QUESTION 129

Magnanimity

Next we have to consider the parts of fortitude one by one, but in such a way that under the four principal parts that Tully posits, we will include other parts; the only exception is that we are positing *magnanimity* (*magnanimitas*), which Aristotle likewise treats, in the place of [Tully's] *confidence* (*fiducia*).

Therefore, we will consider, first, *magnanimity* (questions 129-133); second, *magnificence* (questions 134-135); third, *patience* (question 136); and, fourth, *perseverance* (questions 137-138).

Concerning the first topic, we first have to consider magnanimity (question 129) and then the vices opposed to it (questions 130-133).

Concerning magnanimity there are eight questions: (1) Does magnanimity have to do with honors? (2) Does it have to do only with great honors? (3) Is magnanimity a virtue? (4) Is it a specific virtue? (5) Is magnanimity a part of fortitude? (6) How is magnanimity related to confidence? (7) How is magnanimity related to security (*securitas*)? (8) How is magnanimity related to the goods of fortune?

Article 1

Does magnanimity have to do with honors?

It seems that magnanimity does not have to do with honors:

Objection 1: Magnanimity exists in the irascible [power of the soul]. But it is clear from its very name that magnanimity means largeness or expansiveness of spirit (*magnitudo animi*). Now 'spirit' is here is being posited for the irascible power; this is clear from *De Anima* 3, where the Philosopher says that in the sentient appetite there is desire and spirit (*desiderium et animus*), i.e., the concupsicible power and the irascible power. But honor is a sort of concupiscible good, since it is a reward for virtue. Therefore, it seems that magnanimity does not have to do with honors.

Objection 2: Since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must have to do with either passions or acts. But it does not have to do with acts, since in that case it would be a part of justice. And so it follows that it has to do with passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore, magnanimity does not have to do with honors.

Objection 3: Magnanimity seems to involve pursuing rather than avoiding, since the magnanimous individual is said to tend toward great things. But virtuous individuals are praised not because they desire honors, but rather because they avoid them. Therefore, magnanimity does not have to do with honors.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "The magnanimous individual has to do with honor and dishonor."

I respond: Magnanimity implies by its name the spirit's reaching out toward great things (*quandam extensionem animi ad magna*). Now a virtue is thought of as having a relation to two things: (a) first, *to the subject matter* with respect to which it operates; and (b) second, *to its proper act*, which consists in the appropriate use of this subject matter. And since the habit of a virtue is mainly determined by its act, someone is called magnanimous mainly from the fact that he has a mind set on some great act.

Now there are two ways in which an act can be called great: (a) relatively speaking (*secundum proportionem*) or (b) absolutely speaking (*absolute*). An act can be called great relatively speaking even if it consists in making use of a small or mediocre thing, e.g., if someone were to make use of that thing in the best possible way. But, simply and absolutely speaking, a great act is one that consists in making the best use of the greatest thing.

Now the things the come into a man's use are exterior things, and among these things the best absolutely speaking is honor, because (a) it is very close to virtue in the sense that, as was established above (q. 103, a. 1), it is a sort of testimony to one's virtue, and also because (b) it is bestowed upon God

and upon the best individuals, and also because (c) men put all other things aside for the sake of attaining honor and avoiding dishonor (*propter honorem consequendum et viturperium vitandum*).

So, then, an individual is called magnanimous in light of things that are great simply and absolutely speaking, just as an individual is called courageous in light of things that are the most difficult absolutely speaking. And so it follows that magnanimity has to do with honors.

Reply to objection 1: What is *good* or *bad* considered absolutely belongs to the concupsicible power, but insofar as the notion *arduous* is added, it belongs to the irascible power. And it is in this latter sense that magnanimity has to do with honor, viz., insofar as the honor in question has the character of something *great* or *arduous*.

