

## QUESTION 7

### The Grace of Christ insofar as He is an Individual Man

Next we have to consider the things that were co-assumed by the Son of God in His human nature: first, the things that pertain to that nature's perfection (questions 7-13) and, second, the things that pertain to the nature's defects (questions 14-15). On the first point we have to consider three things: first, Christ's grace (questions 7-8); second, His knowledge (questions 9-12); and, third, His power (question 13).

Now there are two ways to consider Christ's grace: first, His grace insofar as He is an individual man (question 7); second, His grace insofar as He is the head of the Church (question 8). For the grace of union has already been explained (q. 2).

On the first topic there are thirteen questions: (1) Is there any habitual grace in the soul of Christ? (2) Did Christ have virtues? (3) Did Christ have faith? (4) Did Christ have hope? (5) Did Christ have the gifts [of the Holy Spirit]? (6) Did Christ have the gift of fear? (7) Did Christ have gratuitously given graces? (8) Did Christ have [the grace of] prophecy? (9) Did Christ have the fullness of grace? (10) Is such a fullness peculiar to Christ (*propria Christi*)? (11) Is Christ's grace infinite? (12) Was Christ's grace able to be increased? (13) How is this grace related to the union?

### Article 1

#### Was there habitual grace in the soul assumed by the Word?

It seems that there was no habitual grace in the soul assumed by the Word (*in anima assumpta a verbo non fuerit gratia habitualis*):

**Objection 1:** Habitual grace is a certain sort of partaking of the divine nature in a rational creature—this according to 2 Peter 1:4 (“... by whom He has given us great and precious promises, in order that we might be partakers of the divine nature”). But Christ is God in reality and not by participation (*non participative sed secundum veritatem*). Therefore, He did not have habitual grace.

**Objection 2:** Grace is necessary for a man (a) in order that he might act well through it—this according to 1 Corinthians 15:10 (“I have labored more abundantly than all of them; yet not I, but the grace of God with me”)—and (b) in order that the man might attain eternal life—this according to Romans 6:23 (“The grace of God is eternal life”). But the inheritance of eternal life is owed to Christ by the mere fact that He is the natural Son of God. Again, by the fact that He was the Word through whom all things were made, the ability to do all good things was present in Him. Therefore, as regards His human nature, it did not need any grace other than its union to the Word.

**Objection 3:** That which operates in the manner of an instrument does not need a habit for its proper operations; instead, the habit is based in the principal agent. But as Damascene puts it in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, the human nature in Christ was like “an instrument of His divine nature” (*instrumentum deitatis*.) Therefore, it was not appropriate for there to be any habitual grace in Christ.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 11:2 says, “The Spirit of the Lord will rest upon him.” But as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 43, a. 3), the Spirit of the Lord is said to exist in a man through habitual grace. Therefore, Christ had habitual grace.

**I respond:** One must posit habitual grace in Christ, and this for three reasons:

First, because of *the union of [Christ's] soul with the Word of God*. For the closer something receptive is to an influencing cause, the more it participates in the influence of that cause. But the influence of grace is from God—this according to 83:12 (“The Lord will give grace and glory”). And so it was most appropriate of all for that particular soul to receive the influence of God's grace.

Second, because of *the nobility of [Christ's] soul*, the operations of which had to come very close to God through its cognition and love, and for this a human soul has to be elevated by grace.

Third, because of *the relation of Christ Himself to the human race*. For Christ, insofar as He is a man, is, as 1 Timothy 2:5 says, “the mediator between God and men.” And so it was necessary for Him to have the grace that also overflowed into the others—this according to John 1:16 (“Of His fullness we have all received, grace upon grace”).

**Reply to objection 1:** Christ is true God because of His divine person and nature. But since, as is clear from what was said above (q. 2, aa. 1-2), the distinction between the natures remains along with the oneness of person, Christ’s soul is not divine by its essence. Hence, His soul had to become divine by participation, and this participation is by means of [habitual] grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** Insofar as Christ is the *natural* Son of God, He is owed an eternal inheritance, which is uncreated beatitude itself, through His *uncreated* act of knowing and loving God, i.e., the same act by which the Father knows and loves Himself. His soul was not capable of this act because its nature is different. Hence, it had to be the case that it attained to God through a *created* act of enjoyment. But this act cannot exist except through grace.

Similarly, insofar as He is the Word of God, He had the ability to do all things well by a divine operation. However, as will become clear below (q. 19, a. 1), since, in addition to operating divinely, He had to undertake operating in a human way, it was necessary for Him to have habitual grace, through which operations of the latter sort would be perfect in Him.

**Reply to objection 3:** The human nature of Christ is indeed an instrument of His divine nature—not, however, in the sense of being an inanimate instrument which does not act in any way but which is only acted upon, but instead in the sense of being an instrument which is animated by a rational soul and which acts in such a way that it is also acted upon. And so He had to have habitual grace because it was fitting for this latter sort of action.

## Article 2

### Did Christ have virtues?

It seems that Christ did not have virtues (*in Christo non fuerint virtutes*):

**Objection 1:** Christ had an abundance of grace. But grace is sufficient for doing all things well—this according to 2 Corinthians 12:9 (“My grace is sufficient for you”). Therefore, Christ did not have virtues.

**Objection 2:** According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, virtue is divided off from “a certain heroic or divine habit,” which is attributed to godly men (*hominibus divinis*). But this befits Christ most of all. Therefore, Christ did not have virtues, but instead had something higher than virtue.

**Objection 3:** As was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 65, aa. 1-2), all the virtues are had together. But it was not fitting for Christ to have all the virtues together, as is clear in the case of liberality and magnificence, whose acts have to do with riches, which Christ disdained—this according to Matthew 8:20 (“The Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head”). Again, temperance and continence have to do with disordered sentient desires, which did not exist in Christ. Therefore, Christ did not have the virtues.

**But contrary to this:** A Gloss on Psalm 1:2 (“His delight is in the law of the Lord”) says, “Here it is shown that Christ is full of every good.” But virtue is a good quality of the mind. Therefore, Christ was full of every virtue.

