seems that in the state of innocence no female would have been born:

Objection 1: In *De Generatione Animalium* 2 the Philosopher says, "A female is an inadvertent male"—in the sense that a female is produced outside of the intention of nature. But in the state of innocence nothing unnatural (*innaturale*) would have occurred in human generation. Therefore, no females would have been born.

Objection 2: Every agent generates what is similar to itself, unless it is impeded either because of a defect in its power or because the matter is not well disposed, as when a small fire is unable to ignite green wood. But in generation the active power resides in the male. Therefore, since in the state of innocence the male's power would not have been defective and the female's matter would not have been indisposed, it seems that males would always have been born.

Objection 3: In the state of innocence generation was ordered toward the multiplication of men (*ad multiplicationem hominum*). But men could have been multiplied to a sufficient degree through the first man and the first woman, since they were going to live forever. Therefore, in the state of innocence it would have been unnecessary for females to be born.

But contrary to this: Nature would have proceeded in generation in the way that God had instituted it. But as Genesis 1:27 and 2:22 say, within human nature God made them male and female. Therefore, in the state of innocence males and females would likewise have been generated.

I respond: Nothing relevant to the fullness of human nature (*ad complementum humanae naturae*) would have been lacking in the state of innocence. But just as diverse grades of things contribute to the perfection of the universe, so too the difference between the sexes contributes to the perfection of human nature. And so in the state of innocence both sexes would have been produced through generation.

Reply to objection 1: The female is called an ‘inadvertent male’ because she lies outside the intention of a *particular* nature. But, as was explained above (q. 92, a. 1), the female does not lie outside the intention of nature *as a whole* (*non praeter intentionem naturae universalis*).

Reply to objection 2: The generation of a female does not occur just because of a defect in the active power or because of the matter’s indisposition, as the objection implies. Rather, it sometimes occurs because of an extrinsic accident; for instance, in *De Animalibus* the Philosopher says, “The northern wind (*ventus septentrionalis*) favors the generation of males, and the southern wind (*ventus australis*) the generation of females.”

Moreover, the generation of a female sometimes occurs because of a thought on the part of the soul (*ex conceptione animae*) at which the body is readily changed. This could have happened especially in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul, so that the sex of the offspring might be determined by the will of the one generating.

Reply to objection 3: The offspring would have been generated with an animal life (*vivens vita animali*), which involves generating as well as making use of food. Hence, it was appropriate for all of them to generate, and not just the first parents. It seems to follow from this that as many females would have been generated as males.

QUESTION 100

The Condition of the Generated Offspring with respect to Justice

The next thing to consider is the condition of the offspring with respect to justice or moral rectitude (*quantum ad justitiam*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Would men have been born with justice? (2) Would they have been born confirmed in justice?

Article 1

Would men have been born with justice?

It seems that men would not have been born with justice or moral rectitude (*cum iustitia nati*):

Objection 1: Hugo of St. Victor says, “Before the sin the first man generated children who were without sin but who did not inherit their father’s justice.”

Objection 2: As the Apostle says in Romans 5:16 and 21, justice or justification comes through grace (*iustitia est per gratiam*). But grace is not bequeathed [by the parents to the children] (*non transfunditur*), since in that case it would be natural; instead, it is infused by God alone. Therefore, the children would not have been born with justice.

Objection 3: Justice exists in the soul. But the soul is not passed on [from the parents to the children] (*anima non est ex traduce*). Therefore, neither was justice passed on from the parents to the children.

But contrary to this: In *De Conceptu Virginali* Anselm says, “Along with having a rational soul, those whom the man would generate would be just if they did not sin.”

I respond: Man naturally generates what is similar to himself in species. Hence, any accidents that follow upon the nature of the species are such that the children must be similar in those accidents to the parents, unless there is some error in the operation of nature—which there would not have been in the state of innocence. But in individual accidents the children did not have to be similar to the parents.

Now original justice (*iustitia originalis*), in the rectitude of which the first man was made, was an accident belonging to the nature of the species—not in the sense that it was caused by the principles of the species, but in the sense that it was a special gift given by God to the nature as a whole. This is clear from the fact that opposites belong to a single genus, and original sin (*peccatum originale*), which is opposed to original justice, is called a sin of the nature. That is why it is passed down from the parents to their posterity. Because of this, the children would have been like the parents with respect to original justice as well.

Reply to objection 1: The passage from Hugo should be taken not to be about the habit of justice, but rather about the execution of the act of justice.

Reply to objection 2: Some claim that the children would have been born not with the justice of grace (*cum iustitia gratuita*), which is a principle of meriting, but rather with original justice.

However, the root of original justice, in the rectitude of which man was made, consists in the supernatural submission of reason to God (*in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum*)—a submission which, as was explained above (q. 95, a. 1), is effected by habitual grace (*per gratiam gratum facientem*). Hence, one must claim that if the children had been born with original justice, then they would likewise have been born with grace—just as we explained above (q. 95, a. 1) that the first man was made with grace. Still, the grace would not for this reason have been natural, since it would not have been bequeathed by the power of the semen, but would instead have been conferred on man as soon as he had a rational soul—just as it is also the case that even though the rational soul is not passed on [from the parents to the children], it is nonetheless infused by God as soon as the body is disposed for it.

Reply to objection 3: The solution to the third objection is clear from what was just said.

Article 2

In the state of innocence, would the children have been born confirmed in justice?

It seems that in the state of innocence the children would have been born confirmed in justice (*in iustitia confirmati*):

Objection 1: In *Moralia* 4, commenting on Job 3:13 (“For now I should have been asleep, etc.”), Gregory says, “If none of the rottenness of sin (*putredo peccati*) had corrupted the first parent, then he would in no way have generated of himself the children of Gehenna; but those who now have to be saved by the Redeemer would have been born of him only as the elect.” Therefore, all of them would have been born confirmed in justice.

Objection 2: In *Cur Deus Homo* Anselm says, “If the first parents had lived in such a way that, though tempted, they did not sin, then they, along with all their progeny, would have been confirmed in the sense that they would no longer have been able to sin.” Therefore, the children would have been born confirmed in justice.

Objection 3: Good is more powerful than evil. But from the sin of the first man there followed a necessity of sinning on the part of those who were born of him. Therefore, if the first man had persisted in justice, the necessity of preserving justice would have redounded to his posterity.

Objection 4: An angel who adheres to God while others are sinning is immediately confirmed in justice, so that he is no longer able to sin. Therefore, if man had resisted the temptation, he too would have been confirmed. But he would have generated others who were such as he was. Therefore, his children would likewise have been born confirmed in justice.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Human society would have been happy as a whole if they”—viz., the first parents—“had not committed the evil that they passed on to their descendants, and if none of their posterity had perpetrated the iniquity that merited condemnation.” From this one is given to understand that even if the first parents had not sinned, some of their posterity would have been able to perpetrate iniquity. Therefore, they would not have been born confirmed in justice.

I respond: It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children should have been born confirmed in justice. For it is clear that at their birth the children would not have had more perfection than their parents had in the state of generating them. But for as long as the parents were generating, they would not have been confirmed in justice. For a rational creature is confirmed in justice by the fact that he is beatified (*efficitur beata*) through the clear vision of God, who is such that one is unable not to inhere in Him when He is seen; for He is the very essence of goodness, from which no one can turn away, since nothing is desired and loved except under the notion of the good. (I say this as a general rule, since it can happen otherwise by a special privilege, as we believe happened in the case of the virgin mother of God (*sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei*).) But as soon as Adam had arrived at that beatitude by which he saw God through His essence, he would have been made spiritual in both mind and body, and his animal life, in which alone he would have made use of generation, would have ceased. Hence, it is clear that the children would not have been born confirmed in justice.

Reply to objection 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not have generated from himself children of Gehenna, i.e., children who would have contracted from him the sin that is the cause of Gehenna. Yet they would have been able to become children of Gehenna by sinning through their own free choice. Or,

if they did not become children of Gehenna through sin, this would not have been because they were confirmed in justice. Instead, it would have been because of divine providence, through which they would have been preserved immune from sin.

Reply to objection 2: Anselm said this not by way of assertion (*asserendo*), but by way of conjecture (*opinando*). This is clear from his very mode of speaking when he says, “It *seems that* if they had lived, etc.”

Reply to objection 3: This argument is not efficacious even though, as is apparent from his words, Anselm seems to have been moved by it. For through their sin the first parents did not impose on their descendants a *necessity of sinning* in the sense that they would have been unable to return to justice; for this holds only in the case of the damned. Hence, neither would they have transmitted to their descendants a *necessity of not sinning* in the sense that they would have been altogether unable to sin; for this holds only in the case of the blessed in heaven.

Reply to objection 4: There is no similarity here between men and angels. For men have a power of free choice that can turn either way (*vertibile*) both before an act of choice and after an act of choice; by contrast, as was explained above when we were discussing the angels (q. 64, a. 2), this is not the case with angels.

QUESTION 101

The Condition of the Generated Offspring with respect to Knowledge

The next thing to consider is the condition of the offspring with respect to knowledge (*quantum ad scientiam*). On this topic there are two questions: (1) Would the children have been born perfect in knowledge? (2) Would they have had the full use of reason immediately upon birth?

Article 1

In the state of innocence, would the children have been born perfect in knowledge?

It seems that in the state of innocence the children would have been born perfect in knowledge (*in scientia perfecti*):

Objection 1: Adam would have generated children who were like himself. But as was explained above (q. 99, a. 1), Adam was perfect in knowledge. Therefore, children would have been born from him perfect in knowledge.

Objection 2: As Bede says, ignorance is caused by sin. But ignorance is a privation of knowledge. Therefore, before sin the children would have had every sort of knowledge (*omnem scientiam*) immediately upon birth.

Objection 3: The children would have had justice at their birth. But knowledge, which directs actions (*dirigit in agendis*), is required for justice. Therefore, they would have had knowledge as well.

But contrary to this: As *De Anima* 3 says, our soul is by nature “like a blank slate on which nothing has been written.” But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been then. Therefore, the souls of the children would have lacked knowledge at the beginning.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 94, a. 3), what is supernatural is such that one has faith in it on authority alone (*solī auctoritate creditur*); hence, in a case where such authority is lacking, we ought to be guided by what is natural (*sequi debemus naturae conditionem*).

Now as was explained above (q. 84, a. 6), it is natural for man to acquire knowledge (*scientia*) through his senses, and so the soul is united to a body because it needs the body for its own proper operation. This would not be the case if right at the very beginning the soul had knowledge that was not acquired through the sentient powers.

So one should claim that in the state of innocence children would not have been born perfect in knowledge, but that instead they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty as time went on, by discovery or by being taught.

Reply to objection 1: Being perfect in knowledge was an *individual* accident of the first parent—more specifically, insofar as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. And so it was not with respect to this accident that he generated children who were similar to him, but only with respect to the natural or grace-related accidents that belong to *the whole nature*.

Reply to objection 2: Ignorance (*ignorantia*) is a privation of the knowledge that ought to be had at a given time—which would not have been the case with the children immediately upon birth, since they would have had the knowledge that was appropriate for them at that time. Hence, it was not ignorance (*ignorantia*) that existed in them, but rather an absence of knowledge (*nescientia*) with respect to certain things—something that Dionysius likewise posits in the holy angels in *De Caelesti Hierarchia* 7.

Reply to objection 3: The children would have had enough knowledge to direct them in those works of justice in which men are directed by the universal principles of the law, and they would have had this knowledge much more fully at that time than we have it by nature now. The same thing holds

for other universal principles as well.

Article 2

In the state of innocence, would the children have had the full use of reason immediately upon birth?

It seems that in the state of innocence the children would have had the full use of reason (*usum perfectum rationis*) immediately upon birth:

Objection 1: Children now do not have the perfect use of reason because their soul is weighed down (*aggravatur*) by their body. But this would not have been the case at that time, since, as Wisdom 9:15 says, “The corruptible body is a load upon the soul.” Therefore, before the sin and the corruption that followed upon the sin, children would have had the full use of reason immediately upon birth.

Objection 2: Certain other animals have the use of their natural talents immediately upon birth; for instance, a lamb immediately flees from a wolf. Therefore, *a fortiori*, in the state of innocence men would have had the full use of reason immediately upon birth.

But contrary to this: Nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect in all generated things. Therefore, the children would not have had the full use of reason immediately from the beginning.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 84, a. 7), the use of reason depends in a certain sense on the use of the sentient powers; hence, when the sensory power is inoperative and the interior sensory powers are impeded, a man does not have the full use of reason, as is obvious in the case of those who are asleep (*in dormientibus*) and those who are delirious (*in phreneticis*). But the sentient powers are powers of corporeal organs, and so when their organs are impeded, their acts must likewise be impeded and, as a result, the use of reason is impeded.

Now in children these powers are impeded because of the brain’s excessive moisture. And so children do not have the full use of reason, just as they do not have the full use of their other bodily members.

So in the state of innocence the children would not have had the full use of reason in the way that they were going to have it at a mature age. However, they would have had a more perfect use of reason than children do now with regard to those things that were appropriate to them in their state—just as was claimed above (q. 99, a. 1) about the use of their limbs as well.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Weight’ is added by the corruption of the body in the sense that the use of reason is impeded even with respect to what is appropriate for a man at each particular age.

Reply to objection 2: The other animals likewise do not have as perfect a use of their natural talents immediately at the beginning as they will later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and similar examples are found among the other kinds of animals. Yet, as was explained above (q. 99, a. 1), in the case of man there is a special impediment because of the abundance of moisture in the brain.

QUESTION 102

Man's Location, i.e., Paradise

The next thing to consider is man's location, i.e., Paradise. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is Paradise a corporeal place? (2) Is Paradise a place fit for human habitation? (3) What was man placed in Paradise for? (4) Was it fitting for man to be made in Paradise?

Article 1

Is Paradise a corporeal place?

It seems that Paradise is not a corporeal place:

Objection 1: Bede says, "Paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place can be like that, both because (a) it is contrary to earth's nature that it should be so high up (*tantum elevaretur*), and also because (b) the region of fire, which consumes earth, lies under the lunar globe (*sub globo lunari*). Therefore, Paradise is not a corporeal place.

Objection 2: As is clear from Genesis 2:10-15, Scripture mentions that four rivers have their source in Paradise. But the rivers that are named in that passage have obvious sources in other places, as is likewise clear from the Philosopher in *Meteorologia*. Therefore, Paradise is not a corporeal place.

Objection 3: Some have very diligently inquired into all the places in the habitable regions of the earth (*omnia loca terrae habitabilis*), but they make no mention of the location of Paradise. Therefore, Paradise does not seem to be a corporeal place.

Objection 4: The tree of life is described as existing in Paradise. But the tree of life is something spiritual; for Proverbs 3:18 says of Wisdom, "She is a tree of life for those who lay hold of her." Therefore, Paradise is likewise a spiritual place and not a corporeal place.

Objection 5: If Paradise is a corporeal place, then the trees in Paradise must be corporeal. But this does not seem to be the case, since corporeal trees were produced on the third day, whereas Genesis 2:8-9 talks of the trees being planted in Paradise after the work of the six days. Therefore, Paradise is not a corporeal place.

But contrary to this: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, "There are three general opinions about Paradise: One is held by those who claim that Paradise is to be understood only corporeally; the second is held by those who claim that it is to be understood only spiritually; and the third is held by those who take Paradise in both ways. This last opinion, I acknowledge, seems right to me."

I respond: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 13, "Let no one silence what can plausibly be said by way of a spiritual understanding of Paradise—as long as there is a belief in the most faithful truthfulness, preserved by the narrative, of the history of the events." For what is said about Paradise in Sacred Scripture is proposed in the manner of a historical narrative (*per modum narrationis historicae*), and in everything that Scripture hands down in this way there is a historical truth (*veritas historiae*) which should be held on to as the foundation and upon which the spiritual interpretations are to be built.

Therefore, as Isidore says in *Etymologiae*, Paradise is "a place set up in the East, the word for which is from the Greek and is translated by the Latin for 'garden' (*hortus*). Now the site is appropriately said to be in the East. For it is necessary to believe that Paradise was set up in the most noble part of the whole earth. And since, as the Philosopher makes clear in *De Caelo* 2, the East is the right side of the heavens, and since the right (*dextera*) is more noble than the left (*sinistra*), it was appropriate for God to situate the earthly Paradise in the East.

Reply to objection 1: Bede's words are not true if they are taken in their most obvious sense.

However, they could be taken to mean that Paradise rises up to the place of the lunar globe not in terms of its height, but according to a certain likeness. For in Paradise “the air is at a constant moderate temperature (*perpetua aeris temperies*),” as Isidore says, and in this it is like the celestial bodies, which are not subject to contrary extremes (*quae sunt absque contrarietate*). And the reason why the lunar globe is mentioned more often than the other spheres is that the lunar globe is the boundary of the celestial bodies closest to us (*versus nos*) and, in addition, of all the celestial bodies it is the moon that is most like the earth. It even has nebulous shadows, as if it were verging on opaqueness.

Now there are some who claim that Paradise was reaching up to the lunar globe in the sense that it reached up to the middle part of the atmosphere, where rain and wind and things of this sort are generated. For control over these evaporations is attributed especially to the moon.

However, if this were true, then the place would not be fit for human habitation, both because the weather is especially inclement there (*ibi est maxima intemperies*), and also because that place is not congenial to the human constitution, in the way that the lower atmosphere closer to the earth is.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8, “One should hold that since the place of Paradise is very far removed from human cognition, the rivers whose sources are said to be known went underground at some point and after a long course through many regions came up to the surface in other places. For who is ignorant of the fact that this is what many streams commonly do?”

Reply to objection 3: The place in question was cut off from where we live by obstacles—such as mountains or oceans or some very hot region—which cannot be crossed. And this is why the writers of various regions made no mention of the place.

Reply to objection 4: The tree of life is a material tree that is so called because, as was explained above (q. 97, a. 4), its fruit had the power to conserve life. And yet it signified something spiritually, just as the rock in the desert was something material and yet signified Christ (see 1 Corinthians 10:4).

Similarly, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree that was so named because of something that would happen in the future. For after man ate of it, he learned, through the experience of punishment, what the difference was between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. And yet, spiritually, the tree was also able to signify free choice, as some claim.

Reply to objection 5: According to Augustine, on the third day plants were produced not in actuality but only with respect to certain seminal natures (*rationes seminales*), and after the work of the six days both the plants in Paradise and the other plants were produced in actuality.

By contrast, according to the other saints, one must claim that all the plants were produced in actuality on the third day, including the trees of Paradise, and that what is said about the planting of the trees in Paradise after the work of the six days is to be understood as having been said by way of a recapitulation. This is why our text says, “And the Lord God *had planted* a Paradise of pleasure from the beginning” (Genesis 2:8).

Article 2

Was Paradise a place fit for human habitation?

It seems that Paradise was not a place fit for human habitation (*non fuerit locus conveniens habitationi humanae*):

Objection 1: Men and angels are both alike ordered toward beatitude. But angels were immediately, from the beginning, made inhabitants of the place of the blessed, viz., the empyrean heaven.

Therefore, that is where man's place to live should have been set up as well.

Objection 2: If a place is fitting for man (*debetur homini*), then it is fitting for him either by reason of his soul or by reason of his body. If by reason of his soul, then the place that is fitting for him is heaven, which seems to be the soul's natural place, since the desire for heaven is instilled into everyone. On the other hand, if by reason of his body, then the place that is fitting for him is no different from the place that is fitting for the other animals. Therefore, there is no way in which Paradise was a place fit for human habitation.

Objection 3: A place that contains nothing located within it is senseless. But after the sin Paradise was not a place of human habitation. Therefore, if it is a place fit for human habitation, then it seems that it has been made by God for nothing.

Objection 4: A place with a temperate climate (*locus temperatus*) is fitting for man because he has a temperate constitution. But the place of Paradise did not have a temperate climate. For it is said to be located on the equator (*sub aequinoctiali circulo*), which seems to be a very hot place, since twice a year the sun passes over the tops of the heads of those who live there. Therefore, Paradise is not a place fit for human habitation.

But contrary to this: Damascene says of Paradise, "It was a Godly region, and it was a worthy dwelling place for the one who was made in God's image (*secundum imaginem Dei*)."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 97, a. 1), man was incorruptible and immortal not because his body had a disposition for incorruptibility, but because he had a power of the soul for preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body can be corrupted both from within and from without. As was explained above (q. 97, a. 4), it is corrupted from within by the loss of moisture through old age, and the first man was able to counteract this sort of corruption by taking nutrition. Among the things that corrupt the body from without, the main one seems to be an extreme air temperature (*distemperatus aer*), and so this sort of corruption is counteracted mainly by the temperateness of the air.

Now in Paradise both these types of counteraction are found, since, as Damascene says, Paradise "is a place shining through with very temperate, very fine, and very pure air, always decorated with flowering plants." Hence, it is clear that Paradise is a place fit for human habitation, in keeping with the state of initial immortality.

Reply to objection 1: The empyrean heaven (a) is the highest of all corporeal places and (b) lies beyond all mutability.

Given the first of these features, it is a place congenial to the angelic nature, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, "God governs the corporeal creature through the spiritual creature." Hence, it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be set up above everything corporeal, as if presiding over it.

On the other hand, given the second of these features, it is a place appropriate for the state of beatitude, which is grounded in maximal stability. So, then, the place of beatitude is fit for angels according to their nature, and that is why they were created there.

However, the place of beatitude does not befit man according to his *nature*, since he does not preside over all corporeal creatures in the sense of governing them; instead, it befits him only by reason of *beatitude*. Hence, he was not put into the empyrean heaven at the beginning, but instead he was to be transported there in the state of ultimate beatitude.

Reply to objection 2: It is ridiculous to claim that there is a natural place for the soul or for any spiritual substance. However, a special place may be attributed to an incorporeal creature because of some sort of fittingness (*per congruentiam quandam*).

Thus, the earthly Paradise is a place that is fit for man both with respect to his soul and with respect to his body, viz., insofar as his soul had a power for preserving the human body from corruption—something that did not belong to the other animals. And so, as Damascene says, "Nothing

non-rational lived in Paradise,” even though by a certain dispensation the animals were brought there to Adam by God, and even though the serpent entered there by an act of the devil.

Reply to objection 3: It is not the case that this place is senseless because men do not live there after the sin—just as it is likewise not senseless for man to have been given a certain sort of immortality that was not going to be preserved. For things of this sort make God’s kindness manifest to man, and they also make manifest what man lost by sinning.

Still, it is said that Enoch and Elijah are now living in that Paradise.

Reply to objection 4: Those who claim that Paradise is located on the equator are of the opinion that a place on the equator has a thoroughly temperate climate, because day and night are equal all of the time, and because the sun is never so far from the inhabitants that they would have an abundance of cold weather. Neither—so the claim goes—do they have an excess of hot weather, since even if the sun passes directly overhead, it nonetheless does not stay in that position for a long time.

However, in *Meteorologia* Aristotle explicitly claims that the region in question is uninhabitable because of its heat. This seems more likely, since some lands in which the sun is never directly overhead are intemperately hot just because of their closeness to the sun.

But whatever the truth might be about this, one should believe that Paradise was set up in a place with a very temperate climate, either on the equator or somewhere else.

Article 3

Was man put into Paradise to cultivate it and to guard it?

It seems that man was not put into Paradise to cultivate it and to guard it (*ut operaretur et custodiret illum*):

Objection 1: What was introduced as a punishment for sin would not have existed in Paradise in the state of innocence. But as Genesis 3:17 says, the cultivation of the soil (*agricultura*) was introduced as a punishment for sin. Therefore, man was not put into Paradise to cultivate it.

Objection 2: Guarding is unnecessary where there is no fear of a violent invader. But in Paradise there was no fear of a violent invader. Therefore, it was unnecessary to guard Paradise.

Objection 3: If man was put into Paradise to cultivate it and to guard it, then it seems to follow that man was made for the sake of Paradise, and not vice versa—which seems false. Therefore, man was not put into Paradise to work in it and to guard it.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:15 says, “The Lord God took the man, and put him into the Paradise of pleasure as something to cultivate and guard (*posuit illum in Paradiso voluptatis ut operaretur et custodiret illum*).”

I respond: As Augustine points out in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8, there are two ways to understand this passage from Genesis.

On one interpretation, God put man into Paradise in order for God Himself to cultivate and to guard man—to cultivate him, I repeat, by justifying man, in order that He might guard man against every sort of corruption and evil. For if God’s operation withdraws from man, then man is continually in the dark (*continuo obtenebratur*), just as the air becomes dark if the influx of light ceases.

The second possible interpretation is that man is the one who is to cultivate Paradise and guard it. Nor would this work have been laborious, as it was to be after the sin. Rather, it would have been pleasant, because of the experience of the nature of virtue. Moreover, the sort of guarding in question would not have been against invaders, but would instead have been for the purpose of man’s guarding

Paradise for himself, lest he lose it by sinning. And all of this redounded to man's good, and in this sense Paradise is ordered to the good of man, and not vice versa.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Was the man made in Paradise?

It seems that the man was made in Paradise (*homo factus est in Paradiso*):

Objection 1: The angels were created in the place of their habitation, viz., the empyrean heaven. But before the sin Paradise was a place fit for human habitation. Therefore, it seems that the man ought to have been made in Paradise.

Objection 2: The other animals are conserved in the place of their generation, e.g., fish in water and walking animals on the earth, from which they were produced. But as has been explained (q. 97, a. 4), man would have been conserved in Paradise. Therefore, he ought to have been made in Paradise.

Objection 3: The woman was made in Paradise. But the man has more dignity than the woman. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the man ought to have been made in Paradise (*multo magis vir debuit fieri in Paradiso*).

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:15 says, "God took the man, and put him into Paradise."

I respond: Paradise was a place fit for human habitation, given the lack of corruption in the initial state. But this lack of corruption belonged to man not by his nature, but by a supernatural gift from God. Therefore, in order that this gift might be imputed to God's grace and not to human nature, God made man outside of Paradise and afterwards put him into Paradise, in order that he might live there for the whole time of his animal life. Afterwards, when he had attained his spiritual life, he was to be transported to heaven.

Reply to objection 1: The empyrean heaven is a place fit for the angels even with respect to their nature, and that is why they were created there.

Reply to objection 2: The same thing should be said in reply to the second objection. For the places in question were fit for the animals with respect to their nature.

Reply to objection 3: The woman was made in Paradise not because of her own dignity, but because of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. The children likewise would have been born in Paradise, because the parents had already been put there.

QUESTION 103

The Governance of Things in General

After the preceding treatments of (a) the creation of things (questions 44-49) and of (b) the distinctions among them (questions 50-102), what remains is to consider, in the third place, (c) the governance of things. We will consider this, first, in general (question 103) and then with respect to the specific effects of governance (questions 104-119).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is the world governed by anyone? (2) What is the end of governance itself? (3) Is the world governed by a single being? (4) What are the effects of governance? (5) Are all things subject to God's governance? (6) Are all things directly governed by God? (7) Are there cases in which God's governance is frustrated (*cassetur*)? (8) Is there anything contrary to (*aliquid contranitur*) God's providence?

Article 1

Is the world governed by anyone?

It seems that the world is not governed by anyone:

Objection 1: Being governed belongs to those things that act or are moved for the sake of an end. But natural things, which are a large part of the world, do not act and are not moved for the sake of an end, since they have no cognition of an end. Therefore, the world is not governed.

Objection 2: Being governed belongs properly to those things that are moved toward something. But the world does not seem to be moved toward anything, but instead has stability within itself. Therefore, it is not governed.

Objection 3: That which has a necessity by which it is determined to a single outcome does not need an exterior governor. But the principal parts of the world are determined by necessity to a single outcome in their acts and movements. Therefore, the world does not need governance.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 14:3 says, "You, Father, govern all things by your providence." And in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* Boethius says, "You who govern the world by your everlasting plan (*perpetua ratione*)."

I respond: Some ancient philosophers denied governance to the world, claiming that everything occurs by chance (*fortuito agi*). But there are two ways to show that this position is impossible:

First, from what is apparent in *the things themselves*. For we see among natural things that what is better occurs either always or for the most part (*semper aut in pluribus*). But this would not happen if natural things were not directed by some sort of providence toward the good as an end (*ad finem boni*)—which is what it is to govern. Hence, the fixed order of things itself clearly demonstrates the governance of the world. As Tully, quoting Aristotle, says in *De Natura Deorum*, if someone entered a well-ordered house, he would, because of the very order within the house, arrive at the idea of someone responsible for the order (*ordinatoris rationem perpenderet*).

Second, the same point is apparent from a consideration of *God's goodness*, through which, as is clear from what was said above (q. 44, a. 4 and q. 65, a. 2), things were brought into being. For since it belongs to the best to produce the best, it would not befit God's surpassing goodness not to bring the things He produced to perfection. But the ultimate perfection of each thing lies in its attaining its end. Hence, it pertains to God's goodness that just as He has brought things into being, so too He will lead them to their end—which is what it is to govern them.

Reply to objection 1: There are two senses in which something acts or is moved for the sake of an end:

In one sense, the thing moves itself to an end, in the way that men and other rational creatures do, and it belongs to such beings to have cognition of the nature of the end and of the means to that end.

However, some things are said to act or to be moved for the sake of an end in the sense that they are acted upon or directed to their end by another, in the way that an arrow moves toward the target because it is directed by the archer, who has a cognition of the end even though the arrow does not. Hence, just as the arrow's motion to a determinate end clearly demonstrates that the arrow is directed by someone who knows the end, so too the fixed course of natural things that lack cognition clearly demonstrates that the world is governed according to some plan (*ratione aliqua gubernari*).

Reply to objection 2: In all created things there is something stable—at least primary matter—and something else that involves movement (*motus*), where we are also including operation under 'movement'. And a thing needs governance in both respects. For the very feature that is stable in things would fall into nothingness (since it comes from nothing) if it were not preserved by the hand of the one who exercises governance. This will become clear below (q. 104, a. 1).

Reply to objection 3: The natural necessity inherent in things that are determined to a single outcome is a certain impression that comes from God insofar as He is directing things to their end—just as the necessity by which an arrow acts in tending toward a fixed target is an impression that comes from the archer and not from the arrow itself. However, the two cases differ in this: What a creature receives from God is its nature, whereas what a man impresses on natural things over and beyond their natures involves violence. Hence, just as the necessity of violence in the arrow's motion demonstrates that an archer is directing the arrow, so the natural necessity that belongs to creatures displays the governance of divine providence.

Article 2

Is the end of the governance of the world something that exists outside the world?

It seems that the end of the governance of the world is not something that exists outside the world:

Objection 1: The end of the governance of a thing is what the thing is led to. But what a thing is led to is some good within the thing itself; for instance, a sick man is led to health, which is a good that exists within him. Therefore, the end of the governance of things is not any extrinsic good, but is instead a good that exists within the things themselves.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, "Among ends, some are doings (*operationes*) and some are things that are done (*operata*).” But nothing extrinsic can be something that is done by the whole universe, and a doing exists in the things that are done. Therefore, nothing extrinsic can be the end of the governance of things.

Objection 3: The good of a multitude seems to be order and peace, which is itself “a tranquility of order,” as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 19. But the world consists in a certain multitude of things. Therefore, the end of the governance of the world is a peaceful order, which exists among the things themselves. Therefore, the end of the governance of things is not anything extrinsic.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 16:4 says, “The Lord has made all things for Himself.” But He Himself exists outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore, the end of things is a certain extrinsic good.

I respond: Since the end corresponds to the source (*principium*), it cannot happen that the end of things remains unknown, given that the source is known. Therefore, since, as is apparent from what was said above (q. 44, aa. 1 and 2), the source of things is something extrinsic to the whole universe, viz.,

God, the end of things must likewise be a certain extrinsic good.

This is clear from reason. For it is manifest that the good has the character of an end. Hence, the end of any given particular thing is a certain particular good, whereas the universal end of all things is a certain universal good. But a universal good is that which is good *per se* and through its essence; that is, it is the very essence of goodness, whereas a particular good is a good by participation (*est participative bonum*). Now it is clear that within the whole universe of creatures there is no good which is not a good by participation. Hence, the good that is the end of the whole universe must be extrinsic to the whole universe.

Reply to objection 1: There are many ways in which we attain a good: (a) as a form that exists within us, such as health or knowledge; (b) as something done by us, in the way that a builder attains his end by making a house; (c) as a good that is had or possessed, in the way that someone who buys a field attains his end by possessing the field. Hence, nothing prevents it from being the case that what the universe is led to is some extrinsic good.

Reply to objection 2: The Philosopher is talking about the ends of crafts, some of which have the doings themselves as their ends, in the way that a harpist's end is the playing of the harp. By contrast, other crafts have something that is done as their end, in the way that a builder's end is not the act of building, but the house.

Now it is possible for something extrinsic to be the end not only as something that is done, but also as something that is possessed or had—or even as something that is represented, as when we say that Hercules is the end of an image that is made in order to represent him. So, then, it can be said that a good that is extrinsic to the whole universe is the end of the governance of things as something that is possessed or represented, since each thing tends toward participating in this good and toward being like it to the extent that it can be.

Reply to objection 3: To be sure, one end of the universe is a good that exists within it, viz., the order of the universe itself. But this good is not the ultimate end; instead, it is itself ordered to an extrinsic good as its ultimate end—in the same way that, as *Metaphysics* 12 says, the order of an army is itself ordered toward the general.

Article 3

Is the world governed by a single being?

It seems that the world is not governed by a single being:

Objection 1: We judge a cause by its effects. But in the governance of things it appears that there is no uniformity in the way that things act and are moved. For some of them act and are moved contingently and others necessarily, and there are other types of differences as well. Therefore, the world is not governed by a single being.

Objection 2: Things that are governed by a single being conflict with one another only because of a lack of knowledge or a lack of power on the part of the governor—both of which are far removed from God. But as is apparent in the case of contraries, created things conflict with one another and struggle against one another. Therefore, the world is not governed by a single being.

Objection 3: In nature one always finds what is for the better. But as Ecclesiastes 4:9 says, “It is better that two should be together than one.” Therefore, the world is governed by many beings and not just one.

But contrary to this: We confess a single God and a single Lord; for as 1 Corinthians 8:6 says,

“To us there is one God, the Father, and one Lord.” But both of these names involve governance, since the governance of subjects pertains to a lord (*dominus*), and, as was explained above (q. 13, a. 8), the name ‘God’ (*Deus*) is taken from providence. Therefore, the world is governed by a single being.

I respond: One must claim that the world is governed by a single being. For since the end of the governance of the world is something that is good through its essence (*essentialiter bonum*), i.e., the very best thing, the governance of the world must be the best. But the best governance is governance carried out by a single governor. The reason for this is that to govern is nothing other than to direct the things governed to their end, which is a good. But oneness (*unitas*) is relevant to the notion of goodness, as Boethius proves in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 by appeal to the fact that just as all things desire the good, so too they desire oneness, without which they cannot exist. For each thing exists to the extent that it is one; hence, we see that things resist being divided as much as they can, and that the dissolution of any given thing stems from some defect in that thing. And so oneness or peace is what the intention of one who governs a multitude aims for. But a *per se* cause of oneness is itself a single thing. For it is clear that unless a plurality of beings are themselves united in some way, they cannot unite a multitude of things and bring them together in harmony. But that which is one *per se* can be a cause of oneness in a better and more fitting way than many united beings can be. Hence, a multitude is better governed by a single being than by many beings. Therefore, it follows that the best sort of governance of the world is governance by a single governor. And this is what the Philosopher asserts in *Metaphysics* 12: “Things refuse to be ill governed; and a multiplicity of authorities is not a good thing; therefore, there should be a single ruler.”

Reply to objection 1: Motion is an act of the thing moved that comes from the mover. Therefore, deformity in the motions stems not from a diversity of governors but instead from the diversity of the things moved—a diversity that, as was explained above (q. 47, aa. 1-2 and q. 48, a. 2), is required for the perfection of the universe.

Reply to objection 2: Even if contraries conflict with one another with respect to certain proximate ends, nonetheless, with respect to the ultimate end they agree with one another in the sense that they are included within the single order of the universe.

Reply to objection 3: Among particular goods two are better than one, but no addition of goodness can be made to that which is good through its essence (*bonum essentialiter*).

Article 4

Is there just a single effect of the governance of the world, or are there many effects?

It seems that there is just a single effect of the governance of the world, and not many effects:

Objection 1: The effect of governance seems to be that which is caused by the governance in the things that are governed. But this is a single thing, viz., the good of order; this is clear in the case of an army. Therefore, there is a single effect of the governance of the world.

Objection 2: Just a single thing is apt to proceed from a single thing. But as has been shown (a. 3), the world is governed by a single being. Therefore, there is likewise just a single effect of governance.

Objection 3: If it is not the case that because of the oneness of the governor there is just a single effect of governance, then the effect will have to be multiplied in accord with the multitude of the things that are governed. But the things are uncountable to us. Therefore, the effects of governance will not be able to be comprehended under any fixed number.

But contrary to this: Dionysius says, “God includes all things and fulfills all things by His perfect providence and goodness.” But governance pertains to providence. Therefore, there are certain determinate effects of divine governance.

I respond: The effect of each action can be gathered from its end, since it is through an operation that the end is attained. Now the end of the one who governs the universe is something that is good through its essence, and all things tend toward participating in this good and being like it. Therefore, ‘effect of governance’ can be understood in three ways:

First, on the part of the end itself, and in this sense there is a single effect of governance, viz., being like the highest good.

Second, the effect of governance can be considered with respect to those things by which a creature is led to be like God. And in this sense there are two general effects of governance. For a creature becomes like God in two respects, viz., (a) with respect to God’s being good, insofar as the creature is good, and (b) with respect to God’s being a cause of goodness for others, insofar as one creature moves another to goodness. Hence, on this score there are two effects of governance, viz., the conservation of things in goodness and the movement of things toward goodness.

Third, the effect of governance can be considered in particular, and in this sense the effects are uncountable to us.

Reply to objection 1: The order of the universe includes within itself both (a) the conservation of the diverse things that have been made by God and also (b) their motion, since it is in these two things that the order among entities is found, viz., insofar as one is better than another and insofar as one is moved by another.

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the other two objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 5

Are all things subject to God’s governance?

It seems that not all things are subject to God’s governance:

Objection 1: Ecclesiastes 9:11 says, “I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all.” But what is subject to someone’s governance does not occur by chance. Therefore, things under the sun are not subject to God’s governance.

Objection 2: In 1 Corinthians 9:9 the Apostle says, “God has no care for oxen.” But everyone has care for those things that are governed by him. Therefore, not all things are subject to God’s governance.

Objection 3: That which can govern itself does not seem to need the governance of another. But a rational creature is able to govern himself, since he has dominion over his acts and acts on his own (*agat per se*); again, he is not just acted upon by another—a feature that seems to belong to those things that are governed. Therefore, not all things are subject to God’s governance.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, “It is not just heaven and earth, or men and angels, but even the bowels of the lowest and most contemptible animal, the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, and the leaf of the tree, that God has not left without agreement among their parts.” Therefore, all things are subject to His governance.

I respond: The argument for God’s being a governor of things is the same as the argument for His being their cause, since it belongs to the same being to produce a thing and to give it perfection, where

the latter pertains to a governor. But as was shown above (q. 44, aa. 1 and 2), God is a cause not of one particular genus of things, but of the universal whole of being. Hence, just as nothing can exist unless it is created by God, so too nothing can exist which is not subject to His governance.

This same point is also clear from the notion of an end. For the governance of any particular thing extends as far as the end of governance can extend. But as was shown above (a. 2), the end of God's governance is His own goodness itself. So since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 44, a. 4 and q. 65, a.2), there cannot be anything that is not ordered to God's goodness as an end, it is impossible that any beings should be withdrawn from God's governance.

Therefore, it was stupid to hold the opinion of those who claim that lower corruptible things, or even singular things, or even human affairs, are not governed by God. It is into the mouths of such people that Ezechiel 9:9 puts the words, "The Lord has abandoned the earth."

Reply to objection 1: What are said to be "under the sun" are those things that are generated and corrupted in accord with the sun's motion. In all such things there is chance—not in the sense that everything that happens in them occurs by chance, but in the sense that something fortuitous is found in each of them. And the very fact that something fortuitous is found in things of this sort demonstrates that they are subject to some sort of governance. For if corruptible things of this sort were not governed by some superior, then they—especially the ones that lack cognition—would not tend toward anything at all, and so nothing that 'lies outside of their tendencies' (*praeter intentionem*) would occur in them—which is what makes for the notion of chance. Hence, in order that he might show that chance events stem from the order of a higher cause, the author does not say simply that he sees *chance* in all things; rather, he says that he sees *time and chance*, since chance defects are found in these things in accord with some temporal ordering.

Reply to objection 2: Governance is a certain change (*mutatio*) in the things governed that comes from the governor. But as *Physics* 3 says, motion is "an act of the thing moved that comes from the mover." Now every act is proportioned to the thing whose act it is. And so diverse things that are moved must be moved in diverse ways, even in relation to the movement caused by a single mover. So, then, in accord with the single craft of God the governor, things are governed in diverse ways which correspond to their diversity.

For there are some things that act *per se* by their own nature, in the sense of having dominion over their acts, and these things are governed by God not only by being moved by God Himself operating within them, but also by being induced by Him toward what is good and being held back from what is evil, through His precepts and prohibitions and through rewards and punishments.