Reply to objection 2: Even if honor is not a passion or an action, it is still the *object* of a certain passion, viz. hope, that tends toward *the arduous good*. And so magnanimity has to do immediately with the passion of hope and mediately with honor as the object of the hope—just as it was explained above (q. 123, aa. 3-4) in the case of fortitude that fortitude has to do with the danger of death insofar as that danger is the object of fear and daring.

Reply to objection 3: Those who disdain honors in the sense that they do nothing inappropriate for the sake of gaining them and do not value them excessively are praiseworthy. However, if someone were to disdain honors in such a way that he did not take care to do things that are worthy of honor, then this would be blameworthy. And magnanimity has to do with honor in the sense that *it strives to do what is worthy of honor* and not in the sense that it thinks of human honor as something great.

Article 2

Does magnanimity by its nature have to do with great honor?

It seems that magnanimity does not by its nature have to do with great honor:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), the proper subject matter of magnanimity is honor. But honor admits of *great* and *small*. Therefore, it is not part of the nature of magnanimity to deal [only] with great honor.

Objection 2: Just as magnanimity has to do with honors, so mildness (*mansuetudo*) has to do with instances of anger. But it is not part of the nature of mildness to deal [only] with great anger or [only] with limited anger. Therefore, it is likewise not part of the nature of magnanimity to deal [only] with great honors.

Objection 3: A small honor is less distant from a great honor than is dishonor. But a magnanimous individual behaves well with respect to being dishonored. Therefore, he likewise behaves well with respect to small honors. Therefore, magnanimity does not have to do only with great honors.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, "Magnanimity has to do with great honors."

I respond: According to the Philosopher in *Physics* 7, "A virtue is a sort of perfection." And, as is clear from *De Caelo* 1, it is understood to be the perfection of a power that reaches its limit.

Now the perfection of a power occurs not in just any sort of operation, but instead in an operation that has a certain greatness or difficulty; for any power, however imperfect it might be, is capable of some limited and weak operation. And so as *Ethics* 2 puts it, a virtue's nature "involves something *difficult* and *good*."

Now *the difficult* and *the great*, which belong to the same thing, can be thought of in two ways in an act of virtue:

(a) in one way, *on the part of reason*, insofar as it is difficult to discover the mean of reason and to establish it in a given subject matter. And this is the only difficulty found in the case of the act of an intellectual virtue and, again, in the case of an act of justice.

(b) In the second way, the difficulty is *on the part of the subject matter*, which can have in its own right a resistance to the mode of reason that is supposed to be established in it (*quae de se repugnantiam habere potest ad modum rations qui est circa eam ponendus*). And this sort of difficulty is found in the other moral virtues, which have to do with the passions, since, as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "The passions struggle against reason."

Now on this score one should note that there are some passions that have a strong power to resist reason mainly on the part of *the passion itself*, whereas some resist reason mainly on the part of *the things that are the objects of the passions*.

Now passions do not have much power to fight against reason unless they are vehement, since the sentient appetite, in which the passions reside, is naturally subject to reason. And so the virtues that have to do with passions of this sort are posited only with respect to what is great in the passions themselves, in the way that *fortitude* has to do with the strongest instances of fear and daring, and in the way that *temperance* has to do with disordered desires for the greatest pleasures (*circa maximarum delectationum concupiscentias*), and in the way that *mildness* has to do with the instances of the greatest anger.

On the other hand, certain passions have a lot of power to struggle with reason because of the exterior things themselves that are the objects of the passion, as with the love of or disordered desire for wealth or honor (*sicut amor vel cupiditas pecuniae seu honoris*). And with these things what is needed is not only a virtue that has to do with what is greatest among them but also a virtue that has to do with what is ordinary or lesser, since even if the exterior things in question are small, they are very desirable in the sense of being necessary for a man's life. And this is why there are two virtues having to do with the desire for monetary wealth, one concerning ordinary or moderate amounts of money, viz., *generosity*, and the other concerning large amounts of money, viz., *magnificence*. Similarly, there are two virtues that have to do with honor. One has to do with *ordinary* honors and has no name, but is instead named by its extremes, viz., *philotimia*, i.e., a love of honor, and *aphilotimia*, i.e., the absence of a love for honor; for sometimes it is an individual who loves honor who is praised, whereas sometimes it is an individual who does not care about honor, since both can occur with moderation. On the other hand, with respect to great honors the virtue is *magnanimity*.

