

QUESTION 19

The Gift of Fear

We next have to consider the gift of fear. On this topic there are twelve questions: (1) Should God be feared? (2) Is fear appropriately divided into filial fear, initial fear, servile fear, and worldly fear? (3) Is worldly fear always bad? (4) Is servile fear good? (5) Is servile fear the same in substance as filial fear? (6) Is servile fear excluded when charity arrives? (7) Is fear the beginning of wisdom? (8) Is initial fear the same in substance as filial fear? (9) Is fear a gift of the Holy Spirit? (10) Does fear increase as charity increases? (11) Does fear remain in heaven? (12) What in the beatitudes and the fruits [of the Holy Spirit] corresponds to fear?

Article 1

Can God be feared?

It seems that God cannot be feared (*timeri non possit*):

Objection 1: As was established above (*ST* 1-2, q. 41, a. 2 and q. 42, a. 1), the object of fear is something that is bad and future. But God is devoid of everything bad, since He is goodness itself. Therefore, God cannot be feared.

Objection 2: Fear is opposed to hope. But we have hope with respect to God. Therefore, we cannot simultaneously fear Him.

Objection 3: In *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “We fear those things from which evils come to us.” However, evils come to us not from God, but from ourselves—this according to Hosea 13:9 (“Destruction, O Israel, is yours, whereas your help is from me”). Therefore, God should not be feared.

But contrary to this: Jeremiah 10:7 says, “Who will not fear you?” And Malachi 1:6 says, “If I am the master, where is the fear of me?”

I respond: Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future good itself, the acquisition of which one looks forward to, whereas the other is the help of someone through whom one expects to acquire what he hopes for, so, too, fear can have two objects, one of which is the bad thing itself that a man seeks refuge from, whereas the other is that from which this bad thing can come.

Thus, God, who is goodness itself, cannot be an object of fear in the first way.

However, God can be an object of fear in the second way, viz., insofar as something bad can threaten us that is *from Him* or that is *bad in comparison to Him*.

More specifically, the *evil of punishment (malum poenae)*, which is not an evil absolutely speaking but is good absolutely speaking and evil in a certain respect, can threaten us *from Him*. For since *good* is said as ordered toward an end, whereas *evil* implies a privation of this ordering, what is evil absolutely speaking is what excludes being ordered by the final end, and this is the evil of sin (*malum culpae*). By contrast, the evil of punishment is, to be sure, bad insofar as it deprives one of some particular good, but it is good absolutely speaking insofar as it depends on an ordering toward the ultimate end.

On the other hand, *in comparison with God*, what can come to us is the *evil of sin*, if we separate ourselves from Him (*si ab eo separemur*).

And so this is how God can be and should be feared.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through insofar as the object of fear is something that is bad.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of God one must consider both His *justice*, in accord with which He punishes those who sin, and also His *mercy*, in accord with which He liberates us. Thus, if we consider His justice, fear arises in us, whereas if we consider His mercy, hope arises in us. And so it is with respect to diverse notions that God is the object of hope and of fear.

Reply to objection 3: The evil of sin is not from God as its author, but is instead from us ourselves insofar as we withdraw from God.

By contrast, the evil of punishment is, to be sure, from God as its author insofar as it has the nature of something good, viz., because it is just. But the fact that punishment is justly inflicted on us stems in its origins from what is deserved because of our sin. It is in this sense that Wisdom 1:13 and 1:16 says, “God did not make death ... but the wicked with works and words have called it upon themselves.”

Article 2

Is fear appropriately divided into *filial* fear, *initial* fear, *servile* fear, and *worldly* fear?

It seems that fear is not appropriately divided into *filial* fear (*timor filialis*), *initial* fear (*timor initialis*), *servile* fear (*timor servilis*), and *worldly* fear (*timor mundanus*):

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene posits six species of fear, viz., sluggishness (*segnities*), shamefacedness or embarrassment (*erubescencia*), and the others which were discussed above (*ST* 1-2, q. 41, a. 4) and which are not mentioned in the division just enumerated. Therefore, it seems that this division of fear is inappropriate.

Objection 2: Each of these sorts of fear is either good or bad. But there is a sort of fear, viz., *natural* fear, which is neither (a) morally good, since it exists in the demons—this according to James 2:19 (“They believe, and they tremble”)—nor (b) morally bad, since it existed in Christ—this according to Mark 14:33 (“Jesus began to fear and to be heavy”). Therefore, fear is not appropriately divided in the way in question.

Objection 3: The relation of a child to his father, of a wife to her husband, and of a servant to his master are different from one another. But filial fear, which is the fear of a child in relation to his father, is distinct from servile fear, which is the fear of a servant in relation to his master. Therefore, *chaste fear*, which seems to be the fear of a wife in relation to her husband, ought to be distinguished from all the sorts of fear listed above.

Objection 4: Just as servile fear is afraid of punishment, so initial and worldly fear are afraid of punishment, too. Therefore, these sorts of fear should not be distinguished from one another.