On the other hand, non-rational creatures, which do not act but are only acted upon, are not governed in this way by God. So, then, when the Apostle says that God does not care about oxen, he is not totally removing oxen from the care of the divine governor; rather, he is removing them only with respect to that mode of governance that belongs properly to rational creatures.

Reply to objection 3: A rational creature governs himself by his intellect and will, both of which need to be guided and perfected by God's intellect and will. And so in addition to the governance by which a rational creature governs himself as the master of his own acts, he needs to be governed by God.

Article 6

Are all things governed directly by God?

It seems that all things are governed directly (*immediate*) by God:

Objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa rejects the opinion of Plato, who divided providence into three

parts: The first providence belongs to the highest God, who provides for all celestial affairs and all universals; the second providence he claimed to belong to the secondary gods, who travel around the heavens, with respect to what occurs in the realm of generation and corruption; and the third providence he claimed to belong to certain daimons, who are the guardians of human actions around the earth. Therefore, it seems that all things are governed directly by God.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 8 says, it is better, if possible, for something to be done by a single agent rather than by many. But God is able to govern all things by Himself and without any mediating causes. Therefore, it seems that He governs all things directly.

Objection 3: There is nothing defective or imperfect in God. But it seems to involve a defect on the part of a governor that he should govern by mediators; for instance, an earthly governor has to have ministers of his governance because he himself is not sufficient to do everything and because he is not present everywhere in his kingdom. Therefore, God governs all things directly.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “In some sense the crasser lower bodies are ruled with a certain order by the more subtle and powerful bodies; in the same way, all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life, and the one who sins and deserts the rational spirit of life is ruled by the pious and just rational spirit of life, and the latter is ruled by God.”

I respond: There are two things to consider in governance, viz., *the plan of governance* (*ratio gubernationis*), which is providence itself, and *the execution of the plan* (*executio*). Therefore, as regards the plan of governance, God governs all things directly, while as regards the execution of governance, God governs certain things by the mediation of other things.

The reason for this is that since God is the very essence of goodness, everything must be attributed to God in accord with what is best for it. But the best in every type of practical reasoning or practical cognition (which includes plans of governance) consists in having cognition of the particulars that have actuality; for instance, the best physician is not the one who takes only universals into account, but the one who can likewise take into account the minutest particulars. And the same is clear in other cases.

Hence, one must claim that God has a plan for governing all things, even the most minute particulars. But since through governance the things which are governed are led to perfection, the governance will be better to the extent that more perfection is communicated by the governor to the things governed. But it is a greater perfection for something to be good in itself and also to be a cause of goodness for others than if it were only good in itself. And so God governs things in such a way that He sets up certain things as causes of others in governing—just as if a teacher were to make his students not only knowers but also teachers of others.

Reply to objection 1: Plato’s opinion is rejected because he claimed that God did not directly govern all things even with respect to the *plan* of governance. This is clear from the fact that he divided *providence*, which is the plan of governance, into three parts.

Reply to objection 2: If God governed alone, then causal perfection would be denied to things. Hence, it is not the case that everything that is done by many could be done by one.

Reply to objection 3: In the case of an earthly king, having executors of his governance does not bespeak imperfection alone. It also bespeaks the king’s dignity, since his regal power is rendered more excellent (*praeclarior*) by the order of his ministers.

Article 7

Is it possible for anything to occur outside the order of God's governance?

It seems that it is possible for something to occur outside the order of God's governance:

Objection 1: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says, "God disposes all things for the good (*per bonum*).” Therefore, if nothing among the things occurred outside the order of divine governance, then it would follow that there is no evil among things.

Objection 2: Nothing that occurs in accord with a governor's preordination occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing among the things occurs outside the order of God's governance, then it follows that nothing among the things occurs fortuitously or by chance.

Objection 3: The order of God's governance is fixed and immutable, since it is in keeping with an eternal plan. Therefore, if nothing among the things could occur outside the order of God's governance, it would follow that all things occur by necessity and that there is nothing contingent among the things—which is absurd. Therefore, it is possible that among the things something happens outside the order of God's governance.

But contrary to this: Esther 13:9 says, "O Lord, God, almighty king, for all things are in your power, and there is no one who can resist your will."

I respond: It is possible for an effect to occur outside the order of a particular cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason for this is that nothing occurs outside the order of a particular cause except because of some other impeding cause that has to be traced back to the first universal cause. For instance, indigestion occurs outside the order of the nutritive power because of some impediment—e.g., the thickness of a piece of food—that has to be traced back to some other cause, and so on back to the first universal cause.

Therefore, since God is the first *universal* cause—not just the first cause within some genus, but the cause in general of *all* being—it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of God's governance. Instead, by the very fact that something seems in some respect to depart from the order of God's providence when it is considered relative to some particular cause, it must be the case that it falls back under that same order relative to some other cause.

Reply to objection 1: There is nothing in the world that is totally evil, since, as was explained above (q. 48, a. 3), evil is always grounded in what is good. And so a thing is called evil because it departs from the order of some particular good. However, if it totally departed from the order of God's providence, then it would be absolutely nothing.

Reply to objection 2: Some occurrences among things are said to happen by chance because of their relation to particular causes, outside of whose order they occur. But as far as God's providence is concerned, "nothing happens by chance in the world," as Augustine puts it in 83 *Quaestiones*.

Reply to objection 3: Some effects are called contingent because of their relation to proximate causes, which are able to fail in their effects—and not because something can happen outside the whole order of God's governance. For the very fact that something happens outside the order of a given proximate cause stems from a cause that is subject to God's governance.

Article 8

Can anything resist the order of God's governance?

It seems that something can resist the order of God's governance:

Objection 1: Isaiah 3:8 says, "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."

Objection 2: No king justly punishes those who do not resist his ordinances. Therefore, if there were nothing opposed to God's ordinances, then no one would be justly punished by God.

Objection 3: Each thing is subject to the order of God's governance. But one thing does violence to another. Therefore, some things are opposed to God's governance.

But contrary to this: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 3 Boethius says, "There is nothing that wants to or is able to resist this highest good. Therefore, it is the highest good that 'rules over all things with power and disposes things agreeably'"—as Wisdom 8:1 says of God's wisdom.

I respond: There are two ways to think about the order of God's providence: (a) first, *in general*, viz., in accord with what proceeds from the governing cause of the whole, and (b) second, *in its specifics*, viz., in accord with what proceeds from a particular cause that is executing God's providence.

In the first sense, nothing is contrary to the order of God's governance. This is clear from two considerations. First, it is clear from the fact that the order of God's governance tends as a whole toward the good, and each thing, in its operations and inclinations, tends only toward the good, since, as Dionysius puts it, "No one acts with an eye toward evil (*respiciens malum*)."² Second, the same point is apparent from the fact that, as was explained above (aa. 1 and 5), every inclination of a natural or voluntary being is nothing other than a certain impression that comes from the first mover, just as an arrow's inclination toward a determinate target is nothing other than a certain impression that comes from the archer. Hence, all things that act, whether naturally or voluntarily, attain to what is divinely ordained as if by their own accord. This is why God is said to "dispose all things agreeably."³

Reply to objection 1: Some are said to think or speak or act against God not because they totally resist the order of God's governance, since even sinners intend some good, but rather because they are opposed to some determinate good that is appropriate for them, given their nature or status. And this is why they are justly punished by God.

Reply to objection 2: From this the reply to the second objection is clear.

Reply to objection 3: The fact that one thing does violence to another shows that something can resist the order that stems from some particular cause, but not the order that depends on the universal cause of the whole.

QUESTION 104

The Specific Effects of Divine Governance

Next we have to consider the specific effects of God's governance. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Do creatures need to be conserved in being (*in esse*) by God? (2) Are creatures conserved by God directly (*immediate*)? (3) Is God able to reduce a thing to nothingness? (4) Is anything in fact reduced to nothingness?

Article 1

Do creatures need to be conserved in being by God?

It seems that creatures do not need to be conserved in being (*conserventur in esse*) by God:

Objection 1: What is not able not to exist does not need to be conserved in being, just as what is not able to disappear does not need to be kept from disappearing. But there are some creatures that are by their nature not able not to exist. Therefore, not all creatures need to be conserved in being by God.

Proof of the second premise (*probatio mediae*): What exists in something *per se* is such that (a) it exists in it necessarily and (b) it is impossible for its opposite to exist in it; for instance, it is necessary for the number two to be even, and it is impossible for it to be odd. Now *esse* follows *per se* upon a form, since each entity has being in actuality because it has a form. But there are some creatures that are subsistent forms, as has been explained for the case of the angels (q. 50, a. 2), and so *esse* is in them *per se*. And the same line of reasoning holds for those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to only a single [substantial] form, as was explained above for the case of the celestial bodies (q. 66, a. 2). Therefore, creatures of this sort exist by necessity in accord with their nature, and they are not able not to exist; for a potentiality for non-existence cannot be grounded either (a) in their form, which *esse* follows upon *per se*, or (b) in their matter, which exists as the subject of a form that it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.

Objection 2: God is more powerful than any created agent. But there are created agents that can bring it about that their effects are conserved in being even after the agent's own action ceases. For instance, the house remains after the builder's action ceases, and the water remains hot for a time after the fire's action ceases. Therefore, *a fortiori*, God can bring it about that His creatures are conserved in being when His own operation ceases.

Objection 3: Nothing violent can occur in the absence of an agent cause. But to tend toward non-being is unnatural and violent for any creature, since every creature naturally tends toward existing (*naturaliter appetit esse*). Therefore, a creature can tend toward non-being only because of some corrupting agent (*nisi aliquo agente ad corruptionem*). But some entities, e.g., spiritual substances and celestial bodies, are such that it is impossible to do anything to corrupt them. Therefore, creatures of this sort cannot tend toward non-being, even if God's action ceases.

Objection 4: If God conserves things in being, then this will be through some action. But any action of an agent is such that, if it is efficacious, something comes to exist in the effect. Therefore, something would have to come to exist in the creature through God's action in conserving it. But this does not seem to be the case. For it is not the case that the very *esse* of the creature is effected by an action of this sort, since what already exists does not come to exist. Nor, again, is there anything else added to the creature, since if there were, then either (a) God would not be continuously conserving the creature in being or else (b) it would continually be the case that something is being added to the creature—which is absurd. Therefore, creatures are not conserved in being by God.

But contrary to this: Hebrews 1:3 says, "Upholding all things by the word of His power."

I respond: One must claim, in accord with both faith and reason, that creatures are conserved in being by God.

To make this clear, notice that there are two ways in which one thing is conserved by another:

First, *indirectly and per accidens*, in the sense in which someone is said to conserve a thing when he removes a corrupting agent. For instance, if someone keeps a child from falling into a fire, he is said to conserve the child. And God is likewise said to conserve some things in this sense—though not all things, since some things do not have corrupting agents that must be removed in order for them to be conserved.

In the second way, something is said to conserve a thing *per se and directly*, viz., insofar as that which is conserved depends on the conserving agent in such a way that it could not exist without it. And in this sense all creatures need God's conserving action (*indigent divina conservatione*). For the *esse* of each creature depends on God in such a way that the creature could not subsist for even a moment—but would instead, as Gregory says, fall into nothingness—if it were not conserved in *esse* by the action of God's power.

This can be looked at as follows. Every effect depends on its cause to the extent that it is its cause. But notice that in some cases an agent is a cause of its effect only with respect to effect's being-made (*secundum fieri tantum*) and not directly with respect to its *esse* (*non directe secundum esse eius*). This happens both in the case of artifacts and in the case of natural beings.

For instance, a builder is a cause of a house as far as its being-made is concerned, but not directly as far as its *esse* is concerned. For it is clear that the house's *esse* follows upon its form, and that the house's form is its composition and order, and that this form follows upon the natural powers of certain things. For just as a cook cooks the food by making use of a certain active natural power, viz., that of the fire, so too a builder makes a house by using cement, stones, and wood, which are capable of receiving and conserving the relevant composition and order. Hence, the house's *esse* depends on the natures of these things, just as the house's being-made depends on the builder's action.

And we have to think about natural things in like manner. For if an agent is not a cause of a form insofar as it is a form of a given sort, then that agent will not be a *per se* cause of the *esse* that follows upon that form, but will instead be a cause of the effect only with respect to its being-made.

Now it is clear that if two things belong to the same species, then the one cannot be a *per se* cause of the form of the other insofar as it is a form of that sort, since otherwise it would be a cause of its own form, given that the same line of reasoning holds in both cases. However, it can be a cause of the form's existing in matter, i.e., it can be a cause of *this* matter's acquiring *this* form. And this is what it is for it to be a cause with respect to the thing's being-made, as when a man generates a man or a fire generates a fire. And so whenever a natural effect is apt to receive an agent's action (*impressio*) with respect to the same nature that exists in the agent, then that effect depends on the agent for its being-made, but not for its *esse*.

However, in some cases the effect is not apt to receive the agent's action with respect to the same nature that exists in the agent. This is clear in the case of all agents that do not effect what is similar in species to themselves; for instance, the celestial bodies are a cause of generation for lower bodies, which are dissimilar to the celestial bodies in species. An agent of this sort can be a cause of a form with respect to the nature of that sort of form and not just a cause of such a form's being acquired in *this* matter—and in such a case it is a cause not only of the form's being-made but also of its *esse*. Therefore, just as a thing's being-made is not able to remain after the cessation of the action of an agent that is a cause of the effect with respect to its being-made, so too a thing's *esse* cannot remain after the cessation of the action of an agent that is a cause of the effect not only with respect to its being-made, but also with respect to its *esse*.

This is the reason why heated water retains heat after the fire's action ceases, whereas air does not

remain illuminated even for a moment once the sun's action ceases. For the water's matter is receptive to the fire's heat with respect to the same nature by which heat exists in the fire; hence, if the water attained completely to the form of fire, then it would retain heat forever, whereas if it participates incompletely in the form of fire in a sort of incipient way (*secundum quandam inchoationem*), then heat will remain in it only temporarily and not forever—and this because of its weak participation in the source of heat. By contrast, air is not in any way receptive to light with respect to the same nature with which light exists in the sun—that is, in such a way as to receive the sun's form, which is the principle of light—and so, since light is not rooted in the air (*non habet radicem in aere*), it immediately ceases when the sun's action ceases.

Now every creature is related to God in the way that air is related to the sun as an illuminator. For just as the sun illuminates by its nature, whereas the air becomes luminous by participating in light from the sun but not by participating in the sun's nature, so too God alone is a being through His essence, since His essence is His *esse*, whereas every creature is a being by participation (*est ens participative*) and not such that its essence is its *esse*. This is why, as Augustine puts it in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 4, “If God's power ever ceased to rule the things that have been created, their kind would simultaneously cease, and all of nature would perish.” And in book 8 of the same book he says, “Just as the air is luminous when light is present, so man is illuminated when God is present to him and continuously darkened when God is absent.”

Reply to objection 1: *Esse* follows *per se* upon the form of a creature, but only if God's influence is presupposed—just as light follows upon air's transparency (*diaphanum aeris*), but only if the sun's influence is presupposed. Hence, the potentiality for non-being in spiritual creatures and celestial bodies lies in God, who is able to withdraw His influence, rather than in the form or the matter of such creatures.

Reply to objection 2: God is unable to bring it about that a creature is conserved in being when His own operation has ceased, in just the same way that He is unable to bring it about that He is not a cause of the creature's *esse*. For a creature needs to be conserved by God in the way that an effect's *esse* depends on the cause of its *esse*. Hence, there is no parallel to a case involving an agent that is only a cause of being-made and not a cause of *esse*.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for the sort of conservation that occurs through the removal of a corrupting agent—a type of conservation that, as has been explained, not all creatures need.

Reply to objection 4: The conservation of a thing by God does not occur through any new action; instead, it occurs through the continuation of the action by which God confers *esse*—an action that exists without motion or time. It is like the conservation of light in the air by the sun's continuous influence.

Article 2

Does God directly conserve every creature?

It seems that God directly (*immediate*) conserves every creature:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), God is the conserver of things by the same action by which He is also the creator of things. But God is directly the creator of all things. Therefore, He is likewise directly the conserver of all things.

Objection 2: Each thing is closer to itself than it is to another thing. But it cannot be imparted to any creature that it should conserve itself. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it cannot be imparted to any creature that it should conserve another. Therefore, God conserves all things without any mediating conserving cause.

Objection 3: An effect is conserved in being by a cause that is a cause of *esse* and not just a cause of being-made. But, it seems, every created cause is a cause of its effects only with respect to their being-made, since, as was established above (q. 45, a. 3), a created cause acts as a cause only by effecting change (*movendo*). Therefore, created causes are not causes that conserve their effects in being.

But contrary to this: A thing is conserved in the same way that it has *esse*. But God grants *esse* to things by means of certain mediating causes. Therefore, He likewise conserves things in being by means of certain mediating causes.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), there are two ways in which something conserves a thing in being: (a) indirectly and *per accidens*, by removing or impeding the action of a corrupting agent, and (b) directly and *per se*, in the sense that the other thing's *esse* depends on it in the way that an effect's *esse* depends on its cause. Now it is in both of these ways that some created things conserve others.

For it is clear that even among corporeal things there are many that impede the actions of corrupting agents and for this reason are said to conserve things. For instance, salt keeps meat from putrefying, and something similar holds in many other cases.

Again, one finds that some effects depend on a creature with respect to their *esse*. For when many causes are ordered to one another, the effect depends primarily and principally on the first cause and secondarily on all the intermediate causes. And so the first cause principally conserves the effect, whereas the mediating causes conserve it secondarily; and the higher and closer to the first cause a given mediating cause is, the more it conserves the thing in question. Hence, even among corporeal entities the conservation and permanence of things is attributed to higher causes. As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 12, the first motion, viz., the diurnal motion, is a cause of the continuity of generation, whereas the second motion, which is motion through the zodiac, is a cause of the diversity that occurs in generation and corruption. Similarly, astronomers (*astrologi*) attribute the fixed and permanent entities to Saturn, which is the highest planet.

So, then, one should claim that God conserves some things in being by means of certain mediating causes.

Reply to objection 1: God created all things directly, but in the very creation of things He instituted an order, so that some would depend on others through which they would be secondarily conserved in being—yet presupposing the principal conservation, which is from Him.

Reply to objection 2: Since a proper cause conserves an effect that depends on it, it follows that just as one cannot arrive at any effect that is a cause of itself, even though one can arrive at an effect that is a cause of another, so too one cannot arrive at any effect that conserves itself, even though one can arrive at a cause that conserves another.

Reply to objection 3: It is only by means of some change (*nisi per modum alicuius mutationis*) that a creature can be a cause of another with respect to its acquiring a new form or disposition; for a creature always acts on a presupposed subject. However, after it has induced the form or disposition in the effect, it conserves this form or disposition without any other change in the effect. For instance, in the case of air, a certain change is understood to occur when the air is illuminated *de novo*, but the conservation of the light stems from the presence of the illuminating agent alone, without any change in the air.

Article 3

Is God able reduce a thing to nothingness?

It seems that God is not able to reduce a thing to nothingness (*aliquid redigere in nihilum*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “God is not a cause of anything’s tending toward non-being.” But this would be the case if He reduced some creature to nothingness. Therefore, God is not able to reduce anything to nothingness.

Objection 2: God is a cause of the existence of things because of His goodness, since, as Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana*, “We exist insofar as God is good.” But God is not able not to be good. Therefore, He is not able to bring it about that things do not exist. But He would do this if He reduced them to nothingness.

Objection 3: If God were to reduce certain things to nothingness, this would have to be effected through some action. But this is impossible, since every action terminates in some entity; thus, even the action of a corrupting agent terminates in something that is generated, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. Therefore, God is not able to reduce anything to nothingness.

But contrary to this: Jeremiah 10:24 says, “Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in your fury, lest you bring me to nothing.”

I respond: Some have claimed that God brought things into being by acting out of a necessity of nature. If that were true, then God would not be able to reduce anything to nothingness, just as He is not able to change His own nature.

However, as was established above (q. 19, a. 4), this position is false and completely alien to the Catholic Faith, which confesses that God brought things into being by His free will—this according to Psalm 134:6 (“All the things the Lord willed, He did”). Therefore, the fact that God communicates *esse* to things depends on God’s will.

Moreover, as has been explained (a. 1), He does not conserve things in being in any way other than by continuously giving them *esse* (*nisi inquantum eis continue influit esse*). Therefore, just as before things existed, He was able not to communicate *esse* to them and so able not to make them, so too after they have already been made, He is able not to give them *esse*, in which case they would cease to exist. And this is what it is to reduce them to nothingness.

Reply to objection 1: Non-being does not have a *per se* cause, since nothing can be a cause except insofar as it is a being, and a being, speaking *per se*, is a cause of being. So, then, God is not able to be a cause of a tendency toward non-being. Rather, a creature has this tendency from itself, insofar as it comes from nothing. However, God can be a *per accidens* cause of a thing’s being reduced to nothingness, viz., by withdrawing his action from that thing.

Reply to objection 2: God’s goodness is not a cause of things by a necessity of nature, since God’s goodness does not depend on created things; instead, He is a cause of things by His free will. Hence, just as He was able, without prejudice to His goodness, not to bring things into being, so too He is able, without detriment to His goodness, not to conserve things in being.

Reply to objection 3: If God reduced a thing to nothingness, this would occur not by any action, but by His ceasing to act.

Article 4

Is anything in fact reduced to nothingness?

It seems that something is in fact reduced to nothingness:

Objection 1: The ending (*finis*) corresponds to the beginning (*principium*). But in the beginning there was nothing except God. Therefore, things will be brought to this ending: that nothing will exist except God. And so creatures will be reduced to nothingness.

Objection 2: Every creature has finite power. But no finite power extends to what is infinite; hence, *Physics* 8 proves that a finite power cannot effect motion for an infinitely long time. Therefore, no creature can endure for an infinitely long time. And so at some time it will be reduced to nothingness.

Objection 3: Forms and accidents do not have matter as part of themselves. But at some point they cease to exist. Therefore, they are reduced to nothingness.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiastes 3:14 says, “I have learned that all the works which God has made continue for ever.”

I respond: Of those things that are done by God with respect to a creature, some stem from the natural course of things, while, as will be explained below (q. 105, a. 6), others are done miraculously outside the natural order instilled in creatures. Now what God is going to do in accord with the natural order instilled in things can be seen from the very natures of the things, whereas what is done miraculously is ordered toward the manifestation of grace—this according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 12:7, “The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,” where he then goes on to talk about miraculous acts, among other things..

Now the natures of creatures show that none of them is reduced to nothingness, either because (a) they are immaterial and so do not have within themselves a potentiality for non-being, or because (b) they are material and so remain forever at least with respect to their matter, which is incorruptible inasmuch as it serves as the subject of generation and corruption.

Moreover, reducing something to nothingness has nothing to do with the manifestation of grace, since God’s power and goodness are manifested instead in a thing’s being conserved in being.

Hence, one should say without qualification that nothing at all will be reduced to nothingness.

Reply to objection 1: The fact that things were brought into being after not having existed makes manifest the power of the one who produced them. But their being reduced to nothingness would impede the manifestation of this power, since God’s power is made manifest to the highest degree in His conserving things in being—this according to the Apostle in Hebrews 1:3 (“Upholding all things by the word of His power”).

Reply to objection 2: A creature’s power to exist is a merely receptive power, whereas the corresponding active power belongs to God Himself, from whom the outpouring of *esse* comes forth. Hence, the fact that things endure for an infinitely long time follows from the unlimitedness of God’s power.

However, the power to endure is limited in the case of certain things to a determinate temporal interval, because they are prevented from receiving God’s outpouring of *esse* by some contrary agent that their finite power can resist only for a limited time and not for an infinitely long time. This is why things that do not have a contrary persevere forever, despite the fact that the power they have is finite.

Reply to objection 3: Forms and accidents are not complete entities, since they do not subsist; instead, each of them is something that *belongs to* some being (*quodlibet eorum est aliquid entis*); for each is called a being because it is that *by which* something exists.

And yet, even given the sense in which they exist, they are not altogether reduced to

nothingness—not because some part of them remains, but rather because they remain either in the potentiality of matter or in the potentiality of the subject.

QUESTION 105

How God Moves Creatures

Next we have to consider the second effect of God's governance, which is change among creatures: first, the changes effected by God among creatures (question 105) and, second, the changes effected by one creature in another (questions 106-119).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Can God directly change matter with respect to its form? (2) Can God directly move a body? (3) Can God move an intellect? (4) Can God move a will? (5) Does God act in everything that acts? (6) Can God do anything outside the order instilled in things? (7) Are all the things that God does in this way miracles? (8) What are the different types of miracles?

Article 1

Can God directly change matter with respect to its form?

It seems that God cannot directly change (*non possit immediate movere*) matter with respect to its form:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 7, nothing can effect a form in *this* matter except a form that itself exists in matter, since a thing effects what is similar to itself. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore, He cannot cause a form in matter.

Objection 2: If an agent is related to many [possible effects], then it will not produce any of them unless it is channelled to that particular one by something else; for as *De Anima* 3 says, a general opinion (*universalis opinio*) moves someone only by the mediation of some particular apprehension. But God's power is a universal cause (*universalis causa*) of all things. Therefore, it cannot produce any particular form except by the mediation of some particular agent.

Objection 3: As was established above (q. 104, a. 2), just as being-in-general (*esse commune*) depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being (*esse determinatum*) depends on determinate particular causes. But a thing's determinate being stems from its proper form. Therefore, the proper forms of things are not produced by God except by the mediation of particular causes.

But contrary to this: Genesis 2:7 says, "God formed man from the slime of the earth."

I respond: God can move matter directly (*immediate*) with respect to its form. For something that exists in passive potentiality can be brought into actuality by an active power that contains that passive potentiality under its own power. Therefore, since matter is contained under God's power insofar as it is produced by God, it can be brought into actuality by God's power. And this is what it is for matter to be moved with respect to its form. For the form is nothing other than the matter's actuality.

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which an effect is similar to its agent cause:

In one way, it is similar in that it has the *same species*, as when a man is generated by a man and a fire is generated by a fire.

In the second way, it is similar because of *virtual containment*, insofar as the effect's form is virtually contained in the cause. It is in this way that animals generated from putrefaction, along with plants and corporeal minerals, are similar to the sun and stars by whose power they are generated. In this way, then, an effect is similar to its agent cause because it is part of the totality to which the agent's power extends.

Now as was explained above (q. 44, a. 2), God's power extends to both form and matter. Hence, a composite that is generated is similar to God because of virtual containment, just as it is similar to its composite generating cause because of a likeness to its species. Hence, just as a composite generating cause can move matter with respect to a form by generating a composite similar to itself, so too can God.

However, no other form that does not exist in matter can do this, since matter is not contained in the power of any other separated substance. And this is why demons and angels act on visible things here below not by impressing forms on them, but by employing corporeal seeds [via local motion] (cf. q. 110, a. 4).

Reply to objection 2: This argument would go through if God acted by a necessity of nature. But since He acts through His will and intellect, which has cognition of the proper notions (*rationes proprias*) of all forms and not just of their universal notions (*non solum universales*), it follows that He can determinately impress *this* form or *that* form on matter.

Reply to objection 3: The very fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is something they have from God. Hence, given that God is able to order other causes toward determinate effects, He is likewise able to produce determinate effects by Himself.

Article 2

Can God directly move a body?

It seems that God cannot directly move a body:

Objection 1: Since, as is proved in *Physics* 7, the mover and what is moved have to exist together (*oportet esse simul*), there must be some sort of contact (*contactus*) between the mover and what is moved. But there cannot be contact between God and a body, since in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, “With God there is no touch” (*Dei non est aliquis tactus*). Therefore, God cannot directly move a body.

Objection 2: God is a mover that is not moved. But this is what an apprehended desirable thing is. Therefore, God effects movement insofar as He is desired and apprehended. But He is apprehended only by an intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore, God cannot directly move a body.

Objection 3: In *Physics* 8 the Philosopher proves that an infinite power effects instantaneous motion (*movet in instanti*). But it is impossible for a body to be moved with an instantaneous motion (*in instanti moveri*); for since every movement is from one opposite to another, it would follow that two opposites exist in the same thing at the same time—which is impossible. Therefore, a body cannot be directly moved by an infinite power. But as was proved above (q. 25, a. 2), God’s power is infinite. Therefore, God cannot directly move a body.

But contrary to this: God effected the work of the six days directly, and this work included the movement of bodies, as is clear from the fact that Genesis 1:9 says, “Let the waters be gathered together in one place.” Therefore, God can directly move a body.

I respond: It is a mistake to claim that God cannot effect by Himself all of the determinate effects that are brought about by any created cause. Hence, since bodies are moved directly by created causes, there should be no doubt at all that God can directly move any given body.

Indeed, this is a consequence of the things explained above (a. 1). For every movement of any given body either (a) follows upon some form, in the ways that the local motion of heavy bodies and lightweight bodies follows upon the form given them by what generates them (which is why what generates them is called a mover), or (b) is a path to some form, in the way that the action of effecting heat is a path to the form of fire. But it is one and the same thing that (a) impresses the form and (b) disposes [the patient] for the form and (c) gives the movement that follows upon the form; for instance, fire not only (a) generates another fire, but also (b) gives warmth and (c) effects upward movement.

Therefore, since God can directly impress a form on matter, it follows that He can move any given body with respect to any given movement.

Reply to objection 1: There are two sorts of touching (*tactus*), viz., *corporeal*, as when two bodies touch one another, and *virtual*, in the sense that something sad touches one who is saddened. Thus, as regards the first sort of contact, God, since He is incorporeal, neither touches nor is touched. However, as regards virtual contact, He touches creatures by moving them, but He is not touched by them because no natural power had by any creature can get through to Him (*ipsum pertingere*). And this is the sense in which Dionysius meant that “with God there is no touch,” viz., that He is not touched.

Reply to objection 2: God moves as something desired and understood. But it is not necessary for Him in all cases to move as something that is desired and understood by what is moved. Rather, He must always move as something desired and known by *Himself*, since He does all things for the sake of His own goodness.

Reply to objection 3: In *Physics* 8 the Philosopher tries to prove with the following argument that the first mover’s power is not a power that exists in a magnitude:

The first mover’s power is infinite (which he proves by appeal to the fact that the first mover can effect motion for an infinitely long time); but if an infinite power existed in a magnitude, it would effect motion in no time at all, which is impossible; therefore, it must be the case that the first mover’s infinite power does not exist in a magnitude.

From this it is clear that a body’s being moved in no time at all follows only upon an infinite power that exists in a magnitude. The reason for this is that every power that exists in a magnitude effects motion with all of itself (*secundum se totam*), since it effects motion by a necessity of nature. But an infinite power exceeds any finite power incommensurably (*improportionabiliter*). Now a motion has a greater velocity to the extent that the power of the mover is greater. Therefore, since a finite power effects motion for a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power effects motion in no time at all. For there is some proportion that any given temporal interval bears to any other temporal interval.

By contrast, a power that does not exist in a magnitude is the power of an intelligent being who acts in his effects in a way that befits them. And so, since it is impossible for a body to be moved in no time at all, it does not follow that this being effects motion in no time at all.

Article 3

Does God directly move a created intellect?

It seems that God does not directly move a created intellect:

Objection 1: An intellect’s action stems from what it exists in, since, as *Metaphysics* 9 says, this action does not pass into any external matter. But the action of a thing that is moved by another stems not from what it exists in, but instead from the mover. Therefore, an intellect is not moved by another. And so it seems that God cannot move an intellect.

Objection 2: That which has within itself a principle sufficient for its own movement is not moved by another. But an intellect’s movement is the very act of intellectual understanding itself—in the sense in which, according to the Philosopher in *De Anima* 3, acts of intellectual understanding and of sensing are called ‘movements’. But the intelligible light instilled in an intellect is a sufficient principle of an act of intellectual understanding. Therefore, an intellect is not moved by another.

Objection 3: Just as a sensory power is moved by a sensible thing, so too an intellect is moved by an intelligible thing. But God is not intelligible to us; instead, He exceeds our intellect. Therefore, God

cannot move our intellect.

But contrary to this: The teacher moves the intellect of the student. But as Psalm 93:10 says, “God teaches man knowledge.” Therefore, God moves man’s intellect.

I respond: Just as in the case of corporeal movements the mover is defined as what gives a form that is a principle of the movement, so, too, what is said to move an intellect is what causes a form that is a principle of the intellectual operation which is called a movement of the intellect.

Now an intellect’s operation has two principles in the one who is engaged in intellectual understanding, viz., (a) the intellectual power itself, which is a principle even in the one who is [only] potentially engaged in intellectual understanding, and (b) the principle of actual intellectual understanding, viz., the likeness of the thing understood within the one understanding it. Therefore, when something is said to move an intellect, either (a) it is giving the power to understand to the one engaged in intellectual understanding, or (b) it is impressing on it a likeness of the thing understood.

Now God moves a created intellect in both of these ways.

For He is the first immaterial being. And since intellectuality follows upon immateriality, it follows that He is the first being having intellectual understanding. Hence, since the first in any ordering is a cause of those that follow, it follows that any power of intellectual understanding is from Him.

Similarly, since He is the first being and since all things preexist in Him as in their first cause, they must exist in Him as intelligible in accord with His mode. For just as all the intelligible conceptions of things exist first in God and flow from Him into other intellects, in order that those other intellects might have actual intellectual understanding, so, too, these conceptions flow into creatures, in order that those creatures might subsist.

So, then, God moves a created intellect (a) insofar as He gives it its power of intellectual understanding—whether its natural power or some additional power—and (b) insofar as He imprints intelligible species on it. And in both cases, He keeps and preserves these things in being.

Reply to objection 1: The intellectual operation is, to be sure, from the intellect in which it exists as from a secondary cause, but it is from God as from a first cause. For the fact that the one who is engaged in intellectual understanding is able to understand is itself given to him by God.

Reply to objection 2: The intellectual light is, taken together with the likeness of the thing understood, a sufficient principle of an act of intellectual understanding. However, it is a secondary principle and depends on the first principle.

Reply to objection 3: What is intelligible moves our intellect insofar as it in some way imprints upon the intellect a likeness of itself through which it can be understood intellectually. But, as was shown above (q. 12, a. 2 and q. 56, a. 3), the likenesses that God imprints on a created intellect are not sufficient for understanding God Himself through His essence. Hence, as has been explained (q. 12, a. 4), He moves a created intellect and yet is not intelligible to that intellect.

Article 4

Can God move a created will?

It seems that God cannot move a created will:

Objection 1: Everything that is moved by something extrinsic is coerced. But a will cannot be coerced. Therefore, it is not moved by anything extrinsic. And so it cannot be moved by God.

Objection 2: God cannot bring it about that contradictories are simultaneously true. But this would follow if He moved a will, since to be moved voluntarily is to be moved by oneself and not by

another. Therefore, God cannot move a will.

Objection 3: Movement is attributed more to the mover than to the thing moved; hence, homicide is attributed not to the rock, but to the one who throws it. Therefore, if God moves a will, it follows that voluntary works would not be attributed to the man as merit or demerit. But this is false. Therefore, God does not move any will.

But contrary to this: Philippians 2:13 says, “It is God who works in us, both to will and to accomplish.”

I respond: Just as an intellect, as was explained above (a. 3), is moved both (a) by its object and (b) by the one who gave it the power of intellectual understanding, so too a will is moved both (a) by its object, which is the good, and (b) by the one who creates the power of willing.

Now as regards its being moved by its object, a will can be moved by any good whatsoever, even though it is moved sufficiently and efficaciously only by God. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover exceeds or is at least equal to the passive power of the movable thing. But a will’s passive power extends to the good in general (*ad bonum in universali*); for its object is the universal good just as the intellect’s object is universal being. But every created good is a certain particular good, whereas God alone is the universal good. Hence, God alone fulfills a will (*implet voluntatem*) and sufficiently moves it as an object.

Similarly, the power of willing is caused by God alone. For an act of willing (*velle*) is nothing other than a certain inclination toward the will’s object, which is the universal good. But to incline something toward the universal good is the role of the first mover, to whom the ultimate end is proportioned—just as, in human affairs, to direct something toward the common good is the role of one who presides over the multitude.

Hence, it is proper to God to move the will in both of these ways—but especially in the second way, i.e., by inclining it from within (*interius eam inclinando*).

Reply to objection 1: That which is moved by another is said to be coerced if it is moved contrary to its proper inclination; however, if it is moved by another thing that gives it its proper inclination, then it is not said to be coerced. For instance, a heavy thing is not coerced when it is moved downward by the thing that generates it. So, then, God, in moving the will, does not coerce it, since He gives it its proper inclination.

Reply to objection 2: To be moved voluntarily is to move oneself (*moveri ex se*), i.e., to be moved by an intrinsic principle. But that intrinsic principle can itself come from some other extrinsic principle. And so to move oneself is not incompatible with being moved by another.

Reply to objection 3: If a will were moved by another in such a way that it in no way moved itself, then the will’s works would not count for merit or demerit. However, since, as has been explained, being moved by another does not rule out moving oneself, it follows that the nature of merit and demerit is not undermined.

Article 5

Does God act in everything that is acting?

It seems that God does not act in everything that is acting:

Objection 1: Nothing that is insufficient should be attributed to God. Therefore, if God acts in everything that is acting, then He acts sufficiently in each thing. Therefore, it would be superfluous for a created agent to do anything (*superfluum esset quod agens creatum aliquid operaretur*).

Objection 2: A single action does not belong to two agents at once (*una operatio non est simul a duobus operantibus*), just as two things that are being moved cannot have numerically one motion. Therefore, if a creature's action is from God operating in the creature, then that action cannot simultaneously belong to the creature. And so no creature does anything.

Objection 3: A thing's maker is said to be a cause of the thing's action, insofar as the maker gives the thing the form by which it acts. Therefore, if God is a cause of the action of the things made by Him, then this will be so because He gives them the power to act. But this occurs at the beginning, when He makes the thing. Therefore, it seems that He no longer acts in a creature that is acting.

But contrary to this: Isaiah 26:12 says, "You have done all our works in us, O Lord."

I respond: The claim that God acts in everything that is acting has been understood by some in such a way that no created power does anything, but instead God alone does all things directly. For instance, it is not the fire that gives heat, but instead God gives heat in the fire, and likewise for all other cases.

However, this is impossible.

First of all, on this view the ordering of causes and effects (*ordo causae et causati*) would be removed from created things. This involves a lack of power on the part of the creator. For it is part of an agent's power that it should endow its effect with the power to act.

Second, it would make no sense to attribute to things the operative powers that are found in them, if they never acted through those powers. To the contrary, all created things would seem in some way senseless, if they were stripped of their proper operations, since each thing exists for the sake of its own action. For the imperfect always exists for the sake of the more perfect. Thus, just as matter exists for the sake of form, so form, i.e., *first* act, exists for the sake of its own operation, i.e., *second* act. And so a created thing's end is its operation.

So, then, one should understand that (a) God acts in things and yet that (b) the things themselves have their own proper action. To see this clearly, note that even though there are four kinds of causes, the material cause is not a principle of action, but instead serves as a subject that receives the effect of an action. By contrast, the end and the agent and the form all serve as principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end, which moves the agent; the second principle is the agent; and the third is the form of that which is applied to acting by the agent (though the agent itself acts through its own form as well). This is clear in the case of artifacts. For the craftsman is moved to act by the end, which is the thing made, e.g., a chest or a bed; and he applies to his action the hatchet, which cuts by means of its sharpness.

So, then, it is in accord with these three principles that God acts in every agent that is acting:

First, in accord with the nature of an end. For every action is for the sake of some real or apparent good. But nothing is or appears good except insofar as it participates in a likeness of the highest good, which is God. It follows that God Himself is a cause, in the sense of an end, of every action.

Again, note that if there are many ordered agents, it is always the case that the second agent *acts in the power of the first agent* (*secundum agens agit in virtute primi*). For the first agent moves the second agent to act (*primum agens movet secundum ad agendum*). Accordingly, all things act in the power of God Himself, and so He is a cause of the actions of all agents.

Third, note that it is not just the case that God moves things to act in the sense of applying their forms and powers to action, in the way that a craftsman applies a hatchet to cutting even though he sometimes does not give the hatchet its form; rather, God also endows created agents with their form and preserves them in being. Hence, He is a cause of actions not only insofar as He gives the form that is a principle of the action, in the way that the thing that generates is a cause of the movement of heavy and lightweight bodies, but also insofar as He conserves the forms and powers of things, in the way that the sun is said to be a cause of the manifestation of colors insofar as it gives and conserves light, by which

colors are made manifest. And since a thing's form exists within the thing and to that extent is considered prior and more universal, and since God is properly the universal cause in all things of *esse* itself, which is more intimate to things than anything else, it follows that God acts intimately within all things. And this is why in Sacred Scripture the actions of nature are attributed to God as acting in nature—this according to Job 10:11 (“You have clothed me with skin and flesh; You have put me together with bones and sinews”).

Reply to objection 1: God acts sufficiently in things in the manner of a first agent; nor is it the case because of this that the action of secondary agents is superfluous.

Reply to objection 2: A single action does not proceed from two agents of a single order. But nothing prevents one and the same action from proceeding from a first agent and a secondary agent.

Reply to objection 3: God not only gives forms to things, but also, as has been explained, conserves them in being, applies them to action, and serves as the end of all actions.

Article 6

Can God do anything outside of the order instilled in things?