And so one should reply that the proper subject matter of magnanimity is *great honor*, and that the magnanimous individual tends toward those things that are worthy of great honor.

Reply to objection 1: *Great* and *small* are related incidentally to honor considered in itself, but they make for a big difference when they are put into relation with reason, whose mode must be observed in making use of honor and is such that it is much more difficult to observe it in the case of great honors than in the case of small honors.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of anger and other subject matters there is no notable difficultly except for a case in which [the passion] is very great, and it is only in this respect that a virtue is needed.

However, the line of reasoning is different for wealth and honor, which are entities that exist outside the soul.

Reply to objection 3: An individual who makes good use of great things is all the more able to make good use of small things. Therefore, an individual who has magnanimity looks upon great honors as something of which he is worthy, and he likewise looks upon minor honors as something of which he is worthy, since virtue, to which honor is due from God, cannot be sufficiently honored by men. And so the magnanimous individual is not lifted up by great honors, since he does not think of them as beyond him, but he instead disdains them—and all the more so with ordinary or small honors. Similarly, he is not broken by dishonor but instead disdains it in the sense that he thinks of it as having been brought upon him undeservedly.

Article 3

Is magnanimity a virtue?

It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue:

Objection 1: Every virtue consists in a mean. But magnanimity does not consist in a mean; instead, it consists in a maximum, since, as *Ethics* 4 puts it, "[The magnanimous individual] deems himself worthy of the greatest things." Therefore, magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 2: As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 65), an individual who has one virtue has all the virtues. But an individual can have a virtue without having magnanimity; for as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, "If someone is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them, then he is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore, magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 3: As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 55, a. 4), a virtue is a good quality of the mind. But magnanimity includes certain bodily dispositions, since in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man that "his movement is slow, his voice is deep, and his speech is steady." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 4: No virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since, as is pointed out in *Ethics* 4, a magnanimous individual deems himself worthy of great things and disdains other people. Therefore, magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 5: Each virtue is such that its properties are praiseworthy. But magnanimity includes certain blameworthy properties: first, that a magnanimous individual "is not mindful of his benefactors" (*non memor benefactorum*); second, that he is "unengaged and slow to act" (*otiosus et tardus*); third, that he "makes use of self-depreciation in front of many people" (*utitur ironia ad multos*); fourth, that he "cannot get along with others" (*non potest alii convivere*); fifth, that "he holds on to what is unfruitful rather than to what is fruitful" (*magis possidet infructuosa quam fructuosa*). Therefore, magnanimity is not a virtue.

But contrary to this: 2 Maccabees 14:18 says in praise of certain people: "Nicanor, hearing of the valor of Judas' companions and of the greatness of spirit [*animi magnitudinem*] with which they fought for their fatherland, etc." But it is only the works of the virtues that are praiseworthy. Therefore, magnanimity, which involves having an expansive spirit (*magnum animum habere*), is a virtue.

I respond: The nature of human virtue involves preserving the good of reason in human affairs, and this is the proper good of man. Now, as has been explained (a. 1), honors occupy a special place among exterior goods. And so magnanimity, which posits the mode of reason with respect to great honors, is a virtue.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, "The magnanimous individual is at the extreme in magnitude (*est quidem magnitudine extremus*)"—that is, insofar as he tends toward the greatest things—"but he is the mean to the extent that this is required (*eo autem quod ut oportet medius*)"—that is, because it is in accord with reason that he should tend toward the things that are greatest—"... because he deems himself worthy in accord with his [true] worth"—that is, he does not extend himself to what is greater than he is worthy of.

