

QUESTION 18

Christ's Oneness with respect to Willing

Next we have to consider [Christ's] oneness with respect to willing. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is there a divine will in Christ and another will that is human? (2) Is there in Christ's human nature one will of sensuality and another will of reason (*alia voluntas sensualitatis et alia rationis*)? (3) Was there more than one will in Christ on the part of reason? (4) Was there free will (*liberum arbitrium*) in Christ? (5) Was Christ's human will altogether conformed to the divine will in what was willed? (6) Was there any contrariety among the wills in Christ?

Article 1

Were there two wills in Christ, one divine and the other human?

It seems that it is not the case that there were two wills in Christ, one divine and the other human (*in Christo non sint duae voluntates, una divina et alia humana*):

Objection 1: The will is the first mover and commander in each act of willing. But in Christ the first mover and commander was the divine will, since everything human in Christ was moved in accord with the divine will. Therefore, it seems that in Christ there was only one will, viz., the divine will.

Objection 2: An instrument is moved by the will of the mover and not by its own will. But the human nature in Christ was an instrument of His divine nature (*instrumentum divinitatis*). Therefore, the human nature in Christ was moved by the divine will and not by its own will.

Objection 3: Only what belongs to a nature in Christ is multiplied. But the will does not seem to belong to a nature, since things that are natural act by necessity, whereas what is voluntary is not necessary. Therefore, there is only one will in Christ.

Objection 4: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, "To will in a certain way belongs not to nature, but to our understanding (*aliqua velle non est naturae sed nostrae intelligentiae*)," i.e., to our personal understanding. But every act of willing (*omnis voluntas*) is some sort of act of willing (*est aliqua voluntas*), since there is nothing in a genus that is not in one of its species. Therefore, every act of willing belongs to a person. But in Christ there was and is just one person. Therefore, in Christ there is just one will (*tantum una voluntas*).

But contrary to this: In Luke 22:42 our Lord says, "Father, if you will, take this chalice away from me. Yet not my will, but yours be done." Citing this passage in *Ad Gratianam Imperatorem*, Ambrose says, "Just as He had assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow." And in *Super Lucam* he says, "His own will He referred to the man and His Father's will to the divine nature. For the man's will is temporal, the divine will is eternal."

I respond: Some have claimed that in Christ there is just one will, but they seem to have been moved in different ways to make this claim.

For instance, Apollinaris did not posit an intellectual soul in Christ, but claimed that the Word would take the place of the soul or even the place of the intellect. Hence, since, as the Philosopher says in *De Anima* 3, "the will exists in reason," it followed that there would be no human will in Christ, and so just one will would exist in Him.

Similarly, Eutyches and all those who posited a single composite nature in Christ were forced to posit a single will in Him.

Again, Nestorius, who claimed that the union of God and man had been effected only with respect to affection and will, posited one will in Christ.

Afterwards, Macarius, the Patriarch of Antioch, along with Cyrus of Alexandria, Sergius of

Constantinople, along with certain of their followers, posited one will in Christ, even though they posited two natures in Christ united in a person; for, as is clear from the synodal letter of Pope Agathon, they held to the opinion that the human nature in Christ was never moved by its own proper movement, but was moved only insofar it was moved by His divine nature.

And so in the Sixth Synod, which met in Constantinople, it was decided that one must say that there are two wills in Christ, where it reads as follows: “As the prophets taught us of old concerning the Christ, and as He Himself taught us, and as the creed of the holy fathers has handed down to us, we confess that there are two natural wills in Him and two natural operations.”

And this was what had to be said. For as was shown above (q. 4, a. 2 and q. 5 and q. 9, a. 1), it is clear that the Son of God assumed a complete human nature. But as is obvious from what was said in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 1 and q. 80, a. 2), a complete human nature involves the will, which, like the intellect, is a natural power belonging to it. Hence, one must claim that the Son of God assumed a human will in His human nature. But in assuming a human nature the Son of God did not suffer any loss in those things that belong to His divine nature and, as was shown in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 19, a. 1), a will belongs to the divine nature. Hence, one must claim that in Christ there are two wills, one divine and the other human.