**I respond:** As was established in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 110, a. 4), just as grace has to do with the *essence* of the soul, so virtue has to do with the soul’s *powers*. Hence, it has to be the case that just as the powers of the soul flow from its essence, so the virtues flow from grace. But the more perfect the principle, the more it imprints its effects. Hence, since Christ’s grace was the most perfect of all, it

follows that the virtues proceeded from that grace to perfect the individual powers of the soul with respect to all the acts of the soul. And so Christ had all the virtues.

**Reply to objection 1:** Grace is sufficient for a man with respect to everything by which he is ordered toward beatitude. Grace perfects some of these things immediately by itself, e.g., making him pleasing to God, and it perfects other things of this sort by the mediation of the virtues that proceed from the grace.

**Reply to objection 2:** This sort of heroic or divine habit does not differ from what is commonly called virtue except with respect to its more perfect mode, viz., insofar as an individual is disposed toward the good in a higher way than belongs to everyone in general. Hence, Christ is not thereby shown not to have virtues; instead, He is shown to have had them in a most perfect way, beyond the ordinary mode. In the same way, Plotinus posited a certain sublime mode of those virtues which he claimed to belong to the purified mind.

**Reply to objection 3:** Liberality and magnificence are commended with respect to riches insofar as the individual does not value riches so highly that he wishes to retain them by omitting what should be done. But an individual who disdains riches altogether and casts them away because of his love for perfection values them least of all. And so by the very fact that Christ disdained all riches, He showed within Himself the highest level of liberality and magnificence. Still, He also exercised the act of liberality or generosity, insofar as it was fitting for Him, by making sure that things that had been given to Him were handed out to the poor. Hence, when our Lord told Judas, “What you are doing, do quickly” (John 13:27), the disciples thought that our Lord was telling him to give something to the poor.

Now as will become clear below (q. 18, a. 2), Christ did not at all have disordered sentient desires (*concupiscentias pravas omnino non habuit*). However, He was not thereby prevented from having [the virtue of] temperance, which is more perfect in a man to the extent that he is more lacking in disordered sentient desires. Hence, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, the temperate individual differs from the continent individual in that the temperate individual does not have the disordered sentient desires that the continent individual suffers from. Hence, if we understand continence in the way that the Philosopher understands it, then by the very fact that Christ had every virtue, He did not have continence, which is not a virtue but something less than a virtue.

### Article 3

#### Did Christ have faith?

It seems that Christ had faith (*in Christo fuerit fides*):

**Objection 1:** Faith is a more noble virtue than the moral virtues, e.g., temperance and generosity. But as has been explained (a. 2), virtues of this latter sort existed in Christ. Therefore, *a fortiori*, faith existed in Him.

**Objection 2:** Christ did not teach virtues that He Himself did not have—this according to Acts 1:1 (“... Jesus began to do and to teach”). But Hebrews 12:2 says of Christ that He “is the author and perfecter of faith.” Therefore, faith existed in Him most of all.

**Objection 3:** Whatever involves imperfection is excluded from the blessed in heaven (*excluditur a beatis*). But there is faith in the blessed in heaven, since a Gloss on Romans 1:17 (“God’s justice is revealed in [the gospel] from faith to faith”) says, “From the faith of words and of hope to the faith of realities and of what is seen.” Therefore, it seems that there was faith even in Christ, since faith does not involve any sort of imperfection.

**But contrary to this:** Hebrews 11:1 says, “Faith is the evidence of things that are not apparent.” But there is nothing that was not apparent to Christ—this according to what Peter said to Him in John 21:17 (“You know all things”). Therefore, Christ did not have faith.

**I respond:** As was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 2-2, q. 1), the object of faith is divine reality which is not seen. Now the habit of a virtue, like every other habit, receives its species from its object. And so where a divine reality's not being seen is excluded, the character of faith is excluded. But, as will become clear below (q. 34, a. 4), from the first instant of His conception, Christ saw God fully in His essence. Hence, [the virtue of] faith could not have existed in Him.

**Reply to objection 1:** Faith is more noble than the moral virtues, since it has to do with a more noble subject matter, but it nonetheless implies a certain defect in relation to that subject matter, and this is a defect that did not exist in Christ. And that is why it was impossible for [the virtue of] faith to exist in Him—even though He did have the moral virtues, which do not imply in their definition any defect of the sort in question with respect to their subject matters.

**Reply to objection 2:** The merit of faith consists in a man's assenting, out of obedience to God, to things that he does not see—this according to Romans 1:5 (“... to bring about obedience to the Faith among all the nations for His name's sake”). Now Jesus possessed obedience to God to the fullest possible extent (*plenissime*)—this according to Philippians 2:8 (“He became obedient unto death”). And so He taught nothing pertaining to merit that He Himself did not fulfill in a more excellent way.

**Reply to objection 3:** As a Gloss on the same passage says, “Faith is properly that by which things that are not seen are believed.” On the other hand, the faith which is had of things that are seen is called ‘faith’ improperly and according to a certain similitude that has to do with certitude or with firmness of adherence.

#### Article 4

##### Did Christ have hope?

It seems that Christ had hope (*in Christo fuerit spes*):

**Objection 1:** Psalm 30:2 says in the person of Christ, according to a Gloss, “In you, O Lord, have I hoped.” But the virtue of hope is that by which a man hopes in God. Therefore, the virtue of hope existed in Christ.

**Objection 2:** As was established in the Second Part (*ST* 2-2, q. 17, aa. 1 and 3), hope is the expectation of beatitude. But Christ expected something pertaining to beatitude, viz., bodily glory. Therefore, it seems that [the virtue of] hope existed in Him.

**Objection 3:** Each individual is able to hope for what pertains to his perfection if it is future. But there was something future that pertained to Christ's perfection—this according to Ephesians 4:12 (“... for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ”). Therefore, it was fitting, it seems, for Christ to have [the virtue of] hope.