Reply to objection 2: The connectedness of the virtues should not be understood as applying to *acts*, i.e., it should not be taken to mean that everyone [who is virtuous] has the acts of all the virtues. Hence, the act of magnanimity does not belong to every virtuous individual, but only to great individuals.

However, because of the *principles of the virtues*, which are *prudence* and *grace*, all the virtues are connected as *habits* that exist simultaneously in the soul, either in actuality or in a proximate disposition. And so it is possible for someone who does not have the *act* of magnanimity to have the *habit* of magnanimity, through which he is disposed to execute a magnanimous act if it is appropriate for him according to his state.

Reply to objection 3: Bodily movements are diversified in accord with the diverse apprehensions

and affections of the soul. And on this score it is possible for certain determinate accidents having to do with bodily movement to follow upon magnanimity. For quickness of movement arises from the fact that a man intends many things which he is hurrying to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous individual tends only toward great things, which are few and which require a great attention; and so he moves slowly. Similarly, high-pitched and rapid speech belongs mainly to those who want to argue about everything; this does not apply to magnanimous individuals, who do not interject themselves except about great matters. And just as the aforementioned dispositions toward bodily movements are appropriate for magnanimous individuals because of the mode of their affections, so, too, such conditions are found naturally in those who are naturally disposed toward magnanimity.

Reply to objection 4: In a man one finds *something great*, which he possesses because of a gift from God, and *something defective*, which belongs to him because of the weakness of his nature.

Therefore, *magnanimity* brings it about that a man deems himself worthy of great things when he considers the gifts that he has from God; for instance, if great virtue belongs to his spirit, magnanimity makes him tend toward *perfect* works of virtue. And the same thing should be said about the use that he makes of every other good, e.g., scientific knowledge or exterior good fortune. On the other hand, *humility* makes a man think little of himself when he considers his own defectiveness.

Similarly, *magnanimity* disdains others insofar as they forsake the gifts of God (*secundum quod deficiunt a donis Dei*), since it does not value others to such an extent that it would do something bad for their sake. On the other hand, *humility* honors others and thinks of them as superior insofar as it sees in them something of the gifts of God. Hence, Psalm 14:4 says of the just man, "In his sight the bad man counts for nothing"—which pertains to magnanimity's disdaining others—"but he glorifies those who fear the Lord"—which pertains to humility's honoring others.

And so it is clear that magnanimity and humility are not contraries even though they seem to tend toward things that are contrary, and this because they proceed from different ways of considering things.

Reply to objection 5: The properties in question, insofar as they pertain to the magnanimous individual, are not blameworthy but are instead exceptionally praiseworthy.

For the first one, viz., that the magnanimous individual "does not remember whom he has received benefits from," should be understood to mean that it is not pleasant for him to receive benefits from anyone without his paying them back more. This involves a perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wants to excel, just as he wants to excel in the actions of the other virtues.

Again, secondly, he is said to be "unengaged and slow to act" not because he fails to do what is suitable for him to do, but because he does not busy himself with just any sort of works that might be suitable but instead undertakes only great things of the sort that befit him.

Again, third, he is said to make use of self-depreciation, not insofar as it is opposed to truth—i.e., in the sense that he ascribes to himself certain vile things that are not so or denies certain great things that are so—but because he does not show off the whole of his greatness, especially to a crowd of his inferiors. For as the Philosopher puts it in the same place, it pertains to the magnanimous individual "to be great in the presence of persons of dignity and affluence and unassuming in the presence of ordinary people."

Again, fourth, he is said "not to be able to get along with others"—i.e., in a familiar way—"except with his friends," because he altogether avoids adulation and imitation, which involve a smallness of mind. Yet, as has been explained, he gets along with everyone, great and small, to the extent that it is necessary.

Again, fifth, he is said to have more unfruitful things—not just any sort of unfruitful things, but good, i.e., upright, things. For in all matters he prefers upright things to useful things as greater things, since useful things are sought in order to make up for some sort of defect—which is incompatible with magnanimity.

Article 4

Is magnanimity a specific virtue?