Objection 5: Just as sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) is directed toward something good, so fear is directed toward something bad. But concupiscence of the eyes, by which one has a sentient desire for a worldly good, is different from concupiscence of the flesh, by which one has a sentient desire for one’s own pleasure. Therefore, *worldly* fear, by which one is afraid of losing exterior goods, is likewise different from *human* fear, by which one is afraid of the loss of his own person.

But contrary to this is the authority of the Master in *Sentences* 3, dist. 34.

I respond: We are at present talking about fear insofar as through it we are in some sense turned toward God or turned away from Him.

For since the object of fear is something bad, sometimes a man withdraws from God because of bad things that he fears, and this is called *human* or *worldly* fear.

By contrast, sometimes a man turns toward God and adheres to Him because of something bad that he fears. Now there are two sorts of bad things, viz., the evil of punishment and the evil of sin. Thus, if someone is turned toward God and adheres to Him because of his fear of punishment, then this will be *servile* fear. On the other hand, if he does this because of his fear of sinning, then this will be *filial* fear, for it belongs to children to be afraid of offending their father (*filiorum est timere offensam patris*). And if he does this for both reasons, then this is *initial* fear, which lies between servile fear and filial fear. Now when we were discussing the passion of fear above (*ST* 1-2, q. 42, a. 3), it was established that the evil of sin can be feared.

Reply to objection 1: Damascene is dividing fear insofar as it is a passion of the soul. However, as has been explained, the present division is of fear as ordered toward God.

Reply to objection 2: The moral good consists principally in turning toward God, whereas what is morally bad consists principally in turning away from God. And so all the kinds of fear in question imply either moral goodness or moral badness. On the other hand, natural fear is presupposed by moral goodness and moral badness. And this is why it is not enumerated among these sorts of fear.

Reply to objection 3: The relation of a servant to his master stems from the power of the master, who subjects the servant to himself, whereas the relation of a child to his father or of a wife to her husband stems, conversely, from the affection of the child, who submits himself to his father, or from the affection of the wife, who joins herself to her husband by a union of love.

Hence, filial fear and chaste fear are of a piece with one another (*pertinent ad idem*). For through the love of charity God becomes our Father—this according to Romans 8:15 (“You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry out, ‘Abba’”). And it is in accord with the same charity that he is even called our spouse—this according to 2 Corinthians 11:2 (“I have espoused you to one husband, in order to present you as a chaste virgin to Christ”).

By contrast, servile fear is something else, since it does not include charity in its nature.

Reply to objection 4: Three of the types of fear noted here have to do with punishment, but in different ways. For worldly or human fear has to do with punishment that turns one away from God and which is sometimes inflicted or threatened by the enemies of God. By contrast, servile fear and initial fear have to do with the punishment by which men are attracted to God and which is inflicted or threatened by God. This is the punishment which servile fear principally has to do with, whereas initial fear has to do with it in a secondary way.

Reply to objection 5: It is for the same reason that a man is turned away from God because of his fear of losing worldly goods and because of his fear of losing the soundness of his own body; for exterior goods belong to the body. And so the two sorts of fear are being counted here as the same thing, even though the evils that they are afraid of are diverse, just as the goods that they desire are diverse. To be sure, sins that are diverse in species stem from this diversity, and yet it is common to all these sins that they lead one away from God.

Article 3

Is worldly fear always bad?

It seems that worldly fear is not always bad:

Objection 1: It seems to belong to human fear that we should revere men. But some are blamed for not revering men, as is clear from what Luke 18:2 says of the unjust judge, “He neither feared God nor revered men.” Therefore, it seems that worldly fear is not always bad.

Objection 2: Punishments that are inflicted by secular powers seem to be relevant to worldly fear. But we are motivated to act well by such punishments—this according to Romans 13:3 (“Do you want not to be afraid of the power? Do what is good, and you shall have praise from it”). Therefore, worldly fear is not always bad.

Objection 3: What is in us naturally does not seem to be bad, because natural things exist in us from God. But it is natural for a man to fear damage to his own body and the loss of the temporal goods by which the present life is sustained. Therefore, it seems that worldly fear is not always bad.

But contrary to this: In Matthew 10:28 our Lord says, “Do not fear those who kill the body,” where it is worldly fear that is being prohibited. But nothing is prohibited by God unless it is bad. Therefore, worldly fear is bad.

I respond: As is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 2 and q. 54, a. 2), moral acts and habits have both their species and their name from their object. On the other hand, every appetitive

movement is specified and named from its proper end. For instance, if one were to call the love of work greed (*cupiditas*), given that men work because of greed, then he would not have named it correctly, since those who are greedy seek work not as an end but as a means to an end, whereas they seek riches as their end. Hence, it is the desire for or love of riches, which is bad, that is correctly called greed.

In the same way, it is the love by which someone depends on the world as an end that is properly called worldly love. And worldly love, so taken, is always bad. Now as is clear from Augustine in 83 *Quaestiones*, fear takes its origin from love, since a man is afraid of losing what he loves. And so worldly fear is the fear that stems from worldly love as from a bad root. And because of this worldly love is likewise always bad.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible ways for someone to revere men:

In one way, insofar as there is something divine in them, viz., the good of grace or the good of virtue or, at least, the good of being a natural image of God; and it is in this sense that someone who does not revere men is blamed.