Reply to objection 1: Whatever existed in Christ’s human nature was moved at the pleasure of the divine will (*movebatur nutu divinae voluntatis*), and yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will that was proper to the human nature. For the devout wills of other saints are likewise moved in accord with God’s will, which “works in them both to will and to accomplish,” as Philippians 2:13 says. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 105, a. 4 and q. 106, a. 2 and q. 111, a. 2), even though the will cannot be moved interiorly by a creature, it is moved interiorly by God. And so Christ likewise followed the divine will with His human will—this according to Psalm 39:9 (“I have wanted to do your will, my God”). Hence, in *Contra Maximinum* Augustine says, “When the Son said to the Father, ‘Not what I will, but what You will,’ what good does it do for you to add your own words and say, ‘He is showing that His will is truly subject to His Father,’ as if we were denying that a man’s will *should* be subject to the will of God?”

Reply to objection 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent, though in different ways depending on the properties of the instrument’s nature. For instance, an inanimate instrument such as an axe or a saw is moved by the craftsman by a corporeal movement alone. On the other hand, an instrument animated by a sentient soul is moved through its sentient appetite, in the way that a horse is moved by its rider. But an instrument animated by a rational soul is moved through its will, in the way a servant is moved to do something by the command of his master; the servant is in this case like “a living instrument,” as the Philosopher puts it in *Politics* 1. So, then, the human nature in Christ was an instrument of the divine nature in such a way that it was moved by its own will.

Reply to objection 3: The very *power* of the will (*voluntas*) is natural and it follows its nature by necessity. But the *movement* or *act* of the power, which is likewise called *voluntas*, is sometimes natural and necessary, viz., with respect to happiness, but, as is clear from what was said in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 10, aa. 1-2), it sometimes proceeds from the free judgment of reason (*quandoque ex libero arbitrio rationis proveniens*) and is neither necessary nor natural. And yet reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is likewise natural. And so, in addition to the divine will, one must posit a human will in Christ, not only insofar as it is a natural power or insofar as it is natural movement, but also insofar as it is a rational movement.

Reply to objection 4: By saying “to will in a certain way (*aliqua l i t e r v e l l e*),” he is designating a determinate mode of willing. But a determinate mode is posited with respect to the very thing of which it is the mode. Hence, since the will belongs to the nature, “willing in a certain way” likewise itself belongs to the nature not insofar as it is considered absolutely speaking, but insofar as it exists in such-and-such a

hypostasis. Hence, Christ's human will likewise had a certain determinate mode from the fact that it existed in a divine *hypostasis*, so that, namely, it was always being moved at the pleasure of the divine will.

Article 2

Was there in Christ a will of sensuality in addition to a will of reason?

It seems that in Christ there was not a will of sensuality in addition to the will of reason (*in Christo non fuerit aliqua voluntas sensualitatis praeter rationis voluntatem*):

Objection 1: In *De Anima* 3 the Philosopher says, "The will exists in reason, whereas in the sentient appetite (*in sensitivo appetitu*) there exists the irascible and the concupiscible." But 'sensuality' signifies the sentient appetite. Therefore, there was no will of sensuality in Christ.

Objection 2: In *De Trinitate* 12 Augustine says that sensuality is signified by the serpent. But nothing of the serpent (*nihil serpentinum*) exists in Christ; for as Augustine explains in commenting on John 3:14 ("Just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert ..."), He had a likeness to the venomous animal without the venom. Therefore, there was no will of sensuality in Christ.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), the will follows upon the nature. But in Christ there was only one nature besides the divine nature. Therefore, in Christ there was only one human will.

But contrary to this: In *Ad Gratianum Imperatorem* Ambrose says, "Mine is the will that He called His own, since, as a man, He took on my sorrow (*ut homo suscepit tristitiam meam*)." From this we are given to understand that sorrow belongs to the human will in Christ. But as was established in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 23, a. 1 and q. 25, a. 1), sorrow pertains to sensuality. Therefore, it seems that in Christ there was a will of sensuality in addition to the will of reason.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 4, a. 2 and q. 5, a. 9 and q. 9, a. 1), the Son of God assumed a human nature along with everything that pertained to the completeness of that nature. Now animal nature is also included within human nature, in the way that a genus is included within its species. Hence, it must be the case that the Son of God assumed with His human nature those things that pertain to the completeness of animal nature. Among those things is the sentient appetite (*appetitus sensitiva*), which is called sensuality. And so one must claim that there was a sentient appetite (*sensualis appetitus*), i.e., sensuality.