It seems that magnanimity is not a specific virtue:

Objection 1: No virtue that is specific operates in all virtues. But in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says that what pertains to the magnanimous individual is "that which is great in every virtue." Therefore magnanimity is not a specific virtue.

Objection 2: No virtue that is specific is such that acts of diverse virtues are attributed to it. But the acts of diverse virtues are attributed to the magnanimous individual; for *Ethics* 4 says that being a magnanimous individual means (a) "not avoiding someone who exhorts him" (which is an act of *prudence*); (b) "not doing unjust things" (which is an act of *justice*); (c) "being prompt in doing good" (which belongs to *charity*); (d) "promptly helping out" (which is an act of *generosity*); (e) "being truthful" (which is an act of *truthfulness*); and "not complaining" (which is an act of *patience*). Therefore, magnanimity is not a specific virtue.

Objection 3: Every virtue is a sort of spiritual adornment of the soul—this according to Isaiah 61:10 ("The Lord has clothed me with the garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "like a bride adorned with her jewels"). But as *Ethics* 4 says, magnanimity is "the adornment of all the virtues." Therefore, magnanimity is a *general* virtue.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher distinguishes magnanimity from the other virtues.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), it belongs to a specific virtue to establish the mode of reason in some determinate subject matter. But as was likewise explained above (aa. 1-2), magnanimity establishes the mode of reason with respect to a determinate subject matter, viz., honors. Now honor, considered in its own right, is a certain specific good. And, accordingly, magnanimity, considered in its own right, is a certain specific virtue.

However, since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 103, a. 1), honor is the reward for every virtue, it follows as a consequence that by reason of its own subject matter, magnanimity has a relation to all the virtues.

Reply to objection 1: Magnanimity has to do not with just any sort of honor, but with great honor. Now just as honor is owed to virtue, so, too, great honor is owed to a great work of virtue. Hence, the magnanimous individual does great things in every virtue in the sense that he tends toward those things that are worthy of great honor.

Reply to objection 2: Since the magnanimous individual tends toward great things, it follows that he mainly tends toward those things which imply some sort of excellence and he avoids those things that involve defectiveness.

Now it involves a certain excellence for someone to act well, to share many things, and to return many favors. And so he shows himself to be prompt with respect to these things insofar as they have the character of an excellence, though not insofar as they have the character of being acts of other virtues.

On the other hand, it involves defectiveness for someone to value good or bad exterior things to such an extent that for their sake he turns away from justice or from some other virtue. Again, it involves defectiveness to hide the truth in any way, since this seems to proceed from fear. Again, it involves defectiveness for someone to complain, since the mind seems thereby to succumb to exterior evils. And so the magnanimous individual avoids these and similar things for a specific reason, viz., as contraries to excellence or greatness.

Reply to objection 3: Every virtue has a certain comeliness or adornment by its own species, and this is proper to each virtue. But by the very greatness of a virtuous work another adornment is added through magnanimity, which, as *Ethics* 4 puts it, "makes all the virtues greater."

Article 5

Is magnanimity a part of fortitude?

It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude:

Objection 1: The same thing is not a part of its own self. But magnanimity seems to be the same thing as fortitude. For in *De Quatuor Virtutibus* Seneca says, "*Magnanimity*, which is also called *fortitude*, is such that if it exists in your soul, then you live with great confidence." And in *De Officiis* 1 Tully says, "We want to claim that courageous individuals are the same as magnanimous individuals, friends of truth and not at all false." Therefore, magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "The magnanimous individual is not *philokindynus*," i.e., a lover of danger. But being a courageous individual involves exposing oneself to dangers. Therefore, magnanimity does not fit in with fortitude in the sense of being able to be called a part of it.

Objection 3: Magnanimity has to do with greatness in hoping for goods, whereas fortitude has to do with greatness in fearing what is bad or daring to take it on. But goodness is more central than badness. Therefore, magnanimity is a more principal virtue than fortitude. Therefore, it is not a part of fortitude.

