

## QUESTION 77

### The Accidents that Remain in This Sacrament

Next we have to consider the accidents that remain in this sacrament. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Do the accidents that remain exist without a subject? (2) Is dimensive quantity the subject of the other accidents? (3) Can accidents of this sort affect any extrinsic body? (4) Can accidents of this sort be corrupted? (5) Can anything be generated from these accidents? (6) Can these accidents provide nourishment (*possint nutrire*)? (7) What about the breaking of the consecrated bread? (8) Can anything be mixed with the consecrated wine?

#### Article 1

##### Do the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject?

It seems that the accidents do not remain in this sacrament without a subject (*accidentia non remaneant in hoc sacramento sine subiecto*):

**Objection 1:** Nothing disordered or fallacious should exist in this sacrament of truth. But for accidents to exist without a subject is contrary to the order of things that God has instilled in nature. Again, this seems to involve something fallacious, since the accidents are signs of the nature of the subject. Therefore, the accidents do not exist without a subject in this sacrament.

**Objection 2:** It cannot happen, even miraculously, that the definition of an entity should be denied of it (*ab ea separata*), or that the definition of one entity should agree with something else, e.g., that a man, while remaining a man, should be a non-rational animal. For from this it would follow that contradictories exist simultaneously, since, as is explained in *Metaphysics* 4, “What the name of an entity signifies is the definition.” But it belongs to the definition of *accident* that an accident exists in a subject (*sit in subiecto*), whereas it belongs to the definition of *substance* that a substance subsists in its own right (*per se*) and not in a subject. Therefore, it cannot be brought about miraculously that accidents exist without a subject in this sacrament.

**Objection 3:** An accident is individuated by its subject. Therefore, if the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject, they will be universal accidents and not individual accidents. But this is clearly false, since in that case the accidents would not be able to be sensed, but would instead be able only to be understood (*sic non essent sensibilia sed intelligibilia tantum*).

**Objection 4:** The accidents do not, through the consecration that belongs to this sacrament, acquire any sort of composition. But before the consecration they were not composed either of matter and form or of *esse* and essence (*neque ex quo est et quod est*). Therefore, after the consecration they are likewise not composed in either of these ways. But this is absurd, since in that case they would be more simple than the angels are, even though these accidents are able to be sensed. Therefore, it is not the case that the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject.

**But contrary to this:** In an Easter homily Gregory says, “The sacramental appearances (*species sacramentales*) are the words for those things that were there beforehand, viz., belonging to the bread and wine.” And so since the substance of the bread and wine does not remain, it seems that these appearances exist without a subject.

**I respond:** The accidents of the bread and wine, which are apprehended by the sensory power as remaining in this sacrament after the consecration, do not exist in the substance of the bread and wine as in a subject, since, as was established above (q. 75, a. 2), the substance of the bread and wine does not remain. Nor do these accidents exist in the substantial form [of the bread and wine], which does not remain—and, as is clear from Boethius in *De Trinitate*, even if it did remain, it would not be able to be a

subject. It is likewise clear that accidents of the sort in question cannot exist in the substance of the body and blood of Christ as in a subject, since the substance of a human body cannot in any way be affected by these accidents. Nor, again, is it possible for Christ's body, which is glorified and impassible, to be altered in such a way as to receive qualities of this sort.

Now some claim that the accidents exist in the surrounding air as in a subject. But, again, this cannot be the case:

First of all, because air is not receptive to accidents of the sort in question.

Second, because accidents of this sort do not exist where the air is; at the very least, air is displaced by the movement of these appearances.

Third, because accidents do not pass from one subject into another, in the sense that numerically the same accident that at first existed in one subject might come to exist in another subject. For an accident receives its numerical identity (*numerum*) from its subject, and so it cannot be the case that, while remaining numerically the same accident, it sometimes exists in this subject and sometimes in another subject.

Fourth, since the air is not stripped of its proper accidents, it would simultaneously have its own proper accidents and those of something else. Nor can it be claimed that this is done miraculously by the power of the consecration. For the words of consecration do not signify this, and yet they effect only what is signified by them.

And so it follows that the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject. And this can indeed be effected by God's power. For since an effect depends on its first cause more than on a secondary cause, God, who is the first cause of both the substance and the accident, is able by His infinite power to conserve an accident in *esse* even while taking away the substance that is the proper [natural] cause by which the accident is conserved in *esse*—just as He is likewise able to produce all the other effects of natural causes without those natural causes, in the way that He formed a human body in the womb of the virgin without any male semen.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents a thing from being well-ordered according to a general law of nature, even while its contrary is well-ordered according to a special privilege of grace. This is clear in the case of resuscitating the dead and in the case of giving sight to the blind; for even in human affairs certain things are conceded to some individuals by a special privilege outside of the common law. And so even though it is in accord with the common order of nature that an accident exists in a subject, nonetheless, for a special reason in the order of grace, the accidents exist in this sacrament without a subject—and this because of the arguments introduced above (q. 75, a. 5).