In a second way, someone can hold revere men insofar as they are opposed to God. And in this sense those who do not revere men are praised—this according to Ecclesiasticus 48:13 in speaking of Elijah or Elisha (“In his days he did not fear the ruler”).

Reply to objection 2: When secular powers inflict punishments in order to draw individuals back from sin, in so doing they are ministers of God—this according to Romans 13:4 (“For he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that does evil”). And in this sense fearing the secular power belongs not to worldly fear, but to servile fear or initial fear.

Reply to objection 3: It is natural that a man should flee from damage to his own body or even from the loss of temporal things, but it is contrary to natural reason that a man should recede from justice because of these things. Hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher likewise says that there are certain things, viz., works of sin, which a man should not be forced into by any sort of fear, since it is worse to commit such sins than to suffer any sort of punishment.

Article 4

Is servile fear good?

It seems that servile fear is not good:

Objection 1: If the use of a thing is bad, then the thing itself is bad. But the use of servile fear is bad; for a Gloss on Romans 8:15 says, “If a man does anything through fear, even if what he does is good, it is not well done.” Therefore, servile fear is not good.

Objection 2: What stems from a root of sin is not good. But servile fear stems from a root of sin, since in commenting on Job 3:11 (“Why did I not die in the womb?”), Gregory says, “When present punishment is feared because of sin and the lost face of God is not loved, the fear stems from pride (*ex tumore*) and not from humility.” Therefore, servile fear is bad.

Objection 3: Just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of charity, so servile fear seems to be opposed to chaste fear. But mercenary love is always bad. Therefore, so is servile fear.

But contrary to this: Nothing bad is from the Holy Spirit. But servile fear is from the Holy Spirit, since a Gloss on Romans 8:15 (“You have not received a spirit of bondage”) says, “There is one Spirit who effects two sorts of fear, viz., servile fear and chaste fear.” Therefore, servile fear is not bad.

I respond: On the part of its being servile (*ex parte servilitatis*), servile fear has something that is bad. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Hence, since, as is said at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, one who is free exists in his own right (*causa sui est*), a servant is one who does not act in his own right but acts in the sense of being moved by something extrinsic. Now if one does something out of love,

then he acts, as is were, on his own (*ex seipso*), since he is moved to act by his own inclination. And so it is contrary to the nature of what is servile that one should act out of love. So then, servile fear, insofar as it is servile, is contrary to charity.

Therefore, if being servile were part of the nature of fear, then servile fear would have to be bad absolutely speaking, in the same way that adultery is absolutely bad because something that is opposed to charity belongs to the species of adultery. But the sort of servileness in question does not belong to the species of servile fear, just as being unformed does not belong to the species of unformed faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from its object. But the object of servile fear is punishment, and it happens either that (a) the good which is opposed to this punishment is loved as an ultimate end and, as a result, the punishment is feared as the principal evil—this is what happens in the case of one who does not have charity—or that (b) the punishment is ordered toward God as an end and, as a result, it is not feared as the principal evil—this is what happens in one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not destroyed by the fact that its object or end is ordered toward some more ultimate end. And so servile fear is good in its substance, but its being servile is bad.

Reply to objection 1: This passage from Augustine should be understood to apply to the case of one who does something out of servile fear insofar as it is servile, i.e., one who does not love justice but only fears punishment.

Reply to objection 2: Servile fear does not in its substance stem from pride. Rather, its being servile is born of pride, viz., insofar as a man does not through love will to subject his affections to the yoke of justice.

Reply to objection 3: A mercenary love is one which loves God for the sake of temporal goods and is contrary to charity in its own right. And so mercenary love is always bad.

By contrast, servile love does not in its substance imply anything but fear of punishment, regardless of whether or not it is feared as the principal evil (*sive timeatur ut principale malum sive non timeatur ut malum principale*).

Article 5

Is servile fear the same in substance as filial fear?

It seems that servile fear is the same in substance as filial fear:

Objection 1: Filial fear seems to be related to servile fear in the way that informed faith is related to unformed faith, one of which exists along with mortal sin, whereas the other does not. But informed faith and unformed faith are the same in substance (cf. q. 4, a. 4). Therefore, servile fear and filial fear are likewise the same in substance.

Objection 2: Habits are diversified by their objects. But the object of servile fear is the same as the object of filial fear, since it is God who is feared by both sorts of fear. Therefore, servile fear and filial fear are the same in substance.

Objection 3: Just as a man hopes to enjoy God and also to obtain benefits from Him, so, too, he fears being separated from God and suffering punishments from Him. But as has been explained (q. 17, aa. 2-3), it is the same hope by which we hope to enjoy God and by which we hope to obtain benefits from Him. Therefore, it is likewise the case that the filial fear by which we fear separation from God is the same as the servile fear by which we fear being punished by Him.

But contrary to this: In *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis* [*In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos*] Augustine says that there are two sorts of fear, the one servile and the other filial or chaste.