But contrary to this: Macrobius and Andronicus claim that magnanimity is a part of fortitude.

I respond: As was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 61, aa. 3-4), a principal virtue is a virtue which involves setting up a general mode of virtue in some principal subject matter. Now among the general modes of virtue, one is *firmness of mind* (*firmitas animi*), since, as *Ethics* 2 explains, one is required "to behave with firmness" in every virtue.

However, this firmness is mainly praised in virtues which tend toward something arduous and in which it is very difficult to maintain firmness. And so the more difficult it is to behave with firmness regarding something arduous, the more principal is the virtue which gives firmness to the mind regarding it.

Now it is more difficult to behave with firmness in the face of the danger of death, with respect to which *fortitude* strengthens the mind, than in cases of hoping for or attaining the greatest goods, with respect to which *magnanimity* strengthens the mind. For just as a man loves his own life most of all, so he shies away from the danger of death most of all.

So, then, it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude insofar as it strengthens the mind with respect to something arduous, but it falls short of fortitude because it strengthens the mind in a matter in which it is easier to maintain firmness. Hence, magnanimity is posited as a part of fortitude because it is adjoined to it in the way that what is secondary is adjoined to what is principal.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, "*Lacking evil* is found in the notion *good*." Hence, it is likewise the case that not being overcome by a serious evil, e.g., by the danger of death, is in a certain sense substituted for attaining to a great good—the first of these involving *fortitude* and the second *magnanimity*. And on this score fortitude and magnanimity can be taken to be the same. However, since there is a different measure of difficulty in the two situations just mentioned, Aristotle posits magnanimity, properly speaking, as a virtue different from fortitude.

Reply to objection 2: Someone is called a lover of danger when he exposes himself to dangers indifferently, and this seems to pertain to someone who indifferently thinks of many things as great—which is contrary to the character of the magnanimous individual. For no one, it seems, exposes himself to dangers for the sake of something unless he thinks of that thing as great.

By contrast, a magnanimous individual is very prompt in exposing himself to danger for the sake of things that are genuinely great, since he does what is great in his acts of fortitude just as he does in acts of the other virtues. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that the magnanimous individual "is not *microkindynus*"—that is, one who endangers himself for small things—"but *makrokindynus*"—that

is, one who endangers himself for great things. And in *De Quatuor Virtutibus* Seneca says, "You will be magnanimous if you neither seek dangers like a rash man nor fear them like a timid man. For nothing makes the spirit timid except the consciousness of a reprehensible life."

Reply to objection 3: Evil as such (*malum inquantum huiusmodi*) is to be avoided, whereas persisting in opposition to evil is incidental (*per accidens*), viz., insofar as it is necessary to endure evils in order to preserve what is good. By contrast, the good is to be desired in its own right (*de se appetendum*) and fleeing from what is good is always incidental (*per accidens*), viz., insofar as the good is thought to exceed the capability of the one who desires it.

Now what is *per se* is more important than what is *per accidens*. And so what is arduous in bad things is more in conflict with firmness of mind than what is arduous in good things is. And so fortitude is a more principal virtue than magnanimity; for even if the good is, absolutely speaking, more principal than the bad, the bad is nonetheless more principal on this score.

Article 6

Does confidence belong to magnanimity?

It seems that confidence (*fiducia*) does not belong to magnanimity:

Objection 1: Someone can have confidence not only in himself but also in another—this according to 2 Corinthians 3:4-5 ("We have confidence through Christ in God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if it were from ourselves"). But this seems to be contrary to the nature of magnanimity. Therefore, confidence does not belong to magnanimity.

Objection 2: Confidence seems to be opposed to fear—this according to Isaiah 12:2 ("I will act with confidence, and I will not be afraid"). But to lack fear belongs more to fortitude. Therefore, confidence likewise belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.

Objection 3: A reward should not be given except for virtue. But a reward should be given for confidence; for Hebrews 3:6 says, "We are the house of Christ ... if we hold fast to the confidence and glory of hope right to the end." Therefore, confidence is a certain virtue distinct from magnanimity; this is likewise seen through the fact that Macrobius divides confidence off from magnanimity on the same level.