**But contrary to this:** Romans 8:24 says, “Who hopes for what he sees?” And so it is clear that just as faith is of what is not seen, so, too, is hope. But as has been explained (a. 3), faith did not exist in Christ. Therefore, neither did hope.

**I respond:** Just as it is part of the character of faith that an individual assents to things that he does not see, so, too, it is part of the character of hope that an individual looks forward to what he does not yet have (*expectet id quod nondum habet*). And just as faith, insofar as it is a theological virtue, has to do not with just anything that is not seen, but instead has to do only with God, so, too, hope, insofar as it is a theological virtue, has for its object the very enjoyment of God, which a man looks forward to mainly through the virtue of hope. However, as a consequence, an individual who has the virtue of hope can look forward to God's help in other matters, just as an individual who has the virtue of faith believes God not only about divine matters but also about any other things that are divinely revealed to him.

Now as will be explained below (q. 34, a. 4), from the beginning of His conception Christ fully possessed the enjoyment of God. And so He did not have the virtue of hope. However, He did have hope

with respect to some things that He had not yet arrived at, although He did not have faith with respect to anything at all. For even though He had a full cognition of all things because of which faith was totally excluded from Him, He nonetheless did not yet fully have all the things which pertained to His perfection, e.g., immortality and bodily glory, and which He was able to hope for.

**Reply to objection 1:** This is not said of Christ with respect to the hope which is a theological virtue, but instead, as has been explained, it is said because He hoped for certain other things that were not yet had.

**Reply to objection 2:** Bodily glory does not belong to beatitude as one of the things which beatitude mainly consists in, but instead, as was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 4, a. 6), it belongs to beatitude as a sort of overflow of the soul's glory. Hence, insofar as hope is a theological virtue, it has to do with the beatitude of the soul, in which the enjoyment of God consists, and not with the beatitude of the body.

**Reply to objection 3:** The building up of the Church through the conversion of the faithful does not belong to the perfection of Christ by which He is perfect in Himself, but instead belongs to that perfection insofar as it leads others to participate in His perfection. And since hope is properly predicated with respect to something that is expected to be had by the one who is hoping, one cannot properly claim that the virtue of hope belongs to Christ for the reason given here.

## Article 5

### Did Christ have the gifts [of the Holy Spirit]?

It seems that Christ did not have the gifts [of the Holy Spirit] (*in Christo non fuerint dona*):

**Objection 1:** As is commonly explained, the gifts are given in support of the virtues. But what is perfect in its own right (*in se perfectum*) does not need exterior help. Therefore, since the virtues were perfect in Christ, it seems that the gifts did not exist in Him.

**Objection 2:** It does not seem to belong to the same individual both to give the gifts and to receive them, since to give them gifts belongs to one who has them, whereas to receive the gifts belongs to one who does not have them. But it is fitting for Christ to give the gifts—this according to Psalm 67:19 (“He gave gifts to men”). Therefore, it is not fitting for Christ to receive the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

**Objection 3:** Four of the gifts seem to involve the contemplation that belongs to *the present life* (*videntur pertinere ad contemplationem viae*), viz., *wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel*, which belongs to prudence. Hence, in *Ethics* 6 the Philosopher numbers them among the intellectual virtues. But Christ had the contemplation that belongs to *heaven* (*contemplationem patriae*). Therefore, He did not have the gifts in question.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 4:1 says, “Seven women will take hold of one man.” A Gloss: “That is, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit will take hold of Christ.”

**I respond:** As was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 1), the gifts are, properly speaking, certain perfections of the powers of the soul insofar as those powers are apt to be moved by the Holy Spirit. Now it is manifest that the soul of Christ was moved in the most perfect way by the Holy Spirit—this according to Luke 4:1 (“Jesus, filled with the Holy Spirit, withdrew from the Jordan and was led by the Spirit into the desert”). Hence, it is clear that Christ had the gifts in the most excellent way.

**Reply to objection 1:** That which is perfect according to its own nature needs to be helped by what is of a higher nature; for instance, no matter how perfect a man is, he needs to be helped by God. And it is in this way that the virtues need to be helped by the gifts, which perfect the soul's powers insofar as those powers are moved by the Holy Spirit.

**Reply to objection 2:** It is not in the same respect that Christ receives and gives the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Rather, He gives them insofar as He is God and receives them insofar as He is a man. Hence,

in *Moralia* 2 Gregory says, “The Holy Spirit never deserted the human nature of Christ, from whose divine nature He proceeds.”

**Reply to objection 3:** As will be explained below (q.15, a. 10), in Christ there was not only the cognition that belongs to heaven (*cognitio patriae*), but also the cognition that belongs to the present life (*cognitio viae*). And yet as was established in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 6), even in heaven the gifts of the Holy Spirit exist in a certain way.

## Article 6

### Did Christ have the gift of fear?

It seems that Christ did not have the gift of fear (*in Christo non fuit donum timoris*):

**Objection 1:** Hope seems to be more powerful than fear, since, as was established in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 40, a. 1 and q. 41, a. 2 and q. 42, a. 1), the object of hope is something good, whereas the object of fear is something bad. But as was established above (a. 4), Christ did not have the virtue of hope. Therefore, He likewise did not have the gift of fear.

**Objection 2:** As Augustine explains in *Super Canonicam Ioannis*, by the gift of fear an individual fears either (a) being separated from God, and this involves a *chaste* fear, or (b) being punished by Him, and this involves a *servile* fear. But Christ did not fear being separated from God through sin, nor did He fear being punished by Him for His own faults; for as will be explained below (q. 15, a. 1), it was impossible for Him to sin. Therefore, the gift of fear did not exist in Christ.

**Objection 3:** 1 John 4:18 says, “Perfect charity casts out fear.” But the most perfect charity of all existed in Christ—this according to Ephesians 3:19 (“... the charity of Christ, which surpasses all knowledge”). Therefore, the gift of fear did not exist in Christ.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 11:3 says, “The spirit of the fear of the Lord will fill Him.”