**Reply to objection 2:** Since *being* is not a genus, the very thing that is *esse* (*hoc ipsum quod est esse*) cannot be the essence of either a substance or an accident. Therefore, it is not the case that the definition of a substance is 'a being in its own right without a subject' (*ens per se sine subiecto*), or that the definition of an accident is 'a being in a subject' (*ens in subiecto*). Instead, [the definition of a substance] is that it belongs to the what-ness (*quidditati*) or essence of a substance 'to have *esse* without a subject' (*competit habere esse non in subiecto*), whereas [the definition of an accident] is that it belongs to the what-ness or essence of an accident 'to have *esse* in a subject' (*competit habere esse in subiecto*).

However, in this sacrament the accidents exist without a subject not in virtue of their essence, but because God's power sustains them. And so they do not cease to be accidents, since the definition of an accident is not denied of them, nor does the definition of a substance belong to them.

**Reply to objection 3:** The accidents in question have already acquired their individuality (*esse individuum*) in the substance of the bread and wine. And after that substance has been converted into the body and blood of Christ, the accidents remain, by the power of God, in the individuated *esse* that they previously had. That is why they are both singular entities and able to be sensed.

**Reply to objection 4:** As long as the substance of the bread and wine remained, the accidents in

question did not have *esse* themselves or other accidents; instead, their substance had *esse* of various sorts through them, in the way that snow is white through [the accident of] whiteness. However, after the consecration the accidents that remain have *esse* themselves. Hence, they are composed of *esse* and essence (*composita ex esse et quod est*), as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3 and q. 75, a. 5, ad 4) for the case of angels. And along with this, they have a composition of quantitative parts.

## Article 2

### In this sacrament, is the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine the subject of the other accidents?

It seems that, in this sacrament, the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine is not the subject of the other accidents (*in hoc sacramento quantitas dimensiva panis vel vini non sit aliorum accidentium subiectum*):

**Objection 1:** An accident is not had by an accident; for no form can be a subject, since being a subject is a property of matter. But dimensive quantity is a certain accident. Therefore, the dimensive quantity cannot be the subject of the other accidents.

**Objection 2:** Just as the quantity is individuated by the substance, so too with the other accidents. Therefore, if the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine remains individuated according to the *esse* that it previously had and in which it is conserved, then by parity of reasoning the other accidents likewise remain individuated according to the *esse* that they previously had in the substance. Therefore, it is not the case that they exist in the dimensive quantity as in a subject, since every accident is individuated by its subject.

**Objection 3:** Among the other accidents of the bread and wine that remain, the rare and the dense are grasped by the sensory power. But the rare and the dense cannot exist within a dimensive quantity that exists outside its matter, since, as *Physics* 4 explains, the rare is that which has less matter under large dimensions, whereas the dense is that which has more matter under small dimensions. Therefore, it seems that dimensive quantity cannot be the subject of the accidents that remain in this sacrament.

**Objection 4:** A quantity that is separated from its subject seems to be *mathematical* quantity, which is not the subject of qualities that can be sensed. Therefore, since the accidents that remain in this sacrament can be sensed, it seems that they cannot, in this sacrament, exist as in a subject in the quantity of the bread and wine that remains after the consecration.

**But contrary to this:** Qualities are divisible only incidentally (*non sit divisibiles nisi per accidens*). But as is clear to the senses, the qualities that remain in this sacrament are divided through the division of the dimensive quantity. Therefore, the dimensive quantity is the subject of the accidents that remain in this sacrament.

**I respond:** One must claim that the other accidents that remain in this sacrament exist, as in subject, in the dimensive quantity that remains from the bread and wine:

First, because it is apparent to the sensory power that something having quantity (*aliquod quantum*) is colored there and affected by other accidents as well; nor is the sensory power deceived in such matters.

Second, because the first disposition of matter is dimensive quantity; hence, Plato himself posited the large and the small as the first differences of matter. And since matter is the first subject, it follows that all the other accidents are related to the subject by the mediation of dimensive quantity, in the way that the first subject of color is said to be a surface. It was for this reason, as *Metaphysics* 3 reports, that some have claimed that the dimensions are the substances of bodies. And since, once the subject is removed, the accidents remain with the *esse* that they previously had, it follows that all the accidents

remain founded upon dimensive quantity (*fundata super quantitatem dimensivam*).

Third, because, given that the subject is the principle of individuation for the accidents, what is posited as the subject of certain accidents must in some sense be a principle of individuation. For it is part of the notion of an individual that it cannot exist in many [subjects]. There are two ways in which this happens:

In one way, because the individual is not apt to exist in any [subject] at all, and it is in this way that separated immaterial forms, which subsist in their own right (*subsistens per se*), are likewise individuals in their own right (*per seipsas*).

In a second way, because a substantial or accidental form is indeed apt to exist in some [subject] and not in many subjects, e.g., *this* whiteness, which exists in *this* body.