But contrary to this: As was noted above (q. 128, a. 6), in his *Rhetorica* Cicero seems to posit confidence in the place of magnanimity.

I respond: The name *fiducia* (confidence) seems to be taken from *fides* (faith). Now faith involves believing something and someone, whereas confidence involves hope—this according to Job 11:18 ("You shall have confidence, hope being set before you"). And so the name 'confidence' seems mainly to signify that an individual engenders hope from the fact that he believes the words of someone who is promising to help him. However, since a strong opinion is likewise called *faith*, and since it happens that one has a strong opinion about something not only because of what is said by another but also because of what is thought about in another, it follows that confidence can mean that by which an individual engenders hope for a given thing from something that he thinks about—sometimes *something within himself*, as when an individual, seeing that he is healthy, is confident that he will live a long time, and sometimes *something within another*, as when an individual, considering that his friend is powerful, is confident that he will be assisted by him.

Now it was explained above (a. 1) that magnanimity has to do properly with the hope for something arduous. And so, since confidence implies a strength of hope that derives from a thought which effects a strong opinion about pursuing a good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 4, "It belongs to the magnanimous individual not to need anything," since need belongs to one who is deficient. Yet this should be

understood to mean: *according to the human mode*, and this is why he adds, "or scarcely to need anything." For it is beyond a man not to need anything at all, since every man needs, first of all, God's assistance, and, secondly, human assistance as well, since man is naturally a social being because he is not sufficient unto himself for his life. Therefore, insofar as he needs others, it belongs to the magnanimous individual to have confidence in others, since it likewise pertains to a man's excellence that he should have others at hand who can help him.

On the other hand, insofar as he himself is capable of something, magnanimity involves the confidence that he has in himself.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above when we were talking about the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 23, a. 2 and q. 40, a. 4), *hope* (*spes*) is directly opposed to *despair* (*desperatio*), which has the same object, viz. *the good*. On the other hand, if we assume contrariety among the objects, then *hope* is opposed to *fear*, which has *the bad* as its object.

Now confidence implies a sort of strength of hope. And so it is opposed to fear in the same way that hope is. But because fortitude properly speaking strengthens a man against evils, whereas magnanimity strengthens him in the pursuit of honor, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude.

On the other hand, since hope is a cause of daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows that confidence belongs to fortitude in the manner of a consequence.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, confidence implies a certain mode of hope, since confidence is hope that has been strengthened by a firm opinion. Now a mode applied to an affection can be relevant to the commendation of the act, in the sense that the act is thereby meritorious without thereby being determined to a species of virtue; rather, the species comes from the subject matter.

And so 'confidence' cannot, properly speaking, be the name of a virtue, though it can be the name of a condition that belongs to a virtue. And it is on this score that confidence is counted as a part of fortitude—not in the sense that it is a virtue adjoined to fortitude (except insofar as *confidence* is taken for *magnanimity* in the manner of Tully), but in the sense, explained above (q. 128), that it is like an *integral part*.

Article 7

Does security belong to magnanimity?

It seems that security (*securitas*) does not belong to magnanimity:

Objection 1: As was established above (q. 128, a. 1), security implies a certain sort of rest from the perturbations caused by fear. But this is what fortitude effects most of all. Therefore, security seems to be the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; instead, it is just the opposite. Therefore, neither does security belong to magnanimity.

Objection 2: In *Etymologia* Isidore says, "*Security* means *without fear*." But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which cares about upright matters—this according to the Apostle in 2 Timothy 2:15 ("Take care to present yourself to God as proven"). Therefore, security does not belong to magnanimity, which does what is great in all the virtues.

Objection 3: A virtue is not the same thing as the virtue's reward. But as is clear from Job 11:14 and 18 ("If you put away the iniquity that lies in your hand ... you will sleep secure when you are buried"), security is posited as a reward for virtue. Therefore, security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue as its part.