It seems that God cannot do anything outside of the order instilled in things:

Objection 1: In *Contra Faustum* 26 Augustine says, “God, the founder and creator of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature.” But what lies outside of the order naturally instilled in things seems to be contrary to nature. Therefore, God cannot do anything outside of the order instilled in things.

Objection 2: The order of nature is from God in the same way that the order of justice is. But God cannot do anything outside of the order of justice, since in that case He would be doing something unjust. Therefore, He cannot do anything outside of the order of nature.

Objection 3: God instituted the order of nature. Therefore, if God did anything outside of the order of nature, it seems that He is mutable—which is absurd.

But contrary to this: In *Contra Faustum* 26 Augustine says, “God on occasion does something contrary to the usual course of nature.”

I respond: Every cause is such that some sort of ordering flows from it into its effects, since every cause has the nature of a principle. And so when the causes are multiplied, so are the orderings, one of which is contained under another in the same way that one cause is contained under another cause. Hence, a higher cause is not contained under the ordering of a lower cause, but just the opposite. There is a clear example of this in human affairs. For the ordering of a home depends on the father of the family, and this ordering is contained under the ordering of the city, which proceeds from its leader (*rector*), and this ordering is contained under the ordering that proceeds from the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

Therefore, if the ordering of things is thought of insofar as it depends on the *first* cause, then in this sense God cannot do anything contrary to the order of things, since if He did so, then He would be acting contrary to His own foreknowledge or will or goodness. By contrast, if the order of things is thought of insofar as it depends on one of the *secondary* causes, then in this sense God can act outside of the order of things. For He is not subject to any ordering of secondary causes, but instead any such ordering is subject to Him in the sense that it proceeds from Him through the choice of His will and not by a necessity of nature. For He could have instituted some other ordering of things. Hence, when He wants to, He can act outside of the order that has been instituted—for instance, by bringing about the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing effects that the secondary causes do not extend to. This

is why, in *Contra Faustum* 26, Augustine says, “God acts contrary to the usual course of nature, but He does not act in any way against the highest law, since He does not act against Himself.”

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which it can happen that something occurs outside of the nature instilled in natural things:

In one way, through the action of an agent that did not confer the relevant natural inclination—as, for instance, when a man moves a heavy body upwards; for the heavy body does not get from the man its inclination toward downward movement. This is something contrary to nature.

In the second way, through the action of that agent on which the thing’s natural action depends. And this is not contrary to nature, as is clear in the case of the ebb and flow of the sea, which is not contrary to nature even though it lies outside of the natural motion of water, which moves downward. For this [tidal movement] comes from the influence of a celestial body, which the natural inclinations of lower bodies depend on.

Therefore, since the order of nature was instilled in things by God, it is not contrary to nature if He does something outside of that order. Hence, in *Contra Faustus* 26 Augustine says, “Whatever He does—He who is the source of every mode, number, and ordering of nature—is natural to each thing.”

Reply to objection 2: The order of justice involves a relation to the *first* cause, which is the rule of all justice. And so God can do nothing outside of this order.

Reply to objection 3: God instilled a fixed order in things in such a way that He nonetheless reserved to Himself whatever He would on occasion do in a different way for His own good reasons (*aliter ex causa*). Hence, when He acts outside of this order, He does not change.

Article 7

Is everything that God does outside of the natural order of things a miracle?

It seems that not everything God does outside of the natural order of things is a miracle:

Objection 1: The creation of the world, as well as of souls, and the justification of the wicked are accomplished by God outside of the natural order, since they are not done by means of the action of any natural cause. And yet these are not called miracles. Therefore, not everything that God does outside of the natural order of things is a miracle.

Objection 2: A miracle is said to be “something difficult and unusual that occurs beyond the power of nature and beyond the hope of those who marvel at it.” But there are some things done outside of the order of nature that are not difficult, since they involve small matters, such as the recovery of precious stones or the healing of the sick. Nor, again, are they unusual, since they occur frequently, as when sick people were placed in the streets in order to be healed under Peter’s shadow (Acts 5:15). Nor, again, are they beyond the power of nature, as when people are cured of fevers. Nor, again, are they beyond hope, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which is accomplished outside of the order of nature. Therefore, not everything that is done outside of the order of nature is a miracle.

Objection 3: The name ‘miracle’ (*miraculum*) is taken from ‘wonder’ (*admiratio*). But wonder is directed at things that are manifest to the sensory power, and sometimes things happen outside of the natural order in things that are not manifest to the senses, as when the apostles became knowledgeable without either discovering anything or learning anything. Therefore, not everything that is done outside of the order of nature is a miracle.

But contrary to this: In *Contra Faustum* 26 Augustine says, “When God does something contrary to the course of nature that is normal and known to us, such things are called great deeds or marvels

(*magnalia vel mirabilia*).”

I respond: The name ‘miracle’ (*miraculum*) is taken from ‘wonder’ (*admiratio*).

Now wonder arises when the effects are obvious and the cause is hidden; for instance, as it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, someone is filled with wonder when he sees an eclipse of the sun and is ignorant of its cause. But it can happen that the cause of some obvious effect is known to someone even though it is not known to others. Hence, something is surprising (*mirum*) to one man, but not to others; for instance, an uneducated man is surprised at (*miratur*) an eclipse of the sun, but an astronomer (*astrologus*) is not.

By contrast, ‘miracle’ means something that is full of wonder in the sense that it has a cause that is hidden absolutely speaking and from everyone. But this cause is God. Hence, it is those things that are done by God outside of the causes known to us that are called miracles.

Reply to objection 1: Even though creation and the justification of the wicked are done by God alone, they are not properly speaking called miracles. For they are not apt to be done by other causes, and so they do not occur ‘outside of the order of nature’ because they have nothing to do with the order of nature.

Reply to objection 2: A miracle is called difficult not because of the dignity of the matter in which it is done, but because it exceeds the power of nature. Similarly, a miracle is called unusual not because it does not occur frequently, but because it lies outside of the normal course of nature (*praeter naturalem consuetudinem*). Again, a miracle is said to be beyond the power of nature not only because of the substance of the thing that is done, but also because of the mode and order of doing it. And a miracle is said to be beyond the hope of nature, but not beyond that hope of grace that stems from the faith by which we believe in a future resurrection.

Reply to objection 3: Even though the apostles’ knowledge was not manifest in itself, it was nonetheless manifest in its effects, and because of these effects it appeared wondrous (*mirabilis*).

Article 8

Is one miracle greater than another?

It seems not to be the case that one miracle is greater than another:

Objection 1: In *Epistola ad Volusianum* Augustine says, “In things that are done miraculously (*in rebus mirabiliter factis*), the whole reason for what is done is the power of the one doing it.” But it is the same power, viz., God’s power, that brings about all miracles. Therefore, it is not the case that one miracle is greater than another.

Objection 2: God’s power is infinite. But what is infinite exceeds everything finite incommensurably (*improportionabiliter*). Therefore, an infinite power’s doing *this* thing is no more to be marvelled at than its doing *that* thing. Therefore, it is not the case that one miracle is greater than another.

But contrary to this: In John 14:12 our Lord, talking about miraculous works, says, “The works that I do, He also shall do; and greater than these shall He do.”

I respond: Nothing is called a miracle by comparing it to God’s power, since anything that is done is minimal when compared to God’s power—this according to Isaiah 40:15 (“Behold the Gentiles are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance”). Instead, something is called a miracle by comparing it to the power of nature, which a miracle exceeds. And so a miracle is said to be greater insofar as it exceeds the power of nature to a greater degree.

Now there are three ways in which something exceeds the power of nature:

In one way, with respect to *the substance of the thing that is done*, e.g., that two bodies should be in the same place at the same time (*duo corpora sint simul*), or that the sun should travel backwards, or that a human body should be glorified—which nature cannot do in any way at all. These occupy the highest grade among miracles.

Second, something exceeds the power of nature not with respect to *what* is done, but with respect to *that in which* it is done, as with the resuscitation of the dead or the giving of sight to the blind, and so on. For nature can cause life, but not in someone who is dead; and nature can bestow sight, but not to someone who is blind. These works occupy the second place among the miracles.

In the third way, something exceeds the power of nature with respect to *the mode and order of doing it*, as when someone is suddenly cured of a fever by God's power in the absence of medical care and of the normal process of nature in such matters (*absque curatione et consueto processu naturae in talibus*), or as when the air is instantaneously filled with heavy rains by God's power in the absence of natural causes, as happened in reply to the prayers of Samuel (1 Kings 12:18) and of Elijah (3 Kings 18:44-45). Works of this sort occupy the lowest place among miracles. Yet all of these works themselves have different grades, depending on the different ways in which they exceed the power of nature.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: This makes it clear how to reply to the objections, which go through in regard to God's power.

QUESTION 106

How One Angel Illuminates Another

The next thing we have to consider is how one creature moves another. This consideration will have three parts: first, we will consider how angels, who are purely spiritual creatures, effect movement (questions 106-114); second, we will consider how corporeal things effect movement (questions 115-116); and, third, we will consider how men, who are composed of a spiritual and corporeal nature, effect movement (questions 117-119).

On the first topic there are three things to be considered: first, how an angel acts on another angel (questions 106-109); second, how an angel acts on corporeal creatures (question 110); and, third, how an angel acts on men (questions 111-114).

On the first topic, we must consider the illumination (question 106) and speech (question 107) of angels, along with their ordering with respect to one another, both among the good angels (question 108) and among the bad angels (question 109).

As for illumination, there are four questions: (1) Does one angel move the intellect of another angel by illuminating him? (2) Does one angel move the will of another angel? (3) Can a lower angel illuminate a higher angel? (4) Does a higher angel illuminate a lower angel about all the things he knows?

Article 1

Does one angel illuminate another?

It seems that it is not the case that one angel illuminates another:

Objection 1: Angels now possess the same beatitude that we ourselves hope for in the future. But according to Jeremiah 31:34 (“A man will no longer teach his neighbor, and a man will no longer teach his brother”), at that time it will not be the case that one man illuminates another. Therefore, it is likewise not now the case that one angel illuminates another.

Objection 2: In angels there are three kinds of light (*lumen*): the light of *nature*, the light of *grace*, and the light of *glory*. But it is the creator who illuminates an angel by the light of nature; and it is the one who justifies him who illuminates an angel by the light of grace; and it is the one who beatifies him who illuminates an angel by the light of glory—and in each case this is God. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel illuminates another.

Objection 3: Light is a certain form in the mind. But as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, the rational mind is formed by God alone, without a mediating creature. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel illuminates the mind of another.

But contrary to this: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 8, Dionysius says, “The angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, illuminated, and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy.”

I respond: One angel illuminates another. To see this clearly, note that light, as applied to the intellect, is nothing other than a certain manifestation of the truth—this according to Ephesians 5:13 (“All that is made manifest is light”). Hence, to illuminate is nothing other than to pass on to another the manifestation of a truth that one knows. It is in this sense that at Ephesians 3:8-9 the Apostle says, “To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace, to illuminate all men about the dispensation of the mystery which has been hidden from the ages in God.” So, then, one angel is said to illuminate another insofar as he makes manifest to him a truth that he himself knows. Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “Theologians demonstrate plainly that the orders of heavenly substances are taught the deifying sciences by the highest minds.”

Now as was explained above (q. 105, a. 3), two things must come together in order for understanding to occur, viz., (a) *the intellective power* and (b) *a likeness of the thing that is understood*. And it is in these two respects that one angel is able to make known to another a truth that he himself knows.

He does this, first, by fortifying the other's intellective power. For just as the power of a less perfect body is strengthened because of the spatial proximity of a more perfect body—e.g., a body that is less hot increases in heat because of the presence of a body that is more hot—so too the intellective power of a lower angel is strengthened because a higher angel turns toward him. For the order of 'turning toward one another' (*ordo conversionis*) plays the role among spiritual beings that the order of spatial proximity plays among corporeal things.

Second, one angel manifests a truth to another with respect to the likeness of the thing that he himself understands. For the higher angel receives his knowledge of the truth in a type of universal conception that the lower angel's intellect would not be capable of grasping, since it is natural for the lower angel to receive truth in a more particularized way. Therefore, the higher angel somehow draws distinctions within the truth that he conceives of in a universal way in order for the lower angel to be able to grasp it, and this is the way in which he presents to the lower angel that which the latter comes to know—just as, in our own case, teachers make many distinctions within what they know in a unified way in order to accommodate it to the capacity of others. This is how Dionysius puts it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 15: "Each intellectual substance, by his provident power, divides and multiplies the uniform understanding given to him by a substance closer to God (*a diviniore*) in order to fashion a comparison that leads the lower substance upward."

Reply to objection 1: All the angels, both higher and lower, see God's essence directly, and it is not the case that one teaches another in this respect. This is the sort of teaching that the prophet is talking about, and that is why he says, "A man will not teach his brother, saying, 'Know the Lord'. For all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest."

However, the reasons behind God's works, which are known in God as in the cause of those works, are such that God knows them all in Himself, because He comprehends Himself, whereas everyone else who sees God knows more of these reasons to the extent that he sees God more perfectly. Hence, a higher angel knows more of the reasons behind God's works than a lower angel does, and he illuminates the lower angel about them. This is how Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "The angels are illuminated with the reasons for the things that exist."

Reply to objection 2: One angel illuminates another not by giving him the light of nature or the light of grace or the light of glory, but rather, as has been explained, by strengthening his natural light and by making manifest to him the truth concerning things that pertain to the state of nature, the state of grace, and the state of glory.

Reply to objection 3: The rational mind is formed directly by God either (a) as an image from an exemplar, since it is made to no other image than the image of God, or (b) as a subject completed by an ultimate form, since a created mind is always thought of as unformed unless it adheres to the First Truth itself. By contrast, other kinds of illumination, which are from a man or an angel, are, as it were, dispositions with respect to the last form.

Article 2

Can one angel move the will of another?

It seems that one angel can move the will of another:

Objection 1: According to Dionysius, as is clear from the passage quoted above (a. 1), just as one angel illuminates another, so one angel cleanses and perfects another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to involve the will; for cleansing seems to be a cleansing from the filth of sin, which pertains to the will, whereas perfecting seems to occur through the acquisition of an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore, one angel can move the will of another.

Objection 2: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, Dionysius says, “The names of the angels designate their properties.” But the Seraphim are so called because they are ‘fiery’ or ‘ardent’, and they are this way through love, which pertains to the will. Therefore, one angel moves the will of another.

Objection 3: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says that a higher appetite moves a lower appetite. But just as a higher angel’s intellect is higher, so also his appetite is higher. Therefore, it seems that a higher angel can alter the will of another.

But contrary to this: Altering the will belongs to the one who justifies, since justice is rectitude of the will. But it is only God who justifies. Therefore, one angel cannot alter the will of another.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 105, a. 4), there are two ways in which the will is altered: first, on the part of the object, and, second, on the part of the power of willing itself.

Now on the part of the *object*, the will is moved both by (a) the good itself, which is the object of the will and moves the will in the way that what is desirable moves an appetite, and (b) by the one who exhibits the object—as, for instance, by showing that something is good. But as was explained above (q. 105, a. 4), while other goods may incline the will in some way, nothing moves the will with necessity (*sufficienter*) except the universal good, viz., God. And this is the good which He alone exhibits in order to be seen through His essence by those who are beatified; and as we read in Exodus 33:18-19, it is He alone who, when Moses says, “Show me your glory,” replies, “I will show you all good.” Therefore, an angel does not move the will with necessity (*sufficienter*), either as an object or as someone exhibiting an object. However, an angel does incline the will both as (a) a certain lovable object and as (b) one who manifests certain created goods that are ordered toward God’s goodness. And in this way he is able to incline the will of another, by means of persuasion, toward the love of a creature or the love of God.

On the other hand, as far as the *power* itself is concerned, the will cannot be moved in any way except by God. For the will’s operation is a certain inclination toward what is willed on the part of the one who wills, and this inclination can be altered only by the one who conferred the power of willing on the creature—just as a natural inclination can likewise be altered only by an agent who can give the power that the natural inclination follows upon. But it is God alone who confers the power of willing on a creature, since He alone is the author of an intellectual nature. Hence, one angel cannot move the will of another.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Cleansing’ and ‘perfecting’ are to be taken here in a sense that goes along with ‘illuminating’. Since God illuminates both the intellect and will by altering them, He cleanses both the intellect and the will of defects and perfects both the intellect and the will with respect to their ends. By contrast, as has been explained (a. 1), illumination by an angel has to do [only] with the intellect. And so *cleansing* by an angel means cleansing the intellect of a defect, viz., ignorance, whereas *perfecting* by an angel means bringing to fulfillment the intellect’s end, viz., to know the truth. This is why in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, chap. 6, Dionysius says, “In the heavenly hierarchy, the cleansing of lower essences is an illumination with respect to unknown things which leads them to a more perfect knowledge.” In the same way, we say that bodily sight is cleansed insofar as darkness is removed, whereas it is illuminated insofar as it is suffused with light, and it is perfected insofar as it is led to the cognition of what is colored.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, it is by means of persuasion that one angel can induce another toward loving God.

Reply to objection 3: The Philosopher is talking here about the lower, i.e., sentient, appetite, which can be moved by the higher, i.e., intellectual, appetite. For the higher appetite belongs to the same nature of the soul, and the lower appetite is a power that exists in a corporeal organ—something that has no place in angels.

Article 3

Can a lower angel illuminate a higher angel?

It seems that a lower angel can illuminate a higher angel:

Objection 1: The Church's hierarchy is derived from and represents the heavenly hierarchy; hence, the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" in Galatians 4:26. But according to what the Apostle says at 1 Corinthians 14:31 ("You are all able to prophesy, one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted"), in the Church those who are higher are illuminated and taught by those who are lower. Therefore, in the heavenly hierarchy those who are higher can likewise be illuminated by those who are lower.

Objection 2: Just as the order of corporeal substances depends on God's will, so too does the order of spiritual substances. But as has been explained (q. 105, a. 6), God sometimes operates outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore, He likewise sometimes operates outside the order of spiritual substances by illuminating those who are lower without the mediation of those who are higher. Therefore, the lower angels who are illuminated in this way by God can illuminate those who are higher.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), one angel illuminates another by turning toward him. But since this 'turning toward another' is voluntary, the highest angel can turn toward the lowest angel while skipping over the ones in between. Therefore, the highest angel can illuminate the lowest angel directly, and so the latter can in turn illuminate those who are higher than himself.

But contrary to this: Dionysius says, "It is a divine law, fixed immovably, that lower things are led back to God through the mediation of higher things."

I respond: Lower angels never illuminate higher angels, but instead are always illuminated by them. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (q. 105, a. 6), one order is contained under another in the same way that one cause is contained under another. Hence, one order is ordered to another in the same way that one cause is ordered to another.

So it is not unfitting if something is sometimes done outside the order of lower causes in order to direct things to a higher cause—as happens, for instance, when in human affairs someone preempts a governor's precept in order to obey the prince. And so it happens that God sometimes operates miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature in order to direct men toward knowing Him.

However, the preemption of the order that should obtain among spiritual substances has nothing to do with directing men to God, since the operations of angels are not manifest to us in the way that the operations of visible bodies are. And so the order that is fitting among spiritual substances is never preempted by God and, as a result, the lower angels are always moved by the higher angels, and not vice versa.

Reply to objection 1: The Church's hierarchy imitates the heavenly hierarchy in some respects, but does not attain a perfect likeness of it. For in the heavenly hierarchy the whole reason for the ordering is based on closeness to God. And so those who are closer to God belong to a more sublime grade [of angel] and have clearer knowledge, and because of this the higher angels are never illuminated by the lower ones. By contrast, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy it sometimes happens that (a) those who

are closer to God because of their sanctity belong to the lowest grade and are not eminent in knowledge, and that (b) some who are eminent in knowledge in one area are deficient in knowledge in another area. And because of this the higher can be taught by the lower.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, there is no parallel in the arguments regarding God's acting outside the order of corporeal nature and His acting outside the order of spiritual nature. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to objection 3: An angel voluntarily turns toward another angel in order to illuminate him, but an angel's will is always regulated by God's law, which instituted the ordering among angels.

Article 4

Does a higher angel illuminate a lower angel about everything that the higher angel knows?

It seems that a higher angel does not illuminate a lower angel about everything that the higher angel knows:

Objection 1: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 12, Dionysius says that the higher angels have a knowledge that is more universal, whereas lower angels have knowledge that is more particularized and subordinate. But there are more things contained under universal knowledge than under particularized knowledge. Therefore, in being illuminated by the higher angels, the lower angels do not know everything that the higher angels know.

Objection 2: In *2 Sentences*, dist. 11, the Master says that the higher angels knew the mystery of the Incarnation from the beginning, whereas this mystery was unknown to the lower angels up to the time that it was accomplished. This is evident from the fact that, as Dionysius explains in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, when certain angels asked as if they did *not* know, "Who is this king of glory?"—other angels, as if they *did* know, responded, "The Lord of hosts, He is the king of glory." But this would not be the case if the higher angels illuminated the lower angels about everything that they know. Therefore, they do not illuminate them about all the things that are known to them.

Objection 3: If the higher angels make known to the lower angels everything that they know, then nothing that the higher angels know remains unknown to the lower angels. Therefore, there is nothing left about which the higher angels are able to illuminate the lower angels. But this seems absurd. Therefore, the higher angels do not illuminate the lower angels about everything.

But contrary to this: Gregory says, "In that heavenly homeland, even though some are more excellently gifted, nonetheless, nothing is possessed in a unique way." And in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 15, Dionysius says that each heavenly essence, having been given knowledge by a higher essence, communicates it to a lower essence. This is clear from the passage cited above (a. 1).

I respond: All creatures participate in God's goodness in order to diffuse to others the good that they have within themselves, since it is part of the notion of goodness that it communicates itself to others. This is why even corporeal agents pass on to others a likeness of themselves as far as this is possible. Therefore, the greater the participation in God's goodness that given agents have, the greater is their inclination to diffuse their own perfections to others as far as this is possible. Thus, in 1 Peter 4:10 St. Peter warns those who participate in God's goodness through grace, "As each has received grace, administer it one to another as good stewards of the manifold grace of God."

A fortiori, the holy angels, who have the most complete participation in God's goodness, impart to those below them whatever they receive from God. Still, the lower angels do not receive it in as excellent a way as it exists in the higher angels. And so the higher angels always remain in their higher

order and always have a more perfect knowledge—just as the very same thing is understood more completely by a teacher than by the student who is learning from him.

Reply to objection 1: The knowledge that belongs to the higher angels is called ‘more universal’ to indicate a more eminent mode of understanding (cf. q. 55, a. 3) .

Reply to objection 2: The Master’s words should be understood to imply not that the lower angels were completely ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation, but that they did not understand it as completely as the higher angels did and that their cognition of it increased later on when the mystery was accomplished.

Reply to objection 3: Until judgment day new things are being continually revealed by God to the higher angels concerning what pertains to the condition of the world and especially to the salvation of the elect. Hence, until then, there will always be something about which the higher angels are illuminating the lower angels.

QUESTION 107

The Speech of Angels

The next thing we have to consider is the speech of angels. On this topic, there are five questions: (1) Does one angel speak to another? (2) Does a lower angel speak to a higher angel? (3) Does an angel speak to God? (4) Does spatial distance play a role in an angel's speech? (5) Do all the angels know what one angel says to another angel?

Article 1

Does one angel speak to another?

It seems that it is not the case that one angel speaks to another (*angelus alteri non loquatur*):

Objection 1: In *Moralia* 18 Gregory says that in the resurrected state “the corporeality of the parts of the body does not hide anyone's mind from the eyes of another.” Therefore, *a fortiori*, one angel's mind is not hidden from another. But speech has the purpose of making manifest to another what is hidden in one's own mind. Therefore, there is no need for one angel to speak to another.

Objection 2: There are two kinds of speech: (a) *interior* speech, by which one speaks to himself, and (b) *exterior* speech, by which one speaks to another. But exterior speech is effected through a sensible sign, e.g., by the spoken word or by a gesture or by some part of the body such as the tongue or a finger—none of which can apply to angels. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel speaks to another.

Objection 3: When someone speaks, he stimulates the hearer to pay attention to what he is saying. But there does not seem to be any way for one angel to stimulate another angel to pay attention to him, since in our own case this is accomplished by a sensible sign. Therefore, it is not the case that one angel speaks to another.

But contrary to this: 1 Corinthians 13:1 says, “If I speak with the tongues of men or of angels ...”

I respond: There is some sort of speech among angels. For as Gregory points out in *Moralia* 2, “It is fitting that our own mind, which exceeds the character of corporeal speech, should be elevated to sublime and unknown modes of intimate speech.” Therefore, to understand the way in which one angel speaks to another, note that, as we explained above when we were discussing the soul's acts and powers (q. 82, a. 4), the will moves the intellect to its operation.

Now an intelligible thing exists in the intellect in three ways: first, *habitually* or, as Augustine puts it, in memory; second, *as actually being considered or conceived*; and, third, *as related to another*. It is clearly by the command of the will that an intelligible thing moves from the first of these stages to the second. This is why the definition of a habit includes the phrase ‘which someone uses when he wills to’. Similarly, it is through the will that an intelligible thing moves from the second stage to the third. For it is by the will's command that the mind's conception (*conceptus*) is directed toward another, either (a) in order to do something or (b) in order to manifest something to someone else.

Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of what it possesses habitually, one is speaking to himself, since the mind's conception is itself called an interior word (*interius verbum*). But one angel's mental conception is made known to another angel in virtue of the fact that the first angel's mental conception is directed, by the will of the angel himself, toward being manifested to the second angel. And this is the way in which one angel speaks to another. For to say something to someone else is nothing other than to manifest the conception of one's mind to someone else.

Reply to objection 1: In our own case, the mind's interior conception is, as it were, closed off to others by two obstacles.

The first is the will itself, which can either keep the intellect's conception inside or else direct it

toward the outside. In this regard, no one else can see one's mind, with the sole exception of God—this according to 1 Corinthians 2:11 (“No one knows the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him”).

Second, a man's mind is closed off from other men by the body's thickness. Hence, even when the will does direct the mental conception toward being manifested to another, the latter does not know it directly; rather, it is necessary to use some sensible sign. This is what Gregory is talking about in *Moralia* 2 when he says, “In the eyes of others, we stand within the solitude of our mind, behind the wall of our body; but when we want to manifest ourselves, we go out, as it were, through the door of the tongue in order to show externally what we are like.”

However, an angel does not have this second sort of obstacle. And so as soon as he wills to manifest his own conception, the other angel grasps it immediately.

Reply to objection 2: Exterior speech that is effected through spoken words is necessary in our case because of the obstacle posed by the body. Hence, an angel has only interior speech and not exterior speech. However, his interior speech involves not only what he says to himself by conceiving something interiorly, but also what he directs by his own will to be manifested to another. And so the phrase ‘tongues of angels’ is used metaphorically to express the power by which an angel manifests his conception.

Reply to objection 3: As regards the good angels, who always see one another in the Word, it would not be necessary to posit anything that gets the attention of another. For just as one angel always sees another, so too he always sees anything in the other that is directed toward him.

But given that the angels were likewise able to speak to one another when they were created in the state of nature, and given that the bad angels even now speak to one another, one should say that the intellect is moved by an intelligible thing in the same way that the senses are moved by a sensible thing. Therefore, just as the senses are stimulated by a sensible sign, so too an angel's mind can be stimulated by an intelligible power to pay attention.

Article 2

Does a lower angel speak to a higher angel?

It seems that a lower angel does not speak to a higher angel:

Objection 1: A Gloss on 1 Corinthians 13:1 (“If I speak with the tongues of men or of angels ...”) says that every instance of angelic speech is an illumination by which a higher angel illuminates a lower angel. But as was explained above (q. 106, a. 3), lower angels never illuminate higher angels. Therefore, lower angels do not speak to higher angels, either.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 106, a. 1), to illuminate is nothing other than to make manifest to another what is already manifest to oneself. But this is the same as speaking. Therefore, to illuminate and to speak are the same thing, and so the same conclusion follows as above.

Objection 3: In *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He reveals His own hidden and invisible things to their hearts.” But this is just to illuminate them. Therefore, all of God's locutions are illuminations. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, all of an angel's locutions are illuminations. Therefore, there is no way in which a lower angel can speak to a higher angel.

But contrary to this: As Dionysius explains in *De Caelesti Hierarchia* 7, it was the lower angels who asked the higher angels, “Who is this king of glory?” (Psalm 23:10).

I respond: Lower angels can speak to higher angels. To see this clearly, note that among the

angels every illumination is an instance of speaking, but not every instance of speaking is an illumination. For as has been explained (a. 1), for one angel to speak to another is nothing other than for the first, by his own will, to direct his conception toward being made known to the second. Now what is mentally conceived can be related to one of two sources (*duplex principium*), viz., (a) to *God Himself*, who is the First Truth, or (b) to the conceiver's act of *will*, in virtue of which we are actually conceiving of something.

Now since truth is the light of the intellect, and since the standard (*regula*) of all truth is God Himself, it follows that insofar as what is mentally conceived depends on the First Truth, its manifestation is both an instance of speaking and an illumination—as, for instance, when one man says to another, 'The heavens are created by God' or 'A man is an animal'.

By contrast, the manifestation of what depends on the conceiver's will is merely an instance of speaking and cannot be called an illumination—as, for instance, if someone says to another, "I want to learn this" or "I want to do this" or "I want to do that." The reason for this is that a created will is not a light or a standard of truth, but instead participates in the light. Hence, to communicate what stems from a created will *qua* created will is not to illuminate. For it is irrelevant to the perfection of my intellect to know what you want, or to know what you are conceiving of; rather, all that is relevant to the perfection of my intellect is what the truth about the world (*rei veritas*) is.

Now it is clear that angels are said to be higher or lower in relation to the source which is *God*. And so illumination, which depends on the source which is God, passes only through higher angels to lower angels.

However, in relation to the source which is the *will*, the one who is doing the willing is himself the first and highest source. And so the manifestation of what pertains to the will passes through the angel who does the willing to whomever else he wishes. And as far as this sort of manifestation is concerned, it is true both that higher angels speak to lower angels and that lower angels speak to higher angels.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The replies to the first and second objections are clear from what been said.

Reply to objection 3: Every instance of God's speaking to the angels is an illumination. For since God's will is a standard of truth, it is likewise relevant to the perfection and illumination of a created mind to know what God wills. But as has been explained, the same line of reasoning does not apply to an angel's will.

Article 3

Does an angel speak to God?

It seems that it is not the case that an angel speaks to God:

Objection 1: Speaking has the purpose of making something known to another. But an angel cannot make anything known to God, who already knows all things. Therefore, an angel does not speak to God.

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 1), to speak is to direct the intellect's conception toward another. But an angel always directs the conceptions of his mind toward God. Therefore, if there is any time at which an angel is speaking to God, then he is always speaking to God—which might strike someone as absurd, since sometimes an angel is speaking to another angel. Therefore, it seems that an angel is never speaking to God.

But contrary to this: Zachariah 1:12 says, "The angel of the Lord answered, and said, 'O Lord of

hosts, how long will you not have mercy on Jerusalem?” Therefore, an angel speaks to God.

I respond: As has been explained (aa. 1 and 2), an angel speaks by directing the conception of his mind toward another. But there are two ways in which something might be directed toward another.

First, it might be directed toward another in order to communicate something to the other—in the way that an agent is ordered toward a patient among natural things, and in the way that a teacher is ordered toward his student in the case of human speech. And as far as this sort of speech is concerned, an angel does not in any sense speak to God, either about what pertains to the truth or about what depends on his created will. For God is the principle and source of all truth and of all acts of will.

Second, something is directed to another in order to receive something from the other—in the way that a patient is directed toward an agent among natural things, and in the way that a student is directed toward his teacher in the case of human speech. This is the way in which an angel speaks to God, either by consulting God’s will about what he should do or by admiring God’s excellence, which he never fully comprehends. As Gregory puts it in *Moralia* 2, “Angels speak to God when, because they look at what is beyond themselves, they rise up in a movement of admiration.”

Reply to objection 1: Speech does not always have the purpose of manifesting something to another; rather, it is sometimes directed toward the end of having something made manifest to the speaker, as when a student asks his teacher a question.

Reply to objection 2: The angels are always speaking to God with the sort of speech by which angels speak to God by praising and admiring Him. However, as regards the sort of speech by which angels consult God’s wisdom about what they should do, they speak to Him when they have something new to do about which they desire to be illuminated.

Article 4

Does spatial distance play a role in angelic speech?

It seems that spatial distance plays a role (*localis distantia operetur aliquid*) in angelic speech:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, an angel is located where he is operating. But speech is a certain operation that belongs to an angel. Therefore, since an angel exists in a determinate place, it seems that an angel can speak only out to a determinate spatial distance.

Objection 2: Someone speaks loudly because of his distance from the hearer. But Isaiah 6:3 says of the Seraphim that “they cried out to one another.” Therefore, it seems that spatial distance plays a role in the speech of the angels.

But contrary to this: As Luke 16:24 has it, the rich man in hell was speaking to Abraham despite the spatial distance. Therefore, *a fortiori*, spatial distance cannot impede one angel’s speaking to another.

I respond: As is clear from what has been said (aa. 1 and 2 and 3), angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation. But an angel’s intellectual operation is altogether abstracted from time and place; for even our own intellective operation occurs through an abstraction from the here and now—except incidentally because of phantasms, which do not exist in the angels. But neither temporal difference nor spatial distance plays a role in what is altogether abstracted from place and time. Hence, spatial distance poses no obstacle in the case of angelic speech.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), angelic speech is an interior locution that is nonetheless perceived by another; and so angelic speech exists within the angel who is speaking and, as a result, exists where the angel who is speaking exists. But just as spatial distance does not prevent one

angel from being able to see another angel, so also it does not prevent him from perceiving what is directed to him from within that other angel—which is what it is to perceive that other angel’s speech.

Reply to objection 2: The loudness being referred to here is not the sort of loudness which belongs to a bodily voice and which exists because of spatial distance. Rather, ‘loudness’ here signifies the greatness of what was being said, or else the intensity of the affection. Accordingly, in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “Each cries out less loudly to the extent that he has less desire.”

Article 5

Do all the angels know what one angel says to another angel?

It seems that all the angels know what one angel says to another angel:

Objection 1: Unequal spatial distances are responsible for the fact that not everyone hears what a given man is saying. But as has been explained (a. 4), spatial distance plays no role in angelic speech. Therefore, all the angels perceive what one angel is saying to another.

Objection 2: The angels communicate by their power of understanding. Therefore, if the conception of one angel’s mind that is directed toward another angel is known by that other angel, then by parity of reasoning it is known by the others as well.

Objection 3: Illumination is a certain kind of speech. But the illumination of one angel by another reaches all the angels, since, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 15, “Each celestial essence communicates to the others the understanding that has been handed down to him.” Therefore, the speech of one angel to another angel reaches all the angels.

But contrary to this: It is possible for one man to speak to just one other man. Therefore, *a fortiori*, this can happen in the case of angels.

I respond: As was explained above (aa. 1 and 2), the conception of one’s angel mind can be perceived by another angel in virtue of the fact that the one whose conception it is directs that conception toward the other by his own will. Now something can, for whatever reason, be directed toward one angel and not toward another. And so the conception of one angel can be known by a second angel without being known by other angels. And it is in this way that it is possible for an angel’s speech to another to be perceived by one angel and not by the others—not, to be sure, because of an obstacle posed by spatial distance, but rather, as has been explained, because the angel who is speaking directs his conception voluntarily.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The response makes clear the replies to the first two objections.

Reply to objection 3: Illumination has to do with things that emanate from the first standard of truth, which is a principle common to all the angels, and so the illuminations are common to them all. But speech can also deal with things that are ordered toward the principle of a created will, which is proper to each angel. And so it is not necessary for speech of this kind to be common to all the angels.

QUESTION 108

The Arrangement of Angels according to Hierarchies and Orders

The next thing we have to consider is the arrangement of angels according to hierarchies and orders. For it was explained above (q. 106, a. 3) that higher angels illuminate lower angels, and not vice versa.

On this topic there are eight questions: (1) Do all angels belong to a single hierarchy? (2) Is there just a single ordering within each hierarchy? (3) Does more than one angel belong to each order? (4) Does the distinction among the hierarchies and orders stem from nature? (5) What are the names and properties of each order? (6) How are the orders related to one another? (7) Will the orders endure beyond judgment day? (8) Are men assumed into the orders of angels?

Article 1

Do all angels belong to a single hierarchy?

It seems that all angels belong to a single hierarchy:

Objection 1: Since angels are the highest of creatures, one must claim that they are arranged in the best way. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12 and *Politics* 3, the best arrangement of a multitude is for it to be contained under a single principality (*principatus*). Therefore, since a hierarchy is nothing other than a sacred principality, it seems that all angels belong to a single hierarchy.

Objection 2: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 3, Dionysius says, “A hierarchy consists in order, knowledge, and action.” But all the angels share a single ordering with respect to God, whom they know and by whom they are ruled in their actions. Therefore, all angels belong to a single hierarchy.

Objection 3: The sacred principality called a hierarchy is found among men and among angels. But all men belong to a single hierarchy. Therefore, all angels likewise belong to a single hierarchy.

But contrary to this: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 6, Dionysius distinguishes three hierarchies of angels.

I respond: As has just been pointed out, a hierarchy is a sacred principality. Now two things are understood in the name ‘principality’, viz., (a) the ruler (*princeps*) himself and (b) the multitude that is ordered under the ruler.

Thus, since God is the single ruler not only of all angels but also of men and of every creature, it follows that there is a single hierarchy consisting not only of all angels but of every rational creature that is capable of participating in sacred things. Accordingly, in *De Civitate Dei* 12 Augustine says, “There are two cities, i.e., societies, one consisting of good angels and good men, and the other consisting of bad angels and bad men.”

On the other hand, if ‘principality’ is understood with reference to the multitude that is ordered under the ruler, then a principality is called one to the extent that a given multitude can be governed by the ruler in one and the same manner. By contrast, multitudes that the ruler cannot govern in the same manner belong to diverse principalities—as when, for instance, under a single king there are diverse cities ruled by diverse laws and ministers.

Now it is clear that men receive divine illuminations in a way different from angels. For as Dionysius puts it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, angels receive such illuminations in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible likenesses. And so the human hierarchy must be distinguished from the angelic hierarchy.

And in this same way, three hierarchies are distinguished among the angels. For as was explained above when we were discussing angelic cognition (q. 55, a. 3), the higher angels have a more universal

cognition of the truth than the lower angels do. Now among the angels one can distinguish three levels of this sort of universal cognitive reception. For the reasons behind the things that the angels are illuminated about can be considered in three ways.

First of all, these reasons can be considered insofar as they proceed from the *first universal principle*, viz., God. This mode of cognitive reception belongs to the first hierarchy, which reaches directly to God and, as Dionysius puts it in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, “is located in God’s vestibule, as it were.”

Second, the reasons in question can be considered insofar as they depend on *universal created causes*, which at this point are multiplied in a certain way. This mode of cognitive reception belongs to the second hierarchy.

Third, these reasons can be considered insofar as they are applied to individual things and depend on *proper causes*. This mode of cognitive reception belongs to the lowest hierarchy.

All of this will become clearer below (a. 6), when we discuss each order of angels individually.

This, then, is the way in which hierarchies are distinguished within a multitude of subjects. Hence, it is clear that those who posit a hierarchy among the divine persons, which they call a ‘super-celestial hierarchy’, are mistaken, and that their claim goes against Dionysius’s intention. For even though there is a certain order of nature among the divine persons, there is no hierarchy, since, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 3, “The ordering of a hierarchy is such that there are some who are cleansed, illuminated, and perfected, whereas there are others who do the cleansing and illuminating and perfecting.” We hold that this sort of thing is entirely absent among the divine persons.

Reply to objection 1: This objection is about a principality with reference to the ruler, since, as the Philosopher says in the cited passages, a multitude is best ruled by a single ruler.

Reply to objection 2: The angels are not distinguished into hierarchies as regards their cognition of God Himself, whom they all see in the same way, viz., through His essence. Rather, as has been explained, the angels are distinguished into hierarchies by [their mode of understanding] the reasons for created things.

Reply to objection 3: All men belong to a single species, and a single mode of understanding is connatural to all of them. But it is not this way with the angels. Therefore, the arguments are not parallel.

Article 2

Is there more than one order in a single hierarchy?

It seems that there is not more than one order in a single hierarchy:

Objection 1: When definitions are multiplied, the things defined are multiplied. But as Dionysius says, a hierarchy is an order. Therefore, if there are many orders, then there will be many hierarchies and not just a single hierarchy.

Objection 2: Diverse orders are diverse grades. Now among spiritual things, grades are constituted by diverse spiritual gifts. But among the angels all spiritual gifts are common, since “nothing is possessed in a unique way.” Therefore, it is not the case that there are diverse orders of angels.

Objection 3: Within the Church’s hierarchy, orders are distinguished with respect to cleansing (*purgare*), illuminating (*illuminare*), and perfecting (*perficere*). For as Dionysius says in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, chap. 5, the order of deacons is purgative, the order of priests is illuminative, and the order of bishops is perfective. But every angel cleanses, illuminates, and perfects. Therefore,

there is no distinction of orders among the angels.

But contrary to this: In Ephesians 1:21 the Apostle says that God has set the man Christ “above every Principality and Power and Virtue and Domination.” But these are diverse orders of angels, and some of them belong to the same hierarchy, as will become clear below (a. 6).