**I respond:** As was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 42, a. 1), fear has to do with two objects, one of which is a terrible evil and the other of which is the one by whose power the evil can be inflicted, in the way that an individual fears the king insofar as the king has the power to kill him. However, one who has power would not be feared if he did not have a certain preeminence of power that could not be easily resisted. For we do not fear things that we have to repel all of a sudden. And so it is clear that an individual is not feared except because of his eminence.

So, then, one should reply that the fear of God did exist in Christ—not insofar as this fear has to do with the evil of being separated from God through sin or with the evil of punishment for sin, but instead insofar as it has to do with God’s eminence itself, since the soul of Christ, acted upon by the Holy Spirit, was moved toward God with a certain feeling of reverence. Hence, Hebrews 5:7 says that in all things “He was heard because of His reverence.” For Christ, insofar as He was a man, had this feeling of reverence for God to a higher degree than others. And this is why Sacred Scripture attributes to Him the fullness of the fear of the Lord.

**Reply to objection 1:** The habits of the virtues and of the gifts have to do with something good properly and in their own right (*proprie et per se*), whereas they have to do with something bad by way of a consequence. For as is explained in *Ethics* 2, the nature of a virtue involves making an action good. And so what belongs to the essence of the gift of fear is not the bad thing that the fear has to do with, but instead the preeminence of the good thing, viz., the divine good, by the power of which the bad thing can be inflicted.

On the other hand, hope, insofar as it is a virtue, has to do not only with the one who brings about the good thing, but also with the good thing itself insofar as it is not yet possessed. And so since Christ already had the perfect good of beatitude, the virtue of hope is not attributed to Him, whereas the gift of fear is.

**Reply to objection 2:** This argument goes through with respect to fear insofar as fear has an object which is something bad.

**Reply to objection 3:** Perfect charity drives out *servile* fear, which has mainly to do with punishment. But the fear that existed in Christ was not like this.

## Article 7

### Did Christ have gratuitously given graces?

It seems that Christ did not have gratuitously given graces (*in Christo non fuerint gratiae gratis datae*):

**Objection 1:** It is unfitting for someone who has a given thing in its fullness to have it through participation. But Christ had grace in its fullness—this according to John 1:14 (“... full of grace and of truth”). Now gratuitously given graces seem to be certain participations that are given in a divided and particular way to different individuals—this according to 1 Corinthians 12:4 (“There are different kinds of graces”). Therefore, it seems that Christ did not have gratuitously given graces.

**Objection 2:** What is owed to someone does not seem to be given to him gratuitously (*esse gratis ei datum*). But it was owed to the man Christ that He should abound in words of wisdom and knowledge and that He should be powerful in doing prodigious works, and other things of this sort that belong to the gratuitously given graces. For as 1 Corinthians 1:24 says, “He is the power of God and the wisdom of God.” Therefore, it was not fitting for Christ to have gratuitously given graces.

**Objection 3:** Gratuitously given graces are ordered toward the benefit of the faithful—this according to 1 Corinthians 12:7 (“The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit”). But a habit, or any disposition at all, does not seem to involve a benefit if the man does not use it—this according to Ecclesiasticus 20:32 (“Hidden wisdom and unseen treasure: what good is there in either of them?”) But we do not read that Christ used all the gratuitously given graces, especially those having to do with the kinds of tongues. Therefore, Christ did not have all the gratuitously given graces.

**But contrary to this:** In *Epistola ad Dardanum* Augustine says, “Just as all the senses are in the head, so all the graces were in Christ.”

**I respond:** As was established in the Second Part (cf. *ST* 2-2, qq. 171-178), gratuitously given graces are ordered toward the manifestation of the Faith and of spiritual teaching. Now one who teaches must possess the things through which his teaching is made manifest; otherwise, his teaching would not be useful. But the first and principal teacher of spiritual teaching and of the Faith is Christ—this according to Hebrews 2:3-4 (“After it had received its beginning by being enunciated by our Lord, it was confirmed in us by those who heard Him, with God bearing witness by signs and wonders ...”). Hence, it is clear that Christ had in a most excellent way all the gratuitously given graces as the first and principal teacher of the Faith.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as habitual grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) is ordered toward both interior and exterior meritorious acts, so gratuitously given grace (*gratia gratis data*) is ordered toward certain exterior acts that make the Faith manifest, e.g., the performing of miracles and other acts of that sort. Now Christ had the fullness of both sorts of grace. For insofar as His soul was united to His divine nature, He had full efficacy for perfecting all the acts just mentioned.

However, other holy people, who are moved by God not as united instruments but as separated instruments, receive efficacy in a particular way for perfecting this or that sort of act. And so graces of the sort in question are divided in the case of the other holy individuals, but not in the case of Christ.

**Reply to objection 2:** Christ is called the power of God and the wisdom of God insofar as He is the eternal Son of God. But on this score it does not belong to Him to *have* grace; instead, it belongs to Him to be the *provider of* grace.

By contrast, it is with respect to His human nature that it belongs to him to have grace.

**Reply to objection 3:** The gift of tongues was given to the apostles because they were being sent “to teach all the nations” (Matthew 28:19). Christ, on the other hand, wished to preach personally only within the nation of the Jews—this according to Matthew 15:24 (“I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel”). And in Romans 15:8 the Apostle says, “I say that Christ was the minister of the circumcision.” And so it was unnecessary for Him to speak in many languages.

Still, as will be explained below (q. 10, a. 2), the knowledge of all languages was not lacking to Him, since even the secrets of the heart, of which all words are signs, were not hidden from Him. Nor was it useless for Him to have this knowledge, in the sense in which it is not useless for an individual to have a habit which he does not use when it is not opportune to use it.

## Article 8

### Did Christ have [the grace of] prophecy?

It seems that Christ did not have [the grace of] prophecy (*in Christo non fuerit prophetia*):

**Objection 1:** Prophecy implies a sort of obscure and imperfection knowledge—this according to Numbers 12:6 (“If anyone among you is a prophet of the Lord, I will speak to him in a dream or in a vision”). But Christ had full and perfect knowledge, much more than did Moses, of whom it is added, “He sees God plainly and not through riddles” (12:8). Therefore, prophecy should not be posited in Christ.