Now notice that, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1, insofar as sensuality, i.e., the sentient appetite, is apt to obey reason, it is called rational by participation. And since, as has been said (obj. 1), the will exists in reason, by parity of reasoning it can be claimed that sensuality is a *will by participation*.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for that which is called a will *in its essence* (*de voluntate essentialiter dicta*) and which exists only in the intellectual part [of the soul]. On the other, that which is called a will *by participation* (*voluntas participative dicta*) can exist in the sentient part [of the soul], insofar as sentient part obeys reason.

Reply to objection 2: Sensuality is signified by the serpent not with respect to the nature of sensuality, which Christ assumed, but with respect to the corruption that belongs to the stimulant [to sin] (*quantum ad corruptionem fomitis*), which did not exist in Christ.

Reply to objection 3: In a case where one thing exists because of another, there seems to be just one thing, in the way that a surface, which is visible through color, is, along with the color, just one visible thing. Similarly, since sensuality is called a will only because it participates in the will of reason, just as a single human nature exists in Christ, so, too, a single human will is posited in Christ.

Article 3

Were there in Christ two wills on the part of reason?

It seems that in Christ there were two wills on the part of reason (*in Christo fuerunt duae voluntates quantum ad rationem*):

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says that there are two wills in a man: a *natural* will, which he calls *thelesis*, and a *rational* will, which he calls *bulesis*. But in His human nature Christ had whatever belongs to a complete human nature (*quidquid ad perfectionem humanae naturae pertinet*). Therefore, both of the aforementioned wills existed in Christ.

Objection 2: Appetitive powers in a man are diversified by the diversity in apprehensive powers, and so the sentient and intellective appetites in a man are diversified by the differences between the *senses* and the *intellect*. But, similarly, as regards a man's apprehension, a difference is posited between *reason* and *intellect*, both of which existed in Christ. Therefore, there were two wills in Christ, one intellectual and the other rational.

Objection 3: Some posit a will of piety (*voluntas pietatis*) in Christ. But this can be posited only in reason. Therefore, there is more than one will in Christ on the part of reason.

But contrary to this: In every ordering there is one first mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore, in one man there is just one will properly speaking, and this is the will of reason (*voluntas rationis*). But Christ is one man. Therefore, in Christ there is just one human will.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1, ad 3), *voluntas* is sometimes taken for the *power* to will and sometimes for the *act* of willing (*voluntas quandoque accipitur pro potentia et quandoque pro actu*).

Therefore, if *voluntas* is taken for the *act* of willing, then it is necessary to posit two wills (*duas voluntates*) in Christ on the part of reason, i.e., two species of acts of willing. For as was explained in the Second Part (*ST* 1-2, q. 8, aa. 2-3), the will (*voluntas*) has to do both (a) with the *end* and also (b) with the *things that are ordered toward the end*—and it moves toward the two in different ways. For the will moves toward the end absolutely speaking and in an unqualified way (*simpliciter et absolute*) as something that is good in its own right (*secundum se bonum*), whereas it moves toward what is ordered toward the end along with a relation (*cum quadam comparatione*), insofar as it itself has goodness because it is ordered toward something else. And so an act of willing (*actus voluntatis*) has one character insofar as it moves toward something, such as health, that is willed in its own right—and this is an act of will that Damascene calls *thelesis*, i.e. simple willing (*simplex voluntas*) and that the masters call *the will as a nature* (*voluntas ut natura*)—whereas an act of willing (*actus voluntatis*) has a different character insofar as it moves toward something, such as the consumption of medicine, that is willed only in relation to something else—and this is an act of will that Damascene calls *bulesis* and that the masters call *the will as reason* (*voluntas ut ratio*).