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), a hierarchy is a principality, i.e., a multitude ordered in a unified way under the governance of a ruler. However, a multitude would be disorderly (*confusa*), and not orderly, if there were not diverse orders within the multitude. Therefore, the very notion of a hierarchy requires a diversity of orders, and this diversity of orders involves diverse roles (*officia*) and activities (*actus*). For instance, it is clear that in a city there are diverse orders that involve diverse activities. For there is one order of those who judge, another order of those who fight, another order of those who work in the fields, and so on for the others. But even though there are many orders in a single city, they can nonetheless be reduced to three, since every complete multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. Hence, in cities there are three orders of men. For some are the highest, viz., the aristocrats (*optimates*), whereas others are the lowest, viz., the common people (*vilis populus*), and still others are in the middle, viz., the ‘respectable’ people (*populus honorabilis*).

So, then, in each angelic hierarchy there are orders distinguished with respect to diverse activities and roles, and all of this diversity is reduced to three orders, viz. the highest, the middle, and the lowest. This is why Dionysius posits three orders in each of the hierarchies.

Reply to objection 1: ‘Order’ has two meanings. First, it means the very ordering that includes within itself the diverse grades, and this is the sense in which a hierarchy is called an order. Second, ‘order’ means one particular grade, and this is the sense in which there are said to be many orders within a single hierarchy.

Reply to objection 2: Within the society of angels all things are possessed in common, but some of them are possessed in a more excellent way by certain angels than by other angels. Now each thing is had more perfectly by someone who is able to communicate it to another than by someone who is not able to communicate it. For instance, something that is able to give heat is more perfectly hot than something that is unable to give it; and someone who is able to teach has a more perfect knowledge than someone who is unable to teach. And the more perfect the gift that one is able to communicate, the more perfect the grade he belongs to. For instance, someone who can teach a higher science belongs to a more perfect grade of teacher. The diversity of grades or orders among the angels should be thought of along similar lines, in accord with their diverse roles and activities.

Reply to objection 3: The lowest angel is higher than the highest man in our own hierarchy. For according to Matthew 11:11, “One who is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he,” viz., John the Baptist, “than whom none greater has arisen from those born of women.” Hence, a lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy is able not only to cleanse, but also to illuminate and to perfect, in a way that exceeds the orders of our own hierarchy. And so it is not a distinction among these three actions that makes for a distinction among the heavenly orders; rather, it is a difference among other sorts of actions.

Article 3

Does more than one angel belong to a single order?

It seems that it is not the case that more than one angel belongs to a single order:

Objection 1: It was explained above (q. 50, a. 4) that all the angels are unequal to one another. But it is things that are equal that are said to belong to a single order. Therefore, it is not the case that

more than one angel belongs to a single order.

Objection 2: What can be adequately done through one thing is such that it is superfluous for it to be done through many. But whatever is involved in a single angelic role is adequately done by a single angel—even more so than the fact that what pertains to the sun’s role is adequately done by a single sun, since an angel is more perfect than a celestial body. Therefore, if, as was explained above (a. 2), the orders of angels are distinguished by their roles, then it is superfluous for there to be more than one angel in a single order.

Objection 3: It was explained above (q. 50, a. 4) that all angels are unequal. Therefore, if more than one angel—say, three or four—belonged to an order, then the lowest angel from the next highest order would have more in common with the highest angel from the next lowest order than he would with the highest angel of his own order. And so, it seems, he would not belong to the same order as the latter more than he belonged to the same order as the former. Therefore, it is not the case that more than one angel belongs to a single order.

But contrary to this: Isaiah 6:3 says that the Seraphim “cried out to one another.” Therefore, there is more than one angel in the order of the Seraphim.

I respond: Someone who knows a given group of entities perfectly can distinguish their acts and powers and natures down to the smallest details, whereas someone who knows them imperfectly is able to draw only general distinctions (*distinguere in universali*) among them, where a general distinction is made through fewer distinguishing marks. For instance, someone who knows natural things imperfectly makes general distinctions among the orders of natural things, placing celestial bodies in one order, and lower inanimate bodies in another order, and plants in another order, and animals in another order. By contrast, someone who knew natural things perfectly would be able to distinguish diverse orders within the celestial bodies themselves and within each of the other orders.

Now as Dionysius points out in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 6, we ourselves know angels and their roles imperfectly. Hence, we are able to draw only general distinctions among the roles and orders of angels, and it is in this sense that many angels are contained within a single order. However, if we knew the roles of the angels and the distinctions among them perfectly, then we would know perfectly that each angel has his own proper role and his own proper order among things—to an even greater extent than each celestial body (*stella*) does—even though this is now hidden from us.

Reply to objection 1: All the angels belonging to a single order are equal in the sense that they share the common likeness by which they are constituted in a single order; however, they are not equal to one another absolutely speaking. Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 10, Dionysius says that within one and the same order it is possible to designate those angels who are first, those who are in the middle, and those who are last.

Reply to objection 2: We do not know the detailed division of orders and roles according to which each angel has his own proper role and order.

Reply to objection 3: On a surface that is partly white and partly black, two parts located at the border of the white and the black agree more with respect to place than do some pairs of white parts (*quam aliquae duae partes albae*), even though they agree less with respect to [sensible] quality. In the same way, two angels who are located at the limits of two orders agree more with one another in closeness of nature than either one of them agrees with certain other angels belonging to their own respective orders. However, they agree less in their fitness for similar roles, where this sort of fitness extends up to some set limit.

Article 4

Does the distinction among the hierarchies and orders of angels stem from nature?

It seems that the distinction among the hierarchies and orders of angels does not stem from nature:

Objection 1: A hierarchy is a sacred principality, and in defining a hierarchy, Dionysius claims that a hierarchy simulates godlikeness as much as possible. But holiness and godlikeness exist in the angels through grace and not by nature. Therefore, the distinctions among the hierarchies and orders of angels stem from grace and not from nature.

Objection 2: As Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the Seraphim are so called because they are ‘ardent’ or ‘on fire’. But this seems to involve charity, which comes from grace and not from nature. For as Romans 5:5 says, charity “is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us.” And as Augustine points out in *De Civitate Dei* 12, this has to do not just with holy men, but can also be applied to the holy angels. Therefore, the orders of the angels stem from grace and not from nature.

Objection 3: The Church’s hierarchy is modeled after the heavenly hierarchy. But among men, [holy] orders stem from a gift of grace and not from nature. For it is not by nature that one man is a bishop, another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore, the orders of angels stem from grace alone and not from nature.

But contrary to this: In 2 *Sentences*, dist. 9, the Master says that an order of angels is a multitude of heavenly spirits that are like one another in a certain gift of grace, just as they agree with one another in their participation in natural gifts. Therefore, the distinctions among the orders of angels stem not only from their gifts of grace, but also from their natural gifts.

I respond: The order of governance, which is the order of a multitude that exists under an authority (*sub principatu*), has to do with the relation to an end. Now an angel’s end can be thought of in two ways:

First, it can be thought of in relation to what the angelic nature has the ability to do, viz., to know God and to love God with natural cognition and natural love. And in relation to this end, the orders of angels are distinguished by the natural gifts had by the angels.

Second, the end of the angelic multitude can be thought of in relation to their supernatural ability, which consists in seeing God’s essence and in enjoying God’s goodness unshakably. This end they can attain only through grace. Hence, in relation to this end the orders of angels are completely distinguished by their gifts of grace, though dispositively by their natural gifts—for, as was explained above (q. 62, a. 6), angels, unlike men, are given gifts of grace in proportion to the degree of their natural gifts. Hence, in the case of men, the orders are distinguished only by the gifts of grace and not by natural gifts.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 5

Are the orders of angels appropriately named?

It seems that the orders of angels are not appropriately named:

Objection 1: All of the heavenly spirits are called both angels and heavenly virtues. But names that are common to all are not appropriately applied just to some. Therefore, it is inappropriate to name

one order ‘Angels’ and another order ‘Virtues’.

Objection 2: According to Psalm 99:3 (“Know that the Lord Himself is God”), it is proper to God to be the Lord (*Dominus*). Therefore, it is inappropriate for an order of heavenly spirits to be called ‘Dominations’ (*Dominationes*).

Objection 3: The name ‘Dominations’ has to do, it seems, with governance. But so do the name ‘Principalities’ and the name ‘Powers’. Therefore, it is inappropriate to impose these three names on three different orders.

Objection 4: Archangels are so called because they are, as it were, the rulers (*principes*) of Angels. Therefore, the name ‘Archangels’ should not be imposed on any order other than the order of Principalities (*principatus*).

Objection 5: The name ‘Seraphim’ is imposed because of the ardor that belongs to charity, whereas the name ‘Cherubim’ is imposed because of knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts that are common to all the angels. Therefore, ‘Cherubim’ and ‘Seraphim’ should not be the names of specific orders.

Objection 6: ‘Thrones’ means seats. But God is said to be ‘seated’ in a rational creature in virtue of the fact that the creature knows and loves Him. Therefore, the order of Thrones should not be separate from the order of Seraphim and the order of Cherubim. And so it seems that the orders of angels are not appropriately named.

But contrary to this: It is the authority of Sacred Scripture that names the orders in this way. For the name ‘Seraphim’ is used in Isaiah 6:2; the name ‘Cherubim’ is used in Ezechiel 1; the name ‘Thrones’ is used in Colossians 1:16; the names ‘Dominations’, ‘Virtues’, ‘Powers’, and ‘Principalities’ are used in Ephesians 1:21; the name ‘Archangels’ is used in the canonical letter of Jude, verse 9; and the name ‘Angels’ is used in many places in Scripture.

I respond: In naming the angelic orders, we should notice that, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the proper names of each order designate the properties of that order.

Now in order to discern the properties that belong to each order, we should note that there are three ways in which something can exist in the ordered entities, viz., (a) by way of *propriety* (*per proprietatem*), (b) by way of *eminence* (*per excessum*), and (c) by way of *participation* (*per participationem*). Something is said to exist in a given entity by way of *propriety* when it is equal to and proportionate to the entity’s nature. On the other hand, something is said to exist in an entity by way of *eminence* when what is attributed to the entity falls short of the entity to which it is attributed and yet belongs to it with a certain preeminence (*per quendam excessum*)—as has been explained in the case of all the names that are attributed to God (q. 13, a. 2). Finally, something is said to exist in an entity by way of *participation* when what is attributed to the entity is found in it in an incomplete way and not fully—in the way that saintly men are called ‘gods’ by participation.

Therefore, if something is to be named by a name designating what it has by way of *propriety*, then it should not be named either by reference to what it participates in imperfectly or by reference to what it has by way of *eminence*; instead, it should be named by reference to what is, as it were, equal to it. For instance, if someone wishes to give a proper designation of a man, he should say that a man is a *rational substance* and not that he is an *intellectual substance*, where ‘intellectual substance’ is the proper designation of an angel, since simple understanding (*simplex intelligentia*) belongs to an angel as a property, whereas it belongs to a man through participation; nor should he say that a man is a *sentient substance*, where ‘sentient substance’ is the proper designation of a brute animal, since sensation falls short of what is proper to a man and belongs to a man in a way that is preeminent over the other animals (*convenit homini excedenter prae aliis animalibus*).

So, then, in the case of the orders of angels, note that all the spiritual perfections are common to all

the angels and that all the perfections exist more abundantly in the higher angels than in the lower angels. However, since there is a certain gradation even among the perfections themselves, a higher perfection is attributed to a higher order by way of *propriety* and to a lower order by way of *participation*, whereas, conversely, a lower perfection is attributed to a lower order by way of *propriety* and to a higher order by way of *eminence*. And so a higher order is named by reference to a higher perfection. Thus, Dionysius explains the names of the orders by their agreement with the spiritual perfections of the orders.

By contrast, Gregory, in his own explanation of the names, seems to pay more attention to the exterior ministries of the orders. For he says, “Those who announce small matters are called Angels; those who announce great matters are called Archangels; those through whom miracles are done are called Virtues; those by whom opposed powers are repelled are called Powers; and those who preside over the good spirits themselves are called Principalities.”

Reply to objection 1: ‘Angel’ means a messenger. Therefore, all the heavenly spirits, insofar as they make divine things manifest, are called angels. But the higher angels have a certain excellence in this manifestation by reference to which the higher orders are named. On the other hand, the lowest order of angels does not add any excellence over and beyond the common sort of manifestation, and so they are named Angels by reference to simple manifestation. And so, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 5, the common name remains proper for the lowest order.

An alternative reply is that the lowest order is specifically called the order of Angels because they are the ones who make direct announcements to us.

Now ‘virtue’ can have two meanings. First, it can have a common meaning, according to which a virtue lies midway between an essence and its operation; and in this sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues in the same way that they are called heavenly essences. Second, ‘virtue’ can have a meaning according to which it implies a certain excellence with respect to strength, and this is the sense in which it is the proper name of an order. Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 8, Dionysius says, “The name ‘Virtues’ signifies a certain manly and unshakeable strength”—which is appropriate, first of all, for all the divine operations that belong to them, and, second, for receiving divine gifts. And so the name ‘Virtues’ signifies that they fearlessly undertake the divine tasks that belong to them, and this seems to involve a strength of spirit.

Reply to objection 2: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 12, “Domination (*dominatio*) is praised in God uniquely by way of a certain excellence. However, by way of participation, the divine writings use the name ‘lords’ (*dominos*) for distinguished leaders through whom the lower angels receive God’s gifts.” Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 8, Dionysius says that the name ‘Dominations’ signifies, in the first place, “a certain freedom from a servile condition and from common subjection, such as that of the common people, along with a freedom from tyrannical oppression,” which sometimes even great men suffer from. Second, ‘Dominations’ signifies “a certain unyielding and unbending governance, not inclined toward any servile act or any act of the sort characteristic of those subjected to or oppressed by tyrants.” Third, ‘Dominations’ signifies “the desire for and participation in the true dominion that exists in God.”

In the same way, the name of each of the orders signifies a participation in that which exists in God. For instance, the name ‘Virtues’ signifies a participation in God’s strength, and so on for the others.

Reply to objection 3: The names ‘Domination’, ‘Power’, and ‘Principality’ all involve governance in one way or another.

For it belongs to the lord alone to prescribe what is to be done. And so Gregory says, “Because the others are subject in obedience to them, certain companies of angels are called ‘Dominations’.”

On the other hand, the name ‘Power’ designates a type of ordinance, according to the Apostle in Romans 13:2 (“He who resists the power resists the ordinance of God”). And so Dionysius claims that the name ‘Power’ signifies certain ordinances having to do with the reception of divine gifts and with the

divine actions that higher angels perform on lower angels in order to lead them upward. Therefore, it belongs to the order of Powers to ordain what is to be done by those subject to them.

Finally, as Gregory says, to rule (*principari*) is to be prior among the others in the sense that the Principalities (*principatus*) are the first ones involved in the execution of what is commanded. And so in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 9, Dionysius says that the name ‘Principalities’ signifies “one who leads with a sacred ordinance.” For those who lead others and are first among them are properly called ‘princes’ (*principes*) according to Psalm 67:26 (“Princes went before joined with singers”).

Reply to objection 4: According to Dionysius, the Archangels lie midway between the Principalities and the Angels. Now when what lies in the middle is compared to one of the endpoints, it seems like the other endpoint, since it participates in the nature of both. For instance, what is tepid is cold compared to what is hot, but it is hot compared to what is cold. So, too, the Archangels are called the ‘angel princes’ because they are rulers when compared to the Angels, though they are Angels when compared to the Principalities.

On the other hand, according to Gregory, the Archangels are so named from the fact that they rule only over the order of Angels, announcing great things to them, whereas the Principalities are so named from the fact that they rule over all the heavenly powers who carry out God’s decrees.

Reply to objection 5: The name ‘Seraphim’ is imposed not only on the basis of charity, but on the basis of a surpassing degree of charity, which is implied by the name ‘ardent’ or ‘on fire’. Hence, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, Dionysius explains the name ‘Seraphim’ in terms of the properties of fire, in which there is a surpassing degree of heat. Now there are three things we can consider in fire. The first thing to consider is fire’s motion, which is upward and continuous. This signifies that the Seraphim move unswervingly toward God. The second thing to consider is fire’s active power, which is heat. It is found in fire not just simply speaking, but with a certain sharpness, since it penetrates the action to the greatest degree and reaches to the smallest things; again, heat is found in fire with a certain surpassing fervor. This signifies the action, exercised with great power on those below them, by which angels of this type excite the lower angels to a similar fervor and fully cleanse them by their flame. The third thing to consider in fire is its brightness. This signifies that angels of this sort have within themselves an inextinguishable light and that they illuminate others perfectly.

Similarly, the name ‘Cherubim’ is imposed on the basis of a certain excellence in knowledge, which is interpreted as a fullness of knowledge. Dionysius explains this in terms of four points: first, in terms of the perfect vision of God; second, in terms of the full reception of divine light; third, in terms of the fact that the Cherubim contemplate within God Himself the beauty in the order of the things derived from God; and, fourth, in terms of the fact that, filled with this type of cognition, they pour it out copiously upon the other angels.

Reply to objection 6: The order of the Thrones exceeds the lower orders in the fact that the Thrones can discern directly in God the reasons behind God’s works, whereas the Cherubim have an excellence in knowledge and the Seraphim have an excellence in ardor. And though the third excellence is included in these latter two excellences, still, the other two are not included in the excellence that belongs to the Thrones. And this is the way in which the order of the Thrones is distinguished from the order of the Seraphim and the order of the Cherubim. For it is generally true of all the orders that the excellence had by a lower order is contained in the excellence had by a higher order, but not vice versa.

Now Dionysius explains the name ‘Thrones’ by the likeness of the Thrones to material chairs. There are four things to consider in chairs. The first is their position, since chairs are elevated above the ground. And so the angels who are called Thrones are elevated to the point that they know directly in God the reasons behind things. The second thing to consider in material chairs is their firmness, since one sits firmly on them. Here, however, we have the converse, since these angels are themselves firmed up by God. The third thing to consider is that a seat receives the one who sits on it, and he can be carried

on it. So, too, these angels receive God into themselves and in a certain sense carry Him to the lower angels. The fourth thing to consider is the shape of the chair, since a chair is open on one side to receive the one who sits on it. So, too, these angels are, through their promptitude, open to receiving God and serving Him.

Article 6

Are the grades of the orders appropriately assigned?

It seems that the grades of the orders are not appropriately assigned:

Objection 1: The order of prelates seems to be the highest. But the Dominations, Principalities, and Powers imply a certain order of precedence (*praelationem*) by their very names. Therefore, these orders ought to be the highest of all.

Objection 2: The closer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of Thrones seems to be closest to God, since nothing is joined more closely to the one who sits than his chair is. Therefore, the order of Thrones is the highest.

Objection 3: Knowledge is prior to love, and the intellect seems to be higher than the will. Therefore, it seems that the order of Cherubim is higher than the order of Seraphim.

Objection 4: Gregory puts the Principalities above the Powers. Therefore, they are not, as Dionysius claims, immediately above the Archangels.

But contrary to this: In the first hierarchy Dionysius places the Seraphim first, the Cherubim in the middle, and the Thrones last. In the middle hierarchy, he places the Dominations first, the Virtues in the middle, and the Powers last. And in the last hierarchy, he places the Principalities first, the Archangels in the middle, and the Angels last.

I respond: In assigning the grades of the angelic orders, Gregory and Dionysius agree on all the others but differ with respect to the Virtues and the Principalities. For Dionysius places the Virtues under the Dominations and above the Powers, and he places the Principalities under the Powers and above the Archangels. Gregory, on the other hand, places the Principalities between the Dominations and the Powers, and he places the Virtues between the Powers and the Archangels.

Both of these assignments can draw support from the authority of the Apostle. In Ephesians 1:20-21, while enumerating the middle orders of angels in ascending order, the Apostle says, "God set [Christ] at His right hand in the heavenly places, above every Principality and Power and Virtue and Domination," and so here he places the Virtues between the Powers and the Dominations, in keeping with Dionysius's assignment. However, in Colossians 1:16, enumerating the same orders in descending order, he says, "Through Him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers," where he places the Principalities between the Dominations and the Powers, in keeping with Gregory's assignment.

Let us look first at the reasons behind Dionysius's assignment. Notice that, as was explained above (a. 1), the first hierarchy grasps the reasons behind things in God Himself, whereas the second hierarchy grasps them in their universal causes, and the third hierarchy grasps them insofar they are narrowed down to specific effects. And since God is the end not only of the angelic ministries but of the totality of creatures, the consideration of *the end* belongs to the first hierarchy, *the general arrangement of works to be done* pertains to the second hierarchy, and *the application of this arrangement to specific effects*, i.e., the execution of the works, belongs to the last hierarchy. For it is clear that these three components are found in every operation. So Dionysius, taking into account the properties of the orders suggested by

their names, placed in the first hierarchy those orders whose names are imposed with respect to God Himself, viz., the Seraphim, the Cherubim, and the Thrones. Then he placed in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names designate a certain sort of general governance or planning, viz., the Dominations, the Virtues, and the Powers. Finally, he placed in the third hierarchy those orders whose names designate the execution of a work, viz., the Principalities, the Angels, and the Archangels.

Now there are three things that can be considered in relation to the *end*: first, someone thinks about the end; second, he acquires a complete cognition of the end; and, third, he fixes his intention on the end. The second of these points adds to the first, and the third adds to the first two. Since God is the end of creatures in the way that, as *Metaphysics* 12 says, a leader is the end of his army, an example of this order can be found in human affairs. For there are some who rank highly enough to be able to approach the king or leader by themselves with familiarity, whereas, beyond this, there are others who rank highly enough to know his secrets, and again, beyond this, there are still others who always accompany him as if attached to him. By keeping this example in mind, we can grasp the arrangement of the orders in the first hierarchy. For the Thrones are elevated to the point of receiving God within themselves in a familiar way, insofar as they are able to discern the reasons behind things directly in Him—an ability which is proper to the whole first hierarchy. On the other hand, the Cherubim know divine secrets in a preeminent way, whereas the Seraphim excel in the highest of all things, viz., being united to God Himself. So, then, the order of Thrones is named on the basis of what is common to the whole first hierarchy, in the same way that the order of Angels is named on the basis of what is common to all the heavenly spirits.

Next, there are three things that belong to the notion of *governance*. The first is to decree the works that are to be done, and this is proper to the Dominations. The second is to bestow the power to carry out those works, and this pertains to the Virtues. The third is to determine how the works that are commanded or decreed can be carried out in the sense of someone's executing them, and this pertains to the Powers.

Finally, the *execution* of angelic ministries consists in announcing divine things. Now in the execution of any act, there are some who initiate the action and lead the others—e.g., cantors in the case of singing, and those who lead and direct others in the case of war—and this pertains to the Principalities. On the other hand, there are some who simply carry out the commands, and this pertains to the Angels. And as was explained above (a. 5), those are others who stand in the middle, and this pertains to the Archangels.

Now this assignment of the orders is fitting. For in every case the highest member of a lower order has an affinity with the last member of the next higher order, just as the lowest animals are very close to plants. The first order is that of the divine persons and it is terminated with the Holy Spirit, who is the Love who proceeds and with whom the highest order of the first hierarchy of angels has an affinity, since it is named from the ardor of love (*ab incendio amoris*). But the lowest order of the first hierarchy is the Thrones, who, given their name, have an affinity with the Dominations, since, according to Gregory, it is through the Thrones that God exercises His judgments. For the Thrones receive divine illuminations in a way that makes it appropriate for them to directly illuminate the second hierarchy, which has the role of arranging the divine ministries. Moreover, the order of Powers has an affinity with the order of Principalities. For given that the Powers impose ordinances on those subject to them, these ordinances are directly assigned in the name of the Principalities, who are first in the execution of the divine ministries—presiding, for instance, over the governance of nations and kingdoms, which is the first and principal domain in the divine ministries, since the good of a nation is more divine than the good of an individual man. Hence, Daniel 10:13 says, “The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me ...”

The arrangement of the orders posited by Gregory also has a sort of fittingness. For since the Dominations are the ones who decree and prescribe what pertains to the divine ministries, the orders subject to them are deployed according to the arrangement of those on whom the divine ministries are

exercised. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, “Corporeal things are ruled in a certain order, the lower by the higher and all of them by spiritual creatures; and the bad spirits are ruled by the good spirits.” Therefore, the first order after the Dominations is called the Principalities, who also rule over the good spirits. Then come the Powers, through whom the bad spirits are warded off, just as, according to Romans 13:3-4, evildoers are warded off by earthly powers. After the Powers come the Virtues, which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles. And after the Virtues come the Archangels and Angels, who announce to men either great things, i.e., things that are beyond reason, or small things, which reason can grasp.

Reply to objection 1: Among the angels, the fact that they are subject to God is more significant than the fact that they preside over lower creatures, and the latter is derived from the former. And so the orders that take their names from an order of presiding are not the highest orders; instead, the highest orders are the ones that take their names from their turning toward God.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, the closeness to God that is designated by the name of the Thrones belongs also to the Cherubim and the Seraphim, and in a more excellent way.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), cognition occurs insofar as the things that are known exist in the knower, whereas love occurs insofar as the lover is united to the thing loved. Now higher things exist in themselves in a more noble way than they do in lower things, whereas lower things exist in a more noble way in higher things than they do in themselves. And so knowing lower things is better than loving them, whereas loving higher things, and principally God, is better than knowing them.

Reply to objection 4: If the arrangements of the orders given by Dionysius and Gregory are carefully considered, they differ very little or not at all as far as the reality is concerned. For Gregory takes the name ‘Principalities’ to refer to those who preside over the good spirits, and this meaning belongs to the Virtues to the extent that the name ‘Virtues’ implies a strength that gives efficacy to the lower spirits in carrying out their divine ministries. Again, Gregory’s understanding of the Virtues seems to be the same as Dionysius’s understanding of the Principalities. For the first among the divine ministries is the working of miracles, since it is through the working of miracles that the way is prepared for the announcements made by the Archangels and Angels.

Article 7

Will the orders of angels remain after judgment day?

It seems that the orders of angels will not remain after judgment day:

Objection 1: In 1 Corinthians 15:24 the Apostle says that Christ “will bring to naught every Principality and Power and Virtue, when He will have handed over the kingdom to God and the Father”—which will occur in the final consummation of things. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, in that state all the other orders will be brought to naught as well.

Objection 2: The role of the angels is to cleanse, to illuminate, and to perfect. But after judgment day it is not the case that one angel will be cleansing, illuminating, or perfecting another, since none of them will make any further progress in knowledge. Therefore, it would be pointless for the angelic orders to remain.

Objection 3: In Hebrews 1:14 the Apostle says of the angels, “Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for the sake of those who receive the inheritance of salvation?” It is clear from this that the roles of the angels are ordered toward leading men to salvation. But all of the elect pursue salvation

up to and before judgment day. Therefore, the roles of angels and their orders will not remain after judgment day.

But contrary to this: Judges 5:20 says, “The stars, remaining in their order and course ...”—and this is interpreted as being about the angels. Therefore, the angels will always remain in their orders.

I respond: There are two things to consider in the angelic orders, viz., (a) the distinction among the grades and (b) the execution of their roles.

As was explained above (a. 4), the distinction among the grades derives from differences in grace and nature. And both of these sorts of differences will always remain in the angels. For the differences among the natures could not be removed from them without their being corrupted, whereas the differences in glory will always remain in them in a way corresponding to the differences in their prior merit.

On the other hand, after judgment day the execution of the angelic roles will remain in some ways and cease in other ways. The execution of the roles will cease to the extent that the roles of the angels are ordered toward leading certain men to their end, but it will remain to the extent that it is consonant with the ultimate attainment of the end—just as the roles of the military orders in battle differ from their roles in victory.

Reply to objection 1: The Principalities and Powers will be brought to naught in the final consummation as far as their leading others to their end is concerned. For once the end has already been attained, it is no longer necessary to tend toward the end. This meaning can be gleaned from the very words of the Apostle, who says, “..... when He will have handed over the kingdom to God and the Father,”—that is, when He will have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God Himself.

Reply to objection 2: The actions of the angels with respect to other angels should be thought of along the lines of the intelligible actions that exist in us.

For in our case there are many intelligible actions that are ordered in the manner of a cause and what is caused—as, for instance, when we reach a conclusion by going step by step through a series of middle terms. Now it is clear that the cognition of the conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms—and not just with respect to the new *acquisition* of knowledge, but also with respect to the *conservation* of the knowledge. An indication of this is that if someone forgot one of the preceding middle terms, he would be able to have an opinion (*opinio*) about the conclusion or to have faith (*fides*) with respect to it, but he would not be able to have knowledge (*scientia*) of it, since he would not know the order of the causes.

So, then, since the lower angels know the reasons behind God’s works through the light of the higher angels, their cognition of those reasons depends upon the light of the higher angels not only with respect to the *acquisition* of new knowledge but also with respect to the *conservation* of their knowledge. Therefore, even though the lower angels do not make progress in the knowledge of anything after the judgment, this does not rule out their being illuminated by the higher angels.

Reply to objection 3: Even though, after judgment day, men are no longer going to be led to salvation through the ministry of the angels, nonetheless, those who have already attained salvation will have some illumination through the roles of the angels.

Article 8

Are men assumed into the angelic orders?

It seems that men are not assumed into the angelic orders:

Objection 1: The human hierarchy is located under the lowest of the heavenly hierarchies, just as the lowest heavenly hierarchy is located under the middle hierarchy and the middle hierarchy under the first hierarchy. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred to the middle or first hierarchy. Therefore, neither are men transferred into the orders of the angels.

Objection 2: Certain roles—e.g., guarding, working miracles, warding off demons, etc.—belong to the orders of angels. But these roles do not seem appropriate for the souls of the saints. Therefore, the saints are not transferred into the orders of angels.

Objection 3: Demons induce men to evil in the same way that the good angels induce them to good. But it is erroneous to claim that the souls of bad men are converted into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this claim in his commentary on Matthew. Therefore, it does not seem that the souls of the saints are transferred into the orders of angels.

But contrary to this: In Matthew 22:30 our Lord says of the saints that “they will be like the angels of God in heaven.”

I respond: As was explained above (a. 4), the orders of angels are distinguished both by their natural condition and by the gifts of grace. Thus, if we think of the orders of angels only in terms of the grade of nature, then there is no way that men can be assumed into the orders of angels, since the distinction between their natures will always remain.

Some, taking this into account, have claimed that there is no sense in which men can be transferred to an equality with the angels. But this claim is erroneous and conflicts with the promise of Christ, who says at Luke 20:36 that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven. For what stems from nature is, as it were, the material element in the definition of an order of angels, while what stems from the gift of grace—which depends on God’s generosity and not on the order of nature—perfects the material element. And so through the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a way as to be equal to each of the grades of angels, and this is what it is for men to be assumed into the orders of angels.

However, some claim that not all who are saved are assumed into the orders of angels, but only virgins or those who are perfect, whereas the others constitute their own order, which is, as it were, divided off from the whole society of angels. But this is contrary to Augustine, who says in *De Civitate Dei* 12 that there will not be two societies, one of men and one of angels, but one society, “since the beatitude of all of them is to cling to the one God.”

Reply to objection 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts, but, as was explained above (a. 4), this is not the way it is with men. And so just as the lower angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the higher angels, so neither can they be transferred to the level of grace had by the higher angels. By contrast, men can ascend to the level of grace had by the angels, but not to their grade of nature.

Reply to objection 2: According to the order of nature, the angels lie between us and God. And so, as a general rule, the angels administer not only human affairs but all corporeal affairs. Now saintly men share the same nature with us even after this life. Hence, as a general rule, they do not administer human affairs and they do not preside over the affairs of living things, as Augustine points out in *De Cura Pro Mortuis Agenda*. Yet by a certain special dispensation certain holy people, whether living or dead, are sometimes given roles of this type to exercise—either by working miracles or by warding off demons or something else of this sort, as Augustine says in the same book.

Reply to objection 3: It is not erroneous to claim that men are transferred to the punishment of the demons. However, some have claimed erroneously that the demons are nothing other than the souls of the dead. This is the position Chrysostom was rejecting.

QUESTION 109

The Ordering of the Bad Angels

The next thing we have to consider is the ordering of the bad angels. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are there orders among the demons? (2) Is there an order of precedence (*praelatio*) among the demons? (3) Does one demon illuminate another? (4) Are the demons presided over by the good angels?

Article 1

Are there orders among the demons?

It seems that there are no orders among the demons:

Objection 1: As Augustine points out in *De Natura Boni*, *order* has to do with the notion of goodness, just as *mode* and *species* do; and, conversely, *disorder* has to do with the notion of evil. But there is nothing disordered among the good angels. Therefore, there are no orders among the bad angels.

Objection 2: The angelic orders are contained under hierarchies. But the demons are not under any hierarchy, i.e., sacred principality, since the demons are devoid of all holiness. Therefore, there are no orders among the demons.

Objection 3: As is commonly held, demons fell from each of the orders of angels. Therefore, if demons are said to belong to a given order in virtue of the fact that they fell from that order, then it seems that the names of each one of the orders should be attributed to them. But we never find the demons called Seraphim or Thrones or Dominations. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the demons are not in any of the orders.

But contrary to this: In Ephesians 6:12 the Apostle says, “Our struggle is against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness.”

I respond: As has already been explained (q. 108, a. 4), an angelic order may be thought of both in relation to the grade of *nature* and in relation to the grade of *grace*.

Now grace has two states, viz., an *imperfect* state, which is the state of meriting, and a *perfect* state, which is the state of consummate glory. Thus, if the orders of angels are thought of as having the perfection of glory, then the demons are not now and never were in the orders of angels. However, if the orders of angels are thought of as being in the state of imperfect grace, then the demons were once in the angelic orders, but then fell from those orders. This is in keeping with the claim, made above (q. 62, a. 3), that all the angels were created in grace.

On the other hand, if the orders of angels are thought of in relation to nature, then the demons are even now in the orders; for, as Dionysius says, they did not lose their natural gifts.

Reply to objection 1: As was shown above (q. 49, a. 3), good can be found without evil, but evil cannot be found without good. And so the demons are ordered to the extent that they have a good nature.

Reply to objection 2: If the ordering of the demons is thought of from the perspective of God, who orders them, then their order is sacred, since God uses the demons for His own sake. However, if the ordering is thought of from the perspective of the will of the demons themselves, then it is not sacred, since they abuse their own nature for evil purposes.

Reply to objection 3: The name ‘Seraphim’ is imposed because of the ardor of charity, the name ‘Thrones’ is imposed because of God’s indwelling, and the name ‘Dominations’ implies a certain sort of freedom—all of which are opposed to sin. That is why these names are not attributed to the angels who sin.

Article 2

Is there an order of precedence among the demons?

It seems that among the demons there is no order of precedence (*praelatio*):

Objection 1: Every order of precedence corresponds to an order of justice. But the demons fell completely away from justice. Therefore, there is no order of precedence among them.

Objection 2: There is no order of precedence where there is no obedience or subjection. But there is no obedience or subjection without concord, and, according to Proverbs 13:10 (“Among the proud there are always contentions”), there is no concord at all among the demons. Therefore, there is no order of precedence among the demons.

Objection 3: If there is an order of precedence among the demons, then it stems either (a) from their nature or (b) from their sin or punishment. But it does not stem from their nature, since subjection and servitude do not arise from nature but instead follow upon sin. Nor does it stem from sin or punishment, since in that case the higher demons, whose sin was greater, would be subject to the lower demons. Therefore, there is no order of precedence among the demons.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15:24 says, “As long as the world endures, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons.”

I respond: Since an entity’s action follows upon its nature, if the natures of any given entities are ordered, then their actions must also be ordered to one another. This is clear in the case of corporeal things. For since lower bodies lie below the celestial bodies in the order of nature, their actions and movements are subordinated to the actions and movements of the celestial bodies. Now it is clear from what has been said (a. 1) that some demons are situated below others in the order of nature. Hence, their actions are subordinate to the actions of the higher demons. And this is just what the notion of an order of precedence demands, viz., that the action of the one who is subjected be subordinate to the action of the one who is in charge. So, then, the natural arrangement of the demons itself requires that there be an order of precedence among them. This point is also consonant with God’s wisdom, which leaves nothing in the universe unordered and which, as Wisdom 8:1 says, “reaches from end to end mightily, and orders all things agreeably.”

Reply to objection 1: The order of precedence among the demons is based not on their own justice but on the justice of God, who orders all things.

Reply to objection 2: The concord among the demons, by which some obey others, stems not from any friendship they have with one another, but from the common wickedness by which they hate men and fight against God’s justice. After all, it is proper to impious men that they should join with, and subject themselves to, those whom they see as stronger in order that they might live out their wickedness.

Reply to objection 3: The demons are not equal to one another according to nature, and so there is a natural order of precedence among them. This does not happen with men, who are equal by nature.

Now the fact that the lower demons are subject to the higher demons stems not from the goodness of the higher demons, but rather from their evil. For since doing evil is especially relevant to unhappiness, to be preeminent in evil is to be more unhappy.

Article 3

Is there illumination among the demons?

It seems that there is illumination among the demons:

Objection 1: Illumination consists in the manifestation of truth. But a demon can make a truth manifest to another demon, since the higher demons enjoy a greater insightfulness in natural knowledge. Therefore, the higher demons can illuminate the lower demons.

Objection 2: A body that abounds in light can illuminate a body that is weak in light, in the way that the sun illuminates the moon. But the higher demons abound in participation in the natural light. Therefore, it seems that the higher demons are able to illuminate the lower demons.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (q. 106, a. 1), illumination goes along with cleansing and perfecting. But according to Ecclesiasticus 34:4 (“What can be made clean by the unclean?”), cleansing does not befit the demons. Therefore, neither does illumination.

I respond: There is no illumination, properly speaking, among the demons. For it was explained above (q. 107, a. 2) that illumination is, properly speaking, a manifestation of the truth insofar as this truth is ordered toward God, who illuminates every intellect.

However, there can be another sort of manifestation of truth, viz., speaking (*locutio*), as when one angel manifests his own conception to another.

Now the perversity of the demons is such that one demon does not intend to order another demon toward God, but instead intends to lead him away from being ordered toward God. And so it is not the case that one demon illuminates another. However, a demon can, by speaking, intimate his own conception to another.

Reply to objection 1: Not every sort of manifestation of truth satisfies the notion of illumination, but only the sort described above.

Reply to objection 2: As far as things pertaining to natural cognition are concerned, the manifestation of truth is not necessary either in angels or in demons. For, as was explained above (q. 55, a. 2 and q. 79, a. 2), they know all the things pertaining to natural cognition from the very beginning of their creation. And so the greater fullness of natural light which exists in the higher demons cannot be any sort of illumination.

Article 4

Do the good angels preside over the bad angels?

It seems that the good angels do not preside (*non habeant praelationem*) over the bad angels:

Objection 1: The order of precedence among the angels has to do mainly with illumination. But since the bad angels are darkness, they are not illuminated by the good angels. Therefore, the good angels do not preside over the bad angels.

Objection 2: When things are done badly by those subject to someone who presides over them, this seems to involve negligence on his part. But the demons do many bad things. Therefore, if they are subject to good angels who preside over them, then it seems that there is negligence among the good angels. But this is absurd.

Objection 3: As was explained above (a. 2), the order of precedence among the angels follows the order of nature. But if, as is commonly held, demons fell from each one of the orders of angels, then

many demons are higher in the order of nature than many of the good angels. Therefore, it is not the case that good angels preside over all of the bad angels.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “A spirit of life who is a deserter or a sinner is ruled by a spirit of life who is reasonable, pious, and just.” And Gregory says, “The Powers are those angels whose dictate the adverse powers are subjected to.”

I respond: The entire order of precedence exists primarily and originally in God, and it is participated in by creatures to the extent that they are closer to God. For the creatures that have influence over other creatures are those that are more perfect and closer to God. Now the highest perfection, through which one comes closest to God, belongs to those who, like the holy angels, enjoy God—a sort of perfection that the demons are deprived of. And so the good angels preside over the bad angels and the bad angels are ruled by them.

Reply to objection 1: Many of the divine mysteries are revealed to the demons by the holy angels, since God’s judgment demands that certain things be done by the demons either in order to punish evildoers or to test those who are good—just as in human affairs a judge’s assistants make his sentence known to the executioners. Now if revelations of this sort are thought of in relation to the revealing angels, then they are illuminations, since the angels order them toward God. However, they are not illuminations in relation to the demons, since the demons do not order them toward God, but instead order them toward the exercise of their own wickedness.

Reply to objection 2: The holy angels are the ministers of God’s wisdom. Hence, just as God’s wisdom allows certain evils to be done by bad angels or bad men for the sake of the goods that He elicits from them, so too the good angels do not totally prevent the bad angels from doing harm.

Reply to objection 3: An angel who is lower in the order of nature presides over demons, even if the demons are higher than he is in the order of nature. For the power of God’s justice, which the good angels adhere to, is greater than the natural powers had by the angels. Hence, even among men, “the spiritual man passes judgment on everyone,” according to 1 Corinthians 2:15. And in the *Ethics* the Philosopher says, “The virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts.”

QUESTION 110

How Angels Preside over Corporeal Creatures

The next thing we have to consider is how angels preside over corporeal creatures. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are corporeal creatures administered by the angels? (2) Does a corporeal creature obey angels at will? (3) Can angels by their power directly move bodies with respect to place? (4) Are good or bad angels able to work miracles?