Therefore, as regards the first point, matter is the principle of individuation for all the forms that inhere [in it]. For since forms of this sort, as far as they themselves are concerned, are apt to exist in something as in a subject, by the very fact that one of them is received in matter, which does not itself exist in another, the form itself existing in this way is no longer able to exist in anything else.

On the other hand, as regards the second point, one must claim that dimensive quantity is a principle of individuation. For an entity is apt to exist in just one thing from the fact that this one thing is undivided in its own right and divided off from all other things. But as *Physics* 1 explains, division comes to a substance by reason of its quantity. And so the dimensive quantity itself is a sort of principle of individuation for forms of the relevant type, viz., insofar as forms that are numerically diverse exist in diverse parts of the matter. Hence, the dimensive quantity has in its own right a sort of individuation, with the result that we can imagine many lines of the same species which differ in position and which fall within the scope of this quantity (*in ratione quantitatis huius*). For it belongs to a dimension to be a quantity having position. And that is why dimensive quantity can be the subject of the other accidents rather than vice versa.

**Reply to objection 1:** An accident cannot in its own right (*per se*) be the subject of another accident, since it does not exist in its own right (*quia non per se est*). But insofar as it exists in another it is said to be the subject of another accident to the extent that one accident is received in the subject by the mediation of another, in the way that a surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence, when it is divinely granted to an accident to exist in its own right, it can also in its own right be the subject of another accident.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, the other accidents, even insofar as they existed in the substance of the bread, were individuated by the mediation of the bread's dimensive quantity. And so the dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents that remain in this sacrament rather than vice versa.

**Reply to objection 3:** The rare and the dense are certain qualities that follow upon bodies from the fact that they have a lot or a little of the matter under the dimensions, just as all other accidents likewise follow from the principles of a substance. And just as, once the substance is subtracted, the other accidents are conserved by God's power, so, too, once the matter is subtracted, the qualities that follow upon the matter, such as the rare and the dense, are conserved by God's power.

**Reply to objection 4:** As *Metaphysics* 7 explains, mathematical quantity abstracts not from intelligible matter but from matter that can be sensed. But matter is said to be able to be sensed from the fact that it is the subject of qualities that can be sensed. And so it is clear that the dimensive quantity that remains in this sacrament without a subject is not mathematical quantity.

### Article 3

#### Can the appearances that remain in this sacrament effect change in anything extrinsic to them?

It seems that the appearances that remain in this sacrament cannot effect change in anything extrinsic to them (*species quae remanent in hoc sacramento, non possint immutare aliquod extrinsecum*):

**Objection 1:** *Metaphysics 7* proves that forms which exist in matter are caused by forms which exist in matter, but not by forms that exist without matter, since a form causes what is similar to itself (*eo quod simile agit sibi simile*). But the sacramental appearances are appearances without matter, since, as is clear from what has been said (a. 1), they remain without a subject. Therefore, they cannot affect exterior matter by inducing a form.

**Objection 2:** When the action of a first cause ceases, the action of its instrument must cease, e.g., when the carpenter is at rest, the hammer does not move. But all accidental forms act instrumentally in the power of the substantial form, which is their principal agent. Therefore, since, as was established above (q. 75, a. 6), the substantial form of the bread and wine does not remain in this sacrament, it seems that the remaining accidental forms cannot act to effect change in any exterior matter.

**Objection 3:** Nothing acts beyond its species, since an effect cannot be more powerful than its cause. But all the sacramental appearances are accidents. Therefore, they cannot effect any change in exterior matter, at the very least not a change directed toward a substantial form.

**But contrary to this:** If the appearances were unable to effect change in exterior bodies, they would not be able to be sensed, since, as *De Anima 2* explains, something is sensed by the fact that the sensory power is altered by the thing that is sensed.

**I respond:** Since each thing acts insofar as it is an actual entity, it follows that each thing is related to its acting (*se habet ad agere*) in the way that it is related to its *esse* (*se habet ad esse*). Therefore, since according to what was said above (a. 1, ad 3), it is granted to the sacramental appearances by God's power that they should remain in the *esse* which they had when the substance of the bread and wine existed, it follows that they likewise remain in their acting (*in suo agere*). And so every action that they were capable of doing when the substance of the bread and wine existed, they are likewise capable of doing after the bread and wine have passed into the body and blood of Christ. Hence, there is no doubt that they are able to effect changes in exterior bodies.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though the sacramental appearances exist without matter, they nonetheless retain the same *esse* which they previously had in matter. And so in accord with their *esse* they are assimilated to forms that exist in matter.

**Reply to objection 2:** The action of an accidental form depends on the action of its substantial form in the way that the *esse* of the accident depends on the *esse* of its substance. And so just as is granted to the sacramental appearances by God's power that they should be able to *exist* in the absence of the substance, so it is granted to them that they should be able to *act* in the absence of the substantial form—and this by the power of God, on whom, as on a first agent, every action of both the substantial form and the accidental form depends.