However, this diversity in the *acts* does not diversify the *power*, since both of the acts attend to a single common character in the object, viz., the good. And so one should reply that if we are speaking of the *power* to will, then in Christ there is just a single human *voluntas* that is called a will in its essence and not by participation. On the other hand, if we are talking about *voluntas* as an *act*, then in Christ *the will as a nature*, which is called *thelesis*, is distinct from *the will as reason*, which is called *bulesis*.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the wills (*voluntates*) in question are not diversified as *powers*, but only according to a difference among *acts*.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 79, a. 8), the intellect and reason are likewise not diverse *powers*.

Reply to objection 3: The ‘will of piety’ seems to be nothing other than the will thought of as a nature, viz., insofar as it shrinks back from another’s evil considered absolutely.

Article 4

Did free will exist in Christ?

It seems that free will did not exist in Christ (*in Christo non fuerit liberum arbitrium*) :

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, “If we want to speak properly, then it is impossible to claim that *gnome*”—that is, strong opinion (*sententia*), thinking (*mens*), or cogitation (*cogitatio*)—“and *proaeresis*”—that is, choosing (*electio*)—“existed in our Lord.” Now we should speak properly especially in those matters that belong to the Faith. Therefore, choice did not exist in Christ, and, as a result, neither did free will, the act of which is to choose.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 3, the Philosopher says that choice (*electio*) is “the desire for what one has taken counsel about beforehand (*appetitus praeconsiliati*).” But counsel does not seem to have existed in Christ, since we do not take counsel about matters concerning which we have certitude, and Christ had certitude about all things. Therefore, choice did not exist in Christ, and so neither did free will.

Objection 3: Free will is open to both sides (*se habet ad utrumque*). But Christ’s will was fixed on the good (*determinata ad bonum*), since, as was explained above (q. 15, aa. 1-2), He was unable to sin. Therefore, free will did not exist in Christ.

But contrary to this: Isaiah 7:15 says, “He will eat butter and honey, so that he will know how to reject evil and to choose the good.” But this is the act of free will. Therefore, free will existed in Christ.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), in Christ there were two sorts of act of will, (a) one by which His will moved toward something as willed in its own right, which involves the character of an end, and (b) the second by which His will moved toward something in relation to something else, which involves the character of being ordered toward an end.

Now in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher explains that *choosing* or *choice* (*electio*) differs from *willing* (*voluntas*) in that willing, strictly speaking (*per se loquendo*), has to do with the end, whereas choosing has to do with things that are ordered toward the end. And so *simple willing* (*simplex voluntas*) is the same as *the will as a nature*, whereas *choosing* is the same as *the will as reason*; and, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 83, a. 3), choosing is the proper act of free will. And so since the will as reason is posited in Christ, one has to posit in Him the act of choosing and, as a result, free will, the act of which, as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 83, a. 3), is to choose.

Reply to objection 1: Damascene is excluding choice from Christ insofar as he is presupposing that the name ‘choice’ implies hesitation. However, hesitation is not necessary for choice, since choice also belongs to God—this according to Ephesians 1:4 (“He chose us within Himself before the foundation of the world”)—and yet there is no hesitation in God.

Now hesitation affects choice insofar as it exists in a nature that lacks knowledge (*in natura ignorante*). And the same should be said about the other things of which mention is made in the passage in question.

Reply to objection 2: Choice (*electio*) presupposes counsel (*consilium*), and yet it does not follow from counsel unless the counsel has already been made determinate by judgment; for as *Ethics* 3 explains, what we judge, after the inquiry of counsel, as something to be done is such that we choose it. And so if something is judged without hesitation and without prior inquiry to be that which should be done, then this suffices for choice. And so it is clear that hesitation, or inquiry, does not belong to choice

necessarity (*non per se pertinet ad electionem*), but instead belongs to it only insofar as it is found in a nature that lacks knowledge.

Reply to objection 3: Even though Christ's will is fixed on the good, it is nonetheless not fixed on *this* or *that* [particular] good. And so what belonged to Christ—just as it belongs to the blessed in heaven—was to choose by means of a free will that has been confirmed in the good.

Article 5

Did the human will in Christ will anything other than what God wills?

It seems that the human will in Christ did not will anything other than what God wills (*voluntas humana in Christo non voluerit aliud quam quod Deus vult*):

Objection 1: Psalm 39:9 says, in the person of Christ, “I have desired to do your will, my God.” But he who wills to do the will of someone, wills what that individual wills. Therefore, it seems that the human will of Christ willed nothing other than what His divine will willed.