Article 1

Are corporeal creatures administered by the angels?

It seems that corporeal creatures are not administered by the angels:

Objection 1: An entity that has a determinate mode of operating does not need to be governed by someone presiding over it, since the reason why we ourselves need to be governed is in order that we not act otherwise than we should. But corporeal entities have determinate actions that stem from the natures given them by God. Therefore, they do not need the governance of the angels.

Objection 2: Lower entities are governed by higher entities. But among corporeal entities some are called lower and some higher. Therefore, the lower ones are governed by the higher ones. Therefore, it is not necessary for the lower bodies to be governed by the angels.

Objection 3: The different orders of angels are distinguished by their different roles. But if corporeal creatures are administered by the angels, then there are as many angelic roles as there are species of things. Therefore, there are likewise as many orders of angels as there are species of things. But this is contrary to what was asserted above (q. 108, a. 2). Therefore, corporeal creatures are not administered by the angels.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “All bodies are ruled by reasonable spirits of life.” And in *Dialogi* 4 Gregory says, “Nothing can take place in this visible world except through invisible creatures.”

I respond: In the case of both human affairs and natural entities one generally finds that a particularized power is governed and ruled by a universal power. For instance, the power of the magistrate (*ballivus*) is governed by the power of the king. In addition, it has already been explained (q. 55, a. 3 and q. 108, a. 1) that among the angels the higher angels, who preside over the lower angels, have a more universal knowledge.

Now it is clear that a body’s power is more particularized than a spiritual substance’s power, since every corporeal form is individuated by matter and is determined to the here and now, whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. And so just as the lower angels, who have forms that are less universal, are ruled by the higher angels, so too all corporeal entities are ruled by the angels. This claim is made not only by the holy doctors, but also by all those philosophers who have posited incorporeal substances.

Reply to objection 1: Corporeal entities have determinate actions but they do not exercise these actions except insofar as they are moved, since it is proper to a body not to act unless it is moved. And so it is necessary for corporeal creatures to be moved by spiritual creatures.

Reply to objection 2: This argument presupposes the opinion of Aristotle, who claimed that the celestial bodies are moved by spiritual substances, and who ventured to assign a number to the spiritual substances that corresponds to the number of movements that appear among the celestial bodies. But he did not claim that there are spiritual substances—except, perhaps, human souls—who preside directly over lower bodies. The reason for this is that the only operations exercised by lower bodies that he took

into account were natural operations, for which the movement of the celestial bodies was sufficient.

But since we ourselves claim that many things are effected among the lower bodies besides their natural actions and that the powers of the celestial bodies are not sufficient for these things, it is necessary from our perspective to hold that the angels preside directly not only over the celestial bodies but over lower bodies as well.

Reply to objection 3: Philosophers have spoken in diverse ways about immaterial substances.

Plato held that immaterial substances are the ideas and species of sensible bodies, and that some are more universal than others. And so he claimed that immaterial substances preside directly over all sensible bodies, and that different immaterial substances preside over different sensible bodies.

Aristotle, by contrast, claimed that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies but are instead something higher and more universal. And so he attributed to them a direct governance not over individual bodies, but only over the universal agents, viz., the celestial bodies.

Avicenna, on the other hand, followed a middle way. For with Plato he claimed that some spiritual substances preside directly over the sphere of active and passive things—in that, just as Plato claimed that the forms of sensible things are derived from immaterial substances, so Avicenna also made this claim. But he differs from Plato in holding that there is just a single immaterial substance that presides over all the lower bodies, and he called this substance the Agent Intelligence.

Now the holy doctors held, with the Platonists, that different spiritual substances have been put in charge of different corporeal entities. For instance, in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Each visible entity in this world has an angelic power in charge of it.” And Damascene says, “The devil came from among those angelic powers that were in charge of the earthly order.” And in commenting on Numbers 22:23 (“When the donkey saw the angel ...”), Origen says, “The world needs angels to preside over the beasts and to preside over the birth of animals and trees and plants and over the increase of other things.”

However, the reason for making this claim should not be that a given angel is by his very nature more fit to preside over animals than over plants; for each angel, even the least one, has a higher and more universal power than does any genus of corporeal things. Rather, the reason has to do with the order of God’s wisdom, which places different rulers over different things.

Nor does it follow from this that there are more than nine orders of angels; for, as was explained above (q. 108, a. 2), the orders are distinguished by their general roles. Hence, just as, according to Gregory, the order of Powers includes all the angels who properly preside over the demons, so too the order of Virtues includes all the angels who preside over purely corporeal entities, since sometimes miracles are worked in connection with their ministry.

Article 2

Is corporeal matter obedient to the angels at will?

It seems that corporeal matter is obedient to the angels at will (*obediat angelis ad nutum*):

Objection 1: An angel’s power is greater than a soul’s power. But corporeal matter obeys the soul’s conception, since a man’s body changes to being hot or cold, and sometimes even to being healthy or sick, because of the soul’s conception. Therefore, *a fortiori*, corporeal matter is transformed in accord with an angel’s conception.

Objection 2: A higher power can do whatever a lower power can do, and an angel’s power is higher than a corporeal power. But a body is able by its power to change corporeal matter with respect to its [substantial] form, as when a fire generates a fire. Therefore, *a fortiori*, angels are able by their power

to transmute corporeal matter with respect to its [substantial] form.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), all of corporeal nature is administered by the angels, and so it seems that bodies are related to the angels as instruments; for it is the nature of an instrument to be a moved mover. But within a given effect we find something which both (a) stems from the principal agent's power and (b) cannot stem from the instrument's power; and this is the most important aspect of the effect. For instance, the digestion of food occurs by means of the power of natural heat, which is the nutritive soul's instrument, but the fact that living flesh is generated from that food stems from the soul's power. Similarly, the fact that this wood is cut pertains to the saw, but the fact that this wood ends up shaped into a bed stems from the nature of the [carpenter's] craft. Therefore, a substantial form, which is the most important aspect within corporeal effects, stems from the power of the angels. Therefore, matter obeys the angels as far as its being formed is concerned.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, "One should not think that this matter of visible things serves the sinful angels at will; rather, it serves God alone."

I respond: The Platonists claimed that the forms which exist in matter are caused by immaterial forms, since they held that material forms are certain participations in immaterial forms. And in some respects their position was adopted by Avicenna, who held that (a) all the forms which exist in matter proceed from the conception of an intelligence and that (b) corporeal agents merely dispose matter for the forms. They made this mistake, it seems, because they believed that a form is something which is made in its own right (*per se*) and that, as such, it proceeds from a formal principle. However, as the Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 7, it is the *composite* which is made, properly speaking, because it is the composite which subsists, properly speaking. By contrast, the form is called a being not in the sense that it itself exists, but in the sense that it is that *by which* something exists; and, as a result, the form is not made, properly speaking. For *being-made* belongs to that which exists, since *being-made* is nothing other than a path to existing.

Now it is clear that what is made is similar to what makes it, since every agent effects what is similar to itself. And so the agent which makes natural things bears a likeness to the composite, either because (a) the agent itself is a composite, as when a fire generates a fire, or (b) because the whole composite, both matter and form, lies within power of the agent—and this is proper to God alone.

So, then, every instance of matter's being formed comes directly either from God or from some corporeal agent, and it does not come directly from an angel.

Reply to objection 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form of the body, and so it is no wonder that the body is changed formally as a result of the soul's conception—especially since the movement of the sentient appetite, which is effected along with a certain corporeal change, is subject to the command of reason.

By contrast, an angel is not related in this way to natural bodies. Hence, the argument does not go through.

Reply to objection 2: That which a lower power can effect is such that a higher power can effect it in a more excellent way, but not in exactly the same way. For instance, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than the senses do. So, too, an angel changes corporeal matter in a more excellent way than corporeal agents do, viz., by moving the corporeal agents themselves as a higher cause.

Reply to objection 3: Nothing prevents it from being the case that certain effects in natural things that stem from the power of angels are such that corporeal agents are not sufficient for them. But this is not what it is for matter to obey the angels at will—just as it is not the case that matter obeys chefs at will merely because, by using fire in the way prescribed by their craft, they concoct a dish that the fire would not make on its own.

Now it does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent to lead matter to the act of a substantial form, since a corporeal agent is apt by its nature to effect what is similar to itself.

Article 3

Do bodies obey angels with respect to local motion?

It seems that bodies do not obey angels with respect to local motion:

Objection 1: The local motion of natural bodies follows upon their [substantial] forms. But as has been explained (a. 2), angels do not effect the [substantial] forms of natural bodies. Therefore, neither can they cause local motion in those bodies.

Objection 2: *Physics* 8 proves that local motion is the first among movements. But angels cannot cause the other sorts of movements by transmuting matter with respect to its [substantial] form. Therefore, neither can they cause local motion.

Objection 3: The members of the body obey the soul's conception with respect to local motion insofar as they have a principle of life within themselves. But in natural bodies there is no principle of life. Therefore, natural bodies do not obey the angels with respect to local motion.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that the angels use 'corporeal seeds' (*semina coporalia*) to produce effects. But they cannot do this except by moving them with respect to place. Therefore, bodies obey the angels with respect to local motion.

I respond: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 7, "God's wisdom joins the ends of the primary things to the beginnings of the secondary things." From this it is clear that a lower nature is touched at its highest point by a higher nature. Now corporeal nature stands below spiritual nature and, as *Physics* 8 proves, local motion is the most perfect of all corporeal movements. The reason is that something that is movable with respect to place is not, as such, in potentiality with respect to anything intrinsic, but is in potentiality only with respect to something extrinsic, viz., place. And so a corporeal natural is apt to be moved directly by a spiritual nature with respect to place.

Thus, the philosophers, too, have held that the highest bodies are moved with respect to place by spiritual substances. And we ourselves see that the soul moves the body primarily and principally by local motion.

Reply to objection 1: In bodies there are local motions other than those that follow upon their [substantial] forms. For instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow upon the substantial form of water, but instead follows from the power of the moon. *A fortiori*, certain local motions can follow upon the power of spiritual substances.

Reply to objection 2: By causing local motion in the first instance, angels can cause other movements through this local motion, viz., by applying corporeal agents to the production of their own effects—in the way that a blacksmith uses fire to soften iron.

Reply to objection 3: Angels have a power that is less restricted than the power had by souls. Hence, the moving power of a soul is limited to the body that is united to it and made alive by it, and it is through this movement that it can move other things. By contrast, an angel's power is not limited to a particular body. Hence, an angel can move a non-conjoined body with respect to place.

Article 4

Can angels work miracles?

It seems that angels can work miracles:

Objection 1: Gregory says, “The spirits called Virtues are those through whom signs and miracles are most often worked.”

Objection 2: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Magicians work miracles through private contracts (*per privatos contractus*), good Christians work them through public justice, and bad Christians work them through the signs of public justice.” But magicians work miracles “because they are listened to by demons,” as Augustine says in another place in the same book. Therefore, demons are able to work miracles. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the good angels are able to work miracles.

Objection 3: In the same book Augustine says, “All things that are made visibly are plausibly believed to be such that they can also be made by the lower powers of this part of the air.” But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of natural causes, we say that this is a miracle—as, for instance, when someone is cured of a fever but not through any operation of nature. Therefore, angels and demons can work miracles.

Objection 4: A higher power is not subordinated to the order of a lower cause. But a natural body is lower than an angel. Therefore, an angel can operate outside the order of corporeal agents—which is what it is to work a miracle.

But contrary to this: Psalm 135:4 says of God that “He alone works great wonders.”

I respond: Properly speaking, a miracle occurs when something is done outside the order of nature. However, it is not sufficient for the notion of a miracle that something should be done outside the order of the nature of some *particular* thing; for, otherwise, when someone threw a rock up in the air, he would be working a miracle, since this lies beyond the order of a rock’s nature. Something is called a miracle, then, from the fact that it is done outside the order of the *whole* of created nature.

No one except God can work a miracle, since whatever an angel (or any other creature) does by his own power is done within the order of created nature and so is not a miracle. Hence, it follows that only God is able to work miracles.

Reply to objection 1: Certain angels are said to work miracles either because (a) God works a miracle when they desire it, in the same way that holy men are said to work miracles, or because (b) they play some role in the miracles that are being worked, such as gathering up dust at the time of the general resurrection or doing something of this sort.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, miracles occur, simply speaking, when something is done outside the order of the whole of created nature. But since not every power in created nature is known to us, when something is done outside the order of created nature as it is known to us and through a created power that is unknown to us, then there is a miracle as far as we are concerned (*miraculum quoad nos*). So, then, when demons do something by their own natural power, these are not called miracles simply speaking, but are instead called miracles as far as we are concerned. This is the sense in which magicians work miracles through demons.

These miracles are said to be worked “through private contracts” because every created power in the universe is like the power of a private person in a city. Hence, when a magician does something through a pact entered into with a demon, the deed is done, as it were, through a sort of private contract.

By contrast, God’s justice is to the whole universe what public law is to a city, and so insofar as good Christians are said to work miracles through God’s justice, they are said to work the miracles “through public justice.”

On the other hand, bad Christians work miracles “through the signs of public justice”—for instance, by invoking the name of Christ or by making use of certain sacred signs (*sacramenta*).

Reply to objection 3: Things which are done visibly in this world are such that spiritual powers can do them by employing ‘corporeal seeds’ via local motion.

Reply to objection 4: Even though angels can do something outside the order of corporeal nature, they nonetheless cannot do anything outside the order of the whole of creation—which, as has been explained, is what is required by the notion of a miracle.

QUESTION 111

The Action of Angels on Men

The next thing we have to consider is the action of angels on men. We will consider, first, the action of angels insofar as they are able by their own natural power to affect men (question 111); second, the sense in which they are sent by God to minister to men (question 112); and, third, the sense in which they guard men (question 113).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Can an angel illuminate a man's intellect? (2) Can an angel alter a man's affections? (3) Can an angel affect a man's imagination? (4) Can an angel affect a man's senses?

Article 1

Can an angel illuminate a man?

It seems that an angel cannot illuminate a man:

Objection 1: A man is illuminated by faith; hence, in *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia* Dionysius attributes illumination to Baptism, which is the sacrament of faith. But according to Ephesians 2:8 ("By grace you are saved through faith, and not from yourselves; for it is a gift of God"), faith comes directly from God. Therefore, a man is illuminated not by an angel, but directly by God.

Objection 2: The Gloss on Romans 1:19 ("God made it known to them") says, "It was not only natural reason that was useful for making divine things known to men; in addition, God made these things known through His own work, i.e., through creatures." But both of these, viz., natural reason and creatures, are directly from God. Therefore, God directly illuminates a man.

Objection 3: If someone is illuminated, then he knows that he is being illuminated. But men do not perceive that they are being illuminated by angels. Therefore, they are not illuminated by angels.

But contrary to this: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 4, Dionysius proves that revelations of divine things come to men by the mediation of the angels. But, as was explained above (q. 106, a. 1), revelations of this sort are illuminations. Therefore, men are illuminated by the angels.

I respond: Since, as was explained above (q. 109, a. 2), the order of divine providence is such that lower creatures are subject to the actions of higher creatures, it follows that just as the lower angels are illuminated by the higher angels, so too men, who are lower than the angels, are illuminated by the angels.

Now these two types of illumination are in some sense similar and in some sense diverse. For it was explained above (q. 106, a. 1) that the type of illumination that is a manifestation of divine truth involves two aspects, viz., (a) the lower intellect is strengthened by the action of the higher intellect, and (b) the intelligible species that exist in the higher intellect are proposed to the lower intellect in such a way that they can be grasped by the lower intellect.

Now, as was explained above (*ibid.*), this second aspect occurs in the case of angels insofar as the higher angel, in keeping with the capacity of the lower angel, makes distinctions within the universal truth he conceives. However, the human intellect is incapable of grasping sheer intelligible truth itself, since, as has been explained (q. 84, a. 7), it is connatural to the human intellect to exercise its understanding by turning to phantasms. And so the angels propose intelligible truth to men under the likenesses of sensible things. Accordingly in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 1, Dionysius says, "It is impossible for the divine ray to illumine us unless it is enshrouded by a variety of sacred veils."

As for the other aspect, the human intellect, as a lower intellect, is fortified by the action of an angelic intellect.

And so these two aspects are involved in the illumination through which a man is illuminated by an angel.

Reply to objection 1: Two things must come together for faith.

The first is a habit of the intellect by which the intellect is disposed to obey the will insofar as it tends toward divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of the Faith not because it is convinced by reason, but because it is impelled (*imperatus*) by the will, since, as Augustine says, no one believes unless he wills to. And on this score, faith is from God alone.

The second thing required for faith is that what is to be believed should be proposed to the believer. And this, to be sure, comes from men, insofar as “faith comes from hearing,” as Romans 10:17 puts it, but principally it comes from the angels, through whom divine things are revealed to men. Hence, the angels contribute something to the illumination of faith. And yet men are illuminated by the angels not only with respect to what is to be believed, but also with respect to what is to be done.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, natural reason, which comes directly from God, can be strengthened by an angel. And as in the case of species received from creatures, the stronger a human intellect is, the deeper the intelligible truth that is elicited. And so a man is helped by an angel in such a way that he comes to a more perfect cognition of God on the basis of creatures.

Reply to objection 3: Intellectual operations—including illumination itself—can be thought of in two ways.

First, they can be thought of in terms of *the thing that is understood*, and, on this score, if someone is understanding something or is being illuminated, then he knows that he is understanding something or that he is being illuminated. For he knows that something is being made manifest to him.

Second, these operations can be thought in terms of *their principle*, and, on this score, not everyone who is understanding a given truth knows what his intellect, i.e., the principle of his intellectual operation, is. And, similarly, not everyone who is being illuminated by an angel knows that he is being illuminated by an angel.

Article 2

Is an angel able to affect a man's will?

It seems that an angel is able to affect a man's will (*immutare voluntatem hominis*):

Objection 1: The Gloss on Hebrews 1:7 (“He who makes His angels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire”) says, “They are fire when they flame up in spirit and burn away our vices.” But this would not be the case if they did not affect our will. Therefore, angels are able to affect a man's will.

Objection 2: Bede says, “The devil enkindles evil thoughts but does not send them.” However, Damascene says further that the devil sends evil thoughts as well; for in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 he says, “All malice and all unclean passions are thought up by the demons, and they undertake to send them to a man.” And, by parity of reasoning, the good angels send and enkindle good thoughts. But they would not be able to do this if they did not affect the will. Therefore, they affect a man's will.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), an angel illuminates a man's intellect by the mediation of phantasms. But just as the imagination, which serves the intellect, can be affected by an angel, so too the sentient appetite, which serves the will, can be affected by an angel, since the sentient appetite is likewise a power that uses a corporeal organ. Therefore, an angel can affect the will in the same way that he illuminates the intellect.

But contrary to this: According to Proverbs 21:1 (“The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord; He

turns it whichever way He wills”), it is proper to God to affect the will.

I respond: The will can be affected in two ways.

First, it can be affected from within (*ab interiori*). And since the will’s movement is nothing other its inclination toward the thing that is willed, only God can change the will, since only God gives an intellectual nature the power for such an inclination. For just as a natural inclination is exclusively from God, who gives the nature, so too a voluntary inclination is exclusively from God, who causes the will.

Second, the will is moved from without (*ab exteriori*). And in an angel this is effected in just one way, viz., by a good apprehended by the intellect. Hence, someone moves the will to the extent that he is a cause of something’s being apprehended as a good to be desired. And on this score, too, only God can move the will with necessity (*efficaciter*), whereas, in keeping with what was said above (q. 106, a. 2), an angel or a man can move the will only by way of persuasion.

Now in addition to this mode, there is another mode in which a man’s will can be moved from without, viz., by a passion that exists in the sentient appetite. For instance, a man’s will is moved to will something by sense desire or by anger. And so, too, insofar as angels are able to incite passions of this sort, they are able to move the will—not, however, with necessity, since the will always remains free to consent to or to resist a passion.

Reply to objection 1: It is by way of persuasion that God’s ministers, whether angels or men, are said to burn away vices and inflame us toward the virtues.

Reply to objection 2: Demons cannot ‘send thoughts’ by causing them from within, since the use of the cogitative power is subject to our will. Still, the devil is said to ‘enkindle thoughts’ insofar as he incites us to think of certain things or to desire the things thought of, either by way of persuasion or by way of exciting a passion. And it is this sort of ‘enkindling’ that Damascene is calling ‘sending’, since such an operation is effected from within. On the other hand, good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, viz., God, even if they are procured by the ministry of the angels.

Reply to objection 3: Given our present state, the human intellect cannot exercise understanding except by turning toward phantasms. But the human will can will something on the basis of reason’s judgments without following the passions of the sentient appetite. Hence, the two cases are not parallel.

Article 3

Is an angel able to affect a man’s imagination?

It seems that an angel is not able to affect a man’s imagination (*imaginatio*):

Objection 1: As is explained in *De Anima*, an act of imagining (*phantasia*) “is a movement effected by the senses as actually operating.” But if an act of imagining were effected by an angel’s influence, then it would not be effected by the senses as actually operating. Therefore, it is contrary to the nature of an act of imagining, i.e., an act of the imaginative power, that it should exist because of angel’s influence.

Objection 2: Since the forms that exist in the imagination are spiritual, they are more noble than the forms that exist in sensible matter. But, as has been explained (q. 110, a. 2), an angel cannot impress forms on sensible matter. Therefore, an angel cannot impress forms on the imagination. And so an angel cannot affect the imagination.

Objection 3: According to Augustine in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, “By intermingling with another spirit you can, it happens, show the one with whom you are commingling the things that you know through images of the sort in question, so that either he understands them or else accepts them as

understood by another.” But it does not seem that an angel can intermingle with the human imagination, or that the imagination can grasp the intelligible things that an angel knows. Therefore, it seems that an angel cannot alter the imagination.

Objection 4: In an imaginative vision a man adheres to likenesses as if they were the things themselves. But in this there is a kind of deception. Therefore, since a good angel cannot be a cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause an imaginative vision by altering the imagination.

But contrary to this: Things which appear in dreams are seen by an imaginative vision. But angels reveal certain things in dreams, as is clear from Matthew 1-2 in the case of the angel who appeared to Joseph in his dreams. Therefore, an angel can move the imagination.

I respond: Angels, both good and evil, are by their power able to move a man’s imagination. This can be thought of in the following way:

It was explained above (q. 110, a. 3) that a corporeal nature obeys an angel with respect to local motion. Therefore, things that can be caused by the local motion of bodies are subject to the natural power of angels. Now it is clear that imaginative appearances are sometimes caused in us by the local motion of bodily spirits and humors. Hence, in *De Somno et Vigilia* Aristotle, in specifying the cause of dreamers’ visions, says, “When an animal is sleeping and a lot of blood descends to the sentient principle, movements descend at the same time,” i.e., impressions left over from sensible motions, which are conserved in the sensory spirits and which move the sentient principle, so that a certain type of vision occurs, just as if the sentient principle were at that very time being affected by exterior things themselves. And the movement of the spirits and humors can be so strong that visions of this sort can occur even to those who are awake, as is clear in the case of madmen (*in phreneticis*) and others like them. Therefore, just as this can be brought about by the natural movement of the humors—and sometimes even by a man’s will when he voluntarily imagines what he has previously sensed—so too it can be brought about by the power of a good or bad angel, sometimes in separation from the corporeal senses and sometimes without such separation.

Reply to objection 1: The first principle of an act of imagining comes from the senses as actually operating. For we cannot imagine things that we have not sensed in any way at all, either wholly or partially. For instance, someone who is born blind cannot imagine colors. However, as has been explained, sometimes the imagination is formed in such a way that an actual movement of imagining arises from impressions that have been conserved interiorly.

Reply to objection 2: An angel does not influence the imagination by impressing an imaginative form that has not in any way been previously received through the senses (for instance, an angel cannot bring it about that a blind man imagines colors); rather, as has been explained, he does this through the local motion of the spirits and humors.

Reply to objection 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not through the angel’s essence, but rather through an effect which the angel brings about in the imagination in the way explained above. The angel shows the imagination what he knows, yet not in the way in which he knows it.

Reply to objection 4: In some cases, an angel who causes an imaginative vision illuminates the intellect at the same time, so that the intellect simultaneously comes to know what is being signified by likenesses of the sort in question. In such a case there is no deception.

On the other hand, in some cases the only result of the angel’s operation is that likenesses of things appear in the imagination. However, in such a case the deception is caused not by the angel, but by the weakness of the intellect of the one to whom such things appear—just as Christ was not a cause of deception when he proposed many things to the crowds in parables without explaining the parables to them.

Article 4

Can an angel affect the human senses?

It seems that an angel cannot affect the human senses:

Objection 1: A sentient operation is a vital operation. But an operation of this sort does not stem from an extrinsic principle. Therefore, a sentient operation cannot be caused by an angel.

Objection 2: The sentient power is more noble than the nutritive power. But an angel, it seems, cannot affect the nutritive power, just as he cannot affect other natural forms. Therefore, neither can an angel affect the sentient power.

Objection 3: The senses are naturally moved by a sensible thing. But as was explained above (q. 110, a. 4), an angel cannot alter the order of nature. Therefore, an angel cannot affect the senses; instead, the senses are always affected by a sensible thing.

But contrary to this: According to Genesis 19:11, the angels who destroyed Sodom “struck the Sodomites with blindness (or *aorasia*), so that they could not find the door of the house.” And 4 Kings 6:18 says the same of the Syrians whom Elisha led into Samaria.

I respond: The senses are affected in two ways:

First, they are affected by something exterior, as when they are affected by a sensible thing.

Second, they are affected by something interior; for we see that the senses are affected by perturbed spirits and humors. For instance, a sick man’s tongue, full of choleric humor, senses everything as bitter; and something similar happens with the other senses.

An angel can, by his natural power, affect a man’s senses in both ways. For an angel can present some exterior sensible thing to the senses, either by presenting something already formed by nature or, as was explained above (q. 51, a. 2), by forming something himself *de novo*, as he does when he assumes a body. Similarly, as was explained above (a. 3), an angel can also move from within the spirits and humors by which the senses are affected in various ways.

Reply to objection 1: The principle of a sentient operation cannot exist without an interior principle, viz., the sentient power, but, as has been explained, this interior principle can be moved in various ways by an exterior principle.

Reply to objection 2: By moving the spirits and humors from within, an angel can even affect the act of the nutritive power—as well as the act of the appetitive power or of the sentient power or of any power that uses a corporeal organ.

Reply to objection 3: An angel cannot do anything outside the order of the whole of creation, but he can do something outside the order of some particular nature, since he is not subject to such an order. And so he can affect the senses in a unique mode that lies beyond the common mode.

QUESTION 112

The Mission of the Angels

The next thing we have to consider is the mission of the angels. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Are some angels sent on mission to minister? (2) Are all angels sent on mission? (3) Do those who are sent on mission also stand before God? (4) Which orders of angels are sent on mission?

Article 1

Are angels sent on mission to minister?

It seems that angels are not sent on mission to minister (*mittantur in ministerium*):

Objection 1: Every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual actions do not fix any determinate place, since the intellect abstracts from the here and now. Therefore, since angelic actions are intellectual actions, it seems that angels are not sent on mission to perform their actions.

Objection 2: The empyrean heaven is a place that suits the dignity of the angels. Therefore, if they are sent on mission to us, then it seems that something of their dignity is lost. But this is absurd.

Objection 3: Being occupied with something exterior impedes the contemplation of wisdom; hence, Ecclesiasticus 38:25 says, “He who is less involved in action shall receive wisdom.” Therefore, if some of the angels are sent on mission for exterior ministries, then it seems that they are held back from contemplation. But the whole of their beatitude consists in contemplating God. Therefore, if they were sent on mission, their beatitude would be decreased. But this is absurd.

Objection 4: To minister is the role of someone lowly; hence, Luke 22:27 says, “Who is greater, he who reclines at table or he who serves? Is it not he who reclines at table?” But the angels are greater than we are in the order of nature. Therefore, they are not sent on mission to minister to us.

But contrary to this: Exodus 23:20 says, “Behold, I will send my angel who shall go before you.”

I respond: On the basis of what was said above (q. 108, a. 6), it is possible to make clear that some of the angels are sent on mission by God in order to minister.

For as was explained above when we were discussing the missions of the divine persons (q. 43, a. 1), someone is sent on mission when he proceeds in some way from another in order to begin to exist where he had not previously existed, or to exist where he had previously existed, but in a different way.

Now the Son (or the Holy Spirit) is said to be sent on mission insofar as He (a) proceeds from the Father through origin and (b) begins to exist in a new way, viz., through His assumed nature (or through grace), in a place where He previously existed through the presence of the divine nature. For it is proper to God to exist everywhere, since given that He is a *universal* agent, His power touches all entities and thus, as was explained above (q. 8, a. 1), He exists in all things.

By contrast, since an angel is a *particularized* agent, his power does not touch the whole universe; instead, it touches one thing in such a way that it does not touch another. And so an angel exists here in such a way that he does not exist elsewhere. Now it is clear from what was said above (q. 110, a. 1) that corporeal creatures are administered by the angels. Therefore, when something is to be done by an angel with respect to some creature, the angel is applied *de novo* to the body in question by his power; and so the angel begins to exist there *de novo*. And all of this stems from God’s command. Hence, it follows, given these premises, that an angel is sent on mission by God.

Now the action exercised by an angel who has been sent on mission proceeds from God as the first principle by whose will and authority the angel is acting; and so the action is traced back to God as its ultimate end. This satisfies the notion of a *ministry*. For a minister is, as it were, an intelligent instrument; but an instrument is such that it is moved by another and such that its action is ordered

toward that other. This is why the actions of the angels are called ministries, and for this reason they are said to be sent on mission in order to minister.

Reply to objection 1: There are two senses in which an operation can be called an ‘intellectual operation’:

First, the operation can be thought of as consisting in the act of understanding itself, e.g., the act of contemplating. And an intellectual operation, taken in this sense, does not fix a determinate place for itself. Indeed, in *De Trinitate* 4 Augustine says, “Even we ourselves, insofar as we mentally understand something eternal, are not located here in this world.”

Second, an operation can be called ‘intellectual’ because it is regulated and commanded by an act of understanding. And given this sense, it is clear that intellectual operations sometimes fix determinate places for themselves.

Reply to objection 2: The empyrean heaven pertains to an angel’s dignity with a sort of fittingness, since it is fitting that the highest location of bodies should be attributed to a nature that is above all bodies. However, an angel does not receive any dignity from the empyrean heaven. And so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, he does not lose any dignity—just as a king does not lose any dignity when he is not actually sitting on the royal throne that befits his dignity.

Reply to objection 3: In our own case, being occupied exteriorly impedes the purity of contemplation because we enter into an action with our sentient powers, whose acts are such that when they are intense, they retard the acts of the intellective power. But an angel regulates his exterior actions solely by an intellectual operation. Hence, his exterior actions do not in any way impede his contemplation; for because one of the two actions is a rule and measure of the other, the one does not impede the other, but instead aids the other. Hence, in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “The angels do not go forth in such a way that they are deprived of the joys of interior contemplation.”

Reply to objection 4: In their exterior actions the angels minister principally to God and secondarily to us. This is not because we are superior to them, simply speaking. Rather, every man or angel, insofar as he becomes one spirit with God by clinging to God, is superior to every creature. Hence, in Philippians 2:3 the Apostle says, “... regarding one another as superior.”

Article 2

Are all the angels sent on mission to minister?

It seems that all the angels are sent on mission to minister:

Objection 1: In Hebrews 1:14 the Apostle says, “Are they not all administering spirits, sent on mission to minister?”

Objection 2: As is clear from what was said above (q. 108, a. 6), among the orders of angels the order of Seraphim is the highest. But as Isaiah 6:6-7 has it, a Seraph was sent to cleanse the lips of the prophet. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the lower angels are sent as well.

Objection 3: The divine persons infinitely exceed all the orders of angels. But as was explained above (q. 43, a. 1), divine persons are sent on mission. Therefore, *a fortiori*, so are all of the highest angels.

Objection 4: If the higher angels are not sent on mission for an exterior ministry, this is only because the higher angels are executing divine ministries through the lower angels. But since, as has been explained (q. 50, a. 4), all the angels are unequal, each angel other than the lowest has an angel lower than himself. Therefore, only a single angel would be sent on mission to minister. But this is

contrary to Daniel 7:10 (“Thousands of thousands were ministering to Him”).

But contrary to this: Referring to Dionysius’s opinion, Gregory says, “The higher ranks do not in any way have a role in exterior ministry.”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 106, a. 3 and q. 110, a. 1), the order of divine providence is such that—not only among the angels, but in the whole universe as well—lower creatures are administered by higher creatures. However, sometimes in the case of corporeal things, there is, by divine dispensation, a departure from this order for the sake of a higher order, viz., because the departure expedites the manifestation of grace. For instance, God brought it about directly, without any action on the part of the celestial bodies, that the man born blind was given sight and that Lazarus was raised from the dead. Now the angels, too, both good and bad, are capable of acting on lower bodies outside of the action of the celestial bodies—for instance, by condensing the clouds into rain or by doing other such things. And no one should doubt that God could reveal things directly to men without the mediation of the angels, or that the higher angels could do this without the mediation of the lower angels.

Taking these considerations into account, some have claimed that as a general rule it is only the lower angels who are sent on mission and not the higher angels, but that by divine dispensation the higher angels are also sometimes sent on mission.

However, this claim does not seem plausible. For the order among the angels involves the gifts of grace. But the order of grace has no order higher than itself for the sake of which it might be set aside in the way that the order of nature is set aside for the sake of the order of grace.

Notice, in addition, that the reason why the order of nature is set aside in the working of miracles is to strengthen our faith. But it would do no good for the angelic order to be set aside, since we would be unable to perceive this.

Again, among the divine ministries there is no task so great that it could not be executed by the lower orders. Hence, Gregory says, “The archangels are called upon to announce the greatest things. This is why the Archangel Gabriel is sent to the Virgin Mary.” But as Gregory adds in the same place, this was the highest of all the divine ministries.

And so one should simply claim, with Dionysius, that the higher angels are never sent on mission for an exterior ministry.

Reply to objection 1: In the missions of the divine persons there is (a) a *visible* mission that involves a corporeal creature and (b) an *invisible* mission that involves a spiritual effect. Likewise, in the missions of the angels there is (a) something called an *exterior* mission, which involves carrying out a ministry to corporeal things, and not all the angels are sent on this sort of mission, and (b) something called an *interior* mission, which involves intellectual effects—as when one angel illuminates another—and all the angels are sent on this sort of mission.

An alternative reply is that the Apostle says this in order to prove that Christ is greater than the angels through whom the law was given, so that he might show the excellence of the New Law in comparison to the Old Law. Hence, what he says need not be taken to apply to angels other than the ministering angels through whom the law was given.

Reply to objection 2: According to Dionysius, the angel who was sent to cleanse the prophet’s lips was one of the lower angels, but he is equivocally called a Seraph, i.e., one who is on fire, because he came to burn the prophet’s lips.

An alternative reply is that the higher angels communicate their proper gifts, on the basis of which they are named, through the mediation of the lower angels. So, then, one of the Seraphim is said to have cleansed the prophet’s lips with fire, not because he himself did it directly, but because a lower angel did it by his power—just as the Pope is said to absolve someone even when he gives absolution through another.

Reply to objection 3: As is clear from what has been said, the divine persons are sent on mission in an equivocal sense, and they are not sent on mission in order to minister.

Reply to objection 4: There are many levels within the divine ministries. Hence, nothing prevents even unequal angels from being sent directly on mission in order to minister—though in such a way that higher angels are sent for higher ministries, and lower angels for lower ministries.

Article 3

Do the angels who are sent on mission also stand before God?

It seems that the angels who are sent on mission (*mittuntur*) also stand before God (*assistent*):

Objection 1: In *Homilia* Gregory says, “Therefore, it is the case both that the angels are sent on mission and that they stand before God. For even if an angelic spirit is limited to a particular place (*circumscribitur*), the highest spirit Himself, viz., God, is not so limited.”

Objection 2: Tobias’s angel was sent on mission to minister. But according to Tobit 12:15, he himself said, “I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before God.” Therefore, the angels who are sent on mission also stand before God.

Objection 3: Each beatified angel is closer to God than Satan is. But according to Job 1:6 (“When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them”), Satan stands before God. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the angels who are sent on mission to minister also stand before God.

Objection 4: If the lower angels do not stand before God, then this is because they receive divine illuminations through the higher angels and not directly. But every angel, except the one who is highest of all, receives divine illuminations from higher angels. Therefore, only the highest angel would stand before God. But this is contrary to Daniel 7:10 (“Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him”). Therefore, even those who minister stand before God.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 17, commenting on Job 25:3 (“Is there any numbering of His soldiers?”), Gregory says, “Those Powers stand before God (*assistent*) who do not leave to announce things to men.” Therefore, those who are sent on mission to minister do not stand before God.

I respond: The angels who stand before God and the angels who minister are spoken of by appeal to their similarity with those who serve under a king. There are some who always stand before the king and listen directly to his commands, while there are others—for instance, those in charge of administering the cities—to whom the royal commands are announced by those who stand before the king. The latter are said to administer, but not to stand before the king.

Therefore, notice that all the angels see God’s essence directly and, on this score, even those who minister are said to stand before Him. Hence, in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “Those who are sent to minister exteriorly for our salvation are always able to stand before the Father, i.e., to see His face.”

However, not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the divine mysteries in the very splendor of the divine essence; the only ones who can are the highest angels, through whom these secrets are made known to the lower angels. And on this score, the only angels who are said to stand before God are the highest angels, who belong to the first hierarchy, the property of which, according to Dionysius, is to be illuminated directly by God.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The replies to the first and second objections are clear from what has been said, since these objections are talking about the first mode of standing before God.

Reply to objection 3: Satan is not said to have stood before God, but is instead described as having been present among those who stand before God. For as Gregory says in *Moralia* 2, “Even

though Satan lost beatitude, he did not lose his nature, which is similar to the angels.”

Reply to objection 4: All those who stand before God see certain things directly in the splendor of God’s essence, and so it is said to be proper to the whole first hierarchy to be illuminated directly by God. However, the highest among them see more than the lower ones do, and the former illuminate the latter about these things—just as, among those who stand before a king, one knows more than another about the king’s secrets.

Article 4

Are all the angels of the second hierarchy sent on mission?

It seems that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent on mission:

Objection 1: According to Daniel 7:10, all the angels either stand before God or minister to God. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not stand before God, since, as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 8, they are illuminated by the angels of the first hierarchy. Therefore, all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent on mission to minister.

Objection 2: In *Moralia* 17 Gregory says, “There are more who minister than who stand before God.” But this would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy were not sent on mission to minister. Therefore, all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent on mission to minister.

But contrary to this: Dionysius says, “The Dominations are beyond all subjection.” But it involves subjection to be sent on mission to minister. Therefore, the Dominations are not sent on mission to minister.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), to be sent on mission for an exterior ministry is proper to an angel to the extent that he acts by God’s command on some corporeal creature, and this is what is involved in the execution of a divine ministry. But as Dionysius says in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 7, the properties of the angels are made clear by their names. Therefore, the angels who are sent on mission for an exterior ministry belong to those orders whose names imply some sort of execution.

Now the name ‘Dominations’ does not imply any sort of execution, but implies only arranging and commanding what is to be executed. However, some sort of execution is implied by the names of the lower orders. For the names ‘Angels’ and ‘Archangels’ come from announcing, and the names ‘Virtues’ and ‘Powers’ are predicated in relation to some action, and, as Gregory says, a Principality is in charge of those who operate. Hence, it belongs to these five orders to be sent on mission for exterior ministries, but not to the four higher orders.

Reply to objection 1: The Dominations are here counted among the angels who minister not because they execute a ministry, but rather because they arrange and mandate what is to be done by the others—just as architects do not do any manual labor in their trade, but only arrange and direct what others have to do.

Reply to objection 2: There are two possible explanations concerning the number of those who stand before God and the number of those who minister.

Gregory claims that more of them minister than stand before God. For he understands the phrase ‘thousands of thousands were ministering to Him’ (Daniel 7:10) as partitive rather than multiplicative, so that the meaning is ‘thousands from among the number of the thousands’. And so the number of those who minister is posited as indefinite, in order to signify excess, whereas the number of those who stand before God is posited as finite, since the passage adds that “ten thousand times a hundred thousand were standing before Him.” This follows the line of the argument proposed by the Platonists, who claimed

that the closer things are to the unitary first principle, the smaller they are in number—just as the closer a number is to the number *one*, the smaller the multitude it numbers.

This opinion is salvageable as far as the number of orders is concerned, since six orders minister and three stand before God.

By contrast, in *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 14, Dionysius claims that the multitude of angels exceeds every material multitude, so that just as the higher bodies exceed the lower bodies in magnitude, i.e., in immensity, so too the higher incorporeal natures exceed all corporeal natures in multitude. For that which is better is such that God intends it more and multiplies it more. Accordingly, since those who stand before God are higher than those who minister, there will be more who stand before God than who minister. Hence, on this view the phrase ‘thousands of thousands’ is interpreted multiplicatively, so that it means ‘a thousand times a thousand’. And because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if the text said, ‘ten times a hundred thousand’, then that would mean that there are just as many standing before God as ministering. However, because it says, ‘ten thousand times a hundred thousand’, it follows that many more are being said to stand before God than to minister. However, it does not say this in order to indicate that this is the precise number of angels there are. Rather, there are many more angels than this, since their number exceeds every material multitude—something which, as Dionysius points out in the same place, is signified by the multiplication of large round numbers by one another, viz., ten, a hundred, and a thousand.