But contrary to this: In *De Officiis* 1 Tully says that it belongs to magnanimity "not to succumb either to the perturbation of the mind, or to any man, or to fortune." But this is what a man's security consists in. Therefore, security belongs to magnanimity.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Fear makes men take counsel," viz., insofar as they care about how they might escape what they fear. Now security implies the removal of this solicitude which fear engenders. And so security implies a kind of complete repose of the mind from fear, just as confidence implies a certain strength of hope. And so just as hope belongs directly to magnanimity, so security belongs directly to fortitude.

However, one should note that, as was established above when we were talking about the passions (*ST* 1-2, q. 45, a. 2), just as hope is a cause of daring, so fear is a cause of despair. And so just as confidence belongs to fortitude in the manner of a consequence insofar as it makes use of daring, so security belongs to magnanimity in the manner of a consequence insofar as it drives off despair.

Reply to objection 1: Fortitude is not praised mainly because it has no fear—which is what security involves. Instead, it is praised mainly because it involves a certain firmness in the passions. Hence, security is not the same as fortitude, but is instead a certain condition of fortitude.

Reply to objection 2: Not every instance of security is praiseworthy; instead, security is praiseworthy when an individual sets aside his cares (*deponit curam*) in the way that he should and in matters about which he should have no fear. And it is in this sense that security is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.

Reply to objection 3: As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 5, aa. 3 and 7), there is in the virtues a certain similitude of and participation in future beatitude. And so nothing prevents security from being a condition of a given virtue, even though *perfect* security belongs to the reward for virtue.

Article 8

Do the goods of fortune contribute to magnanimity?

It seems that the goods of fortune do not contribute to magnanimity:

Objection 1: As Seneca says in *De Ira*, "Virtue is sufficient unto itself." But as has been explained (a. 4), magnanimity makes all the virtues great. Therefore, the goods of fortune do not contribute to magnanimity.

Objection 2: No virtuous individual disdains those things by which he is aided. But a magnanimous individual disdains what belongs to external fortune; for in *De Officiis* 1 Tully says that an expansive spirit (*magnus animus*) "is commended for despising external things." Therefore, magnanimity is not aided by the goods of fortune.

Objection 3: In the same place Tully adds, "It belongs to a expansive spirit to bear what seems troublesome in such a way as to depart not at all from his natural state or from the dignity of a wise man." And in *Ethics* 4 Aristotle says, "A magnanimous individual is not saddened by misfortune." But troublesome things and misfortunes are opposed to the goods of fortune, whereas everyone is saddened by the removal of those things by which he is aided. Therefore, the external goods of fortune do not contribute to magnanimity.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "Good fortune seems to contribute to magnanimity."

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (a. 1), magnanimity has to do with two things: (a) *honor* as its *subject matter*, and (b) *doing something great* as its *end*. Now the goods of fortune cooperate with respect to both of these things.

For since honor is bestowed on the virtuous not only by the wise, but also by the multitude, which thinks of these sorts of external goods of fortune as the greatest goods, it follows as a consequence that the multitude shows greater honor to those who have the exterior goods of fortune.

Similarly, the goods of fortune organically promote acts of virtue, since a facility to operate is given to us through wealth and power and friends.

And so it is clear that the goods of fortune contribute to magnanimity.

Reply to objection 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient unto itself because it can also exist without the exterior goods in question. But it nonetheless needs those exterior goods in order to operate more expeditiously.

Reply to objection 2: A magnanimous individual disdains exterior goods insofar as he does not think of them as great goods for the sake of which he should do something improper. But he does not disdain them to such a degree that he would not consider them useful for carrying out his works of virtue.

Reply to objection 3: If someone does not think of something as great, then neither does he rejoice much if he obtains it or grieve much if he loses it. And so, since a magnanimous individual does not think of the exterior goods of fortune as great goods, it follows that he does not exult very much if they are present and is not much dejected at the loss of them.