**Reply to objection 3:** A change that is directed toward a substantial form is not effected immediately by a substantial form, but is instead effected by a substantial form through the mediation of active and passive qualities that act in the power of the substantial form. This instrumental power is conserved in the sacramental appearances by God's power, just as it had been previously. And so the sacramental appearances can causally contribute to a substantial form instrumentally, in the manner in which a thing can act beyond its own species—not as if by its own power, but by the power of the principal agent.

#### Article 4

##### Can the sacramental appearances be corrupted?

It seems that the sacramental appearances cannot be corrupted (*species sacramentales corrumpi non possunt*):

**Objection 1:** Corruption occurs through the separation of a form from its matter. But as is clear from what has been said above (q. 75, aa. 4 and 8), the matter of the bread does not remain in this sacrament. Therefore, appearances of the sort in question cannot be corrupted.

**Objection 2:** No form is corrupted except incidentally (*non nisi per accidens*), when its subject is corrupted; that is why forms that subsist in their own right are incorruptible, as is clear in the case of spiritual substances. But the sacramental appearances are forms without a subject. Therefore, they cannot be corrupted.

**Objection 3:** If the appearances are corrupted, they will be corrupted either *naturally* or *miraculously*. But not *naturally*, because it is impossible in this case to designate any subject of the corruption that remains after the corruption is terminated. Similarly, not *miraculously*, because the miracles that are present in this sacrament are effected by the power of the consecration, through which the sacramental appearances are conserved, and the cause of their conservation cannot be the same as the cause of their corruption. Therefore, there is no way in which the sacramental appearances can be corrupted.

**But contrary to this:** It is apprehended by the sensory power that consecrated hosts putrefy and are corrupted.

**I respond:** Corruption is a movement from *esse* to non-*esse* (*motus ex esse in non esse*). Now it was explained above (a. 3) that the sacramental appearances retain the same *esse* that they previously had when the substance of the bread and wine existed. And so just as the *esse* of these accidents was able to be corrupted when the substance of the bread and wine existed, so, too, it can be corrupted when that substance is missing.

Now there are two ways in which accidents of this sort could have previously (*primo*) been corrupted: (a) in their own right (*per se*) and (b) incidentally (*per accidens*):

*In their own right*, e.g., through the alteration of the qualities, and through an increase or decrease in quantity—not, to be sure, in the manner of growth or diminution, which is found only in living bodies and not bodies like the substance of the bread and wine, but through addition or division. For as *Metaphysics 3* explains, a single dimension is corrupted by division and becomes two, whereas, conversely, through addition one dimension comes to be from two.

And it is clear that accidents of the sort in question can be corrupted in this way after the consecration, since the dimensive quantity that remains after the consecration can itself undergo division and addition, and since, as has been explained (a. 2), the dimensive quantity is the subject of the qualities that can be sensed, it can also be the subject of their being altered, e.g., if the color or taste of bread or wine is altered.

In the second way, the accidents can be corrupted *incidentally* through the corruption of their subject.

And they can likewise be corrupted in this way after the consecration. For even though the subject does not remain, there nonetheless does remain the *esse* which the accidents of this sort had in their subject and which is indeed proper and conformed to the subject. And so *esse* of this sort can be corrupted by a contrary agent, just as bread and wine would be corrupted, since bread and wine would likewise not be corrupted except through a preceding alteration of the accidents.

However, a distinction must be drawn between the two types of corruption that have been talked

about:

(a) For after Christ's body and blood succeed the substance of the bread and wine in this sacrament, if on the part of the accidents there is a change of a sort that would not have been sufficient for the corruption of the bread and wine, then Christ's body and blood do not because of such a change cease to exist under this sacrament, whether it be (a) a change on the part of a quality, e.g., when the color or taste of bread and wine is slightly altered, or (b) a change on the part of the quantity, as when the bread or wine is divided into parts which are such that the nature of bread and wine would have still been preserved in them.

(b) If, by contrast, the change is so great that the substance of the bread or wine would have been corrupted, then Christ's body and blood do not remain under this sacrament. And this is both (a) on the part of the qualities, as when the color and taste and other qualities of bread and wine are changed so much as not to be compatible with the nature of bread or of wine, and, again, (b) on the part of the quantity, e.g., if the bread were pulverized or the wine were divided into extremely small parts (*in minimas partes*), so that the appearances of bread and wine would no longer remain.

**Reply to objection 1:** Since it belongs to corruption in its own right that the *esse* of the entity is removed insofar as the *esse* of its form exists in its matter, it follows that through corruption a form is separated from its matter.

However, if an *esse* of this sort did not exist in matter and yet was similar to an *esse* that does exist in matter, it would be able to be removed through corruption even though its matter did not exist. And as is clear from what has been said, this is what happens in the case of this sacrament.

**Reply to objection 2:** Even though the sacramental appearances are forms that do not exist in matter, they nonetheless have the *esse* which they previously had in the matter.