QUESTION 113

The Guardianship of the Good Angels

Next we have to consider the guardianship of the good angels (question 113) and the attacks of the bad angels (question 114).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Are men guarded by angels? (2) Are individual angels assigned to guard individual men? (3) Does this guardianship involve only the lowest order of angels? (4) Does every man have a guardian angel? (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin? (6) Does the angel always guard the man? (7) Does an angel grieve over the loss of the man he is guarding? (8) Is there conflict among the angels by reason of their guardianship?

Article 1

Are men guarded by angels?

It seems that men are not guarded by angels:

Objection 1: Guardians are assigned to someone either because he does not know how to guard himself or because he is unable to guard himself—as is the case, for instance, with children and the sick. But a man is able to guard himself because of his power of free choice, and he knows how to guard himself because of his natural cognition of the natural law. Therefore, a man is not guarded by an angel.

Objection 2: When a stronger guardian is present, a weaker guardian seems superfluous. But according to Psalm 120:4 (“He who guards Israel will not slumber or sleep”), men are guarded by God. Therefore, it is not necessary for a man to be guarded by an angel.

Objection 3: If the one who is being guarded is lost, this goes back to the negligence of the guardian; hence, 3 Kings 20:39 says, “Guard this man, and if he slips away, your life will be exchanged for his life.” But many men are lost every day by falling into sin, and the angels could have helped them by appearing visibly to them, or by working miracles, or in some other such way. Therefore, the angels would be negligent if men had been entrusted to their guardianship. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that angels are the guardians of men.

But contrary to this: Psalm 90:11 says, “He has given His angels charge over you, to guard you in all your ways.”

I respond: In accord with the nature of divine providence, a feature found among all things is that what is movable and variable is moved and regulated by what is immovable and invariable. For instance, all corporeal things are moved and regulated by immovable spiritual substances, and all lower bodies are moved and regulated by those higher bodies that are invariable with respect to their substance. In fact, with respect to those conclusions about which we can come to have different opinions, we ourselves are regulated by principles that we hold invariably.

Now it is clear that in matters of action a man's cognition and affection can vary and fall short of the good in many ways. And so it was necessary that men be assigned guardian angels through whom they might be regulated and moved toward the good.

Reply to objection 1: Through free choice a man can avoid evil in some ways, but not adequately, since his affection for the good is weakened by the many passions of the soul. Similarly, the general cognition of the natural law that is naturally present in a man directs the man in some ways toward the good, but not adequately, since in applying the universal principles of the law to particular actions, a man can fail in many ways. Hence, Wisdom 9:14 says, “The thoughts of mortals are fearful and our counsels uncertain.” This is why the guardianship of the angels was necessary for a man.

Reply to objection 2: Two things are required for acting well. First, it is required that our

affections be inclined toward the good, and this happens in us through the habit of a moral virtue. Second, it is required that reason discover fitting ways to perfect the good of virtue, and this the Philosopher attributes to prudence.

As far as the first point is concerned, God guards a man directly by infusing grace and virtues into him. But as far as the second point is concerned, God guards man like a universal teacher (*instructor*) whose instruction, as has been explained (q. 111, a. 1), comes to a man through the mediation of the angels.

Reply to objection 3: Just as a man departs from his natural tendency toward the good because of the passions associated with sin, so too he departs from a good angel's incitement toward the good, which is effected invisibly by the angel's illuminating the man with respect to acting well. Hence, the fact that men are lost should be blamed not on the negligence of the angels, but on the wickedness of the men themselves.

Now the fact that, outside the general rule, angels sometimes appear visibly to men stems from a special grace of God, just like the fact that miracles are worked outside the order of nature.

Article 2

Are individual men guarded by individual angels?

It seems that individual men are not guarded by individual angels:

Objection 1: An angel is more powerful than a man. But one man is enough to guard many men. Therefore, *a fortiori*, one angel can guard many men.

Objection 2: As Dionysius says, lower things are led back to God through the mediation of higher things. But since all the angels are unequal to one another, there is only one angel who is such that there is no angel between him and men. Therefore, there is just one angel who directly guards all men.

Objection 3: Greater angels are assigned more important roles. But guarding any one man is not a more important role than guarding any other man, since all men are equal by nature. Therefore, since, according to Dionysius, the angels are such that no two of them are equal in greatness, it seems not to be the case that different men are guarded by different angels.

But contrary to this: In commenting on Matthew 18:10 ("Their angels in heaven ..."), Jerome says, "It is the great dignity of souls that each one has from birth an angel assigned to guard it."

I respond: Individual angels are assigned to guard individual men. The reason for this is that the guardianship of the angels is an execution of God's providence with respect to men. Now God's providence is related to men in a way different from the way it is related to other corruptible creatures, since men and other corruptible creatures are related in different ways to incorruptibility. For men are incorruptible not just with respect to their common species, but also with respect to the proper forms of each individual, viz., their rational souls, and this cannot be said of other corruptible entities.

Now it is clear that God's providence has to do principally with entities that endure forever, whereas there is divine providence with respect to transient things insofar as God orders such things toward the everlasting things. So, then, God's providence is related to *individual* men in the way it is related to the individual *genera* or *species* of corruptible things. But according to Gregory, different orders of angels are assigned to different genera of things; for instance, the Powers are assigned to restrain the demons, and the Virtues are assigned to work miracles among corporeal things. And it is plausible to think that different angels of a given order are put in charge of the different species of things. Hence, it is likewise reasonable to think that different angels are assigned to guard different men.

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which a guardian is assigned to a given man. In the first way, he is assigned insofar as the man is an *individual* man; on this score, there is normally one guardian for one man, though in some cases more than one guardian is assigned to guard a single man. In the second way, a guardian is assigned to a man insofar as the man is part of some *social group* (*collegium*); on this score, one guardian is put in charge of guarding the whole group, and his role is to oversee those things that pertain to an individual man in his relation to the whole group, e.g., external actions by which the others are edified or scandalized.

Now guardianship over men is entrusted to the angels with respect to invisible and hidden things that have to do with the salvation of individual men in their own right. This is why individual angels are assigned to guard individual men.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained (q. 112, a. 3), angels of the first hierarchy are all illuminated directly by God about certain things; however, there are other things about which only the highest angels are illuminated directly by God, and these things they reveal to the lower angels.

This same point must be taken into account within the lower orders of angels as well. For an angel at the lower end of a given order is illuminated about some things by an angel at the higher end, and he is illuminated about other things by the angel who is immediately above him. And so it is likewise possible for a man to be directly illuminated by an angel having other angels below him who are illuminated by him.

Reply to objection 3: Even though men are equal by nature, inequalities are nonetheless found among them to the extent that some have been ordered by divine providence toward more important things and others toward less important things—this in accord with Ecclesiasticus 33:11-12, “With much knowledge the Lord has divided them. Some of them He has blessed and exalted, and some of them He has cursed and brought low.” And in this way guarding one man can be a more important role than guarding some other man.

Article 3

Is it just angels of the lowest order who guard men?

It seems that it is not just angels of the lowest order who guard men:

Objection 1: Chrysostom claims that what is said in Matthew 18:10 (“Their angels in heaven ...”) “refers not to just any angels, but to the very highest.” Therefore, it is the very highest angels who guard men.

Objection 2: In Hebrews 1:14 the Apostle says that the angels have been “sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation,” and so it seems that the mission of the angels is ordered toward guarding men. But as was explained above (q. 112, a. 4), five orders of angels are sent exteriorly on mission to minister. Therefore, all the angels of those five orders are assigned to guard men.

Objection 3: In order to guard men, it seems especially necessary (a) to restrain the demons, which, according to Gregory, pertains to the Powers, and (b) to work miracles, which pertains to the Virtues. Therefore, these two orders are also assigned to guard men, and not just the lowest order.

But contrary to this: In Psalm 90:11 guardianship of men is assigned to the Angels, whose order is the lowest according to Dionysius.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), there are two ways in which guardianship is assigned over a man.

In the first way, the guardianship is *particular*, insofar as individual angels are assigned to guard individual men. And this sort of guardianship belongs to the lowest order of angels, whose role, according to Gregory, is to announce the smallest things, and what seems to be smallest among the angelic roles is to take care of what pertains to the salvation of just one man.

The second sort of guardianship is *universal*, and this sort of guardianship is spread out over different orders of angels, since the more universally an agent acts, the higher it is. So, then, guardianship over the whole human race belongs to the order of Principalities or, perhaps better, to the order of Archangels, who are called ‘angel princes’—thus Michael, whom we call an Archangel, is called one of the princes in Daniel 10:13. Again, the Virtues have guardianship over all corporeal natures, and the Powers keep guard over the demons. And, lastly, according to Gregory, the Principalities have guardianship over the good spirits.

Reply to objection 1: The passage from Chrysostom can be understood in such a way that he is talking about the highest angels within the lowest order of angels. For as Dionysius says, in each order there are some who are first, some who are in the middle, and some who are last.

However, it is plausible to think that the greater angels are assigned to guard those who have been chosen by God for a higher degree of glory.

Reply to objection 2: Not all the angels who are sent on mission have particular guardianship over individual men. Instead, as has been explained, some of the orders have a more or less universal guardianship.

Reply to objection 3: The lower angels also exercise the roles of the higher angels to the extent that they participate to some degree in the gift of the higher angels, and to the extent that they execute the power of the higher angels. And it is in this sense that the lowest angels can also restrain the demons and work miracles.

Article 4

Does every man have an angel assigned to guard him?

It seems that not every man has an angel assigned to guard him:

Objection 1: Philippians 2:7 says of Christ that he is “made in the likeness of men, and in appearance (*habitus*) found as a man.” Therefore, if every man is such that an angel is assigned to guard him, then even Christ had a guardian angel. But this seems absurd, since Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore, not every man has an angel assigned to guard him.

Objection 2: The first of all men was Adam. But it was not appropriate for him to have a guardian angel, at least in the state of innocence, since in that state he was not threatened by any dangers. Therefore, not every man is such that an angel is appointed to guard him.

Objection 3: Angels are assigned to guard men in order to lead them to eternal life, and to incite them to act well, and to protect them against the attacks of the demons. But men who are foreknown to be damned never attain eternal life. For instance, non-believers, even if they sometimes do good works, do not do them well, since they do not do them with the right intention; for as Augustine says, “It is faith that sets one’s intention aright.” In addition, as 2 Thessalonians 2:9 says, the coming of the Antichrist will be “in keeping with the work of Satan.” Therefore, not every man has an angel assigned to guard him.

But contrary to this: In the passage from Jerome alluded to above (a. 2), he says, “Each soul has an angel assigned to guard it.”

I respond: A man in the state of the present life is, as it were, on a road (*via*) by which he ought to travel to heaven (*ad patriam*). On this road many dangers threaten a man, both from within and from without—this according to Psalm 141:4: “In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me.” And so just as guardians are provided for men who are walking along an unsafe road, so a guardian angel is assigned to each man for as long as he is a wayfarer (*viator*). But once he reaches the end of the road, he will no longer have a guardian angel. Instead, he will have either an angel to reign with him in heaven or a demon to punish him in hell.

Reply to objection 1: Christ, insofar as He is a man, was directly regulated by the Word of God, and so he did not need a guardian angel. Again, as far as His soul is concerned, He was a comprehender of the divine essence (*comprehensor*), whereas by reason of the passibility of His body, He was a wayfarer (*viator*).

Accordingly, it was not appropriate for Him to have a guardian angel as a superior, but it was appropriate for Him to have a ministering angel as an inferior. Hence, Matthew 4:11 says, “Angels came and ministered to Him.”

Reply to objection 2: In the state of innocence man was not subject to any danger from within, since, as was explained above (q. 95, aa. 1 and 3), everything interior was well-ordered. However, he was threatened with danger from without, because of the snares of the demons—as is proved by how things turned out. And so the man needed angels to guard him.

Reply to objection 3: Just as non-believers and those foreknown to be damned—and even the Antichrist—are not deprived of the interior assistance of natural reason, so they are not deprived of the exterior assistance given by God to the whole human race, viz., the guardianship of the angels. Even if they are not helped by this guardianship to merit eternal life by good works, they are nonetheless helped in being held back from certain evils by which they can harm themselves and others. For even the demons themselves are restrained by the good angels from doing as much harm as they want to. Similarly, the Antichrist will not do as much harm as he will want to.

Article 5

Is an angel assigned to guard a man from his birth?

It seems that an angel is not assigned to guard a man from his birth:

Objection 1: Angels are sent on mission to minister “for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation,” as the Apostle says in Hebrews 1:14. But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation when they are baptized. Therefore, an angel is assigned to guard a man from the time of his baptism and not from the time of his birth.

Objection 2: Men are guarded by angels in the sense that the angels illuminate them in the manner of a teacher. But right after their birth, children are not capable of learning, since they do not have the use of reason. Therefore, angels are not assigned to children right after birth.

Objection 3: Children who are in their mother’s womb have a rational soul at some time, just as they do after being born. But when these children are in their mother’s womb, the angels are not, it seems, assigned to guard them, given that the ministers of the Church do not at that time give them the sacraments. Therefore, angels are not assigned to guard men immediately upon their birth.

But contrary to this: Jerome says, “Each soul has from birth an angel assigned to guard it.”

I respond: As Origen points out in *Super Matthaëum*, there are two opinions about this matter. Some have claimed that an angel is assigned to guard a man from the time of his baptism, while others

have claimed that this happens at the time of his birth.

The second opinion is the one favored by Jerome, and with good reason. For the gifts that God gives a man in virtue of his being a Christian, e.g., receiving the Eucharist and other such gifts, begin at the time of his baptism. But the gifts that God provides to a man insofar as he has a rational nature are bestowed on him at the time he receives that nature by being born. And as is clear from what has been said already (aa. 1 and 4), one such gift is the guardianship of the angels. Hence, immediately upon his birth a man has an angel assigned to guard him.

Reply to objection 1: If we consider the ultimate effect of the guardianship of the angels, viz., the reception of the inheritance of salvation, then the angels are, to be sure, *efficaciously* sent to minister only for the sake of those who receive that inheritance. Nonetheless, the ministry of the angels is not withdrawn from the others, even though it does not have efficacy in them in the sense of their being led to salvation. Yet the angels' ministry to them is efficacious to the extent that they are drawn back from many evils.

Reply to objection 2: The role of guardianship is ordered toward illumination through teaching as its ultimate and principal effect. Nonetheless, it has many other effects that are appropriate for children, e.g., restraining the demons and preventing other sorts of harm, both corporeal and spiritual.

Reply to objection 3: For as long as a child is in his mother's womb he is not totally separate from his mother, but still belongs to her in a certain sense because they are attached to one another—in the same way that a fruit hanging from a tree belongs to the tree. And so it is plausible to claim that the angel who guards the mother also guards the offspring in the mother's womb. But as Jerome says, when the child is separated from the mother at birth, an angel is assigned to guard him.

Article 6

Does a guardian angel ever desert the man whom he is assigned to guard?

It seems that a guardian angel sometimes deserts the man whom he is assigned to guard:

Objection 1: Jeremiah 51:9 says in the person of the angels, "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed. Let us forsake her." And Isaiah 5:5 says, "I will take away the hedge thereof, and it shall be wasted," and a Gloss says, "The hedge, i.e., the guardianship of the angels."

Objection 2: God is a more principal guardian than an angel. But according to Psalm 21:2 ("My God, my God, look upon me. Why have you forsaken me?"), God sometimes forsakes a man. Therefore, *a fortiori*, a guardian angel forsakes a man.

Objection 3: As Damascene says, when the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven. But they are sometimes in heaven. Therefore, sometimes they forsake us.

But contrary to this: According to 1 Peter 5:8 ("Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goes about seeking whom he may devour"), the demons are always assailing us. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the good angels are always guarding us.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (a. 2), the guardianship of the angels is an execution of divine providence effected with respect to men. Now it is clear that neither a man nor any other entity is completely withdrawn from divine providence, since to the extent that something participates in *esse*, it is subject to God's universal providence over beings. However, God is said to forsake a man, in a way consonant with the order of His providence, to the extent that He permits the man to suffer from some defect of either punishment or sin.

Similarly, one should claim that a guardian angel never completely leaves a man, but that he does

sometimes leave him in some respect or other—as when he does not prevent him from undergoing some tribulation or even from falling into sin, in keeping with the order of God’s judgments. This is the sense in which Babylon and the house of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels; for their guardian angels did not prevent them from undergoing tribulations.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The replies to the first and second objections are clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 3: Even if an angel sometimes leaves a man with respect to place, he does not leave him with respect to the effect of guardianship. For even when he is in heaven, he knows what is going on with the man; and he does not need a length of time for his local motion, but can instead make himself present immediately.

Article 7

Do angels grieve over the evils of those whom they are guarding?

It seems that angels grieve over the evils of those whom they are guarding:

Objection 1: Isaiah 33:7 says, “The angels of peace shall weep bitterly.” But weeping is a sign of sorrow and sadness. Therefore, the angels are saddened by the evils of the men they are guarding.

Objection 2: As Augustine says, sadness “is directed at those things that happen to us against our will.” But the loss of a man whom he is guarding is contrary to the will of a guardian angel. Therefore, the angels are saddened when men are lost.

Objection 3: Just as sadness is opposed to joy, so sin is opposed to repentance. But as Luke 15:7 says, the angels rejoice over a sinner who repents. Therefore, they grieve over a just man who falls into sin.

Objection 4: Origen’s gloss on Numbers 18:12 (“Whatever first fruits they offer ...”) says, “The angels are called to judgment about whether it is because of their own negligence that men have sinned, or whether it is because of the men’s weakness.” But it is reasonable for someone to be saddened by evils in light of which he is called to judgment. Therefore, the angels grieve over the sins of men.

But contrary to this: Where there are sadness and sorrow, there is no perfect happiness; hence, Apocalypse 21:4 says, “Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor any sorrow.” But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore, they do not grieve over anything.

I respond: The angels do not grieve over either the sins or the punishments of men. For according to Augustine, sadness and sorrow are directed only at things that are contrary to one’s will. But nothing that happens in the world is contrary to the will of the angels or the will of the others who are beatified, since their will adheres completely to the order of God’s justice, and nothing happens in the world except what is either effected or permitted by God’s justice. And so, absolutely speaking, nothing that happens in the world is contrary to the will of those who are beatified. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, what is voluntary, absolutely speaking, is what someone wills *in the particular case*, insofar as it is done with all the circumstances taken into consideration—even if it would not be voluntary if it were considered *in general*. For instance, a sailor does not will to throw his cargo into the sea when this is considered by itself and in general; but he does will to do it when a danger to safety threatens. Hence, as the Philosopher says in the same place, the act is voluntary rather than involuntary.

So, then, angels do not will the sins and punishments of men, when these are considered by themselves and in general; but they do will that the order of God’s justice should be preserved concerning such matters, and according to the order of God’s justice some men are subject to

punishments and are permitted to sin.

Reply to objection 1: This passage from Isaiah can be understood of Hezekiah's angels, i.e., Hezekiah's messengers, who wept because of the words of the Rabshakeh of which Isaiah 37:2ff. speaks. This is according to the literal sense.

As for the allegorical sense, the angels of peace are the apostles and other preachers, who weep over the sins of men.

On the other hand, if the passage is understood in the anagogical sense to be about the beatified angels, then the locution in question is metaphorical, and the meaning is that the angels will the salvation of men in general. For this is the sense in which these sorts of passions are attributed to God and the angels.

Reply to objection 2: The answer to this objection is clear from what was said above.

Reply to objection 3: With respect to both the repentance of men and their sin, the explanation of joy remains the same in the angels, viz., the fulfillment of the order of God's providence.

Reply to objection 4: The angels are called to judgment for the sins of men not as defendants but as witnesses, in order to convict men of their weakness.

Article 8

Can there be conflict or discord among the angels?

It seems that there cannot be conflict or discord among the angels:

Objection 1: Job 25:2 says, "... who makes concord in His high places." But conflict is opposed to concord. Therefore, there is no conflict among the sublime angels.

Objection 2: Where there is perfect charity and just rule, there can be no conflict. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore, there is no conflict among the angels.

Objection 3: If the angels are said to be in conflict over those whom they are guarding, then it must be that one angel takes one side and another angel takes the other side. But if the one side is just, then, conversely, the other side is unjust. Therefore, it follows that a good angel is a promoter of injustice—which is absurd. Therefore, there is no conflict among the good angels.

But contrary to this: Daniel 10:13 says in the person of Gabriel, "The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this prince of the Persians was the angel assigned to guard the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore, one good angel resisted another, and so there was a conflict between them.

I respond: This question is occasioned by the words just cited from Daniel.

Jerome explains them by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is an angel who had set himself in opposition to the liberation of the people of Israel, on whose behalf Daniel was praying, with Gabriel presenting his prayers to God.

Now it could be that this resistance was being put up because some prince of the demons had led the Jews taken to Persia into sin, and this posed an obstacle to the prayer of Daniel, who was praying on the behalf of these same people. However, according to Gregory in *Moralia* 17, the prince of the kingdom of the Persians was a good angel assigned to guard that kingdom.

Thus, to see how one angel is said to resist another, notice that God's judgments concerning different kingdoms and different men are executed by the angels, and in their actions the angels are regulated by God's decrees. However, it sometimes happens that among different kingdoms (or different men) there are contrary merits and demerits, so that the one kingdom (or man) is made subject to, or put

in charge of, the other. But without a revelation on God's part, the angels cannot know what the order of God's wisdom has decreed concerning a given case, and so they must consult God's wisdom about it. So, then, insofar as the angels consult God's will about contrary and mutually incompatible merits, they are said to resist one another—not because their wills are opposed to one another, since they all agree that God's decree should be fulfilled, but because the things about which they are consulting are opposed to one another.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 114

The Attacks of the Bad Angels

Next we have to consider the attacks of the bad angels. On this topic there are five questions: (1) Are men attacked by demons? (2) Is it proper to the devil to test, i.e., to tempt? (3) Do all the sins of men stem from the attacks or temptations of the demons? (4) Can the demons work genuine miracles in order to seduce men? (5) Are the demons who are conquered by men restrained from further attacking men?

Article 1

Are men attacked by demons?

It seems that men are not attacked by demons:

Objection 1: The angels assigned to guard men are sent by God. But demons are not sent by God, since the demons' intention is to make souls perish, whereas God's intention is to save them. Therefore, demons are not assigned to attack men.

Objection 2: It is not a fair fight (*non est aequa conditio pugnae*) when someone weak is exposed to battle against someone strong, or when someone ignorant is exposed to battle against someone clever. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas demons are powerful and clever. Therefore, God, who is the author of all justice, should not permit men to be attacked by demons.

Objection 3: The attacks of the flesh and of the world are enough to test men. But God permits His chosen ones to be attacked for the sake of testing them. Therefore, it does not seem necessary for them to be attacked by demons.

But contrary to this: In Ephesians 6:12 the Apostle says, "For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in high places."

I respond: As far as the attacks of the demons are concerned, there are two things to take into consideration, viz., (a) the attacks themselves and (b) what the attacks are ordered toward.

An attack itself proceeds from the wickedness of the demons, who out of envy try to prevent a man's progress and out of pride arrogate to themselves a likeness of God's power, assigning determinate servants to attack men in the same way that the angels serve God in determinate roles for the sake of saving men.

On the other hand, the way in which the attacks are ordered itself stems from God, who knows how to use evils in an orderly way by directing them toward goods.

By contrast, as far as the good angels are concerned, both the guardianship itself and the way in which the guardianship is ordered are traced back to God as their first author.

Reply to objection 1: The bad angels attack men in two ways.

First, they prompt (*instigant*) them to sin. And in this sense they are not sent by God to attack men, though they are sometimes permitted to attack men according to God's just judgments.

Sometimes, however, they attack men by punishing them. And in this sense they are sent by God, in the way that, according to 3 Kings 22:22, a deceitful spirit was sent to punish Ahab the king of Israel. For punishment is traced back to God as its first source. And yet the demons who are sent to punish men carry out the punishment with an intention different from the intention with which they are sent. For they themselves punish out of hatred or envy, whereas they are sent by God because of His justice.

Reply to objection 2: In order that the fight might not be unfair, the balance is restored on man's

side—principally through the help of divine grace and, secondarily, through the guardianship of the angels. Hence, in 4 Kings 6:16 Elisha said to his servant, “Do not fear. There are more with us than there are with them.”

Reply to objection 3: Attacks that come from the flesh and the world would be enough to test human weakness, but they are not enough for the demons’ wickedness, which makes use of both the flesh and the world to attack men. Still, by God’s plan this redounds to the glory of the elect.

Article 2

Is testing, i.e., tempting, peculiar to the devil?

It seems that testing, i.e., tempting (*tentare*), is not peculiar to the devil:

Objection 1: According to Genesis 22:1 (“God tempted Abraham”), God is said to tempt. Also, the flesh tempts, and so does the world. And man is likewise said to tempt both God and man. Therefore, tempting is not peculiar to a demon.

Objection 2: Testing is done by one who does not know something. But the demons know what is going on with men. Therefore, the demons do not test them.

Objection 3: Temptation is a path to sin. But sin consists in an act of will. Therefore, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 111, a. 2), the demons cannot affect a man’s will, it seems that it does not belong to them to tempt men.

But contrary to this: 1 Thessalonians 3:5 says, “Lest perhaps he that tempts should have tempted you,” and a Gloss adds, “that is, the devil, whose role it is to tempt.”

I respond: To test or tempt is, properly speaking, to make a trial of a thing.

Now a trial is made of a thing in order to find out something about it. And so knowledge is the proximate end of someone who tests.

However, sometimes a further end is sought from this knowledge, and this end may be either good or bad—good, as when one wants to know how someone stands with respect to knowledge or virtue in order to help him advance (*promoveat*), and bad, as when someone wants to find this out in order to deceive or subvert him.

Given this, we can understand how testing or tempting is attributed to different individuals in different ways:

A *man* is sometimes said to tempt or test someone just in order to find something out, and it is in this sense that tempting God is said to be a sin. For a man who is uncertain, as it were, presumes to test God’s power. On the other hand, a man tests or tempts another man sometimes in order to help him and sometimes in order to harm him.

Now the *devil* always tests or tempts in order to do harm by urging a man to sin. And it is in this sense that tempting is called his peculiar role. For even if one man sometimes tempts another man in this way, he does so insofar as he is a servant of the devil.

By contrast, God is said to test or tempt someone in order to find something out, in that manner of speaking in which He is said to ‘find out’ what He causes others to know. Hence, Deuteronomy 13:3 says, “The Lord your God tempts you, in order that it might be made public whether you love Him.”

Now the flesh and the world are said to tempt instrumentally or materially, viz., insofar as it is possible to know what sort of man someone is by the fact that he succumbs to or resists the desires of the flesh or by the fact that he shows disdain for the fortunes and adversities of the world. In addition, the devil uses the world and the flesh in order to tempt men.

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 2: The demons know what is going on with a man exteriorly; but only God, who is “the weigher of spirits” (Proverbs 16:2), knows men’s interior condition, on the basis of which some are more prone to one vice than to another. And so the devil tempts a man in order to discover his interior condition, so that he can tempt him toward a vice to which the man is more prone.

Reply to objection 3: Even if a demon cannot affect the will, nonetheless, as was explained above (q. 111, aa. 3 and 4), he can in some way affect a man’s lower powers, by which the man’s will, though not coerced, is nonetheless inclined.

Article 3

Do all sins stem from the temptations of the devil?

It seems that all sins stem from the temptations of the devil:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The multitude of demons is the cause of all evils for both themselves and others.” And Damascene says, “All malice and impurity have been devised by the devil.”

Objection 2: One can say of every sinner what our Lord said of the Jews in John 8:44, “You come from your father, the devil.” But this is true insofar as they sinned at the devil’s prompting. Therefore, every sin stems from the devil’s prompting.

Objection 3: Just as angels are assigned to guard men, so demons are assigned to attack men. But all the good things we do stem from the prompting of the good angels, since divine gifts are delivered to us by the mediation of the angels. Therefore, all the evil things we do likewise stem from the devil’s prompting.

But contrary to this: *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* says, “Not all of our evil designs are prompted by the devil; rather, often they emerge from the movement of our free choice.”

I respond: There are two ways in which something can be called a cause of an effect: first, *indirectly*, and second, *directly*.

An agent is said to be a cause of an effect *indirectly* when it causes a disposition for that effect. In such a case the agent is said to be an *occasional* or *indirect* cause of the effect—as, for instance, when the one who chops the wood is said to be a cause of its being burned. And in this sense one should say that the devil is a cause of all our sins, since he himself prompted the first man to sin, and that sin resulted in a proneness to all sins within the whole human race. This is also the sense in which to understand the passages from Dionysius and Damascene.

By contrast, something is said to be a cause of an effect *directly* when it acts directly to bring about that effect. Given this sense, the devil is not a cause of every sin, since not every sin is committed at the devil’s prompting; instead, some sins are committed because of our freedom of choice and because of the corruption of the flesh. For as Origen says, even if the devil did not exist, men would still have a desire for food and sexual pleasure and other such things, and there can be many disorders with respect to these desires if they are not curbed by reason—especially given that our nature has been corrupted. But it is within the power of free choice to curb these desires and to bring order to them. So, then, it is not necessary that every sin should stem from the devil’s prompting.

However, if any sins do stem from the devil’s instigation, then, as Isidore says, “men are now deceived into committing those sins by the same blandishments by which our first parents were deceived.”

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 2: Even if certain sins are perpetrated without the devil's instigation, men still become the children of the devil through those sins in the sense that they are imitating the one who committed the first sin.

Reply to objection 3: A man is able to fall into sin on his own, but a man cannot make progress in merit without God's help, which is given to him by the mediation of the ministry of the angels. And so the angels cooperate in all our good works, whereas it is not the case that all our sins proceed from the prompting of the devil. However, there is no genus of sin that is not at some time or other committed at the prompting of the devil.

Article 4

Can demons seduce men by means of genuine miracles?

It seems that demons cannot seduce men by means of genuine miracles:

Objection 1: The action of the demons is especially evident in the works of the Antichrist. But as the Apostle says in 2 Thessalonians 2:9, the Antichrist's "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power and signs and false wonders." Therefore, *a fortiori*, at other times it is only false miracles that are worked by the demons.

Objection 2: Genuine miracles are effected through a certain change in bodies. But demons cannot change a body into another nature, since, as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 18, "Nor do I believe that the human body can in any way be converted by the art or power of the demons into the members of a beast." Therefore, the demons cannot work genuine miracles.

Objection 3: An argument is not efficacious if it is open to opposite conclusions. Therefore, if genuine miracles can be worked by the demons in order to promote falsehood, then genuine miracles will not be efficacious for confirming the truth of the Faith. But this is absurd, since Mark 16:20 says, "... the Lord working with them and confirming their word with the signs that followed."

But contrary to this: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "It often happens that miracles worked by means of the magical arts are similar to the miracles worked through the servants of God."

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 110, a. 4), if 'miracle' is taken in the proper sense, then neither demons nor any other creature can work miracles—only God can, since a miracle, properly speaking, is something done outside the entire order of created nature, and every power belonging to a creature is contained within that order.

However, 'miracle' is sometimes used in a broad sense for something that exceeds human power and understanding. And given this sense, demons can perform 'miracles', i.e., works that astonish men insofar as they exceed their power and understanding. For even a man, to the extent that he does something that lies beyond the power and understanding of another man, inspires in that other man admiration at what he does, so that it seems that in some sense a miracle has been performed.

Notice, however, that even though demonic works of this sort, which seem like miracles to us, do not satisfy the true notion of a miracle, they are nonetheless real entities in certain cases. For instance, through the power of demons the Pharaoh's magicians made genuine snakes and frogs (Exodus 7:12 and 8:7). And as Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 20, "When the fire fell from heaven and consumed Job's household at one blow along with his herds of cattle, and when because of a storm the house collapsed and killed his children, all of which were works of Satan, these things were not imaginary."

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of the Antichrist can be

called ‘lying signs’ “either (a) because the mortal senses are going to be deceived by imaginary apparitions, so that the Antichrist will seem to do what he does not in fact do, or (b) because even if they are genuine wonders, they will still draw those who believe them into falsehoods.”

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 110, a. 2), corporeal matter does not obey good or bad angels at will in such a way that demons might be able by their power to transmute matter from one [substantial] form into another; however, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, the demons can use certain seminal principles that are found in the world’s elements in order to bring about effects of this sort.

And so one should say that all the transmutations of corporeal things that can be effected by natural powers, to which the aforementioned seminal principles are relevant, are such that they can be effected by the operation of the demons, using seminal principles of this sort—as, for instance, when certain things are transmuted into serpents or frogs, which can be generated through putrefaction. By contrast, those transmutations of corporeal things that cannot be effected by the power of nature cannot in any way be brought about in reality by the operation of the demons—as, for instance, that a human body should be changed into the body of a beast, or that the dead body of a man should come to life again. And if some such thing should seem to be done by a demon’s action, then it is not a reality but a mere appearance.

This sort of appearance can occur in two ways.

First, it can occur *from within*, insofar as the demon is able to affect a man’s imagination or even his corporeal senses in such a way that, as was explained above (q. 111, aa. 3 and 4), something appears to be otherwise than it really is. (In fact, this is also sometimes done, it is said, by the power of certain corporeal bodies.)

The second way is *from without*. For given that a demon can make a body of any shape and form out of elemental air in order to assume that body and appear visibly in it, he can for that same reason place any corporeal form around a given corporeal body so that the body appears to belong to the species of that form. This is the point that Augustine makes in *De Civitate Dei* 18, “A man has a phantom, which in his imagining or dreaming takes on the form of innumerable kinds of things, and this phantom is presented to the senses of other men as if embodied in the likeness of an animal.” This should not be understood to mean that the man’s imaginative power, or the image it has, is itself presented as numerically the same embodied thing to the senses of others. Rather, it should be understood to mean that a demon who forms a likeness in the imagination of one man is also able to present a similar likeness to the senses of another man.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in 83 *Quaestiones*, “When magicians do things such as the saints do, they are done for a different end and by a different law. For the magicians do them seeking their own glory, whereas the saints do them seeking the glory of God. And the magicians act through certain private arrangements (*per quaedam privata commercia*), whereas the saints act by way of public administration and by the order of God, to whom all creatures are subject.”

Article 5

Is a demon who is conquered by someone restrained for that reason from further attacks?

It seems that a demon who is conquered by someone is not for that reason restrained from further attacks:

Objection 1: Christ conquered His tempter in the most efficacious way. Yet afterwards his tempter attacked Him again by inciting the Jews to kill Him. Therefore, it is not true that the devil, once

conquered, ceases to attack.

Objection 2: To inflict punishment on someone for losing a battle is to incite him to fight more fiercely. But such incitement conflicts with God's mercy. Therefore, conquered demons are not restrained.

But contrary to this: Matthew 4:11 says, "Then the devil left Him," i.e., he left Christ, who had conquered him.

I respond: Some claim that a demon, once conquered, cannot tempt any other man with respect to the same sin or any other sin. By contrast, others claim that he can tempt other men, but not the same man.

The latter view is more plausible, but only if one adds 'for a certain period of time'. Hence, Luke 4:13 says, "All the temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this:

The first stems from God's mercy. For as Chrysostom says in *Super Matthaeum*, "The devil tempts men not for as long as he wants to, but for as long as God permits him to. For even if God permits him to tempt a man for a short time, He drives him away because of our weak nature."

The second reason stems from the devil's cleverness. Hence, in *Super Lucam* Ambrose says, "The devil is afraid to persist, since he shrinks from being defeated more frequently."

Yet it is clear from what is said in Matthew 12:44 ("I will return into my house from whence I came out") that the devil sometimes returns to someone he has left.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2: The reply to the objections is clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 115

The Action of a Corporeal Creature

Next we have to consider the action of a corporeal creature (question 115) and fate, which is attributed to certain bodies (question 116).

There are six questions concerning corporeal actions: (1) Are there active bodies? (2) Are there any seminal natures [or ideas] (*seminales rationes*) among bodies? (3) Are the celestial bodies a cause of things that are done here below through lower bodies? (4) Are celestial bodies a cause of human acts? (5) Are the demons subject to the actions of the celestial bodies? (6) Do the celestial bodies impose necessity on those things that are subject to their actions?

Article 1

Are there active bodies?

It seems that no bodies are active:

Objection 1: Augustine says, “Among things there is something that is acted upon and does not act, viz., bodies, and something that acts and is not acted upon, viz., God, and something that acts and is acted upon, viz., spiritual substances.”

Objection 2: Every agent except the first agent requires for its action a subject that is susceptible to its action. But a corporeal substance has no substance lower than itself that might be susceptible to its action, since this sort of substance occupies the lowest grade among beings. Therefore, a corporeal substance is not active.

Objection 3: Every corporeal substance is enclosed by quantity. But quantity impedes a substance’s acting or effecting motion (*impedit substantiam a motu et actione*), since it surrounds the substance and the substance is immersed in it—just as a cloudy atmosphere impedes the reception of light. An indication of this is that the more a body’s quantity grows, the more ponderous and heavy it is to move. Therefore, no corporeal substance is active.

Objection 4: Every agent has its power to act from its proximity to the first agent. But bodies, which are maximally composite, are as remote as possible from the first agent, which is maximally simple. Therefore, bodies are not agents.

Objection 5: If there is a body that is an agent, then it actively contributes to either a substantial form or an accidental form (*agit ad formam substantialem aut formam accidentalem*). Not a substantial form, since in bodies there is no principle of action except an active quality, which is an accident, and an accident cannot be a cause of a substantial form; for a cause is more powerful than its effect. Similarly, not an accidental form, since, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, “An accident does not extend further than its own subject.” Therefore, there are no active bodies.

But contrary to this: In *De Caelesti Hierarchia*, chap. 15 Dionysius says that among the other properties of corporeal fire, “it shows its greatness as something active and powerful on the materials that it lays hold of.”

I respond: It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But there are three sorts of mistakes that have been made with respect to the actions of bodies:

There have been some who have completely removed actions from bodies. This is Avicenna’s opinion in *Fons Vitae*, where by means of the arguments touched on [in the objections] he tries to prove that no body acts, but that instead all the actions which seem to belong to bodies are the actions of a spiritual power that penetrates all bodies—so that, according to him, it is not the fire that produces

warmth, but rather the spiritual power that penetrates it. This opinion seems to have been derived from an opinion of Plato's. For Plato asserted that all the forms that exist in corporeal matter are participated forms and have been determined and contracted to *this* matter, whereas the absolute and, as it were, universal forms are separated; and so he claimed that these separated forms are causes of the forms that exist in matter. Thus, because a form existing in corporeal matter is determined to *this* matter which is individuated by quantity, Avicenna claimed that a corporeal form is contained and limited by quantity, as a principle of individuation, so that the form cannot extend itself by its action to any other matter. Instead, only a spiritual and immaterial form, which is not limited by quantity, can by its action have an effect on another.

However, this argument does not show that a corporeal form is not an agent; rather, it shows that a corporeal form is not a *universal* agent. For to the extent that a corporeal form participates in something, it must participate in what is proper to that thing; for instance, something participates in light to the extent that it participates in the nature of the visible. But to act (*agere*), which is nothing other than to make something actual (*facere aliquid actu*), is a *per se* property of an actuality insofar as it is an actuality (*est per se proprium actus inquantum est actus*), and this is why every agent effects what is similar to itself. So, then, from the fact that something is a form not determined by matter that is subject to quantity, it follows that it is an undetermined and universal agent; on the other hand, from the fact that something is determined to *this* matter, it follows that it is a contracted and particular agent. Hence, if, as the Platonists claimed, the form of fire were separated, then it would in some sense be a cause of every action of igniting (*causa omnis ignitionis*). But *this* form of fire, which exists in *this* corporeal matter, is a cause of *this* action of igniting, which passes from *this* body into *that* body; hence, this sort of action occurs through contact between the two bodies.

Still, Avicenna's opinion goes far beyond Plato's opinion (*superexcedit opinionem Platonis*). For the only substantial forms that Plato posited were separated, whereas he reduced accidents to material principles, viz., the large and the small, which he claimed to be the primary contraries, just as others had claimed that the primary contraries were the rare and the dense. And so both Plato and Avicenna, who followed him to a certain degree, claimed that (a) corporeal agents act through accidental forms to dispose matter for a substantial form, but that (b) the ultimate perfection, which occurs through the introduction of the substantial form, comes from an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; we spoke about it above when we were discussing creation (q. 45, a. 8).

The third opinion was that of Democritus, who claimed that (a) acting occurs through the emission of atoms from a corporeal agent and that (b) being acted upon occurs through the reception of those same atoms in the pores of a corporeal patient. Aristotle disproves this position in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1. For it would follow that (a) a body does not receive an action as a whole, and that (b) a corporeal agent's quantity would decrease by the very fact that it acts—both of which are manifestly false.

Therefore, one should claim that a body acts insofar as it is actual, and that it acts on another body insofar as the latter is in potentiality.