Objection 2: Christ's soul had the most perfect charity of all, and this charity even exceeds the comprehension of our knowledge—this according to Ephesians 3:19 (“... the charity of Christ, which surpasses all knowledge”). But it belongs to charity to bring it about that a man wills what God wills; hence, in *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says that one mark of friendship is “to will the same things and choose the same things.” Therefore, the human will in Christ willed nothing other than what His divine will willed.

Objection 3: Christ was a genuine comprehender [of the divine essence]. But the saints, who are comprehenders in heaven, will nothing other than what God wills. Otherwise, they would not be blessed because they would not have whatever they willed. For as Augustine explains in *De Trinitate*, “The blessed individual is one who (a) has whatever he wills and (b) wills nothing evil.” Therefore, Christ willed nothing different by His human will than He willed by His divine will.

But contrary to this: In *Contra Maximinum* Augustine says, “When Christ said, ‘Not what I will, but what you will’, He showed that He was willing something other than what the Father was willing. This could only have been with His human heart, since He was transfiguring our weakness into His human affections and not into His divine affections.”

I respond: As been explained (aa. 2-3), more than one will is posited in Christ with respect to His human nature, viz., (a) the will of *sensuality*, which is called a will by participation, and (b) the *rational* will, whether it is considered (i) in the *mode of a nature* or (ii) in the *mode of reason*.

Again, it was explained above (q. 13, a. 3 and q. 14, a. 1) that, by a sort of dispensation, the Son of God, before His passion, “permitted His flesh to do and to suffer the things that were proper to it” (Damasce). And, similarly, He permitted all the powers of the soul to do what was proper to them.

Now it is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks back from sensible pain and from bodily damage. Similarly, the will as a nature disdains things that are contrary to nature and that are bad in their own right, e.g., death and other things of this sort. However, sometimes the will in the mode of reason is able to choose such things because of their ordering toward an end. For instance, even in the case of a mere man, his sensuality, and even his will absolutely considered, shrinks back from cauterization (*refugit ustionem*), which the will in the mode of reason chooses for the sake of the end of health.

Now the will of God was that Christ should undergo pains and sufferings and death—not that these things were willed by God in their own right, but instead they were willed because they were ordered toward the end of human salvation. Hence, it is clear that, with respect to His will of sensuality and with

respect to His will of reason considered in the mode of a nature, Christ was able to will something different from what God willed. However, by His will in the mode of reason, He was always able to will what God willed. This is clear from the fact that He said, “Not as I will, but as You will.” For by the will of reason He willed that God’s will should be fulfilled, even though He affirms that He wills something else by another of His wills.

Reply to objection 1: Christ willed that the Father’s will should be fulfilled, but did not will this either (a) with His will of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend as far as God’s will, or (b) with His will considered in the mode of a nature, which moves toward objects considered without any qualifications and not in their relation to God’s will.

Reply to objection 2: The conformity of the human will with the divine will has to do with the will of reason, in accord with which the wills of friends likewise agree, viz., insofar as reason considers what is willed in relation to the friend’s will.

Reply to objection 3: Christ was simultaneously a comprehender and a wayfarer, viz., insofar as through His mind He had enjoyment of God, and insofar as He had passible flesh. And so on the part of the passible flesh it was possible for something to happen to Him that was repugnant to His natural will and also to His sentient appetite.

Article 6

Was there contrariety among the wills in Christ?

It seems that there was contrariety among the wills in Christ (*in Christo fuerit contrarietas voluntatum*):

Objection 1: Contrariety among wills has to do with contrariety among their objects, in the way that, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Physics* 6, contrariety among movements has to do with contrariety among their termini. But Christ willed contrary things by His different wills; for instance, with His divine will He willed death, which He shrank back from with His human will. Hence, in *Adversus Apollinarium* Athanasius says, “When Christ said, ‘Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; and yet not my will but yours be done,’ and, again, ‘The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak,’ He exhibited two wills: His *human* will, which shrank back from the passion because of the weakness of His flesh, and His divine will, ready for the passion.” Therefore, in Christ there was contrariety among the wills.