**Objection 2:** Just as faith is of things that are not seen, and hope is of things that are not had, so prophecy is of things that are distant and not present; for ‘prophet’ (*propheta*) means, as it were, ‘speaking from afar’ (*procul fans*). But as was explained above (aa. 3-4), neither faith nor hope is posited in Christ. Therefore, prophecy should likewise not be posited in Christ.

**Objection 3:** The prophet is of a lower order than the angel. Hence, as was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 2-2, q. 174, a. 4), Acts 12:38 says of Moses, who was the greatest of the prophets, “He spoke with an angel in solitude.” But as Hebrews 2:9 explains, Christ was “made lower than the angels” not with respect to His soul’s knowledge, but only “with respect to His bodily suffering.” Therefore, it seems that Christ was not a prophet.

**But contrary to this:** Deuteronomy 18:15 says of [Christ], “God will raise up a prophet for you from among your brothers.” And in Matthew 13:57 and John 4:44, He says of Himself, “A prophet is not without honor except in his own country.”

**I respond:** ‘Prophet’ (*propheta*) means, as it were, ‘speaking from afar’ (*procul fans*), insofar as a prophet knows and speaks of things that are far removed from men’s senses—as Augustine likewise explains in *Contra Faustum*. Now notice that an individual cannot be called a prophet from the fact that he knows and announces things that are distant from others with whom he is not living. This is clear with respect to both place and time.

For if an individual living in France were to know and announce to others living in France things that are now happening in Syria, then that would be prophetic, in the way that in 4 Kings 5:26 Elisha told Gehazi how the man had gotten down from his chariot and met with him. By contrast, if an individual living in Syria were to announce things that were happening there, this would not be prophetic.

And the same thing is apparent with respect to time. For as is clear from Isaiah 44:28, it was prophetic for Isaiah to foretell that Cyrus, king of Persia, would rebuild the temple of God, but this was not prophetic when Esdra wrote about it, since by Esdra’s time this had already taken place.

Therefore, if God or an angel or even the blessed in heaven know and announce things which are far removed from our knowledge, this does not involve prophecy, since they do not share our state in any way. By contrast, before His passion Christ did share our state insofar as He was not only a

comprehender [of the divine essence] but also a wayfarer. And so it was prophetic that He knew and announced things that were far removed from the knowledge of other wayfarers. And it is for this reason that prophecy is said to have existed in Him.

**Reply to objection 1:** It is not shown by the quoted passage that the enigmatic cognition which comes in dreams and visions is part of the nature of prophecy. What is shown instead is the comparison between other prophets, who perceived divine things in dreams and visions, and Moses, who saw God openly and not through enigmas, and who is nonetheless called a prophet—this according to Deuteronomy 34:10 (“And there has not arisen a prophet since that time in Israel like Moses”).

Still, one could reply that even if Christ had full and clear knowledge with respect to the intellectual part [of His soul], He nonetheless had in the imaginative part certain similitudes in which divine things could likewise be seen—and this because He was not only a comprehender but also a wayfarer.

**Reply to objection 2:** Faith is of things that are not seen by the one who has faith himself. Similarly, hope is for things that are not possessed by the one who has hope. By contrast, prophecy is of things which are far removed from the common understanding of men and which the prophet is familiar with and communicates in the state of the present life. And so faith and hope are incompatible with the perfection of Christ’s beatitude, but prophecy is not.

**Reply to objection 3:** Since an angel is a comprehender, he is above a prophet, who is a mere wayfarer, but not above Christ, who was simultaneously a comprehender and a wayfarer.

## Article 9

### Did Christ have the fullness of grace?

It seems that Christ did not have the fullness of grace (*non fuerit in Christo gratiae plenitudo*):

**Objection 1:** As was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 110, a. 4), the virtues flow from grace. But Christ did not have all the virtues, since, as has been shown (aa. 3-4), He did not have [the virtue of] faith or [the virtue of] hope. Therefore, the fullness of grace did not exist in Christ.

**Objection 2:** As is clear from what was said in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 111, a. 2), grace is divided into *operating* grace and *cooperating* grace. Now the grace through which an ungodly individual is justified is called *operating* grace, and this sort of grace has no place in Christ, who was never subject to any sin. Therefore, Christ did not have the fullness of grace.

**Objection 3:** James 1:17 says, “Every best thing that is given, and every perfect gift, is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.” But what comes down is had in a partial way (*particulariter*) and not fully. Therefore, no creature, not even the soul of Christ, can have the fullness of the gifts of grace.

**But contrary to this:** John 1:14 says, “We have seen Him, full of grace and of truth.”

**I respond:** What is said to be had fully (*plene*) is what is had totally and completely or perfectly (*totaliter et perfecte*). Now there are two ways in which totality and completeness, or perfection, can be thought of:

In one way, with respect to the thing’s *intensive quantity* (*quantum ad quantitatem eius intensivam*); for instance, I might say that someone has whiteness fully if he has it to as great a degree as it is apt to be had.

In the second way, with respect to *power* (*secundum virtutem*)—for instance, when someone is said to have life fully because he has it with respect to all the effects or works of life. And in this sense a man may have life fully, but not a non-rational animal or a plant.

Now Christ had the fullness of grace in both these ways.

First, because *He had grace to the highest degree* (*habuit eam in summo*), in the most perfect manner that it can be had. And this is apparent, first, from the closeness of Christ’s soul to the cause of

grace. For it has been explained (a. 1) that the closer a receptive thing is to the influence of the cause, the more abundantly it receives that influence. And so Christ's soul, which is most closely joined to God among all the rational creatures, receives the maximal influence of God's grace. It is apparent, second, if we compare Christ's soul to the effect. For Christ's soul received grace in such a way that the grace was in some way transferred from his soul to others. And so Christ's soul had to have maximal grace, in the way that fire, which is a cause of heat in all hot things, is maximally hot.