**Reply to objection 3:** This corruption of the appearances is natural and not miraculous, though the natural corruption presupposes the miracle that is effected in the consecration, viz., that these sacramental appearances retain, without a subject, the *esse* that they previously had in a subject. This is similar to the way in which a blind man who has been miraculously granted his sight now sees naturally.

## Article 5

### Can anything be generated from the sacramental appearances?

It seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental appearances (*ex speciebus sacramentalibus nihil possit generari*):

**Objection 1:** Everything that is generated is generated from some matter; for nothing is generated from nothing (*ex nihilo nihil generatur*), even though something can be made *ex nihilo* through an act of creating. But the only matter underlying the sacramental appearances is the matter of Christ's body, which is incorruptible. Therefore, it seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental species.

**Objection 2:** Those things that do not belong to the same genus (*quae non unius generis*) cannot be generated from one another; for instance, a line is not made from whiteness. But an accident and a substance differ in genus. Therefore, since the sacramental appearances are accidents, it seems that no substance can be generated from them.

**Objection 3:** If a corporeal substance is generated from them, it will not exist without an accident. Therefore, if some corporeal substance is generated from the sacramental appearances, then a substance and an accident would be generated from an accident, i.e., two from one—which is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible for any corporeal substance to be generated from the sacramental appearances.

**But contrary to this:** It is clear to the senses that something is generated from the sacramental

appearances—either ashes if they are burned, or worms if they putrefy, or dust if they are ground down.

**I respond:** Since, as *De Generatione* 1 puts it, “The corruption of one thing is the generation of another,” it must be the case that something is generated from the sacramental appearances, and this because, as has been explained (a. 4), they may be corrupted. For they are not corrupted in such a way as to disappear altogether, as if they were reduced to nothingness; instead, it is clear that something that can be sensed succeeds them.

However, it is difficult to see *how* something can be generated from them:

For it is clear that nothing is generated from Christ’s body and blood, which truly exist there, because they are incorruptible. On the other hand, if the substance of the bread or wine remained in this sacrament, or at least their matter, then, as some have claimed, it would be easy to specify that the thing which can be sensed and which succeeds [the sacramental appearances] is generated from them. But as was proved above (q. 75, aa. 2 and 4 and 8), the premise is false.

And that is why some have claimed that the things that are generated are caused not by the sacramental appearances but by the surrounding air. But it is clear in many ways that this is impossible:

First of all, because a thing is generated from what previously appeared to be altered and corrupted. But no alteration or corruption previously appeared in the surrounding air. Hence, it is not the case that worms or ashes are generated from it.

Second, because the nature of air is not such that those sorts of things are generated from it through those sorts of alterations.

Third, because consecrated hosts can burn or putrefy in large quantities, and it would not be possible for such a large earthen body to be generated from the air, unless a great and, indeed, very noticeable condensation of the air took place.

Fourth, this very same thing can occur with surrounding bodies which are solid, e.g., iron or rocks, and which remain whole after the generation of the things mentioned above.

Hence, the position in question cannot hold up, since things that are clear to the senses are opposed to it.

And so others have claimed that the substance of the bread and wine returns with the very corruption of the appearances and so the ashes or worms and other things of this sort are generated from the returning substance of the bread and wine. But this position does not seem to be possible:

First of all, because if, as was established above (q. 75, aa. 2 and 4), the substance of the bread and wine has been converted into Christ’s body and blood, the substance of the bread and wine can return only if Christ’s body and blood are converted back into the substance of the bread and wine, which is impossible; similarly, if air has been converted into fire, the air cannot return unless the fire is converted back into the air. On the other hand, if the substance of the bread and wine has been annihilated, then it cannot return again, since what has fallen into nothingness does not return as numerically the same thing—unless, perhaps, one claims that the previous substance returns because God creates the new substance *de novo* in place of the first one.

It seems to be impossible, second, because one cannot designate the time at which the substance of the bread returns. For it is clear from what has been said (a. 4 and q. 76, a. 6, ad 3) that Christ’s body and blood, which do not exist simultaneously with the substance of the bread and wine in this sacrament, remain for as long as the appearances of bread and wine remain—this according to what was established above (q. 75, a. 2). Hence, the substance of the bread and wine cannot return as long as the sacramental appearances remain. Similarly, they cannot return even if the sacramental appearances do cease to exist, because in that case the substance of the bread and wine would exist without its proper accidents—which is impossible. Unless perhaps one were to claim that at the last instant of the corruption of the species there would return not, to be sure, the *substance* of the bread and wine—since it is at that same instant at which the substances generated from the appearances would first exist—but the *matter* of the bread and

wine, which, properly speaking, would be said to be created *de novo*, rather than to return. And, accordingly, the position under discussion could be sustained.