I respond: The object of fear is properly speaking something evil. And since, as is clear from what has been said (*ST* 1-2, q. 18, a. 5 and q. 54, a. 2), acts and habits are distinguished by their objects,

the types of fear differ in species in a way corresponding to the diversity of evils.

Now as is clear from what was said above (a. 1), the evil of punishment, which servile fear flees from, differs in species from the evil of sin, which filial fear flees from. Hence, it is clear that servile fear and filial fear differ from one another in species and are not the same in substance.

Reply to objection 1: Informed faith and unformed faith do not differ in their object, since both sorts of faith believe God and believe that God ... (cf. q. 2, a. 2), whereas they differ only because of something extrinsic, viz., the presence or absence of charity. And so they do not differ in substance.

By contrast, servile fear and filial fear differ in their objects. And so the lines of reasoning are not parallel.

Reply to objection 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not have the same relation to God. For servile fear looks to God as a principle that inflicts punishment, whereas filial fear looks to God not as an active principle of sin, but rather as the terminus that it fears being separated from by sin. And so they do not get an identity of species from this object which is God. For natural movements are also diversified in species by their relation to a given terminus; for instance, a movement toward whiteness is not the same in species as a movement away from whiteness.

Reply to objection 3: Hope looks to God as a principle both with respect to the enjoyment of God and with respect to every other benefit. But it is not this way with fear. And so the lines of reasoning are not parallel.

Article 6

Does servile fear remain when charity is present?

It seems that servile fear does not remain when charity is present (*non remaneat cum caritate*):

Objection 1: In *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis [In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos]* Augustine says, “When charity begins to live there, fear, which had prepared a place for it, is repelled.”

Objection 2: As Romans 5:5 says, “God’s charity is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.” But as 2 Corinthians 3:17 puts it, “Where the Spirit of the Lord dwells, there is freedom.” Therefore, since freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is expelled when charity arrives.

Objection 3: Servile fear is caused by love of oneself, insofar as punishment diminishes one’s own good. But the love of God expels love of self, since it makes one disdain himself—this is clear from the passage in Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei* 14 (“Love of God to the point of contempt for oneself builds up the city of God”). Therefore, it seems that when charity comes, servile fear is destroyed.

But contrary to this: As was claimed above (a. 4), servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit. But gifts of the Holy Spirit, through which the Holy Spirit dwells in us, are not destroyed when charity arrives. Therefore, servile fear is not destroyed when charity arrives.

I respond: Servile fear is caused by love of oneself, since it is a fear of punishment and punishment is to the detriment of one’s own good. Hence, fear of punishment is compatible with charity in the same sense in which love of self is compatible with charity; for the fact that a man desires his own good is of a piece (*eiusdem rationem*) with the fact that he fears being deprived of that good.

Now there are three ways in which the love of self can be related to charity:

In one way, it is *contrary to* charity, viz., to the extent that someone sets up his end in the love of his own good.

In a second way, it is *included within* charity, insofar as a man loves himself because of God and in God.

In the third way, love of self is, to be sure, *distinct from* charity but *not contrary to* charity, viz.,

when someone loves himself with respect to the notion of his own good, but in such a way that he does not set up his end in this proper good of his—just as there can likewise be some other special love of one’s neighbor over and beyond the love of charity, which is founded in God, when a neighbor is loved by reason of consanguinity or some other human condition, which it is nonetheless possible to refer to charity (*quae tamen referibilis sit ad caritatem*).

So, then, there is one way in which the fear of punishment is included within charity. For being separated from God is a punishment that charity especially flees from. Hence, this belongs to *chaste* fear.

However, in a second way the fear of punishment is contrary to charity, insofar as someone flees from a punishment contrary to his own natural good as the *principal* evil opposed to the good that is loved as an [ultimate] end. And in this sense the fear of punishment does not exist along with charity.

In a third way, the fear of punishment is distinct in substance from chaste fear, because the man fears the evil of punishment (*malum poenale*) not because it involves being separated from God (*non ratione separationis a Deo*), but because it is harmful to his own good—and yet his [ultimate] end is not set up in his own good, and so the evil in question is not feared as the *principal* evil. And such a fear of punishment can exist with charity. But as is clear from what has been said (a. 4), this sort of fear of punishment is not called ‘servile’ unless the punishment is feared as the *principal* evil.

And so insofar as it is servile, fear does not remain when charity is present; however, the *substance* of servile fear can remain when charity is present, just as love of self can remain when charity is present.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about fear insofar as it is servile.

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: The other two arguments are likewise talking about fear insofar as it is servile.

Article 7

Is fear the beginning of wisdom?

It seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom (*timor non sit initium sapientiae*):

Objection 1: A thing’s beginning is part of the thing (*initium est aliquid rei*). But fear is not a part of wisdom, since fear exists in the appetitive power, whereas wisdom exists in the intellective power. Therefore, it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

Objection 2: Nothing is a principle or beginning of its very own self (*nihil est principium sui ipsius*). But as Job 28:28 says, “The fear of God is itself wisdom.” Therefore, it seems that the fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.