Likewise, Christ had grace to the full as regards *the power of grace*, because He had it with respect to all the operations or effects of grace. And this is because grace is conferred on Him as on a universal principle in the genus of those having graces. Now the power of a first principle in any genus extends universally to all the effects of that genus, in the way that the sun, which is a universal cause of generation, is such that, as Dionysius explains in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, its power extends to all things that fall under generation. And so a second fullness of grace is found in Christ insofar as His grace extends to all the effects of grace, viz., the virtues and the gifts [of the Holy Spirit] and the other things of this sort.

**Reply to objection 1:** 'Faith' and 'hope' name the effects of grace along with a certain defect found on the part of the one who receives the grace, viz., insofar as faith is about things that are not seen and hope is about things that are not possessed. Hence, it is not fitting for the defects implied by faith and hope to exist in Christ, who is the author of grace.

On the other hand, whatever perfection there is in faith and hope existed in Christ in a much more perfect way—just as one does not find in fire every mode of defective heat that stems from a defective subject; instead, one finds whatever pertains to the perfection of heat.

**Reply to objection 2:** It belongs to operating grace *in its own right (per se)* to make a soul just, but the fact that it makes a just soul out of an ungodly soul is *accidental to it* on the part of a subject in which sin exists. Therefore, Christ's soul is justified by operating grace insofar as it is made just and holy from the very beginning of its conception, without its ever having been sinful or even non-just beforehand.

**Reply to objection 3:** [There is apparently no reply by St. Thomas to objection 3. However, a couple of manuscripts include the following reply: "The fullness of grace is attributed to Christ's soul in accord with the capacity of a creature, but not by way of comparison with the infinite fullness of the divine goodness."]

## Article 10

### Is the fullness of grace peculiar to Christ?

It seems that the fullness of grace is not peculiar to Christ (*plenitudo gratiae non sit propria Christi*):

**Objection 1:** What is peculiar to an individual belongs to him alone. But being full of grace is attributed to certain other individuals. For instance, in Luke 1:28 it is said to the Blessed Virgin, "Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee." Again, Acts 6:8 says, "Now Stephen, full of grace and power ..." Therefore, the fullness of grace is not peculiar to Christ.

**Objection 2:** That which can be communicated to others by Christ does not seem to be peculiar to Christ. But the fullness of grace can be communicated to others by Christ; for in Ephesians 3:19 the Apostle says, "... in order that you might be filled unto all the fullness of God (*in omnem plenitudinem Dei*)."

Therefore, the fullness of grace is not peculiar to Christ.

**Objection 3:** The state of the present life seems to be proportioned to the state of heaven. But as is clear from Gregory in a homily on the one hundred sheep, "In the state of heaven there will be some sort of fullness, since in that celestial homeland, where there is a fullness of every good thing, nothing is possessed in a singular way even though some things are given in a preeminent way." Therefore, in the

state of the present life the fullness of grace is had by each human being. And so the fullness of grace is not peculiar to Christ.

**But contrary to this:** The fullness of grace is attributed to Christ insofar as He is the only-begotten of the Father—this according to John 1:14 (“We have seen Him as the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and of truth”). But being the only-begotten of the Father is peculiar to Christ. Therefore, it is likewise peculiar to Him to be full of grace and of truth.

**I respond:** Fullness of grace can be thought of in two ways: (a) on the part of *the grace itself* and (b) on the part of *the individual who has the grace*.

On the part of *the grace itself*, fullness is said to exist by the fact that the individual attains to the height of grace both with respect to its *essence* and with respect to its *power*, since he has the grace both with the maximal excellence with which it can be had and with the maximal extension to all the effects of grace. And this sort of fullness of grace is peculiar to Christ.

By contrast, on the part of *the subject*, a fullness of grace is said to exist when an individual has grace fully according to *his own condition*, whether (a) with respect to *intensity*, insofar as in him the grace is intensified to the point fixed for him by God—this according to Ephesians 4:7 (“But to every one of us grace is given according to the measure of the giving of Christ—or, again, (b) with respect to *power*, insofar as he has grace at his disposal for all the things that pertain to his state or to his office—this according to what the Apostle said in Ephesians 3:8-9 (“To me, the least all the saints, this grace was given, to illuminate men ...”). And this sort of fullness of grace is not peculiar to Christ, but is communicated to others through Christ.

**Reply to objection 1:** The Blessed Virgin is said to be “full of grace” neither on the part of the grace itself, since she did not have grace in the highest excellence with which it can be had, nor with respect to all the effects of grace; instead, she is said to have been full of grace in comparison with herself, since she had grace that was sufficient for the state for which she had been chosen by God, viz., being the mother of God.

Similarly, Stephen is said to be full of grace because he had grace that was sufficient for his being an outstanding minister of and witness to God, which was the office he had been chosen for.

One should reply with the same line of reasoning for the others as well. Still, among these instances of fullness, one is more full than another, depending upon whether the individual has been preordained by God for a higher or lower state.

**Reply to objection 2:** The Apostle is speaking here of the sort of plenitude of grace that is received on the part of the subject, in relation to what a man has been preordained to by God. This is either (a) something common that all the saints are preordained to or (b) something special that involves the excellence of some individuals. And, accordingly, a certain sort of fullness of grace is common to all the saints, with the result that they have grace that is sufficient for meriting eternal life, which consists in fully enjoying God. And this is the sort of fullness that the Apostle is wishing for the faithful to whom he is writing.

**Reply to objection 3:** The gifts which are common in heaven, viz., *vision*, *comprehension*, and *enjoyment* and others of this sort, have certain gifts which correspond to them in the state of the present life and which are likewise common to those who are holy. However, there are some prerogatives that belong to saints, both in heaven and in this life, which are not had by everyone.

## Article 11

### Is Christ’s grace infinite?

It seems that Christ’s grace is infinite (*gratia Christi sit infinita*):

**Objection 1:** Everything immense is infinite. But Christ’s grace is immense; for John 3:34 says,

“God does not give the Spirit with a fixed measure,” viz., to Christ. Therefore, Christ’s grace is infinite.