However, since it does not seem reasonable to claim that something happens miraculously in this sacrament other than because of the consecration itself, by which it is not the case either that the matter is created or that it returns, it seems better to reply that in the consecration itself it is miraculously granted to the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine to be the first subject of the subsequent forms. Now this is proper to the matter, and so, as a result, what is given to the dimensive quantity is everything the belongs to the matter. And so whatever could be generated from the matter of the bread if it existed, all of that can be generated from the aforementioned dimensive quantity of the bread or wine—not by a new miracle, but by virtue of the miracle that has previously been effected.

**Reply to objection 1:** Even though there is no matter there from which something might be generated, nevertheless, as has been explained, the dimensive quantity takes the place of the matter.

**Reply to objection 2:** These sacramental appearances are, to be sure, accidents, but, as has been explained, they have the action and the power of a substance.

**Reply to objection 3:** The dimensive quantity of the bread and wine retains its proper nature and miraculously receives the property of a substance as well. And so it is able to pass into both of them, i.e., into a substance and into a dimension.

## Article 6

### Can the sacramental appearances give nourishment?

It seems that the sacramental appearances cannot give nourishment (*species sacramentales non possint nutrire*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Sacramentis* Ambrose says, “This is not a bread that enters our body, but the bread of eternal life, which sustains the substance of our soul.” But everything that gives nutrition enters into the body. Therefore, this bread does not give nourishment. And the same line of reasoning applies to the wine.

**Objection 2:** *De Generatione* says, “We are nourished by the same things by which we exist.” But the sacramental appearances are accidents, which a man is not composed of, since an accident is not a part of a substance. Therefore, it seems that the sacramental appearances cannot give nourishment.

**Objection 3:** In *De Anima 2* the Philosophers says, “Food nourishes insofar as it is a substance, whereas it gives growth insofar as it has a certain quantity.” But the sacramental appearances are not a substance. Therefore, they cannot give nourishment.

**But contrary to this:** In 1 Corinthians 11:21 the Apostle, in talking about this sacrament, says, “One, indeed, is hungry, and another is drunk”—and here the Gloss notes that “he alludes to those who after the celebration of the sacred mystery, and after the consecration of the bread and wine, claimed their oblations, and not sharing them with others, took the whole for themselves, even in order to become intoxicated thereby.” But this could not happen if the sacramental appearances did not give nourishment. Therefore, the sacramental appearances give nourishment.

**I respond:** Given that the preceding question has now been resolved, the present question poses no difficulty. For, as *De Anima 2* explains, food gives nourishment by the fact that it is converted into the substance of the thing that is being nourished. But it has been explained (a. 5) that the sacramental appearances can be converted into any substance that is generated from them. And for the same reason that the sacramental appearances can be converted into ashes or worms, they can likewise be converted into a human body. And that is why it is clear that the sacramental appearances give nourishment.

Now it is clear to the sensory power that something claimed by certain individuals is false, viz., that the sacramental appearances do not truly give nourishment in the sense of being converted into a human body, but that instead they revive or strengthen the body by affecting the senses in the way that a man is strengthened by the smell of food or inebriated by the smell of wine. For this sort of revival is not sufficient for very long in the case of a man whose body, because of its continuous deprivation, needs restoration. And yet a man could be sustained for quite a long time if he consumed hosts and wine in great quantities.

Similarly, what some others claim cannot stand, either, viz., that the sacramental appearances give nourishment through the substantial form of bread and wine, which remain—both because (a), as was established above (q. 75, a. 6), the substantial form of bread and wine does not remain, and also because (b) giving nourishment is not the act of a form, but belongs instead to the matter, which takes on the form of what is nourished as the form of the nourishment recedes. That is why *De Anima* 2 says that the nourishment is dissimilar in the beginning, but similar in the end.

**Reply to objection 1:** Once the consecration has taken place, there are two ways in which ‘bread’ can be predicated in the case of this sacrament:

(a) in one way, for the appearances of bread themselves, which retain the name of their previous substance, as Gregory explains in an Easter homily;

(b) in a second way, what can be called ‘bread’ is Christ’s body itself, which is the mystical bread “come down from heaven” (John 6:50).

Thus, when Ambrose says that “this is not a bread that enters our body,” he is taking ‘bread’ in the second way, viz., because the body of Christ is not converted into a man’s body but instead refreshes his mind, and he is not speaking of bread explained in the first way.

**Reply to objection 2:** As has been explained, even if the sacramental appearances are not things out of which a human body is composed, they are nonetheless converted into such things.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained (a. 3, ad 3 and a. 2), even though the sacramental appearances are not substances, they nonetheless have the power of a substance.

## Article 7

### Are the sacramental appearances [of the consecrated bread] broken in this sacrament?

It seems that the sacramental appearances [of the consecrated bread] are not broken in this sacrament (*species sacramentales non frangantur in hoc sacramento*):

**Objection 1:** In *Meteorologia* 4 the Philosopher explains that bodies are said to be breakable because of the determinate disposition of their pores. But this cannot be attributed to the sacramental appearances. Therefore, the sacramental appearances cannot be broken.