Objection 3: There is nothing prior to a principle or beginning (*principio non est aliquid prius*). But there is something prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore, it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

But contrary to this: Psalm 110:10 says, “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom (*initium sapientiae*).”

I respond: There are two ways in which something can be said to be the beginning of wisdom: (a) because it is the beginning of wisdom itself with respect to its *essence*, or (b) because it is the beginning of wisdom with respect to its *effect*. In the same way, the principles from which an art or craft proceeds are the beginning of the art with respect to its essence, whereas the beginning of the art with respect to its effect is that from which the art begins to operate—in the way we say that the principle or beginning of the art of building is the foundation, since it is with the foundation that the builder begins to operate.

Now since, as will be explained below (q. 45, a. 1), wisdom is the cognition of what is divine, it is thought of in one way by us and in another way by the philosophers. For since our life is ordered and

directed toward the enjoyment of God by a certain participation in God's nature that occurs through grace, it follows that, according to us, wisdom is thought of not only as giving us cognition of God (*non solum consideratur ut est cognoscitiva Dei*), in the way that it is thought of by the philosophers (*sicut apud philosophos*), but also as directing human life (*sed etiam ut est directiva humanae vitae*), which, as is clear from Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12, is directed not only by human reasons but also by divine reasons.

So, then, the first principles of wisdom, i.e., the articles of the faith, are the beginning of wisdom with respect to its *essence*. And on this score *faith* is called the beginning of wisdom.

But as regards its *effect*, the beginning of wisdom is that from which wisdom begins to operate; and on this score *fear* is the beginning of wisdom. However, servile fear is one thing and filial fear is another. For *servile* fear is something like an outside principle *disposing one toward* wisdom, insofar as someone withdraws from sin because of the fear of punishment and in this way becomes susceptible to the effect of wisdom—this according to Ecclesiasticus 1:27 (“The fear of the Lord drives away sin”). On the other hand, *chaste* or *filial* fear is the beginning of wisdom in the sense of being the first *effect* of wisdom. For since it is part of wisdom that human life should be regulated in accord with divine reasons, it must have its beginning in a man's revering God and subjecting himself to Him. For thus, in what follows, he will be regulated by God in all things.

Reply to objection 1: This argument shows that fear is not the principle or beginning of wisdom with respect to the essence of wisdom.

Reply to objection 2: The fear of God is related to the whole of a human life that is regulated by God's wisdom as a root is related to a tree; hence, Ecclesiasticus 1:25 says, “The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for its branches are long-lived.” And so just as a root is said to be the whole tree virtually, so the fear of God is said to be wisdom.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, faith is the principle or beginning of wisdom in one sense and fear in another sense. Hence, Ecclesiasticus 25:16 says, “The fear of God is the beginning of love of Him, and the beginning of faith is to be glued to Him.”

Article 8

Does initial fear differ in substance from filial fear?

It seems that initial fear differs in substance from filial fear:

Objection 1: Filial fear is caused by elective love (*dilectio*). But initial fear is a principle of elective love—this according to Ecclesiasticus 25:16 (“The fear of the Lord is the beginning of love”). Therefore, initial fear is different from filial fear.

Objection 2: Initial fear is afraid of punishment, which is the object of servile fear, and so it seems that initial fear is the same as servile fear. But servile fear is different from filial fear. Therefore, initial fear is likewise different in substance from filial fear.

Objection 3: What lies in the middle differs in the same way from each of the extremes. But initial fear lies in the middle between servile fear and filial fear. Therefore, it differs both from filial fear and from servile fear.

But contrary to this: *Perfect* and *imperfect* do not diversify the substance of a thing. But as is clear from Augustine in *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis* [*In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos*], initial fear and filial fear differ with respect to perfection and imperfection in charity. Therefore, initial fear does not differ in substance from initial fear.

I respond: The name ‘initial fear’ is taken from that which is the beginning. But since both servile fear and filial fear are in some sense the beginning of wisdom, both can in some sense be called ‘initial

fear'. However, 'initial' is not being taken in this way when initial fear is distinguished from servile fear and filial fear.

Instead, 'initial' is being taken insofar as it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom a sort of filial fear has taken root through a beginning of charity (*in quibus inchoatur quidam timor filialis per inchoationem caritatis*)—and yet filial fear does not exist in them perfectly, since they have not yet arrived at the fullness of charity (*nondum pervenerunt ad perfectionem caritatis*). And so initial fear, taken in this sense, is related to filial fear in the way that imperfect charity is related to perfect charity.

Now perfect charity and imperfect charity differ not in their essence but only in their state (*solum secundum statum*). And so one should reply that initial fear, as it is being understood here, does not differ in its essence from filial fear.

Reply to objection 1: The fear that is the beginning of elective love is *servile* fear, which brings in charity "in the way that a needle brings in the thread," as Augustine puts it.

Alternatively, if the passage is taken to be referring to *initial* fear, it is being called 'the beginning of elective love' not absolutely speaking, but with respect to the state of perfect charity.