**Objection 2:** An infinite effect points to an infinite power, which cannot be found except in an infinite essence. But the effect of Christ’s grace is infinite, since it extends to the salvation of the whole human race; for as 1 John 2:2 says, “He is a propitiation for the sins of the whole world.” Therefore, Christ’s grace is infinite.

**Objection 3:** Every finite thing can, through addition, reach the quantity of any finite thing. Therefore, if Christ’s grace were finite, the grace of some other man could grow to the point of reaching equality with Christ’s grace. But against this Job 28:17 says that neither gold nor crystal will equal it, according to the way in which Gregory explains this verse. Therefore, Christ’s grace is infinite.

**But contrary to this:** Christ’s grace is something created in His soul. But every created thing is finite—this according to Wisdom 11:21 (“He has disposed all things in number, weight, and measure”). Therefore, Christ’s grace is not infinite.

**I respond:** As is clear from what was said above (q. 2, a. 10 and q. 6, a. 6), there are two sorts of grace that can be thought of in Christ:

One is the *grace of union*, which, as was explained in the same places, consists in being united in a person to the Son of God, and this is granted gratuitously to the human nature. And it is clear that this grace is infinite, insofar as the person of the Word is infinite.

The other sort of grace is *habitual grace*, which can be thought of in two ways:

In one way, insofar as the grace is a *certain entity*, and on this score it has to be a finite being, since it exists in the soul of Christ as in a subject and the soul of Christ is a certain creature having a finite capacity. Hence, since the *esse* of the grace does not exceed its own subject, it cannot be infinite.

In a second way, it can be thought of according to *the proper definition of grace*. And on this score, the grace itself can be called infinite because it is not limited (*potest dici infinita eo quod non limitatur*); for it contains whatever can belong to the definition of grace, and that which belongs to the definition of grace is not given to [Christ’s soul] according to any fixed measure. For according to the plan for grace that belongs to God, whose role it is to measure grace, grace is conferred on Christ’s soul as on a sort of universal principle of conferring grace on human nature—this according to Ephesians 1:6 (“He has graced us in His beloved Son”). It is like saying that the sun’s light is infinite—not, to be sure, in its *being*, but according to *the definition of light*, since it has whatever can belong to the definition of light.

**Reply to objection 1:** What is said here, viz., that the Father does not measure out the Spirit to the Son, is explained in one way as being about the gift that God the Father gave the Son from eternity, viz., the divine nature, which is an infinite gift. Hence, a certain Gloss says about the same passage, “... so the Son might be as great as the Father is.”

In a second way, the passage can be referred to the gift that is given to the human nature in order that it might be united to a divine person, and this is an infinite gift.

In a third way, the passage can be referred to habitual grace, insofar as Christ’s grace extends to all things that are graces. Hence, in explaining this passage, Augustine says, “The division of the gifts is a sort of measure; for through the Spirit the word of wisdom is given to one and the word of knowledge to another. But Christ, who does the giving, does not receive a fixed measure.”

**Reply to objection 2:** Christ’s grace has an infinite effect both because of the aforementioned infinity of grace and also because of the oneness of the divine person to whom the soul of Christ is united.

**Reply to objection 3:** A lesser thing can, through augmentation, arrive at the quantity of a greater thing in the case of things that have quantity of the same nature. But the grace of some other man is compared to the grace of Christ in the way that a particular power is compared to a universal power. Hence, just as the power of fire, no matter how much it grows, cannot equal the power of the sun, so the grace of another man, no matter how much it grows, cannot become equal to the grace of Christ.

## Article 12

### Was Christ's grace able to be increased?

It seems that Christ's grace was able to be increased (*gratia Christi potuerit augeri*):

**Objection 1:** Every finite thing is such that an addition can be made to it. But as has been explained (a. 11), Christ's grace was finite. Therefore, it was able to be increased.

**Objection 2:** An increase in grace is brought about by God's power—this according to 2 Corinthians 9:8 (“God is able to make all grace abound in you”). But since God's power is infinite, it is not confined by any limit. Therefore, it seems that Christ's grace was able to be increased.

**Objection 3:** Luke 2:52 says that the boy Jesus “advanced (*proficiebat*) in age, wisdom, and grace before God and men.” Therefore, Christ's grace was able to grow.

**But contrary to this:** John 1:14 says, “We have seen His glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and of truth.” But nothing can be greater, or be understood as greater, than that an individual should be the only-begotten of the Father. Therefore, there cannot be, or even be understood to be, a grace greater than that grace which Christ was full of.

**I respond:** There are two ways in which it happens that a form cannot be increased: (a) on the part of the *subject itself* and (b) on the part of the *form*.

On the part of the *subject*, when the subject reaches the ultimate degree of participation in the relevant form according to its own mode—as, for instance, if one says that [the element] air cannot grow in heat when it reaches the ultimate degree of heat which can be preserved in the nature of air—even if there could be a greater degree of heat in nature, viz., the heat of fire.

On the part of *form*, the possibility of increase is ruled out when a subject reaches the ultimate perfection with which such a form can be had—as, for instance, if we say that the heat of [the element] fire cannot be increased because there cannot be a more complete or perfect degree of heat than that which fire reaches.

Now just as the proper measure of other forms has been determined by divine wisdom, so too with grace—this according to Wisdom 11:21 (“He has disposed all things in number, weight, and measure”). But the measure is fixed beforehand for each form in relation to its end; for instance, there is no greater heaviness than the heaviness of [the element] earth (*sicut non est maior gravitas quam gravitas terrae*), since there cannot be a place lower than the place of earth. Now the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with God. But there cannot be, or understood to be, a greater union of a rational creature to God than the union that exists *in a person or hypostasis* (*non potest esse nec intelligi maior unio creaturae rationalis ad Deum quam quae est in persona*). And this is why the grace of Christ attains to the greatest measure of grace. So, then, it is clear that Christ's grace was not able to be increased *on the part of grace itself*.

But neither was it able to be increased *on the part of the subject itself*. For Christ, insofar as He is a man, was from the first instant of His conception a true and full comprehender [of the divine essence]. Hence, there could not have been an increase of grace in Him, just as there cannot be an increase of grace in the others who are blessed in heaven and whose grace cannot be increased because they are in their end state.