**Objection 2:** Breaking is followed by a sound. But the sacramental appearances cannot make a sound (*sunt not sonabiles*), because in *De Anima* 2 the Philosopher explains that what is capable of making a sound is a solid body that has a smooth surface. Therefore, the sacramental appearances are not broken.

**Objection 3:** Breaking and chewing seem to apply to the same thing. But the real body of Christ is what is being chewed—this according to John 6:65 and 67 (“Whoever eats my flesh and drinks my blood”). Therefore, it is Christ’s body which is broken and chewed. Hence, Berengarius’s confession itself says, “I concur with the Holy Catholic Church, and I profess with my heart and with my mouth, that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are, after the consecration, the true body and blood of Christ, and are in truth handled and broken by the hands of the priests, and in truth broken and crushed by the

teeth of the faithful.” Therefore, the breaking should not be attributed to the sacramental appearances.

**But contrary to this:** Breaking is effected by the division of an entity with quantity (*per divisionem quanti*). But no entity with quantity is divided here except the sacramental appearances. For [what is divided] is neither Christ’s body, which is incorruptible, nor the substance of the bread, which does not remain. Therefore, it is the sacramental appearances that are broken.

**I respond:** Among the ancients there were many opinions about this point:

For some claimed that in this sacrament there was no breaking in reality, but only in the eyes of those looking on. However, this claim cannot stand. For in this sacrament of truth the sensory power is not deceived about the things that it has the role of judging. And among those things is the breaking through which the many are derived from the one, and these many are, as is clear from *De Anima*, common sensibles.

Hence, others claimed that there was a real breaking there without any existing subject\*. But this likewise contradicts the sensory power. For what is apparent in this sacrament is an entity with quantity (*quantum*)—at first existing as one and afterwards partitioned into many—which has to be the subject of the breaking.

Now it cannot be claimed that the real body of Christ is itself broken. First of all, because it is incorruptible and impassible. Second, because, as was established above (q, 76, a. 3), it exists as whole under each part—something that is contrary to the notion of a thing that is broken.

Hence, it follows that the breaking exists, as in a subject, in the bread’s dimensive quantity, along with the other accidents. And just as the sacramental appearances are the sacrament of Christ’s true body, so the breaking of these appearances is the sacrament of our Lord’s passion, which itself existed in Christ’s true body.

**Reply to objection 1:** Just as, in the way explained above (a. 2, ad 2), the rare and the dense remain in the sacramental appearances, so the porousness remains there as well and, as a result, breakability.

**Reply to objection 2:** Hardness follows upon density. And so from the fact that density remains in the sacramental appearances, it follows that hardness remains there and, as a result, the ability to give off a sound.

**Reply to objection 3:** That which is eaten in its proper appearance is itself broken and chewed in its own appearance. But Christ’s body is eaten not in its proper appearance, but in its sacramental appearance. Hence, in commenting on John 6:64 (“... the flesh does not profit”), Augustine says, “This should be understood to apply to those who were understanding Him carnally. Indeed, they understood ‘flesh’ in the way in which a dead body is cut up or sold in a meat market.” And so the body of Christ is not itself broken except under its sacramental appearance. And it is in this way that Berengarius’s profession should be understood, viz., that the breaking and crushing of the teeth relates to the sacramental appearance, under which Christ’s body truly exists.

## Article 8

### Can any other liquid be mixed with the consecrated wine?

It seems that no other liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine (*vino consecrato non possit aliquis liquor misceri*):

**Objection 1:** Everything that is mixed with something receives that thing’s condition (*recipit qualitatem ipsius*). But no liquid can receive the condition of the sacramental appearances, since, as has been explained (a. 1), those accidents exist without a subject. Therefore, it seems that no liquid can be mixed with the sacramental appearances of the wine.

**Objection 2:** If any liquid is mixed with those appearances, something that is one must be made from [the two of] them. But nothing that is one can be made from (a) the liquid, which is a substance, and the sacramental appearances, which are accidents, or from (b) the liquid and Christ's blood, which, by reason of its incorruptibility, admits of neither an increase nor a decrease. Therefore, no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine.

**Objection 3:** If any liquid were mixed with the consecrated wine, it seems that it would likewise become consecrated, just as water that is mixed with holy water becomes likewise holy. But the consecrated wine is truly the blood of Christ. Therefore, the liquid that is mixed in would likewise be the blood of Christ. And so something would become the blood of Christ otherwise than by being consecrated—which is absurd. Therefore, no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine.

**Objection 4:** As *De Generatione* 1 explains, if one of the two things is totally corrupted, there will be no mixture. But with the mixing in of any liquid, it seems that the sacramental appearances are corrupted, with the result that Christ's blood ceases to exist under them—both because (a) the large and the small are differences of quantity and diversify it, in the way that white and black diversify color, and also because (b) since the liquid that is mixed in has no obstacle, it seems to be diffused everywhere throughout the whole, and so Christ's blood, which does not exist there with any other substance, ceases to exist there. Therefore, no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine.

**But contrary to this:** It is clear to the senses that another liquid can be mixed with the wine after the consecration, just like before the consecration.