Reply to objection 1: The passage from Augustine should be understood to be about the whole of corporeal nature taken together, which does not have any lower nature below it on which it might act in the way that spiritual nature acts on corporeal nature and that uncreated nature acts on created nature. But it is nonetheless the case that one body is lower than another in the sense that it is in potentiality with respect to what the other body has in actuality.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection. Note, however, that when Avicenna argues as follows, the argument should be conceded: 'There is something that effects motion without being moved, viz., the first maker of things; therefore, conversely, there is something that is only moved and acted upon'. But this is primary matter, which is pure potentiality in the way that God

is pure actuality. A body, however, is composed of potentiality and actuality, and so it both acts and is acted upon.

Reply to objection 3: As has already been explained, quantity does not altogether prevent a corporeal form from acting; rather, it keeps the form from being a universal agent, because the form is individuated insofar as it exists in a matter that is subject to quantity.

Moreover, the point introduced in the argument concerning the ponderousness of bodies is irrelevant. For, first of all, as is shown in *De Caelo et Mundo* 4, the addition of quantity is not a cause of heaviness. Second, it is false that ponderousness makes for slower movement; to the contrary, the heavier something is, the more it moves by its own proper movement. Third, an action does not occur through local motion in the way Democritus claimed; rather, it occurs through something's being brought from potentiality into actuality.

Reply to objection 4: It is not bodies that are maximally distant from God, since a body has some participation in a likeness of God's *esse* because of the form that it has (*secundum formam quam habet*). Rather, what is maximally distant from God is primary matter, which is in no way an agent, since it exists only in potentiality.

Reply to objection 5: A body actively contributes to both accidental forms and substantial forms.

For even if an active quality, such as heat, is an accident, it nonetheless acts in the power of the substantial form as the substantial form's instrument. And so it can actively contribute to a substantial form (*potest agere ad formam substantialem*), just as natural heat actively contributes, as an instrument of the soul, to the generation of flesh [in nutrition].

On the other hand, a body actively contributes to an accident by its own power.

Nor is it contrary to the nature of an accident that it should extend beyond its own subject *in its acting* (*in agendo*); rather, what is contrary to the nature of an accident is that it should extend beyond its own subject *in its being* (*in essendo*)—unless, perhaps, someone were to imagine that numerically the same accident flows from the agent into the patient, in the way that Democritus claimed that action occurs through the outward flow of atoms.

Article 2

Are there any seminal natures [or ideas] in corporeal matter?

It seems that there are no seminal natures [or ideas] (*rationes seminales*) in corporeal matter:

Objection 1: Idea (*ratio*) implies something with spiritual *esse*. But it is not the case that something exists spiritually in corporeal matter; instead, it is only the case that something exists materially in corporeal matter, i.e., in accord with the mode of that in which it exists. Therefore, there are no seminal ideas in corporeal matter.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says that the demons perform certain works by means of hidden movements by making use of certain seeds which they recognize in the elements. But what is employed by means of local motion are bodies and not ideas. Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that there are seminal ideas in corporeal matter.

Objection 3: A seed (*semen*) is an active principle. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter, since, as has been explained (a. 1), it is not the role of matter to act. Therefore, there are no seminal natures in matter.

Objection 4: In corporeal matter there are said to be "causal natures" (*rationes causales*), which seem sufficient for the production of things. But seminal natures are different from causal natures, since

miracles are effected outside of seminal natures but not outside of causal natures. Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that there are seminal natures in corporeal matter.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “All the things that come into being corporeally and visibly have certain hidden seeds (*occulta semina*) which are latent in the corporeal elements of this world.”

I respond: As *De Anima* 2 says, denominations are normally made from the more perfect thing. Now in all of corporeal nature the more perfect things are living bodies, and so even the name ‘nature’ itself is transferred from living things to all natural things. For as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 5, the name ‘nature’ (*natura*) was first imposed to signify the generation of living things, which is called a nativity (*nativitas*); and since living things are generated from a principle that is conjoined to them—e.g., the fruit from the tree, and the fetus from the mother, to whom it is tied—the name ‘nature’ was afterwards transferred to every principle of motion that exists within a thing which is moved.

Now it is obvious that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which the living things are generated. And so Augustine appropriately labels as ‘seminal natures’ *all* the active and passive powers that are principles of generation and natural motion.

Now active and passive powers of this sort can be thought of according to a multiple ordering. For, first of all, as Augustine explains in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 6, they exist principally and originally in the very Word of God as ideal natures (*rationes ideales*). Second, they exist in the elements of the world, where they were produced together at the beginning, as in universal causes. In a third way, they exist in the things that are produced from the universal causes in temporal sequence; for instance, they exist in *this* plant and in *that* animal as in particular causes. In a fourth way, they exist in the seeds that are produced by animals and plants. Again, the latter are related to other particular effects in the way that the primordial universal causes are related to the first effects they produce.

Reply to objection 1: Even if the active and passive powers of natural things cannot be called ‘ideas’ insofar as they exist in corporeal matter, they can nonetheless be called ‘ideas’ relative to their origin, insofar as they are derived from the ideal reasons.

Reply to objection 2: Active and passive powers of the sort in question exist in certain corporeal parts, and when these parts are employed by means of local motion to bring about certain effects, the seeds are said to be used by the demons.

Reply to objection 3: The male’s seed is an active principle in the generation of an animal. But what comes from the female, which is a passive principle, can also be called a ‘seed’. And so both active and passive powers can be included under ‘seed’.

Reply to objection 4: When Augustine speaks of seminal natures of the sort in question, one can plausibly infer from what he says that the seminal natures are themselves causal natures, just as a seed is likewise a certain cause. For in *De Trinitate* 3 he says, “Just as mothers are pregnant with their fetuses, so the world itself is pregnant with the causes of the things that are being brought forth.”

On the other hand, the ideal natures can be called ‘causal’—though not properly speaking ‘seminal’, since a seed is not a separated principle—and miracles are not effected outside of natures of this sort. Similarly, miracles are not effected outside of the passive powers instilled in a creature, with the result that whatever God has commanded can be effected from that creature. By contrast, when one claims that miracles are effected outside of the seminal natures, the miracles are being said to be effected outside of the active natural powers and outside of the passive powers that are ordered to those active powers.

Article 3

Are the celestial bodies a cause of what is effected here below in lower bodies?

It seems that the celestial bodies are not a cause of what is effected here below in lower bodies:

Objection 1: Damascene says, “But we claim that they [read: the celestial bodies] are not a cause of any of the things that are done or of the corruption of the things that are corrupted; rather, they are instead signs of storms and of atmospheric changes.”

Objection 2: An agent and a matter are sufficient for effecting something. But among lower bodies there is matter to be acted upon and there are contrary agents, viz., the hot and the cold and so on. Therefore, in order to cause the things that are effected here below, it is unnecessary to attribute causality to the celestial bodies.

Objection 3: An agent effects what is similar to itself. But we see that everything that is effected here below is effected through things being heated and cooled, and being moistened and dried, and altered by other qualities of this sort, which do not exist in the celestial bodies. Therefore, the celestial bodies are not a cause of what is effected here below.

Objection 4: In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, “Nothing is more corporeal than a body’s sex.” But a body’s sex is not caused by the celestial bodies. An indication of this is that of two twins born under the same stellar configuration (*sub una constellatione*), one is male and the other female. Therefore, the celestial bodies are not a cause of corporeal things here below.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “Crasser and inferior bodies are ruled with a certain order by more subtle and powerful bodies.” And in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “The sun’s light contributes to the generation of sensible bodies, and it moves them to life and nourishes them and makes them grow and perfects them.”

I respond: Notice that since (a) every multitude proceeds from oneness, and since (b) what is unchangeable (*immobilis*) remains the same, whereas what is changed has many forms, every change in all of nature proceeds from what is unchanged. And so to the extent that certain things are more unchangeable, they are more a cause of what is more changeable. But the celestial bodies are more unchangeable than other bodies, since they are changed only by local motion. And so the changes among lower bodies here below, which are varied and multiform, are traced back to the motion of a celestial body as a cause.

Reply to objection 1: What Damascene says should be understood to mean that the celestial bodies are not a first cause of the generation and corruption of things that are made here below, in the way asserted by those who claimed that the celestial bodies are gods.

Reply to objection 2: The only active principles in bodies here below are the active qualities of the elements, viz., the hot and the cold and the others of this sort. And if it were the case that the substantial forms of lower bodies were diversified only with respect to accidents of this sort, whose principles the ancient natural philosophers claimed to be the rare and the dense, then it would be unnecessary to posit an active principle in addition to the bodies here below; instead, they would themselves be sufficient for action.

However, to those who consider the matter correctly, it is apparent that accidents of this sort behave as material dispositions for the substantial forms of natural bodies. But matter is not sufficient for action. And so, in addition to these material dispositions, one must posit some active principle.

Hence, the Platonists posited separated species, by participation in which lower bodies acquire substantial forms.

But this does not seem adequate. For separated species are always in the same condition, since they

are posited as unchangeable, and so it would follow that there would not be any variation with respect to the generation and corruption of lower bodies—which is patently false.

Hence, according to the Philosopher in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 2, it is necessary to posit some active changeable principle that by its presence and absence is a cause of variety with respect to the generation and corruption of lower bodies. And the celestial bodies are things of this sort. And so whatever effects generation among lower bodies moves its subject toward the species as an instrument of a celestial body. Accordingly, *Physics* 2 says that a man and the sun generate a man.

Reply to objection 3: The celestial bodies are similar to lower bodies not by a likeness of species, but rather insofar as they contain within themselves, by their universal power, whatever is generated among lower bodies—in a way similar to that in which we say that all things are similar to God.

Reply to objection 4: The actions of celestial bodies are received in diverse ways in lower bodies in accord with the diverse material dispositions. However, it sometimes happens that the matter of a human conceptus (*materia conceptus humani*) is not completely disposed toward the masculine sex, and so part of it is formed into a male and part into a female (*partim formatur in masculum, partim in feminam*). Hence, the case in question is introduced by Augustine in order to refute divination that is made through the stars; for the effects of the stars likewise vary among corporeal things in accord with the diverse dispositions of the matter.

Article 4

Are the celestial bodies a cause of human acts?

It seems that the celestial bodies are a cause of human acts:

Objection 1: Since, as was explained above (q. 110, a. 3), the celestial bodies are moved by spiritual substances, they act in the power of those spiritual substances as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are higher than our souls. Therefore, it seems that they can affect our souls and in this way be a cause of human acts (*possint imprimere in animas nostras et sic causare actus humanos*).

Objection 2: Everything that is multiform is traced back to some uniform principle. But human acts are varied and multiform. Therefore, it seems that they are traced back to the uniform motions of the celestial bodies as their principles.

Objection 3: Astronomers (*astrologi*) frequently make true pronouncements about wars and other human acts, the principles of which are the intellect and the will. But they would not be able to do this by appeal to the celestial bodies if the celestial bodies were not a cause of human acts. Therefore, the celestial bodies are a cause of human acts.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, “The celestial bodies are in no way a cause of human acts.”

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 3), celestial bodies have an effect on bodies *directly and per se*. Moreover, they have an effect *directly and per accidens* on those powers of the soul that are acts of corporeal organs. For the acts of these powers are necessarily obstructed by impediments to their organs; for instance, an irritated eye does not see well. Hence, if the intellect and will were powers tied to corporeal organs—as some have claimed, asserting that the intellect does not differ from the sensory power—then it would necessarily follow that the celestial bodies are causes of human choices and actions. And from this it would follow that man is driven by natural instinct in his actions in the same way as the other animals, in which there exist only powers of the soul that are tied to corporeal organs. For what happens in these lower bodies through the influence of the celestial bodies happens naturally.

And so it would follow that man does not have free choice, but instead has actions that are determined, just as other natural things do. But these claims are manifestly false and contrary to the human way of life (*conversationali humanae contraria*).

However, note that the influence of the celestial bodies can affect the intellect and the will *indirectly and per accidens*, viz., insofar as both the intellect and the will are in some way receptive to the lower powers that are tied to corporeal organs. But on this score the intellect and the will behave in different ways. For the intellect receives necessarily what it receives from the lower apprehensive powers, and so when the cogitative power or the power of imagination or the power of memory are disrupted, the intellect's action is necessarily disrupted (*ex necessitate turbatur*). The will, on the other hand, does not necessarily follow the inclination of the lower appetite. For even though the passions that are in the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul have a certain power to incline the will, it nevertheless remains within the will's power either to follow the passions or to resist them. And so to the extent that the celestial bodies are able to affect the lower powers, their influence touches the will, which is the proximate cause of human acts, to a lesser degree than it does the intellect.

Thus, the claim that the celestial bodies are a cause of human acts is characteristic of those who assert that the intellect does not differ from the sensory power. Hence, some of them asserted that "the will in men is like the day brought on by the father of men and gods."

Therefore, since it is clear that intellective understanding and willing are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that the celestial bodies should be a cause of human acts.

Reply to objection 1: The spiritual substances that move the celestial bodies act on corporeal things by the mediation of the celestial bodies, but they act directly on the human intellect by illuminating it. However, as was explained above (q. 111, a. 2), they cannot affect the will.

Reply to objection 2: Just as corporeal motions in their multiformity are traced back to the uniform motions of the heavens as to their cause, so too the multiform acts that proceed from the intellect and the will are traced back to that uniform principle which is God's intellect and will.

Reply to objection 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sentient appetite with which the celestial bodies can cooperate, whereas a few wise men resist passions of this sort. And so in many cases (*in pluribus*) the astronomers can make true predictions, especially general predictions (*possunt praedicere et maxime in communi*). However, they cannot make specific predictions, because nothing prevents a man from resisting his passions through free choice. Hence, even the astronomers themselves admit that "a wise man dominates the stars," viz., to the extent that he dominates his own passions.

Article 5

Can the celestial bodies have an effect on the demons themselves?

It seems that the celestial bodies can have an effect on the demons themselves (*possint imprimere in ipsos daemones*):

Objection 1: As is clear from Matthew 4:24 and 17:14, the demons vex certain men, who are thereby called 'lunatics', according to the fixed phases of the moon (*secundum certa augmenta lunae*). But this would not be the case if the demons were not subject to the celestial bodies. Therefore, the demons are subject to the actions of the celestial bodies.

Objection 2: Necromancers make observations of the fixed constellations in order to invoke the demons. But the demons would not be invoked through the celestial bodies if they were not subject to

them. Therefore, the demons are subject to the actions of the celestial bodies.

Objection 3: The celestial bodies are more powerful (*virtuosiora*) than the lower bodies. But according to Porphyry, as quoted by Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 10, the demons are restricted to certain lower bodies, viz., “to herbs, rocks, and living things, and to certain sounds, words, figures, and forms.” Therefore, *a fortiori* the demons are subject to the action of the celestial bodies.

But contrary to this: The demons are higher in the order of nature than the celestial bodies. But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, “an agent is higher than what it acts upon.” Therefore, the demons are not subject to the action of the celestial bodies.

I respond: There have been three opinions about the demons:

The first is that of the Peripatetics, who claimed that the demons do not exist. Instead, the things attributed to the demons according to the art of necromancy are effected by the power of the celestial bodies. And on this score Augustine quotes Porphyry in *De Civitate Dei* 10 as saying that “men manufacture on earth those powers of the stars that are suitable for producing various effects.”

However, this position is manifestly false. For there are many things which are known by experience to be done by the demons and for which the power of the celestial bodies is insufficient, e.g., that delirious men should speak unknown languages, that they should recite verses and passages of which they have no prior knowledge, that necromancers should make statues speak and move, and so on.

The Platonists were moved by these considerations to claim that the demons are animals with an ethereal body and a passive mind (*corpore aerea, animo passiva*); in *De Civitate Dei* 8, Augustine cites Apuleius as having made this claim. This is the second opinion, in accord with which one could say that the demons are subject to the celestial bodies in the same way that has already been explained (a. 4) for the case of men.

However, given what was said above (q. 51, a. 1), this opinion is clearly false. For we explained that the demons are intellectual substances not united to bodies.

Hence, it is clear that the demons are not subject to the action of the celestial bodies either *per se* or *per accidens*, either directly or indirectly.

Reply to objection 1: There are two reasons why the demons vex men according to the fixed phases of the moon.

First, in order to “dishonor a creature of God’s,” viz., the moon, as Jerome and Chrysostom explain.

Second, because, as was explained above (q. 114, a. 4), since they are unable to operate except by the mediation of natural powers, in their actions they take into account the aptitude of bodies for their intended effects. Now as Aristotle points out, it is obvious that “the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body,” and hence the brain is especially subject to the action of the moon, which has the property of effecting motion in what is wet. But the animal powers are brought to perfection in the brain, and this is why the demons perturb a man’s imagination according to the fixed phases of the moon, when they take the brain to be disposed for this.

Reply to objection 2: There are two reasons why the demons come when they are summoned in certain constellations.

First, in order to lead men into the error of believing that the stars have some divine power (*aliquod numen*).

Second, because they think that in conjunction with certain constellations corporeal matter is more disposed toward the effects for which they are summoned.

Reply to objection 3: As Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 21, “The demons are lured through various kinds of rocks, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites, not in the way that animals are lured by food, but in the way that spirits are lured by signs”—viz., insofar as these things are offered to them as a sign of divine honor, which they themselves are desirous of.

Article 6

Do the celestial bodies impose necessity on the things that are subject to their action?

It seems that the celestial bodies impose necessity on the things that are subject to their action:

Objection 1: When a sufficient cause is posited, it is necessary for the effect to be posited. But the celestial bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Therefore, since the celestial bodies, along with their movements and dispositions, are posited as necessary beings (*ponantur sicut ex necessitate entia*), it seems that their effects follow by necessity.

Objection 2: An agent's effect in matter follows by necessity when the agent's power is so great that it can totally subject the matter to itself. But all the matter of lower bodies is subject to the power of the celestial bodies as to something more excellent than it. Therefore, the effect of the celestial bodies is received by necessity in corporeal matter.

Objection 3: If a celestial body's effect does not occur by necessity, this is because of some impeding cause. But any corporeal cause that can impede a celestial body's effect must be traced back to some celestial principle, since the celestial bodies are a cause of everything that occurs here below (*causa omnium quae hic fiunt*). Therefore, since this celestial principle would likewise be necessary, it follows that it is by necessity that the effect of the other celestial body is impeded. And so everything that occurs here below happens by necessity.

But contrary to this: In *De Somno et Vigilia* the Philosopher says, "It is not strange that among the signs found in bodies of celestial events such as rain and wind, many are not fulfilled." So, then, not all the effects of the celestial bodies occur by necessity.

I respond: This question has been solved in part by what has already been said, but in part it presents a difficulty.

For it has been shown (a. 4) that even though certain inclinations come to exist in corporeal nature because of the influence of the celestial bodies, the will does not follow these inclinations by necessity. And so nothing prevents an effect of the celestial bodies from being impeded through voluntary action, not only in the man himself but also in the other things to which human action extends.

However, no such principle that has the freedom to follow or not to follow celestial influences is found in natural things. Hence, it seems that at least among these kinds of things everything occurs by necessity—this according to the ancient argument of those who, having assumed that (a) everything which exists has a cause and that (b) once a cause is posited, its effect is posited by necessity, concluded that everything happens by necessity.

In *Metaphysics* 6 Aristotle refutes this opinion with respect to the two points that they assume.

First, it is not true that once any given cause is posited, it is necessary for its effect to be posited. For there are some causes that are ordered to their effects not by necessity but in the greater number of cases (*in pluribus*), and that at times fail in a minority of cases (*deficiunt in minore parte*). However, since they fail in a minority of cases only because of some impeding cause, the aforementioned incongruity is still not avoided, since even the impediment posed by such a cause occurs by necessity.

And so, second, one must claim that everything that exists in its own right (*quod est per se*) has a cause, but that what exists incidentally (*quod est per accidens*) does not have a cause, since it is not truly a being (*non est vere ens*), given that it is not truly unified (*non sit vere unum*). For instance, the white has a cause (*album causam habet*), and so does the musical (*similiter et musicum*); but the white-and-musical does not have a cause (*album musicum non habet causam*), since it is not truly a being or truly unified. Now it is clear that a cause which impedes the action of some other cause that is ordered

in the greater number of cases toward its own effect sometimes acts with that other cause incidentally (*concurrit ei interdum per accidens*). Hence, to the extent that this sort of concurrence is incidental, it itself does not have a cause. For this reason, what flows from such a concurrence is not traced back to any preexisting cause from which it would follow by necessity. For instance, the fact that a certain fiery body made of the element earth (*aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum*) is generated in the higher part of the atmosphere and falls downward has some celestial power as a cause; similarly, the fact that there is a certain piece of combustible matter on the surface of the earth can be traced back to some celestial principle. However, the fact that the falling fire strikes this particular matter and incinerates it does not have any celestial body as a cause, but is instead incidental (*per accidens*).

And so it is clear that not all the effects of the celestial bodies occur by necessity.

Reply to objection 1: The celestial bodies are causes of lower effects by the mediation of particular lower causes, which are able to fail in a minority of cases.

Reply to objection 2: A celestial body's power is not infinite. Hence, it requires a determinate disposition in the matter in order to induce its effect, both with respect to the distance from the place and with respect to the other conditions. And so just as the distance from a place impedes the effect of a celestial body—for instance, the sun does not have the same heating effect in Dacia that it does in Ethiopia—so too the bulkiness of the matter (*grossities materiae*), or its cold or hot temperature, or some other disposition of this sort can impede a celestial body's effect.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, even though a cause that impedes another cause's effect is traced back to some celestial body as its own cause, nonetheless, since the concurrence of the two causes is incidental, it itself is not traced back to any celestial cause.

QUESTION 116

Fate

Next we have to consider fate, which is attributed to certain bodies (question 116). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is there such a thing as fate? (2) What does it exist in? (3) Is it unchangeable? (4) Are all things subject to fate?

Article 1

Is there such a thing as fate?

It seems that there is no such thing as fate (*fatum nihil sit*):

Objection 1: In his homily for the Epiphany Gregory says, “It is far from the hearts of the faithful to claim that there is such a thing as fate.”

Objection 2: What is brought about by fate is not unprovided for, since, as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 5, “We see that ‘fate’ (*fatum*) comes from ‘utter’ (*dictum a fando*), i.e., from ‘speak’”—so that those things are said to occur by fate which have been ‘spoken beforehand’ by someone’s decree (*a aliquo determinante*). But things that are provided for are neither fortuitous nor accidental (*non sunt fortuita neque casualia*). Therefore, if things are brought about by fate, then chance and fortune are excluded from things.

But contrary to this: What does not exist is not defined. But in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius defines fate as follows: “Fate is a disposition which inheres in movable things and through which providence connects all things to their orderings.” Therefore, there is such a thing as fate.

I respond: Among lower entities, some things seem to occur by fortune or chance (*provenire a fortuna vel casu*). However, it sometimes happens that what occurs by fortune or chance (*est fortuitum vel casuale*) insofar as it is related to lower causes is nonetheless found to be intended *per se* insofar as it is related to some higher cause. For instance, if two servants of the same master are sent by him to the same place, without either knowing about the other, then the meeting of the two servants is (a) a chance occurrence (*casualis*) insofar as it is related to the servants themselves, since it occurs outside the intention of either of them, but is (b) intended *per se* and not a chance occurrence insofar as it is related to their master, who preordained the meeting.

Thus, as regards occurrences here below that happen by chance or fortune in this way, there were those who did not want to trace them back to any higher cause. And these thinkers denied that there is such a thing as fate or providence, as Augustine reports about Tully in *De Civitate Dei* 5.

This opinion is contrary to what was said above (q. 22, a. 2) about providence.

On the other hand, there were some who wanted to trace everything that happens by fortune or chance among lower things—whether in natural matters or in human affairs—back to a higher cause, viz., to the celestial bodies. According to them, fate is nothing other than “the disposition of the stars under which each one is conceived or born.”

But this position cannot stand, and for two reasons.

First, with respect to human affairs. It has already been shown (q. 115, a. 4) that human acts are not subject to the action of the celestial bodies, except incidentally and indirectly (*nisi per accidens et indirecte*). But since a fatalistic cause (*causa fatalis*) regulates (*habet ordinationem super*) what is brought about by fate, it has to be a direct and *per se* cause of what is brought about.

Second, with respect to everything that is brought about incidentally (*omnia quae per accidens aguntur*). For it was explained above (q. 115, a. 6) that what exists *per accidens* is not properly speaking

either a being or a unity (*non est proprie ens neque unum*). But every one of a nature's actions is terminated in something that has unity (*terminatur ad aliquid unum*). Hence, it is impossible for something that exists *per accidens* to be a *per se* effect of any natural active principle. Therefore, no nature can bring it about *per se* that someone who intends to dig a grave should find a treasure. Now it is obvious that a celestial body acts in the manner of a natural principle, and so its effects in this world are natural. Therefore, it is impossible for an active power belonging to a celestial body to be a cause of those things that are done incidentally, whether by chance or by fortune.

Therefore, one should reply that things that are effected incidentally in this world, whether in natural matters or in human affairs, are traced back to that preordaining cause which is divine providence. For nothing prevents what is incidental from being taken as a unity by some intellect or other; otherwise, an intellect would be unable to form the proposition, 'The one who was digging a grave found a treasure'. And just as an intellect can *apprehend* this, so too it can *effect* it—as, for instance, if someone who knew where the treasure was buried were to prompt a simple person who did not know this to dig a grave in that place. And so nothing prevents things that occur incidentally here below (*hic per accidens aguntur*), i.e., by fortune or chance, from being traced back to an ordering cause that acts through an intellect—and, principally, through the divine intellect. For as was established above (q. 105, a. 4), only God is able to affect the will. As a result, the ordering of human acts, the principle of which is the will, should be attributed only to God.

So, then, we can posit fate to the extent that all the things that occur here below are subject to divine providence, in the sense that they are preordained and, as it were, spoken beforehand by providence—even though the holy doctors refrain from using the name 'fate' because of those people who refer this name to a power associated with the position of the constellations. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, "If someone attributes human affairs to fate by reason of the fact that the name 'fate' refers the very will or power of God, then let him hold on to his position but correct his language." And this is likewise the sense in which Gregory denies that there is such a thing fate.

Reply to objection 1: This makes it clear how to reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents certain things from occurring by fortune or chance in relation to their proximate causes, and yet not in relation to divine providence. This is the sense in which "nothing in the world occurs randomly (*temere*)," as Augustine puts it in 83 *Quaestiones*.

Article 2

Does fate exist in created things?

It seems that fate does not exist in created things:

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, "It is the very will or power of God that is signified by the name 'fate'." But God's will and power exist not in creatures but in God. Therefore, fate exists in God and not in created things.

Objection 2: As the very mode of speech indicates, fate is related as a cause to the things that occur by fate. But as was explained above (a. 1), God alone is a universal *per se* cause of those things that occur *per accidens* here below. Therefore, fate exists in God and not in created things.

Objection 3: If fate exists in creatures, then it is either a substance or an accident. And whichever of these answers is given, fate would have to be multiplied in accord with the number of creatures. Therefore, since fate seems to be just a single thing, it seems that fate exists in God and not in creatures.

But contrary to this: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says, "Fate is a disposition

inhering in changeable things.”

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (q. 103, a. 6), divine providence executes its effects through mediating causes. Therefore, there are two ways to think about the ordering of the effects.

First, insofar as this ordering exists in God Himself. So considered, the very ordering of the effects is itself called *providence*.

However, insofar as the ordering in question is thought about in the mediating causes that are ordered by God to produce certain effects, this ordering has the nature of *fate*.

This is how Boethius puts it in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4: “Fate is executed by powers (*spiritibus*) that serve divine providence—whether the soul, or the whole of obedient nature, or the celestial movements of the stars, or angelic power, or the shrewdness of the demons; the course of fate (*series fatalis*) is woven from some or all of these”—each of which have been explained individually in what has been said above (q. 104, a. 2 and q. 110, a. 1 and qq. 113-114).

So, then, it is clear that fate exists in created causes themselves to the extent that they are ordered by God to produce effects.

Reply to objection 1: The very ordering of secondary causes, which Augustine calls “the series of causes (*series causarum*),” has the nature of fate only insofar as it depends on God. And so God’s power or will can be called ‘fate’ as regards its cause (*causaliter*). However, as regards its essence (*essentialiter*), fate is the very arrangement or series, i.e., ordering, of secondary causes (*ipsa dispositio seu series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum*).

Reply to objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause to the extent that the nature of a cause is had by the secondary causes whose ordering is called fate.

Reply to objection 3: Fate is called a disposition (*dispositio*) not in the sense of a disposition that is in the genus *quality*, but rather insofar as ‘disposition’ designates an ordering; and this is a relation and not a substance. To be sure, if this ordering is thought of in relation to its principle, then it is a single thing, and in this sense it is called ‘fate’ in the singular (*sic dicitur unum fatum*). However, if it is thought of in relation to its effects, or in relation to the mediating causes themselves, then it is multiplied; and it is in this sense that the poet says, “Your fates are drawing you forth (*te tua fata trahunt*).”

Article 3

Is fate unchangeable?

It seems that fate is not unchangeable (*non immobile*):

Objection 1: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says, “In the way that reasoning is related to the intellect as to that which gives rise to it, and in the way that time is related to eternity and a circle to its middle point, so is the changeable course of fate related to simple and stable providence.”

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Topics* 2, “When we are changed, that which exists in us is changed.” But as Boethius says, fate is “a disposition that inheres in changeable things.” Therefore, fate is changeable.

Objection 3: If fate is unchangeable, then the things subject to fate happen unchangeably and by necessity. But the things that are attributed to fate seem especially to be contingent. Therefore, there will be nothing contingent among things, but instead everything will happen by necessity.

But contrary to this: Boethius says, “Fate is an unchangeable disposition.”

I respond: There are two ways to think about the arrangement of secondary causes that we call

fate: (a) with respect to the causes themselves that are arranged or ordered in the way in question, and (b) in relation to the first principle by whom they are ordered, viz., God.

Hence, some have claimed that the series or arrangement of causes is necessary in its own right (*secundum se*), with the result that everything would happen by necessity by reason of the fact that each effect has a cause and that once the cause is posited, the effect has to be posited.

But this is clearly false in light of what was said above (q. 115, a. 6).

Others have claimed to the contrary that fate is changeable even insofar as it depends on God's providence. Thus, as Gregory of Nyssa reports, the Egyptians claimed that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices.

But this was ruled out above (q. 23, a. 8) because it conflicts with the unchangeableness of God's providence.

And so one should reply that if we are considering the secondary causes, then fate is changeable, whereas to the extent that it is subject to God's providence, it has unchangeability—not, to be sure, an unchangeability of absolute necessity, but rather an unchangeability of conditional necessity, insofar as we claim that the conditional 'If God foreknew that this will occur, then it will occur' is true or necessary. Hence, after Boethius had claimed that the progression of fate is changeable, a few lines later he added, "To the extent that the progression proceeds from the sources of unchangeable providence, it must itself likewise be immutable."

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Are all things subject to fate?

It seems that all things are subject to fate:

Objection 1: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says, "The progression of fate moves the heavens and the stars, moderates the elements in themselves with respect to one another and forms them by alternating transmutations. This same fate renews all things that are born and that perish by similar progressions of offspring and seeds. It constrains the acts and fortunes of men with an indissoluble chain of causes." Therefore, there seem to be no exceptions to what is contained under the progression of fate.

Objection 2: In *De Civitate Dei* 5 Augustine says, "There is such a thing as fate, insofar as it is referred back to God's will and power." But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 3, God's will is a cause of all things that come to be." Therefore, all things are subject to fate.

Objection 3: According to Boethius, fate is a disposition that inheres in changeable things. But as has been explained (q. 9, a. 2), all creatures are mutable and God alone is truly immutable. Therefore, fate exists in all creatures.

But contrary to this: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 4 Boethius says, "Some things that are situated under providence lie beyond the progression of fate."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), fate is the ordering of secondary causes toward divinely foreseen effects. Therefore, whatever is subject to secondary causes is likewise subject to fate. On the other hand, anything that is done directly by God—e.g., the creation of things, the glorification of spiritual substances, and other things of this sort—is not subject to fate, since it is not subject to secondary causes. And this is what Boethius says, viz., that "those things that are close to the primary

divinity are stably fixed and exceed the order of changeable fate.” From this it is likewise clear that “the further a thing is from the First Mind, the greater the ties by which it is implicated with fate,” since it is more subject to the necessity of the secondary causes.

Reply to objection 1: All the things mentioned in the objection are done by God through the mediation of secondary causes, and so they are contained under the progression of fate. But as has been explained, it is not the case that the same line of reasoning applies to all other things.

Reply to objection 2: Fate is traced back to God’s power and will as its first principle. Hence, as has been explained, it does not have to be the case that whatever is subject to God’s will or power is subject to fate.

Reply to objection 3: Even though all creatures are in some sense mutable, some of them do not proceed from mutable created causes and so, as has been explained, they are not subject to fate.

QUESTION 117

Things Relevant to Human Action

Next we have to consider those things that are relevant to the action of man, who is composed of a spiritual creature and a corporeal creature. We have to consider, first, man's action (question 117) and, second, the propagation of man from man (questions 118-119).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Can one man teach another by causing knowledge in him? (2) Can a man teach an angel? (3) Can a man affect corporeal matter by the power of his soul? (4) Can the separated soul of a man move bodies by local motion?

Article 1

Can one man teach another?

It seems that one man cannot teach another:

Objection 1: Matthew 23:8 says, "Do not be called Rabbi," where Jerome's gloss says, "Lest God's honor be given to men." Therefore, being a teacher (*esse magister*) pertains properly to God's honor. But to teach (*docere*) is proper to a teacher. Therefore, a man cannot teach, but this is instead proper to God.

Objection 2: If one man teaches another, this is only insofar as he acts by his own knowledge (*per scientiam suam*) to be a cause of knowledge in the other man. But the quality by which someone acts to effect something similar to himself is an active quality. Therefore, it follows that knowledge is an active quality, like heat is.

Objection 3: What is required for knowledge are (a) the intelligible light (*lumen intelligibile*) and (b) the species of the thing that is understood (*species rei intellectae*). But one man cannot be a cause of either of these in another man. Therefore, it is impossible for one man to be a cause of knowledge in another man by teaching him.

Objection 4: A teacher (*doctor*) does not act on his student except by proposing certain signs to him, signifying something through either words or gestures. But no one can teach another by proposing signs to him and by thereby causing knowledge in him. For he will propose either signs of things that are known to the other man or signs of things that are not known to him. If he proposes signs of things that are known to him, then the one to whom the signs are proposed already has the knowledge and does not acquire it from the teacher (*a magistro*). On the other hand, if he proposes signs of things that are not known to him, then he will not learn anything through such signs—in the same way that if one man were to propose Greek words to another man who spoke Latin and did not know the meaning of the Greek words, then the first man would not be able to teach the second man anything in this manner. Therefore, there is no way in which one man can be a cause of knowledge in another man by teaching him.

But contrary to this: In 1 Timothy 2:7 the Apostle says, "In this I have been appointed preacher and apostle, a teacher of the Gentiles in the faith and in the truth."

I respond: On this matter there have been different opinions.

As was explained above (q. 76, a. 2), in his commentary on *De Anima* 3 Averroes claimed that there is a single passive intellect for all men. And from this it followed that all men have the same intelligible species. Accordingly, he claims that it is not the case that in teaching one man is a cause in another man of a knowledge distinct from the knowledge that he himself has; instead, he communicates to the other man the very same knowledge that he himself has by moving him to order the phantasms in his own soul in such a way that they are appropriately disposed to an intellectual apprehension.

This opinion is true to the extent that the same knowledge does indeed exist in the student and the teacher, if we are thinking of an identity with respect to the oneness of the thing known. For it is the same real truth (*rei veritas*) that both the student (*discipulus*) and the teacher (*magister*) know. However, as was shown above (q. 76, a. 2), Averroes's opinion is false to the extent that he claims that there is a single passive intellect for all men and that the intelligible species are the same, differing only in their relations to the diverse phantasms.

A second opinion is that of the Platonists, who, as has been explained (q. 84, aa. 3-4), claimed that knowledge exists in our souls from the beginning through participation in the separated forms, but that because of its union with the body the soul is prevented from being able to freely consider the things of which it has knowledge. On this opinion, the student does not acquire knowledge *de novo* from the teacher, but is instead stimulated by the teacher to consider the things that he has knowledge of, so that learning is nothing other than remembering—just as they likewise claimed that natural agents are merely disposing causes (*solummodo disponunt*) for the reception of the forms that corporeal matter acquires through participation in the separated species.

But against this opinion it was shown above (q. 79, a. 2 and q. 84, a. 3) that, in accord with what Aristotle says in *De Anima* 3, the human soul's passive intellect is in *pure* potentiality with respect to intelligible things.

So one must respond in a different way by claiming that the one who teaches causes knowledge in the learner (*in addiscente*) by leading him from potentiality to actuality, as *Physics* 8 puts it.

To see this clearly, notice that among the effects that come from an exterior principle, some come only from an exterior principle; for instance, the form of a house is caused in the matter only by the relevant craft (*ars*). On the other hand, there are some effects that come sometimes from an exterior principle and sometimes from an interior principle; for instance, health is caused in the sick sometimes by an exterior principle, viz., the art of medicine, and sometimes by an interior principle, as when someone is cured by the power of nature.

In effects of this latter sort, there are two things to be noted. First, in its own operation art imitates nature. For instance, just as nature cures by altering, digesting, and expelling the matter that causes a sickness, so too does the art of medicine. The second thing to be noted is that the exterior principle, viz., the art, does not operate as a principal agent, but instead operates insofar as it assists the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it and providing it with instruments and aids that it uses in producing its effect. For instance, a physician strengthens nature and provides it with foods and medicines that nature uses for the sake of its intended end.

Now a man acquires knowledge both (a) from an interior principle, as is clear in the case of one who acquires his own knowledge through discovery, and also (b) from an exterior principle, as is clear in the case of one who learns by being taught (*qui addiscit*). For within every man there is a principle of knowledge, viz., the light of the active intellect, and through this principle there is—naturally and right from the beginning—a cognition of certain universal principles of all knowledge. And when someone applies general principles of this sort to the particulars that he has memory and experience of through the sensory power, it is by his own discovery that he acquires knowledge of things he was previously ignorant of, proceeding from what is known to what is unknown. Hence, it is likewise the case that a teacher (*docens*) leads his student (*discipulus*) from things that the student knows to a cognition of things that he did not previously know—this according to *Posterior Analytics* 1 (“Every instance of teaching and learning (*omnis doctrina et disciplina*) comes from a preexistent cognition”).

Now there are two ways in which a teacher leads a student to a cognition of what is unknown from what was previously known:

First, by proposing to him certain aids or instruments that his intellect uses to acquire knowledge—as, for instance, when he proposes to him certain less general propositions that the student

can judge on the basis of what he knew beforehand, or when he proposes to him certain sensible examples, either similar things or opposites or something of this sort, from which the learner's intellect can be led step by step to the cognition of an unknown truth.

Second, he does this when he strengthens the student's intellect. He does not, to be sure, do this by an active power of a higher nature—as was described above (q. 106, a. 1 and q. 111, a. 1) in the case of an angel who illuminates another angel—since all human intellects occupy the same grade in the order of nature. Rather, he does it insofar as he proposes to his student the ordering of principles to conclusions when the student might not have on his own enough reasoning ability to be able to deduce the conclusions from the principles. And this is why *Posterior Analytics* 1 says that “a demonstration is a syllogism that gives knowledge.” It is in this way that one who presents a demonstration makes his listener have knowledge.

Reply to objection 1: As has already been explained, a man who teaches, like a physician who heals, exercises only an exterior function. By contrast, just as the interior nature is the principal cause of healing, so too the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. Now both of these principal causes are from God. And so just as it is said of God that “He heals all your infirmities” (Psalm 102:3), so it is said of Him that “He teaches man knowledge” (Psalm 93:10) insofar as “the light of His countenance,” through which all things are shown to us, “is signed upon us” (Psalm 4:7).

Reply to objection 2: The teacher does not, as Averroes claims, cause knowledge in his student in the manner of a natural agent. Hence, his knowledge does not have to be an active quality. Instead, his knowledge is a principle by which he is directed in his teaching, in the way that an art is a principle by which someone is directed in his acting.

Reply to objection 3: A teacher does not cause the intelligible light in his student, nor does he directly cause the intelligible species. Rather, through his teaching (*per suam doctrinam*) the teacher moves his student to fashion, through the power of the latter's own intellect, the intelligible conceptions whose signs the teacher proposes to him exteriorly.

Reply to objection 4: The signs that a teacher proposes to his student are signs of things that (a) are known in general and with some vagueness (*sub quadam confusione*), but that (b) are not known in particular and with distinctness (*sub quadam distinctione*). And so when someone acquires knowledge on his own, he cannot be said to teach himself or to be his own teacher, since the sort of complete knowledge required in a teacher does not preexist in him.

Article 2

Can men teach angels?

It seems that men can teach angels:

Objection 1: In Ephesians 3:10 the Apostle says, “... that the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the Principalities and Powers in heaven through the Church.” But the Church is a congregation of faithful men. Therefore, some things are made known to the angels by men.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 106, a. 1 and q. 112, a. 3), the higher angels, who are directly illuminated by God regarding divine matters, are able to instruct the lower angels. But some men have been directly instructed by the Word of God regarding divine matters; this is especially obvious in the case of the apostles—this according to Hebrews 1:2 (“Last of all, in these days He has spoken to us in his Son”). Therefore, some men were able to have taught some angels.