Reply to objection 2: Initial fear fears punishment not as its proper object but insofar as it has something of servile fear adjoined to it. This latter fear does, to be sure, remain with charity when the servileness has been removed, but its act remains with *imperfect* charity in someone who is moved to act well not only by a love of justice but also by a fear of punishment. However, this act ceases in someone who has perfect charity, which "casts out fear," as 1 John 4:18 says.

Reply to objection 3: Initial fear lies in the middle between filial fear and servile fear not in the way that something lies between two things which belong to the same genus, but in the way that, as *Metaphysics 2* says, what is imperfect lies between perfect being and non-being—even though it is the same in substance as perfect being and is totally different from non-being.

Article 9

Is fear a gift of the Holy Spirit?

It seems that fear is not a gift of the Holy Spirit:

Objection 1: No gift of the Holy Spirit is opposed to virtue, which is also from the Holy Spirit; otherwise, the Holy Spirit would be opposed to Himself. But fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore, fear is not a gift of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 2: It is proper to a theological virtue to have God as its object. But fear has God as its object insofar as God is feared. Therefore, fear is a theological virtue and not a gift.

Objection 3: Fear follows upon love (*timor ex amore consequitur*). But love (*amor*) is posited as a sort of theological virtue. Therefore, fear is likewise a theological virtue that pertains, as it were, to the same thing.

Objection 4: In *Moralia 2* Gregory says that fear is given to counter pride. But the virtue of humility is opposed to pride. Therefore, fear is likewise included among the virtues.

Objection 5: The gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since, as Gregory says in *Moralia 2*, the gifts are given to assist the virtues. But hope is more perfect than fear, since hope has to do with what is good, whereas fear has to do with what is bad. Therefore, since hope is a virtue, one should not claim that fear is a gift.

But contrary to this: In Isaiah 11:3 the fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), there are many sorts of fear:

As Augustine points out in *De Gratia and Libero Arbitrio*, *human* fear is not a gift of God, since

it is out of this sort of fear that Peter denied Christ. Instead, this fear is that of which it was said, “Fear him who can throw body and soul in Gehenna” (Matthew 10:28 and Luke 12:5).

Similarly, *servile* fear is not numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, even though it is from the Holy Spirit. For as Augustine says in *De Natura et Gratia*, servile fear can have a will to sin joined to it (*potest habere annexam voluntatem peccandi*), whereas the gifts of the Holy Spirit cannot exist with a will to sin, since, as has been explained (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 5), they cannot exist without charity.

Hence, what remains is that the fear of God which is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit is *filial* or *chaste* fear. For it was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, aa. 1 and 3) that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habitual perfections of the powers of the soul by which those powers are rendered easily moveable (*bene mobiles*) by the Holy Spirit, in the way that through the moral virtues the appetitive powers are rendered easily moveable by reason. Now in order for something to be easily moveable by another, the first thing required is that it be subject to it and not contrary to it, since movement is impeded by the moveable thing’s being contrary to the mover (*ex repugnantia mobilis ad movens impeditur motus*). But filial or chaste fear fulfills this requirement insofar as through it we revere God and seek to submit ourselves to Him. And so, as Augustine explains in *De Sermone Domini in Monte*, filial fear occupies the first place in ascending order among the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the last place in descending order.

Reply to objection 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope. For it is not the case that through filial fear we fear failing to obtain what we hope for by God’s help; instead, what we fear is withdrawing ourselves from this help. And so filial fear and hope cohere with one another and perfect one another.

Reply to objection 2: The proper and principal object of fear is something bad that one flees from. And in this sense, as was explained above (a. 1), God cannot be an object of fear. However, He is in this sense an object of hope and of the other theological virtues. For through the virtue of hope we not only rely on God’s help to obtain other goods, but we principally rely on His help to obtain God Himself as the principal good. And the same thing is clear in the case of the other theological virtues.

Reply to objection 3: From the fact that love is a principle of fear it does not follow that the fear of God is not a habit distinct from charity (*caritas*), which is the love of God (*amor Dei*). For love is a principle of all the affections, and yet we are perfected in diverse habits with respect to diverse affections.

Yet the reason why love has more of the character of a virtue than fear does is that love has to do with what is good, which, as is clear from what was said above (*ST* 1-2, q. 55, aa. 3-4), virtue is principally ordered toward as regards its proper nature. And for this reason hope is likewise posited as a virtue. By contrast, fear has to do principally with what is bad and implies fleeing from what is bad. This is why it is something less than a theological virtue.

Reply to objection 4: As Ecclesiasticus 10:44 says, “The beginning of the pride of man is to fall away from God,” i.e., to will not to submit to God. This is opposed to filial fear, which turns back toward God. And so fear excludes the beginning of pride, and it is because of this that it is given to counter pride.

Yet it does not follow that fear is the same as the virtue of humility. Rather, what follows is that fear is a principle of humility. For as has been explained (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 4), the gifts of the Holy Spirit are principles of the intellectual and moral virtues, while, as was established above [in the same place], the theological virtues are principles of the gifts.

Reply to objection 5: From this the reply to the fifth objection is clear.

Article 10

Does fear decrease as charity increases?

It seems that fear decreases as charity increases (*cresecente caritate diminuatur timor*):

Objection 1: In *Super Primum Canonicum Ioannis [In Epistolam Ioannis Ad Parthos]* Augustine says, “Fear decreases to the extent that charity increases.”

Objection 2: Fear decreases when hope increases. But as was established above (q. 17, a. 8), hope increases when charity increases. Therefore, fear decreases when charity increases.

Objection 3: Love (*amor*) implies union, whereas fear implies separation. But separation decreases when union increases. Therefore, fear decreases when the love of charity increases.

But contrary to this: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, “The fear of God not only initiates wisdom, it also perfects wisdom, i.e., the wisdom that loves God to the highest degree and one’s neighbor as oneself.”

I respond: As has been explained (a. 2), there are two sorts of fear of God: (a) *filial* fear, by which one fears offending God or being separated from Him (*timet offensam ipsius vel separationem ab ipso*), and (b) *servile* fear, by which one fears punishment.

Now filial fear has to increase when charity increases, in the way that an effect increases when its cause increases. For the more one loves someone, the more he fears offending him and being separated from him.

By contrast, servile fear, as regards its servileness, is totally removed when charity arrives, though, as has been explained (a. 6), it remains in its substance as fear of punishment. And this fear decreases as charity increases, especially with respect to its act, since to the extent that someone loves God more, he fears punishment less—first of all, because he pays less attention to his own good, which punishment is contrary to, and, second, because adhering to God more firmly, he is more confident of his reward and, consequently, fears punishment less.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine is talking about the fear of punishment.

Reply to objection 2: It is the fear of punishment that decreases as hope increases. But when hope increases, filial fear increases, since to the extent that someone expects with more certitude the attainment of a good with another’s help, he is more afraid of offending him or of being separated from him.

Reply to objection 3: Filial fear does not imply a separation; rather, it implies submitting to [God], whereas it flees from being separated from submission to Him.

However, it does in a certain sense imply separation by the fact that one does not presume himself to be equal [to God], but instead submits himself to Him. For this sort of separation is found even in charity, insofar as one loves God above himself and above all things. Hence, an increased love of charity does not diminish the reverence of fear, but adds to it.

Article 11

Does fear remain in heaven?

It seems that fear does not remain in heaven:

Objection 1: Proverbs 1:33 says, “He will enjoy abundance, without fear of evils,” which is meant to apply to a man who is already enjoying wisdom in eternal beatitude. But every sort of fear is of something evil, since, as has been explained (aa. 2 and 5 and *ST* 1-2, q. 42, a. 1), the object of fear is something bad. Therefore, there will be no fear at all in heaven.

Objection 2: In heaven men will be conformed to God—this according to 1 John 3:2 (“When He appears, we will be like unto him”). But God fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven men will not have any fear at all.

Objection 3: Hope is more perfect than fear, since hope has to do with what is good and fear has to do with what is bad. But hope will not exist in heaven. Therefore, fear will not exist in heaven, either.

But contrary to this: Psalm 18:10 says, “Holy fear of the Lord remains forever.”

I respond: Servile fear, i.e., fear of punishment, will in no way exist in heaven, since such fear is excluded by eternal beatitude’s security, which, as was explained above (q. 18, a. 3 and *ST* 1-2, q. 5, a. 4), is part of the nature of beatitude itself.

However, just as filial fear increases when charity increases, so, too, it is perfected when charity is perfected. Hence, filial fear will not have in heaven altogether the same act that it has now.

To see this clearly, notice that the proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a possible good. And since the movement of fear is, as it were, a withdrawal (*fuga*), fear implies a withdrawal from some arduous and possible evil, since small evils do not induce fear. Now just as the good of each thing is that it should stay within its own order, so the evil of each thing is that it should desert its own order. But the order of a rational creature is that he should exist under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is bad for a rational creature to subject himself to a lower creature through love, so it is likewise bad for him not to subject himself to God but instead to presumptuously assail Him or disdain Him. Now this evil is possible for a rational creature, considered in his nature, because of the natural flexibility of free choice (*propter naturalem liberi arbitrii flexibilitatem*), but it becomes impossible for the blessed in heaven because of the perfection of glory. Therefore, what will exist in heaven is the avoidance of the evil of not being subject to God as an evil that is possible for nature but impossible in the state of beatitude.

This is why, in *Moralia* 17, Gregory, commenting on Job 26:11 (“The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His nod”), says, “The powers of heaven themselves, which look upon Him without ceasing, tremble in their contemplation. But this trembling, far from being penal, is a trembling of admiration and not of fear, since they admire God as being beyond themselves and incomprehensible to them.” In *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine likewise posits fear in heaven in this same way, even though he leaves the matter in doubt. “If,” he says, “that chaste fear that endures forever will exist in the future age, it will not be a fear that is afraid of an evil that can occur; rather, it will be a fear that holds firm in a good that cannot be lost. For when the love of an acquired good is immutable, then most assuredly the fear of avoiding evil, if we can speak this way, is secure. In fact, the name ‘chaste fear’ signifies a will by which it will be necessary for us to will not to sin—not with any worry about weakness, lest we might perhaps sin, but willing to avoid sin with the tranquility of charity. Or, if no sort of fear at all will be able to exist there, perhaps fear is said to remain forever in the sense that what fear itself leads us to will remain forever.”

Reply to objection 1: What is excluded from the blessed in heaven in the quoted passage is a fear that involves worry and guarding against evil ahead of time, but not a “secure fear,” as Augustine puts it.

Reply to objection 2: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 9, “The same things are both similar to God and dissimilar from Him, similar in the manner of a contingent imitation of what is not imitable”—i.e., insofar as they are able to imitate God, who is not perfectly imitable—“dissimilar because the things that are caused have less from the cause, falling short of His infinite and incomparable measure.” Hence, it is not necessary that if fear does not befit God, since He has no superior to whom He is subject, then for this reason it does not befit the blessed in heaven, whose beatitude consists in perfect subjection to God.

Reply to objection 3: Hope implies a certain defect, viz., beatitude’s being future, which is

removed by its becoming present (*quae tollitur per eius praesentiam*). By contrast, fear implies a natural defect on the part of a creature, insofar as the creature is infinitely distant from God, and this will remain even in heaven. And so fear will not be totally eradicated.

Article 12

Is being poor in spirit the beatitude which corresponds to the gift of fear?

It seems that being poor in spirit (*paupertas spiritus*) is not the beatitude which corresponds to the gift of fear:

Objection 1: As is clear from what has been said (a. 7), fear is the beginning of the spiritual life. But poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life—this according to Matthew 19:21 (“If you want to be perfect, go and sell everything you have and give it to the poor”). Therefore, being poor in spirit does not correspond to the gift of fear.

Objection 2: Psalm 118:120 says, “Pierce my flesh with your fear,” from which it seems that it belongs to fear to repress the flesh. But it is the beatitude that has to do with sorrow that seems especially to pertain to the repression of the flesh. Therefore, the beatitude that has to do with sorrow corresponds to the gift of fear more than the beatitude that has to do with being poor.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 9), the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope. But what seems especially to correspond to hope is the last beatitude, i.e., “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God” (Matthew 5:9); for as Romans 5:2 says, “We glory in the hope of the glory of the children of God.” Therefore, it is this beatitude, rather than being poor in spirit, that corresponds to the gift of fear.

Objection 4: It was explained above (*ST* 1-2, q. 70, a. 2) that the fruits [of the Holy Spirit] correspond to the beatitudes. But there is nothing in the fruits that corresponds to the gift of fear. Therefore, there is nothing in the beatitudes that corresponds to it, either.

But contrary to this: In *De Sermone Domini in Monte* Augustine says, “The fear of God befits the humble, of whom it is said, ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit.’”

I respond: Being poor in spirit properly corresponds to fear. For since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence for God and to be subject to Him, whatever follows upon this sort of subjection belongs to the gift of fear. But by the fact that someone subjects himself to God, he stops seeking to be made great (*desinit quaerere magnificari*) in himself or in anything else except in God, since this would be incompatible with perfect subjection to God. Hence, Psalm 19:8 says, “Some call upon chariots and some call upon horses, but we call upon the name of our God.”

And so from the fact that someone fears God perfectly, it follows that he will not seek to be made great *in himself* through pride, nor will he seek to be made great *in exterior goods* such as honors and riches, where both of these are relevant to being poor in spirit, insofar as being poor in spirit can be thought of either (a) as the emptying of an inflated and proud spirit, as Augustine explains it, or (b) as the renunciation of temporal things which is effected by the Spirit, i.e., by one’s own will at the instigation of the Holy Spirit, as Ambrose and Jerome explain it.

Reply to objection 1: Since beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of the spiritual life. The beginning of this perfection seems to be that in tending toward a perfect participation in spiritual goods one disdains earthly goods, in just the way that fear has first place among the gifts. Now the perfection does not consist in the rejection of temporal goods itself; instead, this is a path toward perfection. However, as was explained above (a. 7), filial fear, which the beatitude about being poor corresponds to, also exists with the perfection of wisdom.

Reply to objection 2: The undue magnification of a man either in himself or in other things is

more directly opposed to submission to God, which filial fear effects, than is extraneous delight. Still, this sort of delight is opposed to fear as a consequence, since one who reveres God and is subject to Him does not delight in things apart from God (*non delectatur in aliis a Deo*).

Nonetheless, delight does not have the character of something arduous, which fear has to do with, in the way that magnification does. And so the beatitude about being poor corresponds directly to fear, whereas the beatitude that has to do with sorrow corresponds to fear as a consequence.

Reply to objection 3: Hope implies a movement along with a relation to the terminus that it tends toward, but fear implies instead a movement along with the relation of withdrawing from a terminus. And so the last beatitude, which is the terminus of spiritual perfection, corresponds fittingly with hope in the manner of its ultimate object, but the first beatitude, which occurs through a withdrawal from exterior things that impede one's subjection to God, fittingly corresponds with fear.

Reply to objection 4: Among the fruits, those which have to do with the moderate use of or abstinence from temporal things, e.g., modesty, continence, and chastity, seem to belong to the gift of fear.