**I respond:** The truth regarding this question is clear from what has gone before. For it has been explained (a. 3 and a. 5, ad 2) that just as the appearances that remain in this sacrament acquire from the consecration a substance's mode of existing, so, too, they acquire a substance's mode of acting and being acted upon, with the result that they can do and undergo what a substance would do and undergo if it were present there.

Now it is clear that if the substance of the wine existed there, some liquid could be thoroughly mixed with it (*liquor aliquis posset ei permisceri*). Yet the effect of this mixing would be different depending on the form of the liquid and depending on its quantity (*et secundum formam liquoris et secundum quantitatem*):

For instance, if the liquid were mixed in with such great quantity that it would be diffused throughout all of the wine, then the whole would be a mixture (*totum fieret permixtum*). But what is blended together from two things is neither of the things being mixed, but instead the two of them pass into some third thing composed of them. Hence, it would follow that the previously existing wine would not remain if the liquid blended with it were of some other species. On the other hand, if the adjoined liquid were of the same species—e.g., if it were wine that was being thoroughly mixed with the wine—then it would remain the same in species, but it would not remain numerically the same wine. A diversity of accidents makes this clear, e.g. if the one wine is white and the other red.

By contrast, if the adjoined liquid were of so small a quantity that it could not be thoroughly diffused throughout the whole, only some part of the wine, and not the whole, would be a mixture. To be sure, it would not remain numerically the same entity, and this because of the admixture of extraneous matter. However, it would still remain the same in species—not only if the small amount of liquid were of the same species, but even if it were of a different species. For as is explained in *De Generatione* 1, a drop of water mixed with a lot of wine passes into the species of the wine.

Now it is clear from what was said above (a. 4 and q. 76, a. 6, ad 3) that Christ's body and blood remain in this sacrament as long as the appearances remain numerically the same, since it is *this* bread and *this* wine that is consecrated. Hence, if there is a large admixture of any sort of liquid that pervades the whole of the consecrated wine and becomes a mixture with it, the appearances will become numerically different and Christ's blood will not remain there. On the other hand, if the added liquid is so small in

quantity that it cannot be diffused throughout the whole, then as regards that small part of the appearances, Christ's blood will cease to exist under that part of the consecrated wine, but it will nonetheless remain under the rest of the appearances.

**Reply to objection 1:** In a certain decretal Innocent III says, "The accidents themselves appear to affect the wine that is added, because if water is added, it takes on the scent of the wine. Therefore, it is possible for the accidents to change the subject, just as the subject can change the accidents. For nature yields to the miraculous, and power operates outside of the ordinary." However, this should be understood to mean not that numerically the same accident that existed in the wine before the consecration comes to exist in the added wine afterwards, but instead that such a change comes about through an action. For in accord with what has been said above, the remaining accidents of the wine retain the action of a substance and so affect the added liquid by altering it.

**Reply to objection 2:** There is no way that a liquid added to the consecrated wine is mixed with the substance of Christ's blood. However, it *is* mixed with the sacramental appearances and yet, once the mixture has been made, the aforementioned appearances are corrupted, either totally or in part—and this in accord with the way in which it was explained above that something can be generated from those appearances.

Now if the appearances are corrupted totally, then no question any longer remains, since the whole will now be uniform. On the other hand, if the appearances are corrupted in part, there will one dimension, given the continuity of the quantity, but not one dimension as regards the manner of existing; for one part of the whole exists without a subject, whereas the other part will exist in a subject. In the same way, if a body is made up of two metals, there will be a single body as regards the notion of quantity, but not a single body as regards the species of the nature.

**Reply to objection 3:** In the decretal cited above, Innocent III says, "If, after the consecration of the chalice, other wine is put into the chalice, that wine does not become the blood, nor is it mixed with the blood; instead, it is mixed with the accidents of the previous wine, and it is diffused throughout the body which lies hidden under them, yet without wetting what surrounds it." This should be understood to be talking about a case in which there is not such a great admixture of extraneous liquid that Christ's blood ceases to exist in the whole. For in such a case it is said to be surrounded not because it is touching Christ's blood in its own proper dimensions, but with respect to the sacramental dimensions under which it is contained.

Nor is there any similarity with holy water, since that blessing does not make for any change with respect to the substance of the water, in the way that the consecration of the wine does [make for a change with respect to the substance of the wine].

**Reply to objection 4:** Some have claimed that no matter how small a mixing of an extraneous liquid is made, the substance of Christ's blood ceases to exist under the whole—and this because of the argument put forth in the objection.

But this argument is not cogent. For the large and the small diversify dimensive quantity not with respect to its *essence*, but with respect to the determination of its *size*. Similarly, the added liquid can be small to such the extent that what keeps it from being diffused throughout the whole is its smallness and not just the dimensions, which, even though they exist there without a subject, nonetheless pose an obstacle to another liquid, just as a substance would if a substance existed there—this in keeping with those things that have been said above.