Objection 3: The lower angels are instructed by the higher angels. But some men are higher than

some angels, since as Gregory says in one of his homilies, some men are assumed into the highest orders of angels (cf. q. 108, a. 8). Therefore, some lower angels can be instructed by some men regarding divine matters.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that God's illuminations are conveyed to men by the mediation of the angels. Therefore, it is not the case that the angels are instructed by men regarding divine matters.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 107, a. 2), the lower angels are able to speak to the higher angels by making known their own thoughts to them, but the higher angels are never illuminated by the lower angels regarding divine matters.

Now it is obvious that the highest men are subordinated to even the lowest angels in the way that the lower angels are subordinated to the higher angels. This is clear from what our Lord says in Matthew 11:11: "There has not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he."

So, then, the angels are never illuminated by men regarding divine matters. However, men are able, in the mode of speaking, to make known to the angels the thoughts of their own hearts, since it belongs to God alone to know the secrets of the heart.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine explains this passage from the Apostle in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 5. The Apostle had prefaced the passage with these words: "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace ... to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which has been hidden from eternity in God." Augustine says, "The manifold wisdom of God was 'hidden', and yet in such a way that it was made known to the Principalities and Powers in heaven, viz., through the Church. It is as if he were saying, 'This mystery was hidden from men, and yet in such a way that to the heavenly Church, which is contained in the Principalities and Powers, it was made known *from* the ages (*a saeculis*)—though not *before* the ages (*ante saecula*), since the Church first existed in heaven (*ibi primitus ecclesia fuit*), and the present Church of men was to be brought together after the resurrection."

But there can also be an alternative reply, viz., that, as Augustine adds in the same place, "What was hidden is not only made known to the angels in God, but also becomes apparent to them when it is brought about and made public." And so when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were being fulfilled by the apostles, certain aspects of these mysteries which had previously been hidden from the angels became clear to them. And in this way one can understand what Jerome says, viz., that when the apostles preached, the angels learned certain mysteries in the sense that through the preaching of the apostles the mysteries were fulfilled in the things themselves—for instance, when Paul preached, the Gentiles were converted. This is what the Apostle is talking about in the passage in question.

Reply to objection 2: The apostles were directly instructed by the Word of God not through His divine nature, but rather insofar as His human nature was speaking. Hence, the argument does not go through.

Reply to objection 3: Even in the state of the present life, some men are greater than some angels—not, to be sure, in actuality, but rather virtually (*non quidem actu, sed virtute*), viz., insofar as they have charity of a such great force (*caritatem tantae virtutis*) that they are able to merit a greater degree of beatitude than some angels have—just as we might say that the seed of some large tree is virtually greater than some small tree, even though it is much smaller than that tree in actuality.

Article 3

Can a man affect corporeal matter through the power of his soul?

It seems that a man can affect corporeal matter through the power of his soul:

Objection 1: In *Dialogi* 2 Gregory says, “The saints work miracles sometimes by their prayers and sometimes by their power. For instance, Peter resuscitated the deceased Tabitha by praying, whereas it was by reproving the liars Ananias and Saphira that he delivered them to death.” But in the working of a miracle some change is effected in corporeal matter. Therefore, men can by the power of their soul affect corporeal matter.

Objection 2: The Gloss on Galatians 3:1 (“Who has bewitched you that you should not obey the truth?”) says, “Some have blazing eyes that bewitch others, especially children, by a single glance.” But this would not be the case unless the power of the soul were able to affect corporeal matter. Therefore, through the power of his soul a man can affect corporeal matter.

Objection 3: The human body is more noble than other lower bodies. But through the human soul’s apprehension the human body is affected with respect to hot and cold, as is clear in the case of those who become angry or afraid; and in some cases a change of this sort leads even to sickness and death. Therefore, *a fortiori*, man’s soul is able by its power to affect corporeal matter.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 3 Augustine says, “It belongs to God alone to have corporeal matter obey Him at will.”

I respond: As was explained above (q. 110, a. 2), corporeal matter is changed with respect to its form only by either (a) an agent composed of form and matter or (b) God Himself, in whom both matter and form virtually preexist as in the primordial cause of them both. Accordingly, it was explained above (*ibid.*) that the angels can affect corporeal matter with their natural power only by applying corporeal agents to the production of certain effects. Therefore, *a fortiori*, the soul by its natural power cannot affect corporeal matter except by the mediation of certain bodies.

Reply to objection 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace and not by the power of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same place, “Those who are sons of God in power, as John puts it—what wonder is it if they perform signs by their power?”

Reply to objection 2: Avicenna assigns as a cause of bewitchment that corporeal matter is more apt to obey a spiritual substance than it is to obey contrary agents in nature. And so when a soul has a strong imagination (*quando anima fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione*), corporeal matter is affected by it. And this, he claims, is the cause of the bewitching glance (*causa oculi fascinantis*).

However, it was shown above (q. 110, a. 2) that corporeal matter does not obey a spiritual substance at will, except for the creator alone. And so it is better to reply that the bodily spirits of the conjoined body (*spiritus corporis coniuncti*) are affected by a strong imagination on the part of the soul. This effect in the bodily spirits occurs especially in the eyes, which the more subtle bodily spirits reach. Now the eyes infect the surrounding air to a set distance—in the same way that new and pure mirrors contract a certain impurity from the gaze of a menstruating woman, as Aristotle says in *De Somno et Vigilia*. So, then, when a soul is vehemently moved to malice, as happens especially in the case of little old women (*in vetulabus*), what is effected in the way described above is a gaze that is poisonous and noxious especially to children, who have a body that is tender and readily receptive to impressions. It is also possible that by God’s permission, or even because of some occult work, the wickedness of the demons with whom the soothsayers have a pact also cooperates in this.

Reply to objection 3: The soul is united to the human body as its form, and, as was explained above (q. 81, a. 3), the sentient appetite, which in some sense obeys reason, is the act of a corporeal

organ. And so for an apprehension of the human soul the sentient appetite has to be moved in conjunction with some corporeal operation (*oportet quod commoveatur appetitus sensitivus cum aliqua operatione coporali*). But, as has been explained, the human soul's apprehension is not sufficient for affecting exterior bodies except through the mediation of a change in its own body.

Article 4

Can a separated soul affect bodies at least with respect to place?

It seems that a separated soul can affect bodies at least with respect to place:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 110, a. 5), with respect to its local motion a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance. But a separated soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore, it can move exterior bodies at its command.

Objection 2: In *Itinerarium Clementis*, Niceta's narrative to Peter reports that through his magical arts Simon the magician held on to the soul of a child he had killed and worked magical acts through it. But this could not have been the case without changes, at least local motions, in certain bodies. Therefore, a separated soul has the power to move bodies with respect to place.

But contrary to this: In *De Anima* the Philosopher says that the soul can move only its own body and not all bodies.

I respond: A separated soul is not by its natural power able to move a body. For it is clear that when a soul is united to its body, it moves its body only insofar as that body is vivified. Hence, if some member of its body dies, that member does not obey the soul with respect to local motion. But it is obvious that there is no body vivified by a separated soul. Hence, with respect to local motion there is no body that obeys a separated soul, as regards the power of its own nature—over and beyond which something can be conferred on it by God's power.

Reply to objection 1: There are some spiritual substances, viz., the angels, who are naturally free of bodies and whose powers are not limited (*determinatur*) to particular bodies. And so diverse bodies can obey them with respect to motion.

However, if a separated substance's moving power were naturally limited to effecting motion in some particular body, then that substance would be able to effect motion in a smaller body but not a bigger body—just as, according to the Philosopher, the mover of a lower celestial body would not be able to effect motion in a higher celestial body.

Hence, since a soul by its nature is limited to effecting motion in a body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power effect motion in any other body.

Reply to objection 2: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 10 and as Chrysostom says in *Super Matthaeum*, the demons often pretend to be souls of the dead in order to confirm the error of the Gentiles, who believed this. And so it is plausible to think that Simon the magician was tricked by some demon who was pretending to be the soul of a child whom he had killed.

QUESTION 118

The Descent of Man from Man with respect to the Soul

Next we have to consider the descent (*traductio*) of man from man, first with respect to the soul (question 118) and then with respect to the body (question 119).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Is the sentient soul passed down (*traducatur*) with the semen? (2) Is the intellective soul passed down with the semen? (3) Were all souls created together?

Article 1

Is the sentient soul passed down with the semen, or does it exist through being created by God?

It seems that the sentient soul is not passed down with the semen, but instead exists through being created by God:

Objection 1: Every perfect substance (*substantia perfecta*) that is not composed of matter and form is such that if it begins to exist, this is through creation and not through generation; for something is generated only from matter. But the sentient soul is a perfect substance; otherwise, it would not be able to effect motion in the body. And since it is the form of a body, it is not itself composed of matter and form. Therefore, it begins to exist through creation and not through generation.

Objection 2: The principle of generation in living things is the generative power, which, since it is numbered among the powers of the vegetative soul, is lower than (*infra*) the sentient soul. But nothing acts beyond (*ultra*) its own species. Therefore, the sentient soul cannot be caused by the generative power of an animal.

Objection 3: That which generates generates something similar to itself, and so the form of what is generated must be actual within that which causes the generation. But the sentient soul is not actual within the semen; nor is any part of the sentient soul actual in the semen, since no part of it exists except in some part of the body, whereas in the semen there is not even a small part (*particula*) of the body, since there is no small part of the body that does not come from the semen and the semen's power. Therefore, the sentient soul is not caused by the semen.

Objection 4: If in the semen there is some active principle with respect to the sentient soul, then that principle either remains or does not remain once the animal has been generated. But it is impossible for it to remain. For either (a) it is the same as the sentient soul of the generated animal—but this is impossible, since in that case what generates would be the same as what is generated, and what does the making would be the same as what is made—or else (b) it is something else—and this is likewise impossible, since it was shown above (q. 76, a. 4) that in a single animal there is just a single formal principle, which is the one soul. On the other hand, if it does not remain, this likewise seems impossible, since in that case some agent would be actively contributing to the corruption of its very self (*ageret ad corruptionem sui ipsius*)—which is impossible. Therefore, the sentient soul cannot be generated from the semen.

But contrary to this: The power that exists in the semen is related to the animal generated from the semen in the same way that the power that exists in the world's elements is related to those animals that are produced from the world's elements, e.g., the animals produced from putrefaction. But in animals of this sort the souls are produced from the power that exists in the elements—this according to Genesis 1:20 (“Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life”). Therefore, it is likewise the case that the souls of the animals that are generated from semen are produced by the power that exists in the semen.

I respond: Some have claimed that the sentient souls of animals are created by God. This position

would be acceptable if the sentient soul were a subsistent entity that has its *esse* and operation in its own right (*per se*). For in that case, just as it would have its *esse* and operation in its own right, so too its *being made* (*fieri*) would belong to it in its own right (*ita per se deberetur ei fieri*). And since a simple and subsistent entity can be made only through creation, it would follow that the sentient soul comes into being through creation.

But the root of this position is false, viz., the claim that the sentient soul has its *esse* and operation in its own right. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 75, a. 3), if that were so, then the sentient soul would not be corrupted when the body is corrupted. And so, since the sentient soul is not a subsistent form, it exists (*habet se in essendo*) in the same way that other corporeal forms do. *Esse* does not belong properly to these forms in their own right (*quibus per se non debetur esse*), but instead they are said to exist insofar as subsistent composites exist through them (*per ea*). Hence, *being made* likewise belongs properly to the composites themselves. And since what generates is similar to what is generated, it must be the case that the sentient soul and other forms of this sort are naturally brought into being by corporeal agents that transform matter from potentiality to actuality (*transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum*) through a corporeal power that exists within them.

Now the more powerful an agent is, the greater the distance to which it is able to diffuse its action; for instance, the hotter a body is, the more remote are the places at which it produces warmth. Therefore, non-living bodies, which are lower in the order of nature, generate what is similar to themselves through their very selves and not through any mediating thing; for instance, fire generates fire through itself. By contrast, living bodies, since they are more powerful, act to generate what is similar to themselves both through something that mediates and also in the absence of anything that mediates: (a) in the absence of anything mediating, as in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh, and (b) along with something that mediates, as in the act of generation, given that an active power flows from the soul of the generating thing into the animal or plant seed (*semen*), in the way that a power that effects motion flows from a principal agent into its instrument. And just as it makes no difference whether one says that a thing is moved by the instrument or that it is moved by the principal agent, so too it makes no difference whether one says that the soul of what is generated is caused by the soul of what generates or that the soul of what is generated is caused by a power which is derived from the generating thing and which exists in the semen.

Reply to objection 1: The sentient soul is not itself a perfect substance that subsists in its own right (*per se subsistens*). This was explained above (q. 75, a. 3), and it is not necessary to repeat the explanation here.

Reply to objection 2: The generative power does the generating not only with its own proper power (*non solum in virtute propria*), but also with the power of the whole soul of which it is a power (*in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia*). And this is why a plant's generative power generates a plant, whereas an animal's generative power generates an animal. For the more perfect a soul is, the more perfect is the effect toward which its generative power is ordered.

Reply to objection 3: The active power which exists in the semen and which is derived from the generating animal is, as it were, a certain motion of the generating animal itself. And this power is neither the soul nor a part of the soul, except virtually—just as what exists in the saw or the axe is not the form of the bed, but instead a certain motion that tends toward a form of that sort. And so the active power in question need not have any actual organ (*aliquod organum in actu*); instead, it is grounded in the very animal spirits (*in spiritu ipso*) included in the semen, which is frothy, as is clear from its whiteness.

These spirits also contain a certain heat that is derived from the power of the celestial bodies, by whose power the lower agents act with respect to their species—as was explained above (q. 115, a. 3). And it is because it is in spirits of this sort that the soul's power comes together with a celestial power

that one says that “a man and the sun generate a man.” And as is explained in *De Anima* 2, this elemental heat is related as an instrument to the soul’s [generative] power as well as to its nutritive power.

Reply to objection 4: In perfect animals, which are generated by sexual intercourse (*ex coitu*), the active power exists in the male’s semen—this according to the Philosopher in *De Generatione Animalium*—whereas the fetus’s matter is what is provided by the female. Within this matter there is a vegetative soul from the very beginning—i.e., a vegetative soul not in second act but in first act, in the way that the sentient soul exists in animals that are sleeping. And as soon as it begins to attract food, it is already actually operating. Thus, matter of this sort is transmuted by the power that exists in the male’s semen until it is brought to the actuality of a sentient soul—though not in such a way that the very power that previously existed in the semen becomes the sentient soul, since if that were so, then what generates would be the same entity as is generated, and, as the Philosopher points out, this would be more like nutrition and growth than like generation. Afterwards, when, through the power of the active principle that had existed in the semen, the sentient soul is produced in the generated animal with respect to one of its principal parts, then the child’s sentient soul is already beginning to act to complete the child’s own body through nutrition and growth. But the active power that had existed in the semen ceases to exist once the semen is dissolved and the animal spirits that were in it vanish. This is not problematic, since that power was an instrumental agent and not a principal agent, and an instrument’s action ceases once its effect has been brought into existence.

Article 2

Is the intellectual soul caused by the semen?

It seems that the intellectual soul is caused by the semen:

Objection 1: Genesis 46:26 says, “... all the souls that came out from Jacob’s loins (*de femore Iacob*), sixty-six.” But nothing comes out from a man’s loins except insofar as it is caused by the semen. Therefore, the intellectual soul is caused by the semen.

Objection 2: As was shown above (q. 76, a. 3), in man the intellectual soul, the sentient soul, and the nutritive soul are one and the same soul in substance. But the sentient soul in man is generated from the semen, as it is in the other animals; thus, in *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher says that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but that instead the animal having a sentient soul comes first. Therefore, the intellectual soul is likewise caused by the semen.

Objection 3: It is one and the same agent whose action is terminated in the form and in the matter; otherwise, the form and the matter would not be a unified entity absolutely speaking. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, and the human body is formed through the power of the semen. Therefore, the intellectual soul is likewise caused through the power of the semen.

Objection 4: A man generates something similar to himself in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore, the rational soul is from the one who generates.

Objection 5: It is ridiculous to claim that God cooperates with those who are sinning. But if rational souls were created by God, then God would sometimes be cooperating with adulterers, from whose illicit sexual union (*de quorum illicito coitu*) a child is sometimes generated. Therefore, it is not the case that rational souls are created by God.

But contrary to this: In *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* it says, “Rational souls are not produced through sexual intercourse (*non seminantur per coitum*).”

I respond: It is impossible for an active power that exists in matter to extend its action to the

production of an immaterial effect. But it is clear that the intellectual principle in man is a principle that transcends matter, since it has an operation that the body does not share in. And so it is impossible for the active power that exists in the semen to produce an intellectual principle.

Likewise, it is also the case that the power existing in the semen acts in the power of the soul of the one who generates insofar as the soul of the one who generates is the actuality of a body, using the body itself in its operation. But the body does not share in the act of the intellect. Hence, the power of the intellectual principle, insofar as it is intellectual, cannot reach to the semen. This is why in *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher says, “It follows that the intellect alone comes from the outside.”

Again, as was established above (q. 75, a. 2), since the intellectual soul has an operation without the body, it is subsistent, and so *esse* and *being-made* belong properly to it (*sibi debetur esse et fieri*). And since it is an immaterial substance, it cannot be caused through generation, but can instead be caused only through being created by God.

Therefore, to claim that the intellectual soul is caused by the one who generates is nothing other than to claim that it is not subsistent and that, as a result, it is corrupted along with the body. This is why it is heretical to say that the intellectual soul is passed down with the semen.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage, through synecdoche, a part is being posited for the whole, i.e., the soul for the whole man.

Reply to objection 2: Some have claimed that the vital operations that are apparent in the embryo do not come from its own soul, but instead come either from the mother’s soul or from the formative power that exists in the semen.

Both of these alternatives are false, because works of life such as sensing, being nourished, and growing cannot come from an extrinsic principle.

Therefore, one should claim that the nutritive soul exists in the embryo from the beginning, and later the sentient soul, and, last of all, the intellectual soul.

Thus, some claim that a second soul, viz., the sentient soul, is added to (*supervenit supra*) the vegetative soul which first existed in the embryo, and that, once again, a third soul, viz., the intellectual soul, is added to the sentient soul. And so in a man there are three souls, one of which is in potentiality to another.

But this was disproved above (q. 76, a. 3).

And so others have replied that the very same soul which at first was merely vegetative is afterwards, through the action of the power that exists in the semen, brought to the point of becoming sentient, and, finally, is brought to the point that the very same soul becomes intellectual—not, to be sure, through the semen’s active power, but through the power of a higher agent, viz., God, who illuminates it from without (*Dei de foris illustrantis*). And this is why that Philosopher claims that the intellect comes from outside.

But this position cannot stand.

First of all, no substantial form admits of more and less; instead, the addition of greater perfection makes for a different species, in the way that the addition of a unit (*additio unitatis*) makes for a different species among numbers. But it is impossible for numerically one and the same form to belong to diverse species.

Second, it would follow that the generation of an animal is a continuous movement, proceeding little by little from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in the case of an alteration.

Third, it would follow that the generation of an animal or a man is not a generation absolutely speaking, since its subject would be an actual entity. For if a vegetative soul exists in the offspring’s matter at the beginning and then is brought little by little to the status of a perfect entity, there will always be a subsequent addition of perfection without any corruption of the preceding perfection. But

this is contrary to the notion of generation in the absolute sense.

Fourth, either (a) what is caused by God's action is something subsistent, and in that case it would have to be something different in essence from the preceding form, which was not subsistent, and so we are back to the opinion of those who posit more than one soul in the body; or else (b) what is caused by God's action is not something subsistent, but instead a certain perfecting of the preexistent soul, and in that case it necessarily follows that the intellective soul is corrupted when the body is corrupted—which is impossible.

There is yet another way of replying, in accord with those who posit a single intellect in everyone. But this was disproved above (q. 76, a. 2).

And so one should reply that since the generation of one thing is always the corruption of another, it must be claimed that, both in man and in the other animals, when a more perfect form arrives, there is a corruption of the prior form, yet in such a way that the subsequent form has whatever the first form had, and still more. And so it is through many generations and corruptions that one arrives at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and in the other animals. This is evident to the senses in the case of animals that are generated from putrefaction.

So, then, one should claim that the intellective soul, which is simultaneously sentient and nutritive, is created by God at the end of human generation, and that the preexistent forms are corrupted.

Reply to objection 3: This argument is relevant in the case of diverse agents that are not ordered to one another. But if there are many agents that are ordered to one another, then nothing prevents the power of the higher agent from attaining to the ultimate form while the powers of the lower agents attain only to some disposition on the part of the matter. For instance, in the generation of an animal the semen's power disposes the matter, whereas the soul's power gives the form.

Now it is clear from what was said above (q. 105, a. 3 and q. 110, a. 1) that a complete corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially God's power. And so nothing prevents it from being the case that the formation of the body is from a corporeal power, whereas the intellective soul is from God alone.

Reply to objection 4: A man generates what is similar to himself insofar as through the power of his semen the matter is disposed for the reception of the relevant form.

Reply to objection 5: What belongs to nature in the action of the adulterers is good, and God cooperates with this. But what belongs to the disordered desire is evil, and God does not cooperate with that.

Article 3

Were all human souls created together at the beginning of the world?

It seems that all human souls were created together at the beginning of the world:

Objection 1: Genesis 2:2 says, "God rested from all the work that He had done." But this would not have been the case if He were to create new souls every day. Therefore, all the souls were created together.

Objection 2: Spiritual substances are especially relevant to the perfection of the universe. Therefore, if the souls were created with their bodies, then every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe, and so the universe would have been incomplete (*imperfectum*) at the beginning. But this is contrary to what Genesis 2:2 says, viz., that God had completed all His work.

Objection 3: An entity's end corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains after the body has been corrupted. Therefore, it began to exist before the body.

But contrary to this: In *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus* it says, "The soul is created with the body."

I respond: Some have asserted that the intellectual soul is accidentally united to the body (*accidat uniri corpori*), asserting that it has the same status as spiritual substances that are not united to matter. And so they have claimed that the souls of men were created at the beginning along with the angels.

But this opinion is false.

First of all, it is false at its root. For if being united to its body were accidental to a soul, then it would follow either that (a) the man who is constituted by this union is a being *per accidens* or that (b) the soul is the man—which, as was shown above (q. 75, a. 4), is false. Moreover, as was shown above (q. 55, a. 2 and q. 85, a. 1), the fact that the soul is not of the same nature as the angels is proved by its diverse mode of understanding. For as was explained above (q. 84, aa. 6-7), a man has intellectual understanding by receiving from the senses and turning himself toward phantasms. And so the human soul needs to be united to a body, which it needs for the operation of its sentient part—something that cannot be said of an angel.

Second, there is an evident falsity in the position itself.

For if it is natural for the soul to be united to its body, then existing without a body is contrary to its nature, and the soul does not have the perfection of its own nature when it exists without a body. But it would not have been appropriate for God to begin His work with imperfect things and with things that lie beyond nature. For He did not make man without hands or feet, which are natural parts of a man. *A fortiori*, then, He did not make the soul without the body.

On the other hand, if someone asserts that it is not natural for souls to be united to a body, then one must ask for the reason why souls are in fact united to bodies. And it is necessary to reply either that (a) this occurs by the soul's will or that (b) it occurs for some other reason.

If it occurs by the soul's will, then this seems ridiculous:

First, the volition in question would be unreasonable if the soul did not need the body and yet willed to be united to it. For if the soul did need the body, then it would be natural for it to be united to the body, since nature does not lack in what is necessary.

Second, there would be no explanation for why a soul that had been created at the beginning of the world would after so long a time will to be united to a body now. For a spiritual substance is beyond time, since it lies outside the revolutions of the heavens.

Third, it would, it seems, be by chance that *this* soul should be united to *this* body. For this union would require the concurrence of two wills, viz., the will of the soul coming to the body and the will of the man who is doing the generating.

On the other hand, if a soul is united to its body in a way that lies beyond both its will and its nature, then the union must result from a cause that does violence to the soul, and so the union will be a source of pain and sadness for the soul (*erit ei poenale et triste*). This opinion follows the error of Origen, who claimed that souls are embodied as a punishment for sin.

Hence, since all these claims are ridiculous, one should reply simply that the souls were not created before the bodies were, but were instead created simultaneously with being infused into their bodies.

Reply to objection 1: God is said to have stopped on the seventh day, but not from all work; for John 5:17 says, "My Father is working even until now." Rather, He is said to have stopped making new genera and species of things that did not in some sense preexist in His first works. For the souls that are now created preexisted by way of a likeness of species in the first works, which contained the creation of

Adam's soul.

Reply to objection 2: As regards the perfection of the universe, something can be added every day to the number of individuals, but not to the number of species.

Reply to objection 3: The fact that the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which is a consequence of sin. Hence, it was not appropriate for God's works to begin with this. For as is written in Wisdom 1:13 and 1:16, "God did not make death ... but the wicked have called it upon themselves with works and words."

QUESTION 119

The Propagation of Man with respect to the Body

Next we have to consider the propagation of man with respect to the body. And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is anything in the food converted into the very reality of human nature (*convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae*)? (2) Does semen, which is the principle of human generation, come from what is left over in the food (*sit de superfluo alimenti*)?

Article 1

Does anything of the food change into the very reality of human nature?

It seems that nothing of the food changes into the very reality of human nature (*transeat in veritatem humanae naturae*):

Objection 1: Matthew 15:17 says, “What enters the mouth goes to the belly and is expelled into the latrine.” But what is expelled does not change into the very reality of human nature. Therefore, nothing of the food changes into the very reality of human nature.

Objection 2: In *De Generatione and Corruptione* 1 the Philosopher distinguishes flesh according to its species (*caro secundum speciem*) from flesh according to its matter (*caro secundum materiam*), and he says that flesh according to its matter comes and goes. But what is generated from food comes and goes. Therefore, what food is converted into is flesh according to its matter and not flesh according to its species. But what pertains to the very reality of human nature is what pertains to its species. Therefore, food does not change into the very reality of human nature.

Objection 3: What pertains to the very reality of human nature seems to be “root moisture (*humidum radicale*),” which, as the physicians (*medici*) claim, is such that once it is lost, it cannot be restored. But this sort of moisture would itself be able to be restored if food were converted into it. Therefore, nutrients (*nutrimentum*) are not converted into the very reality of human nature.

Objection 4: If food changed into the very reality of human nature, then whatever is lost in a man could be restored. But man’s death occurs only through the loss of something. Therefore, a man could be guarded against death forever by the consumption of food.

Objection 5: If food changed into the very reality of human nature, then there would be nothing in a man that is not able to pass away and be replaced (*recedere et reparari*), since what is generated in a man from food is able both to pass away and to be replaced. Therefore, if a man lived for a long time, it would follow that nothing that was in him materially at the beginning of his generation remains in him at the end. And so he would not be numerically the same man throughout his whole life, since identity of matter is required in order for something to be numerically the same. But this seems absurd. Therefore, food does not change into the very reality of human nature.

But contrary to this: In *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “When the flesh’s nourishment is corrupted, i.e., when it loses its own form, it changes into the stuff of the members of the body.” But “the stuff of the members of the body” has to do with the very reality of human nature. Therefore, food changes into the very reality of human nature.

I respond: According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 2, each thing is related to true reality (*ad veritatem*) in the same way that it is related to *esse*. Therefore, what pertains to the very reality of any given nature is what enters into the constitution of the nature itself.

However, there are two possible ways to think about a nature: (a) *in general (in communi)*, in accord with the notion of its species, and (b) *insofar as it exists in this individual (in hoc individuo)*. Therefore, it is a nature’s form and matter taken in general that are relevant to the very reality of the

nature thought of in general, whereas it is the individual designated matter (*materia individualis signata*) and the form individuated by this sort of matter that are relevant to the very reality of the nature insofar as it is thought of as existing in *this* particular thing. For instance, what belongs to the very reality of human nature in general are a human soul and a human body, whereas what belongs to the very reality of human nature in Peter or Martin are *this* soul and *this* body.

Now there are some things whose forms cannot be preserved except in a singular designated matter (*nisi in una materia signata*); for instance, the sun's form cannot be preserved except in the matter that is actually contained under it. In this same way, some have claimed that the human form can be preserved only in a certain designated matter, viz., that matter which was informed from the beginning by such a form in the first man. The result is that whatever else has been added beyond that which flowed from the first parent to his descendants has nothing to do with the very reality of human nature and does not truly, as it were, receive the form of human nature. But the matter that was subject to the human form in the first man is increased within itself (*multiplicata in seipsa*), and it is in this way that a multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these thinkers, food is not converted into the very reality of human nature. They claim instead that food is received as a sort of kindling wood (*fomentum*) for the nature in order that the nature might resist the action of natural heat, so that its radical moisture is not consumed—in the way that lead or an alloy is added to silver in order that the silver might not be consumed by fire.

However, this position is unreasonable in several ways.

First, a form's being able to come to exist in a different matter (*feri in alia materia*) is equivalent to (*est eiusdem rationis*) its being able to withdraw from its own matter (*deserere propriam materiam*); and this is why all generable entities are corruptible, and vice versa. But it is clear that the human form is able to withdraw from that matter which is subject to it (*deficere ab hac materia quae ei subiicitur*); otherwise, the human body would not be corruptible. Hence, it follows that the human form is likewise able to come to a different matter (*advenire alii materiae*), so that something else changes into the very reality of human nature.

Second, in all those things whose matter is found as a whole in a single individual, there is just a single individual in the relevant species; this is clear in the case of the sun and the moon and other things of this sort. So, then, there would be only a single individual in the human species.

Third, an increase of matter (*multiplicatio materiae*) is impossible except either (a) merely with respect to quantity, as happens in the case of things that are rarified and whose matter takes on bigger dimensions, or (b) with respect to the substance of matter as well. Now as long as the very same substance of matter remains, one cannot claim that the matter is increased; for the same thing does not constitute a multitude with respect to itself, since all multiplicity must be caused by some sort of division. Hence, some other substance of matter must come into play, either through creation or through the conversion of something else into the substance of matter. Hence, it follows that matter cannot be increased except either (a) through *rarefaction*, as when air comes to be from water, or (b) through the *conversion* of some other thing into the matter, as when a fire is increased through the addition of pieces of wood, or (c) through the *creation* of matter. But it is clear that the increase of matter in human bodies does not occur through rarefaction, since if that were so, then the bodies of men who have reached a full age would be more imperfect than the bodies of children. Nor, again, does it occur through the creation of new matter, since, according to Gregory, all things were created together with respect to the substance of matter, even if not with respect to the species of form. Hence, what follows is that the increase of the human body occurs only through food being converted into the very reality of the human body.

Fourth, since man does not differ from animals and plants as far as the vegetative soul is concerned, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants likewise increase not through the conversion of food into the nourished body, but through some sort of increase that cannot be natural, since matter by its

nature extends only to some set quantity. Nor, again, does anything increase naturally except through rarefaction or through the conversion of something else into it. And so all the work of the generative and nutritive powers, which are called natural powers, would be miraculous. But this is altogether ridiculous.

Hence, others have claimed that the human form can come to exist *de novo* in some other matter, as long as human nature is considered in general, but not if it is considered insofar as it exists in *this* individual, in which the human form remains fixed in a certain determinate matter on which it was first impressed in the generation of *this* individual—with the result that the form never leaves that particular matter until the ultimate corruption of the individual. And they claim that it is this matter that pertains *principally* to the very reality of human nature. However, since matter of this sort is not enough for the right quantity, it is required that a distinct matter come into play through the conversion of food into the substance of the thing that is nourished, as much as is required for the right amount of increase. This matter, they claim, pertains *in a secondary sense* to the very reality of human nature, since it is required for the individual's quantity but not for his primary *esse*. And if anything else comes from the food, it does not pertain to the very reality of human nature, properly speaking.

However, this is likewise absurd.

First, this opinion thinks of the matter of living bodies along the same lines as the matter of non-living bodies, which are such that even if they have the power to generate something similar to themselves in species, they nonetheless do not have the power to generate something similar to themselves within the individual (*secundum individuum*)—which is the sort of power that the nutritive power is within living things. Therefore, nothing would be added to living bodies through the nutritive power if food were not converted into the very reality of their nature.

Second, as was explained above (q. 118, a. 1), the active power that exists in the semen is a certain impression derived from the soul of that which generates. Hence, semen cannot have a greater power to act than does the very soul from which it is derived. Therefore, if by the power of the semen some matter truly assumes the form of human nature, then *a fortiori* the soul would be able through its nutritive power to impress the very form of human nature on a conjoined nutriment.

Third, nutrition is needed not only for growth (since otherwise it would not be necessary once growth ends), but also for the restoration of what is lost through the action of natural heat. But there would be no such restoration if that which is generated from food did not take the place of what has been lost. Therefore, just as that which first existed belongs to the very reality of human nature, so too does that which is generated from food.

And so, according to others, one should reply that food is truly converted into the very reality of human nature insofar as it truly receives the species of flesh and of bone and of the other parts of the body. And this is why the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 2 that food nourishes insofar as it is flesh in potentiality.

Reply to objection 1: Our Lord does not say that *the entirety of (totum)* what enters the mouth is expelled into the latrine, but rather *each thing (omne)* that enters the mouth. For in every sort of food there is something impure that is expelled into the latrine.

An alternative reply is that, as Jerome explains, if anything is generated from food, it can likewise be dissolved by natural heat and emitted through certain hidden pores.

Reply to objection 2: By 'flesh according to its species' some have understood that which first receives the human species that is taken from the one who generates it, and this, they claim, always remains for as long as the individual endures. On the other hand, they claim that it is 'flesh according to its matter' which is generated from food, and this, they claim, does not remain forever but instead goes just as it comes.

However, this reply is contrary to what Aristotle means. For in the place in question he says that just as in everything that has a species in matter, e.g., wood or stone, so too in flesh there is something

according to its species and something according to its matter. But it is clear that the distinction mentioned above [in the previous paragraph] has no application in the case of inanimate things, which are neither generated from seed nor nourished. And, again, since that which is generated from food is adjoined to the nourished body in the manner of a mixture, in the way that water is mixed with wine—the example that the Philosopher uses in the same place—the nature of that which comes cannot be different from the nature of that to which it comes, since it has already been made one with it through a genuine mixture. Hence there is no reason why the one should be consumed by natural heat and the other should remain.

And so one should reply that this distinction of the Philosopher's has nothing to do with diverse kinds of flesh. Rather, it is a distinction within the same flesh according to the different ways of considering it. For if flesh is considered according to its species, i.e., with respect to what is formal in it, then it always remains the same, since the nature of flesh always remains, along with its natural disposition. On the other hand, if the flesh is considered according to its matter, then it does not as such remain, but is gradually consumed and restored—as is clear in the case of a fire in a furnace, the form of which always remains, even though its matter is gradually consumed and another matter is substituted in its place.

Reply to objection 3: *Root moisture* is thought of as having to do with the entirety of what the power of the species is grounded in. If it is taken away, then it cannot be restored, just as if a hand or a foot or something of that sort were amputated.

On the other hand, *nutrimental moisture* is that which has not yet reached the point of receiving the nature of the species perfectly, but is on its way toward this, in the way that blood and other things of that sort are. Hence, if such things are taken away, the power of the species still remains in its root, which is not destroyed.

Reply to objection 4: Every power in a passible body is weakened by continual action, since agents of this sort are also acted upon. And thus the power of conversion is at the beginning so strong that it can convert not only what is sufficient to restore what has been lost, but also what is sufficient for growth. But afterwards it is able to convert only what is sufficient for replacing what is lost, and at that point growth ceases. In the end, it cannot do either of these, and then diminution occurs. Then, when a power of this sort is totally lacking, the animal dies. Similarly, to use the Philosopher's example in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1, the power of wine to convert water mixed with it is weakened little by little by the wine's being mixed with more water, until in the end the whole becomes watery.

Reply to objection 5: As the Philosopher says in *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1, when a given matter is converted by itself (*per se*) into a fire, then the fire is said to be generated *de novo*, but when a given matter is converted into a preexistent fire, then the fire is said to be 'nourished'. Hence, if the whole matter loses the species of fire all at once, and another matter is converted into fire, then the latter will be a numerically distinct fire.

On the other hand, if, while one piece of wood is being gradually consumed by a fire, another piece is added, and so on until the all of the first piece of wood is consumed, then numerically the same fire will always remain, since it is always the case that what is being added changes into the preexistent fire. Something similar should be understood to occur in the case of living things, in which what is restored by nourishment is what has been consumed by natural heat.

Article 2

Does the semen come from what is left over in the food?

It seems that the semen comes not from what is left over in the food, but rather from the substance of the one who generates:

Objection 1: Damascene says, “Generation is a work of nature which produces what is generated from the substance of the one who generates.” But what is generated is generated from the semen. Therefore, the semen comes from the substance of the one who generates.

Objection 2: A son is similar to his father because he receives something from him. But if the semen from which something is generated came from what is left over in the food, then a man would receive nothing from his grandfather or his more distant ancestors, in whom this food did not in any way exist. Therefore, a man would not be more similar to his grandfather or to his more distant ancestors than he is to other men.

Objection 3: The food of a man who generates sometimes comes from the flesh of cows or pigs or other animals of this sort. Therefore, if the semen came from what is left over in the food, a man generated from that semen would have more affinity to a cow or a pig than to his father or other blood relatives.

Objection 4: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 10, Augustine says, “We existed in Adam not only with respect to the seminal idea (*secundum seminalem rationem*), but also with respect to the corpulent substance.” But this would not be the case if the semen came from what is left over in the food. Therefore, the semen does not come from what is left over in the food.

But contrary to this: In *De Generatione Animalium* the Philosopher proves in many ways that the semen is what is left over in the food.

I respond: This question depends in some sense on what has gone before (a. 1 and q. 118, a. 1). For if there exists in a human nature a power to communicate its own form to another matter not only within some distinct being but also within itself, then it is clear that food, which is in the beginning dissimilar to human nature, becomes in the end similar to it through the communicated form. But the order of nature is such that a thing is brought gradually from potentiality to actuality, and so in those things that are generated we find that each is at first imperfect and afterwards is brought to perfection.

Now it is clear that what is general is related to what is proper and determinate as the imperfect is related to the perfect. And so we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated before the man or the horse (cf. q. 118, a. 2). So, then, food itself likewise receives at first a certain general power with respect to all the parts of the body, and afterwards is channelled (*determinatur*) to this part or that part.

Now it is impossible that what has already been converted into the substance of members of the body should then be used for the semen through some sort of decomposition (*per quandam resolutionem*). For if what is decomposed did not retain the nature from which it was decomposing, then it would already be withdrawing from the nature of the generating thing and would be on a path to corruption, so to speak; and so it would not have the power to convert a distinct thing into a similar nature. On the other hand, if it retained the nature from which it was decomposing, then, since it would have been channelled (*esset contractum*) to a determinate part [of the body], it would have the power to effect movement only toward the nature of that part and not toward the nature of the whole. Perhaps someone might claim, though, that it would be decomposed from *all* the parts of the body and that it would retain the nature of every part. In that case the semen would be like a sort of small animal in actuality (*quasi quoddam parvum animal in actu*), and the generation of an animal from an animal would

occur only through division—in the way that mud is generated from mud, and as happens in the case of animals that live after having been divided. But this is absurd.

Therefore, it follows that the semen is not separated off from anything that was an actual whole; instead, as was explained above (a. 1 and q. 108, a. 1), it is a whole in potentiality, having the power to produce the whole of the body that is derived from the soul of the one who generates. But what is in potentiality to the whole is what is generated from food before it is converted into the substance of the members of the body. And so this is what the semen is taken from. And the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power because what is converted through the nutritive power is received as semen by the generative power. The Philosopher posits, as an indication of this, the fact that animals with large bodies, which need a lot of nourishment, have little semen in proportion to the quantity of their bodies and few instances of generation—and, similarly, fat men have little semen, and for the same reason.

Reply to objection 1: In plants and animals generation comes from the substance of that which generates, because the semen has its power from the form of that which generates and because it is in potentiality with respect to the substance of that thing.

Reply to objection 2: The similarity between what generates and what is generated does not come about because of the matter; rather, it comes about because of the form of the agent, which generates something similar to itself. Hence, for someone to be similar to his grandfather, it is not necessary that the corporeal matter of the semen should have existed in the grandfather. Instead, what is necessary is that the semen have a power derived from the soul of the grandfather, through the mediation of the father.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is the same. For affinity is thought of not with respect to the matter, but rather with respect to the derivation of the form.

Reply to objection 4: This passage from Augustine should not be understood to be saying that there actually existed in Adam either (a) a seminal idea related to *this* man or (b) *this* man's bodily substance. Instead, both of these existed in Adam as in their origin (*secundum originem*). For corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother and which is what Augustine is calling "the corpulent substance," is derived from Adam as its origin. And the same thing holds for the active power which exists in the father's semen and which is the proximate seminal idea of *this* man.

However, Christ is said to have existed in Adam with respect to His corpulent substance and not with respect to His seminal idea. For the matter of His body, which was supplied by His virgin mother, is derived from Adam, but the active power was not derived from Adam, since His body was formed not by the power of a man's semen, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit. For "such a birth was becoming to Him," who is the blessed God over all things, forever and ever. Amen.