Objection 2: Galatians 5:17 says, “The flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.” Therefore, there is a contrariety among the wills when the spirit desires one thing and the flesh another. But this contrariety existed in Christ. For with His will of charity, which the Holy Spirit conformed in His mind, He willed His passion—this according to Isaiah 53:7 (“He was offered because He willed it”)—whereas He shrank away from the passion with His flesh. Therefore, there was contrariety among His wills.

Objection 3: Luke 22:43 says, “And falling into an agony, He prayed the more earnestly.” But ‘agony’ seems to imply a certain struggle in a soul that is tending toward contraries. Therefore, it seems that there was a contrariety among the wills in Christ.

But contrary to this: In a determination of the Sixth Synod it says, “We confess two natural wills—not contrary wills, in the way asserted by impious heretics, but the human will following the divine will—and without resisting or struggling, but rather subject to His divine and omnipotent will.”

I respond: If diversity exists in diverse things with respect to diverse things, this is not sufficient

for the notion of contrariety, just as it is likewise not sufficient for the notion of a contradiction—for instance, that a man is pleasing or healthy with respect to his hand but not with respect to his foot.

Therefore, in order for there to be contrariety among the wills it is required, first of all, that the diversity among the wills have to do with the same thing. For if the one individual wills to do something for some general reason, and the other individual wills not to do that same thing for some particular reason, then there is no contrariety among the wills at all. For instance, if a king wills to hang a robber for the good of the republic, and one of the robber's relatives wills, because of his personal love for the robber, that he not be hanged, then there will be no contrariety between their wills—unless, perhaps, the relative's willing of his own personal good were to reach the point that he willed to impede the public good in order that his personal good might be preserved, since in that case the conflict between the wills would have to do with the same thing.

Again, second, contrariety among wills has to be with respect to the same act of will. For if a man wills one thing in accord with his intellectual desire and another thing in accord with his sentient desire, then there is no contrariety here—unless, perhaps, the sentient appetite prevails to such an extent that it alters or at least impedes the desire of reason, since in that case something of the sentient desire's contrary movement has already made its way into the very will of reason.

So, then, one should reply that even if the natural will and the will of sensuality in Christ willed something different from what His divine will and His will of reason willed, there was nonetheless no contrariety of wills in that case.

First, because neither His natural will nor His will of sensuality rejected the reasoning in accord with which the divine will and the will of human reason in Christ willed His passion. For the absolute will in Christ willed the salvation of the human race, but the absolute will did not have the role of willing this in relation to anything else. On the other hand, the movement of sensuality was unable to extend this far.

Second, because neither the divine will nor the will of reason in Christ were impeded or held back by the natural will or by the desire of sensuality. Similarly, and conversely, neither did the divine will or the will of reason in Christ shrink back from or slow down the movement of His natural human will or the movement of sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in accord with the divine will and the will of reason, that His natural will and His will of sensuality should be moved in accord with the order of their own natures. Hence, it is clear that there was no conflict or contrariety among the wills.

Reply to objection 1: The very fact that one of Christ's human wills willed something different from His divine will proceeds from the divine will itself, by the good pleasure of which, as Damascene explains, Christ's human nature was moved by its own proper movements.

Reply to objection 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or slowed down by the desires of flesh; but this did not occur in Christ. And so in Christ there was no contrariety between the flesh and the spirit, as there is in us.

Reply to objection 3: In Christ the agony did not have to do with the rational part of the soul in the sense of implying a struggle among wills that proceeded from a difference in lines of reasoning—as, for instance, when someone wills *this* insofar as reason takes one thing into account and wills *the contrary* insofar as reason takes another thing into account. For something like this happens because of the weakness of reason, which is unable to adjudicate which is better absolutely speaking. But this did not occur in the case of Christ, since by His reason he judged that it was better, absolutely speaking, for the divine will regarding the salvation of the human race to be fulfilled through His passion.

Instead, as Damascene explains in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3, Christ's agony had to do with the sentient part of the soul, insofar as it brings about dread* at the prospect of an imminent catastrophe (*secundum quod importat terrorem* infortunii imminentis*).