By contrast, the grace belonging to men who are mere wayfarers can be increased both (a) on the part of the *form*, since they do not attain to the highest degree of grace, and (b) on the part of the *subject*, since they have not yet arrived at their end state.

**Reply to objection 1:** If we are talking about *mathematical* quantities (*de quantitibus mathematicae*), then an addition can be made to any finite quantity, since there is nothing on the part of a finite quantity that is incompatible with the addition.

By contrast, if we are talking about a *natural* quantity, then there can be an incompatibility on the part of a form for which a determinate quantity is fixed (*cui debetur determinata quantitas*) along with

other determinate accidents. Hence, in *De Anima 2* the Philosopher says, “The nature of all permanent things is a terminus and fixed limit of magnitude and increase.” And this is why there cannot be an addition to the quantity of the whole of the heavens. Therefore, *a fortiori*, in the forms themselves there is a limit beyond which they cannot go. And this is why it did not have to be the case that an addition could be made to Christ’s grace, even though that grace is finite as far as its essence is concerned.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though God’s power could make something greater and better than Christ’s habitual grace, it nonetheless could not make anything that was ordered toward something greater than a personal union with the only-begotten Son of the Father, and, according to the determination of God’s wisdom, such-and-such a measure of [habitual] grace corresponds sufficiently to that union.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two ways in which an individual can advance in wisdom and grace;

(a) insofar as *the habits themselves of wisdom and grace are augmented*. And on this score Christ did *not* advance in them.

(b) with respect to *the effects*, i.e., insofar as the individual does *works* that are wiser and more virtuous. And it is in this sense that Christ advanced in wisdom and grace, as likewise in age. For in keeping with the advancement of his age, He did more perfect works in order to show that He was a true man, both in matters that had to do with God and in matters that had to do with men.

### Article 13

#### Did Christ’s habitual grace follow upon the union?

It seems that Christ’s habitual grace did not follow upon the union (*gratia habitualis Christi non subsequatur unionem*):

**Objection 1:** The same thing does not follow upon itself. But the habitual grace in question seems to be the same as the grace of union; for in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* Augustine says, “Every man becomes a Christian from the beginning of his faith by the same grace by which that man from his own beginning became the Christ.” The first of these pertains to habitual grace, the second to the grace of union. Therefore, it seems that the habitual grace did not follow upon the union.

**Objection 2:** A disposition precedes its perfection in time or at least in our understanding (*tempore vel saltem intellectu*). But habitual grace seems to be something like a disposition, belonging to the human nature, toward a personal union. Therefore, it seems that habitual grace precedes the union instead of following upon it.

**Objection 3:** What is common is prior to what is proper. But habitual grace is common to Christ and other men, whereas the grace of union is proper to Christ. Therefore, habitual grace is prior, in our understanding, to the union itself. Therefore, it does not follow upon the union.

**But contrary to this:** Isaiah 42:1 says, “Behold my servant, I will uphold him,” and later, “I have given my spirit to him,” and this pertains to the gift of habitual grace. Hence, it follows that the upholding of the human nature in its union with the person precedes habitual grace in Christ.

**I respond:** The union of the human nature to a divine person, which we claimed above (q. 2, a. 10 and q.6, a. 6) to be the very grace of union, preceded habitual grace in Christ—not in the order of time, but in the order of nature and the order of understanding. And this for three reasons:

First, *in accord with the principles of the two sorts of grace*. For the principle of the union is the person of the Son assuming the human nature, and this person is said to have been sent into the world insofar as He assumed the human nature. By contrast, the principle of habitual grace, which is given along with charity, is the Holy Spirit, who is said to be sent insofar as He inhabits a mind through charity. But the Son’s being sent (*missio filii*) is prior to the Holy Spirit’s being sent (*prior est missione spiritus*

*sancti*), just as, in the order of nature, (a) the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and the Father and (b) love proceeds\* from\* wisdom\*.

Second, an argument for this ordering is taken from *the relation of grace to its cause*. For grace is caused in a man by the presence of the divine nature, in the same way that light is caused in the air by the presence of the sun; hence, Ezechiel 43:2 says, “The glory of the God of Israel came in by the eastern way ... and the earth was resplendent with His majesty.” But the presence of God in Christ is understood in terms of the union of the human nature to a divine person. Hence, Christ’s habitual grace is understood as following upon this union, in the way that splendor follows upon the sun.

A third argument for ordering in question can be taken from *the end or goal of grace*. For grace is ordered toward acting well. But actions belong to *supposita* and individuals. Hence, the action—and, consequently, the grace that orders one toward that action—presupposes an acting *hypostasis*. But as is clear from what was said above (q. 4, a. 3), no *hypostasis* is presupposed in the human nature before the union. And so the grace of union, in the order of understanding (*secundum intellectum*), precedes habitual grace.

**Reply to objection 1:** In this passage Augustine is using the name ‘grace’ for God’s gracious will giving benefits gratuitously. And for this reason the same grace by which Christ became a man is the grace by which a man becomes a Christian, since both are effected by the gratuitous will of God without merits.

**Reply to objection 2:** Just as a disposition in the process of generation precedes the perfection toward which it has been disposing those things that are being gradually perfected, so, too, it naturally follows upon a perfection that an individual has already attained; for instance, heat, which was a disposition toward the form of fire, is an effect that flows from the form of fire once the latter already exists. Thus, habitual grace is not understood as preceding the union but instead as following upon it as a sort of natural property. This is why in the *Enchiridion* Augustine says, “Grace is in a certain sense natural to Christ the man.”

**Reply to objection 3:** What is common is prior to what is proper if both of them belong to same genus, but among things that belong to diverse genera, nothing prevents what is proper from being prior to what is common. Now the grace of union is not in the genus of habitual grace, but is instead beyond every genus, just like the divine person Himself. Hence, nothing prevents what is proper in this case from being prior to what is common, since it is not related by addition to what is common, but is instead the principle and origin